Academic Edi o : Sebas ian
Sunday G è e
Recei ed: 7 Janua y 2025
Re ised: 30 Janua y 2025
Accep ed: 1 Feb ua y 2025
Published: 4 Feb ua y 2025
Ci a ion: Gómez-Alonso, Modes o.
2025. Newman and Wi gens ein on
he Will o Belie e: Quasi-Fideism and
he G ound o Religious Ce ain y.
Religions 16: 174. h ps://doi.o g/
10.3390/ el16020174
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A icle
Newman and Wi gens ein on he Will o Belie e: Quasi-Fideism
and he G ound o Religious Ce ain y
Modes o Gómez-Alonso
Depa men o Me aphysics and Cu en T ends in Philosophy, E hics and Poli ical Philosophy, Uni e si y o
Se ille, 41004 Se illa, Spain; [email p o ec ed]
Abs ac : In his a icle, I a gue ha Newman’s emphasis on a ges al ic model o easoning
and he ole played by he imagina ion in in o mal easoning is a ui ul s a ing poin
o an explo a ion o con e gence be ween he G amma o Assen and Wi gens ein’s On
Ce ain y. I claim ha Wi gens ein, like Newman, challenges bo h he claim ha jus i ica ion
mus be neu al and he p ejudice acco ding o which any o m o pe suasion ha is no
demons a i e is i a ional o a a ional. A gumen s a e mainly ocused on he pic u e
o Newman’s epis emology p o ided la ely by Duncan P i cha d. I a gue ha P i cha d
mis ep esen s Newman’s concep ion o he illa i e sense so as o asc ibe o him he hesis
ha eligious belie is e iden ially g ounded in a b oad sense o e idence. This c ea es
a alse dicho omy be ween he a a ional iew o eligious p inciples and he accoun o
eligious ce ain ies as epis emically g ounded. I sugges ha Newman’s e e ence o bo h
li ing pe suasion and he ole played by he will in eligious con ic ion is pa o his
a emp o expose his alse dicho omy.
Keywo ds: Newman; P i cha d; Wi gens ein; assen ; e hics o belie ; hinge epis emology;
illa i e sense; in e ence; pa adox; eligious con ic ion
1. In oduc ion
One way o app oaching Wi gens ein’s hough in On Ce ain y is sugges ed by he
discussions ini ia ed by Newman’s an i-e iden ialism and his ejec ion o he Lockean
hesis ha assen , in o de o be a ional, mus be p opo ional o e idence. Howe e , my
compa ison be ween hese wo philosophe s should be p e aced by some wo ds o cau ion.
Fi s , Newman is commonly placed alongside Desca es and Kie kegaa d as a s ong
oli ionalis who p oposed a ee, uncons ained ac o he will as a way o b idge he gap
be ween condi ional in e ence and uncondi ional belie (Pojman 1978, p. 2). I will claim
ha his iew h ows a alse ligh on Newman’s hough as a whole.
Secondly, e e ence o Wi gens ein’s las no es is pa icula ly p oblema ic. This is
due, a leas , o wo ac o s: (a) he i s is he ac ha , beyond he claim ha hinges a e
no disco e ed as me aphysical ma e s o ac , consensus is lacking, bo h ega ding he
epis emic s anding o hinges (i any) and whe he genuine hinge ce ain ies should be
dis inguished om o he kinds o e e yday ce ain ies; and (b) he second is he di icul y o
dissocia ing Wi gens ein’s concep ion o eligious belie ( iewed as a pa icula applica ion
o hinge epis emology) om ideis o quasi- ideis posi ions, acco ding o which ai h
is in no way ancho ed in he li ing, i s -pe sonal p ocess ha p ecedes i . Since I do
no hink ha Wi gens ein’s posi ion excludes he possibili y o a so o e ospec i e,
engaged jus i ica ion o eligious belie (one which is no based on ‘neu al’ e idence), I
will no p o ide suppo o he absolu e incommesu abili y o eligious amewo ks (and
Religions 2025,16, 174 h ps://doi.o g/10.3390/ el16020174
Religions 2025,16, 174 2 o 20
hus, o a pic u e o eligious commi men as in ulne able o c i icism) ha ideism and
quasi- ideism en ail.
Finally, hough he ques ion o eligious belie and he main opics o hinge epis emol-
ogy a e no en i ely sepa able, I will pay mo e a en ion in his pape o he la e . This
is because, among o he easons, Newman’s me hod indica es ha an unde s anding o
eligious belie is dependen on an unde s anding o belie and ce ain y in gene al.
Howe e , he main s imulus o his a icle comes om he pic u e o Newman’s
epis emology p o ided la ely by Duncan P i cha d, one ha aims o emphasize he di e -
gences be ween Wi gens ein’s hough and Newman’s alleged p o o- i ue epis emology
(P i cha d o hcoming). I is no only he case ha P i cha d has come o ejec his ea ly
iew ha Wi gens ein’s dealing wi h adical scep icism is a way o wo king h ough he
implica ions o Newman’s ideas (P i cha d 2015, p. 425). I is also ha P i cha d, in his new
app oach, mis ep esen s Newman’s concep ion o he illa i e sense so as o asc ibe o him
he hesis ha belie is e iden ially g ounded all he way down, e en i , in his con ex , e i-
dence is unde s ood in a b oad sense ha includes, agains he Lockean aus e e concep ion
o e idence, ex ao dina y o peculia kinds o e idence o a pe sonal and subjec i e na u e.
P i cha d’s shi om a quasi- ideis eading o Newman, wi h emphasis on discon inu-
i y, o a new app oach ha a ge s Newman’s emphasis on con inui y is, in my iew, highly
sugges i e. Wha i sugges s is an implici , backg ound model o easoning, agg ega i e,
ac o ising, and mechanical, ha is sha ed by di ec oli ionalis s and e iden ialis s (wha -
e e hei kind) alike and ha keeps us ho e ing be ween he ‘ a ional aspec ’ and he
‘a a ional aspec ’ o a ‘ a ional–a a ional’ igu e.
These wo aspec s seem o exhaus ou ways o es ablishing he ela ionship be ween
assen and in e ence since hey a e g ounded in a pic u e o ce ain y as hough i is
he esul o a logical ela ion be ween p emises and conclusions which, i i alls sho ,
mus be supplemen ed wi h an ex a pull. I is as i he logical gul be ween condi ional
p emises and uncondi ional assen ha Newman desc ibes would lea e only wo op ions
o illing he gap: ei he assen is esol able in o i s easons, so as o come by deg ees,
o uncondi ional assen is he esul o an a bi a y choice ( eph ased in Kie kegaa d’s
idiom: “o a leap”). In e ms o quali a i e ansi ion, i is as i one we e ei he bound o
conse e he ansi ion a he cos o making i a g adual and quan i a i e one, o o cancel
he luid na u e o he ansi ion by means o a ia ex e nal o he p ocess ha leads o
con ic ion, whe e a ‘ ia ’ s ands also o any a bi a y mechanism, a a ional o isce al,
o gene a ing commi men . Howe e , he e ec i eness o Newman’s in o mal p oo s is
c ucially dependen on hei being no ega ded as p oo s in he sense o adi ional p oo s.
