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Calling vs receiving party pays : market penetration and the importance of the call externality

Abstract

In this paper we study how the access price affects the choice of the tariff regime taken by the network operators. We show that for high values of the access price, that is taken as a parameter by the firms, networks decide to charge only the callers. Otherwise, for low values of the access charge, networks charge also the receivers. Moreover, we compare market penetration and total welfare between the two price regimes. Our model suggests that, for high values of call externality, market penetration and total welfare are larger in Receiving Party Pays regime when the access charge is close to zero.

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Calling vs receiving party pays : market penetration and the importance of the call externality

Author: Majer, Tommaso; Pistollato, Michele
Publisher: Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Year: 2011
Source: https://ddd.uab.cat/pub/worpap/2011/hdl_2072_152020/84510.pdf
Calling s Recei ing Pa y Pays: Ma ke Pene a ion and he
Impo ance o he Call Ex e nali y∗
Tommaso Maje †
Uni e si a Au `onoma de Ba celona
Tommaso.Ma[email p o ec ed]
Michele Pis olla o‡
Uni e si a Au `onoma de Ba celona
Michele.Pis olla [email protected]
Oc obe 21, 2010
Abs ac
In his pape we s udy how he access p ice a ec s he choice o he a i egime
aken by he ne wo k ope a o s. We show ha o high alues o he access p ice, ha
is aken as a pa ame e by he i ms, ne wo ks decide o cha ge only he calle s. O he -
wise, o low alues o he access cha ge, ne wo ks cha ge also he ecei e s. Mo eo e ,
we compa e ma ke pene a ion and o al wel a e be ween he wo p ice egimes. Ou
model sugges s ha , o high alues o call ex e nali y, ma ke pene a ion and o al
wel a e a e la ge in Recei ing Pa y Pays egime when he access cha ge is close o
ze o.
JEL Classi ica ion:L96, L50
Keywo ds: Telecommunica ions, Mobile e mina ion a es, Calling Pa y Pays egime,
Recei ing Pa y Pays egime, Incomple e Co e age, Call Ex e nali y, Ma ke Expansion,
Regula ion
∗We a e g a e ul o Sjaak Hu kens, Xa ie Ma `ınez Gi al , Da id P´e ez Cas illo and F ancesc T illas.
†Depa amen d’Economia i d’His `o ia Econ`omica, Edi ici B, 08193 Bella e a (Ba celona), Spain.
‡Depa amen d’Economia i d’His `o ia Econ`omica, Edi ici B, 08193 Bella e a (Ba celona), Spain.
1
1 In oduc ion
In o de o p o ide in e connec ion among all use s, elecom ne wo ks need access o i al’s
consume s. Access is p o ided a e he paymen o a e mina ion cha ge (o access p ice).
This cha ge is a pa o he cos o o -ne calls and consequen ly a ec s he p ice o calls.
Las yea s in Eu ope ha e seen a g owing discussion among egula o y au ho i ies
abou egula ion o e mina ion cha ges o access p ices. On he one hand, he Eu o-
pean Commission (2008, 2009) ecommended o lowe e mina ion cha ges in o de o
lowe a e age p ice pe minu e. On he o he hand, some o hem (e.g. O com, he
UK elecommunica ions egula o ) a e wo ied ha his could b ing ne wo k ope a o s o
cha ge consume s o ecei ing a call o , in o he wo ds, o swi ch om a Calling Pa y
Pays (CPP) egime, whe e only calle s pay o making a call, o a Recei ing Pa y Pays
(RPP) egime, whe e bo h calle and ecei e pay o join a call.
O com has exp essed se e al conce ns abou he in oduc ion o a RPP a i egime.1
The main objec ions o he UK elecommunica ions egula o y au ho i y a e ha i would
be dis up i e o cus ome s, i would mee wi h consume esis ance and i migh also lead
o cus ome s u ning o hei mobile phones. The e exis many wo ks abou his las
conce n (e.g. Bomsel e al. (2003), Cadman (2007) and Sama aji a & Melody (2000)) bu
hey a e no p o iding a heo e ical backg ound o hei analysis. In pa icula , he e is
no any model which explain how ma ke pene a ion and wel a e would change swi ching
om one egime o he o he . Ou in en ion is o model he wo a i egimes and p o ide
a heo e ical amewo k o compa e hem.
Li lechild (2006) epo s some di e ences be ween he wo egimes. Some da a a e
summa ized in Table 1.
In RPP coun ies minu es o usage a e mo e han in CPP coun ies. To unde s and
he eason o ha , i is impo an o no ice ha RPP coun ies usually adop Bill & Keep
(BaK) as in e connec ion a angemen . This means ha ne wo k ope a o s pay a p ice
equal o ze o (o close o) in o de o e mina e phone calls. Hence, a BaK policy educes
he ma ginal cos s o a ic and he e o e usage p ices, leading o highe usage.
In 2005 ma ke pene a ion in US and Canada is a below pene a ion in EU bu
in o he BaK coun ies as Hong Kong pene a ion is abo e EU a e age. O he da a o
2008 in ERG (2009)2show ha US pene a ion o 87% is lowe han EU a e age o 123%.
Howe e , pene a ion in Hong Kong and Singapo e is abo e EU a e age. F om hese da a
seems ha ma ke pene a ion is lowe in BaK coun ies, bu in CPP coun ies pene a ion
1See O el (2002) and O com (2005).
2See ERG (2009), Nex Gene a ion Ne wo ks Fu u e Cha ging Mechanisms / Long Te m Te mina ion
Issues.
