Recovery after extreme events - Lessons learned and remaining challenges in Disaster Risk Reduction

Integrative Risk and Security Research Volume 2/2017 Alexander Fekete, Alex Lechleuthner, Ompe Aimé Mudimu, Celia Norf, Ulf Schremmer, Christiane Stephan Recovery after extreme events Lessons learned and remaining challenges in Disaster Risk Reduction Edited by Alexander Fekete, Matthias Garschagen, Celia Norf & Christiane Stephan 2 Recovery after extreme events - Lessons learned and remaining challenges in Disaster Risk Reduction Integrative Risk and Security Research Volume 2/2017 T his document is published within the series 'Integrative Risk and Security Research'. All publications can be downloaded from https://www.th-koeln.de/anlagen-energie-undmaschinensysteme/schriftenreihe-integrative-risk-and-security-research_17446.php,; or you http://tinyurl.com/oaj4r7a Despite thorough revision the information provided in this document is supplied without liability. The document does not necessarily present the opinion of the editors. EDITION NOTICE Editors of Series Alexander Fekete (Prof. Dr.) Alex Lechleuthner (Prof. Dr. Dr) Ompe Aimé Mudimu (Prof. Dr.) Celia Norf (M. Sc.) Christiane Stephan (Dipl.-Geogr.) Ulf Schremmer (Prof. Dr.) TH Köln - University of Applied Sciences Institute of Rescue Engineering and Civil Protection Betzdorfer Str. 2 50679 Cologne Germany www.irg.th-koeln.de Editorship of Series - contact: [email protected] Editors of this Volume Alexander Fekete (Prof. Dr.) Matthias Garschagen (Dr.) Celia Norf (M. Sc.) Christiane Stephan (Dipl.-Geogr.) Contact Celia Norf Email: [email protected] Phone: + 49 (0) 221 8275 2739 Web: http://riskncrisis.wordpress.com Recommended Citation Surname, First Name (2017), Title. In: Fekete, A, Garschagen, M, Norf, C, & Stephan C (Eds.) Recovery after extreme events. Lessons learned and remaining challenges in Disaster Risk Reduction. Integrative Risk and Security Research, 2/2017, Page Reference. Cologne, November 2017 3 Integrative Risk and Security Research Volume 2/ 2017 Foreword Disasters such as the Indian Ocean Tsunami 2004, but also other extreme events such as cyclones, earthquakes and tsunami substantially affect the lives of many thousands of people - they are events radically and abruptly changing local circumstances and needs. At the same time they can significantly reshape global paradigms of Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR). Such events also bring to light the challenges in coordinating assistance from the “global community” with all the intended and un-intended effects. Two of the most pressing questions therefore are whether the different actors have learned from the disaster and whether processes of DRR and livelihood improvements have been implemented successfully. This volume gathers selected papers addressing the following key questions: Lessons learned: Which lessons have been learned in a way that a difference can be seen today for the livelihoods and resilience of local people in the regions affected? Lessons to be Learned: Despite the body of knowledge created and reflected in a good number of lessons learned studies – what is still unsolved or needs to be emphasized? Monitoring and evaluation: Which DRR measures have been perpetuated and how can they be monitored and evaluated scientifically? Resilience effects and (unintended) side-effects: Which coping, recovery and adaptation measures are supported by the resilience paradigm and which other areas are side-lined, neglected or even contrary to the intended effects? Dynamics in risk: In which cases has resilience building taken place? In which cases have vulnerabilities been shifted internally or new vulnerabilities been created? Relocation/resettlement: How did the relocation/resettlement process of displaced people take place and what are its long-term effects? Urban-rural divide: How have DRR measures in urban vs. rural areas differed and which linkages but also rifts in rehabilitation and reconstruction initiatives can be observed between the two? Early warning: What is the future of Early Warning and how can important top-down information chains benefit from or be balanced with bottom-up feedback of users and affected people? It appears that extreme disaster events spark a plethora of actions in academia, civil society, media, policy, private sector and other organisations. Tragic, as such disasters are, they offer incentives for learning, locally and globally. Lately, disaster impacts have in many cases been detracted through the application of knowledge and experience gained from previous events. However, there are still a number of challenges with regards to learning from past disasters: The outcomes of the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) Alumni Seminar 2016 „11 Years After the Indian Ocean Tsunami 2004 – Lessons of Disaster Recovery, Rehabilitation and Resilience”, conducted by TH Köln - University of Applied Sciences, United Nations University - Institute for Environment and Human Security (UNU-EHS) and the Social Policy Analysis and Research Centre (SPARC) of the Faculty of Arts, University of Colombo and this volume that is one result of the seminar tie in with the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (SFDRR9 endorsed in 2015, specifically regarding priority 1: understanding disaster risk better through the documentation and critical reflection of lessons learned a decade after the tsunami in the Indian Ocean, but also which other recovery processes of other events it later influenced. This volume also addresses priority 2: strengthening disaster risk governance to manage disaster risk by analysing which institutions have been created after such extreme events, which ‚master plans’ have been set and what 4 Recovery after extreme events - Lessons learned and remaining challenges in Disaster Risk Reduction knowledge management and communication challenges remain. Priority 3, investing in DRR for resilience, is covered by investigating the successfulness and sustainability of investments immediately after extreme events with a midterm perspective. Priority 4 of the SFDRR finally, is fully covered by the papers scrutinising the lessons learned about ‚Building Back’ and how to advance our knowledge to ‚Build Back Better’. In recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction. We thank the authors of this volume for their efforts and willingness to share their insights on lessons learned and remaining challenges in Disaster Risk Reduction. Moreover we thank the reviewers Arinafril Arinafril, Hananto Kurnio und Vicente Sandoval for their constructive comments. We are very grateful for the help of Jan Bäumer for preparing and editing the literature lists. We also thank the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) for the financial support of the Alumni Seminar 2016 „11 Years After the Indian Ocean Tsunami 2004 – Lessons of Disaster Recovery, Rehabilitation and Resilience”. Alexander Fekete1, Matthias Garschagen2, Celia Norf1 & Christiane Stephan1 1TH Köln – University of Applied Sciences, Institute for Rescue Engineering and Civil Protection 2United Nations University – Institute for Environment and Human Security (UNU-EHS) 5 Integrative Risk and Security Research Volume 2/ 2017 Table of Content Planning and development following disaster events .............................................................................................. 6 Economic Revitalization of the Tsunami Victim Community in Aceh Province, Indonesia .................................. 7 Elvira Iskandar, Safrida & Sofyan Planning For Safe Public Open Space in Reconstruction Sites after Large-scale Disasters: Comparing Indonesia and Japan ............................................................................................................................................ 12 Shirleyana & Riyanti Djalante Resilient-Designed Community Structures and Facilities for Vulnerable Coastal Cities: Lessons Learned from Indonesia and the Philippines ..................................................................................................... 23 Ruth Marie I. Equipaje, Shirleyana & Cut Yulvizar What about the Development of a Framework for Coastal Smart Cities? ................................................................ 36 Hrishikesh Venkataraman, Nishara Fernando & Vallam Sundar Learning processes triggered - from individual stakeholders to countries ................................................... 50 Tribal indigenous knowledge of tsunamic hazard prone areas in disaster reducing risk with particular study on Simeuleu Island Aceh and other islands offshore west of Sumatra ............................ 51 Hananto Kurnio, Alexander Fekete & Matthias Garschagen Lessons learned from Syiah Kuala University in surviving and recovering from the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami ..................................................................................................................................... 59 Hiz i r So fy an  A review of the civil protection system development in Peru and recent risk governance challenges with focus on the disaster risk management in the region of Ica after the 1997-1998 El Niño ......................... 66 Iris Dominguez, Alexander Fekete & Christiane Stephan Disaster Risk Management in Myanmar - practical insights in context of the Indian Ocean Tsunami 2004, Cyclone Nargis 2008 and recent events ...................................................................... 78 Moe Moe, Alexander Fekete, Celia Norf Evaluation of efforts: perceptions of satisfaction and long-term effects ........................................................ 86 Studying extreme events from the perspective of the disaster relief workers involved in 2013 floods in Germany ...................................................................................................................................... 87 Christian Baumgartner, Christian Bentler & Alexander Fekete Ankokkawala - a post-tsunami village project, its implementation and a ten-years review .............................. 92 Manfred Domroes Bring back the lessons learned to the beneficiaries! ........................................................................................................ 99 Pia Hollenbach & Gabriela Neuhaus Lessons on relief and recovery after disastrous events – Perception and satisfaction of relief workers......102 Alexander Fekete, Celia Norf, Christiane Stephan & Karolina Bednarska 6 Recovery after extreme events - Lessons learned and remaining challenges in Disaster Risk Reduction Planning and development following disaster events 7 Integrative Risk and Security Research Volume 2/ 2017 Economic Revitalization of the Tsunami Victim Community in Aceh Province, Indonesia Elvira Iskandar1, Safrida1 & Sofyan1 1Agribussiness Department, Syiah Kuala University, Indonesia/ Tsunami Disaster Mitigation Research Centre, Indonesia Email: [email protected]; [email protected]); sofyan[email protected] Introduction The earthquake and tsunami in Aceh on December 26, 2004 destroyed most of the west coast of Aceh and its surrounding areas, including Banda Aceh, Aceh province’s capital. Based on data from the Disaster Management Agency of Aceh province, the tsunami caused approximately 236,116 deaths and 74,000 missing people. Moreover, the tsunami destroyed most of the community activity centers around the coastal areas. There are some alternative possibilities to help develop economic activity in disaster affected areas, including supporting small and medium enterprises, encouraging the establishment of new businesses, attracting foreign investment (domestic and international), investing in the physical infrastructure, investing in soft infrastructure (including human resources, institutional reinforcement and policy issues), supporting the growth of specific business groups, targeting the growth of spatial targets, and targeting the growth of some disadvantaged groups (World Bank, 2001) Revitalization is an effort to enliven an area that had originally been thriving but then suffered a decline. The process of revitalization includes improving the physical, economic and social aspects of an area (Danisworo, 2002). Revitalization is not only used to improve the physical characteristics of a place, but also must improve the local economy and cultural recognition. The revitalization process requires community involvement. However, the community should not just support the formal aspects of the project, but people also really need to engage in all processes of the development (Laretna, 2002). Lee (2004) explains that in order to retain long-term economic improvements and optimize potential resources, great efforts are needed to improve the infrastructure and facilities in the community. Economic revitalization is one aspect of revitalization that should be reviewed now that eleven years have passed since the tsunami. One specific area needs revitalization when its lack of economic growth or the economy will begin to deteriorate. This occurs because of the loss of economic competitiveness. Eleven years after the tsunami, Aceh continues to rise from adversity. This began with the rehabilitation and reconstruction process initiated by BRR (Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Body of Aceh and Nias) from 2005 to 2009, and was completed with various physical and non-physical assistances provided by local and international non-governmental organizations (NGO). Afterwards, the development process was conducted by the Acehnese government. In this period, the government created many projects to improve community life, focusing on the economic empowerment of community assets. However, the recent conditions of the community have indicated that the development process has not shown the expected results. Most of the tsunami-affected communities in the coastal areas are still in poor condition. The major problems faced by the tsunami victims are the loss of property, lack of capital and infrastructure problems. This required an analysis of the economic revitalization eleven years after the tsunami. To