Germany, China, and the Way to the Boxer Uprising

Germany, China, and the Way to the Boxer Uprising1 Jan Kočvar The aim of this article is to explain the influence of German policy in Beijing and in the province of Shandong on the origins of “the Boxer Uprising”.2 German policy to‑ wards China in late 1890’s was marked by unconcealed arrogance, and German inter‑ ference in Shandong, although caused by unrest in the province, only worsened the situation. The circumstances of the seizure of the Jiaozhou Bay in 1897 and of subse‑ quent turning of Shandong into German sphere of influence in 1898 are for the most part excluded from the scope of this article, for they will be treated separately at an‑ other occasion. Since 1644, China was ruled by the Qing dynasty which was of Manchu origin, thus alien to China. The golden era of the Qings ended at the end of the XVIII cen‑ tury. For the larger part of the XIX century, China suffered from horrible uprisings as well from foreign intervention which so far culminated in 1860, when British and French troops conquered Beijing. Since 1861, Chinese policy was dominated by Em‑ press Dowager3 Cixi (1835–1908), who assumed regency for her minor son, and this scenario was repeated several times for the rest of her life. In 1875, another child became Chinese emperor — Cixi’s nephew and adopted son who reigned under the name Guangxu (lived 1871–1908). Up to 1894, it seemed that China had recuperated from the turmoil of mid ‑nineteenth century. But the Sino ‑Japanese War had revealed Chinese weakness: indulgence and greed of the court; corruption of Chinese officials; poor fighting abilities of Chinese army and navy. Foreign powers couldn’t fail to ex‑ ploit such a situation. 1 This study is one of the outcomes of the grant The Political and Economic Interests of Great Britain and Germany in China, 1894–1914, awarded by the Grant Agency of the Czech Republic (GA13–12431S). 2 This very term is most inaccurate. Its participants didn’t call themselves “Boxers”, nor did they rebel against the Qing dynasty — in 1900, they were declared part of Chinese army. Roots of the movement and its very original name are a matter of controversy and will be reminded later. 3 Cixi was neither an Empress nor a dowager, even though she is generally known under this title. She was a concubine of Emperor Xianfeng (ruled 1850–1861) and mother of his only son and successor, Emperor Tongzhi (ruled 1861–1875). 42 PRAGUE PAPERS ON THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 1/2014 Until 1897, the Germans didn’t take part on foreign aggressions against China. On September 2, 1861, Prussia and China concluded a treaty at Tianjin, thus inaugurated modern diplomatic relations. One somewhat disturbing event took place in 1864, dur‑ ing the war between Austria, Prussia, and Denmark. Prussian war vessel captured Danish ship in Chinese territorial waters, and Viceroy Li Hongzhang (1823–1901), hav‑ ing recently ordered a translation of treatise about international law, induced the Prussians to release the vessel.4 On July 21, 1870, numerous foreigners and Christians including French consul in Tianjin were slaughtered during anti ‑missionary riots.5 Since the representative of the North ‑German Confederacy was the then dean of the diplomatic corps, his duty was to coordinate foreign response on such an event. The Germans indirectly saved China from another French aggression by being attacked by France themselves during the Prusso ‑French War. But the reborn German Empire was a great power, and great powers needed a place in the sun. Of course German activities didn’t have only detrimental effect on China. Many Germans were employed in Chinese Imperial Maritime Customs Service, which was a major source of income for Chinese budget.6 German military advisors assisted modernization of Chinese army, and Chinese armed forces were strongly dependent on war materiel of German origin.7 Fortifications of Port Arthur were designed by German engineers. Both battleships owned by the Chinese prior to the Sino ‑Japanese War, Dingyuan and Zhenyuan, were built by the Vulcan naval yards in Stettin, or‑ dered in 1881 and arriving after the Sino ‑French War.8 In 1887, the Germans (Telge and Company) built a telegraph line across Taiwan.9 Since 1885, German instruc‑ tors were training Chinese military personnel in many parts of China.10 It is most 4 J. K. FAIRBANK — LIU, Kwang -ching (Eds.), The Cambridge History of China: Late Ch’ing, 1800–1911, Vol. 11, Part 2, Cambridge 2008, p. 196. 5 H. B. MORSE, The International Relations of the Chinese Empire: The Period of Submission, 1861– 1893, Vol. 2, London, Bombay, Calcutta 1918, pp. 239–261. 6 In 1893, the income of maritime customs totalled 21,989,000 taels, i.e. one fourth of total income (and expenditure, for at this time China had a balanced budget of 88,979,000 taels) of Chinese central government. FAIRBANK — LIU, Table 21 on p. 63. Tael is a traditional Chinese silver currency. Its value was constantly dropping. In 1875, 1 British pound was worth of 3 taels; in 1901, of 6.67 taels; and in 1903, 7.5 taels. In 1901, 1 silver tael was equal to 3.055 Marks. H. B. MORSE, The International Relations of the Chinese Empire: The Pe‑ riod of Subjection, 1894–1911, Vol. 3, London, Bombay, Calcutta 1918, pp. 367–368. 7 It is interesting that while German military instructors were training Chinese troops, Germany didn’t wish to assist improving of Chinese understanding of diplomacy. In 1896, China announced her intention to build a diplomatic school in Beijing, and asked for British advisor. German Foreign Office (Auswärtiges Amt) recommended caution, and German Minister to China von Heyking disclaimed a notion of British -German school for Chinese diplomats. Finally, the plan came to nought. N. PETERSSON, Imperialismus und Moderni‑ sierung. Siam, China und die europäischen Mächte 1895–1914, München 2000, p. 53. 8 FAIRBANK — LIU, p. 248. 9 Ibidem, pp. 261–262. 