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Silicon Valley Bank's collapse: interest rate risk and liquidity risk mismanagement

Abstract

The collapse of Silicon Valley Bank (SVB) in March 2023 marked one of the most significant banking failures in recent history, triggering the Panic of 2023 and raising concerns about risk management practices in the financial sector. This study analyzes the key factors behind SVB’s downfall, focusing on its exposure to interest rate risk and liquidity risk. The bank’s heavy investment in long-term securities made it highly vulnerable to rising interest rates, leading to substantial unrealized losses. Simultaneously, its dependence on large, uninsured deposits from the tech sector exacerbated liquidity pressures when withdrawals surged. Through a detailed examination of SVB’s financial statements, with special focus on its balance sheet structure, this paper identifies the main sources of the aforementioned risks to later quantify them. The findings reveal that by late 2022, SVB was already on the brink of insolvency, with significant unrealized losses on long-term securities and a fragile funding structure heavily reliant on large, uninsured deposits. The poor management of interest rate risk and liquidity risk, coupled with inadequate regulatory supervision, accelerated the bank’s downfall.

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Silicon Valley Bank's collapse: interest rate risk and liquidity risk mismanagement

Author: Leyún Prieto, Oihane
Year: 2025
Source: https://addi.ehu.eus/bitstream/10810/73639/4/TFG_OihaneLeyunPrieto.pdf
Deg ee: Double Bachelo ’s deg ee in
Business and Economics
Final P ojec in Business Adminis a ion
Cou se 2024/2025
Silicon Valley Bank's Collapse:
In e es Ra e Risk and Liquidi y Risk
Mismanagemen
Au ho : Oihane Leyún P ie o
Di ec o : Jose Manuel Chamo o Gómez
In Bilbao, on Feb ua y 13, 2025
Abs ac
The collapse o Silicon Valley Bank (SVB) in Ma ch 2023 ma ked one o he mos signi ican
banking ailu es in ecen his o y, igge ing he Panic o 2023 and aising conce ns abou
isk managemen p ac ices in he inancial sec o . This s udy analyzes he key ac o s behind
SVB’s down all, ocusing on i s exposu e o in e es a e isk and liquidi y isk. The bank’s
hea y in es men in long- e m secu i ies made i highly ulne able o ising in e es a es,
leading o subs an ial un ealized losses. Simul aneously, i s dependence on la ge, uninsu ed
deposi s om he ech sec o exace ba ed liquidi y p essu es when wi hd awals su ged.
Th ough a de ailed examina ion o SVB’s inancial s a emen s, wi h special ocus on i s
balance shee s uc u e, his pape iden i ies he main sou ces o he a o emen ioned isks o
la e quan i y hem. The indings e eal ha by la e 2022, SVB was al eady on he b ink o
insol ency, wi h signi ican un ealized losses on long- e m secu i ies and a agile unding
s uc u e hea ily elian on la ge, uninsu ed deposi s. The poo managemen o in e es a e
isk and liquidi y isk, coupled wi h inadequa e egula o y supe ision, accele a ed he bank’s
down all.
Keywo ds: Silicon Valley Bank, bank ailu e, banking c isis, in e es a e isk, liquidi y isk,
isk managemen .
2
Table o Con en s
1. In oduc ion........................................................................................................................ 4
1.1 Jus i ica ion o he Topic............................................................................................... 4
1.2 Objec i es.....................................................................................................................5
1.3 Me hodology.................................................................................................................5
2. Theo e ical F amewo k......................................................................................................6
2.1. In e es Ra e Risk (IRR).............................................................................................. 6
2.1.1. De ini ion............................................................................................................ 6
2.1.2. Main Sou ces..................................................................................................... 6
2.1.3. Measu emen ..................................................................................................... 7
2.2. Liquidi y Risk (LR)....................................................................................................... 9
2.2.1. De ini ion............................................................................................................ 9
3.2.2. Measu emen ................................................................................................... 10
2.3. IRR and LR Regula ion..............................................................................................11
2.4. IRR and LR Managemen ..........................................................................................13
3. Silicon Valley Bank’s Collapse........................................................................................15
3.1. Silicon Valley Bank His o y........................................................................................15
3.2. De ec ing IRR and LR Sou ces by Analyzing SVBFG’s Financial S a emen s......... 21
3.2.1. SVBFG’s Balance Shee .................................................................................. 21
3.2.1.1. Liabili y S uc u e o SVBFG....................................................................22
3.2.1.2. SVBG’s Asse S uc u e.......................................................................... 24
3.2.2. SVBFG’s Income S a emen and S a emen o Comp ehensi e Income......... 27
3.2.3. SVBFG’s Cash Flow S a emen ....................................................................... 28
3.2.4. Summa y o All IRR and LR Sou ces...............................................................28
3.3. IRR and LR Measu emen .........................................................................................29
3.3.1. Gap Analysis.................................................................................................... 29
3.3.2. Du a ion Analysis............................................................................................. 32
3.4. IRR and LR Managemen E o s...............................................................................34
4. Conclusions......................................................................................................................35
5. Re lec ion on he Wo k Done.......................................................................................... 36
6. Re e ences........................................................................................................................38
7. Appendix...........................................................................................................................41
Appendix 1: Bank ca ego y applicable egula ions and isk managemen equi emen s.41
Appendix 2: SVBFG’s Balance Shee .............................................................................. 42
Appendix 3: SVBFG’s Income S a emen and S a emen o Comp ehensi e Income.....43
Appendix 4: SVBFG’s Cash Flow S a emen ................................................................... 44
3
1. In oduc ion
1.1 Jus i ica ion o he Topic
Silicon Valley Bank (SVB) ailed because o a ex book case o mismanagemen by
he bank. I s senio leade ship ailed o manage basic in e es a e and liquidi y isk.
I s boa d o di ec o s ailed o o e see senio leade ship and hold hem accoun able.
And Fede al Rese e supe iso s ailed o ake o ce ul enough ac ion (Ba , 2023).
On Ma ch 10, 2023, SVB, he six een h la ges bank in he Uni ed S a es collapsed,
becoming he second-la ges bank ailu e in U.S. his o y, ollowing he all o Washing on
Mu ual Bank in 2008. The Vice Chai o Supe ision o he Fede al Rese e, Michael Ba ,
desc ibed SVB’s collapse as a “ ex book case” sugges ing ha basic managemen and
supe iso y e o s ca ied ou by mul iple pa ies led o he ailu e o a well-es ablished
ins i u ion. Howe e , he epe cussions ex ended a beyond SVB i sel . I s collapse igge ed
he Panic o 2023, a b oade banking c isis ha led o he ailu es o o he U.S. ins i u ions,
including Signa u e Bank and Fi s Republic Bank, and con ibu ed o he down all o C edi
Suisse, he la ges bank ailu e in global his o y.
This c isis is ano he eminde o he pe sis en ulne abili ies in he banking sys em.
Despi e he ex ensi e esea ch, egula ion and supe ision aimed a gua an eeing he
co ec unc ioning o he sys em and inancial s abili y, banks con inue o collapse. These
e en s a e highly dange ous, as hei ad e se e ec s can impac ma ke s, economies, and,
in some cases, he global inancial sys em. The Wall S ee C ash o 1929, he G ea
Dep ession, and he global inancial c isis o 2008, a e s iking examples o how
ulne abili ies wi hin inancial ins i u ions can escala e in o widesp ead c ises (Hull, 2018).
The ecu ence o bank collapses ein o ces he impo ance o unde s anding hei
oo causes, which has gained inc easing ele ance in ecen yea s. In ac , he 2022 Nobel
P ize in Economics was awa ded o Ben Be nanke, Philip Dyb ig, and Douglas Diamond o
hei con ibu ions o he s udy o bank ailu es and he pi o al ole o public us in ensu ing
he s abili y o inancial ins i u ions (Be nake, 1983; Diamond & Dyb ig, 1983).