study the economic revitalization of 8 Recovery after extreme events - Lessons learned and remaining challenges in Disaster Risk Reduction the disaster region, we identified the economic conditions of the disaster communities as well as their future expectations for their economic conditions. This study conducted in tsunami-affected areas in Banda Aceh and Aceh Besar District, Aceh Province. The villages determined by the level of damaged they had. The villages were Meunasah Keude, Lampulo, Blang Krueng, Lampaseh, Lampisang and Lamlhom. This study explained about the development program implemented in the affected area after Tsunami. This result has been presented in National Seminar of Indonesian Higher Agricultural Education Communication Forum (FKPTPI) in Yogyakarta, Indonesia in November 2016. Economic Empowerment Program for Affected Community Recovery of economic activities was one of the main focuses of donors during the rehabilitation and reconstruction period (2005-2008). Thus, many things were done to make people able to support themselves and their families able to rise from adversity. The loss of family, property and businesses caused resignation by affected people so they only expected support from other parties. In economics, number of family, property and land are all production inputs, so that if one of them does not exist or is lost, it will obstruct the production process. Through the economic recovery activities, donors created a variety of programs that aimed to increase people's access to economic assets, such as allocating capital, equipment and training to improve people's creativity in the economic sector. In this period, many foreign donors were involved in the economic recovery process. The donors included Oxfam, International Relief and Development (IRD), Islamic Relief, UNICEF, United Nation Development Programme (UNDP), Mercy Corps, Asian Development Bank (ADB). The only government agency which was engaged in the rehabilitation processes was The Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Body (BRR) for Aceh and Nias. BRR was an Indonesian government agency which coordinated and jointly implemented the recovery program following the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami and the 2005 Nias Earthquake. This institute has run many disaster recovery projects in Aceh from 2005 to 2009, so this period is known as the rehabilitation and reconstruction period. The institutions which engaged in the rehabilitation and reconstruction period were mostly international aid agencies. They were focused on the ownership of economic assets and production facilities to increase the community’s ability to generate income. Some assistances given by donor in this period are business capital, fish processing equipment, training of producing Aceh craft, sewing equipment, training of catfish production, procurement of catfish germ, revitalisation brick factories, procurement of boat and fishing gear, procurement of tricycles, training of producing shredded fish, cool box procurement to preserve the fresh fish and training of fish processing to fishermen. After 2009, the aid was more focused on sustainability and equitable distribution of economic activities. In this period, some aid programs were still supported by the government through related agencies, such as the Industry and Trade Department, the Marine and Fisheries Department, the Social Welfare Department, etc. While during the rehabilitation and reconstruction period the type of aid was mostly physical assistance, in the next period the aid was more focused on non-physical assistances in the form of business development training. However, people's lives ten years after the tsunami were still below the standard of living, including low income levels and poor quality of life. Moreover, focus group discussions have shown that there are some aspects that are ignored in the distribution of aid to the community. One case was that people were not involved in determining the economic assets needed. 9 Integrative Risk and Security Research Volume 2/ 2017 In an effective empowerment program, the community should be involved in the process of planning, actuating, results utilization and project evaluation. However, due to time constraints in implementing aid programs, there was incompatibility between the type of assistances provided with the capacity and skills of the community based on their economic activity before the tsunami. In order to give a quick response, the donors formulated quick policies in accordance with disaster locations and the amount of funds available. In addition, the absence of monitoring and evaluation from funders in every provision made donors only focus on the fulfilment of tasks of institutions to provide assistance in a precise time, sometimes regardless of people's basic needs. The people were also not involved in any of the decision making processes, showing that these actions only want to show the existence of donors without requiring the community to participate actively. Moreover, in the rehabilitation and reconstruction period, the affected community also noticed aid that was overlapping between donors. This condition happened because one type of goods was considered more important compared to other types of assistances. This situation left some kinds of help ignored and not used. We realise that many assistances made people move on from their sadness and improve their lives again. But in economic assistance, the huge amount of assistance has had a negative impact on people’s daily attitude. One of the problems is that the beneficiaries have become apathetic and always rely on donors for their livelihood. This happened because the economic resources were not developed as a whole. Donors seemed to put a lot of attention on the type of aid. However, we also need to consider the readiness of the community to take advantage of the aid. Readiness of the society includes not only economic aspects (which means skills in using a given asset), but also the readiness and commitment of the community to use the aid in accordance with the purpose of granting such aid. In some cases it was found that people often used cash capital or other aid for private purposes because they needed to fulfil their primary needs, so their businesses remained undeveloped. People's desire to meet their primary needs quickly also caused other problems in the efforts to accelerate economic growth. Generally, people choose to do business that could increase revenues in a relatively short time and that had a certain market. So many trainings on product innovation were not implemented by the community. It showed that Acehnese people focused more on fulfilling their family needs by using the assistance or working as before tsunami because they don’t want to take a risk to try something new to fail and loose income for their family. Therefore, after the various assistance programs from NGOs and BRR were completed in 2009, the economic life of the people affected by the earthquake and the tsunami did not experience significant development. Eleven years after the earthquake and tsunami, Aceh’s economic conditions have begun to improve. Most people have been forced to change their jobs because of the loss and destruction of business areas, but some others are still doing their previous efforts. People in coastal areas are generally still running the same businesses, such as fishermen and fish processors. Likewise, people in the Lampisang and Blang Krueng village are also still running the same business such as traditional cake production. Lampisang village has been known as a producer of reliable traditional Acehnese cakes since before the tsunami. Along the streets of Banda Aceh-Meulaboh we can see many traditional pastry shops. In contrast, in Blang Krueng village, people sell only on a small scale at the coffee shops around the village and the Darussalam area. For the farmers in the region of Lamlhom village, Aceh Besar, some have had to switch jobs and become as traders or construction workers as their fields are still covered in mud from the tsunami. However, some people are still trying to work as they did before the tsunami as farmers and traders. Recently, we can see 16 Recovery after extreme events - Lessons learned and remaining challenges in Disaster Risk Reduction Case Study of Indonesia and Japan This section compares the implementation of Safe Public Open Space (SPOS) after large-scale disasters in Indonesia and Japan. Both countries have suffered continuous impacts from earthquakes and tsunami and have progressed extensively in their efforts to build resilience. Dome Housing, Yogyakarta, Indonesia Yogyakarta, a city in Central Java Indonesia (Figure 3), was hit by an earthquake on Saturday, 27 May 2006. The earthquake in circa 6.3 magnitudes killed over 5,000 people and injured thousands. More than 100,000 homes were destroyed and around 200,000 were damaged (Suryandono & Wong 2012). Figure 3: Location of Yogyakarta Source: WorldAtlas (2015) An NGO from the USA – DTWF (Dome for the World Foundation) donated for Ngelepen around 80 new buildings in a dome shape called Dome Housing project. Ngelepen is a village in Yogyakarta and had to be relocated because of landslides caused by the earthquake. The new resettlement site is called New Ngelepen which is one km away from the original village (Figure 4). Future residents participated in the housing constructions, but not in the design and plans. The dome houses consist of eleven or twelve blocks of houses that share electricity, public toilets, and pathways. The diameter of the house is seven meters, two stories, with the total area of 38 square meters. Public facilities available are a mosque, playground, kindergarten, health clinic and a cemetery. However, facilities for community activities are lacking. This is because the planners assumed in the construction process that public facilities were nearby. The children playground area is too small and located beside the cemetery. Most community activities happen on the streets. 17 Integrative Risk and Security Research Volume 2/ 2017 Figure 4: Dome Housing plan in New Ngelepen Source: “Dome Yogyakarta”. 7°48'49.79"S and 110°30'12.58"E. Modified from Google Earth. 24 June 2015. September 18, 2015. Figure 5: Changes made by inhabitants of Dome Housing Source: UGM & IRM (2009) According to Saraswati (2007), after one-year occupancy, people liked to stay in the dome houses since they felt safe from the earthquake. However, the dome housing was perceived as not suitable for the Indonesian tropical climate. Therefore, many residents eventually made additional changes to the dome, such as additional eaves, canopy, and other functions (Saraswati 2007). Marcillia and Ohno (2012) investigated the influence of social interaction between residents within three years occupancy. 34 residents out of 51 residents were interviewed. The results indicated that 57% wanted private approach pathways, 61% had not enough yards in the house for social gathering. The available terrace in front of the house should be altered as a guest room, but the limited space made this not possible 18 Recovery after extreme events - Lessons learned and remaining challenges in Disaster Risk Reduction (Marcillia & Ohno 2012). Based on this investigation, the outdoor space was not enough for large gathering space. The only flat open space available was used for a cemetery. The inflexible design of the dome houses made the residents to use open space outside the houses for better social interaction. Housewives chat and children playing were found in the streets activities. The main street was even painted for a badminton court. Here, the function of social gathering that used to be available in the original place, was taking place on the street, though it was considerably dangerous. The discrepancies from the intended usages in the original plan and actual usages showed the insensitivity to the cultural needs (Marcillia & Ohno 2012). Temporary houses, Heita, Kamaishi, Japan The Great Eastern Japan Earthquake and Tohoku Tsunami have led to the loss of approximately 108,000 residencies. The Japanese Government quickly responded to this with multiple offers for transitional shelter according to the affected location (Shiozaki, et al. 2013). Figure 6: Location of Kamaishi Japan Source: The Economist (2015) The Great East Japan Earthquake devastated Kamaishi City in Iwate Prefecture in Tohoku Region (Figure 6). The temporary housing in Kamaishi is located near Heita Athletic Park and its design is similar to the destroyed houses (Figure 7). According to a report of the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) on the reconstruction processes from large-scale disasters (2013), there are 240 housing units and a temporary shopping district to support the inhabitants, comparable to a small town with functions to provide the residents services for daily lives, places for work, and places for offering physical and mental support (JICA 2013). 19 Integrative Risk and Security Research Volume 2/ 2017 Figure 7: Heita Temporary Houses in Kamaishi Japan Source: ”Heita Kamaishi”. 39°14'3.88"N and 141°53'11.27"E. Modified from Google Earth. 