I is my iew ha Newman a emp ed o dispel he abo e illusion by a acking i s sou ce
and ha he aimed a exposing a alse dicho omy and o s ee a way be ween he a ional
and he uncondi ional. Newman desc ibes a pa icula mode o adhe ence and belie , one
ha allows c i izabili y bu which is also uncondi ional, in which belie does no mean
an in ellec ual assen o isola ed, knowledge-ap p oposi ions. This means ha belie is
no a p oposi ional a i ude ha is a cons i uen pa o knowledge. This is p ecisely he
unc ion o he illa i e sense. Cu iously enough, i is Newman’s insigh ha ce ain y is
no exhaus ed by a logical pa adigm ha migh allow us o come o o ge , as Wi gens ein
ecommended, “ his anscenden ce ain y” (Wi gens ein 2004,
1
§
2
47)—a ‘ anscenden
ce ain y’ o which he a a ional, he ine abilis , and he anscenden alis accoun s o hinges
a e equally bound.
Fo Newman, ‘ce ain y’ is, as i happens wi h he ‘illa i e sense’, a “g and name o a
common hing” (Newman 2015, p. 436).
3
Newman’s ce ain ies a e humd um ce ain ies
ha a e g ounded in ou li e. They a e no ‘ anscenden ’ because hey a e no ex e nal o
he p ocess o in o mal easoning ha , h ough he middle o o dina y li e, leads o hem.
Religions 2025,16, 174 3 o 20
Nei he a e hey ully immanen o he p ocess, on pain o iewing hem as g ounded in
so-called ‘e idence’, and hus, as he compulsi e a i ma ions o he a ional au oma on.
I he ollowing p oposal holds wa e , hen simili udes be ween Newman and Wi gen-
s ein may be mo e expansi e and deepe han a cu so y glance on hei hough migh sugges .
2. Newman’s Pa adox
Le us begin by no icing ha since assen is, o Newman, he assu ance we na u ally
and di ec ly eel, I will use ‘assen ’, ‘belie ’, and ‘ce i ude’ as synonyms. I is hen impo an
o dis inguish Newman’s echnical unde s anding o ‘ce i ude’ as a complex, e lec i e
assen (Newman 2008,
4
pp. 157–80), namely, as a delibe a e commi men o an al eady
expe ienced ce i ude, om he i s -o de , simple ce ain y we eel when belie ing.
5
I is
he na u e o he la e ha I aim o disce n in he p esen ex .
I is common knowledge ha Newman s essed he absolu e, un ese ed cha ac e o
ce ain y and ha he also claimed ha ce i ude is a na u al s a e, e en a no mal s a e, o
he mind. Finally, he was empha ic on he poin ha ce ain y is a sui gene is s a e—nei he
logically con inuous wi h no educible o easoning and nei he suscep ible o demons a ion
no a bi a y and emp y.
Newman’s claim ha assen is uncondi ional
6
and ce ain y is na u al has been usually
unde s ood as leading s aigh o a pa adox. The pa adox uns as ollows—i Newman is
igh , hen, ega ding belie o which e idence is less han conclusi e, only wo a ional
al e na i es a e open o us: ei he is wi hheld (scep icism), o else he e is an assen ha
ises highe han i s sou ce, and which is hence i a ional. Thus, i one is o adop a o mal
and logical model o easoning, hen one mus always choose be ween helpless agnos icism
and i a ional commi men . The e would be, howe e , a hi d al e na i e, ha would
make i possible o escape om Newman’s pa adox. One may ake a p agma ic app oach
o he ques ion, and hus, one migh claim ha when e idence, hough no conclusi e, is
a ou able o p, we can gi e a en a i e, quali ied assen o ha p oposi ion, making hus
p o ision o u he doub . On his iew, hesi an assen (which, o Newman, is no assen
a all) would be su icien o conduc ou epis emic p ac ices.7
I migh be plausible o con end ha he main aim o hinge epis emology is o p o ide
an epis emic (and no a me ely p agma ic) esponse o he abo e pa adox.
8
To his end,
hinge epis emologis s emind us ha he epis emic s a us o hinge ce ain ies is a unc ion
o cen ali y in ou web o belie s and ha some p inciples cons i u i e o a ionali y, hough
g oundless, a e amewo k p inciples applicable o all belie s, in any con ex . Hinges may
well be elie ed o he need o wa an , bu , in his iew, hey a e no elie ed o he need
o some so o a p io i jus i ica ion.
I is clea ha i Newman’s explo a ion o easoning ocused he abo e pa adox,
hen his in es iga ion would o e lap nea ly wi h hinge epis emology. Howe e , i is my
iew ha aking his epis emological sho cu would be a alse s ep ha would lead us o
mis ep esen a ion. I is no only he case ha Newman’s pa adox, a om being ph ased
om he s andpoin o he manda es o eason and epis emic a ionali y, i.e., a om
being an idealized o m o pa adox, is a humble desc ip ion o na u al easoning. Ra he ,
he pa adox aced by hinge epis emologis s u ges us o espond o i wi hou dispelling
i s illusion.
My poin is ha while Newman’s in e es lies in desc ibing how ou minds ac ually
ope a e in he e y p ocess o eaching ce i ude, hinge epis emologis s a e ocused on
how ce i ude migh be specula i ely jus i ied a e i is expe ienced, meaning ha hinge
epis emology is a second-o de p ojec which is mainly conce ned wi h o e ing a de ence
o he a ionali y o belie in gene al in he ace o he challenge o adical skep icism.
Howe e , o Newman, judgmen s o ce ain y a e ied o ways o li ing. Fo him, we mus
Religions 2025,16, 174 4 o 20
a emp o app op ia e he pa adoxical ension wi hou ying o esol e o o elimina e i
by abs ac means. I ha e he imp ession ha mos hinge epis emologis s emain hos age o
a esiduum o doub , when genuine doub , doub which ope a es in ou in o mal easoning,
is e ec i ely disca ded in he p ocess o easoning. Thus, Newman is in i ing us o go back
o he ough soil o he pa adox, and hence o abandon (a leas a his le el o sc u iny)
a “ u he doub behind” genuine doub (OC, §19) and he e iola ed so o no ma i e
jus i ica ion ha i elici s. This is why Newman’s explo a ion o in o mal easoning ocuses
i s sui gene is pa adox, one which, I epea , should no be con la ed wi h i s epis emological
su oga e, howe e much hey may be ul ima ely ela ed.
Wha , hen, is Newman’s pa adox? I is, in his own wo ds, “ he inconsis ency which
is in ol ed in holding ha an uncondi ional accep ance o a p oposi ion can be he esul
o i s condi ional accep ance” (GA, p. 135). The pa adox hus lies in ha excess o belie
o e p oo ha Newman illus a es wi h a ba e y o e e yday ce ain ies which, con a y
o he Lockean p inciple o p opo ionali y, a e suppo ed by an a ay o easons ha do no
ouch hem logically (GA, p. 254). The simili udes be ween Newman’s and Wi gens ein’s
examples ha e been no iced, and o good eason. I may also be no ed ha Wi gens ein
was ully awa e o his discon inui y, and ha , in he case o eligious belie , he e en
ex ended i , aking no ice o he disp opo ion be ween he ‘eno mous hings’ o which
belie e s gi e hei assen and he ‘ limsy’ e idence on which i is, in a ce ain sense, based
(Wi gens ein 2007,9pp. 57–58).