2
Min. o use (pe mon hs) Pene a ion (%, 2005)
RPP coun ies
USA 630 61
Canada 359 47
Hong Kong 387 106
Singapo e 282 90
CPP coun ies
UK 151 104
Ge many 76 87
F ance 225 74
I aly 120 110
Spain 135 99
Table 1: Mobile ma ke s uc u e in selec ed coun ies (2005).
migh be o e s a ed because o he adi ionally g ea e numbe o p epaid schemes and
mul iple SIM ca ds.3
In his pape we p o ide a heo e ical analysis o show how he choice o he access
p ice de e mines he e ail p icing egime: ou model con i ms ha CPP is a choice o he
elecommunica ions indus y in esponse o access p ices abo e e mina ion cos . O he -
wise, o access p ices below cos , ne wo ks p e e o cha ge ecei e s as well. Mo eo e ,
we compa e ou p edic ions o wo egimes wi h ac ual da a in o de o gi e some indica-
ions o he egula o . I u ns ou ha wi h high call ex e nali y, a BaK policy (which is
associa ed o RPP egimes) implies highe usage and highe ma ke pene a ion. This is
because highe usage inc eases u ili y o joining a mobile ne wo k and consequen ly mo e
people would like o join a ne wo k. Mo eo e , BaK maximizes social wel a e wi h espec
o any o he policy.
Ou model s esses he ele ance o he call ex e nali y ( he u ili y ha consume s
3A epo o Analysis Mason (2008, pag. 8) o O com says:
While looking a he compa a i e s a ics, i is impo an o no e ha he s anda d pene a ion
da a [. . . ] measu es he numbe o subsc ip ions in ci cula ion, and no he numbe o use s
who hold mobile subsc ip ions, which in he case o Hong Kong, Singapo e and he UK is
much lowe [. . . ].
3
ob ain o ecei ing a call). Indeed, as he Eu opean Commission (2008) ema ks, he
wel a e-maximize policy abou he access p ice may be e y di e en o di e en alues
o he call ex e nali y. Fo low alues ou model sugges s ha he op imal policy is o se
he access p ice close o he e mina ion cos and, consequen ly, o induce he indus y o
adop a CPP p ice egime. O he wise, o high alues o call ex e nali y, he op imal policy
should be BaK (in his case he indus y would adop a RPP egime). The eason is ha
RPP egimes in e nalize he call ex e nali y by making he ecei e paying o ecei ing
he call.4Hence, when his ex e nali y is ele an , RPP egimes a e mo e e icien .
Rela ed li e a u e. The main con ibu ion o he li e a u e on elecommunica ions is
gi en by he seminal pape s by A ms ong (1998) and La on e al. (1998a,b). In hei
pape s hey model elecommunica ions compe i ion be ween wo ne wo k ope a o s ha
compe e o consume s ha ob ain u ili y only om making calls. La on e al. (1998a)
analyze ne wo k in e connec ion in an un egula ed en i onmen whe e p ice disc imina-
ion is excluded. They show ha o non-linea e ail p ices, high in e connec ion a i s
aise inal e ail p ices and educe social wel a e. Gans & King (2001) co ec ed he abo e
analyses and ound ha , unde p ice disc imina ion and non-linea p icing, ne wo ks p e-
e an access p ice below cos .5
These pape s inspi ed many wo ks. Jeon e al. (2004) ex end hese models and allow
consume s o ob ain u ili y om ecei ing calls. In he usual se up o wo ho izon aly
di e en ia ed ne wo ks wi h ull co e age o he ma ke , hey in oduce he possibili y o
ope a o s o cha ge cus ome s also o ecei ing a call. Hence ecei e s may a ec olume
o he calls by hanging up i s . The au ho s de i e equilib ium usage p ices unde di e en
o -ne p icing a i s. On he one hand, wi hou ne wo k based disc imina ion, ne wo ks
se p ices equal o he pe cei ed ma ginal cos . On he o he hand, in p esence o ne wo k
based disc imina ion, ne wo ks se high o -ne p ices ( o high alues o he ex e nali y,
in e connec ion b eaks down) and on-ne p ices lowe han he ma ginal cos . To a oid
mul iplici y o equilib ia, hey in oduce a noise e m in he u ili y o he ecei e .6
Cambini & Valle i (2008) use a model whe e he demand o phone calls be ween each
pai o cus ome s is join ly de e mined. They show ha unde ce ain condi ions he
connec i i y b eakdown is elimina ed. Mo eo e , hey explain he ela ionship be ween
4Fo a discussion o his opic, see BEREC (2010b).
5Fo a good su ey o he li e a u e, see A ms ong (2002).
6No ice ha he hypo hesis o ull co e age p e en s he possibili y o analyzing he e ec s o di e en
access p ice policy on he ma ke size and hei consequences on he wel a e. Indeed, in a pa ag aph he
au ho s s udy incomple e co e age bu hey limi hei analysis o he de ini ion o he equilib ium usage
p ices.
4
he access cha ge and he s uc u e o he e ail p ices chosen by he ne wo k ope a o s
(ne wo ks choose o cha ge he ecei e only i he access cha ge is su icien ly low). Lopez
(2008) ex ends Jeon e al. (2004) in ano he di ec ion. He in oduces a andom a iable
also in he u ili y o he calle . In his amewo k, ne wo ks se p ices equal o he pe -
cei ed ma ginal cos . Mo eo e , he shows ha i m’s p o i s do no depend on he access
cha ge.
