Challenging notions of development and change from everyday life in Africa

BIGSAS Working Papers 4/2013: challenging notions of development and change from everyday life in Africa B BA AY YR RE EU UT TH H Challenging notions of development and change from everyday life in Africa works! B B Ba a ay y yr r re e eu u ut t th h h A A Af f fr r ri i ic c ca a an n n S S St t tu u ud d di i ie e es s s W W Wo o or r rk k ki i in n ng g g P P Pa a ap p pe e er r rs s s No. 11 BIGSAS Working Papers 4/2013: challenging notions of development and change from everyday life in Africa I Bayreuth African Studies Working Papers The “Bayreuth African Studies Working Papers” report on ongoing projects, the results of current research and matters related to the focus on African Studies at the University of Bayreuth. There are no specific requirements as to the language of publication and the length of the articles. Contributions to this series may be submitted directly to the editors; they can also be submitted via university lecturers and professors or via the Institute of African Studies. Acceptance is decided by the editors. The “Bayreuth African Studies Working Papers” is chronicled on the OPUS document server at the university library: An electronic version of each volume is available on the IAS website: http://opus4.kobv.de/opus4ubbayreuth/solrsearch/index/search/searchtype/series/id/6 Institute of African Studies Executive Director: Ute Fendler Vice Director: Ulrich Berner Address: Universität Bayreuth Institute of African Studies 95440 Bayreuth GERMANY Phone: +49 (0)921 555161 Fax: +49 (0)921 555102 [email protected] BIGSAS Working Papers 4/2013: challenging notions of development and change from everyday life in Africa II Bayreuth International Graduate School of African Studies (BIGSAS) Since the year 2007, BIGSAS is part of the competitive ‘Excellence Initiative’ by the German Research Foundation (DFG) and the German Council of Science and Humanities (WR). The basic aims of BIGSAS are to bring together excellent young African and nonAfrican scholars to work jointly in the field of African Studies and to offer a centre of creative and innovative PhD training and research. On 15 June 2012, BIGSAS was one of the successful DGF funded ‘Centres of Excellence’ which were granted support for the next 5 years. BIGSAS has more than 100 junior fellows from 25 African, American, Asian and European countries. BIGSAS builds on this experience and offers a multiand interdisciplinary research environment based upon three clearly defined general Research Areas which are: A. Uncertainty, Innovation and Competing Orders in Africa B. Knowledge, Communication and Communities in Motion C. Negotiating Change: Discourses, Politics and Practices of Development The Research Areas allow for challenging theoretical studies sensitive to emerging basic problems; they also take into account practical questions and problems of the African continent. Thus, the BIGSAS Research Areas encompass basic, strategic and applied research. BIGSAS also contributes to the creation of an African universities’ network. It brings together African and European networks and fosters partnership not only between the University of Bayreuth and universities in Africa but also between the universities in Africa themselves. Six African Partner Universities, namely the University of Abomey-Calavi, Cotonou (Benin), Moi-University, Eldoret (Kenya), Université Mohammed V-Agdal, Rabat (Morocco), Universidade Eduardo Mondlane, Maputo (Mozambique), the University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban (South Africa), and Addis Ababa University (Ethiopia) cooperate closely with BIGSAS in BIGSAS Working Papers 4/2013: challenging notions of development and change from everyday life in Africa III recruitment, selection, training and mentoring of doctoral students. Other partners are the Universities of the Africa-Europe Group for Interdisciplinary Studies, AEGIS. PhD training in BIGSAS is based on various strategies which ensure a quality in the field of African Studies: multiand interdisciplinary research with a multidisciplinary mentorship; specialist academic training with a cross-disciplinarily focus; clearly structured Individual Research Training Plans (IRTP). Also of high importance are: the offer of employment-oriented transferable skills, individual career planning, early integration into the international academic community, shorter time-to-degree with structural and financial encouragements or specific support of female Junior Fellows. Over the past 20 years Bayreuth has amassed considerable experience in co-ordinated research programmes, integrating various disciplines into a stimulating research in the field of African Studies. The Institute of African Studies (IAS) promotes 63 researchers and coordinates African studies at the University of Bayreuth in 12 subject groups distributed over five of the six faculties of the university. Bayreuth International Graduate School of African Studies Dean: Prof. Dr. Dymitr Ibriszimow Vice Dean: Prof. Dr. Rüdiger Seesemann Vice Dean: Prof. Dr. Martin Doevenspeck Address: Universität Bayreuth Bayreuth International Graduate School of African Studies 95440 Bayreuth Phone: +49 (0)921 55 5101 Fax: +49 (0)921 55 5102 http://www.bigsas.uni-bayreuth.de e-mail: big[email protected] BIGSAS Working Papers 4/2013: challenging notions of development and change from everyday life in Africa IV BIGSASworks! With BIGSASworks! we aim at offering Junior Fellows at the Graduate School of African Studies a platform for publishing research-related articles. This new online-journal provides an excellent platform for representing and promoting the idea of BIGSAS. It opens a space for showcasing on-going research, creating transparency of the work carried out by Junior Fellows and providing a space for trying out articles and working jointly on them towards further publication. Each issue focuses on a certain thematic field or theoretical concept and Junior Fellows from any discipline are invited to submit papers, enabling common interests beyond the predetermined BIGSAS research areas to flourish. At the same time BIGSASworks! offers its workgroup participants deeper insights into and practical experience of what it means to be an editor. Last but not least BIGSASworks! makes BIGSAS and its research(ers), (i.e. us!), visible before our theses are published. The name BIGSASworks! had various implications. First and foremost it is an abbreviation of ‘BIGSAS Working Papers!’. Second, it is meant to show the work of our BIGSAS ‘works groups’, so indeed it is the works that are resulting from a structure like BIGSAS. Third, taking ‘works’ as a verb, it demonstrates the work that we as BIGSAS Fellows carry out, with BIGSASworks! guaranteeing us a visible output in addition to our theses. BIGSAS Working Papers 4/2013: challenging notions of development and change from everyday life in Africa V The editors of this issue Girum Getachew Alemu has earned his B.A in Sociology and Social Anthropology and his Master’s degree in Development studies from Addis Ababa University. Currently, he is a PhD student at the Bayreuth International Graduate School of African Studies (BIGSAS), Germany. In his PhD research he interrogates the international climate change adaptation agenda and the associated concept of vulnerability by zooming-in at the local level and locating climate change adaptation in broader ‘social’ context in dry land parts of upper Awash valley in Ethiopia. Girum’s research focuses on the constellation of development, environmental governance, and local livelihoods. Particularly, he explores how these interconnections influence the constitution of human-environment ruptures like disasters, climate change, and their aftermath. In his research Girum also targets applied audience in the sphere of policy making by unearthing the agency of local resource users in pursuing novel responses and adaptations to both disaster and climate change. Peter Narh specializes in the field of Development Studies, particularly in academic and applied work on sustainable environment and growth. He is currently pursuing a doctoral degree in development studies at the Bayreuth International Graduate School of African Studies (BIGSAS), University of Bayreuth, Germany. In his doctoral dissertation on Ghana, he explores environmental governance regime synergies, conflicts and community environmental responsibility. Between 1999 and 2007 he studied at the University of Ghana (UG) and the Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology (KNUST), both in Ghana. He had also been a Programmes coordinator at the Friederich-EbertStiftung from October 2008 to April 2009. BIGSAS Working Papers 4/2013: challenging notions of development and change from everyday life in Africa VI Acknowledging reviewers of this issue The editors of this issue, on behalf of all contributors, express sincerest gratitude to the five University professors who reviewed the contributing papers. In their schedules, they found time to read and offer valuable suggestions on the papers, which eventually culminated in the issue we have now. Indeed, for those who are not members of the University of Bayreuth, we are especially thankful. We also owe Professor Dr. Dieter Neubert of the University of Bayreuth appreciation for rechecking the content of the papers, as well as writing the foreword to this issue. The five reviewers are: Prof. Dr. Kurt Beck University of Bayreuth Prof. Dr. Jürgen Müller University of Bayreuth Dr. Wolfram Laube University of Bonn Prof. Dr. Elisio Macamo University of Basel Prof. Dr. Georg Klute University of Bayreuth BIGSAS Working Papers 4/2013: challenging notions of development and change from everyday life in Africa VII Foreword By Prof. Dr. Dieter Neubert After the post-development debate of the 1990s (Escobar 1995; Rahnema 1997) analysed the concept of development as a construction imposed on the global South to subordinate its people, talking about development seemed to be outdated. Especially in the humanities, post-colonial studies gained interest. The new debates showed that concepts that were for a long time taken for granted needed to be revisited from a critical perspective. But despite radical deconstruction of the concept of development, the notion of development is still alive. This holds true not only at the level of the development institutions whose institutional survival is closely linked to the promises of development co-operation, but also at a local level where people claim their right to development. The intellectual deconstruction of development did not solve the challenges of survival and change in everyday life. Therefore, the presence of ideas of development in the everyday life of the global South cannot be ignored. Against the background of the post-development debate and the work of critics of development practice (e.g. Mosse 2005; Rottenburg 2009), notions of development and change cannot be taken as given, but are topics requiring empirical research. Produced by development institutions, notions of development are challenged from an everyday life perspective. The tensions and processes of negotiation between development and state institutions on the one hand, and people’s understandings and needs on the other hand are the topic of this publication. As the editors show in their introduction we should not misunderstand these tensions as representing a dichotomy between the local and the global. The term development itself with its local interpretation shows that it is not possible to separate local from global processes. They are interconnected and the notions of development to which this publication refers are negotiated between different global and local actors. This underlines not only the agency of the people involved, but also that concepts used in the BIGSAS Working Papers 4/2013: challenging notions of development and change from everyday life in Africa VIII negotiations, such as urban improvement in a Sudanese shanty town, economic development in South Africa, or environment protection in Ghana, have been appropriated by the local communities according to their own terms. With their studies of this topic, the contributors link up with earlier studies carried out at the Bayreuth Institute of African Studies on local action in the context of globalisation (Probst/Spittler 2005; Loimer et al. 2005) and make a big step forward with their empirical analyses. This fourth volume of BIGSASworks! represents main features of BIGSAS in a remarkable way. The articles underline the interdisciplinary approach of BIGSAS and show that studies from Social Anthropology, Geography, Media Studies, Political Sciences and Sociology share a common research focus and together present a multi-perspective, comprehensive picture of the common topic. At the same time, the Junior Fellows, who come from all three BIGSAS research areas, 1 document in an impressive way that the different research areas are deeply interlinked. In the research area “Knowledge, Communication and Communities in Motion”, the media studies paper (Irina Turner), with its focus on new media, adds an important new twist to the analysis of economic policy. The paper grounded in social anthropology (Mohamed A.G. Bakhit), from the research area “Uncertainty, Innovation and Competing Orders in Africa”, uses the notion of competing orders to analyse the negotiation of change. And the papers in the research area “Negotiating Change: Discourses, Politics and Practices of Development”, from geography (Girum Getachew, Peter Narh), political sciences (Felix Brinkmann) and sociology (Julia Boger), refer to situations of uncertainty and processes of innovation. This publication, developed and presented by BIGSAS Junior Fellows, demonstrates the lively und highly productive discussion in BIGSAS, which transcends borders between disciplines and research areas. References Escobar, A. (1995) Encountering Development: the making and unmaking of the third world. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 1 A) Uncertainty, Innovation and Competing Orders in Africa B) Knowledge, Communication and Communities in Motion C) Negotiating Change: Discourses, Politics and Practices of Development BIGSAS Working Papers 4/2013: challenging notions of development and change from everyday life in Africa 5 environmental programmes. Subsequently, many of them become important drivers of change, primarily through transfer of new ideas and knowledge to shaping environmental policies and implementing programmes at the local level. Julia shows however that though the returned experts hold potentials to contribute to environmental policy making and implementation at the micro, meso, and macro levels in Ghana, they also face challenges in lending their skills to use, and to find their feet in the local economy. The experts face inadequate jobs in the formal sector, poor remuneration, poor working equipments, and job opportunities being blocked to migrants by non-migrants. To overcome these challenges, they network and make use of programmes such the Returning Expert Programme (REP) and the Reintegrationprogramme (RE) established and implemented in Germany and Ghana to encourage trained experts to return home to congenial working conditions. Felix Brinkmann adds to the utility of agency in negotiating between national and local conditions. His paper shows how small-scale entrepreneurs manoeuvre weak national institutions to promote their trade. In a study in the Kitwe copper belt of Zambia, Felix finds that the economy of Zambia depends heavily on copper and therefore volatile copper prices on the world market pose a challenge to the Zambian economy. Coupled with weak a national institutional framework for their business, local copper dealers put in place all manner of informal and what Felix sees as illegal institutions to deal with the erratic prices of copper. In the Chisokone-Market, the second biggest market in Zambia, central governmental authorities have not been able to provide adequate institutional and logistic support for the SMEs to operate effectively. In consequence, local market association leaders with power and information take advantage of the weak national institutions to promote their SMEs, and assume control of all activities of the market, managing it to suit their personal and respective associational interests. Usually, the less powerful entrepreneurs are the losers. Felix suggests in his contribution that the kind of strategies successful SMEs employ to overcome the challenges the erratic copper prices pose to their businesses, in the face of the weaknesses of the central state, are still to expend in future. How this expansion unfolds to impact on SMEs as well as on copper prices remain issues for further research. Suffice it to say that local entrepreneurs have been able to manage the weaknesses of the state to provide conducive conditions for their own trade. Thus, Felix’s paper affirms that local people have their own ways of life, and may draw on global forces to enhance their livelihoods. BIGSAS Working Papers 4/2013: challenging notions of development and change from everyday life in Africa 6 References Arce, A. and N. Long (1992) ‘The dynamics of knowledge: Interfaces between bureaucrats and peasants’ in N. Long, and A. Long, (eds), Battlefields of knowledge. The interlocking of theory and practice in social research and development. London: Routldege. Binsbergen, W. van, R. van, Dijk, and J.B. Gewald (eds) (2004) Situating globality: African agency in the appropriation of global culture. Leiden, Boston: Brill. Bruijn, M. E. de, R. van, Dijk, and J.B. Gewald, (eds) (2007) Strength beyond structure: social and historical trajectories of agency in Africa. Leiden: Brill. Long, N (2001). Development sociology: actor perspectives. London, New York: Routledge. Grillo, R. D. and R. L. Stirrat (eds) (1997) Discourses of development: anthropological perspectives. Oxford: Berg. Mazrui, A. A. (2005) ‘The re-invention of Africa: Edward Said, V. Y. Mudimbe, and beyond’, Research in African Literatures 36(3): 68-82. Mudimbe, V. Y. (1988) The invention of Africa: gnosis, philosophy, and the order of knowledge. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. Rostow W. W. (1971) Politics and the stages of growth. Cambridge University Press. BIGSAS Working Papers 4/2013: challenging notions of development and change from everyday life in Africa 7 From illegal squatter settlement towards legal shantytowns: negotiations of power and responsibilities in Khartoum shantytowns Mohamed A.G. Bakhit 2 Abstract The article intends to investigate how social services and development programmes in shantytown areas have been designed and implemented in a very specific way by the three actors involved (local people, NGOs and local government). Also, it examines the perceptions and ideologies behind the particular selection of social services and who actually determines the priorities and takes on the responsibilities involved. The discussion in the paper uses Elbaraka shantytown (located in the south-east of Khartoum, the capital of Sudan) as an example to uncover this complicated process. Keywords: shantytowns, local community, government, NGOs, agency. Introduction Despite its richness in resources, Sudan like many other countries in sub-Saharan Africa has witnessed many years of political instability and civil wars since its independence in 1956. The country has also suffered from many other prolonged problems like ethnic conflicts, high rates of poverty, vast population displacement, the unequal distribution of social services, immense levels of immigration, many kinds of environmental disasters and poor quality of government services (education, healthcare, as well as low achievements in governmentality and rule of law). Indeed about 13.5 per cent 3 of the total populations of Sudan currently live in the capital Khartoum. Migrants to the capital city of Khartoum come from all parts of Sudan, due to its concentration of services and economic growth. The first waves of migrants arrived in the capital in the period from1960-70. These were economic 2 Mohamed A.G. Bakhit is an Anthropologist and lecturer in the Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology, University of Khartoum, Sudan. His main research interests are identity change, urbanization, minority groups and migration. Currently, he is pursuing his PhD project in the Bayreuth International Graduate School of African Studies (BIGSAS). His thesis examines the identity construction and different lifestyles of the Elbaraka shantytown community, which is shaped largely by generational variations, rural-urban disparity, and cultural differences between Khartoum city and local people’s home areas in south and western Sudan. 3 Statistical Year Book for the Year 2009, Central Bureau of Statistics, Republic of Sudan. BIGSAS Working Papers 4/2013: challenging notions of development and change from everyday life in Africa 8 migrants, and the majority of them originated from the northern parts of the country, searching for employment in the newly established commercial and industrial sectors in the capital. Moreover the majority were educated, as only 23 per cent of all migrants to Khartoum aged 20-24 years in 1971 lacked any form of education (Galal-aldin 1980). The majority chose to live at the periphery, or in small villages near the city’s boundaries, until these were gradually swallowed up by the urban area. But the statistics show that a small number also came from areas in western and southern Sudan (between 5 and 8 per cent) to work as unskilled workers, and they lived near the industrial zones in illegal squatter settlements. Later on the government, under pressure from local residents, evacuated them and planned new, legal fourth-class settlements on the outskirts of the city. These formed the nuclei of the present shantytowns. The second wave of migrants arrived during 1980-2000, pushed by the civil war in the south and ethnic conflicts in Darfur, and drought and desertification in western Sudan. About two million people were displaced from their original areas and relocated in the capital city. They lived in different areas, some on any vacant land inside the city, others preferred to settle at the periphery of the city, near old legal shantytowns, but the majority of them inhabited squatter settlements. One study estimates the number of illegal squatter settlements in Khartoum in 1991 as more than fifty settlements, occupied by about 1.5 million IDPs (Banaga 2001). Agency and power in shantytowns In the shantytown areas there are three agents (i.e. local people, government and NGOs) acting in the same sphere. Although ultimately their obvious purpose is to serve the local people of shantytowns and provide them with the services and development programmes they require, each agent has its own unique character and specific ideology, which means that they act differently in order to achieve their respective priorities. Furthermore, to be successful they are obliged to negotiate and share their power and responsibility. Moreover, each one of the three agents has specific course of historical development and resources; therefore clashes and disputes are likely to happen as unilateral successes and achievements occur. ‘Agency’ in this paper stands for the freedom of the contingently acting subject over and against the constraints that are thought to derive from enduring social structures (Loyal and Barry 2001). Human beings have agency, i.e. they act independently of, and in opposition to, structural constraints, and thus are able to re-construct social structure through their freely chosen actions. This concept of BIGSAS Working Papers 4/2013: challenging notions of development and change from everyday life in Africa 9 an agent ties agency directly to power. An ‘acting against the constraints’ (Loyal and Barry 2001) pre-supposes being able to intervene in your community, or to refrain from such intervention, with the anticipated effect of influencing a specific process or state of affairs. Action depends largely upon the capability of the individual/group to ‘make a difference’ to a pre-existing state of structures or course of events. An agent ceases to be such if he/she or they lose the ability to ‘make a difference’, i.e. exercise some sort of power. Mike Davis’s book Planet of Slums is considered one of the most important references in slum studies. It reviewed the most significant approaches and policies dealing with the three actors: slum population, governments, and the international donors. He concludes his book by asserting that ‘the root cause of urban slumming seems to lie not in urban poverty but in urban wealth’ (Davis 2006). He starts with blaming the role of the IMF and the World Bank in imposing financial regulation upon the Third World countries, which led to agricultural deregulation and financial discipline, which in turn pushed huge numbers of rural labour to urban slums even as cities ceased to create new jobs. He also blames the new approach of the late 1970s and early 1980s mandate that the state depend upon international donors, then, NGOs. This approach influenced by the ideas of the English architect John Turner, stressed a sites-and-services provision of basic infrastructure to help rationalize and upgrade selfhelp housing. The purpose was to make housing affordable to lowincome households without the payments of subsidies in contrast to the heavily subsidised public-housing approach, amidst great propaganda about ‘helping the poor help themselves’ (Davis 2006). However, Mike Davis criticised this approach as it paves the way for a withdrawal of state and local government intervention and support for slum dwellers, and puts them at the risk to market fluctuations. The author also criticised the recent approach of Hernando de Soto (Davis 2006), a Peruvian businessman who became an expert in the neo-liberalism approach in the 1990s. De Soto asserted that Third World cities are not so much in need of investment and jobs as suffering from the shortage of property rights. The slum dwellers, he argues, are in fact wealthy, but they are unable to access their wealth, because they do not have improved real estate in the informal sector, or could not turn real estate into liquid capital because they do not possess formal property titles. Titling, de Soto claims, would instantly create massive equity with little or no cost to government. Part of this new wealth, he suggests, would supply capital to credit-starved micro-entrepreneurs to create new jobs in the slums, and shantytowns would then become ‘acres of diamonds’. BIGSAS Working Papers 4/2013: challenging notions of development and change from everyday life in Africa 10 But Mike Davis also made an important critique here by pointing to the fact that titling accelerates social differentiation in the slums and does nothing to aid renters, the actual majority of the poor in many cities. It even risks creating a large underclass population that is denied access to any form of affordable or acceptable housing. Finally, he criticised the national elites for creating patterns of land use and population density which recapitulated the older logic of colonial oppression and racial dominance. He noticed that throughout Third World cities, postcolonial elites have inherited and greedily reproduced the physical footprints of segregated colonial cities. Despite the rhetoric of national liberation and social justice, national elites have aggressively adapted the racial zoning of the colonial periods to defend their own class privileges and spatial exclusivity, the poor rural population replacing the former natives of the colonies. In general, the position of local people in the shantytowns is a very critical one; they are the subjects of the services and development, but still an agent responsible for providing them. Indeed, this double role is sometimes confusing even for local people themselves. Contributing to this is the existence of other agents also participating in this endeavour, sharing in the decision-making and the allocation of resources. Local people are often obliged to act differently in specific situations as decisions makers and providers, when they depend on their resources, in other situations as recipients and dependents, when the government or NGOs design and provide the services and developmental projects in question. In order to investigate the relations between the three agents and the provision of services and development programmes, it is necessary to explore the stages of development and change which have taken place in the Elbaraka shantytown in an historical order. The stage of squatter settlement The first stage of Elbaraka squatter settlement extended from the late 1970s until the planning of the area in 1992. People lived on the basis of ethnic enclaves; every ethnic group having its neighbourhood ruled by an ethnic group leader (sultan), some of them appointed by local people and approved by their chiefs in the areas of origin, others appointed by themselves or only by their close relatives. 