Re iew o Economic Pe spec i es – Ná odohospodářský obzo
Vol. 18, Issue 3, 2018, pp. 195–223, DOI: 10.2478/ e ecp-2018-0012
© 2018 by he au ho s; licensee Re iew o Economic Pe spec i es / Ná odohospodářský obzo , Masa yk Uni e si y,
Facul y o Economics and Adminis a ion, B no, Czech Republic. This a icle is an open access a icle dis ibu ed unde
he e ms and condi ions o he C ea i e Commons A ibu ion 3.0 license, A ibu ion – Non Comme cial – No De i a i es.
Fiscal-Mone a y-Financial S abili y In e ac ions in a
Da a-Rich En i onmen
Ma in Hodula,
1
Lukáš P ei e
2
Abs ac : In his pape , we shed some ligh on he mu ual in e play o economic policy
and he inancial s abili y objec i e. We con ibu e o he in ense discussion ega ding
he in luence o iscal and mone a y policy measu es on he eal economy and he inan-
cial sec o . We apply a ac o -augmen ed ec o au o eg ession model o Czech mac oe-
conomic da a and model he policy in e ac ions in a da a- ich en i onmen . Ou indings
can be summa ized in h ee main poin s: Fi s , loose economic policies (especially
mone a y policy) may ansla e in o a mo e s able inancial sec o , albei only in he
sho e m. In he medium e m, an expansion- ocused mix o mone a y and iscal poli-
cy may con ibu e o sys emic isk accumula ion, by subs an ially inc easing c edi
dynamics and house p ices. Second, we ind ha iscal and mone a y policy impac he
inancial sec o in di e en ial magni udes and ime ho izons. And hi d, we con i m ha
sys emic isk ma e ializa ion migh cause signi ican ou pu losses and de e io a ion o
public inances, igge de la iona y p essu es, and inc ease he deb se ice a io. O e -
all, ou indings p o ide some empi ical suppo o coun e cyclical iscal and mone a y
policies.
Key wo ds: inancial s abili y, iscal policy, mac op uden ial policy, mone a y policy,
in e ac ions, policy mix
JEL Classi ica ion: E44, E61, G28
Recei ed: 20 Ma ch 2018 / Accep ed: 24 May 2018 / Sen o Publica ion: 3 Sep embe 2018
In oduc ion
Success ul implemen a ion o mac op uden ial policies equi es, among o he hings, a
good unde s anding o he in e play be ween economic policies, hei espec i e a ge s,
and inancial sec o de elopmen . In his con ex , he e is an in ense policy deba e o-
cused on de e mining he ex en o which iscal and mone a y policy measu es may
in luence he unc ioning o he inancial sec o (i.e. he inancial cycle). This deba e has
gene a ed in e es in analysing he quan i a i e impo ance o policy ansmission chan-
nels o he inancial sec o , hei mu ual coo dina ion, and he implemen a ion o mac o-
p uden ial policy ools in smoo hing he inancial cycle.
1
VŠB-Technical Uni e si y o Os a a, Economic Facul y, Depa men o Economics, 15/2172
17. Lis opadu S ., 708 33 Os a a, Czech Republic, e-mail: [email p o ec ed]
2
Uni e si y o Economics in P ague, Depa men o Mone a y Theo y and Policy, 1938/4 W.
Chu chill Sq., 130 67 P ague 3, Czech Republic, e-mail: [email p o ec ed]z
Re iew o Economic Pe spec i es
196
In his pape , we con ibu e o ha deba e by p esen ing comp ehensi e ime-se ies
e idence on he iscal-mone a y-mac op uden ial policy in e ac ions in a da a- ich en i-
onmen . We di e om he apidly expanding body o li e a u e on mone a y/ iscal
policy and mac op uden ial policy in e ac ions mainly in ha we conside bo h policy
shocks simul aneously and iden i y a speci ic policy mix ha migh inc ease sys emic
isk in he inancial sec o . Fu he , we also conside he kick-back e ec o inancial
ins abili y and analyze i s p opaga ion in he eal economy. In he p ocess, we aim o
answe he ollowing ques ions: Fi s , does loose economic policy bene i inancial
s abili y? Second, do iscal and mone a y policy shocks impac he inancial sec o di -
e en ly? And hi d, how do inancial imbalances in luence eal economic ac i i y? The
analysis is conduc ed o he Czech Republic, a small open economy ha wen h ough
a ans o ma ion p ocess om a cen ally-planned o a ma ke -based economy in he
1990s. The selec ion o he coun y is pu ely p agma ic; he Czech Republic has a bank-
based inancial sec o domina ed by o eign capi al and anks among he mos open
economies in Eu ope.
A e he Lehman c ash, many o he p e-c isis claims, such as mone a y policy’s ‘be-
nign neglec ’ app oach o asse p ice de elopmen o a s ic di ision o labou be ween
di e en policy le e s, began o be ques ioned. E en he New Keynesian models, which
implied ha ce e is pa ibus p ice s abili y would be a su icien condi ion o ou pu o
emain close o i s na u al le el, we e subjec o c i icism. S udies gene ally conclude
( ega ding he p e-c isis de elopmen ) ha he low-in e es - a e en i onmen in he p e-
c isis pe iod led o he o ma ion o inancial imbalances while associa ed iscal s imuli
du ing c edi booms only deepened sys emic isk (see Taylo , 2009; Obs eld and
Rogo , 2009, o policy discussion, o Ad ian and Liang, 2016, o empi ical analysis).
The subsequen inancial c isis hen led o de la iona y p essu es and an unp eceden ed
(apa om wa ime) inc ease in public deb le els in de eloped coun ies.
3
The in-
c ease in so e eign de aul isk u he lowe ed us in deposi insu ance sys ems and,
in gene al, educed he abili y o iscal policy o suppo economic g ow h. The e o e, i
is only logical o ques ion he ole o economic policy in de e mining economic g ow h
and main aining inancial s abili y.
A e he c isis, a new se o ools was in oduced o educe he p ocyclical cha ac e o
economic policy. I s manda e is o p e en he accumula ion o sys emic isk and he
o ma ion o inancial c ises using p uden ially- uned measu es o mac op uden ial
policy. In he p esen day, i is becoming ob ious ha iscal, mone a y, and mac op u-
den ial policy a ec each o he and a s a egic con lic may a ise in ce ain si ua ions.