10 D. R. REYNOLDS (Ed.), China, 1895–1912: State ‑Sponsored Reforms and China’s Late Qing Revolu tion: Selected Essays from Zhongguo Jindai Shi (Modern Chinese History, 1840–1919), New York 1995, pp. 69–70; FAIRBANK — LIU, pp. 267–268. At this time, there was no uniformi- JAN KOčvAR 43 interesting that during the decisive naval battle of the Sino ‑Japanese war, at Yalu (September 17, 1894), circumstances forced a German army officer (!), who was pres‑ ent on board of Chinese flagship, to assume command of Chinese squadron.11 And on April 23, 1895, after the war, only the Triple Intervention of Russia, Germany, and France saved China from further losses of territory. The intervention was suggested by Russia, and main German aim was to prevent bilateral deepening of Russo ‑French cooperation. But German note to Japan was by far the most sharp.12 The war started a new era of international rivalry in the Far East, and this rivalry was shown also on financial market. The most important of German financial institu‑ tions in China was the Deutsch ‑Asiatische Bank (DAB), established in 1889 by a con‑ sortium led by Deutsche Bank.13 Whereas a Russo ‑French consortium a Russo ‑French consortium lent 400 million francs (15.82 million pounds) to China on July 6, 1895,14 Deutsch ‑Asiatische Bank cooperated with British ‑owned Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC). On March 23, 1896, HSBC and DAB lent 16 million pounds to China, and on February, 1898, this loan was followed by another one of the same amount.15 On June 3, 1896, China concluded a defensive alliance with Russia against Japan and the Russians were granted the right to build the terminal part of the Trans‑ siberian Railroad through Manchurian territory.16 It became clear that this Russian design was endangering Chinese sovereignty, and Russo ‑Chinese relations started ty in Chinese land forces. Several viceroys and governors were training modernized units on their own; various units were equipped by weapons of different origin and calibre; and modern military education was introduced only through private effort of viceroys. Both Li Hongzhang and his colleague Zhang Zhidong, Viceroy of Guangdong and Guangxi, used services of German instructors extensively. 11 FAIRBANK — LIU, p. 106. Previously, both Admiral Ding Ruchang and his British naval advisor have been wounded. This story perhaps relates to German advisor von Hanneken, who was at that time assistant director of the Northern Coastal Navy. REYNOLDS, p. 69. 12 As a possible explanation of the perceived difference between the German note and the other ones, inaccurate transcription of the original text into Japanese was suggested. A. M. POOLEY (Ed.), The Secret Memoirs of Count Tadasu Hayashi, Basingstoke 2002, pp. 82–84; M. KAJIMA, The Emergence of Japan as a World Power, 1895–1925, Vermont, Tokyo 1968, p. 16. Nevertheless, German Minister to Japan, von Gutschmid, was well aware of the difference, as shown in his report to Berlin from April 23, 1895. Whereas the Russian note pointed out that the “resistance” again three great powers was impossible, the German note clearly used the term “fight”. Die Grosse Politik der europäischen Kabinette, 1871–1914 (further only GP), J. LEPSIUS — A. MENDELSOHN -BARTHOLDY — F. THIMME (Hrsg.), Bd. IX, Berlin 1923, Nr. 2252, pp. 275–278. A distinguished scholar Ian Nish is of the opinion that the sharpness of the note was a result of temporal state of mind of German Emperor Wilhelm II. I. H. NISH, Japan’s Foreign Policy, 1869–1942: Kasumigaseki to Miyakezaka, London, Henley, Boston 1977, p. 40. 13 http://www.bankgeschichte.de/de/docs/Chronik_D_Bank.pdf , p. 34, [2014–09–07]. 14 MORSE, International Relations, Vol. 3, p. 53. 15 P. KŘIVSKÝ — A. SKŘIVAN, Století odchází: Světla a stíny „belle époque“, 2nd Ed., Praha 2004, pp. 270, 283; MORSE, International Relations, Vol. 3, pp. 53–54, 116–117. 16 KAJIMA, pp. 49–53. The author, however, states erroneously that the treaty was signed on May 22, 1896. 44 PRAGUE PAPERS ON THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 1/2014 to deteriorate. Later, German Minister to China Edmund von Heyking (1850–1915) privately told to his Austro ‑Hungarian colleague Moriz von Czikann that he got the impression that Chinese officials were weary from ties to Russia.17 Did this hint the possibility of closer German ‑Chinese cooperation? Subsequent seizure of Jiaozhou by German forces thwarted any chance on such a development, had it existed at all. German policy in China was inevitably influenced by German opinion on China and the Chinese. Between 1896 and 1899, Germany was represented in China by Edmund von Heyking, who arrived to China together with his wife Elisabeth, a famous writer. Her opinion of the Chinese was most unpleasant: “Whatever the Chinese may have been in the past, today they are nothing but dirty barbarians who need a European master and not a Eu‑ ropean ambassador — the sooner the better!”, she wrote in her diaries in 1897.18 German Minister to Japan, von Gutschmid, was allegedly even straighter when he explained to his Chinese colleague in Japan: “You Orientals are just plain beasts.“19 A splendid example of an opposite view was Paul Georg von Möllendorff, an employee of the Imperial Mari‑ time Customs Service. Originally sent by enlightened Viceroy Li Hongzhang to Korea in order to promote Chinese influence, he sided with the Koreans, respected Korean customs, and tried to strengthen international position of Korea.20 Nevertheless, Ger‑ man policy in China, as well as policy of other nations, was based on sense of white superiority.21 This view was based on racial, cultural, as well as religious differences. But China was not considered only backward and unenlightened, but also poten‑ tially dangerous. This sentiment wasn’t new. Prior to 1894, China seemed to be a rela‑ tively strong country.22 Her armed forces were in the process of gradual moderniza‑ tion and her navy was considered the strongest in the Far East. Chinese authorities planned building a railway through Manchuria and even demanded retrocession of the Possieta Bay, surrendered to Russia in 1860. The Russians were so alerted by grow‑ ing Chinese assertiveness that they finally started building the Transsiberian Railway in 1891.23 Within a few years, everything had changed.24 The defeat of 1894–1895 led to the struggle for concessions and spheres of influence. Nevertheless, the very defeat 17 Haus -, Hof - und Staatsarchiv, Wien (further only HHStA), Politisches Archiv (further only PA) XXIX, China, Karton (further only Kt.) 6, Berichte 1898, Nr. 2. Czikann an Gołu chowski, Peking, January 7, 1898. 18 G. STEINMETZ, The Devil’s Handwriting: Precoloniality and the German Colonial State in Qin‑ gdao, Samoa, and Southwest Africa, Chicago, London 2007, p. 361. 19 Quoted in: D. SCOTT, China and the International System, 1840–1949: Power, Presence, and Per‑ ceptions in the Century of Humiliation, Albany 2008, pp. 129–130. 20 MORSE, International Relations, Vol. 3, pp. 10–13. 21 For various aspects of Sinophilia and Sinophobia, see STEINMETZ, pp. 361–421. 22 Already in 1883, Edmund Fitzmaurice, a member of British Parliament, stated: “The Chi‑ nese Empire in the last few years had shown an extraordinary recuperative power (…) occupied a position in Asia almost equal to the most palm days of its history.” Quoted in: SCOTT, p. 82. 23 W. L. LANGER, The Diplomacy of Imperialism, 1890–1902, New York 1951, pp. 171–172; A. MALOZEMOFF, Russian Far Eastern Policy, 1881–1904: With Special Emphasis on the Causes of the Russo ‑Japanese War, Berkeley, Los Angeles 1958, pp. 26–27, 38–40. 