4 It depended on whether the system of the respective ethnic group was centralised (e.g.Shilluk) or segmentary (e.g. Dinka). At that time, relations between ethnic enclaves were characterised by tensions and clashes, which were solved partially after the formation of a tribal leaders’ council. This council also dealt with disputes 4 Interview with Sultan William, Elbaraka shantytown, Khartoum, 15 August 2010. BIGSAS Working Papers 4/2013: challenging notions of development and change from everyday life in Africa 11 between individuals of different ethnic backgrounds. Services and security were provided by the NGOs and the people themselves. Health centres, water wells and food assistance were provided by many international NGOs. Meanwhile, security was organised by the people themselves, albeit in a rather chaotic way, which gave the area its reputation for criminality. Kartun Kassala – the former name of the area – was associated with drug dealing, illegal local alcohol distribution, prostitution, and theft. That might have been one reason for the eagerness of the local people to plan and legalise their settlement. To make matters worse, the government took on a destructive role in the squatter settlement, considering it an illegal form of settlement, and indeed on several occasions destroying whole areas, in pursuing what can be called its ‘demolish-legalise’ policy. This policy always tended toward legalising some settlements by planning or upgrading them, usually in remote areas, and toward demolishing the squatter settlements located near the centre, or in real estate areas of high value. In 1988, the capital Khartoum was inundated by floods and heavy rains, causing the wholesale destruction of the shantytowns, since they were constructed of only mud and cardboard. As is usual under such disaster circumstances the poorer sections of society suffered most. Such people tended to live in mud houses and 82 per cent (Davies and Walsh 1997) of the damaged and destroyed houses were built using these materials. Those affected moved to a nearby new market and took shelter in its empty shops. Meanwhile the government represented by the Prime Minister refused to visit the area, 5 unlike other nearby legal shantytowns, because it was not legally considered a part of the city. The stage of planning Initial contact between local people and the government was established during this phase, implying recognition by the government of shantytown settlers as part of the capital city. Local people agreed to participate effectively in the planning measures, because they had observed the benefit of planning in neighbouring areas. This participation included the selection of experts (ereef), local individuals who helped the planning bureaucrats directly, and local committees who contributed by informing the whole community about the procedure of legalising their homes. In fact, the bureaucratic procedures of legalising land ownership included several steps such as registration, investigation, providing documents, and paying the fees. It was very complicated for the 5 Interview with Saymon Ushan Ding, in 21 March 2009, Elbaraka. BIGSAS Working Papers 4/2013: challenging notions of development and change from everyday life in Africa 12 majority of people, but it represented a first step towards integrating them in city life, a style of life characterised by placing more trust in ‘paperwork’ than ‘informal (verbal) agreements’. Prolonged negotiations took place between local committees and the government about how many families had the right to settle in the area, and consequently about the size of each house in the area. Today differences still exist between the size of houses in the various quarters, for example, quarter No.2 has the smallest allocated space per house (217 m²) because the majority of inhabitants were from the same ethnic group (Fur). They wanted as many people as possible to settle together, and did not want members of their ethnic group to disperse to other quarters. As for the planning authority, it was obvious that they were concerned mainly with re-structuring the area to be more organised physically, meaning that in the negotiations they did not intervene on the makeup of the population or its distribution. Instead, they left all those issues in the hands of the local committees and the people, which gave the local population a sense of being participants, and local committees the feeling of being decision makers rather than merely recipients. The stage of planning extended to about two years (1992-1994). It included opening new streets, creating new open spaces, evacuating ‘non-eligible’ inhabitants forced to leave, and re-locating other eligible settlers to new houses. All of those things happened with the participation of experts and local committees together with planning officials. It was the first real interaction between the two agents, interaction that included negotiations and sharing of responsibilities; it was the first time the local people felt that their collective agency could make a difference. Again the planning stage does represent the inclusion of shantytown people in the formal city boundaries in official or legal terms; however it is clear that the balance of power remained in favour of the government. In effect, planning gave legality to shantytown settlements but preserved the status quo hierarchy of the urban setting. In fact, the planning stage gave the low status of shantytown settlers its legitimacy and institutional dimension. The stage of planned settlement When the planning stage was over, a new reality began to emerge. The local committees became the official representatives of local people, not only because of their role in planning, but also in providing the most needed services such as water, electricity, etc. Conversely, the position of tribal leaders was weakened; it was BIGSAS Working Papers 4/2013: challenging notions of development and change from everyday life in Africa 13 restricted only to personal issues and even this depended on the acquiescence of the individuals. The population in Elbaraka stands at about 38,580 people (National Census 2008), which represents about 75.5 per cent of the total population of Elbaraka in 1993 according to the National Census (1993). This decline is a direct result of the upgrading of the area in 1994. However, shantytowns are still the most densely populated areas in the capital city, largely because the average house size in third class areas – the lowest grade for the middle class areas – is about 360-400 m². In addition, shantytowns generally accommodate more than one family per house as a result of the low-income jobs available to inhabitants. The role of the NGOs also diminished considerably under the pressure of the government, which accused NGOs of implementing foreign agendas. This was largely a product of the Arabic-Islamic ideology of the government after the Islamic movement party took power in 1989. Remarkably, the first action initiated by the government after planning was to change the name of the area to ‘Elbaraka’, 6 an Islamic name denoting clearly the government’s vision for the area. People meanwhile established more relations with other shantytowns, especially their ‘core area’; impressive permanent houses appeared and shops packed with diverse goods. A huge change came with the introduction of electricity (2007). Although before that people used private generators for lighting at night, with electricity connection, people had their first taste of a different urban life with an enormous array of electronic devices becoming accessible. All schools were transferred into the management of the government (i.e. 10 schools), except for one belonging to the Catholic Church. Besides these, a growing number of private schools sprang up, run by the educated young generation. Other members of this young generation born and raised in the area started to engage in lucrative economic activities inside and outside the area, such as driving rickshaws. Meanwhile, large numbers of their peers were working in government institutions in the lower ranks, in the police service and the army. The NGOs also continued their efforts in the field of healthcare, as there was no medical centre in the area funded by the government, while some NGOs supported small developmental programmes through local partners. 6 Holy blessing in Arabic, generally used in religious contexts. BIGSAS Working Papers 4/2013: challenging notions of development and change from everyday life in Africa 14 Different perceptions of services and responsibilities The three agents differ in the manner and purpose in which they provide services to the shantytown’s people. These differences are the result of the diverse perceptions and understanding of the character of local people and the nature of the area. Meanwhile, local people’s perception is heavily influenced by their backgrounds and ideology, specifically by their rural background and urban aspirations, which shape their perceptions and priorities toward services. At the same time the government officials have been motivated by a different perception, again arising from their middle class background and their living in other parts of the city, so their priorities diverge from those of the other two agents. NGOs’ concerns are motivated by their western experiences of humanitarian works, which influences their designs and funding of services and development projects. The issue of government-local people relations in worldwide slums was the focus of an important report written by one of the UNagencies. The Challenge of Slums: Global Report on Human Settlements 2003, represents the first global assessment of slums by an international NGO. The report proves that slum dwellers increased substantially during the 1990s (UN 2003). It is further projected that in the next 30 years, the global number of slum dwellers will increase to about 2 billion, while urban population in less developed regions has increased by 36 per cent in the last decade. Adapting an optimistic attitude, the report praises governmental approaches to dealing with slums, describing them as a shift from negative policies such as forced eviction, neglect and involuntary resettlement, to more positive policies such as self-help and upgrading, facilitating and rights-based policies. The report suggested that informal settlements, where most of the urban poor in developing countries live, are increasingly seen by public decisionmakers as places of opportunity, as ‘slums of hope’ rather than ‘slums of despair’. Furthermore, the report stressed that to encounter the challenge of slums, urban development policies should address the issue of livelihoods of slum dwellers and urban poverty in general, thus going beyond traditional approaches that have tended to concentrate on improvement of housing, infrastructure and physical environmental conditions. The report also discussed approaches for dealing with slums, and considered that slum upgrading is among the most important strategies, receiving greater emphasis in recent years, though upgrading is only one solution among several others. The failure of past slum upgrading and low-income housing development has, to a large extent, been a result of inadequate allocation of resources, the BIGSAS Working Papers 4/2013: challenging notions of development and change from everyday life in Africa 21 Loyal, S. and B. Barnes (2001) ‘Agency as a red herring in social theory’, Philosophy of the Social Sciences 31: 507-524. Manger, L. O. (ed) (1987) Communal labour in the Sudan. Bergen: University of Bergen. Njoh, A. J. (2009) ‘Ideology and public health elements of human settlement policies in sub-Saharan Africa’, Cities 26: 9-18. United Nations Human Settlements Program (2003) The challenge of slums: global report on human settlement. London: Earthscan Publications. BIGSAS Working Papers 4/2013: challenging notions of development and change from everyday life in Africa 22 Opposing the Developmental State online: how do South Africans make use of online platforms to challenge government’s macroeconomic strategies? Irina Turner 10 Abstract The performance of a nation is measured by financial indices like the gross national product (GNP) and development statistics like the Human Development Index (HDI) taking dimensions like mortality rate, standard of education or income per capita into account. Whether the development of these figures is positive or negative is determined in comparison to other nations. However, well-being in terms of spirituality, social relationships, ethical values etc. is not considered. In global discourse (Fairclough 2006) it assumed that material wealth makes for happier people and therefore economic growth is the most important feature to foster development. A nation’s official self-assessment and interpretation of these figures is collectively uttered by politicians channelled to the outside world through the president as the epitome of official nation’s representation. State-of-the-nation speeches serve as a condensed peak of a nation’s self-evaluation. This mainstreamed generalization however, cannot reflect the qualitative or subjectively experienced perception of changing life for individual citizens. The new social media Facebook and Twitter as well as the possibility for online citizens to post their comments on blogs is a way of expression deviating opinions from the collective voice of government. On the example of South Africa’s recent history, this article contrasts the official government’s version of development evident in the-stateofthe-nation speeches with people’s real-life experiences uttered online. A critical discourse analysis (Blommaert 2006) of four stateof-the-nation speeches by South African president Jacob Zuma (2009-2012) compared to selected postings on Facebook, Twitter 10 Dr. des. Irina Turner is a qualified Arts Manager (Potsdam University of Applied Sciences, Germany) and holds a M.A. degree in Media Theory and Practice from the University of Cape Town, South Africa. In summer 2013, she finished her tobe-published PhD project on Political Discourse in post-apartheid South Africa at the Bayreuth International Graduate School of African Studies (BIGSAS), Bayreuth University, Germany. Her research interest lies in interdisciplinary approaches of Cultural Studies, Media Studies and Applied Linguistics in exploring questions of communication practices and language change in Africa. Besides having worked in Administration and Human Resources of the academic, public, and private sector in Germany and South Africa, Irina is also an experienced tutor for Media Studies and currently lectures Media and Presentation skills at the chair of African Language Studies at Bayreuth University. BIGSAS Working Papers 4/2013: challenging notions of development and change from everyday life in Africa 23 and Newspaper-Comment-Blogs, allows for an assessment of the gap between official rhetoric and people’s real life experiences. Keywords: new media, contestations, development policy, South Africa. Is South African democracy escaping to the internet? The annual State-of-the-Nation-Address (SoNA) 11 delivered at the Opening of Parliament holds a pivotal position in communicating the South African government’s macroeconomic agenda and political vision to the media and the public. The current SoNA discourse is dominated by transforming South Africa into a so-called Developmental State via the vision of the New Growth Path (NGP), which tries to rectify the ever increasing disparity between rich and poor through strategic state intervention in the economy. Although the speech represents the ‘State of the Nation’ and speaks on behalf of it from a political perspective, the official government version does not necessarily reflect the perceptions and experiences of individual citizens. The SoNA is traditionally a suitable occasion to respond to and challenge the official mainstreamed version of the ‘State of the Nation’. Compared to the apartheid era, South Africans seemingly enjoy great freedoms – online and offline – in expressing their opinions and directing their views about and towards government. Upon closer inspection, however, the country is currently experiencing a presidency that appears to open avenues for public participation via social media and other platforms, 12 while at the same time legally restricting the dissemination of information, 13 suppressing freedom of speech and sometimes violently repressing oppositional voices of protesters (cf. Duncan 20 August 2012; see also Van Rensburg 2012: 96). The possibility to post views and comments on New Media platforms like blogs, social networks or in comment sections of online newspapers opens relatively safe ways of exchanging and 11 The South African State-of-the-Nation-Address (SoNA) is held by the President at the Opening of Parliament in Cape Town in February each year to a joint sitting of Parliament and ‘marks the formal beginning of the parliamentary term’ (Parliament of RSA 2004: 97). 12 For instance, a presidential hotline receiving service delivery complaints (GCIS 2 May 2013). 13 For instance, the Protection of Information Bill, also called ‘Secrecy Bill’ enables government officials to classify contentious information (see n.a. Mail & Guardian Online 14 June 2012; also R2K Campaign 18 February 2013). BIGSAS Working Papers 4/2013: challenging notions of development and change from everyday life in Africa 24 expressing deviating opinions from the collective voice of government for recipients of news with content producers and peeraudiences. In an application of Critical Discourse Analysis (Blommaert 2006), this article contrasts South Africa’s official government version of the Developmental State and its vision brand the New Growth Path with people’s views expressed online. It seeks to sketch answers to the currently pressing question of whether social media outlets are used politically by South Africans in order to challenge hegemonic notions of development and whether online platforms can provide a tool for maintaining or even expanding on the current level of freedom of expression in South Africa. After outlining the relationship between media use and democracy with a focus on South Africa, the South African notion of the Developmental State is explored from various perspectives. Examples from three different online formats responding to the 2012 SoNA and the notion of the Developmental State give insight into the gap between official rhetoric and people’s experiences: first, comments to an online newspaper article (Mail & Guardian Online 9 February 2012); second, three blogs and their comments on the online platform Thoughtleader (Gumede 9 July 2008; SaundersonMeyer 11 February 2012; Potgieter 12 June 2012); and third, postings on the day of the SoNA on the President’s Facebook page (The Presidency 9 February 2012). Democratisation and the New Media in South Africa As the South Africa case proves, democratisation is not only the transition from an authoritarian to a democratic society, but also implies its stability and sustainability. Democracy is sustained by a balance of offers of the rulers and demands of the ruled (Nisbet et al. 2012: 250). Citizens’ demands are expressed through political participation, e.g., elections and public expressions in the press or other formats (ibid.). Campbell and Kwak argue that political debate is the ‘fundamental building block of participatory democracy’ because through talk people overcome uncertainty, establish coherence of their perceived reality and filter relevant information (2001: 1007). 14 The Habermasian model of Deliberations in the Public Sphere, whereby – simply put – political consensus is reached through exchange of ideas in a space between the people and the 14 Also argued by Katz (1994); Pan, Shen, Paek, & Sun (2006) (in Campbell & Kwak, 2011: 1007). BIGSAS Working Papers 4/2013: challenging notions of development and change from everyday life in Africa 25 state, lends itself ideally as a metaphor for the Internet 15 (see e.g., Van Rensburg 2012: 99). Scholars are of two minds when it comes to the Internet’s positive effect on democratisation and political education. 16 Some suggest the Internet has ‘a very limited role in promoting democratic citizenship’ (Hardy and Scheufele, 2005: 73) 17 . An American based study by Hill and Hughes found that most chat room debates are concerned with events and personalities rather than with political issues and are dominated by ‘normative statements that require little evidential backing’ (1998: 118 in Hardy and Scheufele 2005: 75). Furthermore, Gergen (2008), Sunstein (2001) and Mutz (2002) reason that users tend to select content coherent with their world view and meet peers online who, in a type of ‘echo chamber’ (Sunstein 2001), resonate existing political opinions (in Campbell and Kwak 2001: 1010/1018). Others argue that a higher Internet penetration increases indices of democracy (Best and Wade 2009; Groshek 2009; Howard 2009 in Nisbet et al. 2012: 251). Whether utilised or not, the Internet potentially provides features known to enhance the level of democratic citizenship like pluralism of opinion and political knowledge (Nisbet et al. 2012: 252). Especially the possibility for interactive exchange of ideologies, news, agendas and experiences can foster democratic awareness and political activation from ‘the bottom up’ (Nisbet et al. 2012: 252; see also Hardy and Scheufele 2005: 74 and Van Rensburg 2012: 94). Interpersonal discussion, either online or offline, 18 moderates the political input by the media, leads to differential learning and more strategic information gathering, and might result in individual action (Hardy and Scheufele 2005: 72/73/80). Hardy and Scheufele argue based on Habermas (1962) that political decision making is not 15 For a detailed elaboration on the relation between Habermas’ theory and the Internet, see Dalhberg (2001), Heng et al. (2003). 16 For further studies on the effect of the Internet on democratisation see Groshek (2009); Howard (2009); Mozorov (2011); Shirky (2011) (cited by Nisbet et al. 2012: 249). 17 Hardy & Scheufele argue that reliability of online information is more flawed compared to traditional media; exacerbated by the ‘nonlinear nature of this medium’ and its ‘fuzzy layout’ making differentiation between hard and soft news more difficult (2005: 74/80). Nisbet et al. point out that the relationship between Internet penetration and democratisation depends on contextual factors (2012: 253). 18 Hardy & Scheufele found that in terms of the moderating effect through peer debate there is no difference between online and offline, i.e., to face-to-face discussion (2005: 72/73; 81). BIGSAS Working Papers 4/2013: challenging notions of development and change from everyday life in Africa 26 merely a result of accumulating information but that ‘the deliberative aspect is critical in this process because it allows citizens to weigh all different viewpoints and integrate them into their final decision’(2005: 80). 19 Unlike most other available scholarship, 20 Nisbet et al. also looked at the effects of Internet use on political activity in developing countries and conclude that ‘Internet use may play a more meaningful role in strengthening and enhancing young democracies through impacting citizen attitudes rather than promoting outright democratic transitions among autocratic regimes’ (2012: 261). One of the few studies examining the effect of the Internet on democratization in South Africa is provided by Van Rensburg (2012). She argues that the Internet holds great potential for Africans to strengthen their right of self-determination after decades of colonial and post-colonial suppression (2012: 94 based on Ott and Rosser 1999: 137). Many information services provided by the South African government in particular, e.g., Matric results, health information, reservation of bus tickets etc., are available online via mobile phones (Van Rensburg 2012: 105). This suggests that in South Africa, the Internet is highly important for sustaining democracy as long as a sufficient amount of people have access to it. Internet use in South Africa Internet access in sub-Saharan Africa is growing rapidly and was four times higher in 2009 than in 2005 (Nisbet et al. 2012: 254). The lion’s share of access points is in South Africa, where in 2007, 15 per cent of adults had access to the Internet via computer (Gillwald and Storck 2008: 26 in Van Rensburg 2012: 95). By 2011, this number had already climbed to 17 per cent of the population (World Wide Worx in Samie 4 June 2012). Access hereby refers to ownership and proximity (Kreutzer 2009: 18). There are no current numbers for Internet access via mobile phone in South Africa but developments suggest that this number is even higher than access via PC 21 and rapidly growing especially among youths (van Rensburg 2012: 95). 22 19 Kwak et al. (2005) found that people are more likely to participate in an online debate when they are in a small group with like-minded discussants (in Campbell & Kwak 2011: 1009). 20 For instance, Bimber (2003); Norris (2000), Xenos & Moy (2007) (in Nisbet et al. 2012: 252). 21 In his study of the Internet/mobile phone habits of 441 urban youths (grade 11 learners) from deprived areas of Cape Town, Kreutzer found that ’68 per cent of respondents were found to use the Internet on a mobile phone on a typical day’; the most favoured website had been Google (2009: 53). The most frequently used media BIGSAS Working Papers 4/2013: challenging notions of development and change from everyday life in Africa 27 The social media community in South Africa is currently growing about 300 per cent a year; whereby 80 per cent of the people with online access are active in social media (Shier E News Channel 9 February 2012). Despite this growth, over 80 per cent of South Africans are left with no access to the Internet. A study comparing 28 democratic and non-democratic countries from Africa and Asia found that the number of broadband users in South Africa, which was classified as a free country, was low in comparison (Nisbet et al. 2012: 262). This is due to the extremely high cost of Internet access and the monopoly of the service provider Telkom (Van Rensburg 2012: 104). Kreutzer, however, points out that access figures do not speak about the intensity and varieties of usage of New Media 23 and that ‘ownership or access to a certain technology is a poor predictor’ of socioeconomic development per se (Kreutzer 2009: 19). An increase in access points does not automatically lead to beneficial educational effects for the users or raise ‘civic engagement and social capital’ per se (2009: 20). The individual’s motivation for engagement is equally important, as Van Rensburg argues (2012: 99ff. based on Van Dijk 2005: 21). Motivation is determined by the resources available to the individual; i.e., material resources, software and hardware for instance, social resources, i.e., agents who support learning and using the Internet, and cognitive resources, i.e., a culturally and intellectually stimulating environment to make use of the Internet (Van Rensburg 2012: 100). Van Rensburg states that despite the economic hurdle, socio-cultural barriers also play an important role in preventing South Africans to engage with the Internet: ‘Learners’ and students’ lack of inclination towards mathematics, science subjects and traditional cultural practices lead them away from using technology, a problem specific to South Africa (Levin, personal communication, 1 December 2010)’ (2012: 108). She further argues that this distortion can only be rectified by government (Van Rensburg 2012: 108). The state type of the sample group had been TV (81 per cent had watched TV ‘yesterday’); whereas web access via mobile phone or PC scored 56 per cent (used ‘yesterday’) (Kreutzer 2009: 65). A surprisingly large group of the young people had read a newspaper the previous day (56 per cent) (Kreutzer 2009: 65). 