The e o e, Bo io (2017) claims ha coun e -cyclical economic policy se ings a e now
c ucial, as global deb le els a e a a his o ical high poin and oom o policy manoeu-
ing is ema kably na ow. In his con ex , achie ing some o m o coo dina ion be-
ween economic policy and inancial s abili y objec i es seems o be a undamen al ask.
In ac , keeping he inancial sec o s able should be in he bes in e es s o bo h mone-
a y and iscal policy, gi en he excessi e cos s o inancial ins abili y.
The emainde o he pape is o ganized as ollows: Sec ion 2 se es as a e iew o he
li e a u e published on he opic so a . Sec ion 3 ou lines he heo e ical unde pinnings
3
Bank o In e na ional Se lemen s (2016) s a es ha he public deb - o-GDP a io inc eased in
de eloped economies by mo e han 50 pe cen .
Volume 18, Issue 3, 2018
197
o he empi ical amewo k applied and desc ibes he da a employed. Sec ion 4 discuss-
es empi ical esul s, and Sec ion 5 concludes and desc ibes some o he ou s anding
challenges.
Li e a u e e iew
Mone a y policy and inancial s abili y
A ie ce deba e on he in e ac ion be ween economic policy and inancial s abili y
e up ed a e he mos ecen inancial and economic c isis in 2007-2008 and o his
poin , a numbe o bo h heo e ical and empi ical s udies we e published. A en ion was
p ima ily gi en o he in e play o mone a y policy and asse p ices – a ela ionship ha
u ned ou o be c ucial p io o he c isis. Ku ne (2013) p o ides an o e iew o he
empi ical indings bo h p io o and a e he c isis. Cu en gene ally-accep ed heo y
holds ha one may expec asse p ices o dec ease ollowing a con ac iona y mone a y
policy shock h ough he unc ioning o an asse -p ice channel. Howe e , Galí and
Gambe i (2015), using a ime- a ying amewo k, ind p o ac ed pe iods du ing which
s ock p ices inc ease a e a mone a y igh ening. On he o he hand, Paul (2018) inds
ha s ock p ices always dec ease ollowing con ac iona y mone a y policy shocks,
while Aas ei e al. (2017) ind ha Fed episodically ook eal s ock p ice g ow h in o
accoun . S ill, s ock p ice de elopmen s do no ha e a signi ican impac on mone a y
policy decision-making due o hei highe ola ili y. In his a ea, housing p ices a e
equen ly discussed, as hey a e conside ed an ea ly-wa ning indica o (G amlich e al.,
2010, Babecky e al., 2013; Laina e al., 2015), and ended o inc ease sha ply be o e he
c isis. The e o e, many au ho s ha e a gued o he inclusion o esiden ial eal es a e
p ices in he consume p ice index and he mone a y policy decision-making p ocess
(e.g Goodha 2001; Aydin and Volkan, 2011; Hampl and Ha anek, 2017). They a gue
ha his could lead o smoo he business cycle luc ua ions compa ed o con en ional
in la ion a ge ing.
In his con ex , he e has been a enewed “lean o clean” deba e aimed a e i ying
whe he he cen al bank should inco po a e asse p ice de elopmen in o i s decision-
making p ocess, e en when he cu en in la iona y a ge is no a isk. Up un il he
c isis, mone a y policy p ac i ione s only esponded o asse p ices i and when associ-
a ed isks ac ually ma e ialized and we e ansmi ed in o he eal economy (“clean up
a e wa ds” s a egy). E en oday, his app oach has i s ad oca es. S ensson (2016)
p o ides a comp ehensi e discussion and e iew o exis ing empi ical s udies and con-
cludes ha “leaning agains he wind” is s ill no ully jus i ied. Howe e , in ligh o
ecen empi ical e idence showing ha loose mone a y policy in luences asse p ices,
isk appe i e, and inancial s abili y in gene al, a g owing numbe o s udies a ou he
leaning agains he wind s a egy (see Sme s, 2014, o a e iew). Those s udies claim
ha mone a y policy should espond o inancial isk accumula ion o o es all hese
isks’ ma e ializa ion and he associa ed nega i e impac on he eal economy (Fila do
and Rungcha oenki kul, 2016).
Following his in ense discussion, a consensus o so s eme ged in he o m o a mac o-
p uden ial policy oolse o complemen exis ing capi al and liquidi y egula ions. In
many coun ies, mac op uden ial policy ep esen s an au onomous b anch o economic
policy wi h i s own objec i es ( inancial s abili y) and ools. This new pa adigm has
Re iew o Economic Pe spec i es
198
gi en ise o a new se o ques ions ega ding he ex en o which mone a y policy is
able o in luence inancial sec o de elopmen , as well as he ela i e posi ions o mone-
a y and mac op uden ial policy, and hei espec i e a ge s.
In heo y, he impac o mone a y policy on inancial s abili y is ela ed o mone a y
policy ansmission channels: he asse -p ice channel, he bank-lending channel, and he
balance-shee channel. Theo y sugges s ha lowe in e es a es should s eng hen i-
nancial s abili y. Loose mone a y policy is, unde gene al ci cums ances, ansmi ed o
lowe lending a es ( he bank-lending channel). Thus, loans become cheape and mo e
a ac i e, which hen inc eases he olume o asse s, he sha e o loans on o al asse s,
and banks’ p o i abili y. This also imp o es he balance shee s o economic subjec s
( he balance-shee channel). Ho man and Pee sman (2017) also speak o a new channel
o mone a y policy ha wo ks h ough he deb se ice a io, de ined as o al deb pay-
men s o he income o he p i a e non- inancial sec o . Ho man and Pee sman (2017)
and Juselius e al. (2017) a gue ha mone a y expansion leads o a dec ease in he deb
se ice a io, wi h lowe in e es a es on he s ock o deb ou weighing a ise in he
deb - o-income a io. D ehmann and Juselius (2012) and Lomba di e al (2017) u he
s a e ha changes in he deb se ice a io can ha e agg ega e mac oeconomic e ec s
and signi ican ly in luence inancial s abili y.
Also, one mus no o ge ha keeping in e es a es low in he long e m may induce
households and i ms o g adually inc ease le e age h ough he con en ional in e -