Finally, He malin & Ka z (2009) allow consume s o ob ain u ili y om ecei ing calls bu ,
di e en ly om he p e ious pape s, hey assume ha ne wo ks compe e on quan i ies. I
u ns ou ha a egula o can no induce e icien o -ne p ices h ough he access cha ge.
In his pape we modi y he amewo k desc ibed in Jeon e al. (2004) and we inco po a e
ma ke expansion in he benchma k model o compa e equilib ium p ices (including he
ixed pa ), ma ke pene a ion and p o i s in he wo di e en a i egimes. Unde no
ne wo k-based disc imina ion, we conside he case whe e ne wo ks cha ge a s ic ly posi-
i e cha ge o he ecei e s (Recei e Pa y Pays egime) and he case whe e ne wo ks do
no cha ge consume s o ecei ing a call (Calle Pa y Pays egime).
In Sec ion 2 we p esen he model. In Sec ion 3 we cha ac e ize he equilib ium p ices
and quan i ies in he wo a i egimes. In Sec ion 4 we simula e he equilib ium esul s
and we compa e he solu ions in he wo cases. Sec ion 5 concludes.
2 The Model
We gene alize he model in oduced by Jeon e al. (2004) allowing o ma ke expansion.
Ne wo ks. We conside wo mobile ne wo ks i= 1,2 loca ed a wo poin s o an in ini e
Ho elling line. We no malize o one he dis ance be ween he wo ne wo ks. Mobile
ne wo ks incu a ixed cos pe consume and ha e on-ne call cos o c= 2c0+c1, whe e
c0is he ma ginal cos o o igina ing o e mina ing a call and c1is he ma ginal cos o
ansmi ing a call. Le adeno e he access cha ge o e mina ion cha ge. The ma ginal
cos o an o -ne call is he e o e c+ (a−c0) o he calle ’s ne wo k and c0−a o he
ecei e ’s ne wo k.
Ta i s. Mobile ne wo k io e s a mul i-pa a i (pi, i, Fi) whe e piis he calle ’s usage
p ice (no ice ha we only conside he case o non ne wo k-based disc imina ion), iis
he ecei e ’s usage p ice and Fiis he ixed pa .
5

Consume s. Consume s a e di e en ia ed along he Ho elling line. This line ep esen s
he p e e ences o he consume s o e one cha ac e is ic o he ne wo ks. Fo ins ance,
consume s may p e e he well know phone ope a o ins ead o a new one.
A consume loca ed a xand selec ing ne wo k iincu s a anspo a ion cos equal o
|x−xi|.
The u ili y o placing a call is u(q), whe e qdeno es he leng h o he call. As in Jeon
e al. (2004), we assume ha he ma ginal u ili y ha a ecei e de i es om ecei ing a
call is subjec o a noise εwhich in oduces unce ain y abou he willingness o pay o
ecei ing a call independen ly on he p ice she is paying.7Fo ins ance, i could be he
case ha he ecei e is unwilling o alk on he phone when she is d i ing o wo king
and by conside ing he noise we ha e a mo e ealis ic model. Hence he ecei e ’s u ili y
is ˜u(q) + εq and we assume ha ε ollows he dis ibu ion unc ion Fwi h suppo [¯
ε, ¯ε],
ze o mean and densi y . Fo simplici y we conside ˜u(q) = βu(q), wi h β > 0. The len gh
o calls is de e mined by he i s one who in e up s he con e sa ion. The calle equa es
he ma ginal u ili y o he usage p ice piand she would hang up when he ma ginal u ili y
is pi.
The ecei e equa es he ma ginal u ili y ˜u′+ε o he ecei ing p ice i. The e o e he
ecei e will sol e βu′+ε= j o u′and he e o e he would hang up when u′is j−ε
β.
Hence, he olume o calls is q(max{pi,( j−ε)/β}).
The olume o calls is de e mined by he pai (pi, j) and a ealized alue εo he
andom a iable:
D(pi, j) =h1−F( j−βpi)iq(pi) + Z j−βpi
¯
ε
q j−ε
β (ε)dε. (1)
This means ha wi h p obabili y [1 −F( j−βpi)] he calle hangs up i s and he call
las s q(pi) minu es. Wi h p obabili y F( j−βpi) he ecei e hangs up i s and he call
las s q( j−ε
β) minu es. The e o e ne wo k idoes no know a p io i who will be he i s
one o hang up and consequen ly, who will de e mine he leng h o he call.
Conside a consume in ne wo k i. He u ili y o calling a consume in ne wo k jis:
U(pi, j) =h1−F( j−βpi)iu(q(pi)) + Z j−βpi
¯
ε
uq j−ε
β (ε)dε. (2)
He u ili y om ecei ing calls om a consume ha joined ne wo k jis:
˜
U(pi, j) = Z¯ε
j−βpih˜u(q(pi)) + q(pi)εi (ε)dε+
+Z j−βpi
¯
εh˜uq j−ε
β+q j−ε
βεi (ε)dε+ (3)
7This noise esul s in a posi i e p obabili y o bo h he calle and he ecei e o hanging up i s .
6
The e o e, we can w i e he ne su plus o a consume ha joined ne wo k ias ollows:
wi= 0+niU(pi, i) + njU(pi, j) + ni˜
U(pi, i) + nj˜
U(pj, i)
−pihniD(pi, i) + njD(pi, j)i− ihniD(pi, i) + njD(pj, i)i−Fi(4)
whe e 0is a subsc ibe ’s u ili y om o he mobile se ices.