01 June 2015. September 26, 2015. Figure 8: Support Hub location Source: Examples of Initiatives Aimed at Reconstruction (2013) There are two types of temporary houses, one with a wooden deck and one without (Ohno 2011). A support hub facility is given to prevent residents from isolation and to promote interaction between the elderly and the other members of the community (Figure 8). To make the optimum use of spaces, the temporary houses also have porches made of wooden decks so that the residents can sit in front of the houses and interact. Neighbours can meet each other in front of their houses and thus have a social relation. Besides the support hub as a welcome place, there is also a community place called “home for all”, where the community can gather at night (Figure 9) (Worrall 2013). Here, the community participated in the design and construction process. There are also large outdoor spaces around the community centre which can be used as a children playground area. Figure 9: Types of temporary housing (left, centre), Home for All (right) Source: Ohno (2011) (left, centre); Sumner (2013) (right) 20 Recovery after extreme events - Lessons learned and remaining challenges in Disaster Risk Reduction Discussion Based on the two case studies above, this study compares the public open spaces available regarding the criteria of availability, accessibility and equity. Availability From the two case studies, the relocation sites are mostly in areas away from the possibility of danger. This makes the community feel safe. In both cases, meeting places are needed. In Japan, the community centre serves as a welcome place, support hub, and even for elderly. In Indonesia, public spaces and facilities available are a playground, mosque, and health clinic. This is related to different cultures and locations in Indonesia and Japan. The location of the community centre in Japan case is in the centre to ease access of the inhabitants. In Yogyakarta, no space is allocated for community activities. There is no large public open space for gathering space. Thus, the social interaction happens on the streets. The children playground is considered too small and therefore children prefer to play on the streets. Furthermore, the need for social place, either in an outdoor or indoor community centre is important and has not been noticed by the local government. For the case of Heita in Japan, the community made porches between the shelters as shared space to meet their neighbours. Besides, they have a support hub as a welcome place and a different community centre. The outdoor area is also large enough for children playing. The existence of public open space is, therefore, necessary, since it is a place for the community activities, and it is indeed a primary social need of the community. The disaster took not only their physical belonging but also their social, economic life they had before the disaster. Disasters have a great impact on the social relation of the society. The availability of community centres can help to reduce the loss. This is why social ties are important in relocation sites. The social relations or social ties improve community resilience. Besides building construction the reconstruction of new place should consider social behaviour. Shared space for the community can be recommended in two ways: an indoor community centre and outdoor public open space for the community. The indoor community centre should serve as a place for social activities, a health centre and needs to consider the elderly as the most emotionally and physically affected. Outdoor public open space is needed as an assembly point, a refuge for the community during the disaster and for temporary spaces for relocation. Accessibility Public facilities for the community in Yogyakarta are available nearby. Hence, they are easily accessible for all residents. However, the roads as an accessible place to all have taken over the need for real public open space. For instance, children use streets as a place to play badminton. In the case of Japan, the relocation site is surrounded by a large park and has big open spaces. The community centre is located in the middle to ease the access of people. Public open space facilities should have an inclusive design to be accessible to everyone, since its importance in pre-disaster or post-disaster reconstruction. This also means to consider various stakeholders who will benefit from the new relocation sites, from children, youth, adults, elderly, even considering disabled people, which are often not mentioned in many cases for emergency escape ways. The community awareness regarding safety routes and escape ways during disasters is also important, but often lacking in places that do not realize the earthquake and tsunami hazards. The survivors of the Indian 21 Integrative Risk and Security Research Volume 2/ 2017 Ocean Tsunami 2004 mentioned that eye orientation regarding high buildings, sign, hill, etc. made them to react faster, to run away from the water, to go to a higher place, and follow the lock of people. Therefore, the escape routes need to be clear and visible to everyone (Fakhrurrazi 2010) Equity The community involvement is important as part of the reconstruction process. In Yogyakarta, the community participated in construction, but not in the housing plans. As a result, there is some incompatible design to the local culture and condition. Local residents therefore made some adjustment and use roads as an open area for community activities. This is in contrasting situation with the case study of Japan, where community participated in the planning process to ensure the social value between the residents. To sustain a new area, it is suggested to support a community participation that helps to enhance selfbelonging feelings. The community can also maintain the communal space. Since the case studies also shows cultural changes in relocation sites, thus it is important to provide the community an adaptable function of place, for example, public open place which can serve as sport facilities, a place for community gathering and even as a refuge place. This may end up in the open ended and flexible design by the community. Conclusion Enhancing disaster preparedness for effective response and to "Build Back Better" in recovering, rehabilitation, and reconstruction is one of the goals in Sendai Framework. The findings from the two case studies allow to draw the conclusion that the public open space is an important part in planning for relocation sites. It is one important element to build better new relocation sites for disaster risk mitigation, recovery, rehabilitation, and reconstruction. It needs to be easily accessible and to provide options for social activities of various users, like children, youth, adults, elderly, and disabled people. The more adaptable communal spaces are, the better can people use them concerning their needs. Since the beginning of planning regarding the scape`s function and location, the affected community needs to be involved by the planners. This is necessary to ensure sustainability of the space and also increase community awareness for the availability and importance of this space. Social ties also help to build community resilience in the preand postdisaster phase. Therefore, every planning for macro scale of settlement in disaster prone area should take this matter into account. References Allan, P & Bryant, M 2010, The Critical Role of Open Space in Earthquake Recovery: A Case Study, NZSEE Conference. 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The Aceh Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Appraisal (ARRA) Complete Findings Report, The Asia Foundation. The Economist 2014, 20140614_ASM913.png. Available from: https://cdn.staticeconomist.com/sites/default/files/imagecache/640-width/images/printedition/20140614_ASM913.png [24 August 2017] UGM (Gadjah Mada University) & IRP (International Recovery Platform) 2009, Recovery Status Report: The Yogyakarta and Central Java Earthquake 2006. Available from www.recoveryplatform.org [25 September 2015] UN Habitat 2015, Adequate Open Public Space in Cities. A Human Settlement Indicator for Monitoring the Post2015 Sustainable Development Agenda, A Presentation of the UN Human Settlements Programme (UN Habitat) at the Expert Group Meeting on the Indicator framework for the post-2015 development agenda, New York City, 25-26 February 2015. United Nations 2015, Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015 – 2030. Wooley, H 2003, Urban Open Spaces, Spon Press, London. WorldAtlas 2015, Location of Yogyakarta on a map. Available from: http://www.worldatlas.com/img/locator/city/040/8540-yogyakarta-locator-map.jpg [24 August 2017] Worrall, J 2013, Rebuilding Communities. Available from http://www.domusweb.it/en/architecture/2013/06/17/rebuilding_communities.html [25 September 2015] 23 Integrative Risk and Security Research Volume 2/ 2017 Resilient-Designed Community Structures and Facilities for Vulnerable Coastal Cities: Lessons Learned from Indonesia and the Philippines Ruth Marie I. Equipaje1, Shirleyana2 & Cut Yulvizar3 1University of Santo Tomas, Philippines 2Department of Architecture, Widya Kartika University, Indonesia 3Department of Biology, Syiah Kuala University, Indonesia Email: [email protected]; [email protected]; yunda[email protected] Abstract Twenty-first century cities are home to more than fifty percent of the world population. Coastal cities and towns that are highly exposed to sea level rising, have high risk and vulnerability particularly during the occurrence of disasters such as: earthquakes, tsunamis, typhoons, and storm surges. Countries, such as Indonesia and the Philippines, are geographically located along the sphere of climatic hazards and have high vulnerability to these natural disasters. The coastal area is indicated as vulnerable to natural disasters. This study puts a focus on the discussions of disaster preparedness and mitigation measures through identifying safe zones. The analysis presents findings to create concepts of resilient-designed community structures and facilities to help create safer zones and better human security in the highly-dense disaster-prone urban cities and coastal towns of Indonesia and the Philippines. Keywords: safe, community, structures, facilities, disaster, resilience, vulnerability, climate change adaptation Introduction Great disasters such as earthquakes and tsunami often strike coastal areas (Purbani, 2012; Diposaptono, 2005). Some countries are prone due to the fact that large parts of their territory are made of coastal areas. In Indonesia, some cities are close to the fault line of active tectonic plate that is constantly moving. This means that it is highly prone to volcanic eruption, earthquake and even tsunami. There are 290 cities located at the coastal line. Therefore, countermeasures to protect the coastal cities from tsunami are needed (Fakhrurrazi, 2010). Indonesia as the biggest state archipelago has huge natural coastal resources and high natural disaster potential. The present population of the region is approximately 210 million, with approximately140 million living within 60 km of the coasts. The coastal area is indicated as one of the areas that are vulnerable to natural disasters such as earthquakes and tsunami. One of the disasters was the earthquake and the following tsunami that devastated Banda Aceh, Indonesia on December 26th in 2004. It has caused remarkable problems such as social, economic and environmental aspects in Banda Aceh. Although this region of Indonesia is extremely vulnerable to natural disasters and due to its location exposition to danger is unavoidable, disaster risk still could be reduced. The government must consider this in making policy and development strategy to be more suitable for disaster mitigation (Ruswandi, 2009). The Philippine archipelago is frequently visited by strong typhoons, while on a yearly basis of the average of 20 typhoons develop and about eight to ten make a landfall. Being an archipelago of 7,100 islands, it is 24 Recovery after extreme events - Lessons learned and remaining challenges in Disaster Risk Reduction predominantly surrounded by water and geographically located within the “Ring of Fire” and directly adjacent eastward to the Pacific Ocean. With the constant experience of typhoons, the Filipinos have been resilient to the impact of typhoons and flooding. However, Typhoon Haiyan, taught the most cruel first-hand experience on the destructive effect of storm surge which has been recorded to happen once in 50 years. Typhoon Haiyan (2013) is historically recorded to be one of the super typhoons that traversed the Philippines with a wind speed of 195 miles per hour and built a strong gust of wind of 235 miles per hour at landfall. According to the data gathered by United States Agency for International Development from the Government of the Philippines (GPH) National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC) as of April 17, 2014 Typhoon Haiyan affected 16 million people, displaced 4.1 million people, caused 6,300 recorded deaths, damaged and destroyed about 1.1 million houses (USAID, 2014). Planning for disaster-prone towns and cities should be strategic and focus a more concrete sustainability and resiliency solutions that are adaptable and comprehensive. Safe places to function as evacuation space should be managed and planned prior to its occurrence as to minimize the impact of such disasters to the physical environment of cities, to prepare the community for the disaster and most importantly to save lives of the people. The problem is people react faster, run away from water or follow the lock of people instead of following escape routes (Fakhrurrazi, 2010). Besides escape routes, they need to be familiar with the evacuation space or space of refuge, which usually are community facilities. Too little literatures was written about “space of refuge”, but the closest definition is related to the “area of refuge” that is defined and identified in building codes and fire safety standards. Area of refuge is a fireresistive indoor space inside the building where people run to for safety during the occurrence of fire which is equipped with necessary tool to clear the air from smoke and any hazardous gas (ICC, 2015). Space of refuge is an area in a public open space that is unobstructed and with the significant role of providing a free, safe place for people to go during the peak of climate-related disasters and immediately right after it has passed. Considering the need for community facilities which have a multi-functional purpose and can be convertible to evacuation area in times of disasters, it is necessary to have a resilient design community structure and facilities for these prone cities. Disaster preparedness Coastal communities are full of false myths associated with disasters. Community members living in disasterprone areas become victims because of the lack of preparation and false myths about the disaster (Dahuri et al., 1996). After disasters occur, people often lose control and are afraid and anxious. Disaster preparedness reduces these feelings and helps communities to know where to take refuge and how to care regarding domestic purposes. Disasters are inevitable, unpredictable and significantly impact communities and their economy. Therefore, it is important for disaster preparedness to minimize the threat. Planning, warnings, evacuations and search and rescue are processes designed to minimize the deleterious effects of disasters on populations (Gillespie & Streeter, 1987). Disaster preparedness can be in form of rescue facilities such as disaster warning sirens, evacuation routes and evacuation area for disaster victims. In an earthquake rehabilitation period, a warning from the sound of sirens can make people to run to disaster and evacuation sites that have been provided in accordance with instructions or knowledge at the time of counselling, socialization and practical simulations. 