empo al subs i u ion e ec ( o mo e de ailed discussion see ESRB, 2016, and IMF,
2015). E en comme cial banks a e in luenced by he low in e es a e en i onmen , as
o main ain hei p o i abili y, hey need o change hei po olio s uc u e in a ou o
iskie asse s. Bo io and Zhu (2012) desc ibe his as he isk- aking channel o mone a y
policy. Recen empi ical s udies ha e al eady shed some ligh on i s unc ioning (An-
geloni e al., 2014; Abba e and Thale , 2015; Gilbe e al., 2018, o name a ew). Bo io
(2014a) claims ha accumula ion o inancial disequilib ium occu s mos o en du ing
posi i e supply shocks, which push down p ices while enhancing op imis ic expec a-
ions and in es men in o iskie asse s.
Se e al s udies s ess he need o some o m o policy coo dina ion be ween mone a y
and mac op uden ial policy. The need o such coo dina ion s ems om he obse a ion
ha mone a y and mac op uden ial policy ools a e no independen , as hey a ec bo h
he mone a y and c edi condi ions ia hei e ec on c edi g ow h (Malo ana and F ai ,
2017). A he same ime, he bes economic ou comes can be expec ed i bo h policies
a e used in a complemen a y manne and a e execu ed by a single ins i u ion (Libich,
2017). Gala i and Moessne (2013) p o ide an o e iew o esea ch on mone a y-
mac op uden ial policy in e ac ions.
Fiscal policy and inancial s abili y
Du ing he ecen inancial c isis, ex ao dina y measu es we e aken, no only by cen-
al banks bu by go e nmen s as well, o p e en a collapse o he inancial sec o .
Suppo packages om go e nmen s eached unp eceden ed le els and, despi e he ac
hey migh endange iscal de ici s (Agnello and Sousa, 2009) and long- e m deb sus-
ainabili y (Halle and Lewis, 2008; Schuknech e al., 2009), hey a e being jus i ied by
he idea ha iscal policy migh be used o help economic eco e y and, i execu ed
p ope ly, o os e inancial s abili y. In his spi i , BIS (2016) claims ha iscal policy
Volume 18, Issue 3, 2018
199
should be, compa ed o he cu en s a e o a ai s, much mo e coun e cyclical. Fiscal
policy should he e o e in imes o inancial boom gene a e a budge a y su plus and
c ea e su icien iscal space o subsequen inancial cycle con ac ion.
4
Go e nmen s
howe e o en use economic g ow h o inc ease manda o y expendi u es o go e nmen
in es men s, which, despi e o e all posi i e economic de elopmen , lead o a nega i e
p ima y balance. The e o e, iscal policy’s manoeu ing space may be subs an ially
limi ed, especially due o ill-conside ed iscal policy s a egies du ing an economic
boom. S ill, o his day he e is no uni ied iew on he linkages be ween iscal policy
and asse p ices. This is due o he ac ha no all asse p ices eac alike o iscal policy
shocks (Agnello and Sousa, 2013), and ha he iscal and inancial sec o a e inhe en ly
in e linked, making i ha d o iden i y speci ic e ec s and hei di ec ion.
To explain he in e linking in a mo e igo ous manne , le us conside he channels
h ough which changes in so e eign isk may a ec banks. One such channel wo ks
h ough he banks’ di ec holding o so e eign deb ( he asse holding channel). In gen-
e al, a inancial boom o en suppo s so e eign c edi , which lowe s he isk o so e -
eign de aul and imp o es banks’ po olios. Also, banks o en use so e eign secu i ies
as colla e al o secu e wholesale unding om cen al banks, p i a e epo ma ke s, and
issuance o co e ed bonds, and o back OTC de i a i e posi ions. So, when he p ice o
so e eign bonds inc eases, he alue o he colla e al au oma ically inc eases as well
( he colla e al channel). A i (2016) shows ha du ing a c isis, banks become hea ily
exposed o domes ic so e eign bonds, which may lead o a ise in bank unding cos s
and he c owding ou o bank lending o he p i a e sec o . Dee and Hodula (2016) add
ha in cases whe e go e nmen -owned banks di ec ly pa icipa e in la ge go e nmen al
p ojec s, banking agili y may esul in he de e io a ion o s a e unds while also ais-
ing he isk o so e eign de aul . Also, one mus no o ge ha so e eign a ings o en
ep esen a ceiling o he a ing o domes ic inancial ins i u ions, and hus any upg ade
in a coun y’s a ing also a ec s local banks ( he a ings channel). These channels,
when wo king in he posi i e di ec ion du ing a inancial boom, may g ea ly imp o e
banks’ balance shee s and he a ailabili y o addi ional capi al unding.
Du ing a inancial cycle con ac ion, howe e , go e nmen deb usually g ows because
o a dec ease in economic ac i i y and asse p ices. Acco ding o Bo io e al. (2015),
economic ou pu is nega i ely in luenced o many yea s a e a c isis.
5
Du ing a inan-
cial c isis, asse p ices signi ican ly dec ease and a ec consump ion and he eby indi-
ec axes ia weal h e ec s. The g ow h o non-pe o ming loans and decline in asse
p ices can also unde mine he heal h o p i a e inancial ins i u ions. In such cases, he
go e nmen may be o ced o ecapi alize such ins i u ions om public unds (bail-ou
cos s).
6
The e a e also likely o be second- ound e ec s on iscal a iables, pa icula ly
4
See e.g. BIS pape s: Bo io and Lowe (2002), D ehmann e al. (2012), Bo io (2014b).
5
They s a e ha du ing boom pe iods, ac o s o p oduc ion a e being mo ed o less p oduc i e
and mo e p ocyclical sec o s (e.g. cons uc ion). This ine i ably deepens and p olongs he eco-
nomic slowdown du ing inancial s ess and also weakens he sus ainabili y o public deb .
6
Fo he a e occasions when p oblems in he inancial sec o each his scope, a inancial c isis
esolu ion mechanism was o med (acco ding o he Bank Reco e y and Resolu ion Di ec i e –
BRRD). Thei aim is o p e en he need o bank ecapi aliza ion om public unds and he e o e
o p e en a inancial c isis ha ing a one- ime nega i e impac on iscal sus ainabili y.