Despi e i s peculia i ies, he case o SVB becomes a aluable case o each us abou
he gene al case in banking economics, demons a ing how he mismanagemen o
undamen al inancial isks can lead o se e e epe cussions. I s down all no only exposed
weaknesses wi hin he bank bu also s imula ed discussions on he e ec i eness o isk
managemen , egula ion, and c isis esponse in mode n banking.
4
1.2 Objec i es
The main objec i e o his s udy is o analyze he causes behind SVB's collapse,
ocusing on wo key a eas: in e es a e isk and liquidi y isk. This analysis aims o
con ex ualize SVB's ailu e wi hin banking isk managemen p ac ices, emphasizing how
mismanagemen o hese isks con ibu ed o i s down all.
The speci ic objec i es o his s udy a e:
● To de elop a deep unde s anding o in e es a e and liquidi y isks.
● To examine he his o y o Silicon Valley Bank and i s ajec o y.
● To iden i y and quan i y he in e es a e and liquidi y isks he bank aced be o e i s
collapse, and la e assess he managemen ailu es ha led o i s down all.
Beyond i s academic pu pose, his s udy also a ises om a pe sonal in e es in
gaining a deepe unde s anding o he banking sec o , an a ea ha , despi e i s signi icance,
is no explo ed in dep h h oughou he deg ee. I ha e conside ed his wo k as an
oppo uni y o enhance my knowledge o banking ope a ions, analyze he unde lying causes
o a bank ailu e, and unde s and he c i ical ole o e ec i e isk managemen , pa icula ly in
a sec o ha elies hea ily on public us . Fu he mo e, his wo k has allowed me o e ine
my inancial s a emen analysis skill, a capabili y I am cu en ly de eloping in my in e nship
and in end o s eng hen u he in he u u e.
1.3 Me hodology
The me hodology o his s udy combines bo h a heo e ical and p ac ical app oach.
Fi s , liquidi y and in e es a e isks a e de ined, along wi h hei iden i ica ion, measu emen ,
exis ing egula ions, and managemen s a egies. Nex , SVB’s his o y and collapse a e
examined, o unde s and how a bank wi h an inno a i e business model and apid g ow h
ul ima ely ailed. Subsequen ly, a de ailed analysis o i s inancial s a emen s, wi h special
ocus on i s balance shee , as o Decembe 2022 (jus mon hs be o e i s collapse) is
conduc ed o assess i s inancial posi ion and iden i y majo in e es and liquidi y isk
sou ces. Based on his analysis, hese isks a e quan i ied o demons a e how he bank's
ulne abili ies we e al eady e iden be o e he c isis. This examina ion will allow o a
discussion on he sho comings in isk managemen by he esponsible pa ies. Finally, he
conclusions summa ize he key indings and lessons lea ned om he SVB case.
5

2. Theo e ical F amewo k
2.1. In e es Ra e Risk (IRR)
2.1.1. De ini ion
Acco ding o he Basel Commi ee on Banking Supe ision (BCBS)1 (2004) o he
Bank o In e na ional Se lemen s (BIS)2, in e es a e isk e e s o “ he exposu e o a
bank’s cu en and u u e ea nings and capi al a ising om ad e se mo emen s in in e es
a es”. Financial ins i u ions a e especially sensi i e o in e es a e swings due o he na u e
o hei balance shee s, which include in e es -ea ning asse s and in e es -bea ing liabili ies
ha di e in ma u i ies and in in e es a es. Consequen ly, luc ua ions in in e es a es can
al e he alue o mos asse s and liabili ies. Conside ing ha ne in e es income (NII)3, he
p ima y sou ce o e enue o banks, is di ec ly a ec ed by changes in in e es a es,
e ec i e managemen o IRR is essen ial o ensu e banks’ p o i abili y and p ese e hei
economic alue.
2.1.2. Main Sou ces
The BCBS (2004) iden i ies ou p ima y sou ces om which IRR a ises:
1) Rep icing Risk: i de i es om disc epancies in he iming o in e es a e changes
and cash lows. Banks a e exposed o his isk when hey enew he liabili ies used o
und hei asse s, ha come due and a e enewed a di e en imes. Usually, banks
inance long- e m, high-yield asse s wi h sho - e m lowe -in e es liabili ies, which
makes hem liabili y-sensi i e. As a esul , hei liabili ies ep ice as e han asse s,
exposing hem o po en ial losses i in e es a es ise.
2) Yield Cu e Risk: i e e s o he isk aced by a inancial ins i u ion due o a ia ions
in he slope o he shape o he yield cu e4. I esul s om shi s in he co ela ion
be ween in e es a es a di e en ma u i ies wi hin a gi en ma ke o index.
4 The yield cu e is he unc ion desc ibing he ela ionship be ween in e es a e a ia ion and
ma u i y.
3 NII a ises om he di e ence be ween he in e es ea ned om in e es -gene a ing asse s, such as
loans and secu i ies, and he in e es paid on in e es -bea ing liabili ies, such as unds and deposi s
(Hull, 2018).
2 The BIS is an in e na ional inancial ins i u ion ha o e s inancial se ices o cen al banks and
suppo s hem in hei sea ch o mone a y and inancial s abili y h ough in e na ional coope a ion.
1 The BCBS is he p ima y global s anda d se e o he p uden ial egula ion o banks and p o ides a
o um o egula coope a ion on banking supe iso y ma e s.
6
3) Basis Risk: i a ises when he ela ionship be ween in e es a es in di e en inancial
ma ke s o ins umen s changes. This happens because he e a e many di e en
in e es a es in a gi en cu ency, which end o mo e oge he bu a e no pe ec ly
co ela ed.
4) Op ions Risk: i eme ges when a bank o i s clien holds op ions, which a e inancial
ins umen s ha gi e he igh o modi y he iming o amoun o cash lows
associa ed wi h an asse , liabili y, o o -balance-shee (OBS) ins umen .
Consequen ly, he holde o an op ion has he igh o buy o sell a inancial asse a a
speci ied p ice be o e a ce ain da e, which can be p omp ed by changes in in e es
a es. This poses a isk o nea ly all banks, which end o hold inancial ins umen s
wi h embedded op ions on bo h hei asse s and liabili ies, such as a iable- a e
loans wi h p epaymen op ions o demand deposi s.
2.1.3. Measu emen
In iew o he g ea impac IRR has on banks, p ecise and p omp measu emen o
his isk becomes essen ial o adequa e managemen . The Fede al Deposi Insu ance
Co po a ion (FDIC) (2024) holds ha inancial ins i u ions should equen ly measu e IRR
and employ a ious measu emen me hods, sui able o he bank’s cha ac e is ics, such as
i s size, complexi y and isk p o ile. This allows e alua ing how sensi i e a bank’s ea nings,
asse s and liabili ies a e o in e es a es swings. The mos widely used me hods include:
● Ea nings simula ion models: also known as ea nings-a - isk (EaR) models, o ecas
u u e p o i abili y unde di e en scena ios. They measu e sho - e m IRR by
e alua ing he po en ial impac o a e changes on he bank’s ea nings, ypically NII,
o e a speci ied pe iod, o en one o wo yea s (Boa d o Go e no s o he Fede al
Rese e Sys em, 2023a).
● Gap epo s: hey ocus on he iden i ica ion o sho - e m ma u i y and ep icing
imbalances be ween asse s and liabili ies wi hin a gi en pe iod. They gene ally
p esen a ios o a e-sensi i e-asse s (RSA) o a e-sensi i e-liabili ies (RSL)5 o
de e mine he bank’s sensi i i y. The U.S. O ice o he Comp olle o he Cu ency
(OCC)6 (2020) s a es ha a posi i e gap, o an RSA o RSL a io abo e one indica es
asse -sensi i i y, so ha asse s ep ise as e , a nega i e gap o an RSA o RSL a io
6 The OCC, an au onomous bu eau wi hin he U.S. Depa men o he T easu y, is esponsible o
egula ing and supe ising “all na ional banks and ede al sa ings associa ions as well as ede al
b anches and agencies o o eign banks” (OCC, 2020).
