THE AFFECTIVE ARCHITECTURE OF EXTREMISM: Understanding Extremism through Situated Affectivity

Dissertation an der Universität Osnabrück zur Erlangung des Doktorgrades Ph.D. Thema THE AFFECTIVE ARCHITECTURE OF EXTREMISM Understanding Extremism through Situated Affectivity Hina Haq Die Dissertation wurde betreut durch Prof. Dr. Achim Stephan Universität Osnabrück Fachbereich Humanwissenschaften Kognitionswissenschaft Osnabrück, May 2025 2 Table of Contents Acknowledgements……………………………………………………….…………………..... Erklärung über etwaige frühere Promotionsgesuche……………………................…………… Declaration on the Independence of the Work Provided…………………….…………….……. Specification of Author Contributions (in the order of authorship)…………….………………. Abstract (English) ………....……………………………………………………...…................. Abstrakt (Deutsch) ………...……………………………………………………….................... 04 05 06 07 09 10 Chapter 1: Introduction…………………………………………………………...………….. Prologue: A Story of Encounters with Radicalized Youth in Pakistan…………………. What Constitutes Extremism………………………………………………… The Affective Dimension of Radicalization: A Critical Review of Prominent Models………………………………………………………………………………… Situated Affectivity: A Brief Introduction…………………………………….……….. Affective Mind Shaping: A Case Study……………………………………….……….. Affective Arrangements and Religious Zealotry…………………………...…. A Climate of Fear and Hostility……………………………………................. Shaping Of Women Image: Religious and Patriarchal Control………………. The Hudood Ordinances: Creating and Maintaining Gender Control Through Fear………………………………………………………….............. Reform Attempts and Contemporary Reality………………………................. Religion, Education and Jihad: Affective Mind Shaping……………………… The Unfortunate Continuation of Affect Shaping…………………………….. Affective Arrangements as Predictors of Societal Direction…………………………... Situated Affectivity, Society, and Extremism…………………………………………. A Brief Overview of Upcoming Chapters……………………………………............... References……………………………………………………………………............... 11 11 14 15 18 20 21 25 25 27 28 29 32 33 35 36 39 Chapter 2: Radicalization Through the Lens of Situated Affectivity……………................ Abstract……………………………………………………………………................... Introduction……………………………………………………………………………. Situated Affectivity and Affective Scaffolding……………………………................... Mind Invasion in Radicalization………………………………………….……………. Specific Tools Provided for Mind Invasion……………………………………………. Self-Stimulatory Loops of Affectivity In Radicalization……………………………… Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………….. References……………………………………………………………………………... 45 46 47 50 54 59 62 65 66 Chapter 3: Foregrounding Affectivity in the Pathways to Extremism……………………... Abstract………………………………………………………………………............... Introduction……………………………………………………………………………. Affectivity and Situatedness…………………………………………………………… Affective Arrangements…………………………………………………….................. Vantage Points…………………………………...…………………………… The Case of Brenton Tarrant……………………………………….………………….. Arrangement and Scaffolds………………………………………...…...…….. Affective Processes………………………………………………..............…... The Case of Ibn-E-Umar…………………………………………………...………….. Arrangement and Scaffolds…………………………………………................ Affective Processes…………………………………………………................. Conclusions……………………………………………………………………………. References……………………………………………………………………............... 76 77 78 81 85 87 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 3 Chapter 4: The Power of Passion and Nostalgia in Extremism: A Case Study of the Christchurch Mosque Attack………………………………………………………………… Abstract………………………………………………………………………………... Introduction………………………………………………………………….………… Conceptual And Methodological Framework……………………………….………… Passions, Nostalgia, And Other Affective Phenomena………………………............... The Method of Critical Phenomenology and the Framework of Situated Affectivity……………………………………………………………………............... Case Study: The Christchurch Mosque Attacks……………………………………….. Religious-Racial Identity & Nostalgia………………………………………………… Sacred Passion and Religious-Racial Violence………………………………………... Digital And Material Scaffolds of Affect: Orchestrating Nostalgia and Passion……… Creating Affective Templates: The Architecture of Extremist Affect…………………. Synthesis of Affect And Action: The Culmination of Passionate Violence…………… Affective Chains: Engineering Ideological Inheritance……………………………….. Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………….. References……………………………………………………………………............... 102 103 104 106 106 109 110 111 113 115 117 118 119 121 122 Chapter 5: Radicalization from a Societal Perspective ………………..……………………. Abstract………………………………………………………………………………... Introduction……………………………………………………………………………. Extremism and Society………………………………………………………………… Societal vs. Individual Narratives: Terrorists or Freedom Fighters?.............................. Social Repercussions of Marginalization……………………………………................ Phenomenology of Whiteness…………………………………………………………. Trauma: A Facilitator in the Radicalization Process………………..…………………. The Double Signal of Islamophobia…………………………………………................ Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………….. References……………………………………………………………………………... 125 126 127 128 130 134 135 138 142 146 147 Chapter 6: Conclusion………………………………………………………………………... Affect, Extremism, and Societal Trajectories…………………………………………. Chapter Insights and Connections…………………………………………..…………. Final Thoughts………………………………………………………………................ 152 152 152 154 4 Acknowledgments I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my advisor, Prof. Dr. Achim Stephan, for his exceptional guidance, patience, and intellectual generosity throughout my doctoral journey. His wisdom and encouragement have not only shaped this dissertation but also profoundly influenced my growth as a person and a researcher. To my husband, Saad: Thank you for being my rock, my personal IT department, and my caffeine supplier, I couldn't have completed this journey without you! Your unwavering belief in me, even during the most challenging moments, made this achievement possible. Mikail, my dear son, your boundless energy and love taught me the true meaning of patience and perseverance. You reminded me daily that there is joy beyond academia, and for that, I am endlessly grateful. To my parents, who supported me in every conceivable way: Thank you for encouraging me when I decided to embark on a new journey in Germany. Your unconditional love and support across continents sustained me throughout this process. And to the rest of my family especially my brother Umer and my best friend Hira Umer, thank you for your constant encouragement and unwavering faith in my abilities. You stood by me through everything, and words cannot express my gratitude. My sincere thanks go to the Reading Club Affectivity, especially Gregor Hörzer and Louis Loock, for their thoughtful engagement and invaluable feedback, which sharpened my thinking and refined my work. I am also deeply thankful to the Critical Emotions Theory group, especially Imke von Maur and Ruth Rebecca Tietjen, for their intellectual camaraderie and support. Your insights and stimulating discussions were a constant source of inspiration. This dissertation stands as a testament not only to academic pursuit but also to the power of community. It represents the culmination of countless conversations, challenges overcome, and growth experienced, all made possible by the network of support surrounding me. To everyone who contributed to this journey, whether named or unnamed, I offer my heartfelt appreciation. 5 Fachbereich Humanwissenschaften Fach Kognitionswissenschaft Erklärung über etwaige frühere Promotionsgesuche gem. § 6 der Promotionsordnung ANGABEN ZUR PERSON Name und Vorname: Hina Haq Anschrift(en): Pottgraben 16, 49074 Osnabrück Hiermit erkläre ich, dass ich kein früheres Promotionsgesuch an einer wissenschaftlichen Hochschule gestellt habe. _________________________________________ Datum und Unterschrift 6 Declaration on the Independence of the Work Provided I affirm that this work is my own, produced independently without unauthorized aid. All sources—whether quoted directly, paraphrased, or conceptually referenced—have been properly credited in compliance with academic conventions. The analysis, interpretations, and conclusions presented herein reflect my personal understanding of the subject matter. Where AI tools were employed, their role was strictly auxiliary—for refining syntax, structuring outlines, and verifying citations—and is documented transparently. No generative AI was used to formulate core ideas or arguments. Contributions & Tools 1. Supervisor: Prof. Achim Stephan provided iterative feedback on multiple drafts, prompting significant revisions. 2. Peer Review: Members of the Philosophy of Mind and Cognition Research Group and the Reading Club—including Saad Shaheed, Lasse Bergmann, Jumana Morciglio, Daniele Valentini, Gregor Hörzer, Imke von Maur, and Louis Loock—and Sabrina Coninx offered substantive critiques to some parts of this thesis that enhanced the manuscript’s rigor. 3. Software: o Zotero for citation management. o ProWritingAid, ChatGPT, and Claude AI for grammatical polish and structural clarity. Additional Attestations • No third-party services (paid or otherwise) contributed to the work’s creation. • The dissertation is original and has not been submitted elsewhere for evaluation. • I assume full responsibility for all claims and am prepared to defend them academically. _____________________________ (place, date) _______________________________ (Signature) 7 Specification of Author Contributions (in the order of authorship) I hereby declare that the entirety of this dissertation has been independently written by me. Chapter 2, 3, and 5 are published while Chapter 4 is in Review for publication. The contributions of the authors in Chapter 2, 3, 4, and 5 are specified according to the Contributor Roles Taxonomy (CRediT) as follows: Chapter 2 - Published Article Radicalization Through the Lens of Situated Affectivity Authored by Hina Haq, Saad Shaheed and Achim Stephan • Conceptualization: [Hina Haq and Saad Shaheed] – Development of research goals and aims. • Data Curation: [Hina Haq and Saad Shaheed] – Collection, organization, and management of data (e.g., interviews, transcripts, notes). • Formal Analysis: [Hina Haq] – Application of analysis. • Methodology: [Hina Haq, Saad Shaheed and Achim Stephan] – Implementation of theoretical framework. • Writing – Original Draft: [Hina Haq and Saad Shaheed] – Preparation and creation of the initial draft. • Writing – Review & Editing: [Hina Haq, Saad Shaheed and Achim Stephan] – Critical review, commentary, or revision of the work, including preor post-publication stages. Chapter 3 - Published Article Foregrounding Affectivity in the Pathways to Extremism Authored by Saad Shaheed and Hina Haq • Conceptualization: [Saad Shaheed] – Development of research goals and aims. • Data Curation: [Saad Shaheed and Hina Haq] – Collection, organization, and management of data (e.g., interviews, transcripts, notes). • Formal Analysis: [Saad Shaheed] – Application of analysis. • Methodology: [Saad Shaheed] – Implementation of theoretical framework. • Writing – Original Draft: [Saad Shaheed] – Preparation and creation of the initial draft. • Writing – Review & Editing: [Saad Shaheed and Hina Haq] – Critical review, commentary, or revision of the work, including preor post-publication stages. 8 Chapter 4 – Manuscript In Review – Book Chapter The Power of Passion and Nostalgia in Extremism: A Case Study of the Christchurch Mosque Attack Authored by Hina Haq and Ruth Rebecca Tietjen • Conceptualization: [Hina Haq and Ruth Rebecca Tietjen] – Development of research goals and aims. • Data Curation: [Hina Haq] – Collection, organization, and management of data (e.g., interviews, transcripts, notes). • Formal Analysis: [Hina Haq] – Application of analysis. • Methodology: [Hina Haq and Ruth Rebecca Tietjen] – Implementation of theoretical framework. • Writing – Original Draft: [Ruth Rebecca Tietjen and Hina Haq] – Preparation and creation of the initial draft. • Writing – Review & Editing: [Ruth Rebecca Tietjen and Hina Haq] – Critical review, commentary, or revision of the work, including preor post-publication stages. Chapter 5 - Published Article Radicalization from a Societal Perspective Authored by Delaram Shafieioun and Hina Haq • Conceptualization: [Delaram Shafieioun and Hina Haq] – Development of research goals and aims. (This paper draws upon the thesis research of Delaram Shafieion, which itself evolved from a study project originally conceptualized and supervised by Hina Haq) • Data Curation: [Delaram Shafieioun and Hina Haq] – Collection, organization, and management of data (e.g., interviews, transcripts, notes). • Formal Analysis: [Delaram Shafieioun and Hina Haq] – Application of analysis. • Methodology: [Delaram Shafieioun] – Implementation of theoretical framework. • Writing – Original Draft: [Delaram Shafieioun and Hina Haq] – Preparation and creation of the initial draft. • Writing – Review & Editing: [Delaram Shafieioun and Hina Haq] – Critical review, commentary, or revision of the work, including preor post-publication stages. _____________________________ (place, date) _______________________________ (Signature) 9 Abstract This dissertation develops a novel theoretical framework for understanding radicalization and extremism by centering situated affectivity—a perspective that reconceives emotions not as internal mental states but as environmentally scaffolded, relational phenomena. Drawing on philosophy of mind, affect theory, and cognitive science, the work argues that extremist engagement is made possible through affective arrangements—sociomaterial configurations that shape emotional orientations and normalize ideological commitment. These arrangements operate through embodied routines, material affordances, and normative practices that give rise to affective dispositions capable of sustaining radical ideologies. The study shows how both negative and positive emotions—fear, humiliation, pride, nostalgia—are mobilized to forge durable affective ties, which in turn anchor individuals to extremist worldviews and practices. The dissertation consists of six chapters, including three previously published articles. Chapter One offers the conceptual groundwork and an extended case study from Pakistan, illustrating how religious nationalism, educational institutions, and authoritarian statecraft function as affective infrastructures that orient individuals toward rigid and hierarchical modes of belonging. Chapter Two introduces the key mechanisms of affective scaffolding, mind invasion, and self-stimulatory loops, showing how emotions are co-opted and stabilized by extremist milieus. Chapter Three deepens the analysis by examining case studies of digitally mediated radicalization and the affective patterns underpinning online extremism. Chapter Four presents a phenomenological analysis of the Christchurch mosque attack, highlighting the role of sacred passion and nostalgic violence in the formation of extremist subjectivity. Chapter Five critiques dominant counterterrorism approaches by foregrounding the role of racialized marginalization and systemic exclusion in creating affective preconditions for radicalization. Chapter Six summarizes the findings of this dissertation, highlighting how the framework of situated affectivity provides a profound understanding of the affective architecture of extremism while demonstrating its utility as a predictive tool for analyzing societal trajectories toward radicalization and authoritarianism. Across all chapters, the dissertation argues that emotions are not secondary byproducts of ideological transformation but essential structuring forces that enable and sustain it. By framing radicalization as a situated affective phenomenon, the study offers a philosophically rigorous and empirically informed account of the emotional architectures through which extremism is not only justified by those drawn to it but also rendered deeply felt and profoundly lived. Keywords: Situated Affectivity, Radicalization, Affective Arrangements, Extremism, Emotions 16 Similarly, McCauley and Moskalenko's (2008, 2017) "Pyramid Model" presents radicalization as occurring at individual, group, and mass levels. Their framework identifies mechanisms ranging from personal victimization and political grievance at the individual level to group isolation and polarization at the collective level. Despite its multi-level approach, the model predominantly focuses on negative emotional dynamics such as hate and revenge, overlooking the potential role of positive emotions in sustaining commitment to extremist causes. Wiktorowicz's (2005) theoretical framework of cognitive radicalization presents a fourstage processual model that delineates the trajectory through cognitive opening, religious seeking, frame alignment, and socialization. While the model makes significant contributions in conceptualizing the social-psychological mechanisms of radicalization, its primary emphasis remains on cognitive vulnerability and crisis-induced susceptibility. Though it acknowledges the significance of social-organizational dynamics, particularly in the socialization phase, the model's theoretical architecture predominantly focuses on cognitive-behavioral transformations. This limitation reflects a broader tendency in early radicalization models to prioritize cognitive-behavioral mechanisms over the emotional valence of extremist engagement. Silber and Bhatt's (2007) “Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat” also referred as NYPD model (New York Police Department model) presents a four-phase model tracking the progression from pre-radicalization through self-identification, indoctrination, and jihadization. While groundbreaking in its systematic approach to homegrown radicalization, the model primarily emphasizes observable behavioral indicators and ideological progression, offering limited insight into the emotional dynamics that facilitate movement between stages. Each phase describes specific behavioral signatures, but the underlying emotional mechanisms that drive individuals from one stage to another remain underexplored. More recent frameworks offer richer perspectives on the emotional dimensions of radicalization. Webber and Kruglanski's “3N Model” (Kruglanski et al., 2014) examines the interplay between individual Needs (for significance and meaning), Narratives (that justify violence), and Networks (that provide social validation). This model explicitly addresses how positive emotions like the quest for personal significance interact with negative emotions like humiliation and revenge (Kruglanski et al., 2019). Similarly, Hafez and Mullins’ “Four Factors Model” (Hafez & Mullins, 2015) integrates grievances, networks, ideologies, and enabling environments, acknowledging how emotional experiences are embedded within broader social and environmental contexts. Their framework examines how personal and collective 17 grievances intersect with support structures and ideological narratives to create powerful emotional motivators for radicalization (Hafez, 2016). These newer models better capture emotional ecology of radicalization, recognizing how both positive and negative emotions function within broader social, ideological, and environmental contexts to facilitate extremist engagement. They demonstrate how factors like group belonging, quest for significance, and sacred values create complex emotional attachments that sustain commitment to extremist causes beyond mere ideological agreement or grievance-based motivation (Atran, 2016; Kruglanski et al., 2018). Recent developments in the field, particularly van Stekelenburg's (2017) work, have highlighted how emotions in radicalization operate simultaneously at individual, group-based, and collective levels. This multi-level approach begins to bridge the gap between traditional models and a more comprehensive understanding of emotional dynamics in radicalization. Atran's (2016) concept of the “Devoted Actor” further illuminates how sacred values and group devotion, fundamentally positive emotional attachments, drive individuals to extreme actions, explaining behaviors that conventional approaches often struggle to comprehend. While the aforementioned theoretical frameworks have made substantial contributions to our understanding of extremism's psychological and social dimensions, a significant lacuna persists in the literature concerning the role of positive affective states in radicalization processes. The predominant focus on negative affective dimensions, while valuable, provides only a partial view of the complex emotional tapestry that characterizes pathways to extremism. To comprehend how individuals come to embrace and act upon extreme ideologies, we must examine their affective intentionality 1 and its role in structuring experiential worlds (Slaby & Stephan, 2008). For this purpose, we employ the framework situated affectivity, which conceptualizes emotions as actively coupled to the environment rather than as merely internal mental states (Griffiths & Scarantino, 2009). This framework emphasizes how individuals’ emotional experiences are scaffolded by their material and social environments (Stephan et al., 2014). Through this theoretical lens, radicalization emerges as a complex interplay between individual affect and environmental scaffolding, where both positive and negative emotions 1 Affective intentionality refers to the fundamental directedness of emotional experiences towards objects, situations, or states of affairs, whereby emotions are not merely internal states but constitutively involve ways of being oriented toward and making sense of the world (Slaby & Stephan, 2008). This concept emphasizes how our affective states actively structure our perception, understanding, and engagement with our environment rather than simply being responses to it. 18 contribute to the development of an individual’s affective orientation (Slaby, 2014). Understanding this dynamic requires attention not only to isolated emotional states but to the entire affective ecosystem within which an individual's radical perspectives evolve and solidify. IV. Situated Affectivity: A Brief Introduction This section offers a concise overview of the theoretical development of situated affectivity, tracing its origins in situated cognition and establishing a comprehensive framework for understanding the environmental structuring of emotions. Beginning with the foundational work in situated cognition (Suchman, 1987; Lave, 1988), and progressing through the extended mind thesis (Clark & Chalmers, 1998) to contemporary frameworks of situated affectivity (Stephan et al., 2014), situated cognition emerged as a revolutionary framework in cognitive science that fundamentally challenged the traditional computational view of the mind, which treated cognition as abstract information processing occurring solely within the brain. The framework's foundations can be traced to Suchman's (1987) groundbreaking work on situated action and Lave's (1988) studies on cognition in practice, which first demonstrated how cognitive processes are inherently tied to specific social and environmental contexts. These pioneering insights were further developed through Clark's (1997) influential work on embodied cognition and subsequently strengthened by Clark and Chalmers' (1998) extended mind thesis. Rather than viewing cognition as isolated mental computation, situated cognition emphasizes how our thinking processes are inherently tied to bodily experiences, environmental resources, and social interactions. Building upon this theoretical foundation, the situated affectivity framework, systematically developed by Stephan, Walter, and Wilutzky (2014), extends this environmentally embedded understanding to emotional phenomena. Just as situated cognition revealed the environmental scaffolding of thought processes, situated affectivity demonstrates how affective states are constitutively dependent on environmental resources and social dynamics. This framework conceptualizes emotions not as discrete internal states but as dynamic patterns of organism-environment interaction (Griffiths & Scarantino, 2009). The philosophical significance of this approach lies in its reconceptualization of affective phenomena as inherently relational and environmentally constituted rather than merely internally realized. Colombetti and Krueger (2015) further enrich this framework by introducing the concept of “affective niches,” demonstrating how individuals actively manipulate and structure their environment to support specific affective states and regulatory processes. This builds on 19 Gibson’s (1979/1986) ecological psychology, showing how emotional experiences are shaped by environmental affordances and the active exploitation of environmental resources. The framework has been further developed through Slaby’s (2019) work on affective arrangements, which examines how specific sociomaterial settings create and maintain particular patterns of affective experience and behavior. The situated affectivity framework fundamentally challenges the traditional internalist view of emotions as merely private, internal states (Griffiths & Scarantino, 2009). Building upon the insights of situated cognition, Stephan et al. (2014) reconceptualize emotions as extending beyond internal neuronal processes to encompass three interrelated dimensions: a) the morphological and physiological characteristics of the body, b) embodied interaction with the environment, and c) integration with natural, technological, and social contexts. This tripartite structure underscores how affective life depends on the interplay between the agent and their environment, shaped by scaffoldings, that include material resources, social practices, and temporal structures. As von Maur (2021) outlines, scaffolding operates across three key dimensions: the role of the material environment in emotion formation, the ways social practices frame and normalize affective experiences, and the temporal dynamics that organize and sustain emotion episodes over time. These insights reveal that emotions are not merely internal processes but are co-constituted through constant interaction with environmental structures that actively support and shape affective experience. Within this framework, Stephan & Walter (2020) further distinguish between two fundamental ways in which affectivity intertwines with the environment. 