24 “The war showed the world for the first time how astonishingly the Great Qing Empire — which had been aggressively flexing its muscles around its peripheries for several decades — really was.” W. T. ROWE, China’s Last Empire: The Great Qing, Cambridge, London 2009, p. 230. JAN KOčvAR 45 of China by modernized Japan was a proof of inherent capability of Asian nations. The Manchus perhaps were unable to modernize China on their own — in fact, they were frequently considered inferior even to the Chinese –, but many Western ob‑ servers have just learned to fear Japanese designs. During the Sino ‑Japanese War, the Japanese have forcibly initiated reforms in Korea, and after the war they started assisting Chinese reforms as well. The prospect of modernized China under Japanese tutelage was horrible. And Japan herself, which started to court China after the war, had clearly proven both her willingness and potential to achieve such a change. German Emperor was among the first to acknowledge this fact. Already in 1895, he ordered a famous painter Hermann Knackfuss to draw a picture called “The Yellow Peril”, or “Peoples of Europe, Protect You Most Sacred Possessions” (“Völker Europas, wahrt eure heiligsten Güter”). The picture, based on a sketch by Wilhelm II himself, depicted armed female personifications of European great powers, led by Archangel Michael, united under a cross and watching a European city threatened by dark cloud with a dragon and Buddha in its middle. The picture had to express Emperor’s wish to unite European countries both against the Yellow Peril and against “anarchism, repub‑ licanism, and nihilism”. Wilhelm II’s special envoy, Helmuth von Moltke the Younger, presented the picture to Russian Czar, who was much pleased.25 German Emperor considered Russia a bulwark against Asian Paganism and cultural threat, i.e. against the Yellow Peril.26 Such German attitude towards Asian countries couldn’t fail to have consequences both in Beijing and Shandong. The first great power rewarded for the Triple Intervention was France. Already in 1895 the French annexed large territory at Sino ‑Laotian border.27 The British followed French lead and in February, 1897, compelled China to agree with a “rectification” of Sino ‑Burmese border.28 But these areas, although large, were too remote and insig‑ nificant, and their loss didn’t cause much disaffection in Beijing. Russian schemes in Manchuria went hand in hand with French desire to build a railway from French In‑ dochina to Chinese province of Guangxi. Yet the beginning of a new phase of humili‑ ation of China is attributed to Germany. On 1 November 1897, two German Catholic missionaries belonging to the Society of the Divine Word were murdered in the Juye county in Shandong,29 either by casual bandits or, more probably, by the Big Knife So‑ ciety (Dadaohui).30 In retaliation, on November 14, German forces under command of 25 LANGER, p. 448; PURCELL, p. 90; STEINMETZ, pp. 426–427. The picture is available at http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Datei:Voelker_Europas.jpg, [2014–09–07]. The lady hugging Germania isn’t Austria -Hungary, her ally, but Russia. 26 Nevertheless, many observers dismissed the very idea of the “Yellow Peril”, whereas others feared that the main threat is represented by the possibility of conquest and modernization of China by Russia herself. SCOTT, pp. 136–138. 27 J. CHESNEAUX — M. BASTID — M. -C. BERGÈRE, China from the Opium Wars to the 1911 Rev‑ olution, New York 1976, p. 294. 28 LANGER, p. 395. 29 For more information about this Juye Incident, see J. W. ESHERICK, The Origins of the Box‑ er Uprising, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London 1987, pp. 123–127. 30 This name is usually translated as “Big Sword Society”. Yet the character “dāo” 刀 means either a “knife” or a “short sword”. Since it doesn’t make sense to speak about a big short sword, I prefer the less common translation. 46 PRAGUE PAPERS ON THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 1/2014 Admiral Diederichs occupied the Jiaozhou Bay on eastern coast of Shandong.31 Finally, on 6 March 1898 Chinese Imperial court leased the area of Jiaozhou to Germany for 99 years, the entire province was declared German sphere of influence, and Germany was given the right to construct two railways from Jiaozhou to the province capital of Jinan. On 27 April 1898, Germany officially declared Jiaozhou her colony (Schutzgebiet). Even so, Chinese provincial officials constantly discussed the precise legal status of the leased territory, which encompassed 553 km². Qingdao, so far a small coastal village, became centre of the new colony and was transformed into a large city with distinc‑ tively German character. Around the leased area proper was created a 50 km ‑wide zone in which German troops were allowed to operate at will — they didn’t respect its boundaries, anyway.32 Jiaozhou was protected by newly formed Third Naval Bat‑ talion (III Seebataillon) of marine infantry. The colonial administration was subject to German navy. The first governor was appointed Captain33 Kurt Rosendahl. In 1899, he was succeeded by Captain Paul Jaeschke, who died on 27 January 1901, while in office. The only other foreign enclave in Shandong was the naval base in Weihaiwei, which was in February 1895 occupied by Japanese troops. The British wished to re‑ place Japan in possession of Weihaiwei, should the Liaodong Peninsula fall into Rus‑ sian hands, and on 20 March 1898, after Russian seizure of Port Arthur, the British started negotiations with Japan to that end. The Japanese approved the British move, for they were eager to cooperate with the United Kingdom.34 On 25 March 1898 British cabinet finally agreed upon the seizure of Weihaiwei, and the Chinese consented on 2 April.35 Negotiations with the Germans led to a declaration of 20 April 1898, whereby 31 German interest on the Jiaozhou Bay was relatively old. The Prussian expedition of 1860– 1861 noticed its advantageous position for the first time. On March 11, 1895, German Auswär‑ tiges Amt suggested to German navy that Germany could intervene on China’s behalf during peace negotiations in exchange for a suitable naval base. German Minister to China Gustav Adolf Schenck zu Schweinsberg had recommended Jiaozhou again. GP, Bd. XVI, Berlin 1924, Nr. 1628, pp. 5–7. In 1896, Admiral Tirpitz, who was at that time commander of German naval forces in the Far East, also suggested seizure of Jiaozhou. However, Russian war vessels have already spent there the winter of 1895–1896, which accordingly to customs of the age gave priority claim on the bay to Russia. In spring, 1897, the Germans informed Russia, Austria- -Hungary and Italy about their intention to acquire a naval base in China, and sent a powerful squadron led by Admiral Diederichs to the Far East. In August, German Emperor visited his Russian cousin, obtained his approval with German seizure of Jiaozhou, and promised him to support similar Russian action elsewhere. Both Wilhelm II and bishop Anzer were decided to utilize the murder and seize Jiaozhou. LANGER, pp. 451–452; ESHERICK, p. 130. 