25 Integrative Risk and Security Research Volume 2/ 2017 Evacuation space as a safe zone Evacuation shelters are areas that can be used for emergency evacuation directly after the occurrence of a natural disaster. The Japan Study Support (JPSS) categorises evacuation space into three categories: (1) Temporary evacuation sites (Temporary assembly point) (usually the nearest spacious places such as local park, schoolyard); (2) Open evacuation area (e.g. larger park or an open space); (3) Evacuation shelters (places for evacuees to live temporarily e.g. public schools). Based on the categories the City of Hiroshima in Japan differentiates the evacuation shelters in (1) immediate shelter, (2) neighbourhood and daily life designated evacuation shelters and (3) wide-area evacuation shelters. The immediate shelter is a pre-selected evacuation area, e.g. public parks, open fields, or empty spaces near to homes or work places. The neighbourhood and daily life evacuation shelter provides lodging and shelter for persons whose residences are destroyed. The wide-area evacuation shelters are used when the neighbourhood evacuation shelter can no longer be used. Resilient design of community structures and facilities According to the Hyogo Framework for Action (UNISDR, 2005), disaster resilience is determined by the degree to which individuals, communities and public and private organisations are capable of organising themselves to learn from past disasters and reduce their risks to future ones at international, regional, national and local levels. Buildings and structures protect people from negative effects of extreme-weather conditions and impacts of climate change. Therefore, we should design structures that are climate-adaptive and enable better health and chances of survival during climate-related disasters (Roaf et.al, 2005). Another important point is the multi-functional aspect of community structures and facilities. Schools, churches, and community halls become evacuation centres and people often run to these buildings to seek shelter during typhoons and other emergencies and disasters. It is therefore important to consider a multi-functional and multi-hazard approach in the design and planning of community structures and facilities. Most community structures and facilities in developing countries are initiated by donor agencies, politicians, religious groups or people's organizations. Most of these facilities have limited budget also affecting the design and material specifications of the respective buildings. The aspiration of designing climate-adaptive structures that can withstand extreme weather events lacks realization and implementation. 32 Recovery after extreme events - Lessons learned and remaining challenges in Disaster Risk Reduction Figure 11. An open space for recreation at the Evacuation and Temporary Housing for the displaced families in Estancia, Iloilo, Philippines Source: own photograph by Equipaje (2014) Analysis and discussion Both case studies are reactive and take corresponding actions on disaster preparedness and mitigation only after the disaster already occurred. The case of Neheun in Aceh is a resettlement village, while the case in Tacloban is an example of temporary housing that serves as a temporary shelter for Typhoon Haiyan disaster victims. In terms of location, the evacuation sites or relocation sites should be in safe area, far away from possibilities to be affected by continuing disaster. However, since there were many considerations like ease for livelihood, the location of temporary or relocation sites could still be within the radius of danger zones . In the case of Neuheun, the resettlement area is on a hillside and can be considered to lie on a safe area since it is far from the coastline. In contrary, the Bunkhouse temporary shelter in Tacloban is still located in low-lying and flood prone areas. The temporary housing in Estancia, is not far from town centre, and the open public ground such as public school ground was selected for the temporary shelter location. Evacuation plans or way-finding signage of the “escape routes” are installed and made available in Neuheun Village, Aceh, written in the local language. This made the evacuation plan easier to understand, thereby facilitating a better participation among the residents during evacuation procedures. The escape routes showed directions going to the hill. As observed, some of the signs are covered with tree branches and made the signs less visible to the public. This shows that the maintenance of escape routes signs has also be considered, otherwise, the signs will not be visible when needed. In the case of Tacloban and Estancia, since both were temporary shelter case, there were no signs of escape routes. With regards to community facilities, in Neheun Village there were a mosque which also serves as a meeting place, a health clinic, a market place, vaillage office, and three school buildings. In the case of Bunkhouse in Tacloban, there were no communal facilities reported. The community needs child-friendly spaces, recreation facilities, spaces for women, and multipurpose hall. These functions are necessary to create opportunity for people to interact. In the case of Estancia, UNICEF helped to facilitate communal facilities such as setting-up an indoor mobile play area and a small library. Furthermore, a large open space was 33 Integrative Risk and Security Research Volume 2/ 2017 allotted for recreation of the evacuees, which became venue for sports activities and play area for the children. This public open space encouraged interaction among the people, though they came from different neighbourhoods. The evacuation buildings were designed and prepared but the location is also important. In the case of Neheun Village, the escape buildings available are 25 kilometres away. The existing eight Tsunami Escape Buildings (TEB) were located in the city, focused around the coastal area. For the two cases in the Philippines, no further information about evacuation buildings in the temporary sites was provided. The temporary shelters already had a large open area functions as an assembly point, but consequently an evacuation plan is needed, if a disaster occurs again. Case Study 1: Neheun Village Aceh - Indonesia Case Study 2: Bunkhouses, Tacloban, Leyte, The Philippines Case Study 3: Temporary Housing, Estancia, IloIlo, The Philippines T ype of disaster happened Earthquake & tsunami T yphoon & flood T yphoon & flood T ype of housing Resettlement/relocation Housing T emporary housing T emporary housing Location On the hill, safe area Low-lying & flood prone areas 3km from the town centre & public school grounds within town. Escape routes Available in local language, some signs are covered with trees. NGO supported in counselling, socialization, and simulation for the disaster risk reduction. No sign of escape routes No sign of escape routes Evacuation building T he local Government plan the escape buildings for Aceh, the nearest from the settlement is 25 km away. The near available evacuation place is mosque and… Since it is prepared as temporary shelter, no evacuation place planned. Since it is prepared as temporary shelter, no evacuation place planned. Community facilities Mosque, also serve as a meeting place, health clinic, market place, village office, school buildings. No communal facilities were reported. Open space allotted for children, NGO provided indoor play area and small library. However, less access to potable water supply is found. Table 1. Comparison of the Case Studies in Providing Evacuation Space and Community Facilities Source: own elaboration Conclusion and recommendation Coastal towns and cities have high a risk and vulnerability to climate-related disasters as they are geographically exposed to the effects of strong typhoons, tsunamis and storm surge and other hazards. There is a need for thorough risk assessment studies to determine the geological characteristics of these disaster-prone towns and cities, from below and above sea-level, in order to identify weak points or threats and lay out necessary strategies to reduce its vulnerability to tsunamis, storm surges and the impact of typhoons and other disasters. 34 Recovery after extreme events - Lessons learned and remaining challenges in Disaster Risk Reduction Identifying safe zones on these coastal towns and cities is a challenge by itself as its location and exposure to the open sea and adjacency to rivers is by itself a factor contributing to vulnerability. Identification of safe zones should be done by experts and should be adapted in the land use plans of cities as safe and secured zones for climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction and management mitigation purposes. On adapting resilient community structures and facilities, evacuation sites should consider planning for a multi-functional and multi-hazard approach in building these community centres and allow flexibility to enable conversion to evacuation centres to protect the people during extreme-weather events. These should have pre-allocated spaces in identified safe zones of cities and should be structurally sound and apt to adapt flexibly before, during, and after events. But most importantly, it should save live as a resilient evacuation centres during typhoon, storm surge, tsunamis, earthquakes and other hazardous events. Ideally, these safe zones should be within a running distance or in close proximity of most of the permanent residences of the town residents. Evacuation routes have to be prepared and introduced to the people in a socio-culturally sensitive way. The signs can use local language for people to easily understand. As often it is community facilities which are being utilized as evacuation centres, it is important to consider allotting climate-adaptive and resilient community structures and facilities and plot a higher budget to make the structures safer and stronger to withstand the high impact of extreme weather events, thereby preventing disasters to destroy the city and lose its people. References ADRA (2013) Rapid Needs Assessment of Iloilo and North Eastern Panay. November 23, 2013. Badan Rekonstruksi & Rehabilitasi/ Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Agency (BRRR) & partners (2006). Aceh and Nias. Two Years after theTsunami. 2006 Progress Report. CCCM (2014). Bunkhouse Assessment Report of 2014. Dahuri, R. and Dutton, I.M., 2000. Integrated coastal and marine management enters a new era in Indonesia. Integrated Coastal Zone Management, 1(1), pp.1-16. Diposaptono S (2005) Tsunami research needs to support the management integrated coastal area in Indonesia. 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Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations For BP 220(with amendments). ICC (International Code Council) (2015). 2015 International Building Code. Retrieved from: https://codes.iccsafe.org/public/document/code/542/967724C0 [last accessed July 26, 2017] Japan Study Support (JPSS). Lectures for Foreign Students on Disaster Control. Where to evacuate. http://www.jpss.jp/en/life/crisis/5/ [last accessed May 10, 2016]. Latief, H., Sengara, I.W. and Kusuma, S.B., 2008. Probabilistic seismic and tsunami hazard analysis model for input to tsunami warning and disaster mitigation strategies. In International Conference for Tsunami Warning (ICTW) Bali, Indonesia. Mercy Corps (2013). Quick facts: What you need to know about Super Typhoon Haiyan. Retrieved from: http://reliefweb.int/report/philippines/quick-facts-what-you-need-know-about-super-typhoonhaiyan#sthash.tn5ZwrLW.dpuf [last accessed July 26, 2017] Panjwani, D. (2013). The Effects of Resettlement on Community Recovery: An Analysis of Post Tsunami-Aceh, Indonesia. Thesis Report. The Faculty of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies, University of British Columbia, Vancouver. 35 Integrative Risk and Security Research Volume 2/ 2017 Purbani D (2012) Tsunami Mitigation Strategies Based on the Mangrove Ecosystem Application Space Utilization Beach. Dissertation. Institut Pertanian Bogor. Bogor [In Indonesian] Roaf, S. Crichton, D, Nicol, F. (2005). Adapting Building and Cities to Climate Change. Oxford: Elsevier. Ruswandi (2009). Model Development Policy Coastal Region Perspective of Sustainable and Mitigation of Natural Disasters in Coastal Indramayu and Ciamis. Dissertation. Institut Pertanian Bogor. Bogor [In Indonesian] Tacloband Hotels n.d., Location of Tacloban City, Leyte, Philippines. Available from: https://www.taclobanhotels.com/TACLOBAN-MAPS.htm [24 August 2017]. UN (United Nations) (2015). Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015 – 2030. UNISDR (United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction UNISDR) (2005). Hyogo Framework for Action 20052015: Building the Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disasters . World Conference on Disaster Reduction. 