Re iew o Economic Pe spec i es
200
when signi ican inancial ins abili y eeds back in o he economy ( o a mo e de ailed
desc ip ion o ansmission channels, see Eschenbach and Schuknech , 2004).
Fiscal-mone a y- inancial s abili y in e ac ions
O e all, he exis ing esea ch on iscal- and mone a y- inancial s abili y in e ac ions
may be g ouped in o wo s ands. One s and analyzes he e ec s o mone a y and iscal
policies on he eal economy and he inancial sec o sepa a ely, and abs ac s om he
in e linkages be ween indi idual economic policy measu es. A e iew o such s udies,
al hough by no means exhaus i e, was p esen ed in he p e ious sub-sec ions. The sec-
ond, e e -expanding s and o li e a u e analyzes he beha iou o economic agen s in
e ms o in e ac ion and exchange o in o ma ion. O e ime, i became c ucial o ac-
coun o he ac ha bo h mone a y and iscal policy in luence one ano he and in e ac
wi h hei b oad se o ins umen s. This in e ac ion and he (in)compa ibili y o hei
measu es gi e ise o a ious impac s on he eal economy and inancial sec o . I is
easonable o expec ha none o he ins i u ions in ol ed will comple ely igno e he
beha iou o o he economic policy agen s. The heo e ical ounda ions o iscal and
mone a y policy in e ac ions a e well es ablished in he li e a u e (Sa gen and Wallance,
1981; Leepe , 1991; Wood o d, 1996, among o he s). Empi ical a emp s o analyze
policy in e ac ions may be ound e.g. in Musca elli e al.(2004), Moun o d and Uhlig
(2009), Rossi and Zubai y (2011) and ecen ly in Bianchi and Ilu (2017) and O -
phanides (2017). These s udies adop di e en app oaches o he analysis, bu he au-
ho s gene ally ag ee ha mone a y and iscal policies do no con adic hemsel es in
he e en o shocks o ou pu (supply o demand shocks) and can ac as subs i u es in he
case o in la ion shocks o shocks a ec ing indi idual economic policy ins umen s. We
con ibu e o his li e a u e by p o iding comp ehensi e ime se ies e idence on iscal-
mone a y- inancial s abili y in e ac ions. We do so in a lexible amewo k using in o -
ma ion om hund eds o mac oeconomic ime se ies, which signi ican ly lowe s he
in o ma ion bias. We ely mainly on Czech mac oeconomic da a, bu ou modelling
amewo k can be ex ended o o he economies.
The heo e ical ounda ions o policy and inancial s abili y in e ac ions can be ound in
Wood o d (2011) and Ca ls om e al. (2010). Ueda and Valencia (2014) build a model
based on a loss unc ion wi h h ee elemen s: a ia ions o ou pu , in la ion, and p i a e
sec o le e age. They de i e he ollowing, a he in ui i e equa ion:
 