5 RSA (RSL) e e s o all he asse s (liabili ies) ha ma u e o a e ep iced wi hin he gapping pe iod.
7
below one indica es liabili y-sensi i i y, so ha liabili ies ep ice as e , and a neu al
gap o RSA o RSL equal o one indica es a neu al gap o no ma u i y imbalance.
● Du a ion Analysis: Macaulay’s du a ion measu es how much weigh ed a e age ime
an in es o has o wai o eco e he p esen alue o he cash lows o a bond (Hull,
2018). I helps o measu e how much he alue o an asse o liabili y would change
o a small in e es a e shi , which is o en measu ed in basis poin s7. Macaulay’s
du a ion o mula is as ollows:
,
𝐷=Σ𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖
𝐵
( )
whe e e e s o he ime, usually exp essed in yea s, in which he cash low is
𝑡
made, is he p esen alue o he cash low, and is he ma ke p ice o he bond.
𝑣 𝐵
The change in he bond’s ma ke p ice is ob ained as:
,
Δ𝐵 =−𝐷𝐵Δ𝑦
whe e s ands o he shi in he bond’s yield.
∆𝑦
● Con exi y Analysis: simila o du a ion analysis, con exi y measu es he sensi i i y o
a po olio o in e es a e shi s. Howe e , i p o ides mo e accu a e es ima es o
bond p ices, pa icula ly o la ge in e es a e changes by conside ing he non-linea
ela ionship be ween bond p ices and yields (Hull, 2018). The con exi y o a bond is:
,
𝐶= 1𝐵 𝑑2𝐵
𝑑𝑦2=Σ𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑖2𝑒−𝑦𝑡𝑖
𝐵
whe e is he bond’s yield measu ed wi h con inuous compounding and s ands o
𝑦𝑐
cash low. This is he weigh ed a e age o he squa e o he ime o he eceip o
cash lows. Hull (2018) p o ides a o mula o app oxima e he change in he bond
p ice combining bo h Macaulay’s du a ion and con exi y as ollows:
∆𝐵
𝐵 = −𝐷∆𝑦+ 12𝐶(∆𝑦)2
7 A basis poin is 0.01% pe annum.
8
2.2. Liquidi y Risk (LR)
2.2.1. De ini ion
Liquidi y isk e e s o he po en ial di icul ies an en i y may encoun e in unding
asse g ow h and ul illing paymen obliga ions, due o cash sho age o inabili y o con e
asse s in o cash wi hou acing signi ican losses. The BCBS (2008) holds ha banks a e
subjec o LR by na u e since hei co e unc ion is o ans o m sho - e m deposi s in o
long- e m loans. This misma ch be ween he ma u i ies o asse s and liabili ies, along wi h
he unce ain y o ce ain cash lows, such as deposi wi hd awals, loan enewals o new
loan eques s, heigh ens LR. Thus, adequa e LR managemen becomes essen ial o ensu e
a bank emains liquid and can mee all paymen obliga ions a any ime.
Mo eo e , insu icien liquidi y can lead o a bank un, a si ua ion whe e a la ge
numbe o deposi o s simul aneously wi hd aw hei unds om a bank because hey belie e
i migh ail o become insol en , and he e o e ea no being able o eco e hei deposi s
(Iye & Pu i, 2012). This sudden demand can cause sol en 8 inancial ins i u ions o ail as
he bank is unable o make cash paymen s when hey a e due. Besides, he p oblem o one
bank can apidly sp ead ac oss he en i e banking sec o , igge ing a bank panic. In u n,
lack o liquidi y can ha e epe cussions on he whole inancial sys em (BCBS, 2008).
Acco ding o Hull (2018) inancial ins i u ions’ liquidi y unding p oblems a ise om:
● Liquidi y s ess in he economy: c edi isk conce ns can discou age in es o s om
p o iding unding, as i happened in he inancial c isis o 2007.
● O e - eliance on sho - e m unding o long- e m obliga ions: inancial ins i u ions
end o und hei long- e m obliga ions h ough sho - e m ins umen s. These
ma u i y imbalances can b ing liquidi y issues i no managed co ec ly.
● Poo inancial pe o mance: banks ely on cus ome s’ us . I cus ome s pe cei e a
high isk o de aul , hei con idence loss may lead o a unding sho age.
In ac , banks’ insu icien liquidi y le els we e one o he easons ha s imula ed he
economic and inancial c isis o 2007. The con idence loss o he ma ke owa ds he
sol ency and liquidi y o banks impac ed no only he banking sec o bu also he inancial
sys em and he global economy (BCBS, 2011). This was a u ning poin , and since hen
awa eness o he impo ance o LR and i s managemen has inc eased and mo e
app op ia e egula ion has eme ged. The e a e many examples o bank ailu es due o LR,
8 Sol ency e e s o he abili y o a company o mee i s obliga ions. A company is sol en when i s
asse s exceed liabili ies, so ha he alue o i s equi y is posi i e (Hull, 2018).
9
s a ups o es ablished en e p ises10. Figu e 1 p esen s he g oup’s clien unds by clien
ype, p o ing i s high clien concen a ion bo h on deposi s and on unds placed OBS a ising
om VC ac i i y.
Figu e 1: SVBFG’s o al clien unds by clien ype
No es: Ea ly s age echnology, echnology, ea ly s age li e science/heal hca e and li e science/
heal hca e e e o VC-backed companies.
Sou ce: SVB Financial G oup (2023).
Unlike adi ional banks, SVB specialized in suppo ing high- isk s a up companies,
which a e cha ac e ized by unp edic able p o i abili y in hei ea ly yea s, and p o ided hem
inancial suppo ac oss hei en i e li ecycle (Al-Sowaidi & Faou , 2023). This esul ed in a
high concen a ion o unds alloca ed o VC-backed and ea ly-s age companies.
Addi ionally, i s pionee ing and pe sonalized app oach o banking enabled he
company o es ablish s ong s a egic ela ionships wi h he VC and PE i ms wo ldwide,
many o which we e no only clien s bu also po en ial in es o s in o he SVB-backed
companies. This ne wo k played a c ucial ole in acili a ing g ow h and in es men wi hin he
inno a ion ecosys em, in which SVB ac ed as a key inancial pa ne o en ep eneu s,
inno a o s and in es o s.
The g oup p o ided se ices o a di e se a ay o cus ome s ac oss he U.S. and o
in e na ional cus ome s in key in e na ional inno a ion ma ke s. Ne e heless, SVBFG
de i ed he majo i y o i s e enue om U.S. clien s, and abou 80% o i s wo k o ce was
based in he U.S., p oo o hei s ong ocus on he domes ic ma ke .
Be ween 2019 and 2021, he bank expe ienced ema kable p o i s and a subs an ial
ise in deposi pe cen age. This was due o he apid g ow h o he ech indus y du ing
COVID-19 pandemic and he economic measu es aken o s imula e he economy a he
10 SVB o e ed h ee di e en banking p ac ices aimed a each s age o he li e cycle: SVB S a Up
Banking o ea ly-s age p i a e companies wi h annual e enues below $5 million, SVB Ea ly S age
o mid-s age companies, usually en u e- unded and wi h e enues be ween $5 million and $75
million, and SVB Co po a e Banking o ma u e companies wi h annual e enues o e $75 million.
16

ime (Tellez, 2023). The nea -ze o in e es a es du ing his pe iod, combined wi h he excess
liquidi y due o he Fed’s decision o injec $2.3 illion in loans o help mi iga e he e ec s o
he pandemic, pushed in es o s owa ds iskie al e na i es yielding highe e u ns such as
s a ups (Al-Sowaidi & Faou , 2023).