The e is, howe e , some hing odd in how Newman deals wi h he pa adox. One migh
expec o ind a di ec answe o i in he G amma o Assen . All ou e o s a e, howe e , o
no a ail. A e p esen ing he pa adox, Newman, ins ead o p o iding a clea -cu esponse
o i , plunges himsel in o a long discussion o in o mal and na u al app ehension ha
culmina es in a chap e abou he illa i e sense. This sugges s ha Newman’s discussion
o in o mal easoning and he illa i e sense is i sel somehow he answe o he pa adox—a
sugges ion ha , aken in one way, is co ec . The di icul y now lies in iden i ying he w ong
way o aking his answe , and in a guing why i is w ong.
The conc e e ac ion o ou minds in ol es he use o he illa i e sense. Newman
uses his e m o e e o he powe o easoning in gene al, as i ope a es in o mally and
na u ally. Though i does no p o ide a logical p oo , he illa i e sense can lead, as a esul
o con e ging p obabili ies, o genuine ce ain y.
The emp a ion is now o econs uc Newman’s concep ion o he illa i e sense as
hough i we e a cogni i e i ue ha , when eliable, would lead he agen o knowledge
(P i cha d o hcoming). This in e p e a ion, as P i cha d p oposes i , u ns a ound h ee
main claims:
(a) Newman’s posi ion di e s om adi ional e iden ialism in a mo e expansi e
concep ion o e idence. Since ex ended e idence includes pe sonal e idence ha is no
publicly accessible, his eading can easily accommoda e Newman’s an i-e iden ialism (o
a so ), as well as his iew ha he easone , while a ional, migh be unable o communica e
his easons di ec ly and o submi hem o public assessmen . This means ha he agen
migh be unable o gi e he easons ha he has. This iew would hus emphasize he
pa allels wi h Moo e, who pu s o h he same claim ha he e a e many hings we know
ye o which we canno gi e ou easons (Moo e 1959, p. 149).
(b) I is ue ha Newman’s expansi e concep ion o e idence uns agains wha , o
mos epis emologis s, coun s as e idence. Howe e , Newman’s e idence is s ill genuine
e idence. This means ha , o P i cha d, Newman con ends ha ou quo idian ce ain ies,
i p ope ly o med, a e a ional and knowledgeable. They a e, con a y o Wi gens einian
ce ain ies, in he ma ke o knowledge.
Religions 2025,16, 174 5 o 20
(c) The illa i e sense is a so o holis ic sensibili y o ele an e idence, a skill ha ,
while i canno be codi ied, is, like A is o elian p udence in he p ac ical domain, ully
ope a i e in ou in ellec ual endea ou s.
10
Again, in his iew, he illa i e sense is he
in ellec ual powe (wi hin pa icula domains o pe o mance) o app ecia e he o ce o
a ailable easons and how hey ela e, on hei own, o conclusions. We can, indeed,
cul i a e his powe , bu he o ce o he a gumen s ill lies in he a gumen i sel , and no in
how he easone ela es ac i ely o i . In his eading, he pe sonal dimension o he p ocess
leading o ce ain y seems o e e , a mos , o he pe sonal expe iences ha he p ocess
now includes, and o he pe sonal cul i a ion o ou sense o e iden ial an eceden s and o
how knowledge is necessa ily elici ed by he in insic o ce o a gumen .
I is ue ha Newman in oduces he in o mal me hod o easoning by calling a en-
ion o he ac ha i includes “p obabili ies oo ine o a ail sepa a ely, oo sub le and
ci cui ous o be con e ible in o syllogisms” (GA, p. 256). So, i makes sense o asc ibe o
him an expansi e concep ion o easoning which highligh s i s implici ness. I is my iew,
howe e , ha P i cha d is blind o he kind o hing ha Newman was wan ing o deny,
and ha , unawa es, his e sion o Newman is jus a po ayal o he in ellec ual opponen
Newman saw himsel acing.
Fi s , he easons ha lead o ce ain y canno be meaning ully desc ibed as e idence,
nei he publicly a ailable no implici and pe sonal. P i cha d’s pic u e sugges s ha i
we we e able o occupy he exac epis emic posi ion o he belie e , and hus, o su ey
he whole a ay o his expe iences, public and pe sonal, and o app ecia e hem wi h he
same deg ee o illa i e compe ence, we would be a ionally o ced, like he belie e is, o
adop his belie . In his iew o Newman, belie is he compulso y e ec o he easoning
p ocess, a passi e e en ha jus comes o happen o us in he ligh o , and by he o ce o ,
a ailable e idence.
This no only clashes wi h Newman’s s iking a i ma ion ha “ce i ude is no a passi e
imp ession made upon he mind om wi hou , by a gumen a i e compulsion” (GA, p. 271), bu
also wi h his po ai o he ole played by he pe sonal in easoning, whe e he con en o
ou easons canno be abs ac ed om he pe sonal and he a i udinal, and one canno be
educed o he o he . This is one o he aspec s o wha I mean abo e by ‘app op ia ing
he pa adoxical ension’. This is also why Newman is so adaman in his claims ha i is
he pe son who easons (GA, p. 66), and ha we do no become ce ain wi hou o agains ou
will (GA, p. 189). Again, he ac o assen is no , o Newman, impe sonally compelled
by a gumen s. Reg e ully, P i cha d seems o concei e Newman’s easone as a me e
spec a o o his passi e in ellec ual p ocesses.
These las ema ks lead us di ec ly o my second conside a ion ega ding he illa-
i e sense.
I is a om he u h ha he illa i e sense, howe e much i may be g ounded in
i ues o cha ac e , is a i ue o he ba en in ellec . On he con a y, o Newman, i is a
powe o he ained imagina ion (GA, p. 250),
11
he po en ial o he ac i e ecogni ion o
pa e ns which a e no explici ly p esen , as i s di ec ion, in neu al e idence. The c ux o
he ma e is ha , o Newman, he conclusions o in o mal easoning a e no compelled
and no a bi a y, bu a he in e p e ed (GA, p. 131). This means ha he ue o ce o a
non-demons a i e a gumen does no lie in how he p emisses ela e o he conclusion, bu
a he in how he easone pe sonally ela es o hose p emisses by means o wha may be
called an ‘imagina i e elucida ion’. I is p ecisely whe e logic, e idence, and knowledge—
all o hem— ail ha easone s become pe sonal and appeal o “ hei own illa i e sense”
(GA, p. 288). Thus, he illa i e sense may well ha e pe suasi e e ec i eness, bu i will ne e
ha e cogni i e e ec i eness.

Religions 2025,16, 174 6 o 20
This changes he pa adigm, since wha Newman is desc ibing is a p ocess ha , hough
i is ancho ed in eason, culmina es in a so o imagina i ely d i en, syn he ic ges al
shi ha gi es o i sel an in ellec ual ounda ion only e ospec i ely. I is, he e o e, as
i , al hough easons a e egis e ed du ing he p ocess ha leads o a change o pos u e,
hey acqui e hei ull signi icance only a e he shi . They a e no cumula i e easons;
hey a e easons inso a as hey a e in e nally ela ed o an al eady disce ned pa e n.