   
1
ln ee
yy
    

      :
,
(1)
which shows ha ex-pos le e age in he economy is gi en by su p ises in in la ion
 
e


, ou pu
 
e
yy
, and c edi g ow h

. C edi g ow h is in u n de e -
mined by egula o y measu es and c edi shocks. The ela ionship desc ibed in (1) sug-
ges s ha he inc ease o de ia ion om equilib ium o in la ion
 
e


and ou pu
 
e
yy
lowe s p i a e sec o le e age

. Assuming ha he inancial isk is posi-
i ely co ela ed wi h he le el o le e age, eq. (1) sugges s ha loose economic policies
lowe inancial isks in he economy and he e o e he isk o inancial ins abili y in he
u u e. In his pape , we a gue ha he unc ioning o he economy migh no be as
s aigh o wa d as he heo e ical models sugges , as he e ec could go ei he way, i.e.,
may be posi i e o nega i e, and is signi ican ly ime-dependen .
Volume 18, Issue 3, 2018
201
Empi ical me hodology
To s udy he iscal-mone a y- inancial s abili y in e ac ions, we use he ac o -
augmen ed ec o au o eg ession model (FAVAR) in oduced in Be nanke e al. (2005).
Ou p ima y mo i a ion o choosing he FAVAR model is o a oid he in o ma ion bias
when iden i ying he se o economic policy inno a ions.
7
Also, we wan o use he
ad an ageous logic o VAR models, which a e a heo y– ee way o “le he da a speak”
abou causali y ques ions. Las , one can ind many ypes o au o eg essi e pa e ns in
mac oeconomic and inancial ime se ies, implying ha he eal economy does no con-
s i u e a andom en i y. A VAR model accoun s o hese pa e ns and, o each a iable
en e ing he model, compu es an equa ion explaining he a iable’s e olu ion based on
i s own and o he a iables’ lagged alues.
In con as o a simple VAR model, he FAVAR model includes unobse ed low-
dimensional ac o s in he au o eg ession, educing he in o ma ion bias. The FAVAR
model hus u ilizes he ad an ages o a da a ich en i onmen , while emaining ac able
in e ms o he numbe o pa ame e s o be es ima ed. We speci y an
1M
ec o o
mac oeconomic ime se ies
Y
and a
1K
ec o o unobse ed ac o s
F
. We as-
sume ha he join dynamics o
F
,
Y
is gi en by he ollowing equa ion:
 
1
1
.
FF
L
YY



   
  
   
   
,
(2)
whe e
 
L
is a lag polynomial and

is an e o e m wi h ze o mean and co a i-
ance ma ix Q. Equa ion (2) is a s anda d VAR model ha can be in e p e ed as a e-
duced o m o a linea a ional-expec a ions model wi h bo h obse ed and unobse ed
a iables. The unobse ed a iables make he model impossible o es ima e; he e o e,
we assume ha he addi ional in o ma ional ime se ies
X
a e linked o he unobse -
able ac o s
F
and he obse able ac o s
Y
by:
y
X F Y e
   