The p o i s o ne wo k ia e gi en by:
πi=nihni(pi−c)D(pi, i) + nj[pi−c−(a−c0)]D(pi, j) + nj(a−c0)D(pj, i)
+ iniD(pi, i) + njD(pj, i)+Fi− i(5)
whe e ni(pi−c)D(pi, i) a e he p o i s pe use o making on-ne calls, nj[pi−c−(a−
c0)]D(pi, j) a e he p o i s pe use o making o -ne calls, nj(a−c0)D(pj, i) a e he
p o i s o e mina ing o -ne calls, i[niD(pi, i)+njD(pj, i)] a e he p o i s o ecei ing
calls, Fiis he ixed pa o he mul i pa a i and is he cos pe cos ume .
No ice ha he exp ession o he p o i s akes di e en o ms when he calle o he
ecei e de e mines he leng h o he call. On he one hand, when βpi< j he ecei e
will hang up i s and hen he leng h o he call depends only on he p ice . On he o he
hand, when βpi> j he calle will hang up i s and he leng h o he call depends only
on he p ice p. Bu he ne wo k does no know who will be he i s one o hang up. To
model ha , Jeon e al. (2004) in oduce a noise elemen in he olume o calls. The e o e,
we can maximize he exp ession o he p o i s ha depends on he noise. In his case he
p o i s a e di e en iable o all posi i e p ices (pi, i).
3 The equilib ium
In o de o analyze ma ke pene a ion we conside elas ic subsc ibe pa icipa ion. Ex-
plici ly, we model consume demand as he Ho elling model wi h hin e lands.8I he wo
ne wo ks o e u ili ies w1and w2, hen ne wo k ia ac s:
ni=1
2+wi−wj
2 +λwi(6)
whe e λ≥0 ep esen s he magni ude o ma ke expansion possibili ies. This is one o
he no el ies we in oduce in ou model wi h espec o Jeon e al. (2004) because i
allows us o analyze how di e en alues o he access p ice a ec he equilib ium ma ke
pene a ion and he e ec s o he la e on wel a e. In o de o ha e non explosi e ma ke
8Fo mo e de ails see A ms ong & W igh (2009).
7
sha e λmus be small enough.9We impose:
λ < min 1
2(U pp +˜
U pp −cD pp),1
2(Ucpp +˜
Ucpp −pcppDcpp).(7)
The equilib ium is gi en by he ec o o p ices (pi, i, Fi) ha maximize ope a o i’s
p o i s as de ined by equa ion (5). The only es ic ions we impose a e he non-nega i i y
o he p ices. When he ope a o is cha ging s ic ly posi i e p ices o i s use s we ha e a
RPP egime. O he wise, i he ecei ing p ice is ze o we ha e a CPP egime.10 Unde he
assump ion o a balanced calling pa e n11, we cha ac e ize he equilib ium p ices gi en
he access cha ge.
3.1 The case a < c0: he Recei ing Pa y Pays egime
Ne wo k ope a o s a e ee o cha ge cus ome s o making and ecei ing a call. The e o e,
ne wo k ise s a calle ’s usage p ice piand a ecei e ’s usage p ice i ha maximize
consume s su plus ha will be ex ac ed h ough he ixed pa Fi. Using he usual
maximiza ion p ocedu e, he equilib ium e ail p ices a e:
P oposi ion 3.1 (Equilib ium e ail p ices).The symme ic equilib ium e ail p ices
(p, , F)a e:
p pp =c+ (a−c0)
pp =c0−a
F pp = + φ
γ(a) + [3 + γ(a)]λ
whe e γ(a)≡1−2λ[U pp(a) + ˜
U pp(a)−cD pp(a)] and φ≡1 + 2λ 0−2λ .
P oo . See appendix.
No ice ha , as in he case o inelas ic demand desc ibed by Jeon e al. (2004), he
usage p ices a e equal o he pe cei ed ma ginal cos . Mo eo e , he ixed pa is highe
9F om equa ions (15) and (20) he de i a i es o he ma ke size wi h espec o he ixed pa a e
∂N pp
∂F pp
i
=−λ
γand ∂Ncpp
∂F cpp
i
=−λ
δ.
We mus ha e γ > 0 and δ > 0.
10O he cases whe e p ices o he han he ecei ing one a e ze o can no be an equilib ium.
11This assump ion says ha he pe cen age o calls o igina ed and e mina ed on a gi en ne wo k e lec s
he ma ke sha e o his ne wo k.
8
han he ixed cos pe use as long as φ > 0. Finally, he sum o he usage p ice is
cons an and equal o he ma ginal cos c. The access cha ge de e mines he dis ibu ion
o cos be ween calle and ecei e . Fu he mo e, no ice ha γ(a) is an opposi e measu e
o he su plus o joining a call in a RPP egime (U pp +˜
U pp −cD pp), wi hou aking in o
accoun he ixed ee: he bigge is γ(a), he lowe is his su plus.
I is easy o compu e he o al size o he ma ke and he p o i s in he symme ic
equilib ium:
N pp =[γ+ (1 + γ)λ ]
γ[γ+ (3 + γ)λ ]φ(8)
and
π pp
i=N
2hF− i=γ+ (1 + γ)λ
2γ[γ+ (3 + γ)λ ]2 φ2.(9)
No ice ha , in o de o ha e posi i e equilib ium quan i ies, we ha e o impose:
φ > 0⇐⇒ λ > −1
2( 0− )i 0> ,
ha is always e i ied.12
Vanishing noise. As he noise ε ends o ze o, i can be shown ha he calle and he
ecei e demand he same leng h o communica ion when:
a=c0−βc
1 + β≡aI.