This illumina es Newman’s admissions ha “wha o one in ellec is a p oo is no so o
ano he ” (GA, p. 233), and ha , in ega d o ce i ude, which is he unde s anding o one’s
own expe ience, we can only speak o ou sel es.
I should no seem s ange ha Newman makes abundan use o ges al ic compa isons
in which i is he imagina ion ha makes hings conc e e and de e mina e, such as he way
in which a po ai leshes ou a me e ske ch, o he accommoda ion o he eye o “ca ch
and lose again” (GA, p. 249) aspec s hidden in a landscape, o he expanding polygon wi h
i s asymp o ic app oach o he imagina i e limi o a ci cle (GA, p. 253). Con inui y and
discon inui y a e equally emphasized in hose examples, whose unc ion is o illus a e
how ce i ude does no come unde he easoning acul y, bu unde he ju isdic ion o
he imagina ion.
In sho , Newman’s esponse o he pa adox is a pa adoxical esponse. This is no
because Newman p oposes a pa adoxical way o escaping he pa adox ( he leap in o he
a a ional), bu a he because he pa adox is displaced om a ee ac o he will o he
ecogni ion o he pa adoxical, and hus, willing na u e o in o mal app ehension. Agains
he backd op o he linea , cumula i e, and logical model o easoning, ‘seeing as’ and
‘no icing aspec s’ a e pa adoxical phenomena since hey a e non-s anda d, imagina i e
ways o app ehending u hs. The e is no sense in which ce ain ies acqui ed in his way
can be cogni i e achie emen s and hus be in he epis emological ma ke o knowledge. Fo
hem, his ma ke is no ma i ely closed.
3. Newman’s Ges al ic Tu n
Since Newman is anxious o poin ou ha easoning is no impe sonal o compelled,
we do no become ce ain wi hou o agains ou will, as i was no ed ea lie .
This e e ence o he will pa allels he ‘willing na u e’ ha William James highligh s in
his amous essay on he will o belie — he passional na u e, he “ ac o s o belie ” which
complemen ou in ellec ual na u e (James 1956, p. 11). This commi men o passion, sha ed
by Kie kegaa d, Newman, James, and Wi gens ein, poin s o he ole o imagina ion in
in o mal easoning. Howe e , i is also impo an o no ice ha while James’ main objec i e
is o a gue ha we a e wi hin ou epis emic igh s in belie ing some hing when he op ions
a e li ing, o ced, and momen ous, and when he ques ion canno be decided by in ellec ual
g ounds (James 1956, p. 29), Newman is a om unde s anding he will, like James does,
as a gap- ille which is a ionally pe mi ed unde ce ain condi ions. Indeed, he is a om
a emp ing o a gue o ou igh o belie e.
Ce ain y may well be pe son- a iable, bu o Newman i is also absolu e and com-
ple e, i e ocable, and uncondi ional. Thus, om Newman’s posi ion, James’ p og am
mis i es in wo dis inc ways: i misdesc ibes he p ocess leading o ce ain y by a aching
an independen ac o will o easoning—as i , because easoning p ecedes will, hey we e
wo independen ac o s—and i con la es he i s -o de explana ion o how we become
ce ain wi h he p ojec o p o iding a a ional, e lec i e ce i ica e o ou ce ain ies (GA, p.
162). One common mis ake in app oaching Newman esul s om insu icien app ecia ion
o he dis inc ion ha he made be ween hose wo p ojec s.
The p oblem is now how o econcile he wo claims on which he whole o Newman’s
posi ion es s: he claim ha ce ain y is a sui gene is s a e, which is no esol able in o i s
Religions 2025,16, 174 7 o 20
an eceden s, and he claim ha ce ain y is also p e igu ed in easons which a e in ima ions
o belie —since belie does no come by means o a ia a e delibe a ion.
Wha , hen, is he ole played by he will in easoning when he ansi ion om
in e ence o belie is non- oli ional? The c ux o he ma e is ha a model should be
p o ided ha is able o make he dialec ical ension be ween con inui y and discon inui y
in elligible. Addi ionally, his model should make sense o he desc ip ion o he p ocess,
leading o assen being “unde he ju isdic ion o he will”, while ac s o he will a e uled
ou o he pic u e. How can i be ha belie ing ha pis no a ee choice a all, and ye i is
i no a o ced one ei he ?
The solu ion is exp essed, as was al eady hin ed, in e ms o a ‘ges al shi ’.
Le us ocus on simple ges al ic igu es such as he ‘duck– abbi ’ igu e. The i s
hing we can no e is ha , hough no icing, say, he ‘duck aspec ’ o he igu e, may ake
a p elimina y e o o concen a ed a en ion, and maybe e en some kind o linguis ic
guidance, he seeing comes, as i we e, o i sel . The a ending is a ee ac , ye he ecogni ion
we ha e is no achie able by a decision. This no only means ha coming o no ice he
aspec is no he esul o di ec oli ion (as i we could choose o see he aspec , and no only,
as i happens, o y o see he aspec ), bu also, ha his is an all-o -no hing phenomenon,
adecisi e ansi ion wi h he same ma ks o absolu eness and uncondi ionali y, lack o
deg ees, and conclusi eness wi h which Newman desc ibes ce ain y. Fa om coming in
deg ees, he ecogni ion o he ‘duck aspec ’ o he igu e is a sudden, holis ic, and comple e
“ aking hold” (OC, § 511). This poin is u he ein o ced by he ac ha i is no he objec
ha changes, as i new lines and shadows we e added o i , bu a he wha i changes is
ou way o seeing i . Discon inui y, hen, is a necessa y p ope y o ges al ic changes.
This does no en ail, howe e , ha he e is no an in insic con inui y be ween he
objec and he no icing o i s aspec s, so ha he shi is no in eg ally ela ed, as i is, o
wha goes be o e. Fo one, he shi depends upon he ma e ial p ope ies o he pain ing,
o he poin ha , as Wi gens ein highligh s, in he cases o musical o poe ical app aisal,
he change o a simple no e, o o a wo d, o o in ona ion, migh esul , o good o o
bad, in a di e en app ecia ion o he whole wo k (LC, pp. 37–38). Those a e quo idian
examples o how ‘eno mous hings’ could hang legi ima ely on ‘ limsy’ da a.
Addi ionally, and hough Newman would say ha , a e eaching he poin o he
shi , he e would be no ‘mo e o less’ in seeing i as a duck, one could also ollow wi h
he ips o one’s inge he ‘duck lines’ o he objec , which ha e been egis e ed du ing he
p ocess. The poin is ha , al hough he ‘ges al shi ’ is no quan i a i e, i is ne e heless
a unc ion o wha p ecedes i . As was p e iously said, one is always able o p o ide a
e ospec i e, pos hoc kind o jus i ica ion o wha one sees, e en hough i is also ue ha
one could “ne e ha e a i ed o belie [o , by he same oken, o see he ‘duck-aspec ’ o he
igu e] by way o such p oo s” (Wi gens ein 2006,12 p. 97).
Finally, le us men ion, e en i in passing, ha ‘aspec blindness’ is a common
phenomenon—one ha is plausibly ela ed o he imagina ion (o i s absence). The c ucial
poin he e is ha no one can be compelled o see an aspec , jus like no one can be com-
pelled o eel ce ain o some hing, e en when con on ed wi h a gumen s ha lead o he s o
con ic ion. I is in his sense ha ‘no icing an aspec ’, like ce ain y, is ee: i canno happen
wi hou o agains he will; i is incompa ible wi h compulsion; i is i educibly i s -pe sonal.