All his led o inc eased VC and s a up in es men in eme ging echnology
companies (Figu e 2), which b ough a la ge in lux o capi al o he banking sec o in he
o m o deposi s (Figu e 3). SVB made g ea p o i s om aking deposi s om cus ome s,
mos ly uninsu ed11, as seen in Figu e 3, and lending hem a a highe in e es a e.
Figu e 2: U.S. VC deal ac i i y by qua e 2017-2022
No es: Deal ac i i y: equi y in es men s in s a ups.
Sou ce: Ba (2023).
Figu e 3: SVB’s deposi s e olu ion by qua e 2017-2022
Sou ce: Ba (2023).
11 Uninsu ed deposi s a e bank deposi s exceeding he insu ance limi s se by a coun y’s deposi
insu ance agency. In he Uni ed S a es, he FDIC p o ides deposi insu ance up o $250,000 pe
deposi o a each FDIC-insu ed bank o p o ec indi iduals in he e en o a bank ailu e.
17
Ne e heless, he bank s a ed o ace a lending sho age as i ecei ed mo e
deposi s han i could lend ou . To add ess his, SVB alloca ed i s excess unds p ima ily in o
longe - e m, held- o-ma u i y (HTM)12 secu i ies, bo h mo gage-backed secu i ies and U.S.
T easu y bonds, low isk in es men s ha p o ide a p edic able e u n (Tellez, 2023).
In his way, h ough almos ou decades, SVB buil a epu a ion as a co ne s one o
he inno a ion economy and es ablished s ong connec ions wi h VC and PE i ms, po olio
companies o in es o s, p ominen law i ms and in luen ial igu es in his sec o (Nguyen,
2024). In ac , almos hal o all U.S. li e sciences and echnology i ms backed by en u e
capi al ecei ed inancing om SVB, addi ional p oo o he Bank’s link o VC deal ac i i y
(SVB Financial G oup, 2023).
By 2022, SVB was he 16 h la ges bank in he U.S. based on o al asse s and had a
lo o ecogni ion. Be ween 2019 and 2023, SVBFG was lis ed in Fo bes’ p es igious annual
anking o “Ame ica's Bes Banks” o i e consecu i e yea s, as well as in “Fo bes Financial
All-S a s” in 2023. Addi ionally, he g oup was named one o he 100 bes companies o wo k
o by FORTUNE Magazine.
Ne e heless, he Fed's decision in Ma ch 2022 o aise in e es a es o igh in la ion
b ough se e e consequences o he bank and con ibu ed o i s collapse. Th oughou 2022,
he Fede al Funds Ra e, he in e es a e ange a which banks lend o one ano he and a
key benchma k o o he in e es a es, inc eased o a ound 4.5% (Kozlowski &
Jo dan-Wood, 2023). Figu e 4 shows he e olu ion o he Fede al Funds E ec i e Ra e
be ween he beginning o 2020 un il Ma ch 15, 2023.
This comple ely changed he shape o he yield cu e, which by he end o he yea
was nea ly la a a ound 4% o all ma u i ies, indica ing ha he e m-sp ead (o he highe
yield o longe e ms) was elimina ed (Me ick, 2024). Highe a es dec eased he ma ke
alue o he company’s in es men secu i ies and led o un ealized losses13. Mo eo e , hese
highe a es diminished he appeal o iskie in es men s, educing clien s' in e es in unding
new companies and accele a ing he ou low o deposi s (Tellez, 2023).
13 Un ealized losses a e po en ial losses ha a ise when he ma ke alue o a secu i y alls below i s
pu chase p ice, ep esen ing he loss ha would be incu ed i he secu i y we e sold (Ba , 2023).
12 HTM secu i ies consis o secu i ies in ended o be held un il ma u i y, so ha he bank eco ds hem
a amo ized his o ical cos . Howe e , i banks decide o sell e en a pa o hem, hey ha e o
eclassi y all o hem as a ailable- o sale (AFS) a ma ke alue (Vicke y e al., 2015).
18
Figu e 4: Fede al Funds E ec i e Ra e E olu ion by qua e be ween Janua y 1, 2020
and Ma ch 15, 2023
No es: Uni s in pe cen ages. F equency: daily (7-Day).
Sou ce: Own elabo a ion, da a om Boa d o Go e no s o he Fede al Rese e Sys em ia FRED.
The inc ease in deposi wi hd awals caused liquidi y issues o he bank owa ds i s
clien s. To add ess his, SVB sold go e nmen bonds a a p ice lowe han he pu chase
p ice, which u ned un ealized losses in o ealized ones. Al hough he si ua ion wen
unno iced o a while, i u ned se ious when Moody's In es men Se ice h ea ened
downg ading SVB’s c edi a ing by mo e han one no ch due o he Bank’s di icul ies o
mee deposi o s' wi hd awal eques s (Wang, 2023).
In iew o his, on Ma ch 8, 2023, SVBFG announced a es uc u ing o i s balance
shee . “SVBFG had sold $21 billion in a ailable- o -sale (AFS) secu i ies, was booking a
$1.8 billion a e - ax loss, was planning o inc ease e m bo owings by $15 billion o $30
billion, and was seeking o ise $2.25 billion in capi al” (Ba , 2023). The aim was o sell he
low-yielding bonds o ein es he money in asse s yielding highe e u ns, which, along wi h
he sold sha es, would o se he incu ed losses (Wang, 2023).
The ollowing day, panic eme ged among uninsu ed deposi o s, who in e p e ed he
announcemen as a signal o inancial dis ess, which led o a bank un. Wi hd awals o
uninsu ed deposi s app oached $42 billion on Ma ch 9 h, almos 25% o o al deposi s, wi h
es ima es indica ing an addi ional $100 billion ou low on Ma ch 10, nea ly deple ing he
bank’s emaining deposi s. Acco ding o Ba (2023), he un was spa ked by social media
and he i m’s concen a ed clien ele o VC in es o s and echnological i ms ha wi hd ew
hei deposi s simul aneously, esul ing in a ema kable deposi ou low ha accoun ed o
85% o he bank’s o al deposi s. In ac , a s udy conduc ed by Bales & Bu gho (2024)
p o ed how in ense social media ac i i y, especially on Twi e and Google, accele a ed
19
SVB’s collapse by in luencing i s s ock p ice and enabling eal- ime bank un coo dina ion
be ween Ma ch 8 and Ma ch 10, 2023 as shown in Figu e 5.
Figu e 5: Public eac ion o SVB’s es uc u ing announcemen (Ma ch 8-10, 2023)
Sou ce: Bales & Bu gho (2024).
SVB collapsed on Ma ch 10, 2023, due o insu icien cash o mee he ex ao dina y
and sudden ou lows ha caused a bank un. Tha mo ning, he Cali o nia Depa men o
Financial P o ec ion and Inno a ion closed SVB, becoming he as es bank closu e in U.S.
banking his o y, and appoin ed he FDIC as ecei e , which subsequen ly led o he
bank up cy o SVBFG (Ba , 2023). The egula ion and supe ision in place o p e en bank
ailu es p o ed insu icien in a e ing his ou come.
Ne e heless, as p e iously men ioned, bank ailu es a e a ely isola ed e en s.
SVB’s collapse igge ed sys emic isk and se o he Panic o 2023, leading o he ailu es o
o he wo egional banks, namely Signa u e Bank and Fi s Republic Bank, due o simila
exposu e o uninsu ed deposi s and IRR. The con agion e ec caused widesp ead deposi
wi hd awals, esul ing in hei shu downs on Ma ch 12 and May 1, espec i ely.
In an a emp o con ain he c isis, egula o s in oked he “sys emic- isk excep ion”
om he 1991 law, which allowed he FDIC o ully co e uninsu ed deposi s a SVB and
Signa u e. Howe e his measu e p o ed insu icien , and oge he , hese h ee bank ailu es
ep esen he la ges ailu es in U.S. his o y. Ul ima ely he c isis sp ead o Eu ope,
culmina ing in he collapse o C edi Suisse in Ap il 2023, he la ges bank ailu e in global
his o y (Me ick, 2024).