   
,
(3)
whe e

and
y

a e ma ices o ac o loadings and
e
is a se ially unco ela ed
e o e m wi h a ze o mean (inno a ion shock). Equa ion (3) cap u es he idea ha bo h
ec o s
Y
and
F
a e pe asi e o ces ha migh d i e he common dynamics o
X
.
This s a ic ep esen a ion o he dynamic ac o model enables us o es ima e he ac o s
by p incipal componen s. As he s a ic ac o s inco po a e in o ma ion om a la ge
numbe o economic a iables, he in o ma ion se o he s uc u al ac o model is a
g ea e han ha o a s anda d VAR. Thus, i becomes unlikely ha he in o ma ion se
7
A si ua ion in which he econome ician's in o ma ion se is smalle han ha o he economic
agen s. I his is he case, he ela i ely small numbe o a iables in a small model may no be
su icien o p ope ly iden i y shocks, which inc eases he isk o a biased es ima e. Fo example,
when ying o iden i y a mone a y policy shock in a VAR model, he shock may ac ually no be
uly exogenous, as i may also cap u e ins ances when he cen al bank endogenously eac s o
changing in la ion expec a ions. Fo ni and Gambe i (2010) demons a e ha non- undamen als
can accoun o he well-known VAR p ice puzzle and he delayed o e shoo ing puzzle. Simila -
ly, Iwa a (2013) discusses wo iscal policy puzzles and hei possible explana ions.
Re iew o Economic Pe spec i es
202
o economic agen s will be supe io o he in o ma ion se employed by us. In ou appli-
ca ion, he we assume ha he ec o o obse able a iables
Y
holds only ou speci-
ied inno a ions, which a e hen assumed o ha e pe asi e e ec on he en i e econo-
my. No e ha any emaining ime se ies om ou as da ase may be linked o he
ac o s ou side o he VAR model ia ac o loadings iden i ied by he p incipal compo-
nen analysis. Fo de ails on he es ima ion p ocedu e, please consul he Appendix C.
8
Da a and iden i ica ion scheme
Ou ec o
X
o ac o ex ac ion consis s o a balanced panel o 140 qua e ly ime
se ies ep esen ing he Czech economy and he es o he wo ld. They a e d awn mainly
om he Czech Na ional Bank, Czech S a is ical O ice, and ECB da abases. The da a
spans he pe iod 2001:Q1 – 2016:Q1. Gene ally, i is no equi ed o pe o m any ex
an e ca ego iza ion o da a, bu we can bene i om s acking da a in o sub-g oups in
acco dance wi h he di e en classes o economic a iables o he sake o he cla i y o
ou compu a ional p ocess. The da a sub-g oups and co esponding a iable coun s a e
p esen ed in Table 1 below. No e ha p io o es ima ion, he da a was ans o med o
assu e s a iona i y o he ime se ies using na u al loga i hms and i s di e ences. By
modelling he iscal-mone a y- inancial s abili y in e ac ions in a da a ich en i onmen ,
we con ol o eal economy de elopmen , changes in iscal and mone a y policy, inan-
cial sec o de elopmen , and ex e nal in luences.
We iden i y policy inno a ions using ecu si e o de ing, placing unobse ed ac o s
be o e obse ed ac o s. The p incipal assump ion is ha unobse ed ac o s do no
espond o policy inno a ions wi hin he i s qua e . In o de o iden i y policy inno a-
ions, we di ide ou panel o a iables in o wo g oups: slow- and as -mo ing a iables.
Blocks desc ibing he ex e nal en i onmen , eal economy, iscal a iables, and p ices
a e classed as slow-mo ing (in he o de gi en in Table 1). A slow-mo ing a iable is
one ha is la gely p ede e mined in he cu en pe iod and is assumed no o espond
ins an aneously o he speci ied shocks. The es o he blocks a e classed as as -
mo ing a iables, which a e assumed o be highly sensi i e o con empo aneous eco-
nomic news o shocks. In case o a iscal shock, all iscal a iables a e classed as as -
mo ing as in Lagana and Sg o (2011). No e ha he a iables om which we ex ac he
inno a ions a e always o de ed las in he co a iance ma ix (and ea ed as a ac o on
hei own). This means ha we assume each o he gi en inno a ions o a ec ou la en
ac o s wi h a lag o one qua e . Since we wan o a oid a sho age o deg ees o ee-
dom, we p e e o use a smalle model wi h lowe numbe o lags. The s anda d in o -
ma ion c i e ia es s sugges h ee lags, bu using mo e sensi i e exclusion-based Gen-
e al- o-Speci ic app oach, we ind ha wo lags a e su icien . The e o e, ou baseline
FAVAR model con ains wo lags. Ne e heless, we check o he obus ness o ou
esul s la e .
8
The FAVAR modelling amewo k is used in many economic applica ions, see o ins ance
Fo ni and Gambe i (2010), Eickmeie and Ho mann (2013), Aas ei (2013) o Hodula and P ei -
e (2018).
Volume 18, Issue 3, 2018
203
Table 1 Sub-g oups in he da ase
Da a Sub-G oups
Slow/Fas Mo ing
Numbe o Va iables
Ex e nal en i onmen
(S)
12
Real economy
(S)
32
Labou ma ke
(S)
17
Go e nmen
(S)
12
P ices and p ice expec a ions
(S)
20
In e es a es and c edi
(F)
29
Financial sec o
(F)
12
Exchange a es
(F)
6
No e: The Appendix lis s he ime se ies included in hese sub-g oups. Sub-g oups highligh ed in
bold con ain a iables used as he sou ce o an iden i ied shock. Such a iables a e ne e includ-
ed in he da ase om which we ex ac he ac o s.
We conside h ee ypes o economic policy shocks: mone a y and iscal policy expan-
sion and sys emic isk ma e ializa ion. The main policy ool o he CNB is a wo-week
epo a e. Howe e , because he epo a e does no change con inuously bu only as an
ou come o CNB Boa d o Go e no s mee ings, we use he in e -bank a e o p oxy o
he CNB’s key mone a y policy a e; simila o how i is done in he CNB’s own o e-
cas ing sys em. Hence, we iden i y an expansiona y mone a y policy shock as a de-
c ease in PRIBOR 3M. F om he inancial s abili y s andpoin , an in e es a e d op
inc eases he economy’s le e age and boos s he isk appe i e o economic subjec s, and
he e o e may h ea en inancial s abili y. The main iscal policy a iables a e go e n-
men e enue om axes and o al go e nmen expendi u e, ei he o which may be used
as a sou ce o he inno a ions. Howe e , using go e nmen e enue om axes as a
sou ce a iable inc eases he isk o endogenei y, since go e nmen e enue g ow h is
associa ed wi h business cycle expansion. On he basis o hese sho comings, we iden i-
y an expansiona y iscal policy shock as an inc ease in o al go e nmen expendi u e.
9
Las bu no leas , we conside he impac o sys emic isk ma e ializa ion as pa o
inancial cycle de elopmen . We d aw his in o ma ion om he non-pe o ming loans
(NPL) a io ime se ies. Du ing inancial s ess, he NPL a io g ows because o an
inc ease in he absolu e le el o non-pe o ming loans and a dec ease in newly-g an ed
loans. Hence, he sys emic isk ma e ializa ion shock is iden i ied as an inc ease in he
NPL a io.
We conduc a numbe o checks o e i y he obus ness o ou esul s. Fi s , we use
al e na i e a iables and ime ames du ing he iden i ica ion o shocks. In case o
mone a y policy expansion, we check he obus ness o esul s wi h espec o he
CNB’s exchange a e commi men , which s a ed in No embe 2013, and he model
wi h da a ending in 2012Q1.
10
By cu ing he sample, we also add ess he ac ha he
9
Addi ionally, while changes in asse p ices may in luence go e nmen e enues, hey a e much
less likely o a ec go e nmen spending.
10
Fo mo e de ails on he exchange a e commi men (and ecen exi ) please consul he CNB
websi e a h ps://www.cnb.cz/en/mone a y_policy/exi _exchange_ a e_commi /index.h ml
Re iew o Economic Pe spec i es
210
Figu e 4 Sys emic isk ma e ializa ion, policy esponses and he inancial sec o
No es: Median impulse esponses a e epo ed wi h 90% p obabili y bands. The y-axis measu es
he s eng h o he a iable’s esponse in pe cen age poin s; he x-axis is in qua e s a e he
shock. All a iables en e he model as annualized pe cen age g ow h.
Figu e 4 gi es indica ions as o he causes behind he sys emic isk ma e ializa ion in
he inancial sec o : Wi h he dec eased abili y o economic agen s o epay hei loans,
we documen a a he sha p decline in bo h c edi dynamics and housing p ices. This
ad e se ma ke si ua ion a ec s mainly comme cial banks, which collec i ely become
much mo e isk-a e se, changing hei po olios in a o o less isky asse s (in p ac ice,
his would mani es as inc eased exposu e o he go e nmen and cen al bank). This is
a simple signaling s a egy whe ein banks s i e o p esen hemsel es as s able o de-
c ease he cos o addi ional capi al, which, due o he c isis, gene ally inc eases. In spi e
o dec easing isk-weigh ed asse s (ou come o he abo e-men ioned po olio cleans-
ing), capi al su plus signi ican ly dec eases. This migh also be achie ed by simply
inc easing he capi al equi emen s. Ma e ializa ion o sys emic isk inc eases loss p o-
isions and isk cos s, which ep esen a signi ican componen o he in e es a e on
loans. G ow h o in e es a es on loans o he p i a e sec o inc eases he deb se ice
a io and migh lead o u he de e io a ion o he loan po olio.
Conclusions
We explo e si ua ions in which iscal, mone a y, and inancial s abili y may in e ac ,
and con ibu e o he discussion abou he ela ed policies’ coo dina ion and po en ial
-0,8
-0,6
-0,4
-0,2
0,0
0,2
0,4
0 5 10 15
Housing p ice index
-0,8
-0,6
-0,4
-0,2
0,0
0,2
0,4
0 5 10 15
Loans o p i a e sec o
-0,4
-0,2
0,0
0,2
0 5 10 15
Risk-weigh ed asse s
-0,4
-0,2
0,0
0,2
0,4
0,6
0 5 10 15
Deb se ice a io
-0,4
-0,2
0,0
0,2
0,4
0,6
0,8
1,0
1,2
0 5 10 15
Loss p o isions
-0,3
-0,2
-0,1
0,0
0,1
0,2
0,3
0 5 10 15
Capi al su plus
NPL a io
inc ease