13 per cent had read the news on the previous day on a mobile device, and 9 per cent on a PC (Kreutzer 2009: 67). 22 For a study on the politically activating effects of mobile-based communication see Campbell & Kwak (2011). 23 ‘One exception is the figures provided by the marketing research company Nielsen Online, some of which are regularly published by the South African Online Publishers Association (OPA)’(Kreutzer 2009: 15). BIGSAS Working Papers 4/2013: challenging notions of development and change from everyday life in Africa 28 interventions proposed by the Developmental State might be a step in the right direction. The Developmental State as a model for South Africa The ever-increasing rift between rich and poor in South Africa since the dismantling of apartheid, has urged the government to redress their macro-economic outlook in finding a balance between economic growth and development needs of the poor (Reitzes 2009: 13). Marquis (2009) describes the simultaneous existence of three competing notions of development within South Africa in politics and the media (see also Banda 2008). The modernistic approach, which is centred on the ‘metaphor of growth’, sees development as a ‘linear and irreversible process’ whereby underdeveloped countries should imitate developed countries (Marquis 2009: 18). This approach foregrounds ‘quantitative differences’ and frames underdevelopment as a result of resisting reforms and new technologies (Marquis 2009: 18). In South Africa, the shift to the neo-liberal concept Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR; introduced in 1996) can be seen as an embodiment of a modernistic macroeconomic strategy (Marquis 2009: 18). The second notion of development is the dependency paradigm which emerged in the 1960s (Marquis 2009: 20). This notion gave up on the idea that underdevelopment is self-inflicted but acknowledged the influence of external factors and the interdependence among developed and underdeveloped countries (Marquis 2009: 20). The proposed solution to underdevelopment was a delinking from the world economy (Marquis 2009: 20). In South Africa, this paradigm has been mostly reflected through the Redistribution and Development Programme (RDP; introduced in 1994), which was a change from the modernistic economic policies of the apartheid regime (Marquis 2009: 21). In the 1970s, a multidimensional approach emerged emphasising notions of endogenous and participatory self-development (Marquis 2009: 21). Marquis sees this approach manifested in South Africa, through the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) 24 which were the basis for the policies of the Developmental State (2009: 17ff.). By the end of Mbeki’s first tenure in 2004, it became clear that both postapartheid macro-economic strategies, the RDP and GEAR, had not 24 The targets were to be achieved by 2015 but remained unspecific; e.g. ‘ensuring environmental sustainability’ (Levin 2008 in Reitzes 2009: 13). For the only quantifiable goal of ‘halving poverty’, a definition of poverty was lacking in South Africa (see Reitzes 2009: 16; Oosthuizen 2008). BIGSAS Working Papers 4/2013: challenging notions of development and change from everyday life in Africa 29 produced the desired results 25 (Thompson 2001: 281). The notion of the Developmental State as a third alternative became prolific but initially still remained vague and unspecified (Reitzes 2009: 12). In May 2005, in a speech to the National Assembly President Thabo Mbeki pronounced the new outlook for the first time and called for a ‘strong state’ and more political intervention: On this occasion, he reflected upon the decline of the “Washington Consensus’, the ideas which had set the stage for the reduction of the role of the state in the ‘development thinking’ of global bodies such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank since the 1980s’ (Southall 2006: xx). The shift, as Daniel et al. point out, was less a result of looking back at the ANC’s socialist roots, but more active benchmarking with comparable countries such as the developmental capitalist Asian Tigers like Taiwan, South Korea or Singapore (2005: xxviii in Southall 2006: xvii). The Asian-style fostered state’s protection and incentives for selected companies and trades; this protectionist policy met the scepticism of the World Trade Organisation (Nattras 2011: 2). Compared to the Tiger States, South Africa had a few distinctly different parameters that would challenge the implementation of an ‘Asian style’ Developmental State: a deficiency in human resource capacity, tight-knit embedment in a globalist production system, a high level of democracy and public involvement, a low level of social coherence, as well as generally less ‘favourable and historical industrial conditions’ (Southall 2006: xvii/xxxii/xliff.). In 2006, as a first step towards the new model, the Mbeki administration committed to the Millennium Development Goals (MDG), which were translated into measurable national targets on service delivery 26 (Levin 2008 in Reitzes 2009: 13). After the tideturning Polokwane 27 conference in 2007, the governing party issued 25 In 2008, the government admitted in a review that economic growth does not trickle down to the poor or automatically results in an easily accessible labour market for unskilled workers (South African Presidency 2008: 103 in Reitzes 2009: 16/17). 26 By 2007: eradication of the ‘bucket system’; by 2008: potable water provision to 2.07 million households; by 2010: sanitation provision to 3.7 million households; by 2012: electricity provision to 3.4. million households (Levin 2008, 54-55 in Reitzes 2009: 13). 27 At the ANC’s 52th national conference in Polokwane in December 2007, Thabo Mbeki was publicly humiliated and eventually got unceremoniously unseated as the BIGSAS Working Papers 4/2013: challenging notions of development and change from everyday life in Africa 30 a more precise definition on the Developmental State including the following features:  ‘(…) strategic orientation: an approach premised on peoplecentred and people-driven change, and sustained development based on high growth rates, restructuring of the economy and socioeconomic inclusion.  (…) capacity to lead in the definition of a common national agenda and in mobilising all of society to take part in its implementation. (…)  (…) organisational capacity: ensuring that its [the state’s] structures and systems facilitate realisation of a set agenda. (…)  (…) technical capacity: the ability to translate broad objectives into programmes and projects (…). This depends among others on the proper training, (…), and on acquiring and retaining skilled ‘personnel’ (ANC July 2010. [bold in original]). Along with this definition, the ANC set itself further targets at Polokwane; amongst the more specific ones were the implementation of a comprehensive social security system, reduction of certain illnesses and maternal deaths, reduction of violent crime and road accidents, intensifying education in mathematics and natural sciences, and expanding the nation’s artisanship base (Reitzes 2009: 12ff.). Due to the fact that the concept of the Developmental State for South Africa seems vague, discourse and criticism on the notion is broad. Southall describes three critical views represented by the economic liberals, the Jacobins, and the developmentalists (2006: xxiiff.). The economic liberals 28 fear an ideologically driven ‘developmentalism’ that plays into the selfserving interests of the ANC elite and hence, they call for a reduction in state control in order to boost the economy (Southall 2006: xxiiff.). 29 Economic liberals share their concern with the so-called Jacobins, 30 the second critical faction, namely that large-scale state intervention party’s president and consequently president of the country in favour of his rival Jacob Zuma (Tabane & Ludman 2009: 88). 28 The most prominent proxy is opposition leader Tony Leon of the Democratic Alliance (Southall 2006: xxiiff.). 29 Southall argues this stance results from ‘neoclassical economic thinking which commends the minimal state as a prerequisite for growth’ (Southall 2006: xxiiff.). 30 The term Jacobins was coined by Itumeleng Mahabane in Financial Mail ‘in echo of the most radical wing of the bourgeoisie revolutionaries in France after 1789’ who BIGSAS Working Papers 4/2013: challenging notions of development and change from everyday life in Africa 37 role-model but the media chose to focus on the negative and ignored positive aspects (ibid.). An equally critical stance terming the article ‘hostile’ towards government was taken by the poster ‘Helene Passtoors’. 41 Like ‘Harris’, she expressed her disappointment in a newspaper ‘that once was a champion for democracy’ (Comment section. Mail & Guardian Online 9 February 2012). ‘Passtoors’ took issue with the positive representation of Mbeki’s neo-liberal policies which exacerbated the gap between rich and poor in South Africa (ibid.). She further argued, Brazil rather than China will be the role model for South Africa when it comes to implementing the Developmental State and contested the ‘preconceived idea’ that this necessarily has to go hand in hand with ‘an authoritarian regime to succeed’; naming Sweden and France as counter-examples (ibid.). ‘Anton van Niekerk’ 42 argued that South Africa was far from China’s excellence with regard to education and therefore lacked the capacity to produce sophisticated manufacturing or recruit skilled people for civil service (Comment section. Mail & Guardian Online 9 February 2012). He refuted ‘Eric Scott’s’ reproach 43 to be advocating a oneparty dictatorship and romanticising China’s version of repressive State Capitalism by agreeing that China was a dictatorship but reiterating his opinion that ‘the urban education system in China is producing the best in the world’ (ibid.). ‘Van Niekerk’ also defended his position against the criticism by ‘David Harris’, who named Apple’s manual manufacturing in China as a counter-example against the exclusive application of robot technology (ibid.). He argued that logistics, design and management did indeed require a high level of know-how (ibid.). This example showed that the Mail & Guardian Online editorial managed to elicit informed and well-reasoned response and debate from different angles. Some posters defended China while others said China was not an appropriate comparison for South Africa at all. The posters also engaged in direct contact with each other. While the commentators displayed sluggish spelling and were quick to use insulting language, especially when directly referring to each other, they appeared to be from an educated background politically situated 41 Likely, this is the real person Helene Passtoors. She is a former anti-apartheid activist imprisoned during apartheid for her activity in Umkhonto we Sizwe (South African History Online n.d.). 42 Likely, this is the real person Anton van Niekerk. He is Professor for Philosophy at the University of Stellenbosch (van Niekerk n.d.). 43 For this blogger, no identification could be found online. BIGSAS Working Papers 4/2013: challenging notions of development and change from everyday life in Africa 38 on the left and therefore represented the typical readership profile of the Mail & Guardian. Example II: comments on ThoughtLeader blogs Three exemplary blogs and their commentary on the Internet platform ThoughtLeader (Gumede 9 July 2008; Saunderson-Meyer 11 February 2012; Potgieter 12 June 2012) trace the evolvement of the public notion on the Developmental State on blogs. ThoughtLeader is a blogging space administered by the Mail & Guardian Online and promotes itself as an ‘editorial group blog’ with the objective to ‘provide a platform’ for debate among writers from ‘various industries and political spectrums’ and the opportunity for readers to comment (Mail & Guardian Online 2013a). Over 100 bloggers from academia, journalism, and business as well as Diaspora South Africans and some organisations like the Archbishop Tutu Fellows who are advised to ‘try not to be simply a spokesperson for [their respective] organisation or company’ are registered and presented with a photograph and short profile description (ibid.). The site is structured into categories of Business, Equality, Gender Violence, General, Lifestyle, Media and Marketing, News and Politics, Perspective, Sports, and Tech (ibid.). Writers are asked to write mainly in English (ibid.). In 2008, Vusi Gumede 44 wrote on ThoughtLeader about his conference paper 45 that assessed the extent to which South Africa represents the Developmental State 46 (9 July 2008). The paper ‘tentatively concluded that South Africa indeed encapsulates most of the key features’ but found that South Africa’s implementation, influenced by Amartya Sen’s approach to development, was relatively weak and ineffective; despite the relative decline in poverty (Gumede 9 July 2008). According to Gumede, Evan’s concept of ‘embedded autonomy’ (1995), i.e., the networking between bureaucrats and business, has not yet fully materialised in South Africa (ibid.). Responses to the blog were largely positive, although Gumede failed to go into details on key concepts of the policy (Gumede 9 July 2008 Comment Section). 44 Prof. Gumede has worked for the South African presidency for 12 years and is now working as an academic and writer (WhosWho n.d.). 45 SA Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC): Conference on the potentialities for and challenges of constructing a democratic developmental state in South Africa; 4 to 6 June 2008; Cradle of Humankind, Johannesburg. 46 Robinson & White (1998), Edigheji (2005), Evans (1995). No reference list in blog format. (Gumede 9 July 2008). BIGSAS Working Papers 4/2013: challenging notions of development and change from everyday life in Africa 39 Three years later, blogger Elnari Potgieter 47 still identified implementation backlogs (12 June 2012). Potgieter criticised that although the Developmental State was prominently framed in the government’s agenda in Zuma’s 2012 SoNA, it remained a label only (ibid.). She argued that the main feature of the Developmental State, as realised by Japan for example, was a ‘strong, reliable, predictable and skilled bureaucracy’, which South Africa lacked considerably (ibid.). Potgieter elaborated that efficient bureaucracy required ‘a sense of mission’ and ‘vigorous standards’ in the recruitment process (ibid.). She advocated for performance-based rewarding and longterm career development (ibid.). All of this would result in ‘a sense of unity and ‘corporate coherence’ amongst bureaucrats’ (ibid.). In response to Potgieter, ‘TumiM#’ provided an expert’s voice as a practitioner ‘coming from the public sector’ in the blog’s comment section: (…) I can assure you that the problem of delivery is about more than just skills and capacity. (…) In the institution I work for, there have been COUNTLESS suggestions for implementation, most of which are shot down (…) because there is no political support (…). When there is political will, (…) I believe (…) there will be more room for independent decision making (…), and higher standards of delivery’ (Potgieter 12 June 2012 Comment Section). Vigorously defending government, ‘Tofolux#’ argued that implementation was lagging because business and the media were not realising their commitment to work together with the president on the Developmental State but ‘operating in isolation of each other and holding onto old ideologies’(Potgieter 12 June 2012 Comment Section). He saw government’s role as the planning force setting targets whereas business remained the responsible ‘motive force’ realising the plans (ibid.). Blogger ‘The Creator#’ disagreed with ‘Tofolux#’ and argued the implementation of the Developmental State was foremost the responsibility and capability of government but the Zuma administration was not using its power because it was ‘a tool of big business’ who in turn were ‘obsessed with fantasies of profit without investment’ and therefore ‘unresponsive to real developmental needs’ (Potgieter 12 June 2012 Comment Section). 47 MA Student for Political Science at the University of Stellenbosch (Potgieter 12 June 2012). BIGSAS Working Papers 4/2013: challenging notions of development and change from everyday life in Africa 40 A blog by William Saunderson-Meyer 48 related directly to the 2012 SoNA (11 February 2012). The blogger gave a practical example for government’s implementation of the Developmental State and argued this idea originally stemmed from the apartheid government: To commit R300-billion to infrastructural spending, the equivalent of two-and-a-half Soccer World Cups, is bold indeed. These are first steps to the developmental state that President Zuma admires and attributes to China, but which in SA can in fact be traced back to the massive and successful state corporatism of the early National Party years’ (ibid.). Saunderson-Meyer pointed out that Zuma, keeping the international investors in mind, carefully avoided certain sensitive aspects of the strategy: ‘He spoke about the importance of mining but never spoke the word ‘nationalisation’, the mere prospect of which has cost billions in investment and scores of thousands of jobs’ (ibid.). The blog invited 31 responses. ‘jandr0#’ disagreed with SaundersonMeyer on calling Zuma’s investments ‘bold’: ‘Now please explain to me how Zuma was ‘bold’ in spending taxpayers’ money? (…) I would argue on the contrary, that he was taking no risks – that everybody knows spending on infrastructure is generally perceived as a ‘home run’.(…) In my opinion, a ‘bold’ Zuma would have tackled (say) corruption head on. Why is this bold? Well, because it may cost him some support from already corrupted ANC cadres, that’s why’ (Comment section. Saunderson-Meyer 11 February 2012). Saunderson-Meyer argued in response that long-term infrastructure investment was ‘bold’ indeed as its benefits do not immediately ‘show in the statistics’ (ibid.). Thoughtleader blogs attracted the same type of user profile like the comments on the Mail & Guardian Online’s editorial. However, the blogs appear more like a chat-room inviting direct debate with the writer. Compared to the comments to the online article, the blogging format allows for a dynamic eye-level conversation and progressing cross-talk with multiple participants rather than stating an after-thefact opinion to a static article already published by an anonymous detached editor. 48 Saunderson-Meyer is a columnist writing also for The Weekend Argus, The Citizen, Weekend Witness, and Sunday Times (Mail & Guardian Online 2013b). BIGSAS Working Papers 4/2013: challenging notions of development and change from everyday life in Africa 41 Example III: Facebook comments on the Presidency’s page The last example displays yet a different audience and format, viz. Facebook. The Government’s Communication and Information Services (GCIS) has maintained a Facebook page since 23 January 2008, called the presidency in order to ‘increase awareness of branding activities and mobilize South Africans and global ambassadors for the South African brand’ (GCIS 2011: 50). 49 The presidency’s Facebook page invited real-time direct responses; partly while Zuma was presenting his speech (The Presidency 9 February 2012). On 9 February 2012, the day of the SoNA, Zuma’s PR staff issued two postings linking to a live streaming and a written version of the speech which invited 35 and 151 comments respectively (The Presidency 9 February 2012). 50 Based on the profile photos and names, the majority of commentators seemed to be young (between 15 and 35 years) and black. Facebook seems to however, appeal more strongly to adult professionals who want to network and stay in touch with friends and family who might be living elsewhere rather than to youth aged 15-18 (see Kreutzer 2009). Most comments seemed to have been posted via smart phones, since they are often short and in typical text message lingo and coding. 51 This temporal and spatial confinement also had an effect on the quality and complexity of comments. English was the predominant language on the Facebook page. Most commentators – perhaps in the illusion of directly speaking to ‘the president’ on ‘his’ Facebook page – lauded the speech and commented positively (The Presidency 9 February 2012). A large part of the comments and also inter-posters conversations focused on the fact that president Zuma did not greet in Zulu and Venda at the opening of the speech (ibid.). However, some criticism was also apparent. Jayd Naidoo broke the illusion of the ‘people’s president’ by ironically posting: ‘president must be sharp, updating his facebook status while giving his speech’ (The Presidency 9 February 2012) and earned three ‘likes’ for pointing out that Facebook was used as a marketing device. Tshidi 49 In addition to its presence on Facebook, the South African government currently runs four further official social media accounts: on Twitter: @SAPresident and @PresidencZA; on YouTube: PresidencyZA; as well as on Flickr: presidencysa (The Presidency 5 June 2011). President Zuma does not have an individual personal account (The Presidency 5 June 2011). 50 t has only been possible to differentiate between comments made from PCs or from mobile phones since 2013. 51 Comments are quoted verbatim. BIGSAS Working Papers 4/2013: challenging notions of development and change from everyday life in Africa 42 Moreane accused the president of lying and election campaigning by promising the housing loans: He is telling lies how is he going to give ppl earning 3500,00 a month a subsidy? (…) I dnt thnk it will be possi ble 4. Banks to finance those ppl earning 3500 like me. Pure lies mr prez, u only wnt to score political socrs 4 nxt term’ (The Presidency 9 February 2012). Tsholofelo Nkoane called the SoNA an uninspiring ‘pavement speech’ which was more about the party than about the nation (The Presidency 9 February 2012). He pointed out that Zuma did not mention ‘rhino poaching, the secrecy bill nor the immigration’ and criticised the costly campaign of renaming public places. Nkoane concluded that the content of the speech ‘was how the ANC will benefit from government in 2012’ (ibid.). The Facebook space did allow people to refer to specific issues. Bongani Wakwa-Maridili complained that government had discarded ‘the concept of Local Economic Development & that of Small Town Regeneration’ but instead concentrated on the cities resulting in a ‘skewed’ development reminiscent of apartheid structures (The Presidency 9 February 2012). However, Wakwa-Maridili expressed explicit appreciation for the investment in the region of Waterberg (The Presidency 9 February 2012). People responded in real-time when issues were addressed that pertained to their life. Amanda Ndumndum reacted when Zuma spoke about a Housing Funding scheme that would allow people to take affordable loans: ‘Mr President I'm in the police I hope u keep ur word abt the loans bcos I dnt qualify for RDP house’ (The Presidency 9 February 2012). Although Facebook seems to be mostly accessed via mobile phone and therefore only allows for relatively short statements, it is used by a broad political public reflecting a great variety of opinion and does not have the elitist appeal of Mail & Guardian Online and ThoughtLeader. As a result, the debates on Facebook also lack the depth and complexity of the Mail & Guardian’s blog and online newspaper format and give only superficial reference to the notion of the Developmental State. Nevertheless, Facebook also provides concrete accounts of the actual consequences of government’s policies for citizens, while ThoughtLeader and Mail & Guardian Online tend to discuss the issue in abstract and theoretical terms. Online opposing as a form of freedom of speech This article has shown a range of online activity in response to the SoNA. Despite the drastic legal infringements of Freedom of Speech BIGSAS Working Papers 4/2013: challenging notions of development and change from everyday life in Africa 43 South Africa is currently experiencing 52 , the Internet seems a suitable and yet openly accessible outlet for public debate and critique of government. South Africans indeed use the Internet to express their political opinion and dare to challenge mainstream notions and act as a complementing force for the traditional media frames. Activity on social media in South Africa is at an all-time high and conversation is also politically motivated. According to Schreiner, South Africans do not see social media merely as a lifestyle tool but are also ‘ready to discuss policy issues’ online (E News Channel 9 February 2012). However, for complex issues like the evolvement of the Developmental State, spatially restricted social media forums like Facebook are not a suitable platform. They merely allow for briefly sharing how policies affected personal experience or a ‘like’/‘dislike’ kind of statement. However, this is not to discard the possibility of Facebook becoming a mass movement tool as seen in the Arab Spring should the need for a refuge platform become more pressing. The more sophisticated and complex platforms like Thoughtleader allow for detailed and informed comments with reasonable and differentiated arguments partly in favour, partly against government. The concept of the Developmental State seems still to be too vaguely defined by government to be challenged directly. Its evolvement is currently in progress. Except through policies that keep the provision of broadband access unaffordable to most South Africans, the Internet in South Africa is not (yet) restricted by government and growing access to the Internet especially via smart phones suggests that an increase in online expression of political opinion can be expected in future. This, however, does not automatically improve the quality of information available to the public. Nevertheless, some state secrets might be harder to keep under the lid, the more people participate in online debates. Future research in that field should systematically examine user profiles and trace contentious political stories that have run ‘viral’ in order to further explore the power of the Internet for political activation in South Africa. 