18-22 January 2005, Kobe, Hyogo, Japan. A/CONF.206/6. UNISDR. USAID (US Agency for International Development) (2014). PhilippinesTyphoon Yolanda/Haiyan. Retrieved from: https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1866/philippines_ty_fs22_04-212014.pdf [last accessed July 26, 2017] Villar, EA 2003, Map of the Philippines showing the location of Iloilo. Available from: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iloilo#/media/File:Ph_locator_map_iloilo.png [24 August 2017] 36 Recovery after extreme events - Lessons learned and remaining challenges in Disaster Risk Reduction What about the development of a framework for coastal smart cities? Hrishikesh Venkataraman1, Nishara Fernando2 & Vallam Sundar3 1Indian Institute of Information Technology Chittoor, India 2Department of Sociology, University of Colombo, Sri Lanka 3Indian Institute of Technology, India Email: [email protected], [email protected] Abstract The post Tsunami 2004 phase has witnessed significant enhancement in the planning of mitigation measures against extreme coastal natural hazards. However, a safe and quick recovery management in real events even after an early warning is still a critical challenge that is not yet successfully realized. Recently, the Indian government has announced setting up about 100 smart-cities of which, about 50 smart-cities would be along the coast of Indian peninsula; including smart islands for tourism and recreation to come up within the coastal areas. However, developing a town or a city along a coastline is a very different process from that of regular city development within the mainland. The present paper discusses the need to consider the different aspects in city development, among them technical social aspects as well as psychological aspects of the residents. The paper provides insights into these aspects and addresses the question how they could serve as the basis for developing a conceptual framework for building tsunami and cyclone-resilient new coastal smart-cities, in cooperation with different national, international, public and private stake-holders. Introduction Over a decade after the tsunami in the Indian Ocean, coastal cities across the world have given great importance to planning, design and to proactively taking steps to counter the growing number of natural disasters such as cyclones, heat and water stress caused by the rapidly changing global climate. Countries such as Japan, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and other South-east Asian countries across the Indian Ocean have enabled the city metropolitan governments to take pre-emptive steps and provide guidance in planning and recovery measures to various stakeholders including citizens, businesses, communities and rescue emergency support services, such as fire brigades, ambulances, TV and radio channels, utility and transportation companies, etc. In India, after the 2004 tsunami, there has been significant work on enhancing tsunami and earthquake prediction mechanisms. However, even with enhanced early-warning mechanisms and disaster recovery solutions for tsunami, cyclones and storm-surges, there is still considerably long duration between disaster detection and recovery actions like reliable information transmission to the concerned individuals or group, evacuation, protection of critical assets of individuals, etc. A safe and quick recovery management even after early warning is still a critical challenge that is not yet successfully realized; a prime example being - Cyclone Hudhud in Vishakapatnam, AP, India in October 2014 (a city also affected by tsunami in December 2004), that caused humongous damage to the city. Significantly, it is predicted that by 2030, more than 40% of Indian population and 60% of population in south-east Asia will live in towns/cities (Sankhe et al. 2010; United Nations Centre for Human Settlement n.d.). Recently, the Indian government announced the setting up of 100+ smart-cities while around 50 of them including smart islands for tourism and recreation will come up in 37 Integrative Risk and Security Research Volume 2/ 2017 coastal areas. However, building a city around coastline is very different from building a regular city. A major question therefore arises - how to build a smart-city that will ensure strong resilience from different waterbased natural calamities and provide an intelligent ecosystem-adaptive way of living, protecting both residents and industries. Herein, it should be noted that although India has a vast coastline of over 7,000 km with more than 200 ports (comprising 13 major and about 190 minor ports) that carry more than 90% of India’s total trade volume, the coastline is highly underutilized and has significant potential for improvement and development (Ministry of Finance n.d.). A comprehensive analysis of India’s domestic and port traffic movement indicates the need to improve the transport infrastructure and inter-modal linkages to achieve optimal modal mix for port evacuation (Holman Fenwick Willan n.d.). In this regard, it is important to note that in the context of coastal smart cities, the Government of India, in the 2nd half of 2014, has initiated a concept for developing an institutional framework for water-based project called ‘Sagarmala’ (Ministry of Shipping (Government of India) 2014). There are different objectives set under project ‘Sagarmala’ which include:  Port based development  Infrastructure to transport goods quickly, efficiently and using low-cost technique  Develop water-based access to new development regions with inter-transport modes  Development of tourism and recreational activities across different islands  Efficient evacuation in islands in case of emergencies such as cyclones, Tsunamis, etc. It is important to note that such a large scale development of world-class coastal regions require a deeper understanding of many aspects:  Knowledge of the local region and the challenges therein  Different scenarios that need to be tackled  Examples across the world where such scenarios have occurred and the engineering principles, especially surface and ocean engineering concepts that they have investigated and applied  The implementation of such projects and the challenges in terms of both engineering and collaborating with other public agencies and private stake-holders,  The know-how for technologies and usage and deployment of ICT for development of coastal regions The motivation of this work is to investigate the need for a conceptual framework that will serve as the platform for developing new coastal-smart-cities in India and South-East Asia that would be smart enough to avoid the insurmountable losses and other dangerous consequences arising from natural coastal hazards like cyclones and tsunami. The goal of this work is to devise innovative solutions and models right from the planning, design and development of coastal smart-cities, particularly in terms of partnerships with city, state and the central government, different national agencies, private players and other stakeholders such as hospitals, police stations, monitoring rooms, etc. Notably, using technologies such as Internet of Things (IoT) and Machine to Machine (M2M) communication, hundreds of thousands of sensors and other electronic devices can be connected together to form an intelligent network in the design of a coastal smart-city. Further, there are numerous other engineering aspects along with social and cultural aspects that need to be considered in human resettlement and also aspects of current and historical activities in any coastal area that need to be investigated. This paper initially describes different real-world scenarios for water-based transportation along with an example in Indian and South Asian environment; along with a relevant example of how an intelligent use of 38 Recovery after extreme events - Lessons learned and remaining challenges in Disaster Risk Reduction water medium is used for efficient transportation in Germany. This is followed by a discussion on developing a coastal island and its surface/ocean engineering requirements to be considered before going for selfsufficient and regional development. Thirdly, the sociological aspects in the rehabilitation of people and activities in the coastal areas are considered. Subsequently, the different aspects to be considered in an integrated framework for coastal smart cities are discussed and a series of conclusions is drawn. Intelligent use of water medium for efficient transportation In order to understand how an intelligent transportation system can be built, it is imperative to understand that there are many places where a major river flows between the land areas. Over the years, in many places, an example is Mumbai which was originally a combination of seven islands, the lands separated by water bodies have been joined by closing the water body through sand, mud, etc. However, a major and a dangerous drawback of such methods is the destruction of ecology. At the same time, with rapid advancements in 21st century, it is imperative that an efficient connectivity is provided to people across islands and water bodies. In this regard, there are several places in India where people are still using water bodies to travel from one place to another, albeit in a very crude manner. For instance, in the city of Guwahati, the capital of Assam, IIT Guwahati and Guwahati city are separated by river Brahmaputra, as shown in Figure 1. Figure.1: River Brahmaputra between IIT Guwahati and the city of Guwahati Source: Transportation Map in Guwahati and IIT Guwahati (n.d.) The residents of IIT Guwahati have to take a circuitous route to reach the city of Guwahati through the road (Transportation Map in Guwahati and IIT Guwahati n.d.). However, as Figure 1 shows, a shorter water-based route exists which the people of that region use (through a small boat) to travel from IIT Guwahati to the city. This boat carries people and small vehicles like bicycles. An important question is if this concept can be scaled up such that everybody uses this water medium to travel from one place to another, thereby avoiding the long circuitous route? 39 Integrative Risk and Security Research Volume 2/ 2017 Figure 2: River Weser separating Bremen Vegesack port and the Land on Other Side Source: Google Maps (2017) A similar problem existed in the state of Bremen, Germany, at the small port of Bremen Vegesack (Figure 2). The small port at Bremen Vegesack has a long creek where people can take a walk for a distance of about one kilometre. At the same time, there is land across a distance of a half kilometre of water body. Also, due to very brittle ecological condition, the Government of Bremen decided not to construct a flyover across the water body and a medium sized designed ferry that travelled between both sides of the port is used instead. This ferry has the capability to not only carry pedestrians and bicyclers, but also cars and small trucks. In ten minutes the ferry travels to other side of the port and returns to the original side in 30 minutes. This procedure is repeated twice in a period of one hour. Given that a ferry can take around ten cars at a time, it was observed that even during the peak times, the vehicles can be easily ferried without causing traffic congestion. The example of Bremen could be recreated not only at Guwahati but also across other places in India, typically in the state of Orissa, Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu where several similar coastal rural areas exist. In this regard, the authors would like to point out another positive example for a connection of two lands separated by a water body. If one travels from Germany to Denmark by train, one would realize that the two countries are separated by a small distance by Baltic Sea at Puttgraden, as can be observed in Figure 3a. Again, to reach Copenhagen in an economical way from Hamburg in Germany, there was a need to come up with an efficient transportation model. Figure 3a: The German and part of the Danish railway line Source: Bienick (2007) 40 Recovery after extreme events - Lessons learned and remaining challenges in Disaster Risk Reduction Again, the engineering principle used was to have a combination of train and ferry as shown in Figure 3b. For travelling from Germany to Denmark the procedure is the following: a) The train enters the bottom deck of the ferry (there are tracks), along with other vehicles. b) Passengers exit the train and go two floors up to the ferry decks for the 45 minute journey. c) When the ferry nears the port, passengers board the train again. d) The train exits the holding area of the ferry and continues onward in Denmark. Figure 3.b: Way to Ferry at Puttgarden Source: Möller (2005) The entry and exit from the ferry is designed such that trains and cars are loaded by the lower ramp while cars are loaded only by the upper ramp (Möller 2005). It is not only an effective and ecological way of transportation, but also a tourism-friendly that offers options for coffee breaks during the train journey. It is important to note that this procedure requires intense coordination among different agencies –the rail network in Germany, the rail network in Denmark, the shipping company, the port management and most importantly, the customers and the immigration office. This example underlines that an integrative approach, suited to suit the people’s needs along with care for surface and ecological protection, can help to solve major transportation problems in coastal regions, even if it is spread across multiple states. Developing a coastal island for self-sufficient and regional development This situation is getting more and more importance in the coming years, especially in the Indian Peninsula (Ministry of Shipping (Government of India) 2014). The Government of India has identified ten coastal economic zones (CEZs) or clusters around the Indian Peninsula which they would like to develop over the coming years. Notably, the government has shown a lot of interest in developing the towns and small cities in these ten CEZs; and making many of these towns and the islands in this peninsula as tourist and recreational hubs. Figure 4 shows the ten CEZs planned across the Indian Peninsula (marked as red circles). It can be observed that the Indian Peninsula covers a region of 7,000 kilometres, spreads across several major cities with lots of industries and tech-parks. 