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The origin principle and the welfare gains from indirect tax harmonization

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to establish a parallelism between the analyses in Keen (1987,1989.a) referred to indirect tax harmonization when taxes are levied according to the destination principle and its counterpart when taxes are imposed on an origin basis. Using a simple two-country model of international trade it is argued that indirect tax harmonization under the origin principle, considered as a movement of domestic taxes towards an appropriately designed "average" tax structure, is potentially Pareto improving, in the sense that the welfare of a given country can be increased provided that the other country's welfare is kept unchanged with the aid of an international transfer. In the same vein, it is shown that if the initial position is a Nash equilibrium, there are situations under which the above-mentioned reform may generate an actual Pareto improvement, so that both countries improve their welfare without any need for a compensating international transfer. As stated above, the definitive system will be a mixed one, so that the pure origin case is not the most realistic framework from a policy point of view. However, it may be useful in yielding indications that, coupled with the results that have been obtained under the destination principle, provide insights on the effects of the definitive system.

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The origin principle and the welfare gains from indirect tax harmonization

Author: López García, Miguel Ángel
Publisher: Universidad de Sevilla. Departamento de Teoría Económica y Economía Política
Year: 1996
Source: https://idus.us.es/bitstreams/8dd0d0f6-10c2-46b3-bf75-71d7d1748594/download
P.S.P.
2
/10-2-96
I I I
ENCUENTRO
DE
ECONOMIA
PUBLICA
Depa amen o
de Teo ía Económica y Economía Polí ica
Uni e sidad
de
Se illa
Se illa
9, 10 de
eb e o
de 1995
PONENCIA
The o igin p incipie and he
wel a e
gains om
indi ec ax
ha moniza ion.
Miguel Ángel LÓPEZ GARCÍA
Depa amen o
de Economía Aplicada.
Uni e sidad
Au ónoma de
Ba celona.
In oduc ion
The
li e a u e dealing
wi h
he coo dina ion o economic policies among coun ies o
g oups
o coun ies in an in eg a ed wo ld
s ands
ou as one o he mos p ominen
de elopmen s o he las ew yea s. Al hough no he only one, a clea applica ion o he esul s
eme ging om his li e a u e is associa ed
wi h
he ax app oxima ion e o s
ha
ha e been
ca ied
ou
in
he Eu opean
Union,
and, wi hou any
doub ,
he abo e-men ioned de elopmen
canno be unde s ood wi hou a e e ence o
hese
eal wo ld e en s. One o he issues mos
ac i ely
esea ched has p obably been
ha
o indi ec axa ion, s imula ed by he Eu opean
Comission
p oposals aimed a ha monizing
alué
added
axes and
excises.
In pa icula , some
ques ions ela ed o ax compe i ion ha e been analyzed
in
di e en con ex s
[Min z
and
Tulkens
(1986),
de C omb ugghe and Tulkens
(1990),
Sinn
(1990),
Lockwood
(1993),
Kanbu and
Keen
(1993)]
as
well
as he wel a e e ec s o indi ec ax ha moniza ion policies
[Keen
(1987,1989.a,1989.b),
Tu unen-Red and Woodland
(1991),
Keen
and
Lahi i
(1993)].
The
amewo k o he analysis o he impac o ha monizing e o ms has been he
des ina ion
p incipie,
i.e., he p incipie
ha
in e na ionally aded commodi ies a e axed a he
a es o (and he e enue acc ues o) he coun y in
which
inal
consump ion akes place. The
al e na i e o he des ina ion p incipie is he o igin, o sou ce, p incipie, unde
which
commodi ies en e ing in ema ional
ade
a e axed a he a es p e ailing in he coun y whe e
hey a e p oduced ( his being he one
which
collec s he e enue). Al hough he des ina ion
p incipie
has been he cen al idea go e ning he ha monizing e o s o indi ec axa ion
ha
ha e been ca ied ou by he Eu opean
Comission,
he aboli ion o
bo de
con ols has ende ed
i
unsus ainable. The de ini i e sys em, o be enac ed a he s a o 1997, main ains he
des ina ion sys em o ansac ions be ween i ms bu c oss-bo de pu chases by
indi iduáis
will
be axed on an o igin basis,
hus
appea ing as a mixed sys em.
The
pu pose
o his
pape
is o es ablish a pa allelism be ween he analyses in
Keen
(1987,1989.a)
e e ed o indi ec ax ha moniza ion when axes a e le ied acco ding o he
des ina ion p incipie and i s coun e pa when axes a e imposed on an o igin basis.