52 Currently impeding progress is the “Protection of Information Bill”, also called “Secrecy Bill”, which among other freedom restrictions enables even provincial government officials to classify contentious information (see n.a. Mail & Guardian Online 14 June 2012). One of the most contentious issues in this bill is the criminalisation and punishment of journalists and whistleblowers who reveal classified and information by pointing out corruption and dubious practices in government (Williams 11 March 2013; see also R2K Campaign 18 February 2013). BIGSAS Working Papers 4/2013: challenging notions of development and change from everyday life in Africa 44 References Afrobarometer (2005) ‘Survey round 3’, <http://www.afrobarometer.org/results/results-by-country-nz/south-africa>, accessed 11 May 2013. ANC (2010) ‘National general council discussion document. Transformation of State and Governance’ <http://www.anc.org.za/docs/discus/2010/legislaturez.pdf>, accessed 11 May 2013. Banda, F. (2008) ‘Deconstructing media coverage of development’ in Media development: communication on poverty 1. London: World Association for Christian Communication. Blogger (1999–2013). ‘Dave Harris’ [Blogger Profile], <http://www.blogger.com/profile/04281146688216246485>, accessed 13 May 2013. Blommaert, J. (2006) Discourse: A critical introduction. Key topics in sociolinguistics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Campbell, S. and N. Kwak (2011) ‘Political involvement in “Mobilized” society: the interactive relationships among mobile communication, network characteristics, and political participation’, Journal of Communication 61: 1005-24. Dahlberg, L. (2001) ‘Computer-mediated communication and the public sphere: A critical analysis’, Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication 7: 0. doi: 10.1111/j.1083-6101.2001.tb00137. Daniel, J., R. Southall and J. Lutchman (eds.) (2005) State of the Nation: South Africa 2004-2005. Cape Town: HSRC Press. De Lange, D. (2012) ‘Buthelezi criticizes zeal – Iron security locks down Parliament’, Cape Times 5. Doner, R., K. Ritchie and D. Slater (2005) ‘Systemic vulnerability and the origins of developmental states: Northeast and Southeast Asia in comparative perspective’, International Organization 59 (2): 327-362. Duncan, J. (2012) ‘South Africa: the return of the police riot’. Allafrica.com of 20 August 2012, <http://allafrica.com/stories/201208200211.html>, accessed 11 May 2013. E-News Channel (2012) ‘News night special edition: State of the Nation Address 2012: social media reaction’. [Television broadcast of 9 February 2012]. Cape Town, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3p2FT_0IbWw&feature=relat ed>, accessed 11 May 2013. BIGSAS Working Papers 4/2013: challenging notions of development and change from everyday life in Africa 45 Evans, P. (1995) Embedded autonomy. States and industrial transformation. Princeton: University Press. GCIS (2013) ‘Government call centres and help lines’ [Government Website, 2 May 2013], <http://www.info.gov.za/issues/hotline/>, accessed 13 May 2013. GCIS (2011) ‘Government Communication and Information System Strategic Plan 2011/12 - 2013/14, 06.04.2011’ [Government Paper], <http://www.info.gov.za/view/DownloadFileAction?id=147550>, accessed 11 May 2013. Government of South Africa (2010) ‘The New Growth Path: the Framework.3 November 2010’ [Government Paper], <http://www.info.gov.za/view/DynamicAction?pageid=607d=0>, accessed 11 May 2013. Gumede, V. (2008) ‘South Africa: a developmental state?’ ThoughtLeader. [Blog Entry of 9 July 2008], <http://www.thoughtleader.co.za/vusigumede/2008/07/09/southafrica-a...>, accessed 11 May 2013. Habermas, J. (1962) Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit: untersuchungen zu einer Kategorie derbürgerlichen Gesellschaft. Neuwied: Luchterhand. Hardy, B. and D. Scheufele (2005) ‘Examining differential gains from internet use: comparing the moderating role of talk and online interactions’, Journal of Communications (March): 71-84 Heng, M. S. H. and A. De Moor (2003) ‘From Habermas’s communicative theory to practice on the internet’, Information Systems Journal 13: 331-352. Kreutzer, T. (2009) ‘Generation Mobile. Online and digital media usage on mobile phones among low-income urban youth in South Africa’. Cape Town: University of Cape Town Centre for Film and Media Studies, <http://www.tinokreutzer.org/mobile/MobileOnlineMediaSurveyResults-2009.pdf>, accessed 11 May 2013. Levin, R. M. (2008) ‘Public service capacity and organisation in the South African developmental state’ in B. Turok (ed.), Wealth doesn’t trickle down: the case for a developmental state in South Africa. Cape Town: New Agenda. Mail and Guardian Online (2013a) ‘About Thought Leader’, <http://www.thoughtleader.co.za/about-thoughtleader/>, accessed 10 May 2013. BIGSAS Working Papers 4/2013: challenging notions of development and change from everyday life in Africa 46 Mail and Guardian Online (2013b) ‘William Saunderson-Meyer’, <http://www.thoughtleader.co.za/author/williamsaundersonmeyer />, accessed 13 May 2013. Marquis, D. E. (2009) ‘Ties that bind. A critical discourse analysis of the coverage of the Millennium Development Goals in the Mail and Guardian’. Unpublished Master’s Thesis, Rhodes University. Mbeki, T. (2005) ‘Speech of the President of the Republic of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki, on the occasion of the Budget Vote of the Presidency, National Assembly, Cape Town, 25 May’. McDonald, D. A. and S. Jacobs (2005) ‘(Re) writing xenophobia: understanding press coverage of cross-border migration in Southern Africa’, Journal of Contemporary African Studies 23 (3): 295-325. n.a. (2012) ‘UN review lashes SA over secrecy Bill’. Mail and Guardian Online of 14 June 2012, <http://mg.co.za/print/201206-14-international-outcry-over-secrecy-bill>, accessed 11 May 2013. n.a. (2012) ‘Status update of the nation: Zuma is listening’. Mail and Guardian Online of 5 February 2012, <http://mg.co.za/article/2012-02-05-zuma-gets-connected-withsa-citizens>, accessed 11 May 2013. n.a. (2012) ‘Dreams of China vs. local realities’. Mail and Guardian Online of 9 February 2012, <http://mg.co.za/article/2012-02-03dreams-of-china-vs-local-realities/>, accessed 31 July 2012. Nattras, N. (2011) ‘The new growth path: game changing vision or cop-out?’, South African Journal of Science 107 (3/4), <http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?pid=S0>, accessed 11 May 2013. Nisbet, E., E. Stycheff and K. Pearce (2012) ‘Internet use and democratic demands: A multinational, multilevel model of internet use and citizen attitudes about democracy’, Journal of Communications 62: 249-265. Oosthuizen, M. (2008) ‘Estimating poverty lines for South Africa’, Department of Social Development [Government Paper], <http://www.info.gov.za/view/DynamicAction?p0>, accessed 11 May 2013. Parliament of the Republic of South Africa (2004) ‘National Assembly Guide to Procedure’. Creda, Cape Town. [Government Document], <http://www.parliament.gov.za/content/GUIDE.pdf>, accessed 11 May 2013. BIGSAS Working Papers 4/2013: challenging notions of development and change from everyday life in Africa 53 Dormaa’s economy is mainly rural, with crop cultivation, poultry, forestry, and sand winning constituting the main livelihood activities (Dormaa municipal assembly 2012). Due to extensive cultivation and rampant wild fires, large tracts of what was originally forestland have turned into extensive areas of elephant grass and bush. Dormaa abounds in a number of natural environmental goods, some of which are only recognised and exploited as resources. These include clay, gravel, and sand deposits, forests, and water bodies. Moreover, there are some gold deposits that remain unexploited (Dormaa municipal assembly 2012). Use of these resources is governed concurrently by a public environmental regulatory regime and a customary communal property rights regime. These two different regimes complement, conflict, and overlap each other in shaping human use of these resources. Dormaa’s degrading natural environment The Dormaa municipal and Dormaa east districts have wet semiequatorial climates with a double maxima rainfall regime, and a mean annual rainfall between 125 cm and 175 cm. The major vegetation types are the reserved and off-reserve forests, and bush, which are extensively cleared in some areas. Sjoerd and Voorhoeve (1990: 712) introducing the Dormaa in their book on Dormaa traditional herbal medicine note that the original Dormaa vegetation of tropical rain forest has been largely replaced by cocoa-farms and by food crop cultivation. The protected forests include Mpameso (197.67 square kilometres), Pamu-Berekum (116.80 square kilometres) and Tain II (297.6 square kilometres) (DMA and DEDA 2012). These forest reserves, as well as the off-reserves provide valuable timber, flora, and fauna to the state and community people as sources of revenue and food. Timber species include Teak (genus Tectona grandis), Wawa (Tripolichiton Scleroxylon), Odum (Milicia excelsa), Sapele (Guthagrophrama) and Mahogany (Khaya invernesses) (DMA 2012: 9; DEDA 2012: 28). A large part of the off-reserve forests have been extensively cultivated leading to an invasion of grassland and sandy soils. As such the vegetation in the two districts in large parts is dominated by elephant grass and a few short scattered trees with heights ranging between 15 m and 28 m high. As a result of extensive farming activities in the communities, these vegetation types as well as soils are threatened and the forests, for instance, continually change to grassland. Associated with this change is increasing deficiency of soil nutrients for agriculture. The threat extensive cultivation and irregular logging pose to forests has been a major discourse promoting public environmental regulation in Dormaa to replenish lost forests (see BIGSAS Working Papers 4/2013: challenging notions of development and change from everyday life in Africa 54 also Ghana environmental policy 1995). Key environmental concerns in the districts include deforestation, indiscriminate sand/clay/gravel winning, 54 pollution of water bodies (refuse dumps sited close to water bodies), persistent annual bush fires, illegal lumbering, indiscriminate disposal of poultry waste, and excessive use of agrochemicals in farming (DMA 2012: 34; DEDA 2012: 33). There are indications that these environmental concerns feed the dominant discourse of environmental degradation in state policies, which recreate communities as primary causes of land degradation and forest lost (see the Ghana environmental policy 1995). Methodology Empirical dataset for this paper is drawn from twenty-six individual qualitative and five group discussions in Dormaa with migrant and indigenous farmers, landowners, officials of the Dormaa forest services division, officials at the Dormaa municipal assembly, and the Dormaa customary land secretariat. The discussions explored participants’ perceptions, experiences, and knowledge of the natural environment and practices towards its protection. On the basis on a social constructionist perspective, participants were encouraged to show how their customs and social interactions could possibly contribute to these perceptions, experiences and knowledge they held. The whole set of data obtained from these discussions is however, part of the author’s doctoral study programme. In various sections of the paper, these empirical dataset is presented in quotations to support the discussions. Largely, the unit of analysis is the incentive community people draw from the combination of the public environmental regulatory regime and the Dormaa customary property rights regime for their actions on their environment. The Atlas.ti computer assisted data analysis software was used to code and retrieve relevant data segments. Social construction of the environment and its protection: a basis of the methodology With the focus on notions of the environment and how incentives in property rights regime manifest in human environmental actions, the paper is framed within social constructionist perspectives. With this, notions of the natural environment and the incentives to shape behaviours on the environment are constructs people give to them. Such constructs are grounded on culture and social relations. This implies that to assure incentives that will enable use and protection of the natural environment, it is imperative to understand the culture 54 Emphasis ours BIGSAS Working Papers 4/2013: challenging notions of development and change from everyday life in Africa 55 and social processes of a society and how such culture and social processes influence the ways landowners and land users construct these incentives. This is the only way for public environmental policy to ensure synergy between regulation and human action. In Dormaa, constructs of the environment and environmental incentives are socially bounded. In the context of this paper, the communal customary property rights regime constitutes the culture that directs social relations with regard to nature. Thus, the customary property rights regime influences incentives in the public environmental regulatory regimes to protect the environment. Community people’s construction of the natural environment as a resource and the incentives that enable their use of such resources depend not only on state-imposed notions of what a resource is, and the incentives to encourage human actions on the environment in certain particular ways. Rather, community people’s construction of a resource and environmental incentives are shaped largely also by the influences their customary property rights hold on their daily lives. What this means is that public environmental regulatory regimes, based on conventional notions, can impose incentives to shape human action on the environment. But such incentives will always be reinterpreted by people within their own notions. Trees and forests may be considered resources only to the extent that some sort of value is imputed to them by people themselves, bounded by their daily property rights regime. The practice of tree cultivation The teak tree Teak (genus Tectona grandis) is a large deciduous tree of the family Verbenaceae. It is dominant in mixed hardwood forests, and one of the most valuable timbers. It has small fragrant white flowers and papery leaves that are often hairy on the lower surface (Fig. 2). BIGSAS Working Papers 4/2013: challenging notions of development and change from everyday life in Africa 56 The teak tree has a straight but often buttressed stem (i.e., thickened at the base), a spreading crown, and four-sided branchlets with large quadrangular pith. The leaves are opposite or sometimes whorled in young specimens, about 0.5 m (1.5 feet) long and 23 cm (9 inches) wide. In shape they resemble those of the tobacco plant, but their substance is hard and the surface rough. The branches terminate in many small white flowers in large, erect, crossbranched panicles. Fig. 2: the teak tree Source: Peter Narh, field research, March 2012. Teak timber is valued in warm countries principally for its extraordinary durability. Teakwood is used as electric poles, fine furniture, door and window frames, wharves, bridges, louvers, flooring, panelling, shipbuilding, among many other purposes. An important property of teak is its extremely good dimensional stability. It is strong, of medium weight, and of average hardness. Termites eat the sapwood but rarely attack the heartwood; it is not, however, completely resistant to marine borers. The state belief in teak: statutory support for teak cultivation in Dormaa The cultivation of teak trees is one of the instruments the forest services division promotes to reforest degraded areas in and off state protected forests. Reforestation is one of the programmes through which the state governs the environment in Dormaa, through the Dormaa forest services division. The reforestation programme with its associated planting of teak is supported by the National Forest Plantation Development Programme (NFPDP). The NFPDP is a nation-wide programme that seeks to halt the alarming rate of forest degradation in Ghana by providing technical and logistic support to farmers to plant commercial trees within and outside state protected forest reserves. 55 55 <http://www.fcghana.com/>, accessed 20 April 2013. BIGSAS Working Papers 4/2013: challenging notions of development and change from everyday life in Africa 57 In the protected forest reserves, farmers are allocated plots of degraded forests to intercrop trees with food crops, a cropping culture called the Modified Taungya System (MTS). Both in and outside the forest reserves, teak is cultivated by individuals and groups of people on small plots between one and ten acres, or on plantations of over one hectare of land. Outside the protected reserves, teak is grown on private plots of land and plantations. Teak farmers in the protected forests sell their trees to private contractors at government-controlled market prices. Those growers on private plots however sell their trees to private individuals at prices agreed between the farmer and the buyer. For its valuable nature, teak provides financial income to growers when the trees are harvested after maturing between fifteen and twenty-five years. Depending on the age and size of the tree harvested, a teak tree could fetch about Gh₵04 (Ghana cedis, about 2 euro) and Gh₵20 (10 euro). An official of the Dormaa forest services division expresses the financial benefits from planting teak as: OA: Oh I think it is both. You cannot plant trees just for planting sake, no, I don’t think it is wise to do that. You plant a plantation because you want to make some money. However, this also helps sustain the environment. It is the value of the trees for the environment. People have realised they can make a lot from teaks. A lot of people earn good money from the trees. We also educate them about the improvements that protecting the environment can bring to them. For the people in Koradaso, they are doing very well. They are hardworking. And now, with this modified Taungya system we have, you agreed with the people that if you farm this place, the paramount chief has got 15 per cent share of the proceeds, the community has got 5 per cent, I mean the community in which you are living, then the government has got 40 per cent, and you – the one planting the tree and taking care of it – have got 40 per cent.. <ref>P41:D_FA_ID_Da_OA, assistant forest officer_dormaa district_01mar2012.rtf - 41:32 [(66:66)] by peter narh</ref> 56 56 For anonymity, we only provide the initials of the discussion partner. The quotation reference at the end of each quote is interpreted with the following BIGSAS Working Papers 4/2013: challenging notions of development and change from everyday life in Africa 58 The Dormaa forest services division is the decentralized agency of the Forestry commission of Ghana 57 for the Dormaa forest district. The division is located in Dormaa Ahenkro, the capital of the Dormaa municipal. Its task is to oversee the management and protection of forest and wildlife resources, as well as the management of concessions for off-reserve lumbering in its catchment area. The catchment area comprises four political administrative districts in the Brong Ahafo region of Ghana. These are Dormaa municipal, Dormaa east, Goaso, and Brekum districts. Environmental regimes and notions in conflict In the next sections are instances that reveal conflicting incentives to plant teak. In these instances, it can be seen that while the state forest services division supports teak planting to mainly reforest degraded forests and provide income through lumber, community people are constrained to plant the teak due to communal values of their customary property rights regime. If any of them plant teak at all, they indeed do so for its economic value, but this comes at a cost to the communality of land rights. Planting teak brings people into conflict due to communal ownership of land, where an individual cannot perpetuate his or her use of land. For this reason, planting teak has not been sustained in Dormaa outside private plots. Though extensive land areas under communal ownership are degraded through extensive cultivation and sand winning, only a few patches of land outside state-protected forests are planted with teak. example: <ref>P41:D_FA_ID_Da_OA, assistant forest officer_dormaa district_01mar2012.rtf - 41:32 [(66:66)] by peter narh</ref>. “ref>” stands for reference; “P41” means primary document 41, that is, discussion transcript document 41; “D” refers to Dormaa; “FA” stands for formal authority; “ID” stands for individual discussion; “DA” refers to Dormaa ahenkro; “OA” is discussion partner’s initials; “assistant forest officer_dormaa district” is the official title of the discussion partner; “01 mar 2012” is the date on which the discussion was held; “rtf” is a computer file format; “41: 32” refers to 32th quotation in transcription document 41; “[(66:66)]” means quotation begins and ends in paragraph 66 of the document; “peter narh” is the name of the researcher. 57 The Forestry Commission of Ghana was established by the Forestry Commission Act, 1999 (Act 571.) It is responsible for the regulation of utilization of forest and wildlife resources, the conservation and management of those resources and the coordination of policies related to them. It embodies the various public bodies and agencies that were individually implementing the functions of protection, management, the regulation of forest and wildlife resources. These agencies currently form the divisions of the Commission: BIGSAS Working Papers 4/2013: challenging notions of development and change from everyday life in Africa 59 Teak planting and communality of land rights Under the National Forest Plantation Development Programme (NFPDP), the state grants loans and also provides seedlings free of charge to landowners to plant teak trees on their lands to reforest degraded lands. On the surface of it, it is laudable that the state provides such technical and logistics support to individuals and groups who may not have been able to secure this assistance themselves (Dragun 1999). The Dormaa forest services division sees the financial support under the NFPDP as a significant boost to tree planting: OA: No, no, not the Forestry commission but the Board chair of the forest plantation development fund. The fund is part of the commission and Nana is the Board chair of the fund. The fund has contributed a lot to forest plantations here, both on private lands and in reserved forests. Yes, the loan is accessible to everyone, insofar as you have land to plant on. But when you meet the Osagyefoe, he will tell you more about it. Even the migrant farmers at Koradaso have been asking for loans to cultivate their trees, and I have told them to send their application to Nana. So everyone can apply for it. <ref>P41: D_FA_ID_Da_OA, assistant forest officer_dormaa district_01mar2012.rtf - 41:28 [(29:29)] by peter narh</ref> OB: Ya, the loan is for private people who are...whether you plant in the off-reserve or inside the reserve. You can just apply. But normally they give to those in the reserve... the amount is maybe bigger as compared to those not in the reserve. <ref>P43: D_FA_ID_Da_OB, dormaa forestry officer_06apr2012.rtf - 43:58 [(235:235)] by peter narh</ref> Such state support is in line with the main arguments of the public regulation paradigm in the environmental governance debate that state institutions are necessary to intervene and provide support to regulate human environmental actions because private property rights will fail to protect the environment due to private rational aims that may go contrary to values of society as a whole (Smith 1997). However, in the Dormaa municipal the customary property rights regime conflicts with the teak planting programme of the state. It shows the divergence of notions about the incentives for teak planting to protect the environment between public environmental BIGSAS Working Papers 4/2013: challenging notions of development and change from everyday life in Africa 60 governance regimes and community people. For the public regulatory regime, planting teak is based on the illusion of the state forest services division that individuals have absolute control over the decisions they take on their lands. In the property rights regime of Dormaa, this is true only to the extent that while alive, the current cultivator enjoys the usufruct. Inasmuch as the Dormaa customary property rights regime is communal, the usufructary right is indefeasible, inalienable (Da Rocha and Lodoh 1999: 5), and subject to the rights of the land user’s family and the state of Dormaa. The customary communal property rights regime only grants usufructary rights to citizens of Dormaa by descent. Customarily, all lands in Dormaa belong to the people of Dormaa collectively; individuals hold only use rights, the usufruct. To this end, support for planting teak to reforest so-called degraded areas is a normative obligation of land use imposed by the state not only on the individual, but also on the family to which the individual belongs, as well as on the Dormaa state. It is normative because it is at variance to the customary property rights regime of the Dormaa. It is external, based on ideas of the state about incentives to plant teak for people and for improving environmental condition. Such normative programmes of the state constitute a denial of the community of the choice to determine how they pursue their livelihoods. It is a denial because in view of the communal rights in land, when teak is planted on a piece of family land for instance, it constrains the rights of others to the use of that same piece of land for one generation or more. The next paragraph explains this further. The normative obligation to plant teak may work to protect the environment. Aside the negative implications, planting teak certainly provides vegetative cover to replenish degraded land. Nonetheless, in view of the communal property rights regime, planting teak may disrupt the lives of future generations who have equal rights to the land as the current cultivator does. The disruption results if future generations wish to use the land for a different purpose other than a teak farm. The land on which one cultivates now belongs to the present cultivator as well as to other siblings, nephews, nieces, cousins, and so on, living, dead, or yet unborn. It is to say that a piece of land cultivated now belongs to an entire extended family. The current cultivator has a right over such land inasmuch as other members entitled to it have the same use rights. Upon the death of the current cultivator, family members can turn the existing farm into whatever they prefer, or they can develop it in an entirely different way. But this may not be easy in the case of a farm full of teak trees. Indeed, this comes close to what Anderson and Leal (1991) report on free market environmentalists’ approach to environmental BIGSAS Working Papers 4/2013: challenging notions of development and change from everyday life in Africa 61 governance. They note that state involvement in environmental regulation leads to disadvantages for private entrepreneurs; that is, state subsidies for certain environment-based activities to protect the environment may undermine the profitability of the environment for other people in the same activities. In Dormaa, the entrepreneurs are the other family members who have same use rights to the land as the current cultivator. These ‘entrepreneurs’ who lose out on their profits may turn to other economic activities that may not favour the environment and are less economic for them. For example, members of the family who may not desire to plant teak may turn to sand winning on already degraded land. A usufructary right over a piece of land does not allow the user to take possession of the land in perpetuity. But this is what planting teak trees will mean. The teak trees take between 15 and 25 years to mature for harvest. For this period, the teak farm cannot be taken away from the possession of the current cultivator. In the face of this ‘injunction by cultivation’ placed on the land against other holders of rights in the land, a feature of the teak tree is that a few weeks after harvest, it will shoot from the trunk and grow into another tree. Therefore, generations of a teak tree can continue to grow continually on the same piece of land for several decades. If the teak tree effectively maintains the land in the possession of the current cultivator, it merely implies that when a teak tree is harvested, but