1) The “user-resource model” describes how individuals use external resources to enable or regulate affective states, treating the environment as a tool. In contrast, 2) the “mind-invasion model” reflects a deeper integration, where external environmental factors play a significant role in shaping emotional processes, blurring the boundaries between the individual and their environment. Together, these theoretical contributions reveal how emotions are intimately entangled with the environments in which they are enacted, underscoring that affectivity is fundamentally relational and environmentally situated. The theoretical framework of situated affectivity has profound implications for understanding the nature of emotional experience and its relationship to environmental contexts. As Colombetti (2017) argues, emotions should be understood as environmentally extended processes rather than purely internal phenomena, challenging traditional internalist assumptions about the nature of affective states. This reconceptualization suggests that understanding emotions requires attending not just to individual psychological states but to the 20 broader ecological contexts in which these states emerge and are maintained (Stephan & Walter, 2020). Situated affectivity is a working concept that provides a detailed framework for examining the interplay of affective processes in any given context. Chapter Two, discusses how situated affectivity and its key concepts, such as “user-resource interaction” and “mind invasion”, help explain why individuals adopt radical ideologies. In the next section, I explore the broader relevance of this framework by analyzing the affective dimensions of a society. Particularly the directions a society has taken or is likely to take in the future because of the affective shaping 2 of its populace. I will use Pakistan as a case study, drawing upon my personal experiences in my home country to illustrate how the situatedness of individuals impacts their worldview and shapes their affective interactions with the broader social environment. V. Affective Mind Shaping: A Case Study Having left Pakistan in 2016 to study in Germany, I witnessed firsthand how my own perspectives were shaped by the socio-political environment I had grown up in, and how distancing myself from that environment allowed me to question deeply ingrained beliefs that I had previously taken for granted. This realization reinforced my understanding of how an individual’s environment can profoundly shape their affective experiences and thought processes, often without their conscious awareness. In the context of Pakistan, this affective mind shaping through carefully architected affective arrangements has contributed to a growing tendency toward religious extremism—not to the extent of Afghanistan’s struggles, but to a degree where it has become alarmingly easy to justify harassment, violence, or even murder under the guise of defending religious beliefs. The questioning of religious beliefs and leaders has become unacceptable, a phenomenon cemented by Pakistan's repeated imposition of martial law, most notably during the rule of General Zia-ul-Haq (1918-1988). Zia’s regime, characterized by policies now colloquially termed as “Ziaism,” employed religious measures 2 The term “mind invasion,” as used by Slaby (2016), will be replaced here with the term “affective mind shaping” or simply “affective shaping,” as it better captures the concept without the connotations of the word “invasion.” Throughout this dissertation, “affective shaping” and “mind shaping” will be used interchangeably in discussions where the concept of “mind invasion” is addressed. 21 to control the populace under a guise of piety, thereby fostering a society more receptive to fascism. While other nations, such as Iran and Saudi Arabia, exhibit comparable patterns of leveraging religion as a central mechanism of governance to exert control over their populations, Israel provides a particularly striking example of how religious rhetoric is strategically deployed to serve political ends. Israel's political leaders have continuously manipulated religious discord to justify acts of aggression 3 , often invoking ideologically charged terms such as ‘Greater Israel’ and ‘God’s promised land to the Israelites’ religious notion of a divine promise. That has been invoked by Israeli politicians like Bezalel Smotrich 4 and Benjamin Netanyahu, who in public addresses has referenced biblical justifications for retaining territorial control over disputed areas such as the West Bank and East Jerusalem (Lustick, 1993; Pappé, 2006) to legitimize territorial expansion and military campaigns. This rhetoric has provided justification for policies and military actions, including the ongoing atrocities in Gaza, which amount to acts of genocide. However, the scope of this chapter will remain focused on Pakistan: I will explore how dictators and ruling elite in Pakistan have manipulated the socio-political environment to create an affective arrangement which is constantly maintained and fueled with religious rhetoric. This results in the affective shaping of Pakistan populace and nudged them further toward fascism. a. Affective Arrangements and Religious Zealotry Affective arrangements 5 are dynamic configurations of material, symbolic, and social elements that interact to modulate emotions and affect (Slaby, Mühlhoff, & Wüschner, 2019). These 3 Here are some studies for the reference: 1) Sternhell, Z. (1998). The founding myths of Israel: Nationalism, socialism, and the making of the Jewish state. 2) Pappé, 2006, "The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine", examines the historical and ideological basis of Israeli territorial expansion. 3) Lustick, 1988, "For the Land and the Lord", specifically addresses religious justifications in Israeli politics. 4 Recent political rhetoric from figures like Bezalel Smotrich, as cited by reputable news outlets, such as Smotrich says “there’s no Palestinian people There’s no such thing as a Palestinian people. This land belongs to the people of Israel—we are fulfilling the promise of the Torah here.” Magid & Berman, 20th March, 2023 (The Time of Israel). Benjamin Netanyahu’s statements: “In our time we returned to Hebron. We did so because this is our patrimony. This is our homeland, and it will always remain part of the State of Israel." (Jerusalem Post, 2017), "Jerusalem has been the capital of the Jewish people for 3,000 years. It’s mentioned in the Bible hundreds of times. Jerusalem is our capital. It’s mentioned in the Bible — the Bible" (PBS NewsHour, December 6, 2017, speech following the U.S. recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital). 5 Chapter 3 thoroughly explores the concept of affective arrangements and its relevance to understanding extremism. 22 arrangements do not simply emerge organically but are intentionally established to guide emotional responses, perceptions, and behaviors in ways that serve specific goals. Religious, cultural, and political contexts can all serve as sites for these arrangements, embedding principles into collective consciousness in ways that feel natural but are deeply manipulative. When we look at the religious zealotry in Pakistan, some affective patterns emerge which point towards the direction the people has taken in term of religious fanaticism. Pakistan is a country that came into existence on religious basis. Before the independence in 1947, the Muslims of the Indian subcontinent believed that it would be difficult to maintain their religious freedom under the Hindu-majority leadership of united India. This ideology, commonly referred to as the Two-Nation Theory, posited that Hindus and Muslims were two distinct nations, with different religions, cultures, and social practices, necessitating separate states (Razi, 2014; Ahmed, 1988). During the struggle for independence, slogans and symbols based on religion became rallying cries for the Muslim cause. One iconic slogan was “Pakistan Ka Matlab Kya? La Ilaha Illallah” (What does Pakistan mean? There is no god but Allah). This slogan, coined by Professor Asghar Sodai in 1944, became a powerful emotional and affective tool, uniting Muslim masses in their pursuit of a separate homeland (Ayres, A. 2009). It was not just a political statement but a deeply emotional and religious assertion that tied the very existence of Pakistan to Islam. This slogan, which once ignited passion during the independence movement, continued to define the identity of Pakistan after gaining independence in 1947. Growing up in Pakistan, I heard it frequently, at national celebrations, in poetry, and in patriotic songs, without critically reflecting on its implications. It was only after moving to Germany and engagement with the framework of situated affectivity that I realized how deeply this slogan and others like it had shaped my worldview, as well as the collective mindset of an entire nation. Situated affectivity explains how environments and social structures create emotional conditions that shape individuals’ thoughts, beliefs, and identities (Slaby, 2016). In this case, the slogan directly ties the identity of Pakistan to Islam, creating an emotional and cognitive framework where being Pakistani is equated to being Muslim. This slogan was important and provided a strong affective scaffold for the Muslims in united India to come together and fight for their freedom. But now after 78 years of independence this slogan is still being used to define Pakistan. This raises significant implications for minorities. If the meaning of Pakistan is equated with Islam, what space does that leave for the non-Muslim citizens? For a minority person, this 23 slogan does not evoke pride or inclusion but exclusion 6 . For a non-Muslim citizen, the slogan “The meaning of Pakistan is: There is no God but Allah” directly clashes with the religious beliefs and identity of non-Muslims. While it serves as a powerful emotional rallying cry for the Muslim majority, it alienates minorities by implicitly defining the nation through an explicitly religious framework. Though this exclusionary rhetoric contradicts the constitutional promise laid out in Article 20 of the 1973 Constitution, which guarantees that non-Muslims in Pakistan must have the freedom to profess and practice their religious beliefs and enjoy equal rights as Muslim citizens. However, in practice, this contradiction lies at the heart of Pakistan’s systemic challenges for religious minorities. The affective atmosphere shaped by slogans, policies, and societal norms often marginalizes those who do not subscribe to the dominant religious identity. The state's legal frameworks further compound this alienation. For example, Pakistan’s constitution explicitly restricts the presidency and prime ministership to non-Muslims. Now we have a religious based slogan defining a country’s identity, which is further supported by the laws like limiting the religious minorities from achieving highest ranks in the country. Measures like these embed structural discrimination, marginalizing minorities and signaling their inferior status within the state (Shah, 2014; Razi, 2014). This is just one small part of a rather large affective arrangement which Pakistani ruling elites created to control and maintain power. After the end of government of Bhutto (1973-1977), who introduced the law of limiting minority’s role in government, the dictator Zia ul Haq took over. One of the clearest examples of religious manipulation comes from General Zia-ul-Haq, whose “Islamization” policies profoundly shaped Pakistan’s legal and political frameworks. During his regime (1977–1988), Zia implemented a series of amendments in the constitution of the country. Embedding religion further into the legal system to consolidate his power and strengthen his Islamic credentials. One example of his “Islamization” attempt was the changing in blasphemy laws. Previously, blasphemy laws existed in colonial-era legal codes but were rarely enforced. However, Zia introduced harsher penalties and directed them specifically toward safeguarding Islam, significantly changing their scope and application. 6 Chapter 5, “Radicalization from a Societal Perspective,” delves deeply into how society can systematically marginalize and exclude certain individuals, creating environments of alienation and disenfranchisement. 24 Under Zia’s regime, several provisions were inserted into the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC), making the blasphemy laws far more severe. Some of these amendments include: • Section 295-B (1982): Prescribed life imprisonment for defiling the Quran. • Section 295-C (1986): Made derogatory remarks against the Prophet Muhammad a capital offense, punishable by death or life imprisonment. Here Section 295-C, which entails that any person who uses derogatory remarks, spoken or written, or by visible representation, or by any imputation, innuendo, or insinuation, directly or indirectly, against the Holy Prophet Muhammad, shall be punished with death or imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to a fine. Now this clause is defined in a manner which makes accusing anybody of blasphemy very easy. Any gesture or words can be translated as blasphemy. These changes formalized stringent measures to punish any perceived insult toward Islam or Islamic symbols. Ostensibly introduced to protect the sanctity of the religion, these laws soon became tools for societal persecution. Zia’s blasphemy laws, while targeting religious dissent, cultivated hostility toward nonMuslims, institutionalizing their marginalization. These laws disproportionately affect religious minorities, including Christians, Hindus, and Ahmadis. Ahmadis are targeted even more specifically due to the Ordinance XX of 1984, which criminalized their identification as Muslims or their use of Islamic terminology in worship or religious practices (Shah, 2014). False accusations frequently spiral into mob violence, with people taking the law into their own hands due to their deep emotional investment in “protecting” Islam. This affect shaping is the result of years of systematic manipulation. However, the laws are not only used to target non-Muslims. Even Muslims fall victim to these laws, often in intracommunal disputes, such as conflicts between different sects. Accusations of blasphemy are used to suppress critics, resolve political differences, or settle personal vendettas. The case of Salman Taseer, the Governor of Punjab who was murdered by his bodyguard in 2011, demonstrates this strikingly. Taseer was assassinated for defending Asia Bibi, a Christian woman falsely accused of blasphemy. His bodyguard, Mumtaz Qadri, shot him and justified the killing based on religious grounds. Qadri was celebrated as a hero by segments of the population, illustrating the extent to which blasphemy laws have fostered a culture accepting of extrajudicial violence (Julius. 2016). This public celebration of murder demonstrates how deeply these laws have shaped societal attitudes, creating an environment where violence in the name of religious protection is not only accepted but glorified. 25 b. A Climate of Fear and Hostility Zia-ul-Haq’s blasphemy laws represent a key mechanism through which the state creates an affective arrangement designed to control societal behavior and maintain power. By criminalizing perceived religious offenses, these laws have instilled a pervasive climate of fear and hostility. In this context, the law operates not only as a legal framework but as an instrument of intimidation, embedding repression within the collective consciousness. The drastic increase in blasphemy cases following Zia’s reforms, which escalated from a mere 11 cases (resulting in 3 deaths) between 1947 and 1986 to 1403 cases (86 deaths) from 1987 to 2021 (Nafees, 2021), underscores the efficacy of such arrangements in quashing free speech and use fear as controlling agent. However, the impact of Zia’s regime extends beyond blasphemy laws; it encapsulates a broader agenda of Islamization that permeated educational systems through the integration of religious content in school curricula. Under Zia’s 1979 education policy, textbooks were significantly revised to glorify Islamic ideology, presenting it as superior and indispensable for societal transformation. This included the incorporation of Quranic verses and literature that emphasized the virtues of Islamic governance and the historical triumphs of Islam. The impact of this affective arrangement is a shaping of individual ideologies through the fusion of religious identity with civic duty, achieved through zealous pronouncements, legal frameworks including blasphemy statutes, and education infused with ideological content. Together, these elements foster a climate of fear that suppresses critical thought and free expression, ultimately encouraging religious fanaticism and promoting social obedience over independent thinking. Consequently, this arrangement silences criticism of both the laws and broader state policies, framing any dissent as an affront to religion itself. In a society where questioning religious authority can lead to death threats, individuals learn from a young age to internalize this fear. This conditioning perpetuates through generations, transforming Pakistan’s legal and social landscape into one where religious fascism prevails under the guise of faith protection, systematically eroding the fundamental rights and security of all citizens, regardless of their religious affiliations (Rumi, 2018; Khan, 2020). c. Shaping of Women Image: Religious and Patriarchal Control General Zia-ul-Haq’s regime (1977-1988) in Pakistan had a profound impact on the lives of women, particularly through the implementation of conservative Islamic policies that reshaped 32 cycles of violence and oppression, where claims to faith justify actions as extreme as attacks on schoolchildren or the prohibition of girls’ education. The intergenerational transmission of such manipulated affect plays a significant role in the normalization of violence and systemic discrimination in societies. g. The Unfortunate Continuation of Affect Shaping Such unfortunate affect shaping and the ever evolving affective arrangements are still going on. The perpetuation of affective arrangements in Pakistan manifests most powerfully in contemporary military leadership, where religious rhetoric and institutional violence create sophisticated mechanisms of control (Ahmed, 2014). General Hafiz Syed Asim Munir, appointed Chief of Army Staff in November 2022, embodies this convergence of religious authority and military power. His strategic deployment of religious titles, ‘Hafiz’ and ‘Syed’, constructs a dual legitimacy, combining military authority with claims to both Quranic knowledge and prophetic lineage. Creating powerful affective resonances in Pakistan's religiously sensitized society, Munir persistently employed these titles and his memorization of the Quran to portray himself as someone of higher standing compared to regular Muslims. His frequent invocation of Quranic verses in his speeches and his deliberate use of Arabic, a language regarded as sacred in Pakistani Islamic discourse, exemplifies how affective arrangements rooted in religious linguistics are strategically employed to consolidate authority. By quoting Quranic scripture in Arabic, a language revered for its association with divine revelation yet inaccessible to a majority of the population beyond surface understanding, Munir leverages both the aura of sacredness and the perception of intellectual authority. Arabic, carries an intrinsic weight that transcends the immediate semantic value of the words themselves, particularly within religiously devout societies like Pakistan (Gade, 2004). The act of reciting verses in Arabic, followed by their translation into Urdu, functions not merely as a communicative gesture but as a performative enactment of power, one that situates Munir as both a vessel of divine knowledge and a guide for national moral consciousness. Munir’s December 2023 speech offered a compelling illustration of how religious discourse is manipulated to quell modern opposition. He stated that “those disseminating misinformation about state institutions are not only digital terrorists but also adversaries of Islam, given that truth is fundamental to the faith”. This declaration, supported by selective Quranic verses about spreading discord (fitna), exemplifies the military’s sophisticated manipulation of religious sentiment to criminalize criticism. He also uses terms like “Khawarij,” which refers to those who leave Islam. In Pakistani society, there is a widely held 33 belief that anyone who abandons Islam, an apostate, should be killed. By invoking the term “apostate” in a society already shaped by previous dictators and civil governors who have promoted the idea of defending religion through violence, it is equivalent to places a bounty on someone’s head. This rhetoric not only incites fear but also legitimizes acts of violence against those deemed to have strayed from the faith. The immediate material consequences of such rhetoric manifest in violent suppression: during the November 2024 protests in Islamabad, military forces deployed snipers on rooftops and used live ammunition against unarmed civilians, who were protesting against the regime. This resulted in multiple deaths. Between 2018 and 2023, over 2,000 cases of enforced disappearances were reported, with journalists, activists, and social media critics particularly targeted (Pakistan Press Foundation, 2024). This is the same strategy employed by Zia, who implemented policies that advanced religious ideologies in such a way that suppressing dissenters not only received legal protection but also gained societal acceptance. Individuals who engaged in repression were often viewed as defenders of religion and society, safeguarding against those perceived as morally corrupt. This allowed for a culture of intolerance and violence to flourish under the guise of righteousness. The affect shaping extends beyond direct violence into the realm of digital surveillance and religious regulation. When Pakistani citizens attempted to circumvent social media restrictions through Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), Munir orchestrated religious legitimation for digital control. The Pakistan Sharia Council’s subsequent fatwa (religious decree or ruling ) declaring VPN usage “un-Islamic” demonstrates how affective arrangements operate through multiple institutional layers, creating environments where technological resistance becomes equated with religious transgression. These mechanisms of control operate within what we might term an “affective ecology of fear,” where religious authority, state violence, and social control interweave to create self-reinforcing systems of oppression (Massumi, 2015; Slaby, 2019). The outcome is a social structure in which challenging authority becomes not just hazardous but also a sacrilege, thereby establishing significant psychological obstacles to resistance that surpass mere political trepidation. VI. Affective Arrangements as Predictors of Societal Direction Societies do not drift into fascism or authoritarianism abruptly; they traverse affective journeys shaped by meticulously crafted environments that manipulate emotions and sustain hierarchies of control. In Pakistan, decades of authoritarian rule have been masked under the guise of religious morality and bolstered through carefully designed affective arrangements. These 34 arrangements rely on fear, reverence, and obedience as affective agents to regulate individuals’ emotional landscapes and embed patterns of submission as normal and virtuous. This system functions at multiple levels: minorities and women occupy the base of patriarchal hierarchies, controlled by male members of society, who in turn are subjugated by political elites, and ultimately, these elites submit to the overarching authority of Pakistan’s Army, whose power is framed as divinely sanctioned. Such hierarchical configurations are continually enforced through the ritualized invocation of religion as an unquestionable moral shield, providing what Foucault (1980) conceptualizes as “technologies of domination” that transform power into something socially internalized and normatively accepted. The deep entrenchment of such affective systems explains why Pakistanis have historically tolerated authoritarian militarism with striking ease. Since independence in 1947, Pakistan has spent nearly four decades under martial law, with only one democratically elected government managing to complete its term in office. This acceptance is rooted in affective conditioning that begins in childhood. Societal norms teach unquestioning reverence for authority, whether religious, parental, or institutional, instilling a culture that conflates obedience with moral piety. The refusal to question religious authority, enforced in schools and social interactions, becomes a foundational affective habit, which later extends to political and military authority. Ultimately, these affective arrangements produce a population that is not only conditioned to endure authoritarianism but actively defends it when framed as necessary for national or religious security (e.g., Ahmed, 2014; Slaby, 2019). Living outside Pakistan, I, like others who have experienced this affective system firsthand, have had the rare opportunity to critically observe its workings from a distance. Situated in contexts less hegemonized by religious rhetoric, one begins to recognize that the trajectory of a society is often perceptible long before its arrival at a definitive state. The framework of situated affectivity, which reveals how emotions and thought processes are not just private but structured by sociomaterial environments, offers profound insights here. By studying the affective arrangements of a society, one can trace the emotional scaffolding, i.e. fear, reverence, obedience, that predicts whether the society is heading toward authoritarianism, religious fascism, or a more liberal direction. For example, the intergenerational inculcation of unquestioned obedience in Pakistan, coupled with the glorification of religious authority, operates as a feedback loop reinforcing the population's emotional disposition toward acceptance, even celebration, of autocratic power. This predictive potential of affective arrangements highlights their practical relevance beyond philosophical abstraction. By analyzing how norms and values are socially embedded, 35 sustained by material practices (such as laws or educational curricula) and symbolic rituals (like the invocation of Quranic verses), one can identify patterns that indicate whether a society is progressing toward greater inclusivity or deeper exclusion. For Pakistan, this lens reveals a chilling reality: the nation’s affective journey over decades has systematically moved toward religious fascism. The manipulation of religious sentiment to justify brutality and control, whether through military coups, censorship, or targeted violence, has become more than a pattern; it is the fabric of societal experience. Each generation, shaped within this system, inherits not only the norms but also the affective configurations that make oppression seem inevitable and resistance appear illegitimate. Ultimately, the study of affective arrangements, particularly in the context of hierarchical and authoritarian societies like Pakistan, shows us that the trajectory of a nation is neither accidental nor unpredictable. For those of us who have escaped these environments, this distance offers clarity and a lens through which to critique what once seemed normal. The affective shaping of a nation is its emotional history, its joys, fears, reverences, and brutalities, and within that history lies the key to understanding its collective future. In Pakistan’s case, unless these affective arrangements are dismantled, future generations will remain caught in a loop of escalating religiosity entwined with authoritarian rule, oblivious to their own complicity in reproducing these oppressive systems. VII: Situated Affectivity, Society, and Extremism The case of Pakistan, discussed here, offers a powerful example of how the lens of situated affectivity can provide nuanced insights into the role of emotions and affects in shaping societal norms, radicalization, and extremism. Through this lens, we see how policies rooted in religious intolerance not only normalized acts of violence against minorities but also perpetuated a nationalist and so-called “jihadi” narrative constructed by the ruling elites. These narratives were not simply byproducts of domestic governance but deliberate tools used to consolidate power and achieve political goals. In Pakistan’s case, religious zeal and intolerance were systemically cultivated to serve as a moral framework for policies like Zia-ul-Haq’s Islamization, embedding ideas of religious and cultural superiority into the national psyche. Religious intolerance, along with state-approved religious rhetoric, effectively pushed the majority population toward ideological conformity and aligned them with the ruling elite’s objectives. These dynamics were further fueled by the geopolitical alliance between the United States and Pakistan during the Afghan-Soviet conflict, which actively promoted militarized 36 religiosity. By portraying jihad as not only a moral duty but a religious obligation, the U.S. and Pakistan encouraged the radicalization of individuals and normalized militant ideologies, which were sustained by rigid affective arrangements reinforced in educational systems, mosques, and media campaigns. While these efforts achieved their immediate goal of countering Soviet expansion in Afghanistan, they also had catastrophic long-term consequences: the rise of domestic terrorism in Pakistan itself. Groups like Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which carried out relentless violence in the name of religion, emerged as products of the same affective and ideological machinery that had once justified militancy in Afghanistan. This shows how the deliberate manipulation of collective emotions can spiral out of control, creating environments where extremism thrives not only abroad but also domestically. We see how the manipulation of collective emotions through state policies has normalized violence under the guise of religion, leading to a society where extremist acts are perpetuated and justified. Religious narratives enforced through media, education, and public rhetoric create an environment in which intolerance becomes embedded within the cultural fabric, enabling acts of violence to be viewed as morally acceptable. This widespread indoctrination, rooted in the policies of Zia-ul-Haq and further fueled by the U.S.