The Fan Affair and the conquest of Algeria
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The Fan Affair and the conquest of Algeria1 Michael Dudzik2 ABSTRACT The study analyses the domestic political background of the conflict that resulted in the French conquest of Algeria. The author begins at the turn of the 18th and 19th centuries when the Paris government bought grain from Algerian merchants. Subsequent economic cooperation, including the provision and collection of loans, negatively affected mutual relations. Deteriorating relations were negatively affected by the appointment of Hussein Pasha as governor of Algeria in 1818, and they further worsened after adiplomatic insult against the French ambassador in April 1827. The article analyses developments in both countries, the gradual escalation of conflicts and their response in the European powers and presents the reasons that prompted the French government to intervene. KEYWORDS France, the conquest of Algeria, Charles X, Jules Prince de Polignac, 1830 INTRODUCTION The tense political and social climate in France at the end of the second decade of the 19th century reflected the citizens’ dissatisfaction with the regime of the returned Bourbons. King Charles X (1757–1836) promoted absolutism and restrictions on the press and relied primarily on the Catholic Church and the pre-revolutionary nobility. Together with the Prime Minister, Prince Jules Auguste Marie de Polignac (1780–1847), he tried to divert public attention from the negative response of extremely conservative domestic policy measures to foreign policy, and use the ageold dispute with Algeria, avassal of the Ottoman Empire, to achieve easy victory and thus raise the prestige of the army and the regime. The study analyses Franco-Algerian economic and political relations after 1818 when Hussein Pasha became Algerian governor. The analysis will focus on business 1 This study was created at Charles University within the SVV 6 program: History between the past, present and future. 2 Mgr. Michael Dudzik, Department of Economic and Social History, Faculty of Arts, Charles University, Náměstí Jana Palacha 1/2, 116 38 Prague, Czech Republic, michael.dudzik@ seznam.cz.
MIcHAEL DUDzIk 59 negotiations and subsequent debt collection in the early 19th century and then assess the impact of economic relations with Algeria on the domestic French political scene. Last but not least, it will evaluate French policy towards Great Britain and Russia in the context of Algerian-French relations. The analysis was based on sources of apersonal nature. Former Prime Minister Viscount Jean-Baptiste Martignac3 commented on Prince Polignac’s views and political thinking in his memoirs. Interesting details were also provided by the memoirs of Alexander Mazas,4 commander of the Ham prison where Polignac was placed after the coup in 1830. The study also used the memoirs of General Louis Bourmont,5 Admiral Victor Duperré6 and an anonymous participant7 in the desert battles in Africa. Statements by members of the government, new laws in Algeria and articles in the French daily press meant to influence public opinion were also analysed. The study develops some of the conclusions of the still fundamental monograph of Sixte de Bourbon8 from the interwar era, as well as amore recent adaptation by Jennifer Sessions,9 whose work presents the circumstances of the development of French society and the growing position of the press in the post-Napoleonic era. Although the authors of the sub-studies, Charles Ageron and James McDougall,10 commented very marginally on this issue, they provided key information for commenting on the elections in France and for the situation in the occupied Algerian territory. Combined with adescription of the volatile situation in the military, the study presents apicture of the continuous deterioration of French society, culminating in complete exhaustion in July 1830 and the subsequent fall of the Bourbon regime. The sources were analysed by the inductive method, i.e., assessing how the individual actions of the characters affected events in both countries. The diachronic method was used mainly to analyse the rift between the two countries, from causes (purchase of grain) to consequences (bombardment of Algeria). The study also used the biographical method to analyse the changes in French politics resulting from the clash of two personalities, Prime Minister Polignac and Algerian Governor Hussein Pasha, and the probe method for contributions from the pro-regime newspaper Le Moniteur.11 The pivotal methodological approach was modern political historiography, which compares the relationship between politics, the economy and society, i.e., the relationship between the political manoeuvring of France between the powers, the possibility of using atrade dispute to one’s advantage, and the tense domestic political 3 M.Le Vicomte de MARTIGNAC, Défense de M. le Prince Jules de Polignac, Paris 1830. 4 A.MAZAS, Ham: Aout 1829–Janvier 1834, Paris 1834. 5 G.GAUTHEROT, Un Gentilhomme de Grand Chemin: Le Maréchal de Bourmont, Paris 1926. 6 R.P.LECANUET, L’Amiral Duperré: discours prononcé, Paris 1891. 7 S. de ZOUAVES, La Conquȇte d’Alger, Paris 1850. 8 S. de BOURBON, La Derniėre Conquȇte du Roi: Alger 1830, Paris 1930. 9 J.E.SESSIONS, By Sword and Plow: France and the Conquest of Algeria, London 2011. 10 C.R.AGERON— M.BRETT, Modern Algeria: AHistory from 1830 to the Present, Ithaca— New York 1991; J.MCDOUGALL, AHistory of Algeria, New York 2017. 11 Due to the transfer of information between continents, reports of troop movements did not reach Paris until 6th July; the last mention of the fall of the Algerian governor appeared on 10th July 1830. Le Moniteur, 6th–8th July and 10th July 1830, issues 187–189 and 191.