Using
a
simple wo-coun y model o in ema ional
ade
i is a gued
ha
indi ec ax ha moniza ion
unde he o igin p incipie, conside ed as a mo emen o domes ic axes owa ds an
app op ia ely designed "a e age" ax s uc u e, is po en ially Pa e o
imp o ing,
in he sense
ha
he wel a e o a gi en coun y can be inc eased p o ided
ha
he
o he
coun y's wel a e is kep
unchanged
wi h
he aid o an in ema ional ans e . In he same
ein,
i is shown
ha
i he
ini ial
posi ion is a Nash equilib ium,
he e
a e si ua ions unde
which
he abo e-men ioned
1
e o m
may
gené a e
an ac ual Pa e o imp o emen , so
ha
bo h coun ies imp o e hei wel a e
wi hou any need o a compensa ing in ema ional ans e .
As
s a ed abo e, he de ini i e sys em
will
be a
mixed
one, so
ha
he
pu é
o igin case is
no he mos ealis ic amewo k om a policy poin o
iew.
Howe e , i may be use ul in
yielding
indica ions
ha ,
coupled
wi h
he esul s
ha
ha e been ob ained unde he des ina ion
p incipie,
p o ide insigh s on he e ec s o he de ini i e sys em. In he same way as
Keen
(1987,1989.a)
cons uc s his ha monizing e o m unde he des ina ion p incipie in such a way
ha
(neglec ing income e ec s)
wo ld
p oduce p ices a e unchanged, he coun e pa o his
analysis
unde he o igin p incipie
does
no a ec
wo ld
consume p ices.
This
pa alellism
ansla es in o modi ying he common
a ge
owa ds
which
coun ies ha monize hei indi ec
ax
s uc u es,
which
does
no depend on
local
demand esponses bu on
local
supply
esponses. The s uc u e o he
pape
is as
ollows.
In sec ion 1 he basic model is se up.
Sec ion
2 conside e ax ha moniza ion as a po en ial Pa e o imp o emen . Sec ion 3 poses he
ques ion whe he he speci ic
kind
o ha monizing e o m being analyzed can also esul in an
ac ual
Pa e o imp o emen .
Sec ion
4
includes
some addi ional commen s.
1.
The model
The
basic amewo k is a s anda d model o in ema ional
ade
[Dixi
and No man
(1980)]
in
which
wo coun ies, labelled as "home" and "ab oad",
ade
in N commodi ies.
Each
coun y's
a iables
a e ep esen ed by lowe case and uppe case le e s espec i ely, and
he e
is a single consume
in
each o hem. The only dis o ions a e due o consump ion axes,
le ied
on an o igin basis, so
ha
commodi ies a e axed a he a es
p e ailing
in he coun y in
which
hey a e p oduced, his being he coun y
which
collec s he ax e enue.
Since,
assuming away anspo cos s, he applica ion o he o igin p incipie implies
ha
consume
p ices
in each coun y a e he same, we ha e he ollowing ela ionship be ween consume
p ices,
q-Q, p oduce p ices in each coun y, p and P, and he ax ins umen s, and
T:
[1]
P = q- P=q-T
whe e axes a e exp essed in speci ic e ms.1
1
Since he applica ion o he o igin p incipie implies ha expo s a e axed and impo s a e exemp ed, he home
(ab oad)
coun y's consume mus be indi e en , in
equilib ium,
be ween
payingp + (P + T) o domes ically-
p oduced goodsand P + T (p + ) o impo ed
goods.
Thus,
consume p ices a e equalized ac oss coun ies, i.e.,
q = Q. On he wo king and consequences o he o igin p incipie see Cnossen and Shoup (1987) and Keen
(1990,1993).
2
The
home and o eign consume s can be cha ac e ized by hei expendi u e unc ions,
e{q,ü)
and
E(q,
U),
whe e u and U s and o he
u ili y
le éis
achie ed by he consume in each
coun y. Tax e enue is e u ned o he
indi iduáis
as a lump sum paymen . As o he
p oduc ion
side,
i
is
assumed
ha
bo h coun ies beha e
compe i i ely,
and hei beha iou can
be esumed in he e enue unc ions
(p)
and
R(P).2
Since
he
pa ial
de i a i es
o he expendi u e and e enue unc ions
yield,
espec i ely,
he compensa ed demand and supply unc ions, he
wo ld
ma ke -clea ing condi ions o he N
commodi ies a e
gi en
by:
[2]
e¿q,u)
+ E¿q,
U)
= p(p) + Rp(P)
whe e
he subindices
deno e
he
( ec o
o )
pa ial
de i a i es
o he ele an unc ions.
Consume
expendi u e in each coun y equals na ional income a domes ic p ices plus
ax
e enue.