32 G. STEINMETZ, Qingdao as a Colony: From Apartheid to Civilizational Exchange. Paper prepared for the Johns Hopkins Workshops in Comparative History of Science and Technology, “Science, Technology and Modernity: Colonial Cities in Asia, 1890–1940,” Baltimore, January 16th–17th, 2009, p. 15. Available at: http://www -personal.umich.edu/~geostein/ docs/Qingdaocolony.pdf; [2014–09–07]. 33 All governors of Jiaozhou held the rank “Kapitän zur See”, which is equivalent to “Captain at Sea”. 34 KAJIMA, pp. 100–101. 35 T. G. OTTE, The China Question: Great Power Rivalry and British Isolation, 1894–1905, Oxford 2007, pp. 122–127. JAN KOčvAR 47 the British pledged themselves not to connect Weihaiwei with Shandong interior by a railway and to restrain from “injuring or contesting the interests of Germany in the Province of Shantung, or of creating difficulties for her in that province”.36 During private meetings between British statesman Joseph Chamberlain and German Ambassador to the United Kingdom Hatzfeldt, Chamberlain even suggested joint German ‑British protectorate over China in order to prevent Russian encroachment.37 The Japanese still held Weihaiwei until the war indemnity was paid by the Chinese, i.e. until 9 May 1898. On 24 May, the British replaced Japanese occupants in order to counterbalance Russian occupation of the Liaodong Peninsula.38 German seizure of Jiaozhou differed from previous aggrandizement of French Laos and British Burma in several aspects. Firstly, it wasn’t achieved by negotiations, but by direct action of German armed forces. Secondly, Jiaozhou wasn’t an insignificant area on the end of the Chinese world. Even though the settlement of Qingdao was inhab‑ ited only by few fishermen at that time, it lay in one of core provinces of China proper. Thirdly, despite earlier permanent “rectifications of borders” and requests for railway concessions, the seizure of Jiaozhou was the act which initiated the true scramble for concessions and spheres of influence. What else could enrage the Chinese more? Nev‑ ertheless, Chinese foreign relations in 1890’s were as turbulent as Chinese domestic policy. These relations were undergoing a constant change, which meant, generally speaking, only deteriorating. British prestige in China was seriously weakened when the British refused to support China during the Sino ‑Japanese war. As a result, embit‑ tered Chinese turned to Russia. But, as a result of factional struggle at the court, the Russians were increasing their demands. Their ships spent the winter of 1897–1898 in Port Arthur, and in March 1898, Russia seized both Port Arthur and Dalny at the Lia‑ odong Peninsula. On the other hand, Japanese government started courting Chinese court and the relationship between two Asian empires greatly improved. Therefore the possibility of improvement of relations between Germany and China was not a priori precluded even after the seizure of Jiaozhou. However, German policy to‑ wards China was quite different, exploiting the weakness of the Middle Kingdom. Other powers followed German example. The Russians not only seized the Lia‑ odong Peninsula, but also extended their influence throughout Manchuria, Mongo‑ lia, and Chinese Turkestan. The French reserved for themselves area of provinces bordering to Indochina39 and established a naval base at Guangzhouwan in western Guangdong. The British leased additional territory in the neighbourhood of Hong Kong and exacted on China a pledge of non ‑alienation of all provinces in the Yangzi (Chang Jiang) basin — no other power was allowed to obtain any special rights there or any part of the provinces. The Japanese requested and obtained similar assurances in respect to Fujian. Various foreign nations were granted many economic rights throughout China, especially railway and mining concessions. 36 MORSE, International Relations, Vol. 3, p. 119; OTTE, p. 130. 37 OTTE, pp. 147–148. 38 MORSE, International Relations, Vol. 3, p. 118. 39 I.e. Yunnan, Guangxi, and western part of Guangdong — the British prevented any extension of such a privileged French position to the vicinity of Hong Kong. Eastern Guangdong fell under British influence. 48 PRAGUE PAPERS ON THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 1/2014 For the time being, China was saved from greater losses only by her enormous di‑ mensions and by mutual rivalry of the great powers. The progressive part of Chinese society desperately felt the necessity to modernize China. The most influential advo‑ cate of reforms was a young Cantonese scholar Kang Youwei (1858–1927), who gained Guangxu’s trust. Since 11 June 1898, many reform edicts were issued. Foreign diplo‑ mats including German Minister didn’t believe in success of the reforms.40 Since the pace of reforms was ever increasing, many dignitaries started feeling threatened. Fi‑ nally, the reform effort was hindered especially by conservatism and lack of coopera‑ tion, if not direct opposition, of most officials and even the Empress Dowager Cixi herself. In September, the rift between reformers and conservatives was too deep, and both sides were plotting against each other.41 The reformers tried to persuade Yuan Shikai (1859–1916) a brilliant commander of Han Chinese origin, to support their cause; yet Yuan betrayed their plans to his superior Ronglu.42 On 21 September 1898, the Empress Dowager executed a successful coup d’état, imprisoned Guangxu and executed many reformers (Kang Youwei himself managed to escape).43 “It is by such methods as were now to be adopted that general elections are held in Asiatic countries.”44 The conflict had a substantial “racial” dimension. The reformers were Han Chi‑ nese, especially Southerners — in China, there existed a significant mistrust between people from the South and the North, and this contributed to cold reception of reforms by many Han officials born in the North. The victorious reactionary clique, since the September coup controlling the Beijing court, was formed by Manchu aristocrats, in‑ cluding close relatives of the Empress Dowager. Among the most prominent Manchu reactionaries was Zaiyi, Prince Duan (1856–1922), who wished the appointment of his own son Pujun (1886–1929) heir apparent. That would facilitate Guangxu’s elimina‑ tion. Yet immense pressure prevented such a move. Immediately after the coup d’état, dignitaries and gentry throughout all China declared sympathy towards the Emperor. Even more significantly, diplomats of all countries with the exception of Russia were concerned by Emperor’s “poor health” and explained that they were accredited by the Emperor’s person. As a result, a French physician was allowed to visit the Emperor, and diagnosed kidney disease and overall weakening of organism.45 For the time be‑ 40 PETERSSON, p. 70. 