60 PRAGUE PAPERS ON THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 2/2019 scene. It was important to follow the negotiations at the European level and the proactive behaviour of the French cabinet, i.e., to use the history of international relations which assessed the causes of mutual tensions between Paris and Algeria, consolidating the French position between the European powers and the successful takeover of power in aforeign vassal state. * * * The Bourbon restoration in 1815 did not ease domestic political tensions in society. After apartial release between 1816 and 1820 there was ashift to anti-liberal measures. It was initiated by the “ultras”, agroup of conservative aristocrats which included Polignac, to return to the pre-revolutionary regime. In the second decade of the 19th century they had even managed to diminish the electorate and install “royalists who manipulated elections in favour of the king’s followers”12 in districts, which provided the royalists in Paris alengthened hand to rule in every corner of France. The backstage power of the ultras was so mighty that they had succeeded in overthrowing the cabinet of ruling doctrinaires, which was replaced by convinced royalists whose reactionary acts led to the July Revolution. The ultras further welcomed achange on the French throne when aweak King Louis XVIII, brother of the former executed King Louis XVI, died in September 1824 and his younger brother, Count d’Artois, became aking under the name Charles X.The penultimate Bourbon king had not given up his far-right opinions, which he had advocated before the Revolution, and therefore became asymbol of the upcoming rigid regime. After 1815, one of his contemporaries described him as “aman who enchanted the people with his good manners, behaviour and speech”.13 The collaboration of Charles X with Prime Minister Jean-Baptiste Count de Villèle (1773–1854) led to an intensification of the conservative restoration policy, which, among other things, led to apurge at universities, tightening of press censorship and the further return of emigrants and Jesuits.14 The laws granting emigrants compensation of one billion francs and allowing for the inclusion of Jesuit representatives in the government, effectively giving them the power to oversee public life and education in the country, caused great resentment in liberal circles.15 Villèle’s stint did not last long. The Prime Minister’s entreaty that the King dissolve the Chamber of Deputies resulted in his fall in January 1828. Jean-Baptiste Sylvère Gay, 1st Viscount de Martignac (1778–1832) took over the government and tried to keep his policy in the centre yet Charles X disliked the new liberal government because it forbade religious orders to teach.16 Therefore, in August 1829, the King turned to the 12 F.B.ARTZ, Reaction and Revolution 1814–1832, New York, London 1939, p.225. 13 F.-R. de CHATEAUBRIAND— A.POHORSKÝ, Paměti ze záhrobí, Prague 2011, p.597. 14 SESSIONS, By Sword and Plow, p.23. 15 ARTZ, pp.225; 227; 22; J.HARSIN, The Escape to Vincennes: Public Narratives and Political Meanings in the Ex-Minister’s Trial of 1830, In: French Historical Studies, Vol.23, No.2, 2009, pp.258; P.PILBEAM, The Growth of Liberalism and the Crisis of the Bourbon Restoration, 1827–1830, in: The Historical Journal, Vol.25, No.3, 1982, p.355 and SESSIONS, p.24. 16 ARTZ, pp.232–233.