20
3.2. De ec ing IRR and LR Sou ces by Analyzing SVBFG’s Financial S a emen s
3.2.1. SVBFG’s Balance Shee
By he end o 2022, SVBFG’s balance shee al eady p esen ed a isky s uc u e, and
he isks associa ed wi h i could be spo ed. The company held $211.8 billion wo h o
asse s (see Appendix 2 o SVBFG’s balance shee ), consis ing o $120.1 billion in
in es men secu i ies, $73.6 billion in loans, $13.8 billion in cash, and $4.3 billion in o he
asse s. Equi y accoun ed o $16.3 billion, while liabili ies amoun ed o $195.5 billion. O
hese liabili ies, $173.1 billion we e deposi s, $13.6 billion we e sho - e m bo owing, $5.4
billion we e long- e m bo owing and $3.4 billion ell unde o he liabili ies. Figu e 6 p o ides
an o e iew o SVBFG’s balance shee s uc u e as o Decembe 31, 2022.
Figu e 6: SVBFG’s Balance Shee S uc u e Decembe 31, 2022
No es: The colo g adien ep esen s he liquidi y o asse s and liabili ies, wi h da ke blues indica ing
illiquid i ems and ligh e shades ep esen ing mo e liquid ones. While loans a e gene ally mo e illiquid
han in es men secu i ies, his was no he case o SVB, as explained along his sec ion.
Sou ce: Own elabo a ion, SVB Financial G oup (2023).
While o al asse s emained ela i ely s able, amoun ing o $211.3 billion in 2021, he
changes om one yea o he nex we e p ima ily d i en by shi s wi hin indi idual asse and
21

liabili y ca ego ies, a he han a signi ican change in he o e all o al. These shi s e lec
how clien s and he bank esponded o he changing economic en i onmen h oughou
2022, and sugges ed po en ial isks o he ollowing yea .
Hence, analyzing SVBFG’s balance shee s uc u e will p o ide an unde s anding o
he company’s inancial posi ion a he yea -end and he isks i aced p io o i s collapse. By
examining he e olu ion o he composi ion o asse s and liabili ies, and conside ing hei
ma u i y pe iods, i known, he main sou ces o IRR and LR will be iden i ied, which he
company could, and should, ha e iden i ied. Fo his analysis, da a has been ob ained om
he SVBFG’s 2022 annual epo (2022 Annual Repo onwa ds).
3.2.1.1. Liabili y S uc u e o SVBFG
As p e iously men ioned, SVBFG’s liabili ies we e composed o deposi s, sho - e m
bo owings, long- e m deb and o he liabili ies. In o al, hey amoun ed o $195.5 billion
($194.7 billion in 2021). Table 1 p o ides a de ailed b eakdown o he composi ion o
SVBFG’s liabili ies and hei espec i e ma u i ies as o Decembe 31, 2022, as well as a
compa ison o he company’s liabili ies as o Decembe 31, 2021.
Table 1: SVBFG’s Liabili ies (Decembe 31, 2022)
(Dolla s in
millions)
Unce ain
One yea o
less
Mo e han one
yea o i e
yea s
Mo e han
i e yea s
To al 2022
To al 2021
Deposi s
$ 166,416
$ 6,682
$ 11
$ 173,109
$ 189,203
ST bo owings
$ 13,565
$ 13,565
$ 71
LT deb
$ 2,995
$ 2,375
$ 5,370
$ 2,570
O he liabili ies
$ 3,454
$ 3,454
$ 2,855
To al liabili ies
$ 166,416
$ 23,701
$ 3,006
$ 2,375
$ 195,498
$ 194,699
Sou ce: Own elabo a ion, SVB Financial G oup (2023).
The liabili y s uc u e o SVBFG p esen ed a high unding concen a ion, wi h
deposi s being he bank’s main sou ce o unding. Despi e he no o ious deposi ou low
expe ienced du ing 2022, deposi s s ill accoun ed o almos 89% o o al liabili ies by he
end o ha yea , d opping om o e 97% in 2021.
To compensa e o he $16.1 billion dec ease in deposi s, he company signi ican ly
inc eased i s sho - e m bo owings, by nea ly $13.5 billion. While hese bo owings,
p ima ily composed o sho - e m loans, ep esen ed jus 7% o o al liabili ies, hey became
he bank’s second-la ges sou ce o inancing, su passing long- e m liabili ies. This
22
signi ican inc ease highligh s he bank's e o s o add ess i s liquidi y needs and mee i s
obliga ions. Acco ding o he 2022 Annual Repo , he weigh ed a e age in e es a e on
hese bo owings was 2.9%.
Addi ionally, a $2.8 billion inc ease in long- e m deb , which comp ised senio no es,
subo dina ed deb , and con e ible deb wi h ma u i ies exceeding one yea , alongside a
$0.6 billion inc ease in o he liabili ies, which included a ious sho - e m ope a ional
payables, ully o se he decline in deposi s. All hese adjus men s collec i ely led o a sligh
inc ease in he company’s o al liabili ies, which nega i ely impac ed i s NII due o highe
in e es expenses.
Focusing on deposi s, he bank’s p ima y sou ce o unding, in 2022, hey we e
composed o $166.4 billion in demand deposi s, which we e payable on demand, and $6.7
billion in ime deposi s (commonly known as e m deposi s), p edominan ly wi h a ixed
ma u i ies o h ee mon hs o less. This s uc u e exposed he bank o signi ican unce ain y
ega ding he iming o deposi wi hd awals, as mos o i s unding could be equi ed by
clien s’ on e y sho no ice. This unce ain y c ea ed a need o SVB o main ain su icien
liquidi y o mee clien s’ po en ial wi hd awal demands, making i pa icula ly ulne able o
bank uns and inc easing i s LR.
Mo eo e , holding such a high p opo ion o demand deposi s inc eased he bank’s
exposu e o op ion isk, a componen o IRR. Since deposi o s could wi hd aw hei unds a
any ime, luc ua ions in in e es a es could incen i ize ea ly wi hd awals, as seen in 2022.
Fascione e al. (2024) highligh ha digi aliza ion has educed deposi s abili y and inc eased
deposi sensi i i y o in e es a e changes. This end unde sco es he need o banks o
adap hei liquidi y isk managemen s a egies o an en i onmen whe e wi hd awals can
occu mo e apidly han e e be o e.
By yea end, o al deposi s comp ised $80.8 billion in non-in e es bea ing (down
om $125.9 billion in 2021) and $92.4 billion in in e es bea ing (up om $63.4 billion in
2021). These shi s e lec cus ome s’ eac ion o ising in e es a es. On he one hand,
holde s o non-in e es -bea ing deposi s we e incen i ized o seek yield-gene a ing
al e na i es, ei he wi hin he bank by swi ching o in e es -bea ing deposi s, o ex e nally in
he ma ke . On he o he hand, assuming he bank aised in e es a es on deposi s o s ay
compe i i e, clien s wi h in e es -bea ing deposi s had mo i es o e ain hei unds. This
simul aneous inc ease in in e es -bea ing deposi s and decline in non-in e es deposi s
ansla ed in o highe in e es expenses o he bank, which nega i ely impac ed i s NII.
23
Besides, ha ing a cus ome base highly concen a ed and homogeneous u he
inc eased he bank’s exposu e o LR and a po en ial bank un. As SVB’s clien s ope a ed in
ela ed sec o s, he economic and inancial condi ions a ec ing one sec o simul aneously
impac ed a la ge po ion o he bank’s deposi base. The e o e, while he g ow h o he ech
sec o be ween 2019 and 2021 con ibu ed o subs an ial deposi in lows, his eliance also
posed signi ican isk o simul aneous wi hd awals in imes o inancial need, lowe ech
unding o educed VCl ac i i y, as i happened in 2022.