This is why Newman—because he is illumina ing in o mal easoning and ce ain y om a
‘ges al shi ’ model and because he is seeing he illa i e sense, as he imagina i e powe
o o ming and ecognizing pa e ns, as he syn he ic ac i i y o gi ing o de o a heap
o disconnec ed ac s—con ends ha he is dealing, no wi h specula i e ce ain y, wi h
p ac ical ce ain y, o demons a i e ce ain y, bu wi h mo al and in e p e a i e ce ain y
(GA, p. 252).
Religions 2025,16, 174 8 o 20
H.H. P ice a gued ha he dis inc ion be ween no ional and eal assen “is Newman’s
mos o iginal con ibu ion o he epis emology o belie ” (P ice 2013, p. 316). Howe e
impo an and in e es ing his dis inc ion is, i should no make us o ge ha Newman’s
mos s iking con ibu ion o he unde s anding o con ic ion is ha he concei ed ce ain y
as wha may be called a ‘ h eshold concep ’—one o hose concep s ha a e no applicable
un il hey a e o ally applicable. We may hus say, ollowing Unge ’s e minology, ha , o
Newman, assen is an absolu e e m, one ha indica es an absolu e limi (Unge 1975, p. 49).
The p oblem o ges al models ha make use o absolu e e ms is ha he s a es
o ‘seeing as’, ‘unde s anding’, and ‘ce i ude’ come, as i was abo e exp essed, o hem-
sel es, namely, ha c i ical h esholds a e connec ed, howe e much hey may be jus i ied
e ospec i ely, wi h leaps.
I is, he e o e, as i Newman’s hesis o he non-en ailmen o ce i ude would equi e
a p ope explana ion, and as i he mo e plausible candida e o explain belie , absen
ine abilis ansi ions, is an uncons ained ac o he will.
The p oblem is how o do jus ice o he ela ion be ween ce i ude and will wi hou
alling in o he logical pa adigm o a bi a iness. Addi ionally, we mus conside he
no ma i e p oblem o he ole played by he pe sonal dimension in he epis emology
o belie . Migh Newman’s posi ion lead o a o m o p o o-cons uc i ism? A e all,
acco ding o epis emic cons uc i ism, ep esen a ions a e adically con ingen , meaning ha
one is always ee o ep esen an objec di e en ly om he way he wo ld compels us o
pe cei e i . In his app oach, ep esen a ions a bo om a e no a ionally s uc u ed— hey
sp ing om ac s which, no being answe able o easons, a e a andom and a bi a y. This
is he p oblem o no ma i e cons ain in belie ing and wha i s sou ces a e.
We should begin ou explo a ion by no ing ha Newman appeals o an “ac i e ecog-
ni ion o p oposi ions as ue” (GA, p. 271) o p o ide an accoun o he ela ion be ween
belie and will. Wha does he ac i e na u e o an ‘ac i e ecogni ion’ consis in? How can i
help o make a willing culmina ion o ce i ude while i is no some hing ha one decides
o do?
To begin wi h, i is impo an o no ice ha , in Newman’s model, easoning and
ce i ude should no be app oached as hough hey a e wo dis inc ac o s, and hus, as
hough ‘ac i e ecogni ion’ is a way o e e , explaining no hing, o a de ached ‘happening’
ha comes a e delibe a ion, cancelling he la e . This is why I p e e o speak o ce ain y
as a culmina ion in e nal o he p ocess o easoning. I is o he en i e p ocess o coming o
ce i ude ha we mus pay a en ion.
I ha e o con ess, howe e , ha he p e ious conside a ion lea es e e y hing un-
explained. I is o no a ail o poin ou ha ce i ude is in e nal o he en i e p ocess i
‘ ecogni ion’ and ‘belie ’ a e me ely wo wo ds o he same phenomenon. The gap, in e nal
o no , emains unexplained. I is only he in iguing ‘ac i e’ ha quali ies he ecogni ion
o pa e ns ha keeps me sea ching o an in elligible connec ion be ween in e ence and
assen . Wha does Newman mean by his li le, bu c ucial wo d?
I is clea ha he p ima y meaning o wha Newman calls an ‘ac i e ecogni ion’
is ha he ecogni ion o pa e ns canno be o ced upon us. Ins ead, i is by i s na u e
ully i s -pe sonal. Bu ha should no make us o ge ha Newman’s emphasis is on he
simplis ic and illegi ima e opposi ion o libe a ian eedom and he compulsion o logical
deduc ion. His poin is ha i is he indi idual who easons and becomes ce ain, wi h all
his an eceden assump ions. I is hence his emphasis on he indi idual who “s ands by
himsel ” (GA, p. 316) and who, when easoning, “is his own cen e” (GA, p. 271), ha
makes i explici ha , o Newman, he indi idual is he common ac o , o he d i ing o ce,
o e e y ac o easoning leading o ce ain y. I is no only he case ha belie canno be
agains one’s will. I is also ha he indi idual emains ac i e du ing he whole p ocess,
Religions 2025,16, 174 9 o 20
as he elemen in which, bo owing om Wi gens ein, “a gumen s ha e hei li e” (OC,
§ 105). Taken in his sense, one migh p ope ly say ha , o Newman, he a gumen , o lead
o genuine con ic ion, canno p oceed wi hou he will.
Bu how a e we o unde s and his claim? Le us a emp o shed ligh on i in e ms
o he abo emen ioned simplis ic opposi ion o eedom and compulsion ha Newman
denies, so as o make oom o a hi d way ha highligh s he al e na i e opposi ion o
impe sonal compulsion and wha o Newman is he pe sonal app op ia ion o easons.
Al e na i ely, he explo a ion migh be made in e ms o common a ie ies o ‘canno ’.
Le us pay a en ion o a conclusi e a gumen . I can e use o hink abou he
Py hago ean Theo em, bu I am no longe ee o hink wha I will when I a end o
i . I is jus ha I canno deny i s u h. This sha ply con as s wi h judgmen s ha a e
guided by pe sonal p e e ence as he esul o a choice based on indi idual needs, desi es,
and in e es s. In hose cases, he ‘canno ’ o ‘I canno hink o i ’ is ellip ic o ‘canno a o d
o’. I is appa en ha hings ha one canno a o d o belie e a e belie s ha can be inhib-
i ed by a whole se ies o di e en causes (social p essu e, in ellec ual loyal y, in ellec ual
ine ia, mo al commi men , wish ul hinking, e c.). Howe e , he common denomina o o
all hose causes is ha hey can be o e come (howe e ha d) and hei in luence esis ed.
This is why ‘I canno a o d o belie e i ’ is usually ollowed by ‘and I will no ’, he la e
exp essing a ee esolu ion. Howe e , i makes no sense o say in a logical sense ha one
canno a o d o belie e he Py hago ean Theo em.