I a > aI hen he calle is de e mining he leng h o he call wi h p obabili y con e ging
o one (calle so e eign y). Gi en ha he equilib ium calling p ice is inc easing in a, by
educing he access p ice he leng h o he call inc eases. O he wise, i a < aI, he ecei e
is de e mining he leng h o he call ( ecei e so e eign y). Since he equilib ium ecei ing
p ice is dec easing in a, by inc easing he access p ice he leng h o he call inc eases.
Hence, a a=aI, he call is he longes possible.
Since he access p ice ais nonnega i e, an equilib ium whe e bo h calle and ecei e
can de e mine he leng h o a call exis s only i
β⩽c0
c−c0
<1,
o he wise in equilib ium we can ha e only calle so e eign y and he longes call happens
a a= 0.
12I 0< , we would ha e an uppe bound o λ:
λ < 1
2( − 0).
9
Leng h o a call. As usual, he demand unc ion in e ms o leng h o a call, q(·), is
a dec easing unc ion o he e ail p ices (q′<0). Mo eo e we saw ha , as he noise
anishes, he leng h o he call is de e mined by he calle wi h p obabili y con e ging o
one when a > aI.
P oposi ion 4.1 (Leng h o a call.).Calls las mo e unde RPP egime when calls ex-
e nali y is high enough, i.e.:
β≥c0
c.
I β < c0/c calls las mo e unde RPP only i he access p ice is high enough, i.e.:
c0−βc < a < c0.
P oo . See Appendix.
This p oposi ion p o ides suppo o some empi ical e idences: unde RPP egimes
he leng h o calls is signi ican ly longe han unde CPP. Acco ding wi h p oposi ion 4.1
calls a e longe unde RPP i he ex e nali y he ecei e s pe cei ed is high enough.
aI
c0
0.000
0.005
0.010
0.015
0.020
a
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
Leng h o he call
(a) β= 0.25
aI
c0
0.000
0.005
0.010
0.015
0.020
a
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
Leng h o he call
(b) β= 0.5
aI
c0
0.000
0.005
0.010
0.015
0.020
a
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
Leng h o he call
(c) β= 0.75
c0
0.000
0.005
0.010
0.015
0.020
a
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
Leng h o he call
(d) β= 1
Figu e 3: Leng h o a call q. Pa ame e alues: c0= 0.01, c= 0.02, = 1500 and η= 2.
16

We ep esen ed he leng h o a call o di e en alues o βin Fig. 3. F om now on, we
use a cons an elas ici y demand unc ion q(p) = p−η(as in Hoe nig (2007)) whe e η > 1
and u(q) = η
η−1qη−1
η. The do ed line is s ill ep esen ing he h eshold be ween ecei e
so e eign y and calle so e eign y while he dashed line sepa a es RPP egime om CPP
egime.
No ice ha he longes leng h is a ained o aI, when calle and ecei e wan o hang
up a he same ime. The eason is ha in RPP he p ice o a call is sha ed be ween calle
and ecei e , aking in o accoun he posi i e ex e nali y on he ecei e and, he e o e,
he calls end o be longe . Bu his is ue only when calle and ecei e a e eage o
hang up mo e o less a he same ime. O he wise who is bea ing he highe p ice p e e s
o end he call ea lie and, gi en ha in RPP he a ia ion o he e ail p ices is s eepe ,
he leng h o he call d ops quicke han in CPP.
Fo low alues o call ex e nali y β, BaK p oduces sho e calls han alues o access
cha ge jus abo e e mina ion cos .
Fo high alues o β(Fig. 3c and 3d) access p ices close (o equal) o ze o imply
longe calls in RPP han CPP. Since o highe alues o he ex e nali y he ecei e is
eage o pay o ecei ing a call, he alue o a ha makes calle and ecei e o hang up
a he same ime shi s owa ds ze o whe e he associa ed e ail p ices a e highe o he
ecei e . This allows he egula o o se ze o access p ice and keeping calls longe han
CPP egimes. This con i ms he expec a ion o O com (2009, pag. 37):
[. . . ] in e na ional compa isons p o ide e idence ha his ela ionship be-
ween e mina ion a es, and ake-up and usage, exis s. A simple analysis o
c oss-coun y da a [. . . ] sugges s ha coun ies ha ha e, b oadly speaking,
sys ems ha adop ecip oci y o “bill and keep”-like a angemen s – US, Hong
Kong and Singapo e (and o a lesse deg ee Canada) ha e highe usage han
coun ies wi h “Calling Pa y’s Ne wo k Pays” egimes.
Fixed pa . Fig. 4 illus a es he compa ison be ween he ixed pa in he wo p ice
egimes. Fi s , no ice ha he alue o λis chosen acco ding o equa ion (7). I is
wo hwhile o no ice ha a a=aIwe ha e he highes ixed pa in RPP. The eason is
s aigh o wa d: aImaximizes consume su plus o joining a call and he e o e ne wo ks
can ex ac a highe su plus h ough he ixed pa . Indeed his is also he eason why in
hese g aphs highe ixed a i s a e associa ed o longe calls.
Fo low alues o calls ex e nali y, he ela ionship be ween equilib ium alues in RPP
and in CPP is no uni ocally de e mined.