I is no ewo hy ha $151.5 billion o all deposi s we e la ge enough o be uninsu ed,
making SVBFG he bank wi h he highes pe cen age o uninsu ed deposi s among all banks
wi h asse s o $50 billion o mo e (Me ick, 2024). This agg a a ed he bank’s unding
concen a ion, as mos o i s unding came om ewe clien s wi h la ge deposi s.
3.2.1.2. SVBG’s Asse S uc u e
Mo ing in o SVBFG’s asse s, he company held cash, loans, in es men secu i ies
and o he asse s, amoun ing o $211.8 billion ($211.3 billion in 2021). Table 2 p o ides a
de ailed b eakdown o he composi ion o SVBFG’s asse s and hei espec i e ma u i ies as
o Decembe 31, 2022, along wi h a compa ison o he company’s asse s he yea be o e.
Table 2: SVBFG’s Asse s (Decembe 31, 2022)
(Dolla s in
millions)
No
speci ied o
no ma u i y
One yea
o less
Mo e han
one yea o
i e yea s
Mo e han
i e yea s o
en yea s
Mo e han
en yea s
To al
2022
To al
2021
Cash
$ 13,803
$ 13,803
$ 14,586
Ne loans
$ -636
$ 42,913
$ 18,251
$ 13,086
$ 73,614
$ 65,854
In es men
secu i ies
$ 2,664
$ 1,153
$ 15,520
$ 7,441
$ 93,276
$ 120,054
$ 127,959
O he asse s
$ 375
$ 3,082
$ 865
$ 4,322
$ 2,909
To al asse s
$ 2,403
$ 60,951
$ 33,771
$ 20,527
$ 94,141
$ 211,793
$ 211,308
No es: Ma u i ies o cash and o he asse s ha e been es ima ed conside ing he na u e o he asse s.
Asse s wi h no ma u i y o no speci ied ma u i y include allowance o c edi losses in nega i e sign
(classi ied unde ne loans), non-ma ke able secu i ies (classi ied unde in es men secu i ies) and
goodwill (classi ied unde o he asse s).
Sou ce: Own elabo a ion, SVB Financial G oup (2023).
The company’s asse s uc u e was p edominan ly composed o in es men
secu i ies, mos ly wi h ma u i ies o e en yea s, which accoun ed o 57% o o al asse s by
he end o 2022. Loans, on he o he hand, accoun ed o 35% o o al asse s. Acco ding o
24
Ba (2023), his alloca ion was no ably a ypical, as mos la ge banking o ganiza ions (LBOs)
alloca e, on a e age, 24% o hei o al asse s o in es men secu i ies and 58% o loans.
O he $120.1 billion in es men secu i ies, as shown in Table 3, $91.3 billion we e
HTM secu i ies, ep esen ing 76% o o al secu i ies (almos he double o an a e age LBO),
$26.1 billion we e AFS14 secu i ies, which comp ised 22% o o al secu i ies, and $2.7 billion
we e non-ma ke able and o he equi y secu i ies15 accoun ing o 2%.
Table 3: SVBFG’s In es men Secu i ies (Decembe 31, 2022)
(Dolla s in
millions)
No
speci ied o
no ma u i y
One yea
o less
Mo e han
one yea o
i e yea s
Mo e han
i e yea s
o en yea s
Mo e han
en yea s
To al 2022
To al
2021
AFS
$ 1,084
$ 14,784
$ 2,963
$ 7,238
$ 26,069
$ 27,221
HTM
$ 69
$ 736
$ 4,478
$ 86,038
$ 91,321
$ 98,195
Non-ma k.
$ 2,664
$ 2,664
$ 2,543
In es men
secu i ies
$ 2,664
$ 1,153
$ 15,520
$ 7,441
$ 93,276
$ 120,054
$ 127,959
No es: Non-ma k.: non-ma ke able and o he equi y secu i ies. AFS secu i ies a ai alue, HTM
secu i ies a amo ized cos .
Sou ce: Own elabo a ion, SVB Financial G oup (2023).
As p e iously explained, al hough SVB’s p ima y ac i i ies we e deposi in ake and
loan issuance, he excess liquidi y gene a ed by he high olume o deposi s be ween 2019
and 2021, combined wi h he ela i ely weake lending ac i i y, led he bank o in es i s
unds in long- e m HTM secu i ies. This s a egy aimed o gene a e e u ns by in es ing in
secu i ies adi ionally conside ed low- isk, as hei nominal alue is eco e ed a ma u i y
and hey end o p o ide egula and s able cash lows, and because mos o hem we e
issued by he U.S. go e nmen , so hey posed low c edi isk. Ye , holding such a high sha e
o hese ins umen s exposed he bank o bo h signi ican IRR and LR, since secu i ies wi h
la ge ma u i ies a e highly sensi i e o a e luc ua ions.
Meanwhile, mos loans we e sho - e m c edi lines, p ima ily g an ed o PE and VC
i ms ha need inancing be o e ecei ing capi al con ibu ions om hei in es o s. In
con as , he company ex ended e y ew comme cial o esiden ial mo gages. Besides,
15 Non-ma ke able secu i ies a e no adeable and equi y secu i ies do no ma u e (Vicke y e al.,
2015).
14 AFS secu i ies a e lexible secu i ies ha he bank may ei he sell o e ain o long pe iods, and
since hey a e accoun ed o a ma ke p ice, hey a e eco ded a ai p ice in he balance shee .
(Vicke y e al., 2015).
25
p opo ional inc ease in asse income, nega i ely impac ing p o i abili y. This nega i e e ec
would ha e in ensi ied in he in e media e e m, wi h a $98.40 million dec ease in NII, as he
nega i e accumula ed gap con inued o g ow. This e idences he bank’s ulne abili y o
ising a es, as liabili ies would ha e been e inanced a highe cos s, while asse income
would no ha e been su icien o compensa e o his.
In con as , in he long e m, he posi i e accumula ed gap would ha e led o a
$13.89 million inc ease in NII, as long- e m asse s exceeded liabili ies, so ha in e es
income would ha e ou weighed he highe unding cos . Howe e , his bene i would ha e
been limi ed because many o hese asse s we e ixed income, educing he bank’s abili y o
ully cap u e he a e inc ease. Ne e heless, he bank’s inancial p oblems and lack o
liquidi y led o i s collapse be o e i could bene i om he long- e m e e sal.
Gi en SVB's signi ican ma u i y misma ch and exposu e o in e es a e isk, Golding
& Lucas (2023) a gue ha pe iodic disclosu e o he du a ion gap should be equi ed o all
medium and la ge banks o enhance egula o y and ma ke o e sigh . They de end ha
s anda dized disclosu es would allow ea ly de ec ion o eme ging isks, helping o p e en
c ises like SVB’s. Addi ionally, hey p opose linking capi al equi emen s o du a ion gap
le els o discou age excessi e in e es a e exposu e, which could ha e p o ided an ea ly
wa ning signal in SVB’s case.
3.3.2. Du a ion Analysis
Since SVB held a la ge p opo ion o i s asse s in in es men secu i ies, conduc ing a
du a ion analysis allows quan i ying he impac o small basis poin inc eases in in e es a es
on hese secu i ies’ alue and, consequen ly, on he bank’s ne wo h.