Epis emic cons ain , howe e , ope a es beyond he es ic ed domain o ma hema ical
p oo s and conclusi e a gumen s. A he momen he agen a ends o all he easons a ail-
able o he o p and agains q, she is epis emically bound o p e e p o e he al e na i e. I
is appa en ha e en i he agen canno a o d o belie e p, she can e use o hink abou i ,
can u n he a en ion o easons a ou ing q while a e ing he a en ion om easons o
p, can g adually cul i a e he eeling o q, and can e en decla e ha p is no ue; howe e ,
supposing ha a he momen o judging she sees he easons hen in ol ed, she canno
make a judgmen al denial o p. Judgmen in ol es no ee choice. When one is bound o
p e e a p oposi ion as likely o be ue, one ecognizes i as some hing which, p o ided he
same condi ions, ough o be a ionally belie ed. Howe e , one also ecognizes ha one
canno (in ellec ually) help belie ing i , o , al e na i ely, ha one canno help p e e ing i
as likely o be ue.
Acco ding o he p e ious dialec ic, Newman seems o be be ween he wo ho ns
o a dilemma: ei he belie esul s om pe sonal p e e ence, and i is hence lacking no -
ma i e cons ain (pe son ela i i y), o he de e mina ion o he mind by easons is as
undamen ally he e onomous as i s de e mina ion by any objec (wha may be called he
mechanical concep ion o easoning). Newman, howe e , is anxious o dis inguish cons ain
om compulsion, and so o a gue o a model o easoning ha does jus ice o he ac s ha
(a) expe ienced ce i ude has he cha ac e o some hing ha one canno help belie ing;
(b) his cons ain is a pe sonal cons ain , and hence i is no incompa ible wi h eedom,
aken in one way.
The c ux o he ma e is ha Newman’s model is based on an in e p e a i e analogy,
acco ding o which he p ocess o easoning is like con on ing a c yp og aph, ce ain y is
like he deciphe ing o i , and he co ec ness o his ce i ude is con i med by he con inui y
and he connec ions ha appea e e ywhe e (GA, pp. 255–56).
The poin is ha he easone hi s upon he meaning o he le e s by which hey o m
in elligible sen ences. No doub emains possible as o he co ec ness o he deciphe ing,
since he ag eemen and he consis ency canno be acciden al. Simila ly, ce i ude mus
be con i med om i sel . I mus h ow ligh upon he easons in which i is ancho ed
and b ing a heap o discon inuous, non-linea easons in o ag eemen . Newman he e o e
Religions 2025,16, 174 16 o 20
Thus, he epis emological con ex unc ions he e as a ehicle o indi ec communica ion, as a
way o showing de e mina e con en s ha canno be meaning ully exp essed in he no mal
cou se o li e. Wha his shows is he endency o hinge epis emologis s (i) o collapse
he o e all wo ld iew in o incon es able u hs, and (ii) o concei e Wi gens ein’s p ojec
in OC as ha o p o iding an indi ec saying o a de e mina e ‘i ’. This la ly igno es
ha o Wi gens ein i is a pa adox ha expe ience should seem o be embedded in an
o de ed whole.
The e is a well-known passage in LC, p. 59, in which, ega ding he g amma o ‘God’,
Wi gens ein says ha , i he we e asked whe he he unde s ands his wo d, he would
say ‘Yes, and no”. In speaking his way, Wi gens ein is poin ing o he ac ha eligious
language is i educibly pa adoxical, meaning ha whene e one hinks ha one has hi
upon a de e mina e ‘i ’ ha is pa o he meaning o ‘God’, one has in ac only hi upon an
analogy ha does no apply en i ely o God, and so, ha mus be inally e oked. The e is
hence no de ached ‘i ’ o g asp and o communica e.
I ake i ha he same goes o he g amma o hinge e ms, and ha , o Wi gens ein,
hinge language is, like eligious language, ul ima ely and adically pa adoxical. Wi gen-
s ein is hus seeming o pu some epis emological doc ines o h bu e okes hem. He
a emp s o say some hing abou hinge commi men s, only o make us awa e ha simila i-
ies wi h common epis emological ca ego ies suddenly come o an end. Hinges migh be
desc ibed as ‘ u hs’, bu wi h he ca ea s ha hey a e no like empi ical u hs and ha
hey unc ion like ules. They may ha e a con en , bu his pa icula con en exp esses an
o e a ching and highly inde e mina e übe hinge. They a e exemp om doub , bu cases in
which hey could be alse wi hou he annihila ion o ya ds icks a e imaginable. C ucially,
i is as i any a emp o cap u e he wo ld iew in pa icula e ms would ail, and hus
as i he epis emological illusion would consis in hinking ha one migh be able o (in
Schopenhaue ’s e ms) ep esen a li ing pic u e and ha he e is some hing ha , despi e
being unable o be di ec ly exp essed, is ne e heless logically g asped. The wo ld iew is
hus seen as a c us solidi ied on he su ace o expe ience—and epis emology is concei ed
as he a i icial econs uc ion o human expe ience.
Ra he han ying o p o ide some so o neo-Kan ian deduc ion o epis emic ca ego ies,
Wi gens ein sugges s ha one canno unde s and a gi en ca ego y wi hou li ing in i — ha ,
as happens wi h eligious concep s, he connec ions which gi e hinge e ms meaning ake
place in li e. Hinges a e solidly o ganized and p o oundly anima ed by common li e. I his
is igh , hen wha Wi gens ein w i es in CV, p. 58, ega ding he g amma o ‘God’— ha
he wo d “does no show whom you mean, bu wha you mean”—can be also ex ended o
hinges: he way you use a ce ain y does no show he ‘i ’ you mean, bu a he wha you
mean. Hence, he impulse behind he in ellec ualis is ou need o be e lec ed ou o a
pa icula s ance, and hus, o come o unde s and ou sel es (ou li e) by means o wha
we ail o p ope ly mean. Wi h hinge language, like wi h eligious language, we bounce o
agmen s o sense and bounce back o ou sel es in an elucida o y way.
I is ue ha , as was no ed ea lie , Wi gens ein e e s o ‘a desc ip ion’ o he eligious
sys em o coo dina es as pa o he ins uc ion in o ai h. Bu his desc ip ion only makes
sense as long as i is a desc ip ion o ou li ing si ua ion, one ha is ully ancho ed in eal
li e in o de o making sense.
I is also ue ha , unlike wha happens wi h he implici lea ning o so-called quo-
idian hinges, eligious belie s a e usually acqui ed by di ec inculca ion, and hey a e
augh ia explici s a emen . Howe e , his disanalogy does no mean ha con e sion
can be in ellec ually isola ed om he icissi udes o li e. On he con a y, wha i shows
is ha ea ly explici indoc ina ion is jus a way o making oom o complex expe iences
which, hough cons i u i e o he ex u e o human li e, o en a i e la e in he g adual

Religions 2025,16, 174 17 o 20
de elopmen o he indi idual. I is in o he issue o hese expe iences ha eligious belie s
can make sense, and ai h can hus become an educa ion o g own-ups. I is p ecisely o
hese easons ha i makes sense o ega d he eligious and he quo idian amewo ks as
con inuous, and so o ega d he dange o a adical exis en ial diso ien a ion as ha ing
no p i ileged moo ings in he collapse o he egula i ies o he ex e nal wo ld.
16
In any
case, Wi gens ein’s c i ique o all he a ie ies o anscenden alism is accompanied by
a ecommenda ion o s ay ancho ed in he wo ld as will, namely, in he language games
we play.