41 MORSE, International Relations, Vol. 3, p. 141. 42 The role of Yuan Shikai is analyzed by Jerome Ch’en and H. B. Morse. J. CH’EN, Yuan Shih‑ ‑k’ai, 1859–1916: Brutus Assumes the Purple, Stanford 1961, pp. 55–62; MORSE, International Relations, Vol. 3, pp. 141–144. Ronglu (1836–1903) was Manchu aristocrat who was on best terms with the Empress Dowager Cixi. During his life he held top -ranking military and governmental posts, and he was the maternal grandfather of the past Manchu Emperor Puyi. 43 Minister Heyking refused to join a plea of his British colleague MacDonald to save life of a prominent reformer and diplomat Zhang Yinhuan, who had been sentenced to death. PETERSSON, p. 72. Finally, Zhang was pardoned and sent into exile in Chinese Turkestan, only to die at the very end of the “Boxer Uprising”. A. W. HUMMEL (Ed.), Eminent Chinese of the Ch’ing Period (1644–1912): (A–O), Vol. 1, Washington 1943, p. 63. 44 MORSE, International Relations, Vol. 3, p. 144. 45 HHStA, PA XXIX, China, Kt. 5, Berichte 1898, Nr. 22. Czikann an Gołuchowski, Peking, October 24, 1898; XIANG, Lanxin, The Origins of the Boxer War: A Multinational Study, London, New York 2003, p. 23. JAN KOčvAR 49 ing, Guangxu’s life was saved by pressure of foreigners and governors. Nevertheless, the unfortunate Emperor remained for the rest of his life46 absolutely powerless, bul‑ lied and supervised by the Empress Dowager Cixi. The concern of foreign powers including Germany for Guangxu’s life was deeply detested by Manchu aristocracy at the court. Immediately after the coup, unruly elements started attacking Christians and foreigners in the area of Beijing. Foreign diplomats decided to summon significant number of troops to Beijing as legation guards. The position of the victorious court faction was far from secure. The court feared both foreign intervention and insur‑ gency led by partisans of the Hundred Days of Reform. On 5 and 8 November 1898, two edicts have encouraged loyal Qing subjects to form militia.47 Moreover, the court summoned reinforcements to the vicinity of Beijing, some 30,000 men altogether. About half of these troops were Muslims from the province of Gansu, nicknamed “Gansu Braves”. They were under command of General Dong Fuxiang (1839–1908). Their background didn’t prevent them from ruthlessly crushing the revolt of Gansu Muslims of 1895–1896. Unfortunately, both Dong and his troops hated the foreigners, and these soldiers, being unpaid for a long time, started plundering the Beijing met‑ ropolitan area and threatening the Christians and foreigners on their own.48 As a re‑ sult, foreign diplomats in Beijing twice sent a collective note to the Zongli Yamen,49 demanding withdrawal of Dong’s troops. Chinese diplomats, perhaps fearing harsh German action, asked Heyking not to do anything which could be considered as an undue pressure on the Empress Dowager.50 Finally, Dong’s troops were withdrawn.51 In early 1899, the great powers recalled their legation guards from Beijing. The Germans and Italians have delayed the withdrawal of their troops, whose presence constituted a sort of pressure on Chinese government.52 Whereas the Germans de‑ sired concessions in Shandong, the Italians wished to acquire a naval base on Chinese coast. On 10 March 1899, Italian Minister to China Di Martino presented an ultima‑ 46 The Guangxu Emperor died at the same time as the Empress Dowager Cixi, in November 1908. Chinese court publicly declared that he had died on 14 November 1908, the day before Cixi’s death. However, the precise date and cause of his death will be forever unknown. MORSE, International Relations, Vol. 3, pp. 441–442; CH’EN, p. 98. 47 Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, Berlin (further only PA AA), R 18244. Nr. 1248, Ketteler an Auswärtiges Amt, Peking, December 16, 1899; C. T. TAN, The Boxer Catastrophe, New York 1955, p. 41. Such a move had been already suggested by the reformers. ESHERICK, p. 173. 48 HHStA, PA XXIX, China, Kt. 5, Berichte 1898, Nr. 23c. Czikann an Gołuchowski, Peking, October 31, 1898. 49 Zongli Yamen (“Office for General Management”) was created in 1861 in order to manage dealings with foreigners. For the most part of its existence it was presided over by Prince Gong, chief collaborator of the Empress Dowager Cixi. After the “Boxer Uprising”, it was replaced by a normal ministry for foreign affairs (Waiwubu). 50 HHStA, PA XXIX, China, Kt. 5, Berichte 1898, Nr. 24b. Czikann an Gołuchowski, Peking, November 13, 1898. 51 MORSE, International Relations, Vol. 3, pp. 151–153. 52 HHStA, PA XXIX, China, Kt. 6, Berichte 1899, Nr. 3. Czikann an Gołuchowski, Peking, April 4, 1899. 56 PRAGUE PAPERS ON THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 1/2014 The effort of Anzer and his colleagues bore its fruit. In 1882 there were relatively few Christians in his theatre of operations.88 After the “Boxer Uprising”, no less than 47,221 Catholics and 85 Catholic missionaries lived in Shandong, together with 14,776 Protestants and 180 Protestant missionaries.89 This difference in effectiveness of proselytizing was partially due to the fact that the Catholics were less interested in moral profile of their “sheep” and slightly more willing to support them against Chinese officials than the Protestants. Some Protestant missionaries were occasion‑ ally purging their flock from unlawful elements; yet Protestant arrogant sense of superiority over Chinese “superstitions” was no way lesser than the Catholic one. The very same foreigners who considered their sacred duty to get China rid of bad habits of her people had certain bad habits on their own. One of these bad habits was the eagerness to put pressure on the Imperial court in order to punish officials under whose jurisdiction attacks on foreign subjects took place. After two German mission‑ aries were murdered on 1 November 1897, the Germans demanded punishment of Li Bingheng, who was at that time governor of Shandong and was already promised the viceroyalty of Sichuan. The court originally hesitated,90 but on 15 January 1898 finally succumbed to German pressure. Not only didn’t Li Bingheng become viceroy of Si‑ chuan, but he was forbidden to be employed in any official post again.91 