-Pakistan alliance during the Afghan-Soviet war, highlights how deliberate affective arrangements shape societal values and align them with ideological goals. VIII. A Brief Overview of Upcoming Chapters The following chapters form the foundation of this dissertation, each contributing to a deeper understanding of how emotions shape pathways to extremism and radicalization. Chapters 2, 3, and 5 were originally published as standalone peer-reviewed articles in academic journals, while Chapter 4 has been submitted for review as a book chapter in the 7-volume series by Oxford University Press, titled "Extreme Belief and Behavior Series". Together, these chapters integrate seamlessly to build a comprehensive exploration of the affective dimensions of radicalization and extremism. This dissertation aims to advance our understanding of the affective processes in radicalization and extremism cases by employing the framework of situated affectivity, which offers fresh insights into how individual and collective emotions are manipulated to fuel extremist beliefs and behaviors. The in-depth examination of affective manipulation not only provides a better understanding of individual radicalization journeys but also highlights how political and religious elites craft affective arrangements at a societal level to construct 37 narratives and guide populations toward specific ideological directions. In this way, the framework of situated affectivity serves as a powerful tool to investigate the role of emotions and affects in both individual and collective radicalization, while also uncovering the underlying political and social mechanisms that perpetuate extremism. As we continue in the following chapters, this lens will allow us to explore not only the inner workings of extremist groups but also how affective dynamics intersect with broader sociopolitical structures to shape radical ideologies. Chapter 2 advances situated affectivity as a theoretical framework for understanding the complex affective processes of radicalization and extremism. The chapter focuses on both individual and organizational levels of radicalization. On the individual level, we examine how certain affective experiences such as vulnerability, alienation, and anger can create openings for extremist ideologies to take hold, influencing individuals to join radical groups or embrace lone-actor extremism. On the organizational side, we analyze how groups like ISIS, the Taliban, and Al-Qaeda strategically manipulate emotions to recruit and retain members. These extremist organizations create powerful affective platforms where feelings of belonging, pride, and even love are weaponized to draw vulnerable individuals into their ideolog. The theoretical foundation rests on three key conceptual elements: a) Affective Scaffolding: How external environments and structures support and sustain emotions that predispose individuals to extremist ideologies. b) Mind Invasion: How extremist narratives infiltrate individual consciousness, creating deep emotional entanglement with radical worldviews c) Self-Stimulatory Loops of Affectivity (SSLA): How emotional cycles are perpetuated and reinforced within extremist environments, keeping individuals attached to the ideology over time. Through these three concepts, the chapter argues, how radical ideologies penetrate individual consciousness through emotional pathways and how these emotional bonds persist over time. The analysis proves particularly innovative in revealing the deliberate structuring of extremist environments to foster emotional attachment, and the subsequent immersion of individuals within these affective settings. By examining radicalization through both organizational and personal perspectives, the chapter constructs a comprehensive understanding of how emotional and environmental factors interact in the radicalization process. Building upon the foundational framework of situated affectivity introduced in Chapter 2, Chapter 3 expands on this approach by focusing on the concept of affective arrangements. 38 The chapter explores how these arrangements operate across multiple scales, by employing case studies of both lone actors and group-affiliated extremists. This analysis demonstrates how emotions and affects are strategically manipulated to sustain radical ideologies and facilitate violence. The chapter critically examines three extremist case studies. Brenton Tarrant serves as the case study for lone actor extremism, with his manifesto and weapon inscriptions showing how digital spaces and objects function as affective scaffolds for white supremacist ideologies. In contrast, Hoda Muthana and Ibn-e-Umar represent group-affiliated extremism. These latter cases explore how radicalization journeys are shaped through personalized affective bonds and how collective affective arrangements are weaponized to indoctrinate and control individuals within extremist group settings. Through these diverse cases, Chapter 3 underscores the significance of affective arrangements, the dynamic interplay of spaces, objects, discourses, and behaviors, in shaping pathways to extremism. It bridges individual motivations with broader societal dynamics, demonstrating how affectivity functions as both a personal and structural force within radicalization processes, helping to uncover the emotional underpinnings of seemingly incomprehensible actions like committing terror, embracing violence, or sacrificing one's life for a cause. Building on the multi-scalar exploration of extremism in Chapter 3, chapter 4 integrates situated affectivity with critical phenomenology to investigate the role of restorative nostalgia and religious-racial passions in sustaining extremist commitment. Revisiting the case of Brenton Tarrant, the chapter unpacks how a yearning for an idealized past, coupled with intense emotional devotion, generates affective economies that amplify extremist ideologies. Restorative nostalgia, with its longing for absolute truth and tradition, is shown to intersect with fervent zealotry, creating an emotional landscape that validates and sustains acts of violence. This chapter highlights how material artifacts, digital platforms, and ideological narratives operate as affective scaffolds, enabling these emotions to thrive within extremist settings. Through the lens of critical phenomenology, the lived experience and subjective structure of these intense affects are examined in depth, revealing how positive emotional states, such as nostalgia and passion can be central to extremist engagement. By tracing the interplay between these powerful emotions and their socio-political contexts, this analysis offers fresh insights into how extremists use such affective dimensions to justify violence and sustain ideological commitment. 39 Chapter 5 shifts the analytical lens from individual-level pathways to the broader societal dynamics that fuel radicalization, offering a critical interrogation of commonly held counter-terrorism approaches. It challenges the over-reliance on individual profiling and argues instead for a more nuanced understanding of how systemic discrimination and marginalization create affective environments conducive to extremism. By examining post-9/11 governmental policies and the pervasive Islamophobia in Western contexts, the chapter reveals how institutional racism and social trauma shape the emotional trajectories of marginalized communities. Using Ahmed’s concept of “phenomenology of whiteness,” it exposes how structural inequities, and exclusionary practices create affective conditions like shame, humiliation, and alienation, that push individuals toward radical ideologies. The chapter further critiques the media’s role in constructing narrow terrorism narratives that overlook the socio-political underpinnings of extremism. Through interviews with ISIS recruits, the analysis highlights the interplay between societal “push” factors and extremist recruitment strategies, illustrating how collective trauma is weaponized to sustain radical engagement. The discussion emphasizes how social structures orchestrate emotional dynamics, either perpetuating violence or fostering resilience. As the final contribution to this dissertation, it situates extremism within a wider affective ecosystem, demonstrating the urgent need to address these macro-level dynamics to disrupt cycles of radicalization effectively. REFERENCES Ahmed, A. S. (1990). Pakistan: The Social Sciences’ Perspective. Oxford university press. Ahmed, S. (2014). The Cultural Politics of Emotion (Second edition). Edinburgh University Press. Ali, S. S. (2000). Law, Islam and the Women’s Movement in Pakistan. In S. M. Rai (Ed.), International Perspectives on Gender and Democratisation (pp. 41–63). Palgrave Macmillan UK. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-62879-7_3 Atran, S. (2016). The Devoted Actor: Unconditional Commitment and Intractable Conflict across Cultures. Current Anthropology, 57(S13), S192–S203. https://doi.org/10.1086/685495 Ayres, A. C. (2009). Speaking Like a State: Language and Nationalism in Pakistan. Cambridge University Press. BBC News. (2023, December 22). Prevent: Rise in climate activists referred to anti-terror programs. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-67665218 40 Borum, R. (2011). Radicalization into Violent Extremism I: A Review of Social Science Theories. Journal of Strategic Security, 4(4), 7–36. https://doi.org/10.5038/19440472.4.4.1 Burki, S. K. (2016). The politics of misogyny: General Zia-ul-Haq’s Islamization of Pakistan’s legal system. Contemporary Justice Review, 19(1), 103–119. https://doi.org/10.1080/10282580.2015.1101683 Cassam, Q. (2021). Extremism: A philosophical analysis. Routledge. Clark, A. (2001). Being There: Putting Brain, Body, and World Together Again (1. paperback ed). MIT Press. Clark, A., & Chalmers, D. (1998). The Extended Mind. Analysis, 58(1), 7–19. https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/58.1.7 CNN. (2020, July 25). Trump is calling protesters 'terrorists.' That puts him in the... https://www.cnn.com/2020/07/25/politics/us-protests-trump-terrorists-intl Coll, S. (2005). Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001. Penguin Books. Colombetti, G. (2017). The Embodied and Situated Nature of Moods. Philosophia, 45(4), 1437–1451. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-017-9817-0 Colombetti, G., & Krueger, J. (2015). Scaffoldings of the Affective Mind. Philosophical Psychology, 28(8), 1157–1176. https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2014.976334 Da Silva, C., Amadio, N., Domingo, B., Sarg, R., & Benbouriche, M. (2024). The Significance Quest Theory and the 3N Model: A Systematic Review. Canadian Psychology / Psychologie Canadienne, 65(1), 58–70. https://doi.org/10.1037/cap0000364 Davis, Craig. (2002). “A” Is for Allah, “J” Is for Jihad. Duke University Press, 19(1), 90–94. Fair, C. C. (2008). The Madrassah Challenge: Militancy and Religious Education in Pakistan (1. ed). United States Inst. of Peace Press. Foucault, M., & Gordon, C. (1980). Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977 (1st American ed). Pantheon Books. Full transcript: President Trump’s Jerusalem announcement. PBS NewsHour. (2017, December 6). PBS NewsHour. https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/full-transcriptpresident-trumps-jerusalem-announcement Gade, A. M. (2004). Perfection Makes Practice: Learning, Emotion, and the Recited Qurʼān in Indonesia. University of Hawai’i Press. 41 Gibson, J. J. (2013). The Ecological Approach To Visual Perception (0 ed.). Psychology Press. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203767764 Griffiths, P., & Scarantino, A. (2001). Emotions in the Wild: The Situated Perspective on Emotion. In P. Robbins & M. Aydede (Eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition (1st ed., pp. 437–453). Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511816826.023 Grist. (2021, March 31). The term 'eco-terrorist' is back and it's killing climate activists. https://grist.org/article/the-term-eco-terrorist-is-back-and-its-killing-climateactivists/ Hafez, M. M. (2016). The Ties that Bind: How Terrorists Exploit Family Bonds. 9(2). https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-ties-that-bind-how-terrorists-exploit-family-bonds/ Hafez, M., & Mullins, C. (2015). The Radicalization Puzzle: A Theoretical Synthesis of Empirical Approaches to Homegrown Extremism. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 38(11), 958–975. https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2015.1051375 Haqqani, H. (with Carnegie Endowment for International Peace). (2010). Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Hogg, M. A., & Adelman, J. (2013). Uncertainty–Identity Theory: Extreme Groups, Radical Behavior, and Authoritarian Leadership. Journal of Social Issues, 69(3), 436–454. https://doi.org/10.1111/josi.12023 Human Rights Watch. (2019, November 28). Targeting Environmental Activists With Counterterrorism Measures. https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/11/29/targetingenvironmental-activists-counterterrorism-measures-abuse-law Ivaskevics, K., & Haller, J. (2022). Risk Matrix for Violent Radicalization: A Machine Learning Approach. Frontiers in Psychology, 13, 745608. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2022.745608 Jahangir, A., & Jilani, H. (2003). The Hudood Ordinances: A Divine Sanction?; A Research Study of the Hudood Ordinances and their Effect on the Disadvantaged Sections of Pakistan Society. Sang-e-Meel Publ. Jalal, A. (2017). The Struggle for Pakistan: A Muslim Homeland and Global Politics (Bilingual edition). Belknap Press. Jensehaugen, J. (2008). Pappe, Ilan, 2006. The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine. Oxford: Oneworld. 320 pp. ISBN 1851685553. Journal of Peace Research, 45(1), 124–124. https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433080450010810 48 2018). They are usually combined with moral outrage and feelings of revenge (e.g., McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008; Sageman, 2008; Schmid, 2013). Radical groups make use of the factors mentioned above to their advantage in order to influence their followers to build an affective bond with the group and its ideology, which results in mobilizing the recruits to act extremely and violently. In sociology, Social Movement Theory (SMT) is an important theoretical framework which is applied to explain radicalization. SMT focuses on broader dynamics and processes of political mobilization leading to radicalization, in which individuals and groups are driven by political goals and rational agents (e.g., Della Porta, 1992; Wiktorowicz, 2005; DalgaardNielsen, 2008; van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2010; Beck & Schoon, 2018). Social movement theory, in the context of protest events and campaigns, explain the roles of emotions, which can be generally applied to radicalization and provides an important contribution to understanding emotions in radicalization. Organizations and social movements specifically arouse and use multiple emotions in social networks that play a key role in enabling or inhibiting mobilization for their causes and also sustain a commitment to a cause (e.g., Lofland & Stark, 1965; Khawaja, 1993; Nepstad, 2004; Benski, 2010; Jasper & Owens, 2014; Van Ness & Summers-Effler, 2018). We agree with several of the aforementioned approaches that emotions play an important role in radicalization. In particular, they are key elements in establishing a dynamic affective bonding between a radical group and its followers. It is our goal to better understand how radical groups use a variety of external tools to attract new members, retain them, and direct them to violent actions. To do so we will apply the framework of situated cognition and affectivity (see next section) which is a recent development in cognitive science. In contrast to older (internal) approaches to the human mind it explicitly comprises environmental factors as key components of (cognitive and) affective processes. When we focus on the vital role affectivity plays in the process of radicalization, we do this without downplaying other factors that drive recruitments, such as the psychological, social and political factors mentioned above. But we take it as desideratum to investigate particularly the emotional bond between radicalized persons and the groups they belong to, to investigate how such affective bonds between recruits and radical organizations develop and how this supports radicalization, which 49 might prove to be helpful for developing counter radicalization measures.11 Our analysis will help to understand both how radical groups use emotions to influence people and what kind of emotional vulnerability and receptivity makes a person ready to join a radical group and stay committed to it. In that sense, the affective bonds that radical groups develop with their recruits can be accounted for from two main perspectives, that is, an organizational perspective, and a personal perspective. From the organizational perspective, radical organizations structure themselves to provide affective and social platforms for young individuals to connect with the organization and its ideology. Such organizations provide their recruits with a well-developed structure and system, which facilitate them to generate positive feelings such as strength, trust, pride, and belongingness within the group, and to generate negative feelings such as hate, anger, and disgust towards an outgroup, to mention the important ones. From the personal perspective, a recruit joining the organization develops an affective bonding with the organization itself. The more that the recruits are exposed to the ideology and objectives of the radical group, and the more they start relating to it, the more their emotions develop in line with the goals of the group. The same holds true for training rituals and other activities within an organization, which gives a further boost to the affective bonding. This bond keeps the recruit in a specific and long-lasting affective state, which leads them towards a deeper involvement in that organization. In contrast to already established views that mainly address negative emotions such as humiliation, fear, hate, anger, guilt, contempt, and disgust (e.g., Lindner, 2001; Bar-Tal et al., 2007; Wright-Neville & Smith, 2009; Feddes, Mann & Doosje, 2012; Baele, Sterck, & Meur, 2014; Matsumoto, Frank & Hwang, 2015; Baele, 2017; van Stekelenburg, 2017), we would like to also stress the importance of positive emotions, which in combination with negative emotions play a vital role in paving the path to radicalization. A radical organization in its ideology provides its followers with various positive emotions such as hope for a better future, pride of belonging to a certain group or religion, feeling of power as being member of a strong and feared group, and love for the radical ideology and those who follow it, fostering a sense of brotherhood among the members of the group. These positive emotions serve as strong pullfactors in recruitment. The manipulation of emotions in different combinations, including both 11 This move finds backing also by research in industrial-organizational psychology, where researchers have found that affective commitment, which is the strongest type of bonding, supports an enduring attachment to a company (Allen & Meyer, 1990; Mercurio, 2015). 50 the positive and the negative, by radical groups direct the thoughts and actions of followers and recruits. Therefore, love for the radical group and hate for the outgroup goes side by side (e.g., Brewer, 1999). If we look at the case studies of radicalized individuals, positive emotions are also at work and may even occur before the rise of negative emotions which lead towards violent actions. For example, a former fighter for ISIS named Younes (Michael) Delefortrie came back to Belgium from Syria. According to a report on a series of interviews with radicalized individuals by Speckhard, Shajkovci and Yayla (2018), Delefortrie was raised by an alcoholic and violent mother. He was introduced to Islam by second-generation Moroccans settled in Belgium, having strong family ties. Delefortrie felt it appealing that the religion bans alcohol. He later joined a radical Salafi organization named ‘Sharia for Belgium,’ where he felt encouraged to undertake complete Salafi lifestyle, including that of Jihad. Eventually he travelled to Syria in 2013 to practice Islam. However, he returned to Belgium after spending five weeks in Syria to escape battleground and reunite with his wife. After the return, he felt disillusioned with his troubled life in Belgium and expressed his desire to return to Syria in his interview with the authors. Delefortrie idealized the ISIS ‘Caliphate’ and hoped for it to extend to Brussels (Yayla & Speckhard, 2016; Speckhard, Shajkovci, & Yayla, 2018). His case illustrates how radical groups are successful in instilling hope, pride and ingroup love in their followers in the first place, and creating a strong affective bonding with their recruits by providing affective support which was not available in other societies. Before we start analyzing the recruitment and retention strategies of radical groups, mainly the ISIS and the Taliban, and how members bond to them, we introduce the theoretical framework of situated affectivity, in particular the notions of affective scaffolding, mind invasion, and self-stimulatory loops of affectivity. These three notions help us to understand how environmental structures effect emotions in general, and, in particular, they highlight the affective settings intended by recruiting organizations, and also the immersive influence these settings have on the individuals. SITUATED AFFECTIVITY AND AFFECTIVE SCAFFOLDING In order to understand the influence of environmental structures on individuals and their reciprocal influence, philosophical accounts which are extrapolations of so-called ‘situated’ cognition (Walter, 2014) offer a promising framework. The central thesis of situated cognition is that cognitive processing is not solely an intracranial affair, but that it can be, and often is, supported by extracranial ‘tools’ which ease and simplify cognitive tasks. These tools can be, 51 for example, the morphological and physiological characteristics of our body (embodied cognition), but also our embodied interactions with an appropriately structured natural, technological or social environment (embedded or extended cognition). During recent years, researchers have expanded the debate about situated cognition to the affective domain to investigate to what extent extrabodily factors contribute to our affective life—though not in the trivial sense that most of our emotions are triggered by environmental stimuli in a certain context (e.g., Griffiths & Scarantino, 2009; Colombetti, 2014; Krueger, 2014; Stephan, Walter, & Wilutzky, 2014; Colombetti & Krueger, 2015, Colombetti & Roberts, 2015, Wilutzky, 2015; Slaby, 2016). The idea of environmental scaffolding,12 which can be traced back to the work of Lev Vygotsky, was reintroduced by Andy Clark to comprise as scaffolds all sorts of environmental structures that can be used for enabling or facilitating certain cognitive tasks (Clark, 1997). In this broad sense, it also applies to various affective processes. We will principally distinguish two different, albeit interconnected, types of affective scaffolding—ways in which our affective life is essentially a matter of more or less intimate dependencies and interdependencies between us and our natural, technological, and social environment. The first type are so-called user-resource interactions; they have been in the center of attention in the early contributions to situated affectivity, the second type is so-called mind invasion (cf. Stephan and Walter 2020, §§ 3 and 4), which entered philosophy of emotions rather recently, whereas social psychologists studied such phenomena under different terminology before (e.g., Parkinson 1995). Among the user-resource interactions, we distinguish cases (a) with unidirectional material tools for emoting, which are used when we exploit environmental resources in order to regulate our affective life (e.g., visit places that mean something to us, choose music, furnish our apartment)—a strong and relatively permanent example would be the decision to live in a caliphate, 12 For those already familiar with the framework of situated cognition and affectivity, it might suffice to say that we use the term „affective scaffolding“ instead of “embedded” and “extended affectivity”, the distinction of which we no longer take to be promising in empirical contexts (cf. Stephan 2018; Stephan and Walter 2020). Our move is also supported by Kim Sterelny’s claim that the most plausible cases for the extended mind hypothesis are merely “limiting special cases of scaffolded minds,” thus depriving the extended mind paradigm of its heuristic potential, since it “obscures rather than highlights both the continuities and the differences amongst external resources and their contributions to cognitive competence” (Sterelny 2010, p. 473). 