The consequence o all his is ha i is only possible o de elop an in e nal unde s and-
ing, ins ead o an ex e nal one, o he li ing ansi ions be ween a heism and ai h (o he
o he way a ound). The solu ion o he p oblem o incommensu abili y mus be ound
wi hin he domain o human li e as i is. The illusion o uni e sal c i e ia esul s om a
me aphysical concep ion o bo h objec i i y and he o dina y.
5. Concluding Rema ks
The way ou o he quanda y consis s in heeding Wi gens ein’s wa ning ha i
is agains he backd op o he g adual de elopmen o human li e ha anscon ex ual
c i e ia—c i e ia which a e no si ua ed in he abs ac ealms o he cons i u i e and he
anscenden al—can be ound. The c ucial poin is ha he appeal o uni e sali y and o
me e non-con adic ion be ween sys ems o e e ence can be seen as a ma k agains he
p ac ical ele ance o non-quo idian g amma s. Howe e , eligious belie is, o Wi gen-
s ein, in insically ela ed o a p ac ical e-o ien a ion. I is, again, by means o going back
o he ough soil o human li e ha ansi ions and posi i e es s o c i izabili y migh be
made isible.
As o he p oblems o how o a oid he cha ge o dogma ism o eligious assen and
o how o p o ide some cons ain s o eligious g amma , he i s hing o say is ha i is
ue ha eligious pic u es appea o be pa icula ly unassailable, in he sense ha hey lie
ou o each o demons a ion o e u a ion. Howe e , agains he backg ound o a ges al ic
o m o pe suasion ha is non-demons a i e wi hou being non- a ional, his is no o say
ha hey a e in ulne able o c i icism.
The powe wi h which a eligious pic u e holds us cap i e can be b oken, and one can
be led o abandon i as a whole and o see hings in a new way—a way ha in oduces
ano he o de and makes ulle con ac wi h ou li ing eali y. Con e sely, he eligious
pic u e can be so i m and ex ensi e ha i s de ec ibili y, e en i i is possible, canno be
admi ed wi hou an e o o he whole mind. The pic u e’s c eden ials come hus om
how i leads o an in ima e unde s anding o an assemblage o da a.
The poin is ha ou app ecia ion o ce ain hings is so unp oblema ic and so i mly
es ablished ac oss a a ie y o li ing con ex s ha one model/pic u e/ ule ha igno es
o dis u bs i is ul ima ely unaccep able. Ou judgmen s a e ancho ed in a commonali y
o needs and expe iences which a e he subs an ial and anscon ex ual c i e ia o he
e alua ion o wo ld iews. They a e he s anda ds o judgemen ha ou side s and inside s
sha e and which lea e oom o de easibili y and o he possibili y o c i icism. C ucially,
hose phenomena ha a e no in dispu e mainly e e o ac s ha happen in he human
soul—a poin ha Wi gens ein highligh ed when ma king ha “Ch is iani y is no a
doc ine”, bu “a desc ip ion o some hing ha ac ually akes place in human li e” (CV, p.
32). Again, objec i i y, hough i mus be independen o pa icula con ex s and pe sonal
in e es s, needs no ac ually be independen o human li e, human consciousness, and
human judgmen as such. This is an impo an lesson we ecei ed om Wi gens ein.17
I we apply hese hough s o he second way o exp essing he p oblem o incommen-
su abili y, namely o he ques ion ha only mo al phenomena app ehended in a pa icula
Religions 2025,16, 174 18 o 20
way will suppo a eligious conclusion, and so, ha eligious in e p e a ions a e only
ci cula ly suppo ed by ‘ eligious da a’, he implica ions a e analogous.
We migh mee his objec ion by no ing ha , acco ding o Wi gens ein, ges al ic
pe suasion happens in he con ex o ying o make all ha su ounds wha is basic ( he
wo ld iew) ali e. This sugges s, again, ha he e is nei he a clea -cu dis inc ion be ween
‘wha is basic’ and “wha lies a ound i ” (OC, § 144), no an epis emic asymme y be ween
hose wo (alleged) ‘ ac o s’. I also indica es ha eligious pe suasion is based upon
‘side-on’, imagina i e ways o h owing ligh on ‘colla e al ac s’, and so, ha ce ain y is
swallowed down wi h i s ci cums ances (OC, § 143).
C ucially, he way o ai h is no based on ‘ eligious da a’, bu a he on hose anscon-
ex ual da a ha a e no in dispu e—da a which, i he o e iew o which we a e in i ed
is pe suasi e, a e bes owed wi h such a signi icance, s abili y, and o de ha hey come
o be app ecia ed in ull o he i s ime. Bu hose a e he gi s o poe ic, eligious and
philosophical geniuses—who ins uc us h ough a he apy ha in ol es some kind o
ee con e sion.
I hope ha he o egoing su ices o mo i a e he hough ha Newman’s ges al ic u n
is a leas a plausible candida e o explain ce ain y and o o e come some epis emological
delusions. Hope ully, a second ad an age o he o egoing discussion is o b ing o he su -
ace some o e looked simili udes be ween Newman’s hough and Wi gens ein’s me hod.
To summa ize, I ha e a gued ha Newman’s emphasis on he ges al ic model o
easoning and he ole played by he imagina ion in in o mal easoning is a ui ul s a ing
poin o an explo a ion o he con e gence be ween he G amma o Assen and On Ce ain y.
Thus, I hink ha Wi gens ein, like Newman, challenges bo h he claim ha jus i ica ion
mus be neu al and he p ejudice acco ding o which any o m o pe suasion ha is no
demons a i e is i a ional o a a ional. Added o i , bo h endo se a iew o philosophy
as adically he apeu ic, and consequen ly he concep ion o philosophizing as a adically
indi idualis ic ac i i y ha demands he ac i e pa icipa ion o he easone . Indeed, he
claims ha eedom is he essence o philosophy and ha in easoning “ he indi idual
is sup eme (
. . .
) and his own judge” (GA, pp. 277–78) could ha e come as easily om
Wi gens ein as hey did om Newman. Clea ly, his challenges some widely assumed
ep esen a ions o Wi gens ein’s las no es.
Funding: This esea ch ecei ed no ex e nal unding.
Da a A ailabili y S a emen : No new da a we e c ea ed o analyzed in his s udy. Da a sha ing is
no applicable o his a icle.
Con lic s o In e es : The au ho decla es no con lic s o in e es .
No es
1Hence o h, ‘OC’ will s and o On Ce ain y (Wi gens ein 2004).
2In e e ences o Wi gens ein’s On Ce ain y numbe ed ema ks a e ci ed.
3Le e o Meynell, 17 No embe 1869.
4Hence o h, ‘GA’ will s and o Essay in Aid o a G amma o Assen (Newman 2008).
5
Newman dis inguishes be ween wo kinds o commi men —a non-delibe a e adhe ence and a delibe a e adhe ence (GA, pp.