Fo high alues o β, ixed pa in RPP is highe han ixed pa in CPP. In pa icula ,
17
aI
c0
0.000
0.005
0.010
0.015
0.020
a
500
520
540
560
580
600
620
Fixed Pa
(a) β= 0.25
aI
c0
0.000
0.005
0.010
0.015
0.020
a
500
520
540
560
580
600
620
Fixed Pa
(b) β= 0.5
aI
c0
0.000
0.005
0.010
0.015
0.020
a
500
520
540
560
580
600
620
Fixed Pa
(c) β= 0.75
c0
0.000
0.005
0.010
0.015
0.020
a
500
520
540
560
580
600
620
Fixed Pa
(d) β= 1
Figu e 4: Fixed pa F. Pa ame e alues: c0= 0.01, c= 0.02, = 1500, λ= 0.002,
η= 2, = 0 and 0= 750.
BaK de e mines highe ixed ee han any o he alue o he access cha ge. The eason is
ha , when access cha ge is below cos , calls las mo e, he e o e he consume s’ su plus
ha ne wo ks can ex ac is highe . This coincides wi h many empi ical obse a ions. Fo
ins ance, O com (2009, pag. 37) expec s:
High e mina ion a es end o lead o a e ail p ice s uc u e wi h ela i ely
high o -ne call cha ges (since ope a o s ‘co e ’ hei wholesale cos o each
minu e o a call wi h a co esponding e ail cha ge) and lowe subsc ip ion
cha ges (since subsc ibe s gene a e incoming calls ha p o ide call e mina ion
e enue). [. . . ] Equally, i e mina ion a es a e low, consume s will end o
ace highe subsc ip ion ees bu lowe o no cha ges o make (o ecei e) calls.
Ma ke pene a ion. Fig. 5 illus a es ha he e is no a clea ela ionship be ween
ma ke pene a ion in he wo egimes. Fo low alues o ecei e ex e nali y, he e a e
alues o access cha ge such ha pene a ion is highe in CPP egimes. Con e sely, o
18
high ecei e ex e nali y, RPP egimes p esen a high numbe o subsc ibe s. This inde e -
minacy is also p esen in empi ical e idence: on he one hand Li lechild (2006) shows how
CPP a e deno ed by highe ma ke pene a ion, on he o he hand Analysis Mason (2008)
s a es ha ac ual da a mis ep esen ue alues o pene a ion by o e es ima ing pene a-
ion in CPP coun ies. Mo eo e , high pene a ion is explained h ough he highe su plus
he consume s ecei e. Once again in RPP we ha e he highes pene a ion a a=aI.
aI
c0
0.000
0.005
0.010
0.015
0.020
a
3
4
5
6
7
8
Subsc ibe s
(a) β= 0.25
aI
c0
0.000
0.005
0.010
0.015
0.020
a
3
4
5
6
7
8
Subsc ibe s
(b) β= 0.5
aI
c0
0.000
0.005
0.010
0.015
0.020
a
3
4
5
6
7
8
Subsc ibe s
(c) β= 0.75
c0
0.000
0.005
0.010
0.015
0.020
a
3
4
5
6
7
8
Subsc ibe s
(d) β= 1
Figu e 5: Ma ke pene a ion N. Pa ame e alues: c0= 0.01, c= 0.02, = 1500,
λ= 0.002, η= 2, = 0 and 0= 750.
G aphics show, once again, ha RPP egimes a e mo e sensible o a ia ions o he
pe cei ed ex e nali y: pene a ion is inc easing in β.
19
4.1 Wel a e analysis
We compa e he wel a e in he wo egimes in Fig. 6. To al wel a e is gi en by a weigh ed
sum o consume s su plus and indus y p o i s.14 As i is clea , he highes wel a e in
RPP is a ained a a=aI. A his alue o he access p ice, consume su plus o a call is
maximized and he ne wo k can ob ain he highes p o i s by ex ac ing i . In CPP he
highes wel a e is associa ed o alues o he access p ice close o he e mina ion cos .
aI
c0
0.000
0.005
0.010
0.015
0.020
a
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
14000
Wel a e
(a) β= 0.25
aI
c0
0.000
0.005
0.010
0.015
0.020
a
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
14000
Wel a e
(b) β= 0.5
aI
c0
0.000
0.005
0.010
0.015
0.020
a
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
14000
Wel a e
(c) β= 0.75
c0
0.000
0.005
0.010
0.015
0.020
a
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
14000
Wel a e
(d) β= 1
Figu e 6: To al wel a e W. Pa ame e alues: c0= 0.01, c= 0.02, = 1500, λ= 0.002,
η= 2, = 0 and 0= 750.
No ice ha as he ecei e ex e nali y inc eases, he wel a e is ge ing highe in RPP
14The consume su plus is gi en by he ne su plus consume s pe cei e in equilib ium acco ding wi h
equa ion (4) minus he o al amoun o he anspo a ion cos s:
CS pp =“ 0+N pp(U pp +˜
U pp −cD pp)−F pp”N pp −"„N pp −1
2«2
+1
4# ;
CScpp =“ 0+Ncpp(Ucpp +˜
Ucpp −pcppDcpp)−Fcpp”Ncpp −"„Ncpp −1
2«2
+1
4# .
20
egimes. This ac ema ks once again he impo ance o he egula o o ha ing a e y
p ecise knowledge o he alues o βwhen choosing he access p ice: e y low alues o a
(accompanied by a RPP egime) a e socially op imal only i he ecei ing ex e nali y is
high. The Eu opean Commission (2008) ends up o he same conclusion:
RPP migh no be e icien i he calling pa y alues he call highly bu he
called pa y does no and, as a esul , an e icien call migh no be comple ed.