The 2022 Annual Repo al eady p o ides he weigh ed a e age du a ion o bo h he
AFS and HTM secu i ies po olios, which co esponds o he Macaulay du a ion. Since AFS
secu i ies’ du a ion is 3.6, and HTM secu i ies’ du a ion is 6.2, he es ima ed change in
ma ke alue due o a 0.1% (10 basis poin s) inc ease in in e es a es is as ollows:
Δ𝐴𝐹𝑆 =−3.6*26,069*0.001=−$93.85 𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑛
Δ𝐻𝑇𝑀 =−6.2*91,321*0.001=−$566.19 𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑢𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑 𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠 =−(93.85+566.19)=− $660.04 𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑛
This indica es ha a 0.1% ise in in e es a es would ha e caused almos a $94
million dec ease in he ma ke alue o he AFS secu i ies po olio and a ound a $566
million dec ease in he HTM secu i ies po olio. In o he wo ds, he ma ke p ice o AFS
32

secu i ies would ha e d opped o a ound $25,975 million, while HTM secu i ies would ha e
declined o $90,755 million, leading o a o al o $660 million in addi ional un ealized losses.
By yea -end 2022, SVB al eady epo ed $17.7 billion in un ealized losses on i s
secu i ies po olio (as men ioned in Sec ion 3.2.1.2), o conc e ely $17,699 million, b inging
he o al un ealized losses o $18,350 million a e ac o ing in he addi ional losses. Gi en
ha SVB’s equi y s ood a $16,295 million, hese losses would ha e exceeded he bank’s
capi al base. No ably, only he un ealized losses om AFS secu i ies would ha e been
e lec ed on he balance shee , adjus ing epo ed equi y o $16,201 million. Howe e , i he
bank had been o ced o sell i s en i e secu i ies po olio (as ul ima ely happened), bo h AFS
and HTM losses would ha e been ealized, making i c i ical o SVB o ha e su icien equi y
o abso b hem.
Ne e heless, his du a ion analysis p o ides a simpli ied es ima ion based on a 0.1%
a e inc ease. To assess SVB’s ac ual exposu e mo e accu a ely, i is essen ial o conside
he 24-basis-poin inc ease (0.24 p.p.) in he Fed Funds Ra e om 4.33% o 4.57% be ween
Janua y 1, 2023, and Ma ch 8, 2023 ( he day SVB announced i s balance shee
es uc u ing) (Boa d o Go e no s o he Fede al Rese e Sys em, n.d.). Unde his
scena io, assuming he bank main ained i s secu i ies holdings, he addi ional un ealized
losses would be:
Δ𝐴𝐹𝑆 =−3.6*26,069*0.0024=−$ 225.24 𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑛
Δ𝐻𝑇𝑀 =−6.2*91,321*0.0024=−$1,358.86 𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑢𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑 𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠 =−(225.24+1,358.86)=−$1,584.10 𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑛
As a esul , he o al un ealized losses would ha e inc eased o app oxima ely
$19,283 million ($17,699 million + $1,584 million), u he highligh ing SVB’s ex eme
ulne abili y o in e es a e mo emen s. Gi en ha he bank’s o al equi y was only $16,295
million, his mean ha po en ial losses had u he exceeded i s capi al base, ein o cing
deposi o s' conce ns abou SVB’s sol ency and igge ing he bank un.
Had SVB been able o hold i s in es men secu i ies un il ma u i y, i migh ha e
a oided ailu e. Howe e , his scena io was unlikely, as un ealized losses had al eady
su passed i s equi y, making i inc easingly di icul o es o e con idence and main ain
liquidi y.
33
3.4. IRR and LR Managemen E o s
The main p oblem ha con ibu ed o he collapse was he poo managemen o IRR
and LR ac oss all ou lines o de ense, as men ioned in he beginning o his s udy. On he
i s line, many people, such as OOnagh McDonald (2023), o me B i ish Membe o
Pa liamen , highligh SVB Boa d’s lack o inancial and banking se ices knowledge and
expe ience a accep ing he isky and concen a ed business model. Besides, a he
ope a ional le el, he company ocused on sho - e m p o i abili y a he han ensu ing
long- e m s abili y. Decisions such as o e - eliance on HTM secu i ies wi h long ma u i ies, o
closing ou isk hedges when in e es a es we e high o make sho - e m p o i s, ins ead o
holding hem o mi iga e po en ial losses, exposed he bank o signi ican isk.
Fu he mo e, he second line o de ense, consis ing o isk managemen and in e nal
con ol, also ailed o p ope ly manage IRR. Fi s ly, om Ap il 2022 o Janua y 2023, he
company did no ha e a Chie Risk O ice , which u he hinde ed he o e sigh o bo h IRR
and LR. Besides, acco ding o he Fed, he me ics SVB used o assess IRR we e basic and
mos ly o ien ed owa ds NII a ia ions (Ba , 2023). The e o e, hey only con empla ed isk in
he sho - e m, and did no conside he impac on he economic alue o equi y, o he
long- e m. Rega ding LR, he company ailed i s in e nal liquidi y es s bu ook no ac ion,
and had no con ingency unding plan. Ins ead o add essing he p oblems and inding a
solu ion, hey eso ed o mo e elaxed s ess es s o ob ain be e esul s and c ea e a alse
sense o secu i y.
Addi ionally, he hi d line o de ense p o ed o be e y weak. The Fed admi ed ha
SVB’s in e nal audi ailed o hold managemen accoun able o poo isk managemen ,
despi e clea signs o an ine ec i e isk managemen p og am (Ba , 2023). This esul ed in
insu icien independen assu ance ega ding he e ec i eness o isk managemen ,
go e nance, and in e nal con ols. Besides, he audi unc ion did no challenge
managemen ’s assump ions, allowing isky decisions o pe sis unchecked.
Finally, ex e nal o e sigh o SVBFG p o ed inadequa e, as egula o s ailed o de ec
and ac upon SVB’s IRR and LR ulne abili ies and manage ial weaknesses in a imely
manne (Ba , 2023). SVB was supe ised by h ee agencies, namely he Cali o nia
Depa men o Financial P o ec ion and Inno a ion, he Fede al Rese e Bank o San
F ancisco, and he FDIC as he backup ede al egula o , and hey all ailed (Me ick, 2024).
As he bank expanded apidly, supe iso s unde es ima ed i s ulne abili ies, keeping
elaxed capi al and liquidi y equi emen s unde he EGRRCPA. Despi e ising isks, SVB
con inued o be a ed as well-managed, delaying s ic e o e sigh . E en when de iciencies
34
in in e es a e and liquidi y isk managemen we e iden i ied, egula o s ook li le ac ion and
issued no o mal indings (Ba , 2023). Addi ionally, he egula o y amewo k lacked clea
guidance on IRR, allowing banks o igno e un ealized losses, and he EGRRCPA’s elaxed
s anda ds hinde ed o e sigh by exemp ing SVB om s ic e equi emen s, like compu ing
he LCR, making supe iso s less asse i e in en o cing co ec ions.
In conclusion, SVB’s collapse was no only a esul o poo in e nal isk managemen
bu also a ailu e o egula o y o e sigh . While managemen made decisions ha
heigh ened i s exposu e o IRR and LR, supe iso s ailed o in e ene e ec i ely, and
egula o y policies allowed signi ican ulne abili ies o pe sis . This combina ion o in e nal
mismanagemen and ex e nal supe iso y weaknesses c ea ed he condi ions ha ul ima ely
led o SVB’s down all.
4. Conclusions
In conclusion, he case o SVB demons a es how a combina ion o o eseeable
ac o s can lead o a majo c isis when mismanaged. I s balance shee e lec ed a s uc u e
highly exposed o LR and IRR, bo h o which we e easily iden i iable and quan i iable. E en
wi h simple me ics like hose used in his s udy ( a less sophis ica ed han hose employed
by banks), i has been shown ha , by he end o 2022, i was al eady e iden ha he
ins i u ion would ace se ious liquidi y issues, la gely due o i s high exposu e o IRR in a
ising- a e en i onmen . Fu he mo e, i s business model, cha ac e ized by a highly
concen a ed clien base, u he ampli ied i s ulne abili y.
The in e connec edness and apid esponse o SVB’s clien s, ueled by social media,
and combined wi h p edominan ly uninsu ed deposi s, acili a ed he sp ead o panic once
he bank’s p oblems became public. This chain eac ion accele a ed he liquidi y c isis,
o cing SVB o sell asse s a signi ican losses and lea ing i wi h no lexibili y o espond.