MIcHAEL DUDzIk 61 then ambassador to Great Britain, Jules August Armand Marie Prince de Polignac,17 to appoint him Prime Minister. Polignac continued to take arestrictive approach to opposition deputies’ in the Chamber of Deputies and stopped the easing of press censorship. He was seen as an emigrant, an ultraroyalist, a“Prince by the grace of the Holy See” and afriend of Great Britain who had even married aBritish woman.18 Together with Charles X, thanks to Article 14 of the Charter of 1814, they ignored the decision of the Chamber of Deputies because the king could “issue the ordinances necessary for the security of the state and the implementation of laws”19 and thus circumvent the opposition. Polignac’s government20 faced growing opposition and found itself in adifficult situation. The Prime Minister therefore tried to divert attention from domestic to foreign affairs, anticipating that diplomatic success in the international arena could prevent the fall of his government. After the intervention in Greece in 1827,21 the government needed to divert the nation’s attention from domestic problems to foreign success, and therefore it decided to conquer Algeria. THE FAN AFFAIR North African Algeria was apart of European history, as it had been the target of unsuccessful crusades on several occasions. In 1516, the territory was occupied by the Ottomans and became their vassal for three centuries. In the 19th century, the Bourbon regime used the disputes between France and Algeria to control the country. The beginnings of the diplomatic rift date back to the end of the 18th century, when the French Directory sought, after the failure of the Egyptian campaign, an alternative grain seller in order to be able to feed its citizens. It found ataker on the African continent, when the Algerian dey (title of the governor) Mustafa VI offered to sell the Directory grain for amillion francs and assigned two merchants to negotiate with France on behalf of the ruler— Nephtali Busnach, nicknamed the “King of Algeria” for his immense wealth, and Joseph Bacri, both of whom already ran an Algerian monopoly on the grain trade.22 However, no one had any idea that they were unscrupulous speculators— aunit of grain (about 15 kg) was normally sold for 42 francs at the time, while Bacri and Busnach sold it to the French government for 100 to 120 francs per unit. They did not hesitate 17 Charles the Tenth and Louis Philippe: The Secret History of the Revolution of July 1830, London 1839, p.16; MAZAS, pp.77; 101–102. For members of government see J.MAVIDAL— E.LAURENT, Archives Parlementaires de 1787 à1860: Recueil complet des débats législatifs & politiques des chambres françaises, tome 61, Paris 1886, p.516. 18 B. de SAVIGNY, The Bourbon Restoration, Philadelphia 2016, p.420. 19 The king could use the article whenever the homeland was “in danger.” ARTZ, pp.234; 264; HARSIN, p.254; SAVIGNY, pp.427; 430. 20 The composition of the government itself did not inspire much confidence. SAVIGNY, pp.420–426, 430. 21 M.ŠEDIVÝ, Krvavá odyssea: řecký boj za nezávislost 1821–1832, Prague 2011, pp.150–151. 22 MCDOUGALL, pp.50–51; C.ROUSSET, La Conquȇte d’Alger, Paris 1879, pp. 21–22; SAVIGNY, pp.434–435.
62 PRAGUE PAPERS ON THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 2/2019 and went even further: the dey’s offer of one million francs for the sale of grain to the Directory was increased by both traders— without the dey’s knowledge— to the amount of two million francs, and they retained asignificant amount of the money.23 Nevertheless, the Directory didn’t intend to pay, and the amount of the debt first reached five and later eight million francs, of which three million were initially paid into the hands of both traders; after the conclusion of the additional contract, another one million two hundred thousand francs were paid.24 For the rest of the amount, the French government borrowed money from both merchants, to be repaid later. In France, however, the Napoleonic Wars broke out, and in Algeria, numerous revolts of the Janissaries, which resulted in the overthrow of several deys.25 The French government’s payments to Algeria were thus delayed. The turning point came after Hussein Pasha (1764–1838) came to power in Algeria in 1818. After the British fleet shelled Algiers in August 181626 he, as an imam, had the British consul expelled from the country.27 He also got involved in the dispute between Busnach and Bacri and France. He himself demanded that the merchants pay him the owed amount of seven million francs, which they borrowed from Algeria. However, Bacri and Busnach said that they did not have enough money to repay and that they were waiting for the French government of Charles X to pay them the rest of the amount owed.28 The dey therefore sent aletter in August 1826 to the French Consul General, Pierre Deval, to explain the whole situation: “We ask you for the amount owed which France must pay. When the entire amount is ready, send it to us immediately, including any interest attached to it.” He also threatened the diplomat that “if he does not send any money or does not sufficiently justify apossible postponement, the regency will take the position that seems most appropriate for it to achieve its goal,”29 which was tantamount to declaring war. The dey put himself in the role of negotiator, relieved Bacri of all obligations to the state and deprived him of his property, and the merchant had to flee to Livorno because of the pogroms; his companion Busnach was assassinated.30 Hussein Pasha could thus demand the French instalment only for himself and his court. Mutual tensions escalated. At the end of October 1826, the French diplomatic mission had arrived in Algeria to seek reparations for the raided merchant ships. The dey’s hope for the appearance of aFrench ship importing money was replaced by anger: Hussein accused the consul of treachery and of being “an infidel mediator 23 BOURBON, pp.17–18. 24 Ibid, p.19. 25 The authors add that “the deys were either murdered, strangled, lost their heads or were poisoned”. BOURBON, p.15; MCDOUGALL, pp.46–48; ROUSSET, pp.5–10. 26 The British Viscount Exmouth negotiated the release of Sardinian and Sicilian prisoners. However, when the Algerian government opposed the proposal, the British shelled Algeria and demanded the complete abolition of slavery. MCDOUGALL, p.48. 27 ROUSSET, pp.15–16. 28 The remaining amount was two million and almost three hundred thousand francs. BOURBON, p.19, 25; MAVIDAL-LAURENT, pp.61, p.205; p.220; p.594. 29 BOURBON, pp.26–27. 30 MCDOUGALL, p.46.