52 (b) with strongly coupled and integrated material tools for emoting, which are used to enact some kind of self-stimulating activity that has been set in place and maintained over time in order to move into a certain emotional process (e.g., a deeply mourning musician whose playing sets up a mutually constraining cycle of affective responding and expression)—many activities taken by members of radical groups afford such kinds of self-stimulatory affective loops (e.g., listening to nasheeds, a form of vocal music that is used to enhance hate towards an outgroup, immersing in social media supporting extreme ideology, engaging in training rituals and learning the use of weapons), (c) with transiently coupled social tools for emoting, which are used when actors choose other people as ‘tools’ for living out or regulating their emotions (e.g., aggressors who provoke others to enter into a fight, confessors who aim at relieving their sorrows through interaction with a priest)—the life of radicals offers several occasions of such a type (e.g., taking conquered women as sex slaves, giving young recruits an outlet for aggressive impulses by allowing them to punish prisoners), (d) affectivity instantiated by strongly coupled social systems, when they enact certain types of emotional dynamics over and over again (e.g., old couples enacting cycles of mutual soothing and loving, or cycles of one partner sulking, the other trying to reconcile)— strong social couplings develop both internally among members of radical groups and externally via social media between members of radical groups and followers abroad, (e) with coupled social tools for changing the emotional mind-set, where someone is intentionally looking for another person as a ‘tool’ for modifying her life and mood in order to transform her affective response repertoire in general (e.g., seeking a psychotherapist to work with)—when, for example, someone explicitly volunteers a radical group to get orientation for changing his or her mind and life. The various types of user-resource interactions, which in the case of radicalization support the affective bonding between a group and its members, present corresponding instantiations of the personal perspective. Often it is the group that provides a variety of possibilities for looping effects that enhance the affective bonding of members to their groups through strong social couplings. In that sense the groups perform various sorts of mind invasion. 53 Among the cases of mind invasion, we distinguish13 (f) affective enculturation through strongly coupled social systems, which affects all human being in early and later life spans with particular behavior styles, group norms and emotion regimes (e.g., in early childhood, peer groups, companies)—this holds true for everybody who joins a radical group, and particularly for their children, (g) affective transformation through social media by providing possibilities to interact and keep in touch over long distances, but also by spreading hate speeches with all their consequences, or allowing criminal exchanges in the darknet—social media play an important role in the recruitment of new members from abroad, and in directing specific activities including the building of bombs; they also offer lone actors facilities to develop dynamic relationships with other radicals, (h) tools for manipulating people, which are deliberately launched in order to diachronically modify the attitudes and the emotional set up of the members of a target group (e.g., advertising, political campaigns,)—recruitment and retainment of people for extremist groups. In particular, type (h), which corresponds to the organizational perspective, will be relevant for our analysis of the affective scaffolds provided by radical groups. Whereas some very strong instantiations of (h) might result in what is also known as brain washing, not all types of mind invasion are such cases, not even all (h)-cases. As long as the human faculty of critical thinking and distancing from certain positions is not endangered or undermined, we should not treat all kinds of mind invasion as kinds of brain washing. Even if some activities of radical groups can be treated as cases of brain washing, it does not follow that all kinds of mind invasion they provide are instantiations of brain washing; in many interactions with the group we can find volunteering aspects on the side of the members. We now introduce the notion of mind invasion in more detail by first following Slaby, who coined the term, and then use this perspective to present what extremist groups provide to invade the mind of recruits and members.14 Hereafter, we offer several tools that are used as affective scaffolds by the extremist groups to successfully invade the mind of their targets. 13 Feature (g) affective transformation through social media is not independent from features (f) and (h); it can be part of affective enculturation and it can be used for manipulating people; we introduce it here as a separate feature for analytical reasons. 14 For those coming from situated affectivity the concept of mind invasion is useful, because it shifts the attention away from the user/resource model and it focuses instead on how the user can be “used” (or “invaded”) by the resource (or scaffold). On the other hand, scholars coming from sociology or psychology 54 MIND INVASION IN RADICALISATION Slaby (2016) illustrates the concept of ‘Mind Invasion’ with the example of an intern at her new workplace. She has to learn a lot about the activities in her new work environment, how the colleagues interact on different work-related hierarchies, and how they address each other. She learns how showing certain characteristics in the workplace benefits her, and how exhibiting other characteristics does not. She eventually habituates herself to become a professional in her field and progresses to become a full-time employee where she adheres to the workplace culture in a more natural manner. Something which might have felt alien when she first joined the organization now feels natural to her: for example, the long hours at work, continually staying online, answering e-mails even after office hours, feeling anxiety of falling behind on work-related communications even outside the office hours, the ways in which one is expected to show enthusiasm and eagerness for the work, etc. The organization, as Slaby terms it, ‘hacks the mind’ of the new employee, to the extent that she will come to feel as a part of the organization. Her habits and ambitions merge with, and change, according to the organization’s objectives.15 According to Slaby (2016), organizations structure themselves in a way that influences the affective setup of the individuals working within it; some organizations do this intentionally, while others create this affective environment accidentally. Humans who are inclined to think that they are in pretty good control of their affective life can, therefore, easily underestimate the power of the environment on their emotional repertoire. As it becomes evident from the examples Slaby presents, individuals working within an organizational setup can have their subjectivity hacked through the invasion of their minds by the structuring of the organization. For the context of radicalization, it is important to note that environmental structures can be shaped by radical organizations (as tools for mind invasion), to gradually transform the attitudes and the emotional responses of a target group. Accordingly, via social media radical groups attract followers and influence the mindset of individuals (by (g)), to not only join the (who therefore are familiar with concepts such as enculturation) benefit from mind invasion, because this concept correctly frames the environment as something made of scaffolds and niches. 15 Although what Slaby introduces here as mind invasion, is often referred to as ‘company socialization’ in industrial-organizational psychology (Cooper-Thomas and Anderson, 2006), the term ‘company socialization’ could not easily be extrapolated to cover cases of recruitment and retainment as organized by radical groups. 55 group but also to be drawn to their more extreme and radical ideas. In that sense, mind invasion facilitates what is described as Identity Fusion (Swann, Gómez, Seyle, Morales, & Huici, 2009; Paredes, Briñol, & Gómez, 2018), the phenomenon of an individual feeling ‘fused’ or ‘one’ with a group, and it plays a major role in the structuring of recruitment and retention strategies of radical groups. One of such recruitment strategies is called the funnel (Gerwehr & Daly, 2006). As the term indicates, potential recruits are funneled through a carefully structured transformative process (see (e) and (h) above). They emerge from the process as dedicated members of the radical group. This carefully structured and intended process consists of fusing the identity (Swann et al., 2009) of the recruit with the radical group, hazing rituals, commitment to the radical ideology, and support for achieving the desired goals through violence. These processes result in transforming attitudes and radical polarization in those who successfully follow the whole process along the lines as defined by the radical groups. Not all potential recruits follow the whole process. Even if they drop out before they complete the entire process, the minds of the drop-out recruits may still have been invaded to the extent that these recruits will provide benefits to the radical group through, for example, endorsing a positive image of the group among other potential recruits and even navigate others to enter the process of radicalization (according to (f)). Mind invasion by radical groups is not limited to attract and retain new members. Radical groups spread their ideology and shape vulnerable individuals to adopt the extremist world-view in many ways. For example, in some areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan, the radical group who calls itself Taliban has access to influence people directly via giving religious sermons or running the religious educational institutes, more commonly called Madrassah (pl. Madaris). This access gives recruiters a platform to directly invade minds during early phases of enculturation (see f) with the extreme ideology and narrative which is based on hatred and anger towards the outgroup. One instance of spreading violence-based ideology was the use of an elementary Urdu language book, which was covertly being used as a part of the syllabus in some local (and low-income) schools in Pakistan. These books were also meant to be sent to Madaris and schools in the north-western region of Pakistan which had some radical ideological presence. The book was published between 2005 and 2010. Unlike the English alphabet books where the letter A is represented by an apple and B by a ball, the content of the elementary Urdu alphabets book (being taught to very young children), however, are all about implanting radical jihadi imagery in the young minds. For example, the word and image used to explain the Urdu alphabet ب ‘bey,’ consists of an illustration of a Kalashnikov and the word ‘bandooq’ (gun). For the letter ٹ ‘tay,’ the word used is ‘takrao’ (impact) and an illustration 56 of a plane hitting the Twin Towers in New York is shown. For the letter ج ‘jeem,’ an image of a white jihadi flag and the word ‘jihad’ is used. For the letter خ ‘khay,’ an image of a hunting knife (with blood dripping from it) and the word ‘khanjar’ (knife) is used. For the letter ح ‘hey,’ an image of a woman fully covered in black cloth and the word ‘hijab’ is used. For the letter ذ ‘zey,’ the word used is ‘zunoob’ (sin) and the illustration is that of a bonfire made from a pile containing a TV set, a satellite dish, a board game, and a guitar (Paracha, 2011). Education and curricula based on extreme ideology aim to expose and normalize children to categorical thinking and violence, and results in an us-versus-them mindset. Through repeated lessons based on the extreme syllabus taught in some of the Madaris, the Taliban intentionally immerse children into an environment that teaches them hatred, anger, and disgust towards the outgroup (those who do not follow their interpretation of religion, and are perceived as threat to the sanctity of the religion). In these environments, a child is introduced to the alphabet letter ح‘hey,’ an image of a woman fully covered in black cloth and the word ‘hijab’ along with an illustration of a woman covered completely in black cloths. For the child, the only acceptable way for a woman is when she dressed in a hijab, and any other form of dressing is not acceptable. Along with this kind of radical educational material, the child is also provided with the explanation of how it is sinful for a woman to not properly cover herself, and that she deserves to be punished if she refuses to wear a hijab. Through the Taliban’s interpretation of Islamic law, a woman showing her face to a man who is not related to her is the source of corruption (Gohari, 2000). In a similar manner, the burning image of a guitar in fire is introduced to the child with the word ‘zunoob’ (sin). The child is taught that it is not only bad to listen to or play guitar (or any other kind of music), but rather that the music is a forbidden and punishable sin. This kind of early-age introduction to the radical concepts create a different kind of reality within the minds of children undergoing education in radical organizations. It implies that forcing someone to wear hijab or punishing someone for listening to or playing music is the only acceptable way to live a life. This early enculturation changes the way a child looks at the world. The same holds for the concept of Jihad. The radical milieu (Malthaner & Waldmann, 2014) makes it natural for the child to adopt extremist views. When the child grows up, he or she might not join a radical group, but the radical group has already invaded the child’s mind to the extent that he or she accepts and/or supports the extremist ideology. It can also be seen in the children getting education in ISIS territories (e.g., Olidort, 2016). Children who are exposed to this kind of education might not yet be recruits of the radical group, but their lifestyles and ambitions are already developing in alignment with the parameters of the radical 57 group’s ideology (e.g., Anderson, 2016; Al Bayan Center, 2016; NCTV & AIVD, 2017), which raises additional problems for the countries their parents come from, if they return with their mothers or families and join schools in Western countries. Different radical groups use different strategies to shape vulnerable individuals, depending on their organizational structure and aims. Where the Taliban mainly use their easy access to the religious schools and mosques as a tool of mind invasion, ISIS uses more diverse environmental tools to invade the minds of its followers. One such strategy of ISIS is using different social platforms to create an environment which helps them to spread their ideology (see (g) and (h)). They invade the minds of young people by showing them a glorified and adventurous face of ISIS and by repeatedly providing its followers glimpses of its ideology through various means, including its mass media propaganda (e.g., Winter, 2015b). The use of social media, nasheeds, and video games, for example, as tools of mind invasion, over time facilitates the transfer of followers from a virtual caliphate to an active recruit either as fighter in ISIS claimed territories or as ‘lone actor’ fighters in other countries. For example, one Birmingham-born ISIS member compared his so-called Jihad in Syria with a famous firstperson shooter video game, ‘Call of Duty’ by tweeting; “you can sit at home and play call of duty or you can come here and respond to the real call of duty. The choice is yours” (Kang, 2014). A British foreign fighter of ISIS tweeted that “It’s actually quite fun. It’s really really fun. It’s better than that game Call of Duty. It’s like that but it’s in 3D where everything is happening in front of you” (Klausen, 2015). These tweets with the references of famous video games are reinforced by statements from people who have experienced life under ISIS and describe how adventurous their life seems to be. ISIS uses video games as an external tool to brand itself as being a fun and adventurous organization to join. Through social media postings like these, ISIS members portray the image of the radical group as a powerful and ‘cool’ organization (Vale, 2018). To a young individual looking for orientation, this might look like living the life of a hero participating in a real-life adventure and saving the oppressed from infidels. This also provides a chance to follow an ideology which can transform their prosaic life into a cosmic struggle between good and evil (Kang, 2014). Mind invasion works because it distracts with one thing (for instance, as being a hero) while accomplishing another (that is guiding towards violent radicalization). In addition, ISIS strategically approached young people by providing them a platform to redress the grievances they hold against an outgroup, as well as play their part in building an Islamic community. It provided an opportunity to become a hero and a chance to achieve glory while fighting in a real-life game. With mind-invading strategies like these (e.g., 64 Another resource provided by ISIS is the propaganda material published and aired from time to time, including its newsletters, videos, and audio recordings in the form of speeches of leaders and nasheeds (Islamic hymns). These evoke the hope of living in a caliphate and a desire to help those who are already living there. The propaganda glorifies martyrdom and is also focused on the dehumanization of the outgroup. An interesting aspect in this propaganda is the use of numbers in the newsletters and videos, specifically the ‘Hasaad ul Ajnaad (Harvest of the Soldiers)’ reports which indicate the attack metrics of ISIS, e.g. they tell which subgroup killed how many infidels (Bilger, 2014; Cafarella et al., 2019). This report not only serves as mind invasion but also as SSLA of competition, designed to motivate its followers, inspire them and keep the fear elevated among the outgroup. For lone actor terrorists, SSLAs can also develop as they intentionally subscribe to virtual environments projecting hate, anger, and disgust towards an outgroup. Virtual environments, facilitated by virtual networking with other extremists in chat rooms, such as that of ISIS’s ‘virtual caliphate’ specifically in the Telegram social network website, can ultimately lead to mobilization of members towards radicalization (Bloom, Tiflati, & Horgan, 2019). We find similar patterns in right wing terrorism, where affectively structured virtual environments lead vulnerable minds towards developing loops of negative emotions, which eventually lead them towards violent actions, such as Tarrant’s attack in New Zealand on March 15, 2019. An example of Bangladeshi immigrant Roshonara Choudhry, from the report of Speckhard & Shajkovci (2018), shows how SSLA works in so called lone actors. She was a student at Kings College London. She came across the sermon of Anwar al Awlaki (YemeniAmerican preacher and recruiter for Al-Qaeda) on internet (see (g)) and she started relating to Awlaki’s radical ideas of individual Jihad and his anger against US coalition’s invasion of Iraq. She actively searched for his videos and started withdrawing from the “unbelievers” around her (see (e)). She developed her own affective loop of hate against infidels and how western countries are discriminating Muslims. She even quit university on the claim that one of her school departments is wrongly supporting Israeli brutality against Palestine. After conducting research on which local parliamentarians voted for the Iraq war, she performed her “jihad” by stabbing Labour MP Stephen Timms in his office, twice. This example shows how a person developed her own SSLA. She related to the sermons of Awlaki urging revenge, hate and anger against so-called enemies. She on purpose started avoiding people around her to feed her loops of anger and hate in isolation to the extent that it led her to attempt murder. In this particular case, none of the radical organizations was involved, nor was she contacted by any terrorist 65 organization or their members. In many other lone actor cases, however, radical groups are in contact with the actors, and use media as an environmental tool to spread their messages and manipulate vulnerable minds to act according to the group’s ideology. They invade the minds to the extent that the person develops the desired affective loops own their own. The careful manipulation of environmental tools by radical groups to generating customized SSLAs explain how recruits are retained in the group or are inclined towards the group’s ideology, while maintaining the desired emotional state which helps them to form a strong affective bond with the group and its ideology. CONCLUSION Radicalization is a multi-factor process, and one of the most important of these factors is the affective aspect of radicalization. To understand radicalization, it is important to understand how radical groups or radical organizations manipulate affective aspects of human nature and convince their recruits to willingly commit brutal and violent acts of terrorism. This manipulation of human emotions is not restricted to negative emotions such as anger, disgust, but also includes positive emotions, including power, love, feelings of belongingness. During the process of radicalization, different emotions are addressed in a recruit at the same time; for instance, hate towards an outgroup and love for the ingroup fostering the feelings of belongingness and power within the radical group. Such emotions evolve with time and create a very complex emotional web. In this paper, we have tried to provide the first glimpse of how the framework of situated affectivity (especially the notions of affective scaffolding, mind invasion, and self-stimulatory loops of affectivity) can help us to understand the affective structuring of radicalization. The framework of situated affectivity highlights how radical groups provide affective scaffolding, work on the minds of their recruits, and help recruits to develop certain emotions, which deeply entrench individuals into the ideology of a radical group. The framework of situated affectivity provides a broader range of view on the affective aspects involved in radicalization. It also helps us to understand how radical groups create an environment around their potential recruits that determines who and what these potential recruits will be when they go through continuous, reciprocal, dynamical interactions with the radical groups and its affective environment. Detailing the affective processes give us an opportunity to target those environmental factors and tools which radical organizations are using to lure vulnerable minds towards the violent extremism, and helps in developing counter radicalization measures. 66 REFERENCES Al Bayan Center. (2016). The Cubs of the Caliphate: How the Islamic State Attracts, Coerces and Indoctrinates Children to its Cause. Al Bayan Center for Planning & Studies. Al-Ansari, S., & Hasan, U. (2018). Tackling Terror: A Response to Takfiri Terrorist Theology. Retrieved from Quilliam website: https://www.quilliaminternational.com/shop/e-publications/tackling-terror-aresponse-to-takfiri-terrorist-theology/?cn-reloaded=1 Alava, S., Frau-Meigs, D., Hassan, G., Hussein, H., & Wei, Y. (2017). Youth and Violent Extremism on Social Media: Mapping the Research [UNESCO Report]. Retrieved from United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization website: https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000260382 Allen, N. J., & Meyer, J. P. (1990). The measurement and antecedents of affective, continuance and normative commitment to the organization. Journal of Occupational Psychology, 63(1), 1–18. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2044-8325.1990.tb00506.x Almohammad, A. (2018). ISIS Child Soldiers in Syria: The Structural and Predatory Recruitment, Enlistment, Pre-Training Indoctrination, Training, and Deployment [ICCT Research Paper]. International Center for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT). Anderson, K. (2016). Cubs of the Caliphate: The Systematic Recruitment, Training, and Use of Children in the Islamic State. International Institute for Counter-Terrorism. Atran, S., & Axelrod, R. (2008). Reframing Sacred Values. Negotiation Journal, 24(3), 221– 246. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1571-9979.2008.00182.x Baele, S. J. (2017). Lone-Actor Terrorists’ Emotions and Cognition: An Evaluation Beyond Stereotypes: Lone-Actor Terrorists’ Emotions and Cognition. Political Psychology, 38(3), 449–468. https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12365 Baele, S. J., Sterck, O. C., & Meur, E. (2014). Theorizing and Measuring Emotions in Conflict: The Case of the 2011 Palestinian Statehood Bid. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 60(4), 718–747. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002714550083 Bar-Tal, D., Halperin, E., & de Rivera, J. (2007). Collective Emotions in Conflict Situations: Societal Implications. Journal of Social Issues, 63(2), 441–460. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-4560.2007.00518.x Beck, C. J., & Schoon, E. W. (2018). Terrorism and Social Movements. In D. A. Snow, S. A. Soule, H. Kriesi, & H. J. McCammon (Eds.), The Wiley Blackwell Companion to Social Movements (pp. 698–713). https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119168577.ch40 67 Bélanger, J. J., Caouette, J., Sharvit, K., & Dugas, M. (2014). The psychology of martyrdom: Making the ultimate sacrifice in the name of a cause. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 107(3), 494–515. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0036855 Benski, T. (2010). Emotion maps of participation in protest: The case of women in black against the occupation in Israel. In P. G. Coy (Ed.), Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change (Vol. 31, pp. 3–34). https://doi.org/10.1108/S0163786X(2011)0000031004 Bergen, P. (2019, April 24). What explains rich-kid terrorists. Retrieved May 14, 2019, from CNN website: https://www.cnn.com/2019/04/24/opinions/sri-lanka-terroristseducated-middle-class-bergen/index.html Bilger, A. (2014). ISIS Annual Reports Reveal a Metrics-Driven Military Command. Institute for the Study of War (ISW). Bin Sudiman, M. S. A. S. (2017). IS Distortion of Hijrah: Emigrating For A Lost Cause | RSIS (Commentary No. CO17214). Retrieved from S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University website: https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/icpvtr/co17214-is-distortion-of-hijrahemigrating-for-a-lost-cause/#.XaxdUegzbDc Bindner, L. (2018). Jihadists’ Grievance Narratives against France. International Centre for Counter-Terrorism. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep17482 Blaker, L. (2015). The Islamic State’s Use of Online Social Media. Military Cyber Affairs, 1(1), 1–9. https://doi.org/10.5038/2378-0789.1.1.1004 Bloom, M. (2005). Dying to kill: The allure of suicide terror. New York: Columbia University Press. Bloom, M., & Horgan, J. (2019). Small arms: Children and terrorism. Ithaca [New York]: Cornell University Press. Bloom, M., Tiflati, H., & Horgan, J. (2019). Navigating ISIS’s Preferred Platform: Telegram. Terrorism and Political Violence, 31(6), 1242–1254. https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2017.1339695 Boutz, J., Benninger, H., & Lancaster, A. (2019). Exploiting the Prophet’s Authority: How Islamic State Propaganda Uses Hadith Quotation to Assert Legitimacy. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 42(11), 972–996. https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2018.1431363 Brewer, M. B. (1999). The Psychology of Prejudice: Ingroup Love and Outgroup Hate? Journal of Social Issues, 55(3), 429–444. https://doi.org/10.1111/0022-4537.00126 68 Cafarella, J., Wallace, B., & Zhou, J. (2019). ISISI’s Second Comeback: Assessing the Next ISIS Insurgency. Institute for the Study of War (ISW). Callimachi, R. (2019, March 23). ISIS Caliphate Crumbles as Last Village in Syria Falls. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/23/world/middleeast/isis-syriacaliphate.html Clark, A. (1997). Being there: putting brain, body, and world together again. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Clark, A. (2008). Supersizing the Mind. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195333213.001.0001 Colombetti, G. (2014). The feeling body: Affective science meets the enactive mind. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press. Colombetti, G., & Krueger, J. (2015). Scaffoldings of the affective mind. Philosophical Psychology, 28(8), 1157–1176. https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2014.976334 Colombetti, G., & Roberts, T. (2015). Extending the extended mind: The case for extended affectivity. Philosophical Studies, 172(5), 1243–1263. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098014-0347-3. Cooper‐Thomas, H. D., & Anderson, N. (2006). Organizational socialization: A new theoretical model and recommendations for future research and HRM practices in organizations. Journal of Managerial Psychology, 21(5), 492–516. https://doi.org/10.1108/02683940610673997 Cottee, S., & Hayward, K. (2011). Terrorist (E)motives: The Existential Attractions of Terrorism. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 34(12), 963–986. https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2011.621116 Dalgaard-Nielsen, A. (2008). Studying violent radicalization in Europe. I, I,. Copenhagen, Denmark: Danish Institute for International Studies. Darden, J. T. (2019). Tackling Terrorists’ Exploitation of Youth. American Enterprise Institute. De Leede, S., Haupfleisch, R., Korolkova, K., Natter, M., Carvalho, C., & Masieh, H. (2017). Radicalisation and violent extremism – focus on women: How women become radicalised, and how to empower them to prevent radicalisation. Retrieved from European Parliament’s Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs website: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=IPOL_STU(2017)596 838 69 Della Porta, D. (Ed.). (1992). Social Movements and Violence: Participation in Underground Organizations. Greenwich, Conn.: Jai Press. Feddes, A. R., Mann, L., & Doosje, B. (2012). From extreme emotions to extreme actions: Explaining non-normative collective action and reconciliation. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 35(6), 432–433. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X12001197 Gerwehr, S., & Daly, S. A. (2006). Al-Qaida: Terrorist Selection and Recruitment. In D. G. Kamien (Ed.), The McGraw-Hill Homeland Security Handbook. New York: McGrawHill. Ginges, J., Hansen, I., & Norenzayan, A. (2009). Religion and Support for Suicide Attacks. Psychological Science, 20(2), 224–230. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.14679280.2009.02270.x Gohari, M. J. (2000). The Taliban: Ascent to power. Karachi: Oxford University Press. Griffiths, P., & Scarantino, A. (2008). Emotions in the Wild. In P. Robbins & M. Aydede (Eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition (pp. 437–453). https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511816826.023 Güss, C. D., Tuason, Ma. T., & Teixeira, V. B. (2007). A Cultural-Psychological Theory of Contemporary Islamic Martyrdom. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, 37(4), 415–445. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5914.2007.00347.x Hafez, M. (2016). The Ties that Bind: How Terrorists Exploit Family Bonds. CTC Sentinel, 9(2), 15–17. Hafez, M., & Mullins, C. (2015). The Radicalization Puzzle: A Theoretical Synthesis of Empirical Approaches to Homegrown Extremism. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 38(11), 958–975. https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2015.1051375 Harissi, M. A. (2015, March 7). How ISIS lures recruits from the West. Retrieved November 15, 2019, from https://www.businessinsider.com/afp-promises-of-love-jobs-forforeign-recruits-in-is-utopia-2015-3?IR=T Hogg, M. A., & Adelman, J. (2013). Uncertainty-Identity Theory: Extreme Groups, Radical Behavior, and Authoritarian Leadership: Uncertainty-Identity Theory. Journal of Social Issues, 69(3), 436–454. https://doi.org/10.1111/josi.12023 Hogg, M. A., Kruglanski, A., & van den Bos, K. (2013). Uncertainty and the Roots of Extremism: Uncertainty and Extremism. Journal of Social Issues, 69(3), 407–418. https://doi.org/10.1111/josi.12021 Horgan, J. (2008). From Profiles to Pathways and Roots to Routes: Perspectives from Psychology on Radicalization into Terrorism. The ANNALS of the American Academy 70 of Political and Social Science, 618(1), 80–94. https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716208317539 Jasper, J. M., & Owens, L. (2014). Social Movements and Emotions. In J. E. Stets & J. H. Turner (Eds.), Handbook of the Sociology of Emotions: Volume II (pp. 529–548). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-9130-4_25 Kang, J. C. (2014, September 18). ISIS’s Call of Duty. Retrieved from https://www.newyorker.com/tech/annals-of-technology/isis-video-game Khawaja, M. (1993). Repression and popular collective action: Evidence from the West Bank. Sociological Forum, 8(1), 47–71. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01112330 Klausen, J. (2015). Tweeting the Jihad: Social Media Networks of Western Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 38(1), 1–22. https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2014.974948 Krueger, J. (2014). Varieties of extended emotions. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 13(4), 533–555. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-014-9363-1 Kruglanski, A. (2006). Inside the terrorist mind: The relevance of ideology. Estudios de Psicología, 27(3), 271–277. https://doi.org/10.1174/021093906778965008 Kruglanski, A. W., & Fishman, S. (2009). Psychological Factors in Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Individual, Group, and Organizational Levels of Analysis. Social Issues and Policy Review, 3(1), 1–44. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.17512409.2009.01009.x Kruglanski, A. W., Chen, X., Dechesne, M., Fishman, S., & Orehek, E. (2009). Fully Committed: Suicide Bombers’ Motivation and the Quest for Personal Significance: Significance Quest and Suicide Terrorism. Political Psychology, 30(3), 331–357. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9221.2009.00698.x Kruglanski, A. W., Gelfand, M. J., Bélanger, J. J., Sheveland, A., Hetiarachchi, M., & Gunaratna, R. (2014). The Psychology of Radicalization and Deradicalization: How Significance Quest Impacts Violent Extremism: Processes of Radicalization and Deradicalization. Political Psychology, 35, 69–93. https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12163 Lakomy, M. (2019). Let’s Play a Video Game: Jihadi Propaganda in the World of Electronic Entertainment. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 42(4), 383–406. https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2017.1385903 Lindner, E. G. (2001). Humiliation as the source of terrorism: A new paradigm. Peace Research, 33(2), 59–68. 71 Lofland, J., & Stark, R. (1965). Becoming a World-Saver: A Theory of Conversion to a Deviant Perspective. American Sociological Review, 30(6), 862. https://doi.org/10.2307/2090965 Macnair, L. (2018). Linguistic and Narrative Trends Among Islamic State Videos and Magazines (No. WP # 18-08). Retrieved from Canadian Network for Research on Terrorism, Securtiy and Society website: https://www.tsas.ca/publications/linguisticand-narrative-trends-among-islamic-state-videos-and-magazines/ Macnair, L., & Frank, R. (2018). The mediums and the messages: Exploring the language of Islamic State media through sentiment analysis. Critical Studies on Terrorism, 11(3), 438–457. https://doi.org/10.1080/17539153.2018.1447226 Malthaner, S., & Waldmann, P. (2014). The Radical Milieu: Conceptualizing the Supportive Social Environment of Terrorist Groups. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 37(12), 979–998. https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2014.962441 Matsumoto, D., Frank, M. G., & Hwang, H. C. (2015). The Role of Intergroup Emotions in Political Violence. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 24(5), 369–373. https://doi.org/10.1177/0963721415595023 McBride, M. K. (2011). The Logic of Terrorism: Existential Anxiety, the Search for Meaning, and Terrorist Ideologies. Terrorism and Political Violence, 23(4), 560–581. https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2011.575486 McCauley, C., & Moskalenko, S. (2008). Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: Pathways Toward Terrorism. Terrorism and Political Violence, 20(3), 415–433. https://doi.org/10.1080/09546550802073367 Mercurio, Z. A. (2015). Affective Commitment as a Core Essence of Organizational Commitment: An Integrative Literature Review. Human Resource Development Review, 14(4), 389–414. https://doi.org/10.1177/1534484315603612 Miglani, S., & Pal, A. (2019, April 23). Islamic State claims Sri Lanka blasts, as government says probe making progress. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sri-lankablasts-idUSKCN1RZ06M Moghaddam, F. (2005). The Staircase to Terrorism: A Psychological Exploration. American Psychologist, 60(2), 161–169. https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.60.2.161 Moghaddam, F. M. (2012). The omnicultural imperative. Culture & Psychology, 18(3), 304– 330. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354067X12446230 NCTV, & AIVD. (2017). The Children of ISIS: The indoctrination of minors in ISIS-held territory [Joint Publication]. Retrieved from The National Coordinator for Security 72 and Counterterrorism (NCTV) and The General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) website: https://english.aivd.nl/publications/publications/2017/04/26/thechildren-of-isis.-the-indoctrination-of-minors-in-isis-held-territory Nepstad, S. E. (2004). Convictions of the Soul. https://doi.org/10.1093/0195169239.001.0001 Olidort, J. (2016). Inside the Caliphate’s Classroom: Textbooks, Guidance Literature, and Indoctrination Methods of the Islamic State. Retrieved from The Washington Institute for Near East Policy website: https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policyanalysis/view/inside-the-caliphates-classroom Paracha, N. F. (2011, April 15). The alphabet jungle. Retrieved May 22, 2019, from Dawn.com website: http://www.dawn.com/news/621023 Paredes, B., Briñol, P., & Gómez, Á. (2018). Identity fusion leads to willingness to fight and die for the group: The moderating impact of being informed of the reasons behind other members’ sacrifice. Self and Identity, 17(5), 517–530. https://doi.org/10.1080/15298868.2017.1419503 Parkinson, B. (1995). Ideas and realities of emotion. London: Routledge. Richards, C. (2015, February 5). ISIS: Jordanian pilot burnt to death “after Twitter contest.” Retrieved July 4, 2019, from Mirror website: https://www.irishmirror.ie/news/worldnews/isis-jordanian-pilot-burnt-death-5109004 Safi, M. (2019, April 25). Death toll in Sri Lanka bombings revised down to 253. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/apr/25/death-toll-in-sri-lankabombings-revised-down-to-253 Sageman, M. (2008). Leaderless jihad: Terror networks in the twenty-first century. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. Schmid, A. (2013). Radicalisation, De-Radicalisation, Counter-Radicalisation: A Conceptual Discussion and Literature Review. Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism Studies. https://doi.org/10.19165/2013.1.02 Schmid, A. (2015). Challenging the Narrative of the “Islamic State.” The Hague: International Center for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT). Silber, M. D., & Bhatt, A. (2007). Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat. Retrieved from NYPD Intelligence Division website: http://sethgodin.typepad.com/seths_blog/files/NYPD_ReportRadicalization_in_the_West.pdf SITE Intelligence Group. (2014, July 1). Islamic State Leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi Encourages Emigration, Worldwide Action. 73 Slaby, J. (2016). Mind Invasion: Situated Affectivity and the Corporate Life Hack. Frontiers in Psychology, 7. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2016.00266 Soufan Group. (2015). Foreign Fighters: An Updated Assessment of the Flow of Foreign Fighters into Syria and Iraq. Retrieved from http://www.soufangroup.com/foreignfighters/ Speckhard, A., & Ahkmedova, K. (2006). The Making of a Martyr: Chechen Suicide Terrorism. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 29(5), 429–492. https://doi.org/10.1080/10576100600698550 Speckhard, A., & Shajkovci, A. (2018). 10 Reasons Western Women Seek Jihad and Join Terror Groups. Retrieved from International Center for the Study of Violent Extremism website: https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/terrorism-study/10reasons-western-women-seek-jihad-and-join-terror-groups/ Speckhard, A., & Shajkovci, A. (2019). The Jihad in Kenya: Understanding Al-Shabaab Recruitment and Terrorist Activity inside Kenya—in Their Own Words. African Security, 12(1), 3–61. https://doi.org/10.1080/19392206.2019.1587142 Speckhard, A., Shajkovci, A., & Yayla, A. S. (2018). Defected from ISIS or Simply Returned, and for How Long?—Challenges for the West in Dealing with Returning Foreign Fighters. Homeland Security Affairs, 14, 1–22. Stephan, A., & Walter, S. (2020). Situated Affectivity. In T. Szanto & H. Landweer (Eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Phenomenology of Emotions. London: Routledge. Stephan, A., Walter, S., & Wilutzky, W. (2014). Emotions beyond brain and body. Philosophical Psychology, 27(1), 65–81. https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2013.828376 Sterelny, K. (2010). Minds: Extended or scaffolded? Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 9(4), 465–481. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-010-9174-y Swann, W. B., Gómez, Á., Seyle, D. C., Morales, J. F., & Huici, C. (2009). Identity fusion: The interplay of personal and social identities in extreme group behavior. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 96(5), 995–1011. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0013668 Taylor, M., & Horgan, J. (2006). A Conceptual Framework for Addressing Psychological Process in the Development of the Terrorist. Terrorism and Political Violence, 18(4), 585–601. https://doi.org/10.1080/09546550600897413 80 Individuals who engage in extremism are not solely motivated by hatred, anger, or disgust. Therefore, extreme ideas and actions should not be associated only with negative emotions. Researchers need to bring attention to the positive emotions involved in the pathways to extremism. Positive emotions and feelings, such as pride, love, excitement, interest, and hope, play vital roles. A sense of belonging and purpose that comes with being part of an extremist group can be very appealing, providing individuals with a much-needed sense of identity and meaning in their lives. We can look at suicide bombers as an example. Suicide bombers may be motivated by their belief that their actions serve a greater good and purpose. This motivation may include the defense of their group, their rights, and the pursuit of their political goals. The sacrifice of life is not based only on hatred or anger. It can also be based on positive emotional experiences and hope when understood through the ideology and mindset of the bomber. The act of vengeance can also serve as an illustration of the complexity of extremism and affect, whether on a personal, group, or state level. Vengeance in extreme forms could be perceived as driven by negative emotions. However, there may also be positive emotions associated with the object lost or injured for the person, group, or state seeking vengeance. This can be observed in the case of Brenton Tarrant who carried out mass shootings at two mosques on 15th March 2019, in Christchurch. According to him, one reason for carrying out the shooting was to stand up for the defense of the ‘white’ race, and another was to avenge the death of a Swedish child, Ebba Åkerlund, who was killed in a terrorist attack in Stockholm in 2017. Depending on the environment in which an individual lives, it may even be the case that the individual does not display any intense or dominant emotions at all at the beginning, but that such emotions develop as the individual interacts with a variety of elements and individuals. It is possible for some emotions to remain dormant for a long period, and then become extreme and volatile at other times. It is, therefore, crucial to explore the whole spectrum of emotions and affective processes which may influence an individual and drive their interaction with multiple elements, and in multiple engaging environments (Haq et al., 2020). We need to dissect such interactions, emotions, and explain existing affective processes, how they evolve on the pathways to extremism, what functions these affective processes play, and how environmental structures and tools facilitate an individual to delve deeper into extremism. Designing and applying frameworks that only focus on “terrorist” behavior is not sufficient. It is essential to understand in depth the transition from non-extremism to extremism and on to violent extremism. Consequently, one can understand why some ordinary people 81 sympathize, follow, endorse, act or become engulfed in extremist views. It can also help explain why some individuals are hesitant about endorsing extremist viewpoints initially and end up accepting extremist viewpoints later. Our research aims to apply a framework that is able to address both the transition towards extremism and the complexity of affect. To emphasize this desired richness and depth, and bring affect to the foreground, we employ the framework of Situated Affectivity in analyzing extreme cases. The situated affectivity framework helps us in dissecting the affective bond between an individual and their interaction with elements in their environment. This demarcates the situatedness of affect and helps to broaden the focus to encompass the environmental elements that contribute to an individual’s decision to adopt extremist thought and action. Using the situated affectivity framework, this paper brings affect into the foreground while maintaining compatibility with contributions on emotions and affect from different disciplines. In what follows, we first provide an explanation of affectivity and the situatedness of affect. The latter section of the paper then elaborates with the help of two different examples on how affectivity can be analyzed from different vantage points, and how affective interaction exists in arrangements that facilitate individuals to adopt extremist views. AFFECTIVITY AND SITUATEDNESS Affect is complex and cannot be reduced to one emotion, feeling, or mood. Therefore, it is essential that in the context of extremism, affect should also not be limited to a single experience or to negative emotions. We take affect as an inclusive term, referring to multiple feelings, emotions, and moods that an individual has. In this paper, we explore affect in the context of elements, entities, and factors such as agents, materials, space, and time, as opposed to just being a brain-based phenomenon. In a multitude of instances, affect is intertwined with the various elements that are present within an environment. Individuals are both impacted by and have an impact on actors and other participating elements concurrently (Slaby & Mühlhoff, 2019, p. 31). The affect is mutual, but not necessarily proportionate. Thus, an individual does not exist in a vacuum; instead, they are part of a larger system where their actions impact the environment, which in turn impacts that individual. A person’s decision to adopt extreme thoughts and actions is determined by several push and pull factors. Therefore, it becomes problematic to assume that extremism can only result from negative emotions. Positive and negative emotions both influence an individual’s overall affective state. Multiple emotions are responsible for either driving them to engage in extremism or causing them to withdraw from it. The affect can be explored from the standpoint 82 of the individual by considering their vulnerabilities and dispositions (e.g., Kruglanski et al., 2009, 2014, 2019; Webber & Kruglanski, 2017). Every individual has a unique ‘affective’ biography that is built upon their socio-cultural and historical practices and lifestyles, as well as their socio-economic and cultural backgrounds (von Maur, 2021). Combined with an individual’s affective biography, dispositions contribute to the formation of further affective interactions with elements of their environments. This socio-cultural and historical background and the dispositions that individuals possess influence their affective experiences and how they interact with the environment. As a result, not only does this influence the individual’s affective biography but also the manner in which he or she perceives and interacts with the world, which influences their response on the pathway to or away from extremism. It is here that we come to the concept of the ‘situatedness’ of affect. The central thesis and emphasis of situated affectivity is that affective processing is not simply an individual’s internal state, feeling, or emotion. An individual’s environment can play an important role in supporting or facilitating the processing of affect (Krueger & Szanto, 2016; Stephan et al., 2014; Stephan & Walter, 2020). An element in the environment that facilitates or regulates affect has also been called a scaffold (e.g., Coninx & Stephan, 2021; Stephan & Walter, 2020; Sterelny, 2010; Valentini, 2022). Situated affect in this context is the relational dynamics between an individual and elements in their environment (Slaby & Mühlhoff, 2019). Often, these environmental elements also contribute to our affective lives without our full awareness or intention (Coninx & Stephan, 2021; Slaby, 2016). An individual’s agentive abilities may be enhanced or diminished by these elements both in the shortand long-term (Slaby & Mühlhoff, 2019). The most general examples of situatedness are using a mobile phone to call your loved ones, listening to a song, or watching a favorite video clip to regulate your feelings. The mobile phone is, hence, the element used as a scaffold to generate or regulate an affective experience. The use of a mobile phone before bedtime, however, may unintentionally disrupt the quality and hygiene of our sleep. The purpose of this paper is to examine the affective relationship, or simply the affective bond between an individual and different environmental elements. It is this complex affective bond that, when explored and elaborated, foregrounds affectivity in cases related to extremism as well. These affective bonds can be unidirectional or bidirectional and can also be categorized as user-resource interaction bonds, or as mind-shaping bonds (e.g., Coninx & Stephan, 2021; Haq et al., 2020; Stephan & Walter, 2020). An example of a unidirectional interaction would be listening to music without a reciprocal effect on what kind of music is played next. The listener has no direct control over 83 the music that will be played next on the radio, for instance. However, the affective bond becomes bi-directional if there is a reciprocal effect on what music one chooses next, and this in turn helps one to become more deeply engaged in an affective experience. Essentially, a choice of music enables and deepens an affective experience, which influences the choice of music that follows (Colombetti & Roberts, 2015). For instance, listening to music on a streaming platform, such as Spotify, where either the listener has selected a particular playlist or the streaming platform’s algorithm determines based on the listener’s choices and likes. An example of a user-resource interaction is the individual reaching out to interact with an environmental element. A simple example of this is heading to the library to study. This results in an individual being able to limit distractions and enhance their ability to study by using the library’s space, available relevant educational materials, and quietness. Conversely, mind-shaping (or specifically affect shaping) is an affective phenomenon in which the effects of the environmental elements reaches inwards to affect the individual. There are several ways in which this mind-shaping influence may affect us, both within and outside of our awareness (Slaby, 2016). Military academies and camps, for example, use rituals and structures to train soldiers in specific ways. The training that recruits undergo during their training is designed to prepare them for specific tasks and missions, bringing about skills such as leadership, discipline, and teamwork. A recruit, in this scenario, is aware that the military camp is exerting an intentional influence on her. Recruits are, however, often unaware that their training has also had other effects on them. This is because they are exposed to strict routines, violence and aggression (e.g., Haq et al., 2020). It is important to note that organizations or institutes can deliberately design environmental structures to gradually transform the attitudes and the emotional responses of a target group. Educational institutes are also an example of this. In order to enhance or support the learning of students, teachers use teaching aids, study aids, room settings, and other study-related tools. The content of education as well as the manner in which it is delivered have a significant impact on what and how students learn. On the negative and extreme spectrum, one can observe how recruits from extremist groups, or individuals with a vulnerability to extremism, will seek extreme settings with relevant individuals, materials, spaces, and ideologies. Another instance of mind-shaping can be that some governments or agencies use their political power over the media to limit the amount of information they disseminate to people or frame it in a certain way to reinforce a particular narrative. If the content taught to individuals or consumed by them is extreme, then they are at a heightened risk of developing extremist thinking and committing extremist acts. An 84 unfortunate example is that of school children being exposed to extreme content and ideas through textbooks. During the growing Russian influence, at the end of the 1970s, educational content glorifying communist ideology in the Afghan cultural context was published and disseminated. As a counter-measure against communist influence and to build support for the fight against the Russian invasion, educational textbooks were published in Peshawar, Pakistan, glorifying jihad and anti-Russian sentiment. These books were sanctioned and financed by American grants at the time, and were disseminated in regions of Pakistan and Afghanistan. However, even in the 2000s, almost 20 years after the Russian withdrawal, textbooks with extremism-related material remained in stores unrevised, and sold as freshly printed copies (Davis, 2002). These textbooks glorify martyrdom, celebrate jihad, and speak of the execution of “the enemy”. Consider the following mathematical problem as stated in a textbook for fourth-grade students. “The speed of a Kalashnikov bullet is 800 meters per-second. If a Russian is at a distance of 3,200 meters from a mujahid, and that mujahid aims at the Russian’s head, calculate how many seconds it will take for the bullet to strike the Russian in the forehead.” This mathematical problem glorifies killing and promotes extremism by shaping how a fourth grader may think about such cases. Extreme and disturbing as it is, if we take a closer look, there is one missing word here that generalizes extremism further. The missing word is “soldier”. It does not say how a mujahid should aim at a Russian soldier, but only says “Russian”. While it glorifies killing, it also generalizes what a fourth grader should think like. 17 This is a clear example of mind-shaping or affect-shaping towards extremism. Even though individuals may not join an extremist group, their exposure to extreme content may lead them to sympathize with the values and beliefs of the group. Consequently, they may support the group’s actions or engage in behavior consistent with its ideology, which can be just as dangerous as joining the group. This emphasizes the need to understand the consequences of mind-shaping toward extremist ideas, actions, and how such exposure can foster support for extremist groups. 