shoots and grows into another generation of tree, the current cultivator only extends his or her user rights over the land. In effect, this only means denying other potential users the right to use the land the way they see fit. Taking the communality of the Dormaa customary property rights regime into consideration then, it can be said that teak will be planted solely on private plots of land. Strictly private plots of land can be acquired through gift or lease. However, many usufructary land rights holders are planting the trees on communal lands. Most do this with the hope that their own children will inherit their rights in the land immediately after them. Yet, empirical evidence in Dormaa shows that this is not always the case. Other family members often lay claim to the land in the event of the death of the current cultivator. Where there is teak on the farm, the right to inherit the farm is not easily determined between the teak owner’s immediate family and the extended family. Consequently, some informants report that planting teak results in family tensions in many instances. Cultivation of teak to renew degraded lands by itself is not necessary unproductive. Instead, it is important to note that by the communality of property rights, teak cultivation do not accrue the same incentive BIGSAS Working Papers 4/2013: challenging notions of development and change from everyday life in Africa 62 to all individuals or families over time. One cannot take decisions over land completely as an individual without due reference to the family, clan, or the community. The environmental actions of individuals are always judged by their influence on the family and the Dormaa state as a whole. In the customary property rights regime, the current cultivator only has use rights, while it is the family through the community that possesses the ownership rights. Thus, land cannot be treated as in individual complete perpetual ownership. Competition between teak trees and food crops Another instance of conflicting incentives between the state and community people in planting teak trees is the competition for arable land between teak trees and food crops. In Dormaa, land under teak cultivation implies reduced space for food crops cultivation. Findings of this study indicate that the competition is the result of land immobility in Dormaa. Land is immobile for two main reasons. One, there is land scarcity and virtually no land is uncultivated, lying idle currently and not planned for. Tracts of land can be seen uncultivated, but many apparently lie idle because owners consider them too degraded to cultivate, or owners have other plans for them other than food crop cultivation. Outside the state protected forests, land is scarce due to increasing population and increasing division of land within the family. Two, by some norm, Dormaa people rarely ever rent out agricultural land. Thus, agricultural land does not easily move between different users outside the landowning family. Perhaps land has not been vacant to a large extent like in the cocoa growing areas in the western part of Ghana, which have attracted migrants from other parts of the country and beyond since the mid20th century to acquire large tracts of uncultivated yet fertile land (see Alhassan and Manuh 2005; Benneh 1987; Aidoo 1989; 1996; Hill 1963). With land immobility, landowners have rights to a piece of land over their life time, and that of their progeny. On this same piece of land, food crops and cash crops may be grown. There is no competition between crops for space if different types of crops will grow well together. This is not the case with the teak tree. After between three and five years, food crops interplanted with the teak do not grow well. The canopy of the trees prevents sunlight from effectively reaching the crops underneath. Moreover, the land under teak over time loses its soil structure conducive for food crops cultivation. According to informants, loss of soil structure results from cultivating teak because the roots of the teak tree spread out shallowly just beneath the top soil, blocking out other crop roots. A community elder laments: BIGSAS Working Papers 4/2013: challenging notions of development and change from everyday life in Africa 69 Benneh, G. (1987) ‘Land tenure and agroforestry land use systems in Ghana’, proceedings of an international workshop on tenure issues in agroforestry, Nairobi, May 27-31, 1985, University of Wisconsin. Da Rocha, B. J and C. H. K Lodoh (1999) Ghana land law and conveyancing. Accra: DR and L Printing and Publishing Services. Anderson, T. and D. Leal (1991) Free market environmentalism. Boulder: Westview press. Dobson, A. (2007) Green political thought. London, New York: Routledge. Dormaa municipal assembly (2012) ‘Report on municipal mediumterm development plan sustainability assessment report’. Dormaa Ahenkro. Dragun, A. K. (1999) ‘Environmental institutional design: can property rights theory help?’, Discussion papers, University of Queensland. Fairhead, J. and M. Leach (2000) ‘Reproducing locality: A critical exploration of the relationship between natural sciences, social sciences, and policy in West African ecological problems’ in V. Broch-Due, and R. A. Schroeder (eds), Producing nature and poverty in Africa. Stockholm: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet. Hill, P. (1963) The migrant cocoa-farmers of southern Ghana: A study in rural capitalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Li, T. M. (2007) ‘Practices of assemblage and community forest management’, Economy and Society 36 (2): 263-293. Meadows, D., J. Randers and W. Behrens (2005) Limits to growth: the 30-year update. London: Earthscan. Nsiah-Gyabaah, K. (1994) Environmental degradation and desertification in Ghana: A study of the Upper West Region. Brookfield: Ashgate. Robbins P. (2000) ‘The practical politics of knowing: state environmental knowledge and local political economy’, Economic Geography 92 (2): 126-144. Sekhar, N. U. (2004) ‘Local versus expert knowledge in forest management in a semi-arid part of India’, Land Degradation and Development 15: 133-142. Smith, D. M. (1997) ‘Geography and ethics: A moral turn?’, Progress in human geography 21: 583-590. BIGSAS Working Papers 4/2013: challenging notions of development and change from everyday life in Africa 70 Underdale, A. (2008) ‘Determining the causal significance of institutions: accomplishments and challenges’, in O. Young, R. King, A. Leslie and H. Schroeder (eds), Institutions and environmental change: principal findings, applications, and research frontiers. Cambridge, Massachusetts. London: The MIT Press. Zambakari, C. (2011) ‘African and the poverty in knowledge production’, <http://pambazuka.org/en/category/features/77655>, accessed 10 February 2013. BIGSAS Working Papers 4/2013: challenging notions of development and change from everyday life in Africa 71 The politics of resources, vulnerability and pastoral practices in Upper Awash Valley, Ethiopia Girum Getachew Alemu 59 Abstract In light of continuing environmental and social sources of changes, Karrayyu pastoralists are responding in various ways. Broadly speaking, these responses can be categorised into two areas: responses that combine different norms and rules of accessing scarce resources and diversification of livelihood activities. In this paper I present new forms of resource arrangements as adaptation strategies that have resulted out of the socio-ecological and demographic pressure on Karrayyu land. However, this article does not limit itself only to these factors, since the change in pastoral livelihood practices could not be attributed to one factor only. Comprehending the changing livelihood practices should take into account, parallel to the demographic pressure, other interrelated factors such as government policy interventions and their impact on pastoral land ownership. This is also in line with the political ecology theoretical framework that emphasizes the need for the recognition of the political, economic, historical, geographical and ecological determinants to understand the changing pastoral livelihood practices. Keywords: new practices, pastoralists, political ecology, vulnerability. Introduction The structural factors and processes shaping vulnerability are largely a product of rapid social change, driven by distant processes. By social change, I mean the broad range of ‘human’ factors that affect local adaptation, as opposed to biophysical factors influencing 59 Girum Getachew Alemu has earned his B.A in Sociology and Social Anthropology and his Master’s degree in Development Studies from Addis Ababa University. Currently, he is a PhD student at the Bayreuth International Graduate School of African Studies (BIGSAS), Germany. In his PhD research he interrogates the international climate change adaptation agenda and the associated concept of vulnerability by zooming-in at the local level and locating climate change adaptation in broader ‘social’ context in dry land parts of upper Awash valley in Ethiopia. Girum’s research focuses on the constellation of development, environmental governance and local livelihoods. Particularly, he explores how these interconnections influence the constitution of human-environment ruptures like disasters, climate change, and their aftermath. In his research Girum also targets applied audience in the sphere of policy making by unearthing the agency of local resource users in pursuing novel responses and adaptations to both disaster and climate change. BIGSAS Working Papers 4/2013: challenging notions of development and change from everyday life in Africa 72 exposure. Social change thus encompasses social, cultural, economic, and political factors and processes. Any endeavour to better understand the ways in which local actors adapt must start by exploring the dynamic social, political, and demographic context of vulnerability. These dynamics have, I argue, critical implications for understanding contemporary local adaptations in the face of climatic stress. Accordingly, the major sources of vulnerability that have influenced, in one way or another, the decision making and adaptation processes of local actors in the semi-arid environment of Upper Awash Valley are explored. The data presented and analysed in this paper was generated using various sources. Secondary sources of information such as government documents concerning the major activities in the Upper Awash Valley were consulted. In addition, primary data were obtained through focus group discussions and key informant interviews with elders, while various PRA tools such as problem identification and ranking were utilised in focus group discussions. The Karrayyu pastoralists in Upper Awash valley have been vulnerable to various socio-political and ecological forces over the past six to seven decades. Although groups, individuals, and communities may be vulnerable to climate change, vulnerability is indicative of broader social dynamics—thus vulnerability is processual. This process of vulnerability was in motion during my field research, and was manifested in the way the Karrayyu pastoralists deploy various strategies while interacting with the natural environment, particularly with respect to the recurrent drought and the various actors that are actively present in the locality. In order to approach the problem, I apply a political ecology approach that takes into account general contexts within which both environmental problems and management issues arise (Forsyth 2003). Many authors (such as Bohle et al. 1994) have also defined political ecology as a combination of political economy and human ecology approaches to the interactions between nature and society. Political ecology varies from the political economy approach since it puts emphasis on the environment as an independent variable that structures social relations. In other words, the influence of the environment on societal change was recognised in the political ecology approach. National development-local vulnerability nexus Access to entitlements denotes the options that individuals, communities and social groups have available to them to minimise BIGSAS Working Papers 4/2013: challenging notions of development and change from everyday life in Africa 73 the negative impacts of climate change and take advantage of the opportunities. The encroachment of large-scale commercial farms into Karrayyu territory has made pastoralists susceptible to recurrent drought and famine by disrupting their localised adaptation strategies that were tailored towards mobility of livestock and people. The political ecology approach accounts for the close connection between the expansion of development programmes in Awash Valley and the recurrence of drought and famine in the region. In other words, social and political sources of vulnerability relate to social developments such as changes in the political regime, including altered power relations at the regional and communal level. For instance, development policies may, at least temporarily, add to political uncertainties at various levels, since they may redistribute resources and powers between various actors. In a similar manner, multiple, simultaneous interventions by the state and other groups may cause confusion and generate unanticipated outcomes. In this regard, entitlement theory shifts our attention away from climatic forces as an explanation of famine (Downing 2003). Rather than approaching famine and food insecurity as a product of drought and crop/livelihood failure, Sen (1981) framed famine as a result of ‘entitlement failure’. The powerlessness of individuals or groups to access resources crucial to coping with extreme climatic conditions such as drought is at the centre of entitlement failure. From this perspective, resource availability and the ability of individuals to mobilise these resources are central to an understanding of vulnerability (Adger 2006). This is important in the context of the Karrayyu pastoralists in Upper Awash Valley for it highlights the fact that local-scale vulnerability is created by processes which are beyond the capacity of the locals and with distant forces such as shifts in policy. In this regard, vulnerability to climate change can also be considered within the framework of entitlements (Watts and Bohle 1993; Bohle et al. 1994; Adger and Kelly 1999). According to Bohle et al. (1994), the concept of entitlements includes cultural and intra-familial entitlement to resources, as well as encompassing wider structures of empowerment by which these entitlements are secured and contested. Entitlements therefore extend beyond material and economic measures of well-being to encompass the multitude ways in which resources necessary for well-being are accessed, distributed, and contested over space and time (Kelly and Adger 2000). Access to entitlements denotes the options that individuals, households, communities and social groups have available to them to minimise the negative impacts of climate change and take advantage of the opportunities. BIGSAS Working Papers 4/2013: challenging notions of development and change from everyday life in Africa 74 Commercial farms and the loss of pastoral spaces of adaptation In the 1960s, charting out its path through five year development plans, 60 the modernist government preferred to see the Awash Valley in terms of one or two of its resources and disregarded the rest. This resulted in incalculable damage to the environment and the wellbeing of the many local communities in the valley. For instance, those interested in the ‘agricultural development’ of the valley only tended to see the Awash Valley as nothing but potential agricultural land that could generate foreign exchange and move the national economy. The well-being of local communities and their livestock were not taken into consideration. Because the Upper Awash valley is endowed with agricultural potential, both in terms of natural resources and through its proximity to local and international markets, the Karrayyu land has attracted the government and become a ‘bone of contention’ between the locals and the ‘interventionist’ government (Ayalew 2001; Müller-Mahn et al. 2010). The loss of access to critical ‘spaces of adaptation’ by the Karrayyu pastoralists started with the establishment of the Metahara Sugar Factory (MSF) under an agreement between the Imperial Ethiopian Government and Hendels-Vereeniging Amsterdam (HVA) in 1967. This agreement resulted in the gradual allocation of 10,000 ha of land for irrigation purposes on the other side of Awash River, taken from the prime dry season grazing area of the Karrayyu pastoral groups. The mill, with a crushing capacity of 17,000 quintals of sugarcane, became operational in 1969. The factory started to produce 1,700 quintals of sugar per day. This brought the number of sugar factories in the Awash Valley to three, namely, Wonji, WonjiShoa and Metahara, established in 1954, 1960 and 1969, respectively. 60 It is to be recalled that the First Five Year Plan, from 1957 to 1961, gave priority to infrastructures, while the Second Five Year Plan, from 1962 to 1967, allotted pride of place to directly productive undertakings, particularly manufacturing industry, mining, electricity, etc. and the Third Five Year Plan, 1968-1973, introduced a substantial shift of emphasis from the preceding plans by placing high priority on agriculture. BIGSAS Working Papers 4/2013: challenging notions of development and change from everyday life in Africa 75 Fig. 1: the proliferation of irrigated farms in the Awash Valley With the establishment of MSF, the Karrayyu pastoralists lost their dry season grazing area and watering points along the Awash River. The particular ecological importance of the area on which the sugar plantation was established was that it was dominated by Acacia Nilotica, Acacia Syal and Acacia Tortilis, and tall grasses. Furthermore, it was the tall trees that grew along the river bank that used to give sufficient protection against the sun during the dry season. On top of this, according to my key informants, the area used to harbour more than ten spiritual sites along the river which were of great importance to the Karrayyu people. In-migration of non-locals to Karrayyu land Another important demographic factor is the movement of non-locals into Karrayyu territory, which has put a lot of stress on the limited resources that have been left after encroachment by the large-scale commercial farms and conservation measures. Particularly important here was the immigration of the Ittu, which increased in magnitude in the 1950s and continued throughout the 1950s and 1960s as a result of war with the Issa Somali over resource use and ownership in their ancestral land. BIGSAS Working Papers 4/2013: challenging notions of development and change from everyday life in Africa 76 After the migration, some Ittu settled alone in villages like Benti, and others lived together with the Basso Karrayyu in Kobboo, Degha Hedhu, Galcha, and Moogassa. The first three are located in the foothills of Mount Fentalle, and the fourth near the sugar cane plantation and the park. The relations between the newcomers and the hosts were good from the very beginning, since the migration was conducted in agreement with the Karrayyu. The friendship and solidarity between the Ittu and Karrayyu that characterised the premigration period were further strengthened after the migration through marriage, reciprocal exchange of stocks and gifts, cooperation in the payment of blood compensation in particular and pastoral life in general. Drought triggered the migration of the Ittu only in 1984/85. Otherwise, what made the migration of the Ittu of this period different from the previous ones was that until 1984/85, it was only the pastoralists who migrated to Fentalle. But this time, the absence of rain for two consecutive years and the subsequent drought and famine in west Hararge also forced the agro-pastoralist Ittu to migrate to the Karrayyu territory in Fentalle Woreda. Pastoral agency and new practices Pastoralists actively employ their agency in order to deal with the structural sources of vulnerability. The ‘duality’ between structural forces of vulnerability and pastoral agency leads to the formation of emerging practices through active engagement by the actors. Consequently, rather than viewing actors as unintentionally responding to structural shifts in power relations emanating from above, this research takes seriously the notion that local resource users are agents in their own right. However, this ‘requires a concept of human agency that is neither determined by social structure nor entirely voluntaristic’ (Gezon 2006: 15). Actors, in this framework, are seen as socially positioned with systematic and patterned affinities and dispositions (Rocheleau 1995), while at the same time, seeking their own benefit, constantly engaged in negotiation and ‘the work of social change’ (Bailey 2001). Actors are also situated within differential, yet dynamic, power matrices, where identities such as gender and ethnicity and other collectivities frame strategies and shape social interaction. Giddens (1979) also takes the concept of agency and defines it as ‘the capability of an actor to act otherwise’. In this section I explore how the Karrayyu pastoral groups have managed to actively balance their traditional livestock-based mechanisms of dealing with vulnerability with cultivation in the process of interacting with their broader environment. BIGSAS Working Papers 4/2013: challenging notions of development and change from everyday life in Africa 77 Increase in farming practices and disruption of pastoral social relations As stated in the previous section, for several decades the Karrayyu were exclusive pastoralists deriving their sustenance from rearing livestock. Nevertheless, within the last six to seven decades, due to a combination of broader social as well as climatic factors, the role of the pastoral way of life based on livestock production as a sole source of livelihood has gradually declined. The main reasons for this were the shrinkage of the resource base due to external interventions and consequent environmental degradation, and the recurrent drought. Development interventions like those of the commercial farms were not favourable to pastoralists in the valley, since this resulted in the alienation of the dry season grazing lands of the Karrayyu pastoralists (Ayalew 2001; Müller-Mahn et al. 2010). The Karrayyu case is further aggravated by the Ittu migration and the establishment of the Awash National Park and the expansion of Lake Beseka. These developments have led to increased vulnerability of the pastoral way of life by reduced access to resources that are crucial in supporting mobile strategies. The loss of pasture and the recurrent drought have resulted in a sharp decline in the size of the livestock population 61 and impoverishment of the Karrayyu. All these processes of vulnerability have forced the once full-time pastoralists to adapt themselves flexibly to agro-pastoralism in which the herdsmen combine livestock raising with farming practices as an adaptive measure. Thus, a supplementary non-pastoral activity, namely farming, began to expand despite unsuitable climatic conditions. Farming is also dictated by the need to supply the increasing population with food, which the livestock sector alone cannot achieve. In the context of the Karrayyu, cultivation is practised in two different ways, namely, rain-fed and irrigated (Ayalew 2001). Both mechanisms of crop production in Karrayyu land have been used for the past three decades. The Karrayyu themselves have not developed an agricultural tradition. Agriculture was introduced to the Karrayyu areas in the wake of the migration of the agro-pastoralist Ittu. According to the Karrayyu elders, it was introduced by the Ittu migrants, especially by those agro-pastoralists who came to Fentalle 61 The mean number of livestock per household plummeted from 59.4 TLU (tropical livestock unit) in 1977 to 14.5 in 1997 (Tibebe 1997 cited in Ayalew 2001). BIGSAS Working Papers 4/2013: challenging notions of development and change from everyday life in Africa 78 district for the first time during the 1984/85 drought due to the crop failure in West Hararghe. Bringing new principles in: the practice of fencing communal pasture Land in the Karrayyu area has been handled in the past by customary institutions. However, with the social sources of vulnerability, the role of these traditional institutions in the Karrayyu pastoral community has declined. For instance, an increased influx of non-local farmers from other areas, particularly the Ittu groups from West Harareghe, has brought about new world views and resulted in the expansion of small scale cultivation in Karrayyu territory through private enclosure. As a result, the handling of the natural resource base, mainly land, has also undergone changes. In other words, with the increased social sources of vulnerability, Karrayyu pastoralists have started to put in place mechanisms for handling the scarce resources, such as private enclosures, by using their ‘pastoral agency’. This means the well-off Karrayyu herders with large numbers of livestock did not sit back and watch while the communal pasture lands were taken over for farming purposes. Rather, as individual agents they introduced the idea of enclosing the land for grazing purposes, either individually or in a group. Locally, land that is enclosed for private farming purposes is called Qonna, while land that is enclosed for grazing purposes is known as Kalloo. In other words, the engagement of the pastoralists in counterbalancing the enclosure of land for private farming has led to the introduction of new practices/strategies among the Karrayyu that restrict open access to communal pasture. These were introduced among the Karrayyu after the shrinkage of their resource base due to the various sources of vulnerability, and represent an attempt to actively create mechanisms for dealing with these vulnerabilities. As such, Kalloo is aimed at resolving the problem of shortage of pasture in the seasons of Birraa (autumn) and Bonna (winter). Restrictions were placed on a portion of grazing land in their permanent villages by agreements made by the pastoralists themselves through the village leader. This decision was announced to the Woreda administration so that it would not be violated by anyone. The portion of grazing land on which restrictions are placed remains fallow until it becomes accessible to all members of the village in the dry season by another decision of the village leaders. But nowadays the severe shortage of land caused by the migration of the Ittu pastoralists from Western Hararghe to the Fentalle area, and the use of most of the wet season grazing zone (onna ganna) for settlement purposes and opportunistic farming have resulted in a failure to find BIGSAS Working Papers 4/2013: challenging notions of development and change from everyday life in Africa 85 Scott, J. (1985) Weapons of the weak: everyday forms of resistance. New Haven: Yale University Press. Sen, A. (1981) Poverty and famines: an essay on entitlement and deprivation. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Watts, M. J. and H. G. Bohle (1993) ‘The space of vulnerability: the causal structure of hunger and famine’, Progress in Human Geography, 17 (1): 43-67. Zimmerer, K. S. and T. J. Bassett (2003) Political ecology: an integrative approach to geography and environmentdevelopment studies. New York: Guilford Publications. BIGSAS Working Papers 4/2013: challenging notions of development and change from everyday life in Africa 86 Ghanaian ‘green-degree’ graduates returning from Germany and their impact on environmental development in Ghana Julia Boger 64 Abstract This paper deals with international student migration of Ghanaians and the notion that it has positive effects on the development of the source country. Ghanaians study in Germany and specialise in subjects related to the environment and resource protection. Usually, migration studies on highly skilled Sub-Saharan Africans deal with out-migration. It is said that this out-migration causes a permanent loss, a ‘brain-drain’. The cases presented in this paper show the contrary. They show that migrants who go abroad in order to pursue their studies are likely to return and to contribute to the sustainable development in emerging fields such as ecology. The premise for this positive notion on the migration-development nexus is that the home country’s formal labour market offers employment for graduates who return. In this case, returning graduates can reinvest their enhanced knowledge in Ghana’s labour market. This knowledge transfer helps returning graduates impact society at different levels: they implement environmental policies (micro-level); they build institutional capacities (meso-level) and influence policy-making processes that shape environmental governance (macro-level). By presenting empirical data from fieldwork in Ghana, this paper clearly demonstrates that returning graduates from Germany achieve the strongest impact at the meso-level in capacity building. The analysis of qualitative interviews shows that this kind of ‘brain-circulation’ creates positive effects and return migration becomes a ‘brain-gain’. Keywords: migration and development, return migration, green economy, Ghana. Introduction Policy-related research and debates argue that highly skilled migrants from economically undeveloped countries can foster sustainable development in their countries of origin if they are able to apply their knowledge. However, the circumstances under which they can contribute to their home countries’ development are still not 64 Julia Boger holds an M.A. in Social Anthropology from Johannes GutenbergUniversity and is pursuing a PhD in Development Sociology at the Bayreuth International Graduate School of African Studies (BIGSAS). She is writing her PhD thesis on the job-hunt experiences and professional trajectories of Cameroonian and Ghanaian graduates who have studied in Germany and who have returned. The project is closely linked to her practical work in the field of reintegration and development at World University Service (WUS) Germany. BIGSAS Working Papers 4/2013: challenging notions of development and change from everyday life in Africa 87 clear. The general question of how migration influences development processes has created a vast research field labelled as the “migration and development-nexus” (Nyberg-Sorensen et al. 2002; Faist 2008; Nieswand 2011). Since the 1950s, one discussion thread led to controversial viewpoints: this controversy concerned the impact of return migration on development. Scholars advocating the positive notion of return migration perceived highly skilled migrants as potential “agents of change” who can contribute to development upon their voluntary return: 65 According to dominant views of the 1950s and 1960s in development theory, return migrants were seen as important agents of change and innovation. It was expected that migrants not only bring back money, but also new ideas, knowledge, and entrepreneurial attitudes. In this way, migrants were expected to play positive role [sic!] in development and contribute to the accelerated spatial diffusion of modernization in developing countries (de Haas 2010: 5). However, this optimistic view on return migration contributing to development seems not to apply equally to every region in the world. For instance, whereas return migration has become a success for many Asian countries, the opposite seems to be the case for SubSaharan African nations. Only a few of their highly skilled workforces who go overseas ever return, because the obstacles are too manifold 66 and the risk of suffering from ‘brain-waste’ is too high for them 67 . Their investment in higher education is wasted because they cannot fully apply what they have learned due to political restrictions in their home countries and because career prospects in most Sub65 Today, European and United States (U.S.) governments are increasingly utilizing these estimated positive effects of voluntary return migration. The growing number of policy documents on this topic reflects this increase in interest (Black et al. 2004; BAMF 2006; EMN 2007; Schneider and Kreienbrink 2010; IOM 2010; Black et al. 2011; Kovács et al. 2012). 66 Many Africans who have migrated abroad have a strong return-oriented rhetoric but ultimately are reluctant to return to their countries of origin. Tsagué (2009: 21) explains the reasons for this with the example of Cameroon. Most Cameroonians fear returning because they expect to have difficulties in the scarce formal labour market. They also know that the endemic corruption causes serious problems in everyday life and that they would lack the kind of infrastructure they enjoy abroad (permanent access to electricity and water supply, healthcare). 67 In particular, highly skilled African migrants risk wasting their brains either abroad or in their home countries. If they remain abroad, they often only access low-paid employment (for the case of Kenyans abroad see Oyelere 2007). In addition, their potential remains unused if they return and have to work outside their fields of studies. BIGSAS Working Papers 4/2013: challenging notions of development and change from everyday life in Africa 88 Saharan African countries are far from being attractive. Despite promising growth rates of many countries’ GDPs and their extraordinary wealth of natural resources, governments have failed to transform this economic development into income generating decent employment creation. Today, formal labour markets in most SubSaharan African countries still are extremely narrow: Formal employment is limited to about 10 per cent of the labour force, with most workers eking out a living in survivalist-oriented activities in the smallholder or subsistence agricultural sector and in the urban informal economy, both characterized by low productivity, low incomes and low protection. Moreover, little progress has been made in shifting the reliance of African economic growth away from agriculture and resource extraction towards manufacturing and other more dynamic and knowledge-intensive activities in the service sector (ILO 2007: 31). Thus, highly skilled Sub-Saharan Africans rather see emigration as a way out of poverty and since the 1980s, many nations have lost their brightest heads permanently. 68 A ‘brain-drain’ occurs and the model of agent-related self-help within the migration-development model seems to have failed to meet the high expectations. Nevertheless, scholars such as Patterson (2007; 2008) have a vision that more “strategic” approaches could make return migration become a tool that stimulates a ‘brain-circulation’ in a very specific knowledge field by which Sub-Saharan African nations finally could become world leaders: (…) African governments can encourage and facilitate graduates of engineering and life science undergraduate programmes at home to seek graduate education in those fields in the United States and other Western countries throughout the next decade to be in a position to help pioneer and early adopt the ecological economy possibly just over the horizon. If Africans were to do this strategically and successfully, they would be establishing systematic brain circulation similar to what some Asian transnational groups have done around the digital knowledge economy (Patterson 2007: 146). 68 For instance, in Ghana the large amount of out-migration of highly skilled workers has created large gaps of trained personnel in the health care sector (Nyonator and Dovlo 2005). BIGSAS Working Papers 4/2013: challenging notions of development and change from everyday life in Africa 89 Though the aspect of knowledge-transfer as a tool for development is not new, Patterson mentions this knowledge-transfer within an important and innovative specific field: that of ecological protection. Today, especially the poorest countries in the global South suffer the most from the negative side effects of industrialisation in the global North. Therefore, a global agenda was started to at least limit these negative effects and at the same time continue with economic growth: this agenda is also known as ‘green economy’ (UNEP 2011). By applying this agenda of a green economy, Sub-Saharan African governments will also have to shift towards exploring the opportunities of renewable energies. This shift towards a technologyintensive economy will also increase the local labour market’s demand for highly skilled workforces. This specific demand, argues Patterson (2011), could motivate highly skilled Africans in the diaspora to return and contribute to this specific development. Their transferred knowledge would lead to a similar rapid development as has been seen in many Asian countries, like India, China, Taiwan, and Korea. These nations have become front-runners in specific knowledge-based technologies, like information and communication technologies (ICTs), thanks to their students who first went abroad and then returned with enhanced knowledge, which they then transferred to their home countries’ economies. 69 In this paper, I argue that this positive vision of voluntary return migration based on a paradigm shift towards a more ecologically economic development is already underway. My argumentation is based on empirical data deriving from qualitative interviews with Ghanaians who graduated from environmental programmes in Germany and returned to Ghana to work as employees. The analysis shows that in the case of Ghana two important premises apply: first, the graduates have a professional profile focussing on environmental subjects and second, Ghana enforces environmental activities on a policy level. For a better understanding of the country case, the paper first introduces the debate on contemporary return migration to Ghana. Next, I outline Ghana’s promotion of a green economy. Then, the current generation of Ghanaian students in Germany and their focus on ecological subjects, the ‘green-degrees’, is portrayed. Thereafter, I present case studies of returned Ghanaians and their knowledge transfer into the Ghanaian labour market. I show that Ghanaian graduates apply their environmental knowledge on three 69 Saxenian (2005) presented the case of Indian and Chinese software developers who had previously worked in Silicon Valley and then returned to their home countries’ economies. Similarly, for the case of China, Zweig (2006) showed how Chinese graduates returned successfully after their studies abroad. Recently, Pham (2010) investigated the country case Vietnam and its returning diaspora. BIGSAS Working Papers 4/2013: challenging notions of development and change from everyday life in Africa 90 different levels: the micro, meso and macro-levels. Several factors that hinder their knowledge transfer are also presented. Finally, I reflect these empirical findings in light of the migration and development nexus. This summary leads to the conclusion that return migration in this specific knowledge field has positive effects. However, it can only unfold its full potential if governments and especially people working for the government welcome the returned migrants and also implement the urgently needed ecological paradigm shift. Studies on return migration to Ghana in the context of development Return migration to Ghana has increased during the last decade. 70 Especially Ghanaians living in the global North are returning more often. 71 This return trend primarily concerns the young generation of highly skilled (Anarfi et al. 2005: 206) who pursue their second degree outside Ghana. They are in contrast to those migrants in who went abroad during the phase of the large-scale exodus in the 1980s and who remained in their host countries (Arthur 2008; Nieswand 2011). Today’s young Ghanaian migrants living abroad of working age tend to return due to the fact that conditions in their home country have improved and hence, they find economic opportunities and political freedom, which in general encourages return migration, state Anarfi and Jagare (2005: 6). 72 In brief, returning to Ghana has become an attractive opportunity especially for the highly skilled: 70 IOM (Quartey 2009: 58) presents an overview on the different estimations that range between 1 million to 3 million Ghanaians living abroad (overseas and on the African continent). 71 The proportion of Ghanaians among persons who arrived in Ghana steadily increased from 18.6 to 34.6 per cent during the period from 2000 to 2007 (Quartey 2009: 13). 72 First, Ghana’s economy and political stability has improved (Elischer 2009). Second, the recent start of off-shore oil and gas exploitation has raised high hopes for further economic growth (Breisinger et al. 2009; Egyir 2012). Third, the Ghanaian government explicitly offered incentives to the diaspora to return and to contribute to Ghana’s development (Kleist 2011: 10). One of the main events was the Ghanaian Home Coming Summit launched by the government of the New Patriotic Party (NPP) in 2001. It was the first conference for Ghanaians living abroad (Manuh and Asante 2005: 298). The summit appealed to those living abroad to return and to invest in their home country. They were promised adequate investment opportunities and that they could benefit from dual citizenship (Quartey 2009: 16; Adepoju 2008: 36). However, in the midst of the latest economic crises, late president Attah Mills was reluctant to encourage diasporas to return because this would have created high pressure on the formal labour market (CNN 2009). BIGSAS Working Papers 4/2013: challenging notions of development and change from everyday life in Africa 91 As these transnational migrants return home, it is argued that they can facilitate the transfer of the critical financial and human capital the developing world needs. Thus high skill migration is a vital part of that game, a joint venture from which both source and receiving countries and even the migrants themselves have the potential to gain, thus creating a ‘triple win’ situation to the benefit of everyone and for development and poverty reduction (Awumbila 2008: 57). The increase of this return trend and the question how these transnational migration flows contribute to Ghana’s development also attracted scientists’ attention. One of the larger projects that was carried out to investigate this field of return migration to Ghana was the ‘Transnational Migration, Return and Development in West Africa’ (Transrede) 73 project funded by the UK Department for International Development through its Globalisation and Poverty programmes. Thanks to this project, a number of studies investigated migration from and to Ghana. Many of these studies had a comparative design and compared the situation of Ghanaian return migrants to that of Côte d’Ivoirian (Black et al. 2003a; Tiemoko 2003a; Tiemoko 2003b; Tiemoko 2005; Black and Castaldo 2009, Ammassari 2009). The majority of these studies identified entrepreneurs as prime agents of change having foremost an economic impact upon return. They contribute to the development of their countries by investing their savings in infrastructure and by starting their businesses, which in turn creates job opportunities for the population. Interestingly, only a minority of empirical studies have touched on the role of employees and their more intangible and social contributions to development upon return (Martin 2005; Taylor 2009; Bochmann et al. 2008; Olivier 2011). This is surprising, because the majority of returning migrants from Germany to Ghana ultimately become employees (cf. Tiemoko 2005: 193). They lack sufficient financial capital. Achieving this financial capital is often difficult, especially for foreign students in Germany. This has to do with the German language barrier; with the particular regulations of labour law and with the bureaucratic hurdles 73 Transrede is a collaborative effort by the Sussex Centre for Migration Research (SCMR) at the University of Sussex, the Ecole Nationale Supérieure de Statistique et d’Economie Appliquée (ENSEA), Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire and the Institute for Social, Statistical and Economic Research (ISSER) at the University of Ghana. BIGSAS Working Papers 4/2013: challenging notions of development and change from everyday life in Africa 92 that students have to clear to obtain an official work permit after graduation. 74 Due to these obstacles, student migrants lack unfettered access to their host country’s formal labour market and often end up in low-paid jobs. In consequence, this leads to a devaluation of their education and degrees (Elwert and Elwert 2011). Thus, very few students in Germany accumulate enough savings to set up their business upon return. Therefore, it seems quite natural that most Ghanaians who return as graduates from Germany seek for employment opportunities at first. 75 Being employees instead of employers, these returned graduates can become drivers of change, too. For instance, Ammassari (2009) concludes in her empirical study ‘the most important contributions reported by returnees were those in the workplace. This consisted of the introduction of new knowledge, skills and ideas and execution of some critical changes and reforms’ (2009: 292). To underline her findings she presents practical examples of employees ‘in the fields of research and teaching, administration and audit, marketing and human resources, banking and brokerage, environment and forestry, telecommunications and information technology’ (2009: 263-264). Ammassari points out that “change initiatives in the workplace mostly hinge on whether returnees have enough responsibility, authority and power and enough time to get established in such top positions” (2009: 293). 76 In addition, Arthur (2008) specifies this impact-level approach. He finds that returned graduates have most impact on development 74 Regarding student migration, initially foreign students in Germany could work 90 days annually. After graduation, they had to depart immediately (DAAD 2012: 2). The German government has eased this legal regulation since 2005. Today, graduates may apply for a visa after their studies that allows them to search for work for 18 months. Nevertheless, very few foreign graduates use this opportunity. The reasons for this are that they simply do not know of this regulation, cannot speak German fluently enough to secure qualified jobs, or have problems finding an adequate workplace (Sykes and Chaoimh 2012: 51). 75 Evidence for this assumption is given by the fact that the interviews of the present study mentioned, that they would have preferred to start their business, but lacked capital. After having worked for some time and accumulated sufficient amounts of financial resources, some of the interviewed migrants had become self-employed. 76 A very prominent example in the field of medical care is Ghana’s ‘heart man’: Prof. Kwabena Frimpong-Boateng, the founder of the Cardio Centre of the Korle Bu Teaching Hospital in Accra, who went to Germany in 1978 to study cardiothoracic surgery and who returned in 1992. In 2006, he went into politics. Recently, African students in Ohio, United States elected him as “African hero” (Tsikata 2012). Prof. Frimpong-Boateng promotes the use of ‘green’ friendly fuels in Ghana, producing biodiesel on a small scale in the process to run vehicles (Sey 2010). BIGSAS Working Papers 4/2013: challenging notions of development and change from everyday life in Africa 93 issues on the micro-level, whereas the positive effects on the national, the macro-level, are ‘yet to be felt’: ‘Though they are utilizing their human capital skills (acquired abroad working in diverse capacities as engineers, pharmacists, doctors, and business entrepreneurs), the collective impact of these contributions at the national level has yet to have any significant measurable impact on the society at-large [sic]’ (Arthur 2008: 155). Both positions, Ammassari’s and Arthur’s, confirm that returning migrants can stimulate development processes as employees. As such, they can introduce innovations on different levels. However, one has to see if the graduates’ profiles fit the particular labour market demand. Because, as Awumbila (2008: 58) correctly states, the returning migrants ‘are unlikely to be the key factor in the development of their homeland, but they can play significant roles (…) and can be playing a complementary role rather than the key role in transforming an economies’. However, this kind of complementary development in is only possible if the graduates find work at all. In this regards, the recent generation of Ghanaians who studied in Germany and returned does quite well. Their educational profile matches the emerging ‘green economy’s’ demand and hence they land jobs in the field of environmental protection and renewable energies. In addition, to facilitate their return financially, the German government even runs specific reintegration programmes, which in particular have the goal to contribute to development processes. 77 77 In Germany, the two major programmes are the Returning Expert Programme (REP) and the Reintegrationprogramme (RE). The REP already exists since the 1980ies. Today, it is run on behalf of the Centre of International Migration and Development (CIM). CIM is a cooperation between the German International Cooperation (GIZ) GmbH and the International Job Placement Service (ZAV) of the German Federal Employment Agency (BA). Another long-term partner in the REP is the World University Service (WUS e.V.). WUS, an association working on the human right to education in Germany since 1950, designed the part of the workplace equipment subsidy in the 1990ies. WUS carries out this part on behalf of CIM (Laaser 2007: 345). See for more information about the programme and its combinable parts: www.returning-expert.de and www.wusgermany.de. The Protestant Association Church Development Service (EED) carries out the RE-Programme, which focuses on job-placing graduates in civil society organisations (see Sevegnani and Schuh 2010: 6). For more detail please read the homepage: www.brot-fuer-die-welt.de. BIGSAS Working Papers 4/2013: challenging notions of development and change from everyday life in Africa 94 Towards sustainable development in Ghana Since independence, Ghana’s government has gradually integrated aspects of environmental protection into its development policies. 78 In 2012, shortly after Rio+20, Ghana mainstreamed the concept of a ‘green economy’ (UNEP 2011) into national development as an important tool to reach the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (GNA 2012). This official step is an important signal. It shows that protection of the environment has become an urgent global task and that Ghana’s government has accepted the challenge to fight for a better environment. However, it has taken a long time for this concept to reach this level of awareness. In 1972, the United Nations (UN) globally launched the concept of sustainable development. 79 78 Ghana’s development agenda after independence in 1957 at first mainly targeted economic growth. The first governmental strategy was the Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) in 1983. It was part of the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) supported by the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Whereas this programme stabilised economic growth, it soon created severe environmental problems caused by overexploitation of natural resources and pollution. In 1994 therefore, as a long-term approach, Ghana’s Vision 2020 was promoted to target Ghana’s development in the period from 1996-2000. This vision merely focussed economic stability and it underrepresented the environment. Moreover, the Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS I) was launched in 2001. This strategy targeted development projects during the period 2003-2005. It followed the concept of the Agenda 21 and was in line with National Strategies for Sustainable Development (NSSD). Whereas GPRS I focused mainly on poverty reduction, the following strategy, the Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS II), emphasised growth-inducing policies. This strategy was launched in 2006 and implemented in the period from 20062010. It integrated all three pillars of sustainable development in Ghana (economic, social, and environmental development) for the first time. Strategic Environmental Assessments (SEAs) were involved and thus environmental components mainstreamed in sector strategies of the GPRS II (Rai 2008). Finally, the Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda (GSGDA) succeeded the GPRS II in 2010. 79 The global call for environmental protection started in 1972, when the UN organised the first conference on environment and development, the UN Conference on Human Environment (UNCHE) in Stockholm, Sweden. In 1983, the UN set up the World Commission on Environment and Development, headed by Gro Harlem Brundtland, a former Prime Minister of Norway. Four years later, in 1987, the Commission published a report, ‘Our common future’, synonymously called the ‘Brundtland Report’. This report recommended creating synergies between economy and ecology and called on governments to take responsibility for environmental damage and to monitor the policies that cause the damage. What followed was the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in the Brazilian city of Rio de Janeiro in 1992. This conference was the Earth Summit or Rio 92. One of its main results was the final report, the AGENDA 21. This report was also described as a blueprint for sound development into the 21st Century. About ten years later, in 2002, a review conference was held in Johannesburg, South Africa to evaluate gains made since AGENDA 21, and in 2012 Rio+20 discussed current achievements. This latest conference strongly promoted the green economy concept (Awuku Apaw 2012). BIGSAS Working Papers 4/2013: challenging notions of development and change from everyday life in Africa 101 classic civic engineering. Both men and women had limited formal work experience. As first-degree graduates, they had already completed their National Service 93 in Ghana or had worked in temporary projects. Regarding their subjects in Germany, they concentrated (Fig. 1) on ‘green-degree’ programmes. Fig. 1: subjects of studies of interviewed Ghanaian graduates The subjects which Ghanaians in the sample preferred most were general resource management (31 per cent) and hydro engineering (28 per cent), followed by 14 per cent who concentrated on forestry in tropics and subtropics. Only 7 per cent enrolled for the classic domain of engineering, agriculture, and development management. One person (3 per cent) graduated from sciences (chemistry) and one (3 per cent) from information technology (IT). It is now of interest to find out how these graduates applied their expertise in their occupations upon their return to Ghana. 93 A military decree (N. R. C. D 208) established the Ghana National Service Scheme in 1973. It had the mandate to mobilise and deploy Ghanaian citizens aged 18 years and above. Since 1982, the duration of service was extended from one to two years. The scheme, since its inception, has become the institutional option for Ghanaian youth, especially tertiary education graduates, to exercise their civic responsibility towards the state (GNSS 2011). BIGSAS Working Papers 4/2013: challenging notions of development and change from everyday life in Africa 102 Environmental knowledge transfers As indicated earlier, educational migrants can contribute to their countries’ development if their profiles match the labour market demand in specific fields of expertise. As previously cited, Ammassari and Arthur argue that the impact of their knowledge transfer strongly depends on the level at which migrants transfer this knowledge. I will now investigate whether this argument also applies to the example of the interviewed migrants, who graduated and have returned from Germany. Regarding their occupation, all secured formal employment in the tertiary sector, the services. 