MIcHAEL DUDzIk 63 between him and the French king”.31 Instead of Deval he demanded the appointment of a“brave man” to his position, but Charles X did not respond to the dey’s rebukes. The last attempt at reconciliation took place on 30th April 1827 when Hussein invited Deval to his residence. The dey asked about unanswered letters: “Am Isome sort of abumpkin, aragbag or ascrounger? Why didn’t Iget an answer? You are amere scoundrel, infidel and idolater!”32 Deval only replied that Hussein Pasha would not get an answer because it was useless. At that moment, the dey made afatal mistake that deprived him of the throne and subjected the country to the will of the French. He ordered the French diplomat to leave the residence; he didn’t do so, and the dey, full of anger, rose from the throne, approached Pierre Deval, and struck him three times in the face with all his might with the fan in his hand. Deval commented on the diplomatic scandal: “Iwant to assure Your Highness that Iam afraid only of God and not of people. His Excellency Baron de Damas answered with my mouth. The damage suffered does not affect me, but the King of France.” 33 The consequences were not long in coming— in June, aFrench special diplomatic mission was sent to Algeria. The situation was complicated: the dey could either humbly repent to the French representative and thus endanger his life or wait for all the ships to leave and his country to come under fire. The French gave Hussein one day to rectify the situation by sending his deputy on one of the ships, apologizing and hoisting the French flag over Algiers. The dey did not respond to this humiliation and said to his entourage that he was “surprised that they did not ask for my wife, too”. 34 Hussein had merely told French envoys that he was declaring war on France.35 The day after, on 16th June 1827, all the French in Algeria boarded ships and sailed back home, while the Algerians on the mainland destroyed their property and French trading posts. French battleships then began athree-year blockade of Algerian ports and the French government cut ties with Algeria.36 THE ISOLATION OF ALGERIA The conquest of Algeria was the only possible way to subdue the whole country and, in away, take revenge for the insult that the dey, through the ambassador, had inflicted on Charles X himself. “Bombarding of Algiers will be ineffective, assault from the sea impossible, disembarkment probable,”37 enumerated Aimé Marie Count de Clermont-Tonnerre, the Minister of War at the time. Planning began as to how many 31 Ibid, p.28. 32 BOURBON, p.32; ROUSSET, p.31. 33 In this context Imust point out that the French ambassador spoke inconsiderately about the dey and his faith, so Hussein’s behaviour can be partially understood. For comparison see AGERON, p.5; S.BLONDEL, Histoire des éventails: chez tous les peuples et atoutes les époques, Paris 1875, p.44; BOURBON, pp.31–32; MCDOUGALL, p.51; ROUSSET, pp.29–31. 34 BOURBON, pp.35–36; MCDOUGALL, p.51. 35 MAVIDAL-LAURENT, p.217. 36 BOURBON, pp.33–36; ROUSSET, pp.33–34. 37 MAVIDAL-LAURENT, p.554.