17 A recent example of this is the ‘North Rhine-Westphalia Coloring Book’ giveaways in Krefeld, for which the political party AfD (“Alternative for Germany”) was accused of sponsoring (Silk, 2020). The coloring book showed people with guns and holding Turkish flags. This was highly criticized by other political parties in Germany. 85 AFFECTIVE ARRANGEMENTS An individual on the pathway of extremism is surrounded by multiple and overlapping elements in offline as well as online environments which may influence affect (e.g., Valentini et al., 2020). As such, within the framework of Situated Affectivity, we draw upon the concept of Affective Arrangements (Slaby et al., 2019) 18 . Essentially, what we are referring to is the assembly of several elements in an ‘arrangement’ or constellation, which act as scaffolding and impact an individual’s affect. Affect exists in unique arrangements in our daily lives, and involves individuals, materials, spaces, discourses, and behaviors coming together into a coordinated formation of mutual affecting and being affected. By focusing on the local elements in an arrangement, the concept assists in analyzing the affective relationality. Within an arrangement and in the relationality, there are multiple types of processes that generate and intensify affect. Additionally, each of its affective agents has a history that influences and supports the arrangement. The affectivity of an arrangement is also supported by multiple organizational and technical elements. These elements include the people, tools, and resources that are available to the affective agents, the context and environment of the arrangement, and the underlying structures and processes that shape the arrangement. All of these elements work together to support the affectivity. The concept of Affective Arrangement allows for the consideration of the diverse composition of elements within an individual's environment, as well as the individual's biography (von Maur, 2021), involvement, and disposition (Slaby et al., 2019). Slaby, Mühlhoff, and Wüschner (2019) discuss how a workplace team is supported cognitively and emotionally by other employees, technological devices, space, and tools. This work arrangement entails the collaboration of multiple affective agents and environmental resources to accomplish specific goals. Moreover, there exists a sense of interconnectedness among the team members. Through these connections, the team may encounter both negative and positive emotions in different scenarios, such as through emotional contagion processes. We apply the arrangement model by exploring affect in extremism. Multiple online and offline environmental factors are analyzed in different cases to understand how they influence an individual’s affectivity. A case in point is Hoda Muthana (Speckhard, 2019), a YemeniAmerican girl who joined the so-called Islamic State (ISIS) and became an extremist. Initially, 18 Affective Milieus (Schuetze, 2021) is another work extending the scope of Affective Arrangement by bringing into focus the everyday and common affective engagements of individuals with elements in their environment. In order to maintain clarity, we adhere to the original term arrangement. 86 she was not driven by negative emotions toward others to embark on a path of extremism. Among the factors that contributed to her joining ISIS were her anxiety regarding the future, her religious beliefs in hellfire and heaven, and her difficult relationship with her mother. Ultimately, it was her interactions with ISIS, as well as her time spent with them, that led to her extreme beliefs. In Muthana’s case, she used a smart phone, specifically Twitter, as an initial point of contact with ‘religious’ people, in order to feel belonging. During this time period, the ISIS group was at its peak in its exploitation of mainstream social media platforms. As she describes it, she initially joined the group of people in the ‘Twittersphere’ who were, as she states, ‘just being ourselves.’ Some members of the group then became more serious about their religious practices and invited others to join them. She reports it was on Twitter where she first heard about the then-newly created ‘caliphate’ and felt ‘obligated’ to go in accordance with her beliefs. The fact that she found an option to choose her own future, rather than being guided by her family, also appealed to her. After living for some time in ISIS, she started her Twitter handle and started inciting violent extremism. In one of her tweets, she encouraged lone-style attacks on American citizens (Speckhard, 2019). Considering Muthana’s case, we are able to sketch out her affective arrangement, before her joining the ISIS, i.e. the beginning of the transition to extremism. By observing each interaction between Muthana and an element in her arrangement, we gain a rich description of affect, allowing us to analyze it. Her decision to join a caliphate appealed to her vulnerability, allowing her to choose for herself rather than having to succumb to the decisions of her family. Considering this vulnerability, she consciously engages with the various elements present in her environment. There are a number of factors that influence her, including individuals (i.e., recruiters/inciters and other people with similar ideas as hers), the spaces (i.e., Twittersphere, where she seeks validation of her beliefs), and narratives (i.e., living in a caliphate, and her beliefs regarding the afterlife). The use of her mobile phone for this purpose served as scaffolding for her affectivity. She started to be affected in the Twittersphere, because she found a niche that resonated with the anxiety in her beliefs and ideas. Social media algorithms promoted more relevant posts and members in the Twittersphere to her. If observed through the property of ‘mutual affect’ of an affective arrangement, this is an instance of Muthana’s being affected. In the affecting direction, the online presence of ISIS was acquiring momentum and getting more widespread. One of the biggest gains for ISIS was the influx of foreigners, their endorsement, and sympathies. There was an influx of fighters, job seekers, and opportunity seekers joining ISIS. However, some were just inspired by the notion of a caliphate 87 and joined for this reason alone. In terms of social media, it was ‘trending’, as was the exploitation of ISIS recruiters. This is just one case elaborating the affective arrangement of an individual. Other elements like the involvement of family or friends with an extremist ideology, the media content available, the space a person is living in (e.g., a war-torn area), no job or security, witnessing the deaths of loved ones, etc., all these elements, events and many more factors can be involved in an arrangement which contributes into shaping the affect of a person. We recognize that each case of extremism is unique and has its own complexities and peculiarities. Furthermore, affective arrangements may be culturally influenced, asymmetrical, overlapping, and temporally convoluted. Sketching the affective arrangement of each and every case may be impractical. Therefore, our focus is less on individual dispositions and the factors that drive an individual to extremism. Our concern is rather with affective bonds and processes, which are applicable not only to cases of extremism but also to our daily lives. Using the framework of situated affectivity, we can dissect the affective bonds between an individual and different elements of the environment. It is also possible to observe these dynamics of affect from different perspectives or vantage points, which are discussed in the following section. We are able to analyze the features and processes of affect that are generated or modulated (perpetuated, intensified, exploited, etc.). Specifically, we are referring to how certain affectcentric features (such as emotional contagion, significance, etc.) can serve as a basis for an individual's experience of affect. It is possible, for example, that the interaction with an element generates other emotions, intensifies or perpetuates existing emotions. This framework can ultimately be integrated with insights on emotions from other disciplines, such as political science, psychology, sociology, and criminology. This will provide a more comprehensive and holistic understanding of affect. Particularly, the focus of affect will contribute to the improvement of policies and programs related to preventing and countering extremism. Vantage Points With the help of concepts such as affective arrangements and the framework of situated affectivity, we are able to examine affect from a variety of perspectives or vantage points. These vantage points enable us to examine emotions from multiple perspectives, encompassing individual and societal dimensions, temporal aspects, spatial contexts, and various physical and linguistic elements. Hence, this methodology offers a comprehensive grasp of the intricate nature of affect. As a result of these vantage points, affect can be analyzed in terms of i) single element interactions, ii) personal arrangements, iii) group arrangements, and iv) societal 88 arrangements. When we analyze affect from these vantage points, and at various points in time, we are also able to observe affect changing over time. Additionally, the first and second vantage points highlight the importance of the user-resource affective bond in an individual’s affective experience. For instance, a person may have a positive affective experience with a particular resource, leading to an increase in the person’s motivation and engagement with that resource. This may then lead to further engagement with that resource. For instance, in Muthana’s case, we see that engagement on Twitter. The third and fourth vantage points emphasize the importance of mind-shaping affective bonds. For example, organizations can shape the affective experience of individuals by designing user experiences that foster positive affective bonds between users and other resources. This too can be seen in the case of Muthana on Twitter, where recruiters and Twitter ‘scholars’ are able to persuade her to join ISIS (Speckhard, 2019). We can begin with a detailed analysis of the affective bond of an individual at the level of single element interaction. From this vantage point, we can observe how a single element can regulate affect when it is interacted with. A common example would be how we use our mobile phone as a scaffold to influence our affect. In the case of Muthana, we can observe her interaction on Twitter. Twitter is the medium (the online space) through which she communicates with other people who share similar interests. This contributes to her strengthening and shaping her beliefs about the caliphate, heaven, and hellfire, which leads to further interactions with the online ISIS recruiters and community. As reported in Muthana’s interview, she explains that prior to committing herself to extreme and ISIS-prescribed interpretations, she felt she had people who understood her on Twitter (Speckhard, 2019). We can observe in detail how interactions on Twitter shaped her affect at the beginning, and then later once she was in ISIS territory. We can examine how one or more elements can impact the affectivity of an individual, and vice versa. The simultaneous interplay of affectivity between an individual and elements in their online and offline environments can be understood when we observe their personal arrangements. This vantage point helps us examine the affectivity of lone-acting extremists as well as those of members of an extremist group. A general example is how students are influenced by their teachers, peers, textbooks, online and offline educational spaces, and studyrelated behaviors during different timelines, such as at the beginning and end of the semester. In a specific example related to Muthana’s case, it was her belief in the caliphate, heaven and hellfire, her online Twitter space, news related media, her interactions with other individuals on Twitter, and her following ISIS invitations. All these elements had their role in influencing 89 the affectivity and decisions of Muthana. Once she enters ISIS territory, the arrangement alters and so does her affectivity. From a group arrangement vantage point, we can see how affect is built up and shaped in organizations, groups, and movements. Organizations, for example, operate as arrangements to shape employee behaviors and affectivity. Among these factors may be dress codes, types of offices, technological devices, best practices, etc. A company’s employees enrich its overall effectiveness, for example, through their educational backgrounds, skill sets, and diversity. In Muthana’s case, we see how ISIS penetrated her life, initially through Twitter. During this period, ISIS’s lure and seduction on social media was at its peak. Once Muthana entered ISIS territory, she was expected to follow the dictates of the group. For instance, the only way she could get out of a madhafa (guesthouse) was to marry an ISIS fighter, either foreign or local. After some time, she too started inciting ISIS followers on Twitter 19 . We can further dissect ISIS as an organization to see that it had multiple councils. The councils played specific roles in the organization's management, and each affected the group’s operations. Some of these councils were the media council, the financial council, the military council, and the foreign fighters’ council (e.g., Milton, 2021). Perhaps the most effective council during recruitment was their media council, which made the creation of the so-called caliphate, and migration to an Islamic state, “glamourous” and “trending”. The media council handled the creation of videos, blogs, and other forms of propaganda that glorified the caliphate. The videos made it seem like an ideal place for people to live and practice their faith. It gave potential members the impression that joining ISIS was the only way to live a true Islamic life and be part of a utopian society. The propaganda circulated attracted numerous sympathizers and followers to ISIS. As more and more members joined ISIS, its popularity and resources increased. In the online communities of the far-right and in the movements of white supremacy, we can observe similar patterns. These far-right and white supremacist organizations rely on a shared set of values and beliefs that unite members and guide their behavior. They also rely on organizational structures, such as hierarchies and codes of conduct, to ensure that members follow the same set of rules. In addition to this, they often use physical symbols (flags, logos, etc.) to identify themselves and distinguish themselves from other groups. One example is the Reichsbürger movement. The Reichsbürger movement is a far-right, anti-government 19 However, Muthana claims that it was her husband at that time who tweeted from her Twitter handle (Speckhard, 2019). 96 activity was to increase children’s ability to perform in a warlike environment. This was made to look like an adventure. This shows framing as a mind-shaping feature of affect. ISIScontrolled camps are therefore affect-exploiting and affect-perpetuating environments. When the kids were shown how the mujahideen are fighting on the front-lines, they felt motivated to stay with ISIS. ISIS’ religious discourse was coupled with the excitement of these young recruits. The situation was presented in such a way that the kids felt optimistic about it: for instance, they were made to believe that ISIS is doing good for society. These can be considered the contagion and framing features of affect. Additionally, there is a feature that can be described as categorization, i.e., ‘us versus them’, which creates cohesion among ISIS members and sympathizers against all those opposed to ISIS’s objectives. These features of affect can be classified as affect-exploiting, affect-perpetuating, and affect-intensifying processes. For the confusion of affect that Ibn-e-Umar had during times of violence and beheadings, the other kids served as scaffolds, in the sense that he should feel how they feel. Money, weapons, the military camp, the taught narrative, and practices (such as faking happiness) served as scaffolds. The processes of affect shaping in such an arrangement are observable. We can see that, where Ibn-e-Umar shows signs of being confused by beheadings, his friend who performs the execution feels happy, powerful, and even ‘closer to God’. For some, we see desensitization to violence, for others, we see fear and panic. Features of contagion and desensitization are observable in this instance. For the younger recruits, situations of violence were framed according to a religious narrative and presented as a win of good over evil. These processes can be categorized as affect-generating, affect-intensifying, and affect-perpetuating. In the minds of many young recruits, the justice of their sharia prevailed, and the society was free of evil. CONCLUSION By employing the framework of situated affectivity and its concept of affective arrangement, the examination of the mentioned cases in this paper brings to the forefront the affective dynamic, contributing to a comprehensive understanding of affect across individual and societal domains, temporal and spatial contexts, and physical and linguistic modalities. They emphasize the fact that our emotions are not solely individual experiences but are influenced by our interactions with others and the surroundings. This approach presents a holistic understanding of the intricate dynamics of emotions. Furthermore, it aids in our understanding 97 of the intricate processes associated with the interaction among multiple elements of the arrangement, further elucidating the functions fulfilled by these processes. Situated affectivity and the concept of affective arrangement may hold critical insights for current preventive and counter violent extremism (P/CVE) programs as well. As we have analyzed and explained with examples, there is always an affective arrangement comprising multiple elements that contributes to an individual transitioning to extremism. Similarly, with careful considerations in P/CVE programs, affective arrangements can be designed for individuals that can assist them in transitioning away from extremism. Counseling and emotional support should not be the only focus of P/CVE programs. Adding scaffolds that are capable of generating, intensifying, or perpetuating affect would facilitate the transition from extremist ideas and beliefs. It is important to increase exposure of individuals to materials, including counter narratives, educational materials, and spaces, that can assist them in finding a sense of purpose, identity, and belonging. All scaffolds must include the possibility of affective engagement, i.e., individuals must be able to relate emotionally to the provided elements. Moreover, scaffolds should provide opportunities for interpersonal relationships with non-extreme individuals through empathic and compassionate communication. To conclude, we consider that situated affectivity and concepts like affective arrangements provide us with rich analytical tools, which assist us in giving a very detailed affective map, starting from a single element analysis to multiple elements working in an arrangement. It can contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of extremism by integrating existing literature from various disciplines, such as political science, psychology, sociology and criminology. By examining cases of extremism through this lens, we can foreground affect-centric features and processes. The allows us to understand not only the pathways leading to extremism but also the pathways leading out of it. REFERENCES Agnew, R. (2010). A General Strain Theory of Terrorism. Theoretical Criminology, 14(2), 131–153. https://doi.org/10.1177/1362480609350163 Associated Press. (2019, March 16). New Zealand shooting: Gunman, who called himself ‘Brenton Tarrant’, painted white supremacist icons on his guns. South China Morning Post. https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/australasia/article/3001957/newzealand-mosque-shooter-who-called-himself-brenton-tarrant 98 Baele, S. J. (2017). Lone-Actor Terrorists’ Emotions and Cognition: An Evaluation Beyond Stereotypes: Lone-Actor Terrorists’ Emotions and Cognition. Political Psychology, 38(3), 449–468. https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12365 Borum, R. (2011). Radicalization into Violent Extremism I: A Review of Social Science Theories. Journal of Strategic Security, 4(4), 7–36. https://doi.org/10.5038/19440472.4.4.1 Clément, M. (2021). Emotions and affect in terrorism research: Epistemological shift and ways ahead. Critical Studies on Terrorism, 14(2), 247–270. https://doi.org/10.1080/17539153.2021.1902611 Colombetti, G., & Krueger, J. (2015). Scaffoldings of the affective mind. Philosophical Psychology, 28(8), 1157–1176. https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2014.976334 Colombetti, G., & Roberts, T. (2015). Extending the extended mind: The case for extended affectivity. Philosophical Studies, 172(5), 1243–1263. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-014-0347-3 Coninx, S., & Stephan, A. (2021). A Taxonomy of Environmentally Scaffolded Affectivity. Danish Yearbook of Philosophy, 54(1), 38–64. https://doi.org/10.1163/24689300bja10019 Daily Sabah. (2019, March 15). New Zealand mosque shooter names his ‘idols’ on weapons he used in massacre. Daily Sabah. https://www.dailysabah.com/asia/2019/03/15/newzealand-mosque-shooter-names-his-idols-on-weapons-he-used-in-massacre Dalgaard-Nielsen, A. (2008). Studying violent radicalization in Europe. 1: The potential contribution of social movement theory. Danish Institute for International Studies. Davis, C. (2002). “A” Is for Allah, “J” Is for Jihad. World Policy Journal, 19(1), 90–94. https://doi.org/10.1215/07402775-2002-2012 Haq, H., Shaheed, S., & Stephan, A. (2020). Radicalization Through the Lens of Situated Affectivity. Frontiers in Psychology, 11, 205. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2020.00205 Hogg, M. A., & Adelman, J. (2013). Uncertainty-Identity Theory: Extreme Groups, Radical Behavior, and Authoritarian Leadership: Uncertainty-Identity Theory. Journal of Social Issues, 69(3), 436–454. https://doi.org/10.1111/josi.12023 Krueger, J., & Szanto, T. (2016). Extended emotions. Philosophy Compass, 11(12), 863–878. https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12390 Kruglanski, A. (2006). Inside the terrorist mind: The relevance of ideology. Estudios de Psicología, 27(3), 271–277. https://doi.org/10.1174/021093906778965008 99 Kruglanski, A. W., Bélanger, J. J., & Gunaratna, R. (2019). The Three Pillars of Radicalization: Needs, Narratives, and Networks. Oxford University Press. Kruglanski, A. W., Chen, X., Dechesne, M., Fishman, S., & Orehek, E. (2009). Fully Committed: Suicide Bombers’ Motivation and the Quest for Personal Significance: Significance Quest and Suicide Terrorism. Political Psychology, 30(3), 331–357. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9221.2009.00698.x Kruglanski, A. W., & Fishman, S. (2009). Psychological Factors in Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Individual, Group, and Organizational Levels of Analysis. Social Issues and Policy Review, 3(1), 1–44. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.17512409.2009.01009.x Kruglanski, A. W., Gelfand, M. J., Bélanger, J. J., Sheveland, A., Hetiarachchi, M., & Gunaratna, R. (2014). The Psychology of Radicalization and Deradicalization: How Significance Quest Impacts Violent Extremism. Political Psychology, 35, 69–93. https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12163 LaFree, G., & Freilich, J. D. (2016). The Handbook of the Criminology of Terrorism. WileyBlackwell. Macklin, G. (2019). The Christchurch Attacks: Livestream Terror in the Viral Video Age (Volume 12, Issue 6; CTC Sentinel). Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. https://ctc.usma.edu/christchurch-attacks-livestream-terror-viral-video-age/ McCauley, C., & Moskalenko, S. (2008). Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: Pathways Toward Terrorism. Terrorism and Political Violence, 20(3), 415–433. https://doi.org/10.1080/09546550802073367 McCauley, C., & Moskalenko, S. (2017). Understanding political radicalization: The twopyramids model. American Psychologist, 72(3), 205–216. https://doi.org/10.1037/amp0000062 Milton, D. (2021). Structure of a State: Captured Documents and the Islamic State’s Organizational Structure. Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. https://ctc.westpoint.edu/structure-of-a-state-captured-documents-and-the-islamicstates-organizational-structure/ Mühlhoff, R. (2019). Affective Disposition. In J. Slaby & C. von Scheve (Eds.), Affective Societies: Key Concepts (pp. 119–130). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351039260 100 Rice, S. K., & Agnew, R. (2013). Emotional Correlates of Radicalization and Terrorism. In J. B. Helfgott (Ed.), Criminal Psychology (pp. 215–226). Praeger, an imprint of ABCCLIO, LLC. Sageman, M. (2014). The Stagnation in Terrorism Research. Terrorism and Political Violence, 26(4), 565–580. https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2014.895649 Schmid, A. (2014). Violent and Non-Violent Extremism: Two Sides of the Same Coin? Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism Studies. https://doi.org/10.19165/2014.1.05 Schuetze, P. (2021). From Affective Arrangements to Affective Milieus. Frontiers in Psychology, 11, 611827. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2020.611827 Shafieioun, D., & Haq, H. (2023a). Radicalization from a societal perspective. Frontiers in Psychology, 14, 1197282. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2023.1197282 Shafieioun, D., & Haq, H. (2023b). Radicalization from a societal perspective. Frontiers in Psychology, 14, 1197282. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2023.1197282 Silk, J. (2020, February 18). Germany: AfD accused of “racist” coloring book | DW | 18.02.2020. DW.COM. https://www.dw.com/en/germany-afd-accused-of-racistcoloring-book/a-52424303 Slaby, J., & Mühlhoff, R. (2019). Affect. In J. Slaby & C. von Scheve (Eds.), Affective Societies: Key Concepts (pp. 27–41). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351039260 Slaby, J., Mühlhoff, R., & Wüschner, P. (2019). Affective Arrangements. Emotion Review, 11(1), 3–12. https://doi.org/10.1177/1754073917722214 Slaby, J., & von Scheve, C. (2019). Affective Societies: Key Concepts (J. Slaby & C. von Scheve, Eds.; 1st ed.). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351039260 Speckhard, A. (2019, April 23). American-Born Hoda Muthana Tells All About Joining, Escaping ISIS. https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matterareas/counterterrorism/american-born-hoda-muthana-tells-all-about-joining-isis-andescaping-the-caliphate/ Speckhard, A., & Yayla, A. S. (2016). Cubs of the Caliphate. In ISIS Defectors: Inside Stories of the Terrorist Caliphate. Advances Press, LLC. Stephan, A., & Walter, S. (2020). Situated Affectivity. In T. Szanto & H. Landweer (Eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Phenomenology of Emotions. Routledge. Stephan, A., Walter, S., & Wilutzky, W. (2014). Emotions beyond brain and body. Philosophical Psychology, 27(1), 65–81. https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2013.828376 101 Sterelny, K. (2010). Minds: Extended or Scaffolded? Phenomenology and The Cognitive Sciences, 9(4), 465–481. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-010-9174-y Valentini, D. (2022). Expanding the Perspectives on Affective Scaffoldings. Thaumàzein | Rivista Di Filosofia, 189-217 Paginazione. https://doi.org/10.13136/THAU.V10I1.148 Valentini, D., Lorusso, A. M., & Stephan, A. (2020). Onlife Extremism: Dynamic Integration of Digital and Physical Spaces in Radicalization. Frontiers in Psychology, 11, 524. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2020.00524 Van Ness, J., & Summers-Effler, E. (2018). Emotions in Social Movements. In D. A. Snow, S. A. Soule, H. Kriesi, & H. J. McCammon (Eds.), The Wiley Blackwell Companion to Social Movements (pp. 411–428). John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119168577.ch23 van Stekelenburg, J. (2017). Radicalization and Violent Emotions. PS: Political Science & Politics, 50(04), 936–939. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1049096517001020 von Maur, I. (2021). Taking Situatedness Seriously. Embedding Affective Intentionality in Forms of Living. Frontiers in Psychology, 12, 599939. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2021.599939 Webber, D., & Kruglanski, A. W. (2017). Psychological Factors in Radicalization: A “3 N” Approach. In G. LaFree & J. D. Freilich (Eds.), The Handbook of the Criminology of Terrorism (pp. 33–46). John Wiley & Sons, Inc. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118923986.ch2 Wibisono, S., Louis, W. R., & Jetten, J. (2019). A Multidimensional Analysis of Religious Extremism. Frontiers in Psychology, 10, 2560. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2019.02560 Wiktorowicz, Q. (2005). Radical Islam Rising: Muslim Extremism in the West. Bowman and Littlefield. 102 Chapter 4 The Power of Passion and Nostalgia in Extremism: A Case Study of the Christchurch Mosque Attack Hina Haq & Ruth Rebecca Tietjen This chapter is based on a co-authored book chapter with Ruth Rebecca Tietjen, titled “The Power of Passion and Nostalgia in Extremism: A Case Study of the Christchurch Mosque Attack.” The piece is forthcoming in the edited In Extremism and Subjectivity: Extremist, Academic, and Practitioner Perspectives” to be published by Oxford University Press and edited by Rik Peels and Quassim Cassam. Ruth and I co-authored the original draft, integrating our respective expertise in phenomenology and affect theory. I led the empirical data curation and case reconstruction, while Ruth contributed significantly to the theoretical framework. This chapter offers a critical phenomenological analysis of violent extremism through the lens of Situated Affectivity, emphasizing how sacred emotion and nostalgic longing are weaponized within radicalized subjectivities. It argues that radicalization is driven not only by negative emotions like fear or hatred, but also by aspirational affects— such as hope, transcendence, and redemptive purpose—sanctified within ideological systems. Drawing on the concepts of affective niches, affective templates, and affective chains, the chapter analyzes how digital and material environments orchestrate nostalgia and collective passion. The Christchurch case exemplifies how racial and religious identity, sacred values, and mediated memory converge to shape a powerful affective orientation toward violence. Rather than viewing such attacks merely as ideological ruptures, the chapter conceptualizes them as the culmination of a situated affective trajectory, urging interventions that address not only belief systems but the emotional ecologies that nurture extremist commitments. Reference Haq, Hina, and Ruth Rebecca Tietjen. Forthcoming. "The Power of Passion and Nostalgia in Extremism: A Case Study of the Christchurch Mosque Attack." In Extremism and Subjectivity: Extremist, Academic, and Practitioner Perspectives, edited by Rik Peels and Quassim Cassam. Extreme Belief and Behavior Series, vol. 5. Oxford University Press. 125 Chapter 5 Radicalization from a Societal Perspective Delaram Shafieioun & Hina Haq This paper, co-authored with Delaram Shafieioun and published in 2023 in Frontiers in Psychology (Research Topic: Power, Discrimination, and Privilege in Individuals and Institutions), offers a critical socio-affective perspective on radicalization. This paper draws upon the thesis research of Delaram Shafieion, which itself evolved from a study project originally conceptualized and supervised by me. Shafieioun led the development of the theoretical framing, and we collaborated closely on research design, data collection and organization. I contributed substantively to the formal analysis, interpretive synthesis, and co-authored the initial draft. Both authors were actively engaged in the review and revision process, ensuring conceptual coherence and analytical depth in the final manuscript. This chapter advances a shift from psychological individualism toward a structurally embedded account of radicalization, arguing that extremist trajectories are shaped not only by ideological exposure but also by persistent experiences of systemic exclusion, affective injury, and social devaluation. Drawing on the concepts of affective injustice, phenomenology of whiteness, and racialized trauma, the paper explores how the lived experiences of Muslim minorities in Western contexts are mediated by discrimination, alienation, and the erosion of belonging. Through qualitative analysis of interviews with ISIS recruits, the study uncovers how marginalization becomes affectively transfigured into a sense of moral outrage and existential significance within extremist ideologies. It further critiques prevailing counterterrorism frameworks that focus on behavioral profiling and individualized surveillance, contending that such approaches obscure the deeper sociopolitical forces that structure vulnerability to radicalization. The chapter concludes by advocating for a more affectsensitive, socially embedded strategy of intervention—one that acknowledges the emotional economies of exclusion and the structural conditions that shape how extremism is felt, internalized, and enacted. This paper received recognition and an invitation to register our project with MOTRA (Monitoringsystem und Transferplattform Radikalisierung), a research network funded by the Federal Ministry of Education and Research and the Federal Ministry of the Interior and Community for civil security research. Reference Shafieioun, D., & Haq, H. (2023). Radicalization from a societal perspective. Frontiers in Psychology, 14, 1197282. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2023.1197282 126 ABSTRACT Studies on radicalization tend to focus on the dynamics of extremist groups and how they exploit grievances of vulnerable individuals. It is imperative, however, to also understand the societal factors that lead to such vulnerabilities and grievances. Our social environment plays a key role in how we view the world and shape our beliefs. By understanding the social dynamics, we can gain insight into the motivations that drive people to extremism. Throughout this paper, we examine the societal factors and processes such as discriminative institutional structures and social norms/practices that can make an individual vulnerable and serve as a driving force for them to join a radical group. To do that, we use the process-oriented psychology of Arnold Mindell and the phenomenology of whiteness of Sara Ahmed as our theoretical framework. These frameworks help us map out the societal dynamics causing individuals to carve social niches out of their current social group and into an extremist group. We use interviews with ex-militants of the radical group, Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, to show how certain societal dynamics, such as social injustice, misuse of power, marginalization and discrimination, served as key factors that led these individuals to identify and sympathize with radical ideology. The aim of this paper is to emphasize that, to develop effective preventative measures against recruitment into extremist groups, it is imperative to have a profound understanding of the social dynamics that make an individual susceptible to radicalization in the first place. Keywords: terrorism, radicalization, discrimination, marginalization, social injustice, power, society 127 INTRODUCTION As social beings, humans live in societies that are shaped by shared norms, values, and beliefs. Members of society interact with each other and with the world around them to create a sense of identity and purpose. However, there can always be an element of social inequality in society. Dorling (2010) explains that social inequality persists in a society in such a way that it becomes the part of everyday normal life. As a result of social injustice, prejudice and discrimination may become normalized. A pattern of discrimination and stigmatization can result in feelings of rejection, self-stigmatization, internalized shame, and lowered self-esteem (Burke & Parker, 2007), leading to eventual reaction. This reaction can take a variety of forms. As a group, the reaction may take the form of protest, which, if provoked further, may lead to riots. One recent example of this is the Black Lives Matter movement, which was triggered by anger following the murder of George Floyd in Minnesota on May 25, 2020, by a white police officer. Individuals are also affected by systemic discrimination and marginalization. Marginalization and discrimination may lead to feelings of alienation, exclusion, and deprivation. These feelings can change an individual’s perspective on society. In such a case, she may choose to leave the said society or join an ideology or group that offers her a chance to get her grievances addressed. In recent years, radical groups like Islamic State of Syria and Iraq (ISIS) have also exploited societal injustices to recruit marginalized people. In this paper, we will discuss this affect. This is especially true in the case of people who join extremist groups or extreme ideologies. According to the Revised EU Strategy for Combating Radicalization and Recruitment to Terrorism (2014) report “Violations of human rights can give rise to grievances and the very conditions conducive to the spread of radicalization and recruitment to terrorism”. Therefore, it is vital to ensure that human rights are respected and protected in order to reduce the risk of extremism. This paper aims to emphasize that understanding the social dynamics that make individuals susceptible to radicalization in the first place is critical to developing effective preventative measures against recruitment into extremist groups. A review of radicalization studies will be presented in the following section, along with a discussion of why we must take a step back to understand the social imbalance of power in a society in order to understand the reasons that make it inevitable for someone to move toward extremism. 134 violence and crimes but trying to understand the anger and frustration which can result in violent riots. Mindell further elaborates that the political leaders suppress people who are angry in order to keep their popularity and show political success. In the first encounter, this position might seem reasonable, but it totally ignores where anger and violence come from. Why are some people angry? Privileged people, in terms of belonging to the majority and belonging to the center of the society, get angry when their world and its cultural norm is not recreated. For instance, how some conservative and far right governments target minorities. They condemn actions of minorities such as riots and retaliation and suppress them without taking a peek at the roots (Mindell 1995). As a result, suppression leads to even more revolts, more unhappiness, and does not make conflict and violence disappear (Mindell, 1995). To understand the anger and frustration of suppressed groups in more detail, in the next section, we will discuss the power imbalance that enables one group to suppress another, resulting in an affective push toward radicalization. To do so, we rely on Mindell’s idea of rank. Which refers to the imbalance of power in a society. The concept of rank helps us to understand that when privileged groups abuse their power, they create an environment that normalizes discrimination and further marginalizes vulnerable groups. This results in anger and frustration among them. SOCIAL REPERCUSSIONS OF MARGINALIZATION Mindell argues that issues such as “riots” or “minority crime” are related to their so-called “rank”. He defines rank as “the sum of the person’s privileges” in the society, for instance, color of skin, education, social class, etc. (Mindell, 1995, p. 28). He argues that problems do not necessarily start from the mere existence of ranks, rather they develop when the rank, or in other words the privileges, get forgotten by the ones who have a higher rank. For instance, an educated person might assume that people with less education are ignorant and that they are the ones who cause the problems. On an international level, powerful countries might blame the countries with less power for being violent and supporting terrorism because privileged nations, even if they do the act of international killing in less powerful countries, are always associated with being “victims of terrorism” (Mindell, 1995, p. 90). One recent example is the refusal of the United States of America to let the International Criminal Court (ICC) investigate the cases over the alleged war crimes (involving torture and cruel treatment, dehumanizing 135 abuses, and rape and other forms of sexual violence) committed by U.S. Army and CIA personnel during the invasion of Afghanistan (Scheffer, 2020). In different societies, people with a specific profile have a higher rank. As a result of having a higher rank, they form the center of that society. People who do not represent the mainstream profile are pushed to the margins. Along this line of thought, Ayata (2019) suggests that the affective dimension of citizenship helps to understand how affects and emotions are used to reinforce differences and differential treatments among the members of a society: ... while two individuals may be equal citizens from a legal point of view, their perceived difference in terms of religion, race, sex, gender, or class may result in identifying one individual as the proper, true citizen who is naturally entitled to the privileges and status of citizenship, whereas the other may be identified as a “quasi” or “technical” citizen, whose belonging to the political community remains in question despite holding citizenship. (Ayata, 2019, p. 332) When power is abused, not only people are pushed to the margins, but there is also a tendency of marginalizing these people’s problems because what is experienced in the center is deemed to be more important and needs to be focused on. The ones in the center might take an attitude and send an unintended message to the margin: “Stop nagging, quit complaining and fix your problem on your own” (Mindell, 1995). Rejecting people and their problems from the center and accepting that they and their problems belong to the margin is a form of oppression. Mindlessly oppressing and marginalizing individuals has consequences. The ones who are oppressed either become silent or gain vengeance by becoming the oppressors (Mindell, 1995). The overall affective environment created by the ‘ruling class’ or ‘center’ results in clear discrimination, which may lead to fostering frustration in the quasi citizen and result in conflicts. In order to understand how power imbalance in the societal structures affects individuals, in the following section, we would like to use Sara Ahmed’s idea about the ‘phenomenology of whiteness’. Ahmed’s ideas about the “white world” and its varying impacts on non-white individuals provide a powerful context for Mindell’s work, demonstrating how their perspectives can be further enriched. PHENOMENOLOGY OF WHITENESS Phenomenology attends, in general, to the tactile, vestibular, kinesthetic, and visual character of embodied reality. However, underlying all of these characters, as Frantz Fanon says, we should consider and think of a “historic-racial” scheme (1986, p. 17). Ahmed (2006) describes 136 our societies as containing a historical and racial dimension. In her view, these dimensions form individuals’ experiences in society differently. As we arrive in this world, we are born into an environment that conveys affective, historical, and racial aspects that affect and direct our way of being in the world. The history of the group or nation to which we belong provides us with our first affective environment. This provides an informative perspective on why, and how, certain groups and individuals may feel oppressed, or socially excluded, from traditional mainstream society. Sara Ahmed (2007) refers to the idea of whiteness not as a biological characteristic of the body that we are born with. Rather, she defines whiteness as an ongoing history and background of experience which make the lived experiences of humans distinct from one another. This history can enable some humans while disabling the others. This concept of “whiteness” thus refers not only (or even primarily) to the color of skin, it rather denotes an orientation that puts people in different categories and creates different experiences. Therefore, we consider it to be a promising concept for an in-depth exploration of the perceived injustice by minorities. Whiteness is a determining element of rank if we consider whiteness as a feature of “the privileged”, a feature that marginalized populations lack. In this regard, “whiteness” is not only relevant for the Muslims in Europe and the United States, but also Muslims in minority sects in other Muslim countries e.g., Sunnis in Iraq. Ahmed argues that, because of the history of colonialism, we live in a white world. The world of whiteness is the world which we inherit. The world which is designed and has orders in a specific way. When we come to this world, we already have a place in which we can dwell, have access, and reach certain objects. This world of whiteness is a world in which certain things are within reach of certain bodies, allowing them to successfully reach those objects while making it difficult for others to do the same. As Ahmed states: “The ‘matter’ of race is very much about embodied reality; seeing oneself or being seen as white or black or mixed does affect what one ‘can do’, or even where one can go, which can be described in terms of what is and is not within reach” (Ahmed, 2006, p. 112). Ahmed argues that there are some bodies which are seen as “alike”; since they are “sharing whiteness” and have similar objects within reach. By having a common direction, not only does it give the bodies that have the same direction a sense of community, but it also makes them distinct from those with different directions. A we emerges as an effect of sharing a common orientation and a they emerges as an effect of cohering in a different direction. Ahmed states that the other side of the world is associated with racial otherness, meaning that we attribute all the otherness which we do not recognize as our common characteristics to the 137 other side of the globe (Ahmed, 2006, p. 121). We are we and they are they. The following statement from prime minister of Hungary, Viktor Orbán, is a good illustration of what Ahmed refers to as “racial otherness” and “other side of the world”: “We must state that we do not want to be diverse and do not want to be mixed: we do not want our own color, traditions, and national culture to be mixed with those of others. We do not want this. We do not want that at all. We do not want to be a diverse country” (Bayrakli & Hafez, 2019, p. 42). In Orban’s statement above, an enormous wish for a distinction between “us” and “them” is visible. The distinction based on the color of skin, traditions and what one calls “national culture” which in The Fundamental Law of Hungary is referred to as “Christian Culture” (Bayrakli & Hafez, 2019, p. 48), clearly ignores and devalues the individuals who do not share their mainstream norms. Ahmed (2006) claims that sharing “otherness” comes at the cost of being stopped. Having a body that is not aligned with “white bodies” can cause two problems. On the one hand, the difficulty of accessing objects because they are far away. On the other hand, the body itself does not cooperate in trailing behind the action. A good example of not having the objects within reach is the concept of ‘glass ceiling’. The non-white body does not only lack access to certain objects due to living in a white world, but when it attempts to reach for the objects, the non-white body raises against itself and prevents the body from reaching it. The non-white body cannot go unnoticed in the sea of whiteness because the spaces are made in a way that makes the non-white body noticeable. Non-white bodies feel uncomfortable, exposed, and visible as they try to take up space because they do not share a certain likeness with white bodies. Whiteness is the permission for some bodies to pass over repetitively, while the others are being stopped (cf. also Bajwa et al. 2023). Whiteness is invisible to the white bodies because they can fade in the background, whereas the non-white bodies cannot pass and become hyper-visible. Non-white bodies appear to be “out of place”, and therefore being stopped when crossing the line. Not being aware of the invisibility of white bodies to them could be what Mindell referred to as a form of rank abuse and, as already discussed, this could lead to violent responses in the society. Being viewed as an outsider and a constant failure is traumatizing. Being constantly stopped and pushed away can cause a form of social trauma, which could motivate violence from the oppressed group (e.g., Williams, Osman, & Hyon, 2023). 138 TRAUMA: A FACILITATOR IN THE RADICALIZATION PROCESS In general, a cultural trauma may be described as a physical and psychological assault inflicted by a group that is dominant. This assault is on the culture of a group of people who shares a specific identifying characteristic or affiliation (e.g., ethnicity, religion) (e.g., Evans-Campbell, 2008; Stamm et al., 2004). This trauma can manifest itself in everyday life, often leaving individuals feeling like they are not capable of attaining the same opportunities as those without “otherness”. It can be further compounded when those in positions of power and privilege refuse to acknowledge this injustice, amplifying the feeling of marginalization and exclusion. The “feelings of comfort, unease, anger, empathy, (mis)trust, (dis)respect, love, and hate toward an imagined ‘us’ and ‘others’ are regulated and reproduced in official policies, discourses, and practices” (Ayata, 2019). This systematic discrimination can lead to feelings of deep frustration and resentment, which can lead to further alienation. This plays an important role in the case of young people being recruited to groups like ISIS. The interviews with former ISIS members and their families conducted by Speckhard & Yayla (2016) indicate a common storyline for the foreign fighters who joined ISIS from Europe, especially Belgium. Many of them were encouraged by teachers from a young age to pursue the (more basic) technical track in school, and then later faced difficulties finding a fulltime job. However, even when they have been to the university, they still have to face discrimination in finding jobs and getting hired 25 . One mother described the situation for her son, a second-generation immigrant, like this: “He was smart and spoke multiple languages, but high school teachers discouraged him and made him feel like he could only be a factory worker or garbage collector, so finally he dropped out of school. Then, of course, he could only get those types of jobs, so he felt totally humiliated. The terrorist recruiter promised him much more” (Speckhard & Yayla, 2016). In one of the interviews done by ICSVE (2018) which we already referred to, Salma, the 22-year-old Belgian, talks about her experience of joining ISIS. She states: “[In Belgium], sometimes you feel targeted. You feel watched upon as if you’re not the same like them. If your head is covered, you’re wearing a hijab this big and everything, you’re watched upon.” (A Belgian Family in The Islamic State, 2018). Another interview (Georges the Belgian Jihadist, 2018) with Georges M., a 25-year-old from Belgium, who intended to join the 25 Papers that elaborate on immigrant workers' discrimination on the European job market, see Weichselbaumer, 2017; 2020; and Ball et al., 2022. 139 uprising in Syria but never succeeded, portrayed the common story of being stopped, becoming hyper-visible and not being able to move upward. He converted to Islam when he was in high school and faced his parents’ disagreement and disappointment. He was suspended from high school for proselytizing, and he ultimately dropped out of the school. “I knew that if I stayed in that establishment or another, things would get worse” (Georges the Belgian Jihadist, 2018). He began working in jobs below his intellect and, because of the lack of high school final certificates, he could not get a university education. He explains that after watching videos from Syria, he and his friends felt the urge to go to Syria and help Muslims fight against Bashar al-Assad. They had to return home because the father of a friend took them back. Here is a snippet demonstrating his perceived the discrimination: I wish everyone could practice his religion as he wants to like it’s been done for a long time. Not only for Muslims, but also for Christians and Jews. [But, here in Belgium] I cannot pray at work like I want. If I wear a beard, there are prejudices. If my wife wants to wear the hijab, she’ll face discrimination. [At my job], I asked to do my prayers. Everybody goes out to smoke cigarettes. Why can’t I go out to do my prayer that doesn’t take more than five minutes? I am not in an Islamic land, but in a so-called ‘democratic’ country. [Here] there is no trust in the other. (Georges the Belgian Jihadist, 2018) When societies and institutions fail to provide spaces for some individuals and groups to act freely as compared to the other groups of society, trauma is generated. After 2001, identities of Muslim citizens in America were put under surveillance and many were perceived as dangerous or threatening. This created a comparable affective register that highlights the two categories of citizens, one (who were not Muslims) automatically shift to the naturally entitled citizens, and others (Muslims) whose citizenship became conditional and relegated to a formality if they do not act, feel and behave in a desired way. This required additional emotional and affective efforts to confirm the rightful political belonging (Slaby & von Scheve, 2019). Having the wrong name, the wrong color of skin, the wrong nationality, the wrong religion, obstruct the path for individuals, sometimes temporarily and sometimes forever. It ceases them and their movements. Even if they have the right passport with a wrong body, their way is blocked. Therefore, if our nationality does not match our body, if my name does not match my nationality, if my nationality does not match my religion, then we are held as suspect and should answer those inconsistencies and mismatches. Some bodies feel more at home, and some feel the discomfort of being strangers. Some bodies are recognized more as “strangers” 140 and “out of the place” than others (Ahmed, 2006). Being a stranger is being suspected of sharing otherness. What non-white bodies are facing is a form of social traumatization, since it targets the entire group, and it is implemented in a societal context. Another factor that aggravates this socially embedded trauma is that the public fails to acknowledge or even actively denies the trauma. A famous example is the debate about Armenian Genocide. Even in trauma-related literature, this avoidance of acknowledging oppressive traumatic experiences as trauma exists. Holmes et al. (2016) criticized DSM 5 for not including different forms of oppression (e.g., racism or sexism) as potentially traumatic events. They elaborate that empirical evidence has shown that marginalized groups experienced higher PTSD levels in comparison to the majority (see Holmes et al., 2016). Despite established empirical evidence, the current definition of trauma fails to include institutional, systemic and psychological forms of violence as potentially traumatic experiences. This kind of psychological violence which is usually “invisible” is a form of social neglect of trauma. As mentioned before, social trauma is an imperative element in the recruitment of young people by groups like ISIS. On the one hand, not being able to move forward, feeling hyper-visible, being stopped and interrogated, and being considered as an outsider and on the other hand, the dream that ISIS sells, the dream of having a home where you can be free and belong to. This can create a powerful contrast between the feelings of hopelessness and the promise of security and belonging that ISIS offers, making the group particularly attractive to vulnerable young people. When hierarchies and the differences in rank are institutionalized, people with higher rank usually feel that they do not have to bear with the problems of people with less rank. Hence, all the problems get associated with the rank and the rank system gets internalized (Mindell, 1995). Internalization of oppression is so strong that people from minorities feel traumatized. There is no doubt that the political process in each country is different, but there are similar elements in all of these processes: the structure of processes between center and margin. Considering that almost all of our sources are linked to cultures practiced in the center of the society and our embeddedness in cultural systems, how we feel, and think is also an effect of that culture. Subsequently, our sense of self-worth and the worth of others is linked to what we receive from that culture. As a result, it is understandable that marginalized groups may lack confidence. “Unfulfilled needs”, “repressed feelings”, and “the search for the meaning of life” of marginalized groups, play a crucial role in forming a mass frustration (Mindell, 1995, p. 24). 