157–61). A conscious and delibe a e assen o ou i s -o de assen is e med a complex assen which esul s om in es iga ion
(GA, pp. 157, 159), while he eeling o ce i ude ha we ha e he du y o in es iga e and ce i ica e e ospec i ely is wha
Newman calls simple assen . Complex assen s a e hus e lec i e ac s ha a e composed o simple assen s and cha ac e ized
by epose and pe sis ence (GA, p. 167). In addi ion, Newman is empha ic on he claim ha eason and e lec ion only ha e a
c i ical unc ion, meaning ha hough hey can s i le ce ain y, hey canno c ea e i (GA, p. 168). He desc ibes he expe ience o
being ce ain as a bell ha s ikes (GA, pp. 189–90). [I am g a e ul o an anonymous e iewe o calling a en ion o he la e
image, which is in acco d wi h he ges al ic model p oposed in his pape ].The o egoing easons mo i a e my sugges ion ha he
ce ain y we eel and simple assen a e, o Newman, synonymous. While he u he opic o which condi ions ha e o be me
Religions 2025,16, 174 19 o 20
o a e lec i e app op ia ion o ou ce ain ies is o u gen in e es in eligious epis emology, i also goes well beyond he aims o
he p esen a icle. I am g a e ul o an anonymous e iewe o p essing me on his issue.
6
Tha assen is independen o in e ence (wha I ha e called elsewhe e he hesis o he independence o con ic ion) is in insically
ela ed o Newman’s an i-e iden ialism, namely o his ejec ion o Locke’s wo doc ines, ha con ic ion has deg ees, and ha o
be a ional, he deg ee o belie ough o be p opo ional o he s eng h o e idence o he p oposi ion o which one assen s. On
Newman’s iew, eligious belie is cha ac e ized as en i ely di e en om o dina y belie closely ela ed o e idence, compu a ion
o chance, and knowledge. The signi icance o his claim lies in i s e e ence o a pa icula mode o p o-a i ude cha ac e ized by
pe sis ence, enaci y, and a spon aneous esis ance o change—a kind o adhe ence ha di e s om a me e in ellec ual accep ance
o p oposi ions, and so, ha sui s well he phenomenology o eligious con ic ion. This iew is sha ed by Kie kegaa d, Newman
and Wi gens ein. I am g a e ul o an anonymous e iewe o p essing me on his issue.
7
This is he posi ion ha was ul ima ely aken by H. H. P ice (2013, pp. 130–56). In my iew, P ice was w ong in hinking ha he
pa adox o mula ed by Newman is he second-o de pa adox ha has ecen ly come o ix he agenda o Hinge Epis emology,
a he han a i s -o de pa adox ha comes om he ac ha assen is uncondi ional, whe eas in e ence (wha e e i s kind may
be) is condi ional.
8
This is he common ac o sha ed om he apeu ic o heo e ical eadings o On Ce ain y, as i is a gued in (Coli a 2016,
pp. 10–12).
9Hence o h, ‘LC’ will s and o Lec u es and Con e sa ions on Aes he ics, Psychology, and Religious Belie (Wi gens ein 2007).
10
P i cha d’s concep ion o he illa i e sense as an in ellec ual powe is made clea by he ollowing passage: “Newman’s idea is
ha a p ope ly e ined illa i e sense can gene a e good judgmen s, and he eby a ional belie s, e en when e iden ial suppo
doesn’ mee he Lockean s anda ds. (
. . .
) In his way, one’s illa i e sense, p ope ly employed, may lead o one us ing a belie
whe e he o iginal e idence is no longe ecalled, o s icking wi h a belie in he ace o appa en ly pe suasi e coun e a gumen s.
(
. . .
) O cou se, one migh ha e a aciocina i e acul y ha is deg aded (
. . .
) Fo Newman, hen, ou basic eligious ce ain ies
a e o be unde s ood such ha hey could well amoun o knowledge, p o ided hey a e p ope ly o med ia he illa i e sense.
Indeed, hey can also coun as e iden ially g ounded, a leas in a b oad sense o e idence” (P i cha d o hcoming).
11
Newman also exp esses his poin by desc ibing he illa i e sense in e ms o ‘no icing aspec s’, as ollows: “[The illa i e sense] is
a powe o looking a hings in some pa icula aspec , and o de e mining hei in e nal and ex e nal ela ions he eby” (GA,
pp. 265–66). C ucially, as i happens wi h pa adigm examples o ges al -shi s, he illa i e sense may lead o a “sudden e ela ion”,
so ha “ligh b eaks in upon us” (GA, p. 266). I is in e es ing o no e ha he illa i e sense is hen ela ed o app aisal o meaning,
a he han o e idence, in e ence and knowledge. As Newman makes clea , he logic o language mus be supplemen ed by he
mo e elas ic “logic o hough ” (GA, p. 281).
12 Hence o h, ‘CV’ will s and o Cul u e and Value (Wi gens ein 2006).
13
As o a classical e e ence o pa i y a gumen s, see Al in Plan inga’s p og am in his a icle “Is Belie in God Ra ional?” (Plan inga
1979, pp. 7–27).
14
Fo example, no ice how Wi gens ein con as s quo idian hinges like ‘e e y human being has wo human pa en s’ wi h how
Ca holics belie e ha Jesus only had a human mo he (OC, §§ 239, 240).
15
Wi gens ein w i es in his passage: “I I now say “I know ha he wa e in he ke le on he gas- lame will no eeze bu boil”, I
seem o be as jus i ied in his “I know” as I am in any. ‘I I know any hing I know his’. —O do I know wi h s ill g ea e ce ain y
ha he pe son opposi e me is my old iend so-and-so? And how does ha compa e wi h he p oposi ion ha I am seeing wi h
wo eyes and shall see hem i I look in he glass?—I don’ know con iden ly wha I am o answe he e. —Bu s ill he e is a
di e ence be ween he cases. I he wa e o e he gas eezes, o cou se I shall be as as onished as can be, bu I shall assume some
ac o I don’ know o , and pe haps lea e he ma e o physicis s o judge. Bu wha could make me doub whe he his pe son
he e is N. N., whom I ha e known o yea s? He e a doub would seem o d ag e e y hing wi h i and plunge i in o chaos”.
16
Tha he scien i ic image o he wo ld migh lead o some hing close o a chao ic dis up ion o one’s ya ds icks is illus a ed by
Da win’s ‘ho id doub ’, as i was exp essed in his le e o William G aham o 3 July 1881: “You would no p obably expec
anyone ully o ag ee wi h you on so many abs use subjec s; and he e a e some poin s in you book which I canno diges . The
chie one is ha he exis ence o so-called na u al laws implies pu pose. I canno see his. (
. . .
) Ne e heless you ha e exp essed
my inwa d con ic ion, (
. . .
), ha he Uni e se is no he esul o chance. Bu hen wi h me he ho id doub always a ises
whe he he con ic ions o man’s mind, which has been de eloped om he mind o he lowe animals, a e o any alue o a all
us wo hy. Would any one us in he con ic ions o a monkey’s mind, i he e a e any con ic ions in such a mind?” (Da win
Co espondence P ojec 2024, Le e no. 13230).I is my iew ha ‘ho id doub s’ a e mo e closely connec ed wi h images o
mechanical p ocesses ha unde mine ou sel -concep ion as sel -winding pe sons and wi h a de iciency o meaning, han wi h
i egula i ies o na u e.
17
Cu iously, he claim ha Newman did no equi e, o objec i i y, a necessa y co espondence wi h absolu e u h- alues
independen o human consciousness, has been o cibly a gued by Fe ei a (1980, pp. 62–70). He e, again, we mee a s iking
simili ude be ween Newman and Wi gens ein.
Religions 2025,16, 174 20 o 20
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