64 PRAGUE PAPERS ON THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 2/2019 troops would be sent to North Africa, how large afleet would be needed, how high the cost of the entire expedition would be and most importantly— whether European powers would allow intervention in another country. The Minister of War needed to gain asupportive attitude from Russia and, above all, from Great Britain because “England is in principle unfavourable to our African interest”.38 At the same time, however, he coined the theory that if Britain could operate in India and Russia in Asia, why couldn’t the French land in Algeria? His universal response had always been that “none of the European powers has the right to intervene to prevent the king from retaliating for abloody crime”.39 At the same time, he stated that he intended to make Algeria an example of how other states, who dared to offend the Christian country and the Christian faith in general, would be treated.40 Russia’s position on the campaign was favourable from the outset, as the Russian government had been competing more intensely with the British government for influence in the Ottoman Empire ever since the struggle for Greek independence. By agreeing to the expedition, it hoped to weaken Polignac’s ties with London, strengthen its role in European politics and, above all, strengthen trade ties in the Mediterranean.41 For France, Russia became awelcome partner— the Eastern power persuaded the sultan to exercise restraint towards Algeria and its diplomats even managed to conceal all the information about the expedition from British and Austrian envoys.42 Prussia also joined with Russia in consent but Austria43 and Great Britain remained in opposition; nevertheless, due to Polignac’s ties with the British Isles, his cabinet decided to negotiate mainly with this country. The British Isles had objected to the possible creation of aFrench trading post by the Mediterranean Sea, which could potentially disrupt British trade. Nevertheless, it could not object when the French cabinet declared on 6th July 1828: “It would be forgotten that England, the Lady of Gibraltar and the ruler of the Mediterranean, would have adirect interest in the dey’s downfall, with France also risking war with England.”44 Still, England was hesitant. At the end of 1829, its ambassador to Paris Baron Charles Stuart de Rothesay45 recommended to the new Prime Minister Polignac that he explain the reasons for the expedition to the British government. However, the haughty behaviour of the Prime Minister could have caused anew rift: “Offended France does not need 38 BOURBON, p.46. 39 Ibidem, p.46; pp.48–49; MAZAS, p.179; ROUSSET, p.83. 40 “France’s honour must not suffer.” V. de GUICHEN, La Révolution de juillet 1830 et l’Europe, Paris 1916, p.66; MAVIDAL-LAURENT, p.206. The newspaper Le Moniteur even called the intervention “anationwide war”. Le Moniteur, 6th July 1830. 41 M.LARAN, Michel, La politique russe et l’intervention française àAlger (1829–1830), in : Revue des études slaves, Vol.40, No.38, 1961, p.121. 42 Ibid, p.124. 43 Austria feared adecline in the sultan’s prestige and deterioration in relations between the European powers but eventually agreed. M.ŠEDIVÝ, Metternich, the Great Powers and the Eastern Question, Pilsen 2013, p.409. 44 BOURBON, p.60. 45 Charles Stuart, Baron Stuart de Rothesay (1779–1845) was twice the British ambassador to France (1815–1824 and 1828–1830) and to Russia (1841–1844).
MIcHAEL DUDzIk 65 anyone’s help to take revenge; as for the English, we are not involved in their affairs so they should not interfere in ours.”46 All the motives for the intervention had been explained by the Minister of the Navy Charles de Longpré, Baron d’Haussez in 1830. Concerning the general interest of the European powers, Algeria was actively supporting piracy in the Mediterranean area, which was complicating trade. Furthermore, if ships wanted to sail along the Algerian coast, they were obliged to pay the deys an annual tribute.47 The most crucial point was, however, trafficking with Christian captives, which was denounced by Russians, Austrians and Prussians. Other reasons directly concerned France, as Hussein Pasha supported the raid of two merchant ships in 1828, had apeace ship fired upon ayear later and deprived France of the privilege of fishing corals in favour of Great Britain.48 However, the minister concealed that the cabinet had planned the campaign for the time when elections were to take place in France and that the government wanted to gain the favour of the army, buy voters and secure Polignac’s strong mandate49 in the upcoming elections after the Liberals had won amajority in the Chamber of Deputies, which was therefore dissolved.50 However, studies from recent years also indicate the secondary goal was to fill the empty treasury with the dey’s wealth.51 Acircular for French ambassadors in Europe ordered the intervention to be justified by “the need to return all regencies to dependence