Volume 18, Issue 3, 2018
211
con lic s. We highligh he need o ake in o conside a ion bo h iscal and mone a y
policy, as hey may bo h a ec asse p ices and c edi dynamics and con ibu e o sys-
emic isk accumula ion and he e o e in luence inancial cycle ampli ude. Fo his
pu pose, we cons uc a FAVAR model o cap u e he policy in e play in a da a- ich
en i onmen . The FAVAR model helps ensu e ha he es ima ed impulse esponses a e
in a ian wi h espec o ex ensions o he in o ma ion se – an issue ha o en plagues
impulse esponse esul s.
The p esen ed model enables us o iden i y se e al pa e ns. Fi s , loose economic poli-
cies ha e a posi i e impac on inancial s abili y in he sho e m, bu his e ec may
e e se in he medium e m. In g ea e de ail, we ind ha iscal and mone a y policy-
like shocks impac he economy and inancial sec o di e en ly. While iscal expansion
in luences c edi dynamics and he ela ed se o inancial sec o a iables in he sho
e m and hen quickly ades ou , mone a y expansion seems o bene i inancial s abili y
a i s , bu i s e ec s u n nega i e in he medium e m. This somewha complica es he
answe s o he i s wo esea ch ques ions p esen ed in he in oduc ion: Fo he i s
ques ion, loose economic policies migh indeed bene i inancial s abili y in he sho
e m, bu (i kep accommoda i e long enough) hey will e en ually wo k in he oppo-
si e di ec ion, owa ds ins abili y. Fo he second, yes, iscal and mone a y policy shocks
impac he inancial sec o di e en ly. We highligh he need o conside he ull policy
mix ( iscal and mone a y policy e ec s) when o mula ing app op ia e policy measu es.
Rega ding ou hi d esea ch ques ion, we ind ha inancial imbalances (sys emic isk
ma e ializa ion) cause losses in ou pu , damage public inances, and igge de la iona y
p essu es. Fu he mo e, sys emic isk ma e ializa ion leads o inc eases in he deb se -
ice a io and migh lead o u he de e io a ion o he loan po olio.
O e all, ou esul s con i m he need o discuss and coo dina e changes in economic
policy o a oid po en ial con lic si ua ions and su p ises in he ma ke . Going beyond
exis ing esea ch, we also p o ide ime-se ies e idence showing ha mac op uden ial
policy canno iew iscal policy as Rica dian (passi e), bu mus conside i simila ly o
how i iews mone a y policy. Fu he , ou inding ha bo h iscal and mone a y policy
may be ansmi ed in o he inancial sec o and in luence he isk- aking beha io o
economic agen s p o ides suppo o coun e cyclical iscal and mone a y policy.
The e o e, we make se e al policy ecommenda ions ha may dec ease he p ocyclical
cha ac e o economic policy and mi iga e possible con lic si ua ions a low implemen-
a ion cos :
In he iscal policy a ea, we belie e implemen ing a iscal ule o es ic he p ocyclical
cha ac e o public inances and s abilize go e nmen deb o e he long e m would be
bene icial. Howe e , as he Bank o In e na ional Se lemen s (2016) s a es, i is im-
po an o augmen he iscal ule wi h a p ope au oma ic s abiliza ion scheme, and
apply i ex an e when ce ain economic condi ions a e me . Fu he , Bo io e al. (2013)
ecommend including in o ma ion abou inancial cycle de elopmen in o he po en ial
p oduc and ou pu gap es ima ion. Ano he possibili y o mi iga ing he unwan ed
iscal policy p ocyclicali y associa ed wi h sys emic isk build-up would be o pa ially
adjus he axa ion sys em in o de o limi he g ow h o ce ain ypes o c edi . Gi en
he p ocyclical de elopmen o esiden ial p ope y p ices and loans o he p i a e sec o ,
Re iew o Economic Pe spec i es
212
i would be bene icial o limi mo gage ax elie (see And ews e al., 2011).
13
The
Eu opean Commission (2015) has encou aged Membe S a es o ensu e ha ax sys ems
do no encou age household deb . Lomba di e al. (2017) gi e e idence o he nega i e
impac o high household indeb edness on GDP g ow h o e he long e m. The e a e
possibili ies o limi he impac o so e eign isk on he banking sec o . The Czech Na-
ional Bank was among he i s o implemen me hods o public inance s ess es ing
wi h special capi al equi emen s on banks wi h highe so e eign de aul isk on go -
e nmen bonds (CNB, 2016).
The impac o mone a y policy ac ions on inancial s abili y may be pa ially mi iga ed
by inco po a ing esiden ial p ope y p ices in he a ge ed consume p ice index o by
using a b oade index (Hampl and Ha anek, 2017, desc ibe CPIH on he case o he
Czech Republic) as a supplemen a y indica o o mone a y policy decisions. The e a e
also o he , mo e con o e sial p oposi ions o mi iga ing he p ocyclical cha ac e o
mone a y policy. Bo io (2016) sugges s he use o an augmen ed Taylo ule, in which
he mone a y au ho i y should espond no only o he in la ion gap bu also o some
de ined inancial s abili y gap, and s a e ha a mone a y policy ule ha akes inancial
de elopmen s in o accoun could help educe he inancial cycle, leading o highe ou -
pu in he long un.
Acknowledgemen s: We would like o hank Ja omi Baxa, Ales Melecky and wo
anonymous e e ees o hei help ul commen s on ea lie e sions o his pape . We
would also like o hank he semina pa icipan s a he 2016 Con e ence on Cu ency,
Banking, and In e na ional Finance, he 2016 Eu opean Financial Sys ems Con e ence,
Technical Uni e si y o Os a a, and he Slo ak Academy o Sciences o hei com-
men s. The iews and opinions exp essed he ein a e hose o he au ho s and do no
ep esen he iews o hei ins i u ions. All e o s and omissions emain en i ely he
aul o he au ho s.
Funding: This wo k was suppo ed by he 2017 esea ch g an (SP2017/110) om
Technical Uni e si y o Os a a and he Czech Science Agency, g an An i-cyclical
policies and ex e nal equilib ium in a model o in la ion a ge ing, No. 18-12340S.
Disclosu e s a emen : No po en ial con lic o in e es was epo ed by he au ho s.
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Re iew o Economic Pe spec i es
218
Appendix
A. Da a desc ip ion
Table 1. Da a desc ip ion and sou ces
G oup
No.
Se ies desc ip ion
Uni
Sou ce
TC
S/F
Real economy
1
Indus ial p oduc ion index, indus y o al
2010=100
CSO -Indus y, ene gy
2*
S
2
Indus ial p oduc ion index, mining and qua ying
2010=100
CSO -Indus y, ene gy
2*
S
3
Indus ial p oduc ion index, manu ac u ing
2010=100
CSO -Indus y, ene gy
2*
S
4
Indus ial p oduc ion index, elec ici y, gas, s eam and ai condi ioning
2010=100
CSO -Indus y, ene gy
2*
S
5
Sales om indus ial ac i i y, indus y o al
2010=100
CSO -Indus y, ene gy
2*
S
6
Sales om indus ial ac i i y, mining and qua ying
2010=100
CSO -Indus y, ene gy
2*
S
7
Sales om indus ial ac i i y, manu ac u ing
2010=100
CSO -Indus y, ene gy
2*
S
8
Sales om indus ial ac i i y, elec ici y, gas, s eam and ai condi ioning
2010=100
CSO -Indus y, ene gy
2*
S
9
Di ec expo sales, indus y o al
2010=100
CSO -Indus y, ene gy
2*
S
10
Di ec expo sales, mining and qua ying