In 1900 this injustice was washed off by rivers of blood, for Li Bingheng gained Imperial favour again, supported the anti ‑foreign violence, and took his revenge on Christians, for‑ eigners, and moderate dignitaries at the court. Li Bingheng was succeeded by Zhang Rumei. Arrogant German behaviour had consequences in the sphere on which the Ger‑ mans were so proud. Prior to the seizure of Jiaozhou, the position of German military advisors in Chinese land forces was superior to position of any other advisors. In late 1890’s, this German position was questioned, and finally lost, due both to disappoint‑ ment by German aggressive behaviour after 1897 and to rise of competition among foreigners. Both Russia and Japan spared no effort to replace German advisors. This was evident in case of the Guard Army, deployed not far from Beijing, led by Ron‑ glu, and divided into five divisions or “armies”. “Tenacious Army” of General Nie Shicheng was originally led by German advisers; yet Russian mission led by Lt. Col. Woronov managed to oust them all.92 Brilliant military leader Yuan Shikai, who had to shape China’s destiny in the decades to come, had experience with the Germans as well. Since 1895 he led the “Newly Created Army”, or “Guard to the Right”, which was composed largely from recruits from Shandong. Not only did Yuan accept Ger‑ man military advisors, he even ordered his subordinates to recite the Introductory 88 Joseph Esherick states that in Shandong already lived 4,000 Christians in 1839, whereas Vatican online source claims that no more than 158 Catholics lived there in 1881, although it doesn’t state unequivocally whether or not the number relates to Shandong or southern Shandong. ESHERICK, p. 77; http://www.vatican.va/news_services/liturgy/saints/ns_lit_ doc_20031005_freinademetz_en.html, [2014–09–07]. 89 ESHERICK, p. 79. 90 MORSE, International Relations, Vol. 3, p. 107. 91 STEINMETZ, Qingdao, p. 3. 92 REYNOLDS, p. 72. JAN KOčvAR 57 Manual of German Army Drills “until they gradually understood it”.93 Yet in 1899 some 40 Japanese instructors arrived to China, only to be followed by many others.94 In the fol‑ lowing years Yuan started relying on Japanese help, and as a result, he had 175 Japan advisors in 1908. At that time, Japanese military advisors have replaced most of other foreigners with the exception of a handful of Germans. It is an irony that Meiji Japan herself had modernized her army under German tutelage.95 A sort of a vicious circle was operating in Shandong. Financial problems forced the authorities to dismiss large part of military forces in the province. Prior to the Sino ‑Japanese War, there were almost 50,000 troops on the payroll in Shandong, but these numbers have dropped to 30,000 in 1897 and to some 21,000 only in 1898. Fear from further German designs, and undoubtedly also from subsequent rage of the Imperial court, forced the authorities to deploy the remaining troops in eastern Shan‑ dong and at the coast, whereas the interior of Shandong was left with insufficient force.96 Dismissed troops (had they existed at all, for Chinese commanders were of‑ ten reporting higher numbers of troops under their command, and then embezzled their salary) became unemployed, thus tempted to resort to banditry. Even if the ban‑ dits hadn’t attacked the foreigners themselves, the need to fight the bandits was the reason why many Chinese joined the “Boxers”. In other words, strategic decisions caused by foreign aggression led to such unrest that the foreigners gained a pretext to another aggression. In Chinese society, there was an ancient tradition of forming various secret soci‑ eties and sects. Some of them were well known — and feared — for centuries, while others were relatively new. In 1890’s the Big Knife Society was formed in western Shandong, started fighting banditry, and cooperated with local officials. In June 1896 when the society turned against Christians, looting their possessions but not killing a single one of them. In July, the Big Knife Society was ruthlessly suppressed by Yux‑ ian, a Manchu who was at that time prefect of Caozhou.97 Soon thereafter, a dangerous mass movement emerged in Shandong. In the West it is known as the “Boxers”. Since it was a secret society, little is known about its inten‑ tions, history, or even original name. Accordingly to an official named Lao Naixian, the sect was a branch of the Eight Trigram Society, which had unsuccessfully at‑ tempted to overthrow the dynasty in 1813 and then went into hiding. An alternative theory by scholar George N. Steiger states that the movement was had originated as a militia founded in accordance with decrees from November 1898. The attitude of the “Boxers” toward the Manchu dynasty was most uncertain. It is most probable that among them were both loyal and disloyal elements, and that most of newly ‑admitted members in later phases of the movement weren’t informed about seditious designs, had such designs existed. Anyway, the battle ‑cry of the “Boxers” was “Support the Qing, exterminate the foreigner” (Fu Qing mie yang). Official attitude towards the move‑ ment was indecisive. The movement originally called itself Yihequan, or “Righteous 93 Ibidem, p. 70. 94 PURCELL, p. 100. 95 REYNOLDS, pp. 74–77. 96 ESHERICK, pp. 170–173. 97 Ibidem, pp. 115–122, 191–192. 58 PRAGUE PAPERS ON THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 1/2014 and Harmonious Fists”, hence the nickname “Boxers”. Sometimes in 1898 or in 1899 the name had changed to Yihetuan, or “Righteous and Harmonious Militia”. In 1899, the foreigners for the first time noted the existence of the anti ‑foreign movement in Shandong, even though they weren’t certain about its name. The roots of the movement were discussed in an article in “Shen Pao”, Chinese newspapers printed in Shanghai.98 Accordingly to the article, a sect was founded by Zhu Hong‑ deng, a bandit chief who repeatedly changed both its name and territory of opera‑ tions. Originally his society was supposed to be called “Red Lantern”,99 “Armor of the Golden Bell”,100 “Iron ‑cloth Shirt” and “Great Water Sect”.101 After a clash with governmental troops, Zhu was supposed to have renamed his society to Yihequan and, ultimately, to Yihetuan. On 15 March 1899 the court gave up to a long ‑term goal of the Catholic Church and recognized equality of Catholic clergy with Chinese dignitaries of equivalent rank.102 Thus, Anzer was considered equal in dignity to governors and viceroys of the same country whose sovereignty and dignity he was constantly ignoring. It is interesting that Anglican bishops refused the same position.103 Yet the foreigners in Shandong were occupied by other matters. In late 1898 the magistrate of Yizhou declared that he would no more