on High Porta”, which meant that France would also control local governments in Tunisia and Tripolitania. The sultan’s promise to take aneutral approach to the war against the regents and not intervene in their favour was obtained by Polignac52 after Russia did the same. The aggressive French policy bore fruit: because Britain wanted to preserve the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, “the head of the Foreign Office clearly acknowledged our intervention in Algeria,”53 and the tsar said that “whatever the king’s decision is, he approves it”.54 The European powers were acquainted with the decision of the French government on 4thFebruary 1830, when Charles X resolved to “destroy slavery and piracy along the coast of Africa” while “restoring freedom of navigation and trade in the Mediterranean”.55 46 BOURBON, p.125; GUICHEN, p.71 ; ROUSSET, p.84. 47 Spain paid Algeria 48,000 francs, Britain 40,000, France 200,000, the Netherlands 160,000 and Austria 200,000 francs. BOURBON, p.16; MAVIDAL-LAURENT, p.217; SAVIGNY, The Bourbon Restoration, p.434. 48 BOURBON, pp.14–15; LARAN, p.120; MAVIDAL-LAURENT, pp.220; 594. 49 In the next, June elections, Polignac eventually lost when 270 opposition deputies opposed his 145 supporters in the Chamber. Asimilar situation occurred in July. HARSIN, p.254, PILBEAM, pp.351, 365; SESSIONS, pp.44, 47. 50 AGERON, p.5; GUICHEN, pp.64; 69, MCDOUGALL, p.51; SESSIONS, pp.24–25; 27. 51 SESSIONS, p.25. 52 LARAN, p.122. 53 For the whole negotiation with the British ambassador see BOURBON, pp. 114–115; GUICHEN, pp.65–72; MAZAS, pp.179–182. 54 LARAN, p.120. 55 BOURBON, p.119; pp.122–123; F.DUMASY, Propriété foncière, libéralisme économique et gouvernement colonial: Alger, 1830–1840, in: Revue d’histoire moderne & contemporaine,
66 PRAGUE PAPERS ON THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 2/2019 THE ALGERIAN COUNTERATTACK Preparations for the campaign culminated in January 1830, when the army was to begin to arm itself and prepare the fleet for an expedition to Algeria. Thirty-seven thousand Frenchmen, three thousand horses, 144 cannons and 675 ships, consisting of sixty-six battleships and five hundred boats that helped transport troops, cannons and supplies to the mainland, were to oppose Hussein’s men.56 The price of the whole expedition was debated for along time until the deputies agreed on an amount of 25million francs.57 This unexpected expense was repaid in July with valuables and gifts valued at 43 million francs,58 which also outraged the public because of looting and theft of French soldiers abroad. On 11th April 1830, the court of Charles X appointed the Minister of War Count Louis de Bourmont, who commanded the ground forces, as leader of the expedition, and the Admiral Baron Victor Guy Duperré as commander of the naval fleet. Bourmont pledged that his only task would be to capture Algeria and “in the case that Duperré jeopardizes the success of military operations” he would take command of the entire expedition.59 However, the Minister of War had no reason to doubt the Admiral because he “has fought the most beautiful naval battles and will inspire confidence in the navy in all people” .60 As it soon became clear, Duperré’s fleet proved its worth many times during the bombing of the mainland. The British ambassador Lord Stuart, the liberal opposition and most of the admirals rejected the whole project, as the campaign to “an inhospitable land without an anchorage and harbour where wild winds are blowing” was considered an act of madness.61 Nevertheless, the crews embarked in Toulon on 25th May, arrived at the port of Palma de Mallorca on 1st June, where they regrouped, and on 10th June sailed for the North African coast, where they arrived after four days and began to disembark.62 The entire African expedition is brought to our memory by the Zouaves, members of the French light infantry in North Africa, since they landed on the Sidi Ferruch peninsula 20 kilometres west of Algiers.63 The movement of provisions, people, and the breaking up of the camp, was been very soon disrupted by Algerian troops who sent amessage to the dey of Algiers that “Sidi Ferruch would become the Vol.63, No.2, 2016, p.41; GUICHEN, pp.67–68; LARAN, p.123, MARTIGNAC, p.141; ROUSSET, p.85; SESSIONS, p.33. 56 BOURBON, pp.49; 73–74; p.130; M.FRANQUE, Lois de l’Algérie: du 5 juillet 1830 (occupation d’Alger) au 1er janvier 1844, Paris 1844, p.1; GAUTHEROT, p.382, MAZAS, p.185; MCDOUGALL, p.51; ZOUAVES, pp.14–15. 57 GAUTHEROT, p.382; MAZAS, p.183. 58 Valuables amounted to 20 % of the income for 1829. MCDOUGALL, p.51. 59 Bourmont eventually fulfilled his promise not to negotiate anything with anyone. GAUTHEROT, p.25. 60 LECANUET, p.23. 61 MAZAS, pp.184–185. 62 J.H.BLOFELD, Algeria, Past and Present, London 1844, p.375; ZOUAVES, pp.10–12; 18. For the sorting of divisions, preparations and shipping see ROUSSET, pp.95–97; pp.101–103; pp.119–120. 63 AGERON, p.5; SAVIGNY, p.438; J.SESSIONS, p.43; ZOUAVES, p.20.