41 Integrative Risk and Security Research Volume 2/ 2017 Figure 4: Concept of 10 Coastal economic zones (CEZs) planned across Indian Peninsula (Ministry of Shipping Source: Government of India (2014) So, this offers a lot of opportunities for development across this region. The coastal smart cities and recreational areas can be developed at appropriate locations, based on the available coastal features and sediment transport that plays a key role in any type of coastal development. But there are several challenges in building and protecting the coastal areas. This could be done by using coastal structures like groins, offshore breakwaters and submerged reefs and designed in the form of hard and soft measures in protecting the coast/reclaiming the land and energy barriers for recreational purposes, based on the requirements. Typical case studies focusing on different surface engineering aspects using the above mentioned structures are detailed below. These include: Groin field The land reclamation for these coastal islands using groin fields can be done in the coastal area with a predominant alongshore sediment transport. This has to be done with proper care in order to eliminate possible errors. A typical coastal protection measure in the Indian scenario by utilising the existing out crop with proper design has yielded fruitful results with the formation of beach at Simon Colony is shown in Fig. 5. The Groin field functions well in trapping the long shore sediment. The beach of about 100m wide in between the groin filed gets formed and has got stabilised. The groin field serves not only as coastal protections measure for the coast but also acts as mini fishing harbours. Similar, protection measure with short groins has been utilised to protect most of the coastal lands and islands to act as a buffer in protecting the coast during extreme events are in practice in most of the developed countries. During the tsunami of 2004, the beaches formed due to the present groin field acted as buffers due to which the inundation distance and run-up heights had reduced leading to almost nil damage. The tsunami had exhibited its might on the villages adjoining the study area. 48 Recovery after extreme events - Lessons learned and remaining challenges in Disaster Risk Reduction further marginalized and more vulnerable after the relocation; which in-turn would enable not only a faster but much smoother development of any planned industrial or residential township or coastal smart city. Conclusion This paper discusses the three different aspects - technology (i.e., communication system, intelligent transportation system), surface and ocean engineering and social/rehabilitation - a framework for developing a coastal smart city should include. A major consideration in the development of a smart city is to use different ICT based techniques for efficient maintenance, connectivity and ease of transportation of the people, for all residents, industries, tourists, etc. Further, there is a need to have a closer cooperation between different stakeholders of the society like hotels and residential colonies, industries, hospital, police, insurance, for quick and correct transmission of information and people when required. However, even before planning a smart city along a coast there are two very significant aspects that need to be considered – the first aspect is the suitability of the coastal line/land for building a smart city. In order to do that, the first exercise is to prepare a coastal vulnerability map using satellite imageries wherein the identified locations would be categorised depending on the degree and nature of vulnerability. The second exercise would be to identify locations that are affected badly only during extreme events like storm surge, tsunami which need to be treated in special manner as regard to the mitigation measure. This has to be followed up with the preparation of a shoreline management plan that would clearly indicate, apart from the vulnerable locations, fishing grounds, fishing harbours, ports, tourism, coastal corridors for efficient transport, etc. The second aspect to be considered is the current status of the location, the nature of the people’s work, their strength and weakness and how would the relocation affect them. For a better growth of society, it is extremely essential that these people are involved at every stage in the development of a city; so that they are not only not left out; but also feel proud to be part of the new township or smart city. Finally, the consideration of these aspects in the framework would help not only to develop a coastal smart coastal city but also to make it a rebellion free and long-term sustaining smart city. References Alvarez, IE, Rubio, R & Ricalde, H 2007, 'Beach restoration with geotextile tubes as submerged breakwaters in Yucatan, Mexico', Geotextiles and Geomembranes, vol. 25, 4-5, pp. 233–241. Bienick, M 2007, The German and part of the Danish railway line. Available from: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vogelfluglinie#/media/File:Vogelflugkarte.jpg [24 August 2017] Fernando, N 2012, Forced Relocation after the Indian Ocean Tsunami 2004. Case study of vulnerable populations in three relocation settlements in Galle, Sri Lanka, United Nations University Institute for Environment and Human Security, Bonn. Fernando, N & Punchihewa, AG 2013, Relocating the displaced strategies for sustainable relocation, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Colombo. Google Maps 2017. Route Zur Vegesacker Fähre 45, 28757 Bremen - An der Fähre 2, 27809 Lemwerder. Available from https://www.google.de/maps/dir/Zur+Vegesacker+F%C3%A4hre+45,+28757+Bremen/An+der+F%C3 %A4hre+2,+27809+Lemwerder/@53.1677561,8.6163229,16z/data=!3m1!4b1!4m14!4m13!1m5!1m1!1s 0x47b6d354b9f1b19b:0xa15a76e93066ae7c!2m2!1d8.62325!2d53.16936!1m5!1m1!1s0x47b6d3558e1 a47a5:0x925d4071caa2103b!2m2!1d8.6182058!2d53.1661202!3e0 [24 August 2017]. Holman Fenwick Willan n.d., Indian Ports: The Need for Further Capacity and Investment. Available from: http://www.hfw.com/Indian-Ports [26 January 2017]. Ministry of Finance n.d., Public Private Partnerships: Sector Ports, Government of India. Available from: http://www.hfw.com/Indian-Ports [31 January 2016]. Ministry of Shipping (Government of India) 2014, Concept Note on SagarMala Project: Working Paper. Möller, S 2005, Fehmarn: Fährhafen Puttgarden. Available from: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/9/99/Fehmarn_Puttgarden_114.jpg/800px -Fehmarn_Puttgarden_114.jpg [09 August 2017]. 49 Integrative Risk and Security Research Volume 2/ 2017 Sankhe, Shirish, Vittal, I, Dobbs, R, Mohan, A, Gulati, A, Ablett, J, Gupta, S, Kim, A, Paul, S, Sanghvi, A & Sethy, G 2010, India’s Urban Awakening: Building Inclusive Cities: Sustaining Economic Growth, McKinsey Global Institute. Available from: http://www.mckinsey.com/global-themes/urbanization/urban-awakeningin-india [02 February 2016]. Sundar, V & Sundaravedivelu, R 2007, 'Role of Groin Field for Coastal Protection Considering Socio Economic Aspects'. 32nd International Association of Hydraulic Engineering and Research. Harmonizing the demands of art and nature in hydraulics. n.d., Transportation Map in Guwahati and IIT Guwahati. Available from: http://www.iitg.ac.in/hep/sercthep09/transportation.html [09 February 2016]. United Nations Centre for Human Settlement n.d., Urbanization: Facts and Figures. Available from: http://www.un.org/ga/Istanbul+5/bg10.htm [09 February 2016]. van Rijn, LC 1997, 'Sediment transport and budget of the central coastal zone of Holland', Coastal Engineering, vol. 32, no. 1, pp. 61–90. van Rijn, LC 2011, 'Coastal erosion and control', Ocean & Coastal Management, vol. 54, no. 12, pp. 867–887. 50 Recovery after extreme events - Lessons learned and remaining challenges in Disaster Risk Reduction Learning processes triggered - from individual stakeholders to countries 51 Integrative Risk and Security Research Volume 2/ 2017 Tribal indigenous knowledge of tsunamic hazard prone areas in reducing disaster risk with focus on Simeuleu Island Aceh and other islands offshore west of Sumatra Hananto Kurnio1 Alexander Fekete2 & Matthias Garschagen3 1Marine Geological Institute Of Indonesia, Indonesia 2Institute for Rescue Engineering and Civil Protection, TH Köln - University of Applied Sciences, Germany 3United Nations University – Institute for Environment and Human Security (UNU-EHS), Germany Email: [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected] Abstract Besides other types of knowledge indigenous knowledge (IK) was accessed after the Tsunami 2004. In indigenous communities it was possible to reduce deaths and injuries, due to the knowledge of processes in the physical world related to a tsunami. In Simeuleu Island – Aceh Province north of Sumatra, IK saved a lot of local residences from the catastrophic consequences of the tsunami hazard that hit Aceh and North Sumatra in 2004. At the island the number of victims was only 7 people out of the 78,000 total population of the island, compared to Aceh at the mainland of Northern Sumatra where the number of victims reached 200,000. The type of IK that saved most Simeuleuan people was related to the traditional culture inherited from their ancestors in facing tsunami hazards. Indigenous knowledge on the tsunami hazard was built up in the form of the smong story. Smong being the word for tsunami in local language since 1907’s tsunami event, the smong story became an early warning system on the island. Smong culture tends to be forgotten by the young generation due to the influence of mass media and mobile phones that takes lots of people´s attention and time. Education for children at school is the key to preserve smong stories and it could be improved by accompanying it in TV programs, movies and books. In Aceh and Sumatra stories and messages about tsunami that had occurred in the past could be found in some oral histories, poems and songs. The conclusion is drawn that utilizing IK is a powerful tool for disaster risk reduction (DRR); the recognition of the high value of IK by local communities could even improve future human security. Key words: Indigenous Knowledge, tsunami hazard and Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) Introduction The term indigenous knowledge (IK) generally refers to knowledge systems embedded in the cultural traditions of communities. These include traditional and local knowledge. Indigenous knowledge is sourced from indigenous peoples and their societies (Dunn, 2014). The United Nations estimates that more than 370 million indigenous people live spread across at least 70 countries. This figure allows the argument that problems will occur if the knowledge systems that characterize them are generalized and simplified. The problem increases when we realize that indigenous societies often live in remote and isolated places, and that their identities vary strongly. Indigenous knowledge is acquired in a much more empirical way compared to modern knowledge in the process of finding out the world (Dunn, 2014). First-hand experience is considered the best and the only way to properly learn. Sense perception and language are used to understand something and to experience it. This is the way many indigenous societies approach knowledge. 52 Recovery after extreme events - Lessons learned and remaining challenges in Disaster Risk Reduction Processes of gaining knowledge involve the strong bonds between the people and the place in which indigenous people live (Dunn, 2014). To describe how strongly people are related to their living place, an illustration was given by a member of the US Indian Navajo tribe who defended in court his people being forcibly removed from their ancestral land by a mining company in the 1980s: “The land is sacred to us, we cannot practice our religion elsewhere, only on the land where we are known. It is like your family. You could not leave your relatives if they were sick – it is in this way that we must stay with this land, our relative” (Manybeads et al., 1989, pp.228, 230) Indigenous knowledge can be believed to be stored in the land itself, any relocation means dislocation from everything that defines indigenous people. They transfer knowledge to younger individuals by telling stories. The stories allow their listeners to relate to the objects of the story, and empathize with them; It can be reflected how it is like to be the animals in the story and experience the world from their perspective. There are many different ways for passing stories and knowledge. In Australia aborigines traditionally transform information about the landscape into songs, which are then passed down from generation to generation. Those who know the songs can get from one place to another and can navigate through the harsh environment of the Australian bush. The verses of the song are taught to aborigine children by their mothers from a very early age on while children are carried around on their mothers´ backs. As a result, grown up aborigines have a combined imagination, artistic ability and navigational skill. In the South African San society, important skills for survival are delivered in the ceremony of the great dance. There are two implications of passing on knowledge using the methods mentioned above; firstly, it requires the use of imagination by the listeners to develop a thoughtful bond with their living environment and the way to live successfully in the environment; secondly, the story telling, song learning and ritual dance help to strengthen community bonds and build respect in the society. The adaptation of indigenous knowledge to the modern western world is sometimes considered as outdated, static and ill-adapted. Not well-adapted does not mean that they are not very good at adapting to change and facing challenges. A society which could operate effectively within its environment should be considered very well adapted (Dunn, 2014). Indigenous knowledge in Indonesia was becoming well-known after the disastrous tsunami 2004 event which fortunately only took few lives of Simeuleuan peoples. This can be seen as an evidence of the power of Indigenous Knowledge in reducing disaster risk. For its role in disaster risk reduction, there are four main views (UNISDR, 2008): 1) Various indigenous knowledge practices and strategies against natural hazards can be transferred and adapted to other communities with similar conditions. 