94 Within the services sector they work in different industries (Fig. 2). Fig. 2: employing industries of interviewed returning Ghanaians The majority of 34 per cent finds employment in local consultancy firms (including non-governmental organisations (NGOs)). Two equal parts (28 per cent) work in higher education and in the public service. Only three (10 per cent) start their career in international 94 In 2010, the contributions of the three economic sectors to the Ghanaian GDP were agriculture (25.6 per cent), industry (25.9 per cent), and services (48.5 per cent) (GSS 2012: 5). BIGSAS Working Papers 4/2013: challenging notions of development and change from everyday life in Africa 103 organisations. 95 Now, I will show how the respondents transfer their environmental knowledge on three levels (Fig. 3). 96 Fig. 3: levels of occupational knowledge transfer The figure shows three levels and their impact spheres: first, at the micro-level, the interviewees implement their knowledge that positively affects life in rural communities. Second, at the meso-level, the graduates are building in-country capacities, thereby strengthening the country’s institutions that will profit on a long term from this measure. Third and finally, graduates at the macro-level are directly involved in designing environmental policies and thus have an impact on society at large. Implementing water and sanitation policies Ghanaians who graduate from the fields of hydro engineering are experts on sanitation, water, and wastewater management. Their expertise precisely meets the demands of many local consultancies that carry out current governmental policies (GPRSII) to improve access to safe water and sanitation in rural and urban areas. Today, these local consultancies and NGOs are important players in the water and sanitation sector (Yirenya-Tawiah and Tweneboah Lawson 2012). In consequence, they offer employment for the returning graduates. A master’s degree holder of Water Resources 95 Consequently, I only chose examples from the first three employment categories: government, higher education, and consultancies. 96 These levels of course may overlap: lecturers at universities also implement government curricula on environmental protection; workers in consultancies also create awareness in rural communities when they implement new technologies. Remembering the fact that the interviewed Ghanaians primarily studied the two subjects hydro and resource engineering (see fig. 1), the following examples concentrate on cases that show how their knowledge was applied in these two industries. BIGSAS Working Papers 4/2013: challenging notions of development and change from everyday life in Africa 104 Engineering and Management (WAREM) from the University of Stuttgart, Mr. L., describes 97 his work in the communities: For one year we have to be with the community. We go there to check the facility whether it is the way we want it to run, we look at the test, also check the quality of the water; look at the facility whether it is stable and we do recommendation for one year. We call something defective liability that is if something goes wrong according to the construction, the contractor would have to do it at his own cost. I will also go there to record any facility which is not good, come back write a letter to him that this one is not good, go and change it and he will go and do it at his own cost. After one year when everything is okay he hands over everything and I also leave. L’s work in the communities is time-consuming and intense. He carries out many technical steps and acts directly at the implementation level. His tasks include feasibility studies (“check the facility”), water quality tests (‘check the quality of the water’) and monitoring of the construction (‘look at the facility whether it is stable’). The results of L’s work are very tangible. It makes live of local community population easier and healthier. They have less problems accessing clean potable water, which reduces improves their life quality: Like, where I went to from Monday, you pass through villages, and you see a lot of them [people] carrying water from streams. If money is available all this [these, J.B.] people should be given boreholes with water (…) but there is no money, so the people are left to fetch from those streams anything (…) when I design, we do construction, the first time you open the tap, they get water, they start shouting: ‘eeehh’. At least you have solved some problem. Since I came I have done quite a lot, I have done about 10 designs and everybody is getting water out of it (…) Somebody helped us somewhere and we are also helping. This quote shows how L’s technical expertise enables him to “design” and to do “constructions” in the broad field of hydro engineering. Working in an employing structure that is empowered to implement 97 All interviews are anonymous and extracts are from transcribed interviews. To facilitate reading, I have slightly modified the spelling of the spoken language. BIGSAS Working Papers 4/2013: challenging notions of development and change from everyday life in Africa 105 governmental policies on sanitation, he finally is able to improve the living conditions for many community members. He thus has an impact on development processes on the micro-level. Environmental awareness and capacity building Today, Ghana’s government is calling for more awareness in society concerning environmental issues and seeking to build in-country capacities. Graduates who studied ‘green-degree’ programmes in Germany and later multiply their knowledge in institutions of higher education, universities and polytechnics, contribute towards this demand. Their professional integration in this sector is likely because careers in the educational segment are attractive. ‘A university position’ as Neubert (2008: 100) outlines, ‘has a good reputation and offers good chances for consultancy work to add to the salary’ and might even become a ‘stepping stone’ for top jobs in the government or in international organisations. In addition, the demand for qualified lecturers in Ghana is high. The country faces an immense shortage of qualified academic staff, secondary school teachers and researchers due to the vast outmigration of the highly skilled (Manuh et al. 2005). Therefore, graduates with a degree from abroad can fill this gap perfectly well. Such is the case of Mr. U., a master’s degree holder from the University of Stuttgart in the field of Waste Water Management. After his return, U. first starts to work in a governmental consultancy and after two years, he applies at a polytechnic. From scratch, he gains the position of Head of Department in a polytechnic. When I ask him during the interview what he thought was the most important qualification to do the job as a head of department, U. mentions the degree in the first place: Yeah the qualification I got from Stuttgart of course it has been very helpful because to be a lecturer in a tertiary institution the minimum is a master’s level and if you have a BSc. in a polytechnic you can be an instructor but your conditions of service are not good. Getting the master’s degree had positioned me in a better place. In fact, there were other people who had been in the department before I came. But because they didn’t have their master’s even though they had a lot of experience in terms of “on the job” training, they are now in the background and I just came and I was made the HEAD of Department (…) it is because of the qualification, yes. Despite his lack of teaching experience, the degree itself positioned U. professionally ‘in a better place’. As a head of department, he is BIGSAS Working Papers 4/2013: challenging notions of development and change from everyday life in Africa 106 also involved in the establishment of a new master’s degree programme on waste management: There are some of the courses you can’t get them here (…) there is no institution in Ghana that handles waste management and K-Poly is now trying to work on it. We are developing a curriculum, our dean went to Holland with the rector, and they went to (…) the Technical University of Hamburg-Harburg (HH) who is into this waste management/from Stuttgart we have the waste management aspect (…) So for such a course like this we need to train people at the MSc level; there is not any fair degree; we don’t have technology, we don’t have it. MSc – we don’t have it but each course is run in Germany, water resources (...) so for such courses if you don’t travel outside then you can’t have it and if you don’t have it there is no chance there is no way Ghana will have any education in that line. It shows that U. is supposed to build up a curriculum based on the raw model of the courses he took in Germany. Finally, the results of this knowledge transfer have an impact at an institutional (meso-) level. This is because as soon as the curricula are designed, many more students gain education up to master’s level. This new study programme will definitely generate more in-country experts and prevent further outmigration of young students. What is more, if ‘green-degree’ graduates return and become lecturers in higher education, they become role models. They not only teach but also fulfil societal commitments at an institutional (meso-) level, which creates broader awareness of the environment. This is because the higher education institutes in most African countries are obliged to “prove [their, J.B.] usefulness through development activities even without a research component” (Neubert 2008: 98). Mr. B., a graduate from the BTU Cottbus Environmental Resource Management (ERM) programme, describes the impact of his additional societal commitment for environmental capacity building: When I came home, because of the experience in Germany, I realised that the situation was very bad (…) And that is why I established with some other colleagues/we started a clean-up service. 98 We 98 Today, the scope of this formerly locally acting clean up service has become more global and professionalised. The members successfully registered as an NGO, developed further links to their former German professors and returned graduates in BIGSAS Working Papers 4/2013: challenging notions of development and change from everyday life in Africa 107 organised the students, went to the hospitals and market areas, and planted trees. We also made educational campaigns to educate people on how to clean the environment. We organised forums, made some presentations and because of my teaching roles we were not able to do it more frequently. This is one thing that I have done for this particular region [in the Upper West] I had to develop these brochures because I think we had to move forward and advertise in the schools so that people will come (…) And I think that is my social responsibility help the nation to move forwards. What is interesting is that the actions towards awareness creation are not part of his lecturing duties. B. must carry them out in his spare time. Still, using his formal role as a lecturer enables him to reach a broad audience: his students, his colleagues, and people at the hospitals and the markets. This is definitely a more significant field of influence than in contrast to those who simply impart their knowledge to an individual (e.g. to their own children). These examples show that the knowledge transfer of returning graduates from Germany who work as lecturers in higher education builds capacities in Ghana’s institutions. They act as multipliers in passing on their specific knowledge at the (meso-) level. Influencing environmental policies The interviewees working in the public service are ambivalent about their impact opportunities. A very high level of knowledge transfer describes a resources engineer from the University of Karlsruhe, Ms. A. A. who starts working as a research assistant at the Ministry of Environment. There she is responsible for a section that advises the minister on environmental cooperation: I will give you a typical example like a letter from the German government wanting to establish ECOWAS climatic change research desk. The letter came and then normally what they will do (…) the minister will write letters ‘let us go straight to them’ so I will write a minute to them (…) I wrote a memo to the deputy minister saying that OK, reading what they want to establish, I think the Centre for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) can host this because they have research scientists on climatic change. It has Uganda and Nigeria. The NGO “Clean Africa” is online at http://www.cleanafrica.org/clean/. BIGSAS Working Papers 4/2013: challenging notions of development and change from everyday life in Africa 108 thirteen institutes so they can give enough people to do these things so the project should be and he agrees. What happens is, if he agrees with my suggestion, I go ahead and write a letter to the German government. But I don’t sign. He will sign but I write a letter. In this example, A. explains how much influence she has in the background (‘he will sign but I write a letter’), due to her expert knowledge. She is even in a position to actively shape international cooperation on climate change (‘establish ECOWAS climatic change research desk’). Her career, she explains, is the result of a course she completed in Germany: And more also another thing why they chose me (…) is the course I did in Germany (…) It is for policy makers, you know. It is for decision makers (…) And when I came here, it was also where I have to be from here. I make decisions. Another case that shows how graduates with green-degrees apply their knowledge at the macro-level is the case of another BTU Cottbus graduate, Mr. M. He studied Environmental Resource Management (ERM) and wrote his master’s thesis on environmental taxation. This thesis provided a model for Ghanaian future taxation schemes at the Ghanaian Internal Revenue Service: And then it happened that I had to do my master’s thesis and I contacted my boss at IRS [Internal Revenue Service, JB.] and he said (...) we have this problem in Ghana how to tax environmental resources. So when I say environmental resources minerals for instance gold, bauxite, manganese and diamond, timber and all that (…) look at the German tax system and then how I can apply it to Ghana (...). My supervisor helped me to study the tax system, especially in the area of environmental resources. So I did that and then I used that as a model. If you look at my thesis, Germany is a model to what I did, So I looked at what Germany has done and did a similar thing. I then brought it back to them and they were so excited because they have not had that thing done before. The example of M. shows that his specialisation fits the demand in a niche. By transferring this expertise and adapting the German model of environmental taxation to fit Ghana’s context, he even influences BIGSAS Working Papers 4/2013: challenging notions of development and change from everyday life in Africa 109 the government’s budget. 99 In both cases, the profiles of the interviewees match the concrete demand of the governmental institution and – which must not be taken for granted – their superiors welcome them both. Therefore, they both are in a position to influence the decision-making process on environmental policies. Their knowledge transfer will have an impact for society at the macro-level. However, as I mentioned earlier in this section, other graduates face constraints and challenges that hinder them advancing their environmental knowledge. Constraints on environmental knowledge transfer Whereas the previous examples of academics who studied in Germany and returned to Ghana suggest that everyone finds a job easily and can adopt what she or he learned abroad, undoubtedly, reality proofs different. Not all graduates who study in Germany are in a position to become ‘agents of change’. This, because many have to face serious challenges upon their return, which complicate and sometimes even totally block their knowledge transfer. Regarding the interviews, as well as taking evidence from previous studies on the topic of return migration to Ghana, I identified four main obstacles: first, finding work in the formal sector; second, receiving adequate payment; third, having the right equipment to work and fourth, being welcomed by employees and superiors. Searching for a job after graduation has become already a difficult transition process for academics who can search in familiar surroundings. However, it becomes even more difficult if one moves to another country first. Than it is a double transitional process and requires patience 100 as Ms. C. explains: It is not easy with the job search in Ghana (.) but if you have the patience because something I realise that most people after just a year of frustration they leave to the US. Some people even go back to Germany, UK. BUT that’s one difference, if you have 99 The design of this taxation model would create a new source of income for the Ghanaian government. It is an ‘economic instrument’ (EI). Economic instruments like this require entities that cause environmental damage to pay taxes. This concerns foreign-based mining companies. Launching this type of taxation model in Ghana generates budgetary income and at the same time encourages foreign companies to capitalise on resources using environmentally friendly technologies (Kombat 2009: 26). 100 Especially those who started in state universities complained that the recruitment procedures were too time-consuming. The shortest time from first interview to being on the pay roll was six months. In another case, it even took almost two years until the interviewee received his first salary. BIGSAS Working Papers 4/2013: challenging notions of development and change from everyday life in Africa 110 the patience and wait. At least you find something in Ghana, no matter what. You will find something to do. And not only something. If you have the patience, you will really land yourself on a good job. But you know when we come the frustration is there. You wanna work you wanna work and within three four five months nothing comes. Because you had the opportunity to go outside getting a visa to another country is not difficult. But you will still come back and where are you going to start from? It is better you stay in and HOOK yourself somewhere. As Mrs. C. who studied Forest Ecosystem Management at the University of Freising mentions, it sometimes is so frustrating to return and to search for work unsuccessful in Ghana, that some people are tempted to leave the country again. What makes it so difficult to access the local labour market is work experience? Most employers require three to five years of qualified experience. The expert Dr. Bih, who has insights on the topic from his former experience as a job counsellor for returning graduates 101 therefore suggests that to overcome the issue of work experience one must be prepared to take up lower positions/lower-paying jobs (2008: 12). The difficulties in finding a well-paid job have even increased since 2008 because of the financial crisis. Since then, finding well-paid employment in the formal segment of Ghana’s labour market soon after return has become even more challenging even for those who have a matching profile, confirms Dr. V. who did complete her doctorate in chemistry in Bremen: As for the for the financial crisis it is not improving it is even getting worst, hmmm, things are not - you know the way they SHOULD be (…) you have to adjust yourself and combine everything that is it - that is what SCARES a lot of these young people. Either they do not come back or they come and they go BACK. That is the problem. Because if I look at myself I compare it and I try to change it you see that in Euro it is nothing - it is virtually nothing - if I would be working in Euro I would have been earning MORE than THIS (…) I really don’t want to compare because it doesn’t make 101 Since 1994, job counsellors who also studied in Germany have assisted fresh returns in finding jobs in the formal segment. The first job counsellors worked in the context of a migrant self-organisation, the “Rückkehreroffice” (Martin, 2005: 240). The organisation renamed itself the Ghanaian German Alumni-Network (GGAN) (Boger 2010). Today, the counsellor works as part of the German International Cooperation office (GIZ) in Accra. BIGSAS Working Papers 4/2013: challenging notions of development and change from everyday life in Africa 117 <http://www.statsghana.gov.gh/docfiles/GDP/revised_gdp_2011_ april-2012.pdf>, accessed 06 October 2012. GNA (2011) ‘AUCC to produce graduates in green technology and communication’. Ghana News Agency of 05 October 2011, Accra. <http://www.ghananewsagency.org/details/Education/AUCC-toproduce-graduates-in-Green-Technology-andCommunication/?ci=9&ai=34273>, accessed 06 October 2012. GNA (2012) ‘Government mainstreams green economy into national development: Environment minister’. Ghana News Agency of 27 September 2012, Accra. <http://www.ghananewsagency.org/details/Social/Governmentmainstreams-green-economy-into-national-developmentEnvironment-Minister/?ci=4&ai=49768>, accessed 31 December 2012. GNSS (2011) Ghana National Service Scheme, <http://196.201.43.251/>, accessed 30 June 2012. Hennen, L. (2001) ‘Folgen von umweltund ressourcenschutz für ausbildung, qualifikation und beschäftigung’, Arbeitsbericht 71. Berlin. Büro für Technikfolgen-Abschätzung beim Deutschen Bundestag (TAB). HIS (Hochschul-Informations-System) (2012) BildungsinländerStudierender 2000-2010 nach Erdteilen, Regionen, Herkunftsstaaten. Wissenschaft Weltoffen. DAAD (Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst), <http://www.wissenschaftweltoffen.de/daten>, accessed 30 September 2012. ILO (2007) The decent work agenda in Africa 2007-2015: report of the Director-General. Eleventh African Regional Meeting, Addis Ababa. Geneva. ITUC (2012) Growing green and decent jobs. Brussels. International Trade Union Confederation, <http://www.ituccsi.org/IMG/pdf/ituc_green_jobs_summary_en_final.pdf>, accessed 30 September 2012. IOM (2010) The future of migration: building capacities for change. World Migration Report. Geneva: International Organisation for Migration, <http://www.jcp.ge/iom/pdf/WMR_2010_ENGLISH.pdf>, accessed 30 September 2012. Klebs, F. (2004) ‘Studienbewerber aus Ghana. Sie müssen leider draußen bleiben’. Spiegel online of 20 August 2004, BIGSAS Working Papers 4/2013: challenging notions of development and change from everyday life in Africa 118 <http://www.spiegel.de/unispiegel/studium/0,1518,313727,00.ht ml> accessed 15 September 08. Kleist, N. (2011) ‘“Let us rebuild our country”. Migration-development scenarios in Ghana’. DIIS Working Paper 30. Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies. Kombat, A. (2009) ‘Sustainable development Action plan (SDAP) for Ghana: the role of economic instruments (EI)’. Internal report for the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Accra: Ghana Revenue Authority (GRA). Koessler, R. (1998) Entwicklung. Münster: Westfälisches Dampfboot. Kovács, Z. and L. Boros et al. (2012) Returning people to the homeland: tools and methods supporting remigrants in a European context. Leibniz. Re-Turn Consortium, <www.remigrants.eu/d.php?id=364&dn=1>, accessed 30 September 2012. Kubitschek, J. (2008) ‘Exploring Skilled Migration between Ghana and Germany. The Perspective of Ghanaian Graduate Students. Unpublished Bachelor thesis, University of Bielefeld, Transnationalisation and Development Research Center, Bielefeld. Kuptsch, C. (2006) ‘Students and talent flow – the case of Europe: From castle to harbour?’ in C. Kuptsch and E. Pang (eds), Competing for global talent. Wee Kim Wee Centre. Geneva: International Institute for Labour Studies (ILO). Laaser, M. (2006) ‘Rückkehr und entwicklung: Folgen von rückkehr im herkunftsland’ in Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge (BaMF) (ed), Rückkehr aus Deutschland: forschungsstudie 2006 im rahmen des Europäischen migrationsnetzwerks. Nürnberg: Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge (BAMF). Manuh, T. and R. Asante et al. (2005) ‘The brain drain in the higher education sector’ in T. Manuh (ed), At home in the world? Legon, Ghana: Sub-Saharan Publishers. Manuh, T. and R. Asante (2005) ‘Reaping the gains of Ghanaians overseas. An evaluation of the Home Coming Summit of 2001’ in T. Manuh (ed), At home in the world? Legon, Ghana: SubSaharan Publishers. Martin, J. (2005) Been-to, burger, transmigranten? Zur bildungsmigration von Ghanaern und ihrer rückkehr aus der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Berlin, Hamburg, Münster: LIT Verlag. BIGSAS Working Papers 4/2013: challenging notions of development and change from everyday life in Africa 119 Martin, J. (2006) ‘Aspekte der rückkehr ghanaischer bildungsmigranten’ in World University Service (ed), Mission Possible. Wiesbaden: WUS. Mutz, K. (no date) Green degree programmes in Germany, <http://www.study-in.de/en/community/tandem-reporters/-- 16307>, accessed 06 October 2012. NDPC (2010) Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda 2010-2013: GSGDA. National Development Planning Commission (NDPC), <http://www.ndpc.gov.gh/GPRS/7 per cent20 per cent20Ghana per cent20Shared per cent20Growth per cent20and per cent20Development per cent20Agenda per cent20(GSGDA per cent202010 per cent20per cent202013).pdf>, accessed 30 October 2012. Neubert, D. (2008) ‘Academic cooperation between Germany and Africa: challenges and some lessons learnt’ in E. Schamp and S. Schmid (eds), Academic cooperation with Africa: Lessons for partnership in higher education. Berlin: LIT Verlag. Nieswand, B. (2005) ‘Die Stabilisierung transnationaler felder: grenzüberschreitende beziehungen ghanaischer migranten in Deutschland.’ Sonderheft “Transnationale Räume”, Nord -Süd aktuell 19 (1): 45-56. Nieswand, B. (2011) ‘Der migrations-entwicklungs-nexus in Afrika: diskurswandel und diasporaformation’ in T. Baraulina and A. Kreienbrink, et al. (eds), Potenziale der migration zwischen Afrika und Deutschland. Nürnberg: Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge (BAMF). Nyberg-Sørensen, N. and N. van Hear et al. (2002) The migrationdevelopment nexus: evidence and policy options. Migration Research Series 8. International Organisation for Migration (IOM). Nyonator, F. and D. Dovlo (2005) ‘The health of the nation and the brain drain in the health sector’ in T. Manuh (ed), At home in the world? Legon, Ghana: Sub-Saharan Publishers. Olivier, C. (2011) ‘Transnationalisierung und entwicklung. Zirkuläre soziale transfers als voraussetzung “erfolgreicher” rückkehr’ in T. Baraulina and A. Kreienbrink et al. (ed), Potenziale der migration zwischen Afrika und Deutschland. Nürnberg: Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge (BAMF). Oyelere, R. U. (2007) ‘Brain drain, waste or gain? What we know about the Kenyan case’, Journal of Global Initiatives 2 (2): 113129. BIGSAS Working Papers 4/2013: challenging notions of development and change from everyday life in Africa 120 Patterson, R. (2007) ‘Building the new African eco-industrial economy: circulating brains and recycling materials' in R. Patterson (ed), African brain circulation. Leiden, Boston: Brill. Patterson, R. (2008) ‘Preparing sub-Saharan Africa for a pioneering role in eco-industrial development, Journal of Industrial Ecology 12 (4): 501-504. Patterson, R. (2011) ‘Renewable energy, migration-development model, and sustainability entrepreneurship' in B. HouseSoremekun and T. Falola (eds), Globalization and sustainable development in Africa. Rochester NY: University of Rochester Press. Pham, A. T. (2010) ‘The returning diaspora: Analyzing overseas Vietnamese (Viet Kieu) contributions towards Vietnam’s economic growth’. Working Paper Series 2011/20. Quartey, P. (2009) Migration in Ghana. A country profile 2009. Geneva: International Organisation for Migration (IOM). Rai, N. (2008) ‘Growth & poverty reduction strategy’ and its coherence with the principles of the NSSD: A case study of Ghana. University of Maastricht, <http://arno.unimaas.nl/show.cgi?fid=15118>, accessed 27 September 2012. Van Roosbroeck, P. and D. Amlalo (2006) ‘Country environmental profile of Ghana: draft final report’. MWH Global, <http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/Ghana per cent20_CEP_2006.pdf accessed 25.9.2012. Saxenian, A. (2005) ‘From brain drain to brain circulation: transnational communities and regional upgrading in India and China’, Studies in Comparative International Development 40 (2): 35–61. Schepelmann, P. and R. Bleischwitz et al. (2012) ‘Ecological industrial policy: key concept of a green economy’ in N. Netzer and J. Althaus (eds), Green economy: turning over a new leaf towards sustainable development? Global Policy and Development. Berlin: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. Schneider, J. and A. Kreienbrink, (2010) Rückkehrunterstützung in Deutschland: programme und strategien zur förderung von unterstützter rückkehr und zur reintegration in drittstaaten. Working Paper 31. Nürnberg. Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge (BaMF). Schraven, B. and I. Eguavoen et al. (2011) ‘Capacity development durch bildungsmigration: ergebnisse einer befragung von BIGSAS Working Papers 4/2013: challenging notions of development and change from everyday life in Africa 121 afrikanischen entwicklungsforschern’ in T. Baraulina and A. Kreienbrink et al. (eds), Potenziale der migration zwischen Afrika und Deutschland. Nürnberg: Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge (BAMF). Sevegnani, C. and C. Schuh (2010) Wie wirkt personelle förderung? Was wir aus evaluationen erfahren. Bonn: Evangelischer Entwicklungsdienst e.V. Sey, M. (2010) ‘NPP needs an achiever: Frimpong-Boateng’. The Ghanaian Journal online of 24 May 2010, <http://www.theghanaianjournal.com/2010/05/24/npp-needs-anachiever per centE2 per cent80 per cent94frimpong-boateng/>, accessed 22 March 2013. Statistisches Bundesamt (StBa) (2005-2010) Ausländische bevölkerung: ergebnisse des ausländerzentralregisters. Bevölkerung und Erwerbstätigkeit. Wiesbaden: DESTATIS. Sykes, B. and E. N. Chaoimh (2012) Mobile talente? Ein vergleich der bleibeabsichten internationaler studierender in fünf staaten der Europäischen Union. Berlin: Sachverständigenrat deutscher Stiftungen für Integration und Migration (SVR) GmbH. Taylor, L. (2009) Return migrants in Ghana. London: Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR). Tiemoko, R. (2003a) Migration, return and socio-economic change in West Africa. The role of the family. Sussex Migration Working Paper 15. Brighton. Sussex Centre for Migration Research. Tiemoko, R. (2003b) ‘Unveiling local opportunities and challenges in return migration and development nexus. The case of Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana’. Working Papers. Brighton: Sussex Centre for Migration Research. Tiemoko, R. (2005) ‘Understanding the opportunities for and challenges to migrant’s investment in la Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana’ in T. Manuh (ed), At home in the world? Legon, Ghana: SubSaharan Publishers. Tonah, S. (2007) Ghanaians abroad and their ties home: cultural and religious dimensions of transnational migration. Working Papers 25. Bielefeld. COMCAD <http://www.unibielefeld.de/tdrc/ag_comcad/downloads/workingpaper_25_Tonah .pdf>, accessed 21 September 2012. Tsagué, F. (2009) Abwanderung kluger köpfe aus Afrika: Kamerunische bildungsmigranten in Deutschland. Erfurt: Ausländerbeauftragte Thüringer Ministerium für Soziales, Familie und Gesundheit. BIGSAS Working Papers 4/2013: challenging notions of development and change from everyday life in Africa 122 Tsikata, Y. (2012) ‘Prof Frimpong-Boateng honoured in Ohio as “African Hero’’’. MyJoy Online of 10 February 2012, <http://edition.myjoyonline.com/pages/news/201202/81335.php accessed 25.09.2012. UNEM (2011) Working towards a balanced and inclusive green economy. A United Nations system-wide perspective, <http://www.unemg.org/Portals/27/Documents/IMG/GreenEcono my/report/GreenEconomy-Full.pdf>, accessed 06 October 2012. UNEP, I. and IOE et al. (2008) Green jobs. Towards decent work in a sustainable, low-carbon world, <www.unep.org/labour_environment/features/greenjobs.asp>, accessed 25 September 2012. UNEP (2011) Towards a green economy. Pathways to sustainable development and poverty eradication, <www.unep.org/greeneconomy>, accessed 25.9.2012. World Bank (2011) Changes in country classifications, <http://data.worldbank.org/news/2010-GNI-incomeclassifications>, accessed 04 October 2012. Witzel, A. (2000) ‘The problem-centered interview’, Forum Qualitative Social Research 1 (1): Article 22. YEN and IYF (2009) Private Sector Demand for Youth Labour in Ghana and Senegal: Ghana and Senegal study findings. Washington DC: YEN, Youth Employment Network; IYF, International Youth Foundation. Yirenya-Tawiah, D. and E. T. Lawson (2012) ‘Civil society is paving the way towards better sanitation in Ghana’, D+C 9: 327-329. Zweig, D. (2006) ‘Learning to compete: China’s efforts to encourage a “reverse brain drain”’ in C. Kuptsch and E. Pang (eds), Competing for global talent. Wee Kim Wee Centre. Geneva: International Institute for Labour Studies (ILO). BIGSAS Working Papers 4/2013: challenging notions of development and change from everyday life in Africa 123 Kleinhändler auf dem Chisokone-Markt in Kitwe/Sambia – viele Herausforderungen, kreative Lösungen Felix Brinkmann 102 Abstract Über Kleinhandel in Afrika und dessen Herausforderungen existiert bereits eine Vielzahl an Literatur. Immer wieder wird dabei auf die schwierige Lage von Kleinhändlern in wirtschaftlicher wie personaler Hinsicht verwiesen. Häufig herrscht Kapitalmangel, hoher Konkurrenzdruck in einem kompetitiven Umfeld sowie wenig bis keine Regulierung des wirtschaftlichen Rahmens. Diese Faktoren gelten ebenfalls für Kleinhändler auf dem Chisokone-Markt in Kitwe/Sambia. Die Wirtschaft Sambias basiert im Wesentlichen auf Kupferabbauund Export, dessen Zentrum Kitwe ist. In kaum einem anderen Land Afrikas spüren Kleinhändler die Auswirkungen eines volatilen Rohstoffpreises so drastisch wie in Sambia. In Zeiten niedriger Kupferpreise auf dem Weltmarkt sinkt die Kaufkraft der örtlichen Bevölkerung. Bei steigendem Kupferpreis stellt sich nur eine teilweise Verbesserung der wirtschaftlichen Situation her. Hervorgerufen durch Arbeitslosigkeit, möchten viele Sambianer an dem wirtschaftlichen Aufschwung teilhaben und eröffnen zusätzliche Marktstände, was zu einem Überangebot führt. 103 Der ChisokoneMarkt ist der zweitgrößte seiner Art in Sambia und ist nie offiziell als solcher registriert worden. Mehrere Akteure konkurrieren um Einfluss und Macht. Das gesetzlich für die Verwaltung zuständige Kitwe City Coucil (KCC) ist seit Jahren nicht im Stande eine angemessene Verwaltung zu gewährleisten. In diese Lücke sind Händlerorganisationen getreten, die quasi als Substitutivmarktverwaltungen agieren und ebenso wie das KCC den Chisokone-Markt als Einnahmequelle nutzen. Zwischen diesen Akteuren herrscht je nach Opportunität Konkurrenz oder Kooperation, was das wirtschaftliche Handeln für Kleinhändler zusätzlich erschwert und kaum planbar macht. Dieser Artikel zeigt, welche betrieblichen und personalen Strategien Kleinhändler 102 Felix Brinkmann is an Economist and Political Scientist, and holds a Master’s degree holder in ‘Culture and Society of Africa’. His current research is about business strategies of SME’s at the Chisokone-Market in Kitwe/Zambia. This project considers also the unusual institutional frame of the Chisokone-Market, which is the second largest one in Zambia and further more predominantly illegal. Since 2010 Felix Brinkmann is affiliated to the Bayreuth International Graduate School of African Studies (BIGSAS) and conducted during this time several field researched in Zambia and Tanzania. 103 Die Anzahl der Händler auf dem Chisokone.Markt hat sich innherhalb von 3 Jahren von ca. 10.000 auf 15.000 Händler erhöht. BIGSAS Working Papers 4/2013: challenging notions of development and change from everyday life in Africa 124 anwenden, um in diesem wirtschaftlich wie institutionell ungewöhnlichen Umfeld bestehen zu können. Dabei geht die Darlegung über klassische betriebswirtschaftliche Sichtweisen hinaus und widmet sich ebenso dem Normenund Wertesystem der Kleinhändler, welches ein entscheidender Faktor im örtlichen Marktaublauf ist. Der Artikel arbeitet Erfolgsfaktoren für eine günstige ökonomische Entwicklung der Kleinhändler heraus und thematisiert ebenso die Grenzen ökonomisch rationalen Handelns im sambianischen Kontext. Die Anforderungen der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung zwingen die Kleinhändler, ein hohes Maß an Flexibilität und informeller Kooperation einzugehen. Stichwörter: die Kleinhändlern, Kupferabbauund Export, betrieblichen und personalen Strategien, der Chisokone-Markt, Sambia. Über Kleinhandel in Afrika und dessen Herausforderungen existiert bereits eine Vielzahl an Literatur. 104 Immer wieder wird dabei auf die schwierige Lage von Kleinhändlern in wirtschaftlicher wie personaler Hinsicht verwiesen. 105 Häufig herrscht Kapitalmangel, hoher Konkurrenzdruck in einem kompetitiven Umfeld sowie wenig bis keine Regulierung des wirtschaftlichen Rahmens. Diese Faktoren gelten ebenfalls für Kleinhändler auf dem Chisokone-Markt in Kitwe, Sambia. Dieser Artikel zeigt, welche Strategien und Netzwerke Kleinhändler anwenden, um in einem wirtschaftlich wie institutionell ungewöhnlichen Umfeld bestehen zu können. Dabei geht die Darlegung über klassische betriebswirtschaftliche Sichtweisen hinaus. Zudem erfolgen eine genaue Beschreibung und ein Blick auf das institutionelle Umfeld, in dem die Kleinhändler agieren müssen. Der Artikel arbeitet Erfolgsfaktoren für eine günstige ökonomische Entwicklung der Kleinhändler heraus und thematisiert ebenso die Grenzen ökonomisch rationalen Handelns im sambianischen Kontext. Die Anforderungen der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung zwingen die Kleinhändler, ein hohes Maß an Flexibilität und informeller Kooperation einzugehen. Die Wirtschaft Sambias basiert im Wesentlichen auf Kupferabbauund Export, dessen Zentrum Kitwe ist. 106 In kaum einem anderen Land Afrikas spüren Kleinhändler die Auswirkungen eines volatilen Rohstoffpreises so drastisch wie in Sambia. In Zeiten niedriger 104 Vgl. bspw. Hartmann 1994/ Banda, C., Mutula, S., Grant, B. 2004. 105 Vgl. Liedholm/Mead 1988, S. 13. 106 Vgl. Siachoono 2003. BIGSAS Working Papers 4/2013: challenging notions of development and change from everyday life in Africa 125 Kupferpreise auf dem Weltmarkt sinkt die Kaufkraft der örtlichen Bevölkerung. Dies war besonders während der Wirtschaftsund Finanzkrise in den Jahren 2008 bis 2009 zu beobachten. Bei steigendem Kupferpreis stellt sich nur teilweise eine Verbesserung der wirtschaftlichen Situation ein. Von hoher Arbeitslosigkeit betroffen, möchten viele Sambianer am wirtschaftlichen Aufschwung seit 2010 teilhaben und eröffnen zusätzliche Marktstände, was zu einem Überangebot führt. 107 Der Chisokone-Markt ist der zweitgrößte seiner Art in Sambia und ist nie offiziell als solcher registriert worden. Mehrere Akteure konkurrieren um Einfluss und Macht. Das gesetzlich für die Verwaltung zuständige Kitwe City Council (KCC) ist seit Jahren nicht im Stande, eine angemessene Verwaltung zu gewährleisten. In diese Lücke sind Händlerorganisationen getreten, die quasi als Substitutivmarktverwaltungen agieren und ebenso wie das KCC den Chisokone-Markt als Einnahmequelle nutzen. Zwischen diesen Akteuren herrscht je nach Opportunität Konkurrenz oder Kooperation, was das wirtschaftliche Handeln für Kleinhändler zusätzlich erschwert und kaum planbar macht. Hauptgrund für das ungenügende wirtschaftliche Umfeld für Kleinhändler auf dem Chisokone-Markt ist die bis heute nicht vollständig geklärte Frage, wer letztendlich die Marktverwaltung innehat. Das angesprochene KCC kann bis zum heutigen Zeitpunkt keine angemessene Verwaltung des Marktes gewährleisten, da es unter chronischem Personalmangel und Unterfinanzierung leidet. Dabei spielt auch die Entstehung des Marktes eine wesentliche Rolle. Der Chisokone-Markt entstand in Kitwe in den 1950er Jahren und war ursprünglich für den Handel mit Lebensmitteln bestimmt. Dabei sollte der Markt insbesondere der weißen Bevölkerung zu Gute kommen, da er von der örtlichen Kolonialverwaltung installiert wurde. Im Verlauf der Lossagung und der Unabhängigkeit Sambias im Jahr 1964 änderte sich auch die Struktur des Chisokone-Marktes, da er nun von allen Bevölkerungsschichten genutzt werden konnte. Durch seine zentrale Lage nahe dem Stadtzentrum erfreute sich der Markt zunehmender Beliebtheit, wurde aber nie als solcher offiziell registriert; trotz stetigen Wachstums. Im Zuge der Minenprivatisierung erfuhr der Chisokone-Markt eine Neuund Umgestaltung. Hervorgerufen durch Massenentlassungen und hohe Arbeitslosigkeit wichen zunehmend vormalige Minenarbeiter in den informellen Sektor aus und betätigten sich als Händler. Auf dem Chisokone-Markt wuchs durch die zunehmende Händleranzahl das Warenagebot und dessen Vielfalt rasant. Dabei dehnte sich das 107 Die Anzahl der Händler auf dem Chisokone-Markt hat sich innherhalb von 3 Jahren von ca. 10.000 auf 15.000 Händler erhöht. BIGSAS Working Papers 4/2013: challenging notions of development and change from everyday life in Africa 126 Marktgeschehen auch örtlich aus. Aus voranschreitendem Wachstum und dem nie geklärtem rechtlichen Status des ChisokoneMarktes entstanden die bis heute dem Markt immanenten Probleme. Durch den illegalen Status fühlte sich das KCC anfangs nicht für die Verwaltung zuständig und leitete damit der unkontrollierten Ausbreitung und den prekären Verhältnissen Vorschub. In diese Verwaltungslücke stießen Anfang der 1990er Jahre dann so genannte Market Boards, die den Markt in Eigenregie verwalten sollten. Relativ rasch zeigte sich, dass diese Organe aufgrund der zahlreichen divergierenden Interessen seiner Mitglieder nicht in der Lage war, im Sinne einer angemessenen Verwaltung des ChisokoneMarktes zu handeln. Folge hiervon war die Gründung der Marktorganisation ZANAMA (Zambia National Marketeers Association) im Jahr 1999, 108 die sich zur Aufgabe machte, die Interessen der Händler gegenüber staatlichen Institutionen sowie anderen Interessensgruppen zu vertreten. Ob seiner Größe und zentralen Lage wurde der Chisokone-Markt neben dem City Market in Lusaka sehr bald zu einem Hauptoperationszentrum der Organisation. Durch die unbefriedigenden Administrationsversuche des KCC stieg ZANAMA ab dem Jahr 2000 zu einer QuasiMarktverwaltung auf und verdrängte das KCC als Hauptverwaltungsorgan. Allerdings hatte sich bis zur Gründung von ZANAMA bereits eine desolate Infrastruktur entwickelt. ZANAMA verwaltete also den Mangel, tatsächliche Verbesserungen der Marktstrukturen konnte die Handelsorganisation nie realisieren. Außerdem wurde der Chisokone-Markt zum Politikum. Entgegen ihrer Konstitution handelte ZANAMA keineswegs politisch neutral, sondern agierte als Interessenvertreter der damals herrschenden Partei MMD (Movement for Multiparty Democracy). Diese Einseitigkeit schlug sich im Marktgeschehen in Chisokone nieder. Durch die politische Rückendeckung gelang es ZANAMA in zunehmenden Maße, den Chisokone-Markt zu beherrschen und die Verwaltung fast komplett zu übernehmen. Allerdings profitieren von der Verwaltungsübernahme lediglich Händler, die politisch dem MMD nahestanden. Andere Händler, die der Opposition gewogen waren oder auch neutral agierten, wurden zum Teil systematisch unter Druck gesetzt und ihr Wirtschaften erschwert. Es häuften sich Skandale und Kompetenzüberschreitungen, wie beispielsweise das erheben von illegalen Steuern auf „Großhandelsware“. Des Weiteren ging ZANAMA sogar so weit, in einigen Marktsektionen Zwangsabgaben einzufordern und bei Nichtentrichtung Waren der betroffenen Händler zu konfiszieren und 108 Vgl. Moeller-Larsson 2009, S. 33 – S. 34. BIGSAS Working Papers 4/2013: challenging notions of development and change from everyday life in Africa 133 Ein Problem für die Kleinhändler ist, dass sowohl die Trennung von betrieblichem und privatem Kapital als auch die Trennung zwischen familiären und geschäftlichen Verhältnissen schwer fällt. Oft können betrieblich sinnvolle und rationale Strategien aufgrund des sozialen Erwartungen nicht umgesetzt werden. Erfolgreichere Händler versuchen, dem mit der Gründung einer offiziellen Firma entgegen zu wirken. Diese hat ihren Sitz dann zwar auf einem illegalen Markt, wird aber dennoch von der PACRA (Patents and Companies Registration Agency) akzeptiert und vom sambianischen Steuerregister erfasst. Dieser Schritt ist aber nur sehr wenigen vorbehalten. Er hat aber ganz entscheidende Vorteile. Ohne ein Firmenkonto ist es nahezu unmöglich, an einen Kredit zu marktüblichen Zinsen zu gelangen. Grundsätzlich sind Banken nur bereit, einen Kredit zu gewähren, wenn der Bewerber sich im formellen Sektor bewegt und seine finanzielle Situation transparent darlegt. Händler, die im informellen Sektor agieren (wie es die ganz überwiegende Zahl an Kleinhändlern auf dem Chisokone-Markt tut), müssen sich an eine der vielen Mikrokredit-Banken in Kitwe wenden. Allerdings sind deren Zinsen enorm, da das Ausfallrisiko durch die unsichere rechtliche wie institutionelle Lage auf dem ChisokoneMarkt sehr hoch ist. Wer es allerdings schafft, eine Firma zu gründen und an marktübliche Kredite zu gelangen, ist in der Lage, sein Geschäft zügig auszubauen und den hoch lukrativen Wareneinkauf im benachbarten Ausland zu tätigen. Immer mehr kommt es auf dem Chisokone-Markt zu einer Spaltung der Händler. Circa 20 Prozent der Händler können die beschriebenen Faktoren umsetzen und so erfolgreich auf dem Markt operieren. Durch ihre Finanzkraft, Kreditwürdigkeit und nachgefragtes Warenangebot entfernen sie sich zusehends von der Mehrzahl der Kleinhändler, deren Geschäftsmodell am Rande des Existenzminimums rangiert. Gleichwohl ist ein großer Kapitalstock kein Garant für eine erfolgreiche Unternehmung. Diese Erfahrung mussten etliche im Zuge der globalen Finanzkrise entlassene Minenarbeiter machen, die sich ab 2008/2009 als Händler auf dem Chisokone-Markt versuchten. Ohne Erfahrung im Bereich des Handels ist es schwierig, gerade die kritische Anfangsphase einer Unternehmung zu überstehen. Hauptgrund für das vielfache Scheitern war eine verfehlte Preispolitik. Die ehemaligen Minenarbeiter versuchten, mit Kampfpreisen konkurrenzfähig zu werden, ihre Unternehmung missglückte aber dann rasch aufgrund einer rasant schmelzenden Kapitaldecke und einer verfehlten Sortimentspolitik. Aber auch das Geschäftsmodell der bis heute erfolgreichen Händler ist risikobehaftet. Dabei droht Gefahr von außerhalb. Durch die BIGSAS Working Papers 4/2013: challenging notions of development and change from everyday life in Africa 134 lasche Regulierung kann im Grunde jeder ein Geschäft auf dem Chisokone-Markt eröffnen – auch ausländische Händler. Die hohen Gewinnspannen haben sich bis nach Tansania herumgesprochen; immer mehr Händler aus Tansania eröffnen nun Geschäfte und machen den alteingesessenen Händlern aus Kitwe Konkurrenz. Der Ärger unter den Händlern darüber ist groß und protektionistische Stimmen, die eine Verbannung ausländischer Händler fordern, werden immer lauter. Ebenfalls für Schwierigkeiten könnte die zu lässig gehandhabte Praxis der fehlenden Trennung zwischen Großund Kleinhandel auf dem Chisokone-Markt sein. Zwar machen sich Händler eine solche Zwitterstellung ökonomisch zu Nutzen, sie birgt aber auch Risiken. Diese kommen von Seiten der chinesischen Großhändler, die bis vor kurzem ausschließlich als Beschaffungsoption der sambianischen Händler wahrgenommen wurden. Mittlerweile greifen die chinesischen Händler ganz direkt in den Endverbrauchermarkt ein und eröffnen Geschäfte auf dem Chisokone-Markt. Aufgrund ihres Beschaffungsvorteils können sie Waren konkurrenzlos günstig veräußern. Das Image der Chinesen in Sambia und insbesondere im Kupfergürtel kann allerdings nur als ausgesprochen negativ bezeichnet werden. Hierzu haben etliche Skandale in chinesischen Firmen und Bergbauunternehmen beigetragen. 114 Mr. Mofya, der Vorsitzende der Händlervereinigung ZATMA, sagte in einem Interview, angesprochen auf die chinesische Präsenz in Kitwe: „the worst investors we ever had“. 115 Diese Imageproblem versuchen chinesische Händler durch die Anstellung von Sambianern zu umgehen, die dem Geschäft auf dem ChisokoneMarkt einen lokalen Anstrich geben sollen. Klar ist, dass sich eine derartige Praxis schnell herumspricht und allgemein bekannt ist, welches Geschäft von Chinesen geführt wird. Es bleibt also abzuwarten, wie sich der Einfluss der ausländischen Händler aus Tansania und China auswirken wird. Viel wird auch davon abhängen, in wie weit es das KCC schaffen wird, in den nächsten Jahren eine funktionierende Administration aufzubauen und den Marktablauf in geregelte Bahnen zu lenken. Ein ganz anderer Faktor wird sein, wann das erste Shopping-Center in Kitwe eröffnet. Dann werden die bis heute erfolgreichen Händler ernsthafte Konkurrenz erhalten. Kaum jemand wird freiwillig den Chisokone-Markt mit seiner kundenunfreundlichen Infrastruktur, den Unbequemlichkeiten und den chaotischen Warendarbietungen einem geordneten, sauberen und dem Zeitgeist entsprechenden Konsumort vorziehen. Sollte es so weit kommen, können sich Händler fast 114 Vgl. Raine 2009, S. 138 – S. 139. 115 Vgl. Archiv Felix Brinkmann, Interviews 2012 Kitwe, Mr. Mofya am 23. Mai 2012. BIGSAS Working Papers 4/2013: challenging notions of development and change from everyday life in Africa 135 ausschließlich über den Preis positionieren und es besteht die Gefahr, dass sich der schon jetzt statt findende, zum Teil ruinöse, Preiswettbewerb fortsetzt. Es ist nur noch eine Frage der Zeit, bis das besagte Einkaufszentrum errichtet wird. Unmittelbar neben dem Freedom Park ist bereits eine Fläche hierfür ausgewiesen, die nur knapp einen Kilometer vom Chisokone-Markt entfernt liegt. Nicht ohne Grund haben sich die ganz überwiegend sehr erfolgreichen Elektronikhändler am Rand des Marktes platziert, um so auch klar sichtbar eine Abgrenzung zum restlichen Marktgeschehen zu schaffen. Dieser Bereich wird bereits als eine separate Marktsektion vom KCC verwaltet. Auch in diesem Falle hat das KCC nicht proaktiv gehandelt, sondern seine Verwaltungsstruktur den reellen Entwicklungen anpassen müssen. Mittlerweile ist der zweitgrößte Markt Sambias in einem derart schlechten Zustand, dass Händler wie Kunden die momentane Situation als nicht mehr tragbar ansehen. Dabei ist das Grundproblem, dass alle verwaltenden Institutionen den Markt nicht als Handelsplattform verstehen und etablieren wollen, sondern als Einnahmequelle. Der jahrelange Machtkampf auf dem Markt und die Dominanz von ZANAMA haben Strukturen geschaffen, die immer noch nachwirken. Bis heute versucht ZATMA, wieder an Einfluss zu gewinnen und ist in zähen Verhandlungen mit dem KCC, wie die „Rollenverteilung“ in den nächsten Jahren aussehen soll. Über Restrukturierungen oder gar Reformen lassen beide Akteure wenig verlautbaren. Es drängt sich der Eindruck auf, dass beide daran interessiert sind, sich für die nächste Zeit in eine Position zu manövrieren, die es erlaubt, weiterhin finanziell von den strukturellen wie administrativen Unzulänglichkeiten des Chisokone-Marktes zu profitieren. Dabei sollten allen Akteuren neuere Entwicklungen eine Warnung sein. Seit der letzten Wahl 2011 ist es „Street Vendors“ erlaubt, im ganzen Stadtgebiet Handel zu treiben, wovon auch ausgiebig Gebrauch gemacht wird. Seitdem klagen fast alle Händler auf dem Chisokone-Markt über massive Umsatzeinbußen, wie meine Befragungen der letzten Feldforschung im Frühjahr 2012 ergeben haben. Sobald eine Alternative vorhanden ist, vermeiden es Kunden, sich in das kundenunfreundliche Marktgeschehen zu begeben. Sobald die angesprochene Shopping Mall errichtet ist, kann davon ausgegangen werden, dass der Markt weiter an Kunden und damit auch an Bedeutung verliert. So kursieren seit einigen Jahren Gerüchte und Halbwahrheiten um eine Neugestaltung des Chisokone-Marktes in Kitwe. Allen Beteiligten ist klar, dass diese schnellstmöglich umgesetzt werden müsste. Wenn aber bis heute kaum ausgemacht ist, dass das KCC endgültig die Verwaltung BIGSAS Working Papers 4/2013: challenging notions of development and change from everyday life in Africa 136 übernimmt und sogar die verbannte ZANAMA wieder versucht, im Dunstkreis des Chisokone-Marktes Fuß zu fassen, ist es schwer vorstellbar, dass in absehbarer Zeit eine Neugestaltung des Marktes vonstatten geht. Eine sinnvolle Lösung bietet der Vorsitzende der Handelskammer in Kitwe, Herr Banda, an. Da die Händler die Rochaden und Machtspiele der institutionellen Akteure und die damit verbundene Lähmung leid sind, schlägt er einen privaten Investor vor. 116 Dieser übernähme die Verwaltung des Marktes, gestaltete ihn um und nähme dringend notwendige Renovierungsarbeiten vor. Ein privater Investor könnte aus Sicht des Vorsitzenden das Marktgelände von der Stadt für beispielsweise 20 Jahre anmieten und die Marktgebühren selbst einnehmen, wobei Obergrenzen festgesetzt werden müssten. Herr Banda betont bei diesem Verfahren im Besonderen die Neutralität. Bei einer Neugestaltung seitens des KCC befürchtet er, dass Geschäfte in günstiger Lage nicht transparent vergeben werden, sondern im klientelistischen bzw. patrimonialem Stil an Günstlinge verteilt werden. Bis es zu einer Verbesserung der Lage auf dem Chisokone-Markt kommt, bleibt die Situation für die Händler prekär. Weiterhin besteht die große Unsicherheit, wer eigentlich den Markt letztendlich verwalten wird und ob dieser in seiner jetzigen Form Bestand haben kann. Ein solches Umfeld schafft kein investitionsfreundliches Klima und bremst damit die Anstrengungen der Händler aus. Selbst diejenigen, die erfolgreich Handel treiben, halten sich mit Expansionsplänen zurück. Viel wird davon abhängen, ob es in Kitwe gelingt, eine funktionierende Verwaltung zu installieren, die auch als solche von allen an dem Markt beteiligten Akteuren anerkannt wird. Das KCC als alleinige Verwaltung zu benennen und die Macht der Händlerorganisationen zu kappen, war ein erster richtiger Schritt. Literatur Banda, C., S. Mutula and B. Grant (2004) ‘Informations needs assessment for small scale business community in Zambia: case study of Chisokone-Marktet, Kitwe’, Malaysian Journal of Library & Information Science 9 (2): 95-108. Egbert, H. (2001) ‘Netzwerke als unternehmerische ressourcen und restriktionen’. Unternehmer in der tansanischen Stadt Tanga. 1. Aufl., Berlin. 116 Vgl. Archiv Felix Brinkmann, Interviews 2012 Handelskammer-Kitwe, Mr. Banda am 20. Mai 2012. BIGSAS Working Papers 4/2013: challenging notions of development and change from everyday life in Africa 137 Hartmann, M. (1994) ‘Industrialisierung, bürokratie und die entwicklung von kleinunternehmern in Sambia’. Berichte aus dem Arbeitsgebiet Entwicklungsforschung, Heft 24, Münster. Liedholm, C. and D. C. Mead (1999) Small enterprises and economic development. The dynamics of micro and small enterprises. London. Möller-Larsen M. (2009) ‘Institutional Entrepreneurship in Zambian Markets. The Case of Zambia National Marketeers Association’. Master thesis, Copenhagen Business School. Raine, S. (2009) China's African challenges, IISS, London: Inst. for Strategic Studies. Siachoono, S. (2003) Guide to the Copperbelt. Ndola: Copperbelt Museum. Onlinequellen: <http://www.postzambia.com/Joomla/postprint_article.php?articleId=4171>, aufgerufen 20. Oktober 2012. <http://www.who.int/substance_abuse/publications/en/zambia.pdf>, aufgerufen 29. September 2012. BIGSAS Working Papers 4/2013: challenging notions of development and change from everyday life in Africa 138 Anhang 1: eine filiale der Baby Boy Company auf dem Chisokone-Markt