Using
he sign' o
deno e
ansposi ion, he
budge
cons ain s
in
each coun y can
be
w i en
as:
[3]
e(q,u) = (p) + ' p(p) + qxz
[4]
E(q,U)
= R(P) + T'R iP)-qlz
whe e
' p(p) and T' R (P) exp ess ax e enue in each coun y. The e m z ep esen s a
ans e o commodi y
1
om he o eign coun y o he home one. I s pu pose is o cha ac e ize
e o ms
en ailing a po en ial Pa e o imp o emen , in he sense
ha
u can be inc eased o a
gi en
alué
o U. The ole o z
is
jus
ha
o assu ing
ha
he o eign
u ili y
le el
does
no
change. On he o he hand, z = 0 in [3] and [4] when he ocus is on cha ac e izing an ac ual
Pa e o imp o emen , i.e., a si ua ion in
which
bo h « and U inc ease wi hou any need o an
in ema ional
ans e .
As
a ma e o
no maliza ion,
commodi y
1
is aken o be he nume ai e (so q = 1) and
is
assumed o be un axed in bo h coun ies
(i.e.,
= T =
0).
In o de o
a oid
excessi e
no a ion, ec o
p ices
will
he ea e be in e p e ed as being oiN-
dimensión.
By
Wal as'
Law
one o he N+2 equa ions in
[2]-[4]
can be d opped, so we can
d op
he equilib ium condi ion
o
commodi y 1. The e o e he sys em in
[2]-[4]
can be desc ibed as N+l independen
equa ions
wi h
N+l a iables. In he sea ch o a po en ial Pa e o imp o emen he la e a e
N-l
ela i e consume p ices, q, he home
u ili y
le el,
u, and he size o he in ema ional
2
The
e enue
(o
GNP)
unc ion, exp essing he
alué
o p oduc ion a gi en p oduce p ices (and amoun s o
he
p ima y
ac o s), is ex ensi ely discussed in Dixi and No man (1980, ch. 2).
3
ans e , z, gi en he ax pa ame e s and T as
well
as he o eign
u ili y
le el,
U. Al e na i ely,
in
he sea ch o an ac ual Pa e o imp o emen he N+l
a iables
a e q, u and U and he
pa ame e s a e / and T.
2. Tax Ha moniza ion as a Po en ial Pa e o Imp o emen
Conside
i s
ax ha moniza ion as a po en ial Pa e o imp o emen , so
ha
he policy
leads o an inc ease in one coun y's wel a e when i is accompanied by an app op ia e
in ema ional ans e o he
o he
coun y so
ha
i s wel a e
le el
is kep cons an . We can
hus
e alúa e
in
[2]-[4]
he wel a e e ec s in e ms o he
home
coun y's wel a e, du, o an
a bi a y ax e o m, {d ,dT}, coupled
wi h
he ans e , dz, equi ed o hold U unchanged.
Di e en ia ing
in
[2]-[4]
wi h
dU = 0, we ha e:
[5]
eq/iu
+
[eqj
+
EC í-
pp - Rpp]dq +
ppd
+
RPPdT
= 0N.i
[6]
e,¿lu+[eq- p- pp ydq
+
' ppd -dz
= 0
[7]
[Eq-Rp-RPPT],dq+T'Rppd +dz = 0
whe e is he (N-1)- ec o o ze oes.
Thus,
elimina ing dz in
[6]
and
[7]:
du] = -( ' ppd +T'RPPdT) •
dq [
-{ ppd
+ RppdT)
whe e A = +
Egj
- pp -
Rpp,
i.e, he ma ix o he de i a i es o he compensa ed wo ld
excess demand o he non-nume ai e
goods
wi h
espec o he non-nume ai e p ices, is
nega i e semi-de ini e. I
will
be assumed
h oughou
ha
he e
is enough subs i u abili y in
demand o p oduc ion be ween he nume ai e good and he
o he
goods
o ensu e
ha
A
will
be
nega i e de ini e.3
The
sys em in
[8]
allows
one o ob ain an exp ession o he change in
home
u ili y,
du,
as a unc ion o he e o m associa ed
wi h
d and dT:
-{ '
ppd
+ T'
RppdT)
-( pp
+
RPPT)'
-( ppd + RppdT) A
whe e:
3
See Dixi and No man (1980, ch. 5).
[8]
-( pp +RPPT)'
'qu
[9]
du -
4

[10]
a = eu + ( pp +
RPPT)
'A^e^
and i can be shown ha a is posi i e whene e an inc ease in he home coun y's endowmen
o
he
i s
commodi y, a cons an ax a es and o eign
u ili y,
implies a s ic po en ial Pa e o
imp o emen . We
will
assume his is he case.