send troops in order to protect missionaries without direct orders from the governor.104 In November 1898 a Catholic priest Georg Stenz from SVD has temporarily arrested or kidnapped in a port town of Rizhao in southeast Shandong. It is most probable that this incident wasn’t connected with the Yihetuan movement. Bishop Anzer at first contended himself with a huge indemnity, but Heyking refused. German governor of Jiaozhou Jaeschke sent investigators, who were threatened by the Chinese as well. With approval from Berlin, two punitive expeditions took place; two villages in the Yizhou prefecture were burnt and many Chinese killed. After some pe‑ riod of occupation of Rizhou by German troops, their commander invited local gentry to a meeting, captured five of them and took them as hostages to Qingdao.105 Another punitive expedition was connected with violating of German railway property. Even though the SEG hasn’t been founded yet, German engineers and workers already started surveying the proposed route and even preparing terrain for the railway track. When Chinese villagers started removing survey markers, German mariners 98 Quoted in Berliner Neueste Nachrichten. Die “Boxer” in Schantung, Berliner Neueste Nach‑ richten, April 6, 1900. 99 “Rother Lampenschirm” in German original. Although the word “Lampenschirm” means “lampshade”, it is most probable that the author had confused the “Boxer” society itself with its female branch called “Red Lanterns”. 100 “Schleier der goldenen Glocke” in the original article. A spiritual technique called “Armor of the Golden Bell” was exercised in Shandong in 1890’s. ESHERICK, pp. 104–106. 101 In the original article, it is transcribed “Tatauhui”. It seems that the correspondent had mistranslated the name of the Big Knife Society. 102 PURCELL, p. 77. 103 Ibidem, note 4 on p. 302. 104 MORSE, International Relations, Vol. 3, p. 173. 105 Ibidem, pp. 174–175; ESHERICK, pp. 187–190; STEINMETZ, Qingdao, p. 15. Whereas Morse claims that Rizhao was occupied for six weeks, Steinmetz states that the hostages were dragged away after five days of German occupation. JAN KOčvAR 59 stole their cattle and killed two Chinese in the process.106 Such brutal measures were perhaps adopted partially from fear that the Germans would otherwise lose face, even in the eyes of other foreigners. More fortunate Chinese were “only” fined — the for‑ eigners were extorting huge sums indeed, both from the people and from the govern‑ ment. In the period of 1897–1899, the missionaries accepted 104,000 taels altogether.107 Zhang Rumei was so occupied by foreign threat that he absolutely neglected the care of dikes at the Yellow River. In summer 1898, severe floods followed, and as a con‑ sequence, Zhang Rumei was dismissed in spring 1899.108 On 11 April 1899, his succes‑ sor Yuxian assumed his office. He was a Manchu conservative who was favourably disposed to the Yihetuan movement. Although his original attitude toward the “Box‑ ers” is disputed,109 he had finally shown himself to be great supporter. Yuxian was of the opinion that among the “Boxers” were both loyal and disloyal elements, and he in‑ tended to use the loyal ones as militia. He had shown a high self ‑esteem when he tried to negotiate indemnity for destroyed property and Chinese killed by the Germans, and even asked Zongli Yamen to ask German government to replace officials respon‑ sible for punitive expeditions.110 This effort was unsuccessful, but German campaign from spring 1899 was followed and counterweighted by temporal transfer of large detachments of the Guard Army from Zhili to Shandong. Of course the Germans weren’t intimidated. Instead, they started another pun‑ ishment operation. Between June 23 and July 10, 1899, forces of Captain Mauve were sent to punish the city Gaomi for attacks against German railway workers. Soon thereafter, between July 22 and August 11, 1899, Shandong’s countryside became tar‑ get of another expedition by Lieutenant von Rettberg and his cavalry detachment. The expenses of Rettberg’s expedition amounted to 1,782.02 marks, the expedition to Goumi cost 7,126.57 marks. Fortunately, these expenses were partially paid by a con‑ tribution forced upon local officials, which totalled 2,402.05 marks.111 But such mea‑ sures couldn’t suppress the entire province. Already on July 26, 1899, Ketteler both informed and warned Governor Jaeschke by a 32 ‑pages long message. He was of the opinion that even though the governor of Shandong had originally supported xeno‑ phobic sects (Big Knife Society and “Red Fist”, i.e. the “Boxers”), they got entirely out of his influence and have merged with state ‑supported and state ‑armed militia.112 In late August, disturbances in Shandong forced Minister Ketteler to warn the Zongli Yamen that “if they cannot control their people and prevent their interference with the railway construction, Germany will take the matter in hand herself”.113 One week later, the Germans discovered a group of Chinese who planned to attack the railway. Many plotters were arrested and weapons in their possession confiscated.114 106 ESHERICK, p. 184; STEINMETZ, Qingdao, p. 15. 107 CHESNEAUX — BASTID — BERGÈRE, p. 329. 108 ESHERICK, pp. 177–180. 109 Ibidem, pp. 190–192, 198–202. 110 Ibidem, p 193. 111 PA AA, R 18244 Nr. 254. J. Jaeschke, Tsingtau, February 2, 1900. 2 Beilagen. 112 PA AA, R 18244, Nr. 1248. Ketteler an Auswärtiges Amt, Peking, December 16, 1899. 113 Peking & Tientsin Times, August 26, 1899. 114 Peking & Tientsin Times, September 2, 1899. 60 PRAGUE PAPERS ON THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 1/2014 In late 1898, the “Boxers” from north ‑western Shandong for the first time openly displayed their exercise. They were publicly practicing martial arts, believing that they were securing invulnerability by magical means. Thereafter they harassed Chi‑ nese Christians. In October 1899, large “Boxer” disturbances in northwest Shandong forced local authorities to use open force. Governor Yuxian dismissed the dignitar‑ ies responsible for suppression of the Yihetuan movement, even though he used the substantiated pretext that their troops have got out of control and endangered peaceful inhabitants.115 While the Yihetuan movement flourished in Shandong, i.e. on south ‑eastern border of Zhili, another violent resistance against foreigners was taking place in Russian ‑occupied Manchuria, to the north ‑east of Zhili. Manchurian bandits — khunkhuzy (Honghuzi — lit. “Redbeards” in Chinese) — were relentlessly attacking Russian targets both before and after the “Boxer Uprising”. Yet their behav‑ iour was too criminal in its nature, and they had no distinct ideology on their own, so their influence on events outside Manchuria was negligible. At