141 Sometimes people do support social order and let it continue as it is; as if by nature, some are superior to others. For instance, when people see that a considerable proportion of immigrants is unemployed, they start doubting immigrants’ abilities and intelligence instead of asking what would have happened if they would have gotten the same amount of opportunities to unfold their talent as the mainstream population (Mindell, 1995). This discriminatory approach persists even in research literature. Jason Richwine, for example, received a doctorate in public policy from Harvard in 2009. In his dissertation titled “IQ and Immigration Policy”, he argues that immigrants have lower IQs than native white Americans, and that these low IQs are likely to persist for generations to come (Richwine, 2009). In addition, the book “The Bell Curve” by political scientists Charles Murray and Richard Hermsteirrayn can be cited as an example. They argued in the book that poor people, especially poor black people, were intrinsically less intelligent than white people (Herrnstein & Murray, 1996). Mindell (1995) mentions that mass frustration of minorities can ignite a revolution. In other terms, they aim at the replacement of existing structures, i.e., a revolution that replaces the current social, economic, or political structures. Revolutions are more radical than reforms. Reforms are some alternations in the existing systems, whereas revolutions aim to change the entire system. If structures do not change enough with reform, revolution follows (Mindell, 1995, p. 225). The up-rise of ISIS as a group might be a case in point. “It is no coincidence that ISIS and its extreme jihadi message took root in a region that was experiencing socio-political upheavals arguably of a ‘one in a century’ kind” (Oosterveld et al., 2017, p. 9). After the attacks of 9/11, the American government started the war in Afghanistan and Iraq against Al-Qaeda. In the time of Iraq’s invasion, Al-Qaeda was not yet grounded in Iraq, but following years of chaos, the circumstances became ideal for them to expand in Iraq and beyond. There are two concrete fatal decisions on behalf of Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), which assisted the rise of ISIS, namely the de-Baathification of Iraq’s government and disbanding the Iraqi army. These decisions played an important role in promoting and increasing Iraq's sectarian conflicts that played off Sunni against Shia. Since the CPA’s decision had an exclusive impact on Sunni population, Al-Qaeda which later became the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), found an opportunity and used the massive frustration of the Sunni population against the Shia and Western forces (Oosterveld et al.,2017). Not to mince words, the mass frustration of the Sunni population with their governments and Western countries for the marginalization, the help of former Iraqi Baathist officials as a significant part of ISIS’ leadership, high goals of living in a society without discrimination under Islamic laws, the failure of the governing powers in Syria and 142 Iraq, and lastly the unintentional support from the outside by Western countries and rebels in Syria and Iraq, contributed to the rise and development of ISIS. In the following section, we highlight how the increase in Islamophobia might have an imperative role in contributing to a heightened sense of paranoia and fear of Muslims, adding to the appeal for the vulnerable individuals to join the extremist groups like ISIS. THE DOUBLE SIGNAL OF ISLAMOPHOBIA According to Mindell (1995), being unaware of one’s rank could be a trigger for conflicts in the society. He elevates his argument and introduces the concept of “sending mixed signals” as one of the most troublesome consequences of unawareness of rank. In our communication, within families, groups, communities, and even on an international level, two types of signals are sent. “Primary signals” are the ones that are intended, and “secondary signals” are the signals which are unintended and indicate another level of a person’s feeling and unconscious sense of power and rank. Often we send the primary message of “Let’s talk” accompanied by a secondary message of “I am superior and what I say does not come in debate” or “stay where you belong” (Mindell, 1995, pp. 49–60). Despite the primary signal about “respect for religious diversity” the increase of Islamophobia not just among the people, but also among politicians is a secondary signal that is contrasting with the primarily intended message and thereby stigmatizes Muslims in general. As an example of the contrary signals, Canada can be cited. While Canada emphasizes multiculturalism as a primary message, it also conveys a secondary message through institutional policies such as Bills 21 and 62. Policies like these target Muslim women and marginalize them (Williams et al., 2022). In this section, we explain how the arising issue of Islamophobia, prejudice against Muslims and the policies to combat these issues could send such secondary signals. There has been an increase in Islamophobia and prejudice against Muslims in recent years. Muslim identity has been portrayed as an incompatible identity with modernity and democracy (Wike & Grim, 2010). Muslims, and especially second-generation immigrant Muslims, can have a strenuous life in Western societies. There is unfortunately little research on the matter of “Western views towards Muslims” but research by Wike and Grim (2010) has shown that Western societies perceive Muslims as both a security and a cultural threat which causes negative attitudes towards Muslims and therefore people tend to be more intolerant toward them. Wike and Grim cite from Cesari (2004) that September 11 was a starting point for a “Bin Laden effect” which caused discrimination and even violence against Muslims in Western societies. “The ‘Bin Laden Effect’, according to Cesari, ‘consists mainly of casting all 143 Muslims within the U.S. and Europe in the role of The Enemy, transforming them into scapegoats for the entire society’” (Cesari, 2004). Therefore, the perceived threat identified with Muslims turns the majority (non-Muslims) against the minority. The results of this research have shown that in the investigated countries (Spain, the U.S., Britain, France, and Germany) Muslims are regarded not only as a cultural but also as a security threat. Negative attitudes regarding Muslims do not primarily arise because of Westerners being worried about the incompatibility of Islam with democracy and modernity, rather they lie in the perception of extremism within Muslim communities. Certainly, there are extremist groups both in Muslim countries and in the West. Research has continuously shown that in most Muslim communities, only a small minority holds extremist views, and the majority are against extremism (Wike & Grim, 2010). For instance, in 2015 Pew Research Centre collected data about how the countries with significant Muslim population hold negative views about extremist organisations like ISIS (Poushter, 2015). Perceiving Muslims as a security threat can lead to extreme reactions against them and a sense of exclusion from society. The European Islamophobia Report 2018 (Bayrakli & Hafez, 2019) was published with the financial support of the European Union on the matter of Islamophobia in Europe. This report was an investigation on the dynamics that support anti-Muslim racism in Europe in a direct or indirect way. A simple example would be the incidents in which Muslims are the target. These are usually described as hate crime, whereas in other cases, they would be referred to as terrorist attacks (e.g., Corbin, 2017). In the following paragraphs, we will provide an overview of this report. During the last decades, far-right movements, nationalists, and populists started rising in Europe, in countries such as Italy and Austria they even have been in power and in coalitions for a while. Considering that only 12% of Muslims who have been experiencing discrimination report to the authorities (Hafez et al. 2019), Islamophobia incidents happen too frequently to be ignored. Austria reported 540 cases of Islamophobic incidents in 2018, which shows a 74% increase in comparison to 2017 in anti-Muslim racist attacks. In Belgium, 84% of reported discriminations at workplaces were related to Islamophobia. France documented a 52% rise of Islamophobic incidents in 2018 in comparison to 2017, with a total number of 676 incidents (which include 20 physical attacks). According to the police statistics in Germany, there were 678 attacks on German Muslims; 40 attacks on mosques, and 1775 attacks on refugees in 2018. In the Netherlands, 91% of a total of 151 incidents of religious discrimination reported to the police were related to Muslims. Violent acts against Muslims happened in different forms, for 150 Moghaddam, F. M. (2012). The omnicultural imperative. Culture & Psychology, 18(3), 304– 330. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354067X12446230 Oosterveld, W. T., Bloem, W., Farnham, N., Kayaoğlu, B., & Sweijs, T. (2017). The rise and fall of ISIS: From evitability to inevitability. The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies. Poushter, J. (2015, November 17). In nations with significant Muslim populations, much disdain for ISIS. Pew Research Center. http://pewrsr.ch/1MkLqee Revised EU Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism (No. 5643/5/14; Issue 5643/5/14). (2014). Council Of The European Union. https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST%209956%202014%20INIT/EN/pdf Rewards of Joining the Islamic State. (2018, March 14). [YouTube video]. International Center for the Study of Violent Extremism. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6kHwyGLI5JQ Richwine, J. (2009). IQ and Immigration Policy [Harvard University]. https://gwern.net/doc/iq/ses/2009-richwine.pdf Sageman, M. (2008). Leaderless jihad: Terror networks in the twenty-first century. University of Pennsylvania Press. Schclarek Mulinari, L. (2019). The Spectrum of Repression: Swedish Muslims’ Experiences of Anti-terrorism Measures. Critical Criminology, 27(3), 451–466. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10612-019-09462-8 Scheffer, D. J. (2020). The ICC’s Probe Into Atrocities in Afghanistan: What to Know. Council on Foreign Relations. https://www.cfr.org/article/iccs-probe-atrocitiesafghanistan-what-know Schmid, A. (2013). Radicalisation, De-Radicalisation, Counter-Radicalisation: A Conceptual Discussion and Literature Review. Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism Studies, 4. https://doi.org/10.19165/2013.1.02 Sedgwick, M. (2010). The Concept of Radicalization as a Source of Confusion. Terrorism and Political Violence. https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2010.491009 Slaby, J., & von Scheve, C. (2019). Introduction: Affective societies–key concepts. In Affective Societies (pp. 1–24). Routledge. Speckhard, A., & Ellenberg, M. (2020). ISIS in Their Own Words: Recruitment History, Motivations for Joining, Travel, Experiences in ISIS, and Disillusionment over Time – Analysis of 220 In-depth Interviews of ISIS Returnees, Defectors and Prisoners. Journal of Strategic Security, 13(1), 82–127. https://doi.org/10.5038/19440472.13.1.1791 151 Speckhard, A., & Yayla, A. S. (2016). ISIS defectors: Inside stories of the terrorist caliphate. Advances Press, LLC. Stamm, B. H., Stamm, H. E., Hudnall, A. C., & Higson-Smith, C. (2004). Considering a theory of cultural trauma and loss. Journal of Loss and Trauma, 9(1), 89–111. https://doi.org/10.1080/15325020490255412 van Stekelenburg, J. (2017). Radicalization and Violent Emotions. PS: Political Science & Politics, 50(04), 936–939. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1049096517001020 Weichselbaumer, D. (2017). Discrimination Against Migrant Job Applicants in Austria: An Experimental Study. German Economic Review, 18(2), 237–265. https://doi.org/10.1111/geer.12104 Weichselbaumer, D. (2020). Multiple Discrimination against Female Immigrants Wearing Headscarves. ILR Review, 73(3), 600–627. https://doi.org/10.1177/0019793919875707 Wike, R., & Grim, B. J. (2010). Western views toward Muslims: Evidence from a 2006 cross-national survey. International Journal of Public Opinion Research, 22(1), Article 1. Williams, M., Osman, M., & Hyon, C. (2023). Understanding the Psychological Impact of Oppression Using the Trauma Symptoms of Discrimination Scale. Chronic Stress, 7, 247054702211495. https://doi.org/10.1177/24705470221149511 Williams, M. T., Khanna Roy, A., MacIntyre, M.-P., & Faber, S. (2022). The Traumatizing Impact of Racism in Canadians of Colour. Current Trauma Reports, 8(2), 17–34. https://doi.org/10.1007/s40719-022-00225-5 Wilner, A. S., & Dubouloz, C.-J. (2010). Homegrown terrorism and transformative learning: An interdisciplinary approach to understanding radicalization. Global Change, Peace & Security. https://doi.org/10.1080/14781150903487956 152 Chapter 6 Conclusion Affect, Extremism, and Societal Trajectories This dissertation contributes to the understanding of extremism and radicalization by prioritizing affect through a novel application of situated affectivity, thereby establishing its utility as both an analytical framework and a predictive model for societal trends. Through five interconnected chapters, this work analyzes the multifaceted nature of affectivity in extremism, encompassing individual radicalization and societal shifts, while bringing a relatively less studied affective dimension to the forefront of explanatory models traditionally dominated by negative emotions or grievance-based approaches. A key contribution is the exploration of positive emotions in extremist engagement, an aspect often overshadowed in radicalization research. By analyzing cases from religious extremism to right-wing movements, the study demonstrates how emotions such as passion, pride, and nostalgia are powerful drivers of commitment, sustaining both individual and collective dedication to extremist ideologies. These insights underscore the need to consider positive affect as a central factor in understanding the dynamics of radicalization. Chapter Insights and Connections Each chapter of this dissertation contributes unique insights while building upon the foundational framework of situated affectivity, demonstrating a cohesive and progressive development of the overall thesis. Chapter 1: Introduction and Theoretical Foundation This chapter introduces the central argument: situated affectivity serves as both an analytical and predictive framework for understanding extremism and societal shifts. The case study of Pakistan demonstrates how systematic affective mind-shaping can predict broader political and ideological transformations, particularly a society's movement toward authoritarianism. This chapter sets the stage by highlighting the importance of understanding affective arrangements and their potential to shape societal trajectories. Chapter 2: Radicalization Through the Lens of Situated Affectivity Here, the dissertation delves into the micro-level processes of individual radicalization, introducing key theoretical concepts such as affective scaffolding, mind invasion, and Self- 153 Stimulatory Loops of Affectivity (SSLA). These concepts explain how extremist organizations deliberately structure environments to facilitate recruitment and maintain membership through emotional manipulation. This chapter connects to the overall thesis by illustrating how individual affective experiences are shaped by broader environmental contexts and arranged to foster extremist commitments. Chapter 3: Foregrounding Affectivity in Pathways to Extremism Building upon Chapter 2's micro-level analysis, this chapter develops a multi-level analytical framework examining extremism through various vantage points. Through detailed case studies, particularly Brenton Tarrant's Christchurch mosque attacks, it analyzes how digital platforms and physical spaces function as affective scaffolds. Tarrant's manifesto "The Great Replacement" and his deliberate inscription of white supremacist symbols on weapons demonstrate how physical objects and digital spaces are weaponized to create and maintain affective bonds. The case illustrates how online forums like '8chan' and the livestreaming of attacks serve to amplify emotional contagion and create templates for future extremist actions. The chapter also examines the case of Ibn-e-Umar, a 15-year-old ISIS defector, revealing how different affective arrangements operate at personal and group levels. Through these cases, the analysis connects individual radicalization processes to broader societal dynamics, demonstrating how affective arrangements function simultaneously across multiple scales - from personal interactions to societal structures. Chapter 4: The Power of Passion and Nostalgia Building on Chapter 3's multi-scalar analysis, this chapter combines situated affectivity with critical phenomenology to examine how restorative nostalgia and religious-racial passions drive extremist commitment. Through a re-examination of Brenton Tarrant's case, it illuminates how restorative nostalgia, a longing for absolute truth and tradition interacts with intense forms of devotion and zealotry to create powerful affective economies. The methodological synthesis reveals how material objects, digital spaces, and narratives function as affective scaffolds, while critical phenomenology helps unpack the lived experience of these intertwined affects. This dual analytical approach provides novel insights into how positive affective experiences—particularly the combination of nostalgic longing and passionate devotion—operate within broader socio-political contexts to justify violence and maintain extremist engagement. 154 Chapter 5: Radicalization from a Societal Perspective The concluding chapter shifts the focus to macro-level dynamics, challenging conventional counter-terrorism approaches by revealing how systematic discrimination and marginalization create environments conducive to extremism. The examination of post-9/11 policies and Islamophobia in Western contexts demonstrates how institutional racism and social trauma can function as catalysts for radicalization. This chapter is crucial to the overall thesis because it underscores the importance of understanding societal-level affective arrangements and their potential to either mitigate or exacerbate extremist tendencies. Final Thoughts Situated affectivity provides unprecedented insight into the intricate affective architectures of radicalization and extremism. On the one hand this framework reveals in detail, how individual pathways toward extremism are scaffolded through carefully engineered affective environments, as demonstrated in cases like Brenton Tarrant, Hoda Muthana and Ibn-e-Umar in chapter 3, where digital platforms, symbolic artifacts, and community practices create powerful emotional resonances that sustain extremist commitments. On the other hand, this framework also illuminates how radical organizations strategically deploy affects as recruitment tools. For example, as explained in chapter 2, ISIS's and Taliban’s sophisticated use of affective scaffolding demonstrates how vulnerable individuals are drawn into extremist ideologies through positive emotions—brotherhood, purpose, belonging—before being further entrenched through self-stimulatory loops of affect that make disengagement increasingly difficult. These loops, combining digital propaganda, community practices, and carefully curated emotional experiences, create resilient patterns of extremist commitment resistant to conventional intervention approaches. At the societal level, the framework of situated affectivity not only reveals how governments and political actors engineer affective environments to shape collective behavior but also functions as an important predictive tool. The success of Trump’s “Make America Great Again” slogan is a prime example of how nostalgic affects can be mobilized to drive political transformation. His dehumanizing rhetoric against immigrants (e.g., referring to them as threats to American society) and his policies targeting free speech—such as pressuring universities to hand over student information or banning certain protests—are instrumental in creating affective arrangements that normalize authoritarian politics. A striking manifestation of this manipulation is the recent removal of diversity-related books from the U.S. Naval Academy’s library under the guise of rejecting “divisive” narratives. Works like Maya 155 Angelou's “I Know Why the Caged Bird Sings” and literature on the Holocaust have been censored, while Hitler's “Mein Kampf”—a text rooted in white supremacy—remains available. These decisions reflect an engineered societal shift toward authoritarianism that primes populations to reject dissent and embrace exclusionary policies. Such predictive capabilities of the situated affectivity framework become even clearer when considering Chapter 1’s analysis of Pakistan. By examining the affective architecture created through state policies—ranging from the control of educational material to the enforcement of severe punishment laws, to state-controlled media promoting specific narratives—the framework illustrated how a society was primed to accept religious intolerance and authoritarian power with minimal resistance. Over decades, the state actively shaped what citizens could feel, express, and believe, leading to a population largely desensitized to atrocities committed by authoritarian regimes. This affective engineering demonstrates how controlling narratives, social norms, and values allows regimes to redirect societal emotions in ways that legitimize policies of control and oppression. Historical parallels can be found in Nazi Germany, where similar affective manipulation was used to subdue and mobilize a population. The regime systematically controlled books, such as banning works by Jewish authors or those considered “un-German,” while promoting Nazi propaganda. Authors like Thomas Mann and Stefan Zweig were exiled, while media and education were inundated with anti-Semitic, nationalist content glorifying the regime. Public book burnings became rituals that emotionally united citizens under shared ideological purposes. Furthermore, the tightly orchestrated Nuremberg rallies—with their dramatic symbolism, architectural displays, and synchronized rituals—created overwhelming collective emotional experiences, systematically priming German society for war and genocide. The Holocaust did not happen suddenly; it was the culmination of years of emotional conditioning, manipulating societal values to normalize and justify inhumane policies. In contemporary Germany, societal trends have emerged in public discourse and political representation, culminating in visible shifts toward exclusionary policies and rhetoric. The Alternative for Germany (AfD), a far-right party, has surged in electoral success, reflecting a broader societal pivot toward nationalist, exclusionary narratives. The imbalanced presentation of key issues in media suggest the construction of an affective environment conducive to the normalization of right-wing ideologies. This trend further demonstrates how analyzing affective arrangements can uncover patterns pointing toward a society’s direction— whether liberal or conservative, authoritarian or democratic. 156 The strength of situated affectivity lies in its ability to provide a detailed analysis of these affective architectures to reveal not only the mechanisms of extremism and radicalization but also the affective pathways shaping societal transformations. By applying the framework to societal norms, media patterns, educational policies, and controlled narratives, one can observe the gradual priming of individuals with specific emotional and ideological dispositions. For example, in the U.S., the shift towards right-wing authoritarianism is increasingly visible in policies that erode free speech while manipulating societal fears. This dissertation began by establishing situated affectivity as a dynamic framework capable of mapping affective pathways from individual cases of radicalization to understanding how extremist organizations manipulate affects to recruit and retain followers. As explored in earlier chapters, the framework demonstrated its utility in explaining recruitment strategies by groups like ISIS and the Taliban and connecting these individual dynamics to broader societal trends in places like Pakistan, the U.S., and Germany. The ability of this framework to uncover nuanced connections between engineered affective environments and societal behavior has profound implications for its development as a predictive tool. The findings emphasize that the affective architecture of any society—shaped by policies, social norms, media control, and cultural narratives—can predict the trajectory of that society. Whether it leans toward liberalism or authoritarianism, inclusivity or exclusion, the patterns revealed through situated affectivity point to how people are primed emotionally to accept certain ideologies and power structures. By continuing to study its application across diverse societies, this framework can be developed into a robust predictive tool, capable of producing detailed maps of affective evolutions that highlight both vulnerabilities and opportunities for timely interventions.