The
no ion o ha moniza ion is usually aken o mean making he ax sys ems mo e
"uni o m".
This
en ails bo h a p ocess o con e gence owa ds a common
a ge
and he
sugges ion o de e mining his
a ge
as some
kind
o a e age o he
exis ing
ax s uc u es. The
i s
ques ion can be app oached as a p og am o domes ic ax e o ms
implying
a uni o m
p opo iona e con e gence o he ax a es in bo h coun ies owa ds a ce ain common s uc u e
H,
i.e.:
whe e H is a N-l ec o and /3 is a
small
posi i e scala
which
measu es he
"size"
o he
e o m.
As o he second ques ion, i.e., he choice o he common
a ge
o
which
bo h
coun ies "ha monize" hei axes, he coun e pa o he p oposi ion shown in
Keen
(1987)
e e s o he pa icula class o ha monizing e o ms [11]
which
imply
a con e gence owa ds
he ec o
The
in e p e a ion o
[12]
becomes clea e when i
is
ew i en as:
[13]
H=<P +(INA-<P)T
whe e
<P
= [ pp + Rpp]'l pp and is he iden i y ma ix o o de N-l, so
ha
(Ip¡_i
-
<P)
=
[ pp + RpP]'1Rpp. As shown in
[13],
His a
ma ix
weigh ed a e age o he ax s uc u es in he
wo coun ies whe e he weigh s depend on
local
supply esponses. In pa icula , i
hese
local
supply
esponses a e iden ical a he s a ing posi ion, i.e., pp = RPp, [13] becomes
H=
(l/2)(í+7),
and each componen o His loca ed jus midway be ween he co esponding
componen s o he
ini ial
domes ic ax s uc u es and T.
Now
we can show
ha
he ha monizing e o m unde examina ion leads o a wel a e
imp o emen :
[11]
[12]
H=
[ pp + RppY pp +
RPPT)
5
P oposi ion 1: When
axes
a e
le ied
acco ding o he o igin p incipie, and
gi en
any
a bi a y
ini ialposi ionin
which * T, he ha monizing e o m in
[11]-[13],
consis ing in a
p opo iona e
con e gence
owa ds
an
app op ia e
weigh ed
a e age
o he
exis ing
domes ic
ax
s uc u es,
gene ales
a
po en ial
Pa e o
imp o emen .
P oo . The p oo uns pa allel o
ha
o
Keen
(1987)
and hinges on he ac
ha
[11]-[13]
imply:
[14]
ppd +
RppdT
=
OAM
whose subs i u ion in
[9]
gi es ise o:
[15]
du=
±( ' pPd +T'RppdT)
= ^-{T- yRPp$(T- )>0
whe e he inequali y ollows om he ac
ha
he ma ix
Rpp<P=
Rp [ pp + Rpp' 1 pp =
Tpi
+ Rpp}1 is posi i e de ini e.
Q.E.D.
Some in ui ion on he esul can be ob ained i we neglec income e ec s o he non-
nume a ie goods, i.e., i e^ =
0p¡. .
Subs i u ing in
[8]
and using
[14]
p o ides dq-
OJV-I,
so
ha
wo ld
consume p ices do no
a y.
The e o e, he ha monizing e o m is designed o lea e
consume p ices unchanged. As a consequence,
wo ld
demand,
e¿ q,u)
+
E< q,U),
will
no
change, as nei he
will
wo ld
supply, p(p) +
Rp(P).
The only e ec o he policy is he
" ealloca ion"
o p oduc ion be ween coun ies so
ha
he
agg ega e
wel a e loss om dis o ing
axes is dec eased.
A
g aphical explana ion is p o ided
in
Figu e
l.4
I shows he
simpli ied
case in
which
he wo coun ies ha e he same supply schedule o a single axed good whose consume
wo ld
p ice is q. The excess bu den associa ed
wi h
he axes and T in each coun y is gi en
by ABC
in coun y 1 and
ADE
in coun y 2. In his case in
which
supply esponses a e he
same, i he wo coun ies ha monize hei axes a he
le el
(1/2)
( + T) implied by
[12],
he
educ ion in
excess
bu den in he high- ax coun y is
BCFG,
which
exceeds he inc ease in he
low- ax
coun y,
DEFG.
Since he dis ances y
¿y
and y y a e he same,
agg ega e
supply
does
no
a y.
P o ided he app op ia e in ema ional ans e is made, one coun y can imp o e
wi hou he o he one expe iencing any wel a e change.