The e e se issue may a ise in he CPP sys em, whe e an e icien call may no
be ini ia ed e en i he called pa y alues i highly bu he calling pa y does
no .
Indeed, i a egula o conside s ha in i s coun y he ex e nali y is e y low BaK is no
he wel a e maximizing policy.
Finally, assigning di e en weigh s o consume s su plus and indus y p o i s, esul s
do no change quali a i ely.
5 Conclusions
Regula o y au ho i ies a e conce ned abou educing mobile e mina ion a es bu he e
is a lack o heo e ical analysis ha could gi e hem hin s abou he consequences o such
a policy.
The Eu opean Commission (2008, 2009) p oposed a d as ic educ ion o he mobile
e mina ion a es du ing he nex yea s. This, acco ding o empi ical e idence and compa-
nies’ p e isions, would imply o cha ge consume s o ecei ing calls in o de o co e he
e mina ion cos o a call: he Eu opean Commission (2008, pag. 26) no iced ha “RPP
may e ol e a e a educ ion o he egula ed e mina ion cha ge o as a esponse o a Bill
and Keep sys em”. O com (2005) wa ned ha RPP egimes could ind he opposi ion o
consume s who do no wan o be cha ged o incoming calls.
In ou pape we p o ide a heo e ical amewo k ha allows o compa e he wo a i
egimes. We con i m he ela ionship be ween in e connec ion a angemen s and e ail
p ice s uc u e. I u ns ou ha i does no exis one a i egime supe io o he o he
o he in e ms o e ail p ices, usage, ma ke pene a ion and o e all wel a e o all alues
o he access p ice.
Using ealis ic alues o he indus y pa ame e s, we ind ou ha he le el o he call
ex e nali y is c ucial. When i akes high alues, ma ke pene a ion and o al wel a e a e
highe in a RPP egime wi h access cha ges close o ze o. This sugges s ha a BaK policy
(which esul s in he adop ion o a RPP egime) should be implemen ed only once he
p esence o a high call ex e nali y is p o en. O he wise access p icing a he e mina ion
21

cos would be a be e policy.
Up o ou knowledge, he e a e no es ima es o he call ex e nali ies. On he one hand, he
Body o Eu opean Regula o s o Elec onic Communica ions (BEREC (2010b)) poin ed
ou ha i seems easonable o assume ha he u ili y o he ecei e is lowe han ha
o he calle bu ha he di e ence is no e y signi ican . On he o he hand, in BEREC
(2010a) se e al phone companies claim ha he call ex e nali ies a e e y low o e en
equal o ze o.
A P oo s
P oo o P oposi ion 3.1 To ind he usage p ices we maximize p o i s wi h espec
o piand ikeeping ma ke sha e nicons an :
max
pi, i
πi
s. . pi, i≥0
We look o he in e io solu ions whe e pi, i>0. Fo a gi en ni, he i s o de de i a i e
o πiwi h espec o piwhen = i= jis:
q′[1 −F( −βpi)]{(ni+nj)(u′−c)−nj(a−c0) + ni(˜u′+E[ε|ε⩾ −βpi])
−ni
1
1 + 2 λ(˜u′+E[ε|ε⩾ −βpi]− )}= 0.(11)
Simila ly, o a gi en ni, he i s o de de i a i e wi h espec o iwhen p=pi=pjis:
ni(u′−c) + nj(a−c0) + (ni+nj)˜u′+ni
1
1 + 2 λ(u′−p) + E[εq′|ε⩽ i−βp]
E[q′|ε⩽ i−βp]= 0.(12)
As he noise anishes, when he calle and he ecei e wan o hang up a he same
ime we ha e ha u′=pand ˜u′= . In a symme ic equilib ium he i s o de condi ions
u n ou o be:
p= (c− ) + 1
2(c+a−c0−c+ )
= (c0−a) + 1
2(c−p−c0+a).
No ice ha bo h condi ions hold o p=c+a−c0and =c0−a. To ind he ixed pa
22
o he wo-pa a i , we de i e p o i s wi h espec o Fi:
∂πi
∂Fi
=∂ni
∂Fihni(pi−c)D(pi, i) + nj(pi−c−(a−c0))D(pi, j) + nj(a−c0)D(pj, i)
+ iniD(pi, i) + njD(pj, i)+Fi− i
+nih∂ni
∂Fi
(pi−c)D(pi, i) + ∂nj
∂Fi
(pi−c−(a−c0))D(pi, j) + ∂nj
∂Fi
(a−c0)D(pj, i)
+ i∂ni
∂Fi
D(pi, i) + ∂nj
∂Fi
D(pj, i)+ 1i
Using equilib ium p ices:
∂πi
∂Fi
=∂ni
∂Fihni(pi−c)D(pi, i) + nj(a−c0)D(pj, i)
+ iniD(pi, i) + njD(pj, i)+Fi− i
+nih∂ni
∂Fi
(pi−c)D(pi, i) + ∂nj
∂Fi
(a−c0)D(pj, i)
+ i∂ni
∂Fi
D(pi, i) + ∂nj
∂Fi
D(pj, i)+ 1i
=∂ni
∂FihFi− i+ni= 0
The e o e he ixed pa is:
Fi= −ni
∂ni
∂Fi
(13)
Combining (4) wi h (6) we ind he o al size o he ma ke Nand he numbe o consume s
ni: We ob ain:
N=1−λ(Fi+Fj−2 0)
1−2λ(U+˜
U−cD)and
ni=N
2+(Fj−Fi)(1 + λ )
2 (14)
Le us w i e he ma ke size as ollows:
N=1−λ(Fi+Fj−2 0)
γ(15)
whe e γ(a)≡1−2λ(U pp +˜
U pp −cD pp). The de i a i e o he ma ke sha e o ne wo k
iwi h espec o Fiis:
∂ni
∂Fi
=1
2h∂N
∂Fi
−1 + λ
i
=−1
2
λ +γ(1 + λ )
γ (<0) (16)
23
Subs i u ing (14) and (15) in o (13) and looking o he symme ic equilib ium, we ha e:
Fi= +N
2
2γ
λ +γ(1 + λ ).