2) Participation of the affected community is needed when there is an incorporation of indigenous knowledge in existing practices and policies, in order to encourage and empower its members to take the leading role in all disaster risk reduction activities. 3) Project implementation will also be improved because information contained in indigenous knowledge provides valuable information about the local context. 4) Dissemination of indigenous knowledge in non-formal ways provides a successful model for education on disaster risk reduction. 53 Integrative Risk and Security Research Volume 2/ 2017 Objective of the study It is a fact that mostly in tsunamic hazard prone coastal areas of Indonesia, awareness of this hazard was not realized by most local people until the catastrophic event hit Aceh in 2004. It took 230,000 to 280,000 lives and left more people missing that lived in the coastal areas of Aceh – Northern Sumatra Indonesia as well as other countries surrounding the Indian Ocean such as Sri Lanka and Thailand. On the other hand, the death toll in Simeuleu Island west of Aceh was much less, only seven people from 78,000 total population of the island. It is argued that the comparably lower number of deaths was a result of indigenous knowledge (IK) present on the island that has been inherited from generation to generation. It contains information on how to react when a big earthquake occurs which is followed by a dropping sea level at the coast, which is a process preceding a tsunami. The objective of this study is to identify those characteristics of indigenous knowledge which reduced the number of people vulnerable to tsunami hazards on Simeuleu Island Aceh and other islands offshore west of Sumatra, and examine local geomorphological characteristics that support their escape route to higher grounds. Disasters in Indonesia Indonesian territories are prone to either natural or man-induced disasters. The list of disasters contains terror or sabotage, flood, flood and landslide, high wave and abrasion, earthquake, forest and land fire, transportation accidents, volcano eruption, small tropical cyclone and landslide (BNPB, 2016). In 2016, a total number of 1,928 events resulted in 478 people dead or missing, 2,421,619 affected or evacuated and 30,763 houses destroyed (Figure 1). Figure 1: Disaster statistic of Indonesia 2016 Source: BNPB (2016) 54 Recovery after extreme events - Lessons learned and remaining challenges in Disaster Risk Reduction Figure 2: Number of disasters per province in 2016 (until October) Source: BNPB (2016) Table 1: Details of the disaster types, their victims and impact until October 2016 Source: BNPB (2016) Figure 2 shows the distribution of disasters per province on a map of Indonesia for the first ten months of 2016, showing that Aceh Province and Simeuleu Island belong to high risk disaster areas. Details on the events are presented in Table 1. Concerning the total number of events, flood has the most frequent occurrence in Indonesia with up to 150 events in February together with heavy rains. Flooding is followed by landslides which at the same month had an occurrence of approximately 75 events. This is possibly related to over saturation of soils with rain water that increases the weight of soils and can cause landslides. Earthquake events in 2016 can be neglected as only few occurred: ten events with two deaths and missing. Property loss due to earthquake resulted in 390 houses heavily damaged, 1,036 moderately damaged and 3,036 lightly damaged. No tsunami event was recorded in 2016. Indigenous knowledge (IK) Natural disasters are not easy to predict, but indigenous knowledge (IK) could anticipate them in advance before they occur. Example of such knowledge exists in island communities of Simeuleu Aceh and other 55 Integrative Risk and Security Research Volume 2/ 2017 islands offshore the West coast of Sumatra (Figure 3). This IK was firstly recognized after the Aceh’s tsunami disaster 2004. Figure 3: The location of Simeuleu Island offshore west of Aceh Province Source: archi pelago fastfact (2012) Indigenous knowledge can be a powerful tool for Disaster Risk Reduction, as long as it is recognized and utilized. Without this, it is merely a part of common things in community. Empowering local communities to recognize the high values of Indigenous Knowledge for DRR can improve the future of human security. Indigenous Knowledge originates within the community (Sartini, 2004), which contrasts from scientific knowledge that is often influenced by many outside sources unrelated to the local culture or environment. Indigenous Knowledge can be easily adopted and used by the community (Marfai, 2012). Community response to earthquake and tsunami hazard Simeuleu Island Living in a region of seismic activity, Simeuleu’s people are familiar with earthquakes and tsunamis. This condition has influenced their culture to adjust to such hazards. Their adjustment to tsunami hazard was stimulated in 1907 when a 7.8 M earthquake occurred in the Indian Ocean causing the death of seventy per cent of the Simeuleu population. The survivors shared their experiences and knowledge through the oral story of Smong. The story explains the tsunami disaster phenomenon where a big earthquake is followed by low tide of sea water in the beach before a giant wave sweeps through the land. This IK showed its power during the disastrous events on December 26th, 2004 and March 28th, 2005. On the other hand, within Aceh ethnic group living in coastal areas of northern Sumatra, the messages and story of tsunami that happened in the past were implied in some traditional songs and oral histories. In Bahasa Indonesia, the songs and oral histories are called hikayat or syair. Unfortunately, this valuable IK was not recognized. Unrecognized IK could not be used as disaster risk reduction tool. This is evidence from more victim numbers in Aceh main land (Syafwina, 2014). Furthermore, adaptation of one successful practice of IK in one place to another place needs modification (Syafwina, 2014). The modification shall meet the culture based on the new location and community. Simeuleu Island has an excellent road network surrounding the island, as shown in figure 4. The roads run parallel to the coastline on the whole island. These roads connect its Regency Capital City Sinabang located in the Southeast of the island with other places along the coastal zone. The highest place is Gunung (Gg) Sibau or Sibau Mountain (625 m above sea level) and Ayerpinang (530 above sea level) which are both 56 Recovery after extreme events - Lessons learned and remaining challenges in Disaster Risk Reduction located northwest of Sinabang. These mountains are located at the coastal zone, creating high relief morphology in its northeast facing coasts around Ujung Tinggi village (Figure 4). Figure 4: Simeuleu Island Source: SumatraEcoTourism (n.d.) Mentawai Island Mentawai Island belongs to the same island belt with Simeuleu and is located offshore of West Sumatra. The island itself geologically was formed dominantly by folded and faulted marine sediments controlled by the active Mentawai Fault. Mentawai Fault runs through the island belt offshore West Sumatra. Due to its hazard prone area, Mentawai tribe disposes of Indigenous Knowledge related to the selection for residence areas. People choose residence locations far from the coastline. They select areas close to mangrove forests which in the past acted as a natural protection against incoming large waves from the sea (Zuriyani, 2016). There also exists Indigenous Knowledge concerning the building of houses, which are constructed approximately two metres above soil ground which allows to adapt to temporally rising sea levels during (Figure 5). Figure 5: An Uma, the traditional communal house of the Mentawai Source: Lapuerta (2004) Each household also has small boats which serve as evacuation tools in case of sea waves (Romana, 2010 in Zuriyani, 2016). This local wisdom has been inherited from people´s ancestors who were aware of geological hazards and their effects on their residential areas. IK of Mentawai people is listed in Table 2. 57 Integrative Risk and Security Research Volume 2/ 2017 Type of indigenous knowledge Implied values Conservation implications Its role on adaptation and hazard mitigation T raditional houses are built approximately two metres above the ground in Mentawai Islands Adaptation effort using low and precise technology as well as saving energy suitable with local natural conditions - Efforts to mitigate sea water flood and high tide wave Sabulungan wisdom means no separation between human and nature Principle of balance between nature and humans as well as respect for the surrounding nature T o preserve flora and fauna diversities in the forest Protecting biodiversity is one effort to store carbon in anticipation of climate change impact Respect to the sea or water as the source for human life but also as potential danger, local Mentawai’s name : Tai Leubagat Koat Respect to the surrounding nature that creates harmony between humans and nature T he community realize that they are part of the nature, this creates respect and awareness on the need to maintain biodiversity Carbon reserve storage and climate change anticipation Selection of residential areas far from coastline for members in Mentawai communities Adaptation capability using precise low technology and energy saving suitable to local natural conditions T o keep environment capabilities, through adaptation of residential location with local condition As a form of anticipation for large wave hazard (tsunami) or to minimize the impact of tsunami Table 2: Conservation principle and hazard mitigation in local wisdom Source: Analysed based on conservation principles of local wisdoms by Nababan (1995) Conclusions Indigenous knowledge is a powerful tool in Disaster Risk Reduction as evidence from its application by Simeuleu and Mentawai people in the islands offshore west of Sumatra Island shows. During the Tsunami 2004, it is reported that the victims were only seven people from 78,000 total population of Simeuleu Island. The traditional culture that had been inherited was re-established after a tsunami event in 1907 when almost 70 percent of Simeuleu people died. Survivors taught the lessons learned to their children and grandchildren and they are remembered until the present day. The culture took the form of a story they called smong which means tsunami in local language. The regional geological conditions in the area made local residents aware of the tsunami hazard and has given the opportunity to adapt. Culture in harmony with nature is an Indigenous Knowledge that possibly can be used by modern societies in understanding better how nature works. While IK is a powerful tool, it is necessary to that local community recognise the high value of it for future human security. Much research has to be carried out on Indigenous Knowledge especially concerning the relationship of people with their physical living environment. Physical characteristics especially those that relate to the geomorphology of tsunami prone coastal areas need to be examined further. Pressing questions are e.g. how far the distance of higher hinterland as evacuation zones have to be from people’s residences , in what type 64 Recovery after extreme events - Lessons learned and remaining challenges in Disaster Risk Reduction university in the Tohoku area, conducted several actions to deal with post-disaster activities (Aoki & Ito, 2014). One year after the disaster, Tohoku University established the research institute “International Research Institute of Disaster Science” to deal with more comprehensive and wider access to international institutions to support the reconstruction of the affected areas and also to strengthen the research activities (IRIDeS, 2015). The organisation “Iwate University Headquarters for Promotion of Sanriku Region Recovery” was established for a long-term support for the reconstruction of the disaster-afflicted areas. Iwate University set up a crisis management headquarter to confirm the safety of students and faculty members and to identify the damage to campus buildings (Matsuoka, 2015). Conclusions In facing a disaster, a university requires a strong leadership so that it is capable of inviting other national and international institutions to partner in disaster risk reduction and disaster management. To ensure that the administration procedure does not hinder the partnership, which leads to the delayed response, a decision should be taken immediately. The normal academic culture requiring deliberation and consensus building might not be appropriate during a disaster. The case at Syiah Kuala University revealed that tactical and strategic responses are two key aspects in dealing with a disaster so that any actions necessary can be taken immediately. Academicians at affected universities should play important roles in initiating actions for disaster risk reduction, post-disaster reconstruction, and rehabilitation. It is therefore strongly recommended that knowledge access to disaster is widely opened to them. Acknowledgements The author would like to express his profound gratitude to Prof. Dr. Samsul Rizal, the Rector of Syiah Kuala University, Banda Aceh, for his insightful comments and fruitful discussion on the post-tsunami university leadership. Grateful appreciation also goes to Dr. Muzailin, Dr. Khairul Munadi, Mr. Faisal Mustafa and Mr. Nur Fadli for their generous support in preparing the manuscript. References Affan, M., Koshimura, S., Imamura, F., Sofyan, H., Agustina, S., Nizamuddin, & Fadli, N. 2015. Lessons Learned from Two Villages in the Tsunami Most Affected Area of Banda A ce h City; A Review of the Housing Reconstruction and the Current State of V illa g e Development. In V. Santiago-Fandiño, Y. A. Kontar, & Y. Kaneda (Eds.), Pos t -Tsunam i Hazard. 