Figu e
1 is he eoun e pa in he p esen con ex o he analysis o ha moniza ion unde he des ina ion
p incipie
in Keen (1990,1993). I am indeb ed o Ben Lockwood o
sugges ing
his diag am in his discussion o
he pape a he Copenhagen mee ing o he
HCM
esea ch ne wo k on
"Fiscal
Implica ions o Eu opean
In eg a ion".
6
3.
Tax Ha moniza ion as an Ac ual Pa e o Imp o emen
While
he p e ious sec ion has a gued
ha
he ha monizing e o m
[11]-[13]
is wel a e
imp o ing
in he sense
ha
i inc eases he
u ili y
le el
o a coun y p o ided he
o he
coun y's
wel a e
is kep unchanged, he ques ion
ha
a ises is whe he his e o m may also imply an
ac ual Pa e o imp o emen , i.e., a gain in bo h coun ies' u ili y wi hou any need o an
in ema ional compensa ion.
This
is he ques ion discussed in
Keen
(1989.a) when axes a e
le ied
acco ding o he des ina ion p incipie unde he assump ion
ha
he a e no income e ec s
o
he N-l axed commodi ies
(i.e.,
—
Equ - 0#_i in e ms o he
p esen
model).
The
analysis can now be ca ied ou o cing z = 0 in
[2]-[4]
and in e p e ing he N+l
a iables
as N-l consume p ices, q, and wo u ili y
le éis,
u and
U,
o gi en
alúes
o he ax
pa ame e s and
T.
Di e en ia ing o ally
we
ob ain:
[16]
e^/iu +
EqUdU
+ Adq +
ppd
+
RppdT
=
Oy.i
[17]
eudu
+ [eq- p -
pp ]'dq
+
' ppd
= 0
[18]
EudU+[Eq-Rp-RpPT]'dq+T'RppdT =0
1
Using
[16]
o isola e dq, he e ec s on wel a e, du and dU, associa ed
wi h
an a bi a y
e o m
{d ,dT} a e he solu ion o he sys em: 5
[19]
c«
-
(eq
- p -
pp )
'A' eq4 - {eq - p - pp )
'A
EqU
-
{Eq-RP-
RppT)'A'Xeqi
E -(Eq-RP-RPPT)'A'lEqU_
dU}
=
L
dU i
-
'
ppd
+ (eq - p - pp ) 'A'
( ppd
+ RppdT)
T'RppdT
+{Eq-Rp-
RppT)'A~ ppd +
RppdT)
_
We
can now assume, as in
Keen
(1989.a),
ha
he e
a e no income e ec s o he N-l
axed
goods,
i.e.:
[20]
Zqu
=
Equ=0 í-l
so
ha
all
income e ec s a e h ough he un axed nume ai e.
This
allows
one o ew i e
[19]
as:
{eq- p- pp yAA
[21]
eju
EudU
' +(eq- p- pp )'A~
(Eq-Rp-RpPT)'A
1
T'
+{Eq-Rp-RPPT)'A
ppd
RppdT
Sol ins
o
du
we ob ain:
[22]
du = M[ ' - (eq - p -
pp )']AA ppd
- (eq - p -
pp )
'A'lRPPdT}
and a
simila
exp ession o dU. Focusing on he ha monizing e o ms
[11]-[13],
and ecalling
ha
hey imply
ppd
+
RppdT
= 0#-i,
[22]
becomes:
[23]
du= —{ 'S - 'ST)
5
In
he
pa icula
case o he ha monizing e o ms [11]-[13], and using [14], he igh hand side in [19] becomes
-
í
' ppd
, -
T'RppdT']
' -
We can obse e ha adding he exp essions o
du
and dU
in
[19] we md a weigh ed
sum
o he wel a e changes expe ienced by bo h coun ies:
[eu + { pp
+
RppT)'Aleq^du
+
[E
+
( pp
+
RPPT)'A'X
Eqjj dU
-
- (í
' ppd
+
T
'RppdT)
> 0
whe e he weigh s a e a (> 0) in [10] and i s coun e pa A (> 0) o he o eign coun y. Since his is posi i e
using he igh hand side in [15], he ha monizing e o m [11]-[13] is wel a e-enhancing in he
sense
ha i
inc eases he
alué
o a social wel a e unc ion W = au + AU, i.e., an addi i e measu e o wo ld wel a e whe e
he weig hs a ached o each coun y a e a
and
A. Ac ually, his esul is no su p ising when compa ed o ha
in
sec ion 2, and he p ocedu e in ha sec ion has he ad an age o ocusing on he ole o he in ema ional
ans e
dz
equi ed
o
du
o be posi i e o a gi en
alué
o U.
8