Al hough SVB’s in es men s we e concen a ed in low- isk asse s, i s in es men
s a egy did no align wi h he eali y o i s liabili y s uc u e, which was p ima ily composed o
ola ile, sho - e m, o unce ain-ma u i y deposi s. The misma ch be ween asse s and
liabili ies, combined wi h a high concen a ion in bo h unding sou ces and in es men s, as
well as in i s cus ome base, c ea ed he pe ec condi ions o he c isis. Consequen ly, as
in e es a es ose, he alue o i s in es men s declined a mo e han expec ed; when
clien s eac ed, wi hd awals mul iplied; and, lacking lexibili y, he bank was unable o
wi hs and he liquidi y c isis wi hou incu ing massi e losses.
35
SVB's collapse also e eals ailu es ac oss he ou lines o de ense. The i s line
allowed an in es men s a egy misaligned wi h he bank’s unding s uc u e. The second
ailed o iden i y and quan i y isks in a imely manne o implemen e ec i e mi iga ion
measu es. In e nal audi did no exe cise su icien o e sigh o e isk managemen , and
ex e nal supe ision nei he de ec ed no demanded imely co ec i e ac ions. This
combina ion o de iciencies allowed manageable issues o escala e in o a la ge-scale c isis.
Mo eo e , he exis ing egula o y amewo k p o ed inadequa e o an a ypical
ins i u ion like SVB, highligh ing he need o bo h supe ision and egula ion o adap o he
cons an ly e ol ing banking sys em. As iskie , non- adi ional banks eme ge, cu en
o e sigh has epea edly allen sho in p e en ing collapses. Meanwhile, egula o y
esponses, such as bailou s, ha e ein o ced he oo big o ail pe cep ion, po en ially
unde mining inancial s abili y in he long un.
This case unde sco es he impo ance o p uden managemen o IRR and LR, as
well as he need o di e si y bo h unding sou ces and he cus ome base. I also e eals he
signi icance o a well-designed in es men s a egy ha no only seeks p o i abili y bu also
accoun s o po en ial isks and adap s o he eali y o he business. In a sec o as
ulne able as banking, whe e ma u i y misma ches a e an inhe en cha ac e is ic, ha ing
e ec i e mechanisms o iden i y and manage isks is c ucial o p e en ing uncon ollable
c ises.
SVB’s collapse u he e idences ha he s abili y o he inancial sys em depends
no only on he indi idual decisions o each bank bu also on he obus ness o hei in e nal
con ols and he e ec i eness o egula ion and supe ision. When hese ail collec i ely,
e en sol en ins i u ions can ail due o a c isis o con idence wi h sys emic consequences.
5. Re lec ion on he Wo k Done
The analysis o SVB’s collapse p o ides insigh in o he c ucial ole o inancial
s abili y in a democ a ic socie y and i s di ec link o sus ainable de elopmen . A
well- unc ioning banking sys em suppo s economic g ow h, public us , and ins i u ional
anspa ency. This s udy aligns wi h se e al Sus ainable De elopmen Goals (SDGs),
pa icula ly SDG 16: Peace, Jus ice, and S ong Ins i u ions, SDG 8: Decen Wo k and
Economic G ow h, SDG 9: Indus y, Inno a ion, and In as uc u e, and e en SDG 3: Good
Heal h and Well-being.
36
SVB played a key ole in inancing s a ups and inno a i e indus ies (SDG 9),
os e ing en ep eneu ship and inno a ion. Many o i s clien s belonged o he li e sciences
sec o , con ibu ing o ad ancemen s in heal hca e and medical esea ch (SDG 3). The
bank’s ailu e dis up ed unding o bio ech i ms and heal h s a ups, posing isks o
inno a ion in medical ea men s and echnologies. Mo eo e , i s collapse exposed c i ical
weaknesses in isk managemen and egula o y o e sigh , h ea ening inancial s abili y and
economic g ow h (SDG 8 and SDG 9), and ein o cing he need o obus ins i u ions and
anspa en go e nance (SDG 16).
F om a democ a ic pe spec i e, SVB’s case unde sco es he need o inancial
anspa ency, egula o y accoun abili y and esponsible banking p ac ices (SDG 16). A
well- egula ed banking sys em is essen ial no only o p o ec ing deposi o s bu also o
ensu ing economic s abili y and p e en ing c ises ha could hinde inno a ion, job c ea ion,
and social p og ess (SDG 8 and SDG 9).
37

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40
7. Appendix
Appendix 1: Bank ca ego y applicable egula ions and isk managemen equi emen s
Bank
ca ego y
To al Asse
Range
Key Applicable
Regula ions
Main Risk Managemen
Requi emen s
U.S. domes ic
i ms (2022 Q4)
Ca ego y I
Globally
Sys emically
Impo an Banks
(G-SIBs)
$700B in o al
≥
asse s o $75B
≥
in c oss-bo de
ac i i y
- Dodd-F ank Ac
- Regula ion YY
- Basel III
- EPS unde
Fed/OCC/FDIC
- Annual s ess es s
- Addi ional capi al bu e
o GSIBs
- In ensi e sys emic isk
supe ision
- S ic liquidi y
equi emen s (LCR, NSFR)
- Resolu ion planning
- Bank o Ame ica
- Bank o New Yo k
Mellon
- Ci ig oup
- Goldman Sachs
- JPMo gan Chase
- Mo gan S anley
- S a e S ee
- Wells Fa go
Ca ego y II
$700B in o al
≥
asse s o $75B
≥
in ce ain
exposu es
- Dodd-F ank Ac
- Amendmen s
unde EGRRCPA
- Regula ion YY
- Biennial s ess es s
- Full LCR and NSFR
compliance
- In ensi e liquidi y and
capi al supe ision
- Simpli ied esolu ion plans
- No he n T us
Ca ego y III
$250B in o al
≥
asse s o $75B
≥
in speci ic isk
indica o s
( unding,
o -balance-shee
exposu es, e c.)
- Dodd-F ank Ac
- EGRRCPA
- Regula ion YY
- Biennial s ess es s
(se e ely ad e se scena io
equi ed)
- Pa ial LCR and NSFR
compliance (50%)
- Ligh e supe ision
compa ed o Ca ego ies I
and II
- Capi al One
- Cha les Schwab
- PNC Financial
- T uis Financial
- U.S. Banco p
Ca ego y IV
$100B in o al
≥
asse s; does no
mee c i e ia o
Ca ego ies I, II,
o III
- Dodd-F ank Ac
- EGRRCPA
- Regula ion YY
- Biennial s ess es s o
se e ely ad e se scena ios
- No manda o y LCR o
NSFR, bu basic liquidi y
managemen and
con ingency planning
equi emen s
- Mo e limi ed capi al and
liquidi y o e sigh
compa ed o highe
ca ego ies
- SVB Financial
- Ally Financial
- Ame ican Exp ess
- Ci izens Financial
- Disco e
- Fi h Thi d
- Fi s Ci izens
- Hun ing on
KeyCo p
- M&T Bank
- Regions Financial
Banks wi h
< $100B
< $100B in o al
asse s
- EGRRCPA
- Speci ic s a e o
ede al
egula ions
depending on he
ins i u ion ype
(FDIC o OCC)
- Exemp om EPS*
- S anda d supe ision
(adequa e capi al, basic
isk managemen , e c.)
- No equi ed o conduc
s ess es s (al hough some
ins i u ions may pe o m
in e nal es ing)
No es: EPS: Enhanced P uden ial S anda ds. Regula o y equi emen s unde he Dodd-F ank Ac .
Sou ce: Own elabo a ion wi h da a om Dodd-F ank Ac , Regula ion YY, Basel III, EGRRCPA and
Fede al Rese e Supe ision and Regula ion Repo May 2023.
41