the end of 1899, the situation in Shandong was turbulent, and the interior of the province didn’t resemble sphere of German influence. In November, the “Boxers” started attacking foreign targets and Christian targets on a large scale and at some places engaged in bloody clashes with well ‑armed converts. Employees of SEG were attacked, and the railway construction was temporarily halted. On December 1, 1899, Anzer reported to Ketteler that German missionary area was at peace.116 Yet Ketteler’s report of December 16, 1899 reiterated minister’s fear from Chinese sects which have merged with militia.117 At that time, Shandong had finally received a governor able to cope with the situation. On December 6, 1899, Yuxian was recalled to Beijing “on consultations” and replaced by Yuan Shikai. Yuxian was indeed granted an audience at the court and he spoke in favour of utilization of the Yihetuan movement against the foreigners. This was in absolute accordance with traditional Chinese policy — countless notable military leaders were origi‑ nally bandits, pirates, insurgents or rascals of all kinds, until they were pardoned by the authorities. In March, 1900, Yuxian was appointed governor of Shanxi, and he became notorious for massacres which took place in that province during the “Boxer Uprising”. In contrary, Yuan Shikai clearly saw the threat posed by the Boxers” and was fully determined not to get into trouble. Yuan also knew that his power was based solely on the “Newly Created Army”, which followed him to Shandong. “The first thing Yuan did was to test the Boxers invulnerability.” In a memorial to the throne of January 13, 1900, Yuan pointed out that several hundreds of “Boxers” were unable to conquer a single fortified church. “How can they wipe out the foreigners,” he asked?118 It is a mat‑ ter of paradox that the situation in Shandong didn’t improve, and the first murder of a stranger, British missionary Brooks, took place on December 31, 1899, i.e. only after 115 ESHERICK, pp. 246–257; MORSE, International Relations, Vol. 3, p. 177. 116 PA AA, R 18243. Telegramm Nr. 140. Ketteler an Auswärtiges Amt, Peking, December 7, 1899. 117 PA AA, R 18244. Nr. 1248. Ketteler an Auswärtiges Amt, Peking, December 16, 1899. 118 CH’EN, p. 66. JAN KOčvAR 61 Yuan had assumed his duty in Shandong.119 Assaults by Chinese mobs on construction workers caused the construction of the Shandong railway to be interrupted anew be‑ tween December, 1899, and February, 1900.120 Yet the focus of the Yihetuan movement moved to the metropolitan province of Zhili. At the same time, on January 24, 1900, Prince Duan’s son Pujun was appointed heir apparent at last. It was a clear proof of power of the Manchu reactionary clique; but, at the same time, countless reaffirma‑ tions of loyalty towards Guangxu arrived from the provinces and even from abroad.121 Foreign diplomats failed to congratulate Prince Duan, thus even more annoyed him. With Chinese xenophobes raging in the metropolitan area and Manchu xe‑ nophobes at power at the court, the stage for the “Boxer uprising” was prepared. Germany had contributed much to such a development. Arrogant behaviour of her officials and missionaries and brutality of German troops offended and threatened Chinese dignitaries and people alike. Chinese officials have encountered unjust and biased demands of the foreigners and they had the choice between humiliation and immediate threat of dismissal by their own court, which itself was bullied by for‑ eign powers. Chinese religion wasn’t respected. Chinese population was forced to pay high indemnities; villages were burnt and people killed. Even though Chinese troops were often behaving in equally or even much more brutal manner towards their country ‑fellows, they were after all native to the country, whereas the Germans were simply foreigners, unwelcome, despised, and considered “barbarian”. To sum up, the encounter between two ancient civilizations, the Western and the Chinese one, took a form of a deathmatch. Many foreigners appreciated that. Already in 1857, Gideon Nye, American vice ‑consul in Canton, wrote that “the last armed struggle be‑ tween Paganism and Christianity” was taking place in China.122 Many Chinese, for their part, got the impression that the foreigners were nothing but devils, organizing and arming Chinese criminals and aiming at destroying the very core of Chinese civiliza‑ tion. Since Chinese civilization was considered the only genuine civilization, such destruction would be an analogy of the end of the world. China was ripe for the final battle between light and darkness; yet no ‑one represented the light. ABSTRACT Prior to 1897, Sino ‑German relations were generally peaceful and in some respects beneficiary. Yet since the seizure of Jiaozhou, Germany was following a policy of harshness and used any opportu‑ nity to exert pressure on China. This was due to widespread feeling of racial, cultural, and religious superiority. Even though Germany wasn’t the first great power to gain Chinese territory after the Sino ‑Japanese War, German seizure of Jiaozhou started the Scramble for Concessions. Christian missionaries didn’t respect Chinese beliefs, and they were in most cases supporting their converts 119 Brooks wasn’t killed immediately after his capture. Although he was wounded, he unsuccessfully attempted to escape. Enraged, the bandits beheaded him. MORSE, International Relations, Vol. 3, pp. 178–179; PURCELL, pp. 290–291. 120 PA AA, R 18244. Without number, Schantung Eisenbahn Gesellschaft, Berlin an Schantung Eisenbahn Gesellschaft, Tschingtau, Berlin, February 7, 1900; WENDELS, p. 46. 121 MORSE, International Relations, Vol. 3, pp. 183–185; HHStA, PA XXIX, China, Kt. 6, Berichte 1900, Nr. 3. Czikann an Gołuchowski, Peking, February 19, 1900. 122 Quoted in: SCOTT, p. 36. In the original text, the phrase has been emphasised. 62 PRAGUE PAPERS ON THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 1/2014 against Chinese justice at all costs. The missionaries themselves were supported by Germany. Ger‑ man military had undertaken many punitive expeditions against inhabitants of Shandong, thus radicalized the people. At the same time, the “Boxer” movement had emerged in Shandong Due to inappropriate response of the authorities, the movement gained significance, and at the eve of the year 1900 it was ready to cause havoc in the metropolitan province of Zhili. At the court in Beijing, the most influential group was represented by anti ‑foreign aristocrats. KEYWORDS Germany; China; Qing Dynasty; Triple Intervention; Yellow Peril; Jiaozhou; Qingdao; Boxers; Yihet‑ uan; Imperialism; Missionaries Jan Kočvar | Military History Institute in Prague, U Památníku 2, 130 05 Praha 3 [email protected]