Sol ing o Fwe ob ain:
F= + φ
γ+ (3 + γ)λ .
P oo o Lemma 3.1 Remembe ha γ(a)≡1−2λ(U pp +˜
U pp −cD pp). I s de i a i e
is:
∂γ
∂a =−2λh∂U
∂a +∂˜
U
∂a −c∂D
∂a i.
Le us i s compu e he de i a i e o he olume o calls wi h espec o he access p ice.
∂D
∂a =∂D
∂p
∂p
∂a +∂D
∂
∂
∂a
whe e15
∂D
∂p =∂F( −βp)
∂p βq(p) + [1 −F( −βp)]q′+q(p) ( −βp)(−β) = [1 −F( −βp)]q′
∂D
∂ =− ( −βp)q(p) + q(p) ( −βp) + 1
βZ −βp
¯
ε
q′ (ε)dε
=1
βEhq′ε≤ −βpiF( −βp).
Hence, we ha e
∂D
∂a =h1−F( −βp)iq′−1
βEhq′ε≤ −βpiF( −βp).
The de i a i e o he u ili y de i ed by making calls wi h espec o he access p ice is:
∂U
∂a =∂U
∂p
∂p
∂a +∂U
∂
∂
∂a
whe e
∂U
∂p =∂F( −βp)
∂p βu(q) + [1 −F( −βp)]u′(q)q′+u(q) ( −βp)(−β)
=[1 −F( −βp)]u′(q)q′
∂U
∂ =−F( −βp)
∂ u(q) + u(q) ( −βp) + 1
βZ −βp
¯
ε
u′(q)q′ (ε)dε
=1
βEhu′q′ε≤ −βpiF( −βp).
15He eina e q′<0 deno es he de i a i e o he lengh o a call wi h espec o he usage p ice.
24
Hence, we ha e
∂U
∂a =h1−F( −βp)iu′q′−1
βEhu′q′ε≤ −βpiF( −βp).
The de i a i e o he u ili y de i ed by ecei ing calls wi h espec o he access p ice is:
∂˜
U
∂a =∂˜
U
∂p
∂p
∂a +∂˜
U
∂
∂
∂a
whe e
∂˜
U
∂p =˜u′q′[1 −F( j−βpi)] + β˜u(q(pi)) ( j−βpi) + q′[1 −F( j−βpj)] E[ε|ε≥ j−βpi]
+βq(pi)( j−βpi) ( j−βpi)−β˜u(q(pi)) ( j−βpi)−βq(pi)( j−βpi) ( j−βpi)
=˜u′+Ehεε≥ −βpih1−F( −βp)iq′
∂˜
U
∂ =−F( −βp)
∂ ˜u(q) + q ( −βp)( −βp) + ˜u(q) ( −βp) + 1
βZ −βp
¯
ε
˜u′(q)q′ (ε)dε
+ ( −βp)q(p) ( −βp) + 1
βZ −βp
¯
ε
q′ε (ε)dε
=1
βEhq′(˜u′+ε)ε≤ −βpiF( −βp).
Hence, we ha e
∂˜
U
∂a =˜u+Ehεε≥ −βpih1−F( −βp)iq′−1
βEhq′(˜u′+ε)ε≤ −βpiF( −βp).
Hence, he de i a i e o γ(a) is:
∂γ(a)
∂a = 2λn1
βF( −βp)E[(u′(q) + ˜u′(q) + ε−c)q′|ε≤ −βp]
+h1−F( −βp)ihc−u′(q)−˜u′(q)−E[ε|ε≥ −βp]iq′o.
As he noise anishes we ge :
∂γ(a)
∂a = 2λn1
βF( −βp)hu′(q) + ˜u′(q)−ciq′−h1−F( −βp)ihu′(q)−˜u′(q)−ciq′o.
No ice ha when a > aI(a < aI) he calle ( he ecei e ) wan s o hang up i s and
he e o e we ha e ˜u′(q)> (u′(q)> p). This implies ha u′(q) + ˜u′(q)−c > 0. Mo eo e
emembe ha F( −βp) deno es he p obabili y ha he ecei e hang up i s : as he
noise ends o ze o his p obabili y is equal o 1 in ecei e so e eign y and equal o 0 in
consume so e eign y. Finally we ha e:
∂γ
∂a =




2λ
βhu′(q) + ˜u′(q)−ciq′<0 i a < aI;
−2λhu′(q) + ˜u′(q)−ciq′>0 i a > aI.
25
Sama aji a, R. & Melody, W. H. (2000). B ie ing pape . In Fixed-Mobile In e connec ion
Wo kshop. a ailable a h p://www.i u.in /osg/spu/ni/ mi/wo kshop/.
32