2010=100
CSO -Indus y, ene gy
2*
S
11
Di ec expo sales, manu ac u ing
2010=100
CSO -Indus y, ene gy
2*
S
12
Domes ic sales, indus y o al
2010=100
CSO -Indus y, ene gy
2*
S
13
Domes ic sales, mining and qua ying
2010=100
CSO -Indus y, ene gy
2*
S
14
Domes ic sales, manu ac u ing
2010=100
CSO -Indus y, ene gy
2*
S
15
Domes ic sales, elec ici y, gas, s eam and ai condi ioning supply
2010=100
CSO -Indus y, ene gy
2*
S
16
New indus ial o de s, indus y o al
2010=100
CSO -Indus y, ene gy
2*
S
17
Non-domes ic new o de s
2010=100
CSO -Indus y, ene gy
2*
S
18
Domes ic new o de s
2010=100
CSO -Indus y, ene gy
2*
S
19
Cons uc ion p oduc ion index
2010=100
CSO - Cons uc ion
2*
S
20
House p ice index, buildings
2010=100
CSO - Cons uc ion
2*
S
21
House p ice index, ci il enginee ing wo ks
2010=100
CSO - Cons uc ion
2*
S
22
Re ail ade eceip s
2010=100
CNB, ARAD
2*
S
23
G oss domes ic p oduc , ma ke p ices
Millions CZK
CSO - GDP
2*
S
24
GDP de la o
2010=100
CNB, ARAD
2*
S
25
Final consump ion expendi u es, o al, cu en p ices
Millions CZK
CSO - GDP
2*
S
26
Final consump ion expendi u es, households, cu en p ices
Millions CZK
CSO - GDP
2*
S
27
Final consump ion expendi u es, go e nmen , cu en p ices
Millions CZK
CSO - GDP
2*
S
28
Final consump ion expendi u es, non-p o i o ganisa ions, cu en p ices
Millions CZK
CSO - GDP
2*
S
29
G oss capi al o ma ion, o al, cu en p ices
Millions CZK
CSO - GDP
2*
S
30
Expo , cu en p ices
Millions CZK
CSO - GDP
2*
S
31
Impo , cu en p ices
Millions CZK
CSO - GDP
2*
S
32
Real g oss domes ic income
Millions CZK
CSO - GDP
2*
S
33
Deb se ice a ios o he p i a e non- inancial sec o
%
BIS da abase
2
S
Labou ma ke
34
Indus y o al, a e age numbe o pe sons employed (ANPE)
no. o pe sons
CSO -Indus y, ene gy
2*
S
35
Indus y, mining and qua ying, ANPE
no. o pe sons
CSO -Indus y, ene gy
2*
S
36
Indus y, manu ac u ing, ANPE
no. o pe sons
CSO -Indus y, ene gy
2*
S
37
Indus y, elec ici y, gas, s eam and ai condi ioning supply, ANPE
no. o pe sons
CSO -Indus y, ene gy
2*
S
38
Indus y o al, a e age g oss nominal wage (AGNW)
CZK pe pe son
CSO -Indus y, ene gy
2*
S
39
Indus y, mining and qua ying, AGNW
CZK pe pe son
CSO -Indus y, ene gy
2*
S
40
Indus y, manu ac u ing, AGNW
CZK pe pe son
CSO -Indus y, ene gy
2*
S
41
Indus y, elec ici y, gas, s eam and ai condi ioning supply, AAGNWNPE
CZK pe pe son
CSO -Indus y, ene gy
2*
S
42
Cons uc ion o al, a e age numbe o pe sons employed (ANPE)
no. o pe sons
CSO - Cons uc ion
2*
S
43
Cons uc ion o al, a e age g oss nominal wage (AGNW)
CZK pe pe son
CSO - Cons uc ion
2*
S
44
Employees o al, hou s wo ked
housand hou s
CSO - GDP
2*
S
45
Employees, Ag icul u e, o es y and ishing
housand hou s
CSO - GDP
2*
S
46
Employees, Manu ac u ing, mining and qua ying and o he indus y
housand hou s
CSO - GDP
2*
S
47
Employees, Cons uc ion
housand hou s
CSO - GDP
2*
S
48
Employees, T ade, anspo a ion, accommoda ion and ood se ice
housand hou s
CSO - GDP
2*
S
49
Employees, Public adminis a ion, educa ion, heal h and social wo k
housand hou s
CSO - GDP
2*
S
50
Gene al unemploymen a e o he aged 15 o 64 yea s
%
CNB, ARAD
1*
S
Volume 18, Issue 3, 2018
219
51
Job Vacancies
housand
CNB, ARAD
2*
S
52
Unplaced job seeke s
housand
CNB, ARAD
2*
S
Go e nmen
53
Go e nmen deb , o al
Millions CZK
CSO - Go e nmen
2*
S
54
Deb secu i ies, o al
Millions CZK
CSO - Go e nmen
2*
S
55
Deb secu i ies, sho - e m
Millions CZK
CSO - Go e nmen
2*
S
56
Deb secu i ies, long- e m
Millions CZK
CSO - Go e nmen
2*
S
57
Go e nmen loans, o al
Millions CZK
CSO - Go e nmen
2*
S
58
Go e nmen loans, sho - e m
Millions CZK
CSO - Go e nmen
2*
S
59
Go e nmen loans, long- e m
Millions CZK
CSO - Go e nmen
2*
S
60
Deb in e es s payed
Millions CZK
CSO - Go e nmen
2*
S
61
Go e nmen expendi u es, o al
Millions CZK
CSO - Go e nmen
2*
S
62
Go e nmen e enue, o al
Millions CZK
CSO - Go e nmen
2*
S
P ices and p ice expec a ions
63
Consume P ice Index (CPI), o al
2015 = 100
CNB, ARAD
2*
S
64
CPI, ood and non-alcoholic be e ages
2015 = 100
CSO - P ices
2*
S
65
CPI, alcoholic be e ages, obacco
2015 = 100
CSO - P ices
2*
S
66
CPI, clo hing and oo wea
2015 = 100
CSO - P ices
2*
S
67
CPI, housing, wa e , elec ici y, gas and o he uels
2015 = 100
CSO - P ices
2*
S
68
CPI, u nishings, household equipmen , ou ine main enance
2015 = 100
CSO - P ices
2*
S
69
CPI, heal h
2015 = 100
CSO - P ices
2*
S
70
CPI, anspo
2015 = 100
CSO - P ices
2*
S
71
CPI, communica ions
2015 = 100
CSO - P ices
2*
S
72
CPI, ec ea ion and cul u e
2015 = 100
CSO - P ices
2*
S
73
CPI, educa ion
2015 = 100
CSO - P ices
2*
S
74
CPI, es au an s and ho els
2015 = 100
CSO - P ices
2*
S
75
CPI, miscellaneous goods and se ices
2015 = 100
CSO - P ices
2*
S
76
Indus ial P oduce P ices (IPP), o al
2015 = 100
CSO - P ices
2*
S
77
IPP, mining and qua ying
2015 = 100
CSO - P ices
2*
S
78
IPP, manu ac u ing
2015 = 100
CSO - P ices
2*
S
79
IPP, elec ici y, gas, s eam and ai condi ioning supply
2015 = 100
CSO - P ices
2*
S
80
IPP, wa e supply; sewe age, was e managemen and emedia ion
2015 = 100
CSO - P ices
2*
S
81
Ma ke se ices p ice indices in he business sphe e, o al
2015 = 100
CSO - P ices
2*
S
82
In la ion expec a ions o non- inancial co po a ions and companies
%
CNB, ARAD
1
F
83
Financial ma ke in la ion expec a ions
%
CNB, ARAD
1
F
In e es a es and c edi s
84
Repo a e - 2 weeks
%
CNB, ARAD
1
F
85
PRIBOR 3M
%
CNB, ARAD
1
F
86
PRIBOR 1Y
%
CNB, ARAD
1
F
87
Go e nmen bond yield 2Y
%
CNB, ARAD
1
F
88
Go e nmen bond yield 5Y
%
CNB, ARAD
1
F
89
Go e nmen bond yield 10Y
%
CNB, ARAD
1
F
90
Bank in e es a es on CZK-denomina ed loans, households o al
%
CNB, ARAD
1
F
91
Bank in e es a es on CZK-denomina ed loans, households, up o 1Y
%
CNB, ARAD
1
F
92
Bank in e es a es on CZK-denomina ed loans, households, up o 5Y
%
CNB, ARAD
1
F
93
Bank in e es a es on CZK-denomina ed loans, households, o e 5Y
%
CNB, ARAD
1
F
94
Bank in e es a es on CZK-denomina ed loans, households consume c edi
- o al
%
CNB, ARAD
1
F
95
Bank in e es a es on CZK-denomina ed loans, households o house
pu chase - o al
%
CNB, ARAD
1
F
96
Bank in e es a es on CZK-denomina ed loans, households o he loans -
o al
%
CNB, ARAD
1
F
97
Bank in e es a es on CZK-denomina ed loans, non- inancial co po a ions
%
CNB, ARAD
1
F
98
Bank in e es a es on CZK-denomina ed loans, non- inancial co po a ions,
up o 1Y
%
CNB, ARAD
1
F
99
Bank in e es a es on CZK-denomina ed loans, non- inancial co po a ions,
up o 5Y
%
CNB, ARAD
1
F
100
Bank in e es a es on CZK-denomina ed loans, non- inancial co po a ions,
o e 5Y
%
CNB, ARAD
1
F
101
Mone a y base, mon hly a e age
Billions CZK
CNB, ARAD
2
F
102
Mone a y agg ega e M1
Millions CZK
CNB, ARAD
2
F
103
Mone a y agg ega e M2
Millions CZK
CNB, ARAD
2
F
104
Loans o esiden s and non- esiden s - MFIs
Millions CZK
CNB, ARAD
2
F