44. 59-72. Aoki, T., & Ito, K. 2014. What is the role of universities in disaster response, recovery, a nd rehabilitation? Focusing on our disaster victim identification project. Commun ic a ti ons Magazine, IEEE, 52(3), 30-37. De Vera, P. 2012. University civic engagement in disaster management: The Case of the University of the Philippines in the Aftermath of Tropical Storm Sendong. Presented on Regional Conference on Higher Education-Industry-Community Engagement in Asia: Forging Meaningful Partnership, 7 – 9 May, Malaysia. Griffin, C., D. Ellis, S. Beavis, and D. Zoleta-Nantes. 2013. Coastal resources, livelihoods and the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami in Aceh, Indonesia. Ocean & Coastal Management 71:176-186. JICA. 2013. 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M., Sieh, K., Horton, B., Daly, P., Majewski, J., & Ismail, N. 2013. Predecessors of the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami in a coastal cave, Aceh prov i n ce , Sumatra. In AGU Fall Meeting Abstracts. 1, p. 08. Steinberg, F. 2007. Housing reconstruction and rehabilitation in Aceh and Nias, Indonesia—Rebuilding lives. Habitat International 31:150-166. Sharma, Y. 2012. University’s key role in disaster preparedness and r e spons e . Retrieved from ht t p: // www.univers it ywor l dn e ws. c om /a r ticle .php ? s t ory = 20120518132734905 . Spiekermann, R., Kienberger, S., Norton, J., Briones, F. & Weichselgartner, J. 2015. Th e DisasterKnowledge Matrix – Reframing and evaluating the knowledge challenges i n disaster risk reduction. International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction. 13. 96-108. Srinivas, H. and Y. Nakagawa. 2008. Environmental implications for disaster preparedness: Lessons Learnt from the Indian Ocean Tsunami. Journal of Environmental Management 89:4-13. Rizal, S. 2015. University Involvement on Disaster Management and Recovery from Sum at r a Tsunami. Presented at Third UN World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction Pub lic Forum, Disaster-Stricken Universities Symposium, Sendai, J a p a n. Seville, E., Hawker, C., Lyttle, J. 2011. Shaken but not Stirred: A University's Resilience in the Face of Adversity - the 4th September 2010 Earthquake. Retrieved from http://www.resorgs.org.nz/images/stories/pdfs/ shakenbutnotstirred.pdf Seville, E., Hawker, C., Lyttle, J. 2012. Resilience Tested: A year and a half of 10,000 aftershocks. Retrieved from http://www.resorgs.org.nz/images/stories/pdfs/Organisationsfacingcrisis/resilience_tested_a_yea r_of_10000_aftershocks_pdf.pdf 66 Recovery after extreme events - Lessons learned and remaining challenges in Disaster Risk Reduction A review of the civil protection system development in Peru and recent risk governance challenges with focus on the disaster risk management in the region of Ica after the 1997-1998 El Niño Iris Dominguez1, Alexander Fekete2 & Christiane Stephan2 1Department of Engineering, Pontifical Catholic University of Peru, Peru 2Institute for Rescue Engineering and Civil Protection, TH Köln - University of Applied Sciences, Germany Email: [email protected]; [email protected]; christiane.st[email protected] Abstract Peru is a country prone to disasters, mainly because of the Pacific Ring of Fire, region of high seismicity, and impacts of El Niño. Recent civil protection in Peru has been formed according to such natural hazards, for example, after a major earthquake in Ancash in 1970. In this article, the development of the civil protection in Peru is reviewed with emphasis on the last years, including the changes that followed international guidelines for disaster risk management (DRM). The review focuses on the department of Ica in the South of Peru. In 1998, the city of Ica was flooded due to heavy rainfall caused by El Niño. In 2007, a major earthquake devastated three provinces in the department and in 2017 El Niño hit the urban periphery of the city. This work reviews which institutions have been created relating to the extreme events in Peru and in particular which plans and measures have been introduced in the department of Ica since the disaster caused by El Niño in 1997-1998. Keywords: Civil protection, disaster risk management, vulnerability, risk governance, El Niño, Peru, Ica Introduction Peru is a country prone to earthquakes, tsunamis, floods, droughts and landslides, being part of the Pacific Ring of Fire, as well as being under the impact of El Niño in the equatorial Pacific. According to the future climate change scenarios of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, an intensification of the El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO) is expected (IPCC, 2007). Further, Peru is considered to have ‘four of the five geographical areas most vulnerable to climate change’ (The Guardian, 2013). Peru has undergone major disasters in its history. The earthquake and tsunami of 1746 in Lima, the capital city, and El Callao, the main harbour in Peru, killed around 1,200 of the estimated population of 60,000 at that time (Oliver-Smith, 1997). In the last century, the earthquake of magnitude 7.8 Richter in 1970 in the department of Ancash, and the following avalanche buried the towns of Yungay and Ranrahirca (Kuroiwa, 2010). In this century, an earthquake of 8.0 Mw and tsunami affected the department of Arequipa in 2001. Similarly, an earthquake of 7.9 Mw and tsunami impacted the department of Ica in 2007 (Tavera, 2008). Concerning El Niño, Kuroiwa (2002) says that in the 19th and 20th centuries, four ‘mega’ El Niño events have taken place in Peru in 1891, 1925, 1983 and 1998. About ’mega’ El Niño events in the history of Peru, Rocha (2007, p. 11) warns about repeating the same mistakes: ‘Looking back at the last five centuries [...] each Meganiño [...] that caused extensive damage, was considered [...] unusual and not expected to occur again. That is why same mistakes are made again.’ Furthermore, human action adds to the high probability of the occurrence of disasters in Peru. Urbanization with poor planning and management is an important factor in disaster vulnerability (UN-Habitat, 2012). Cities 67 Integrative Risk and Security Research Volume 2/ 2017 have grown and still grow in Peru with limited or poor planning (Diario Gestión, 2016). Nowadays, 74% of the 28,220,764 people in Peru live in cities, according to the latest census of 2007 (INEI, 2008). According to a United Nations Mission report about the implementation of the disaster risk management in Peru, poverty, poor control and regulation of land use, weakness of social organisations, limited capacity to manage emergencies and disaster are those factors that make Peru a country of high vulnerability (Naciones Unidas, 2014). The present paper focuses on disaster risk management (DRM) in the department of Ica after the 1997-1998 El Niño. This case of a major disaster and recent events of El Niño allow the assessment of the development of the DRM within the civil protection system at regional scale. Measures and projects in reaction to El Niño disasters are presented. For a deeper understanding of the DRM in Ica, the civil protection system development at national scale is summarized, regarding DRM public policies, institutions and plans. The main research question is how the development of disaster risk management in civil protection is interlinked with significant disaster events and the specific context in Peru. The following sub-questions are to analyse this according to selected aspects:  Which institutions have been created, changed and shaped by the disaster events?  Which management plans and measures have been implemented?  How effective are these implementations in terms of the reduction of vulnerability and the acceptance of the local population? The present work is based on the review of documents such as public policies, national and regional government plans concerning DRM, in particular, in the department of Ica. The paper is a descriptive overview, extracting key phases of institutional development in the field of disaster risk management. Expert interviews and qualitative local media sources complement a descriptive assessment of recent changes in DRM. The expert interviews mainly served the purpose to identify challenges inside the DRM system of Peru today. The expert interviews did not follow a standardised scientific methodology, were mostly explorative, and contain internal knowledge. Therefore, sources to individual statements are undocumented and names are not provided, also for reasons of preserving anonymity. While these sources are therefore not scientifically valid, for the context of this working paper they shall mainly serve as to assist in explaining the hitherto largely undocumented history of the civil protection development in Peru. Section 2 starts with a general overview of the development of civil protection institutions in Peru at national level. Section 3 provides an overview on DRM in Ica and specifies environmental and human-made factors contributing to risks and impacts due to El Niño in 1997-1998. Section 4 analyses changes introduced in the disaster risk management in Ica. The discussion summarises relevant aspects of the disaster risk management in the department of Ica within the context of Peru. Development of the civil protection system in Peru This section outlines the development of the civil protection system since the 1970s. This development follows significant disaster events, is intertwined with the political changes in Peru and influenced by international frameworks for disaster risk management at UN level (Naciones Unidas, 2014). In Peru, the establishment of the first agency to attend the population in a disaster situation is linked to the major earthquake that occurred in 1970 in the department of Ancash. After the disaster, the military government (1968-1975) created the National Civil Defence System (Sistema Nacional de Defensa Civil - SINADECI) in 1972 by the Law Nr. 19338 (the use in Peruvian Spanish is ‘civil defence’ instead of ‘civil 68 Recovery after extreme events - Lessons learned and remaining challenges in Disaster Risk Reduction protection’). With the cited law, the National Institute of Civil Defense (Instituto Nacional de Defensa Civil - INDECI) was created in 1972. After the 1972-1973 El Niño with heavy rainfall, landslides and floods (INDECI, 2002), the Program for the Regional Study of El Niño Phenomenon (Programa para el Estudio Regional del Fenómeno El Niño - ERFEN), that involves Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru, was created in 1974. Following this, the Multisectoral Committee in charge of the National Study of El Niño Phenomenon (Comité Multisectorial encargado del Estudio Nacional del Fenómeno El Niño - ENFEN) was created in Peru in 1977. The 1982-1983 El Niño caused losses that amounted to more than one billion dollars due to the flooding in the north and the drought in the south of Peru (INDECI, 2002). The catastrophe added to the political crisis due to a breakout of terrorist activities with the Communist Party of Peru-Shining Path within the recently installed democracy (since 1980). The political and economic crisis deepened in Peru, ending with an average annual inflation of 7481.7% in 1990 (BCR, 2016). In 1986, the Peruvian Japanese Centre for Earthquake Engineering Research and Disaster Mitigation (Centro Peruano Japonés de Investigaciones Sísmicas y Mitigación de Desastres – CISMID) was created with funding of the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA). To cope with the effects of El Niño, the CISMID includes the Institute of Mitigation of the Effects of El Niño Phenomenon (Instituto de Mitigación de los Efectos del Fenómeno El Niño - IMEFEN). In 1992, the president in office carried out an ‘auto’ coup-d’etat and established a dictatorship (CVR, 2003). The 1997-1998 El Niño resulted to be ‘one of the most catastrophic in history’, because it affected about 41 countries and left in Peru losses of 1,800 million dollars approximately (INDECI, 2002). In Peru, the disaster happened in the dictatorial regime, when corruption and the armed conflict with the Shining Path had weakened the social structure and the public institutions (CVR, 2003). After a democratic regime was re-established in Peru (2001), the new government, the political forces and the civil society signed a National Agreement in 2002 'to set a course for the sustainable development and to assert the democratic governance' (Acuerdo Nacional, 2002). In June 2001, an earthquake and tsunami in the department of Arequipa hit also the departments of Moguegua and Tacna in the south of Peru. The disaster raised losses about 310 million dollars (INDECI, 2002). In the following years, taking into account the evolution about ‘disaster’ and ‘risk’ towards a vision according to the Development Agenda, in 2010 the National Agreement approved public policies in Disaster Risk Management (Policy Nr. 32) and Land Use and Management (Policy Nr. 34). Both were set within the framework of the Andean Strategy for Disaster Prevention and Attention (Estrategia Andina para la Prevención y Atención de Desastres), the Millennium Development Goals and the priorities set in the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015 (Naciones Unidas, 2014). In 2011, the Law Nr. 29664 created the National System for Disaster Risk Management (Sistema Nacional de Gestión del Riesgo de Desastres - SINAGERD) (Congreso de la República, 2011). The law set the National Policy of Disaster Risk Management (Política Nacional de Gestión del Riesgo de Desastres) and the National Plan for Disaster Risk Management (Plan Nacional de Gestión del Riesgo de Desastres – PLANAGERD), on the basis of the prospective, corrective and reactive management by means of the risk estimation, prevention, reduction, preparedness, response, rehabilitation and reconstruction. The law also installed the National Centre of Disaster Risk Estimation, Prevention and Reduction (Centro Nacional de Estimación, Prevención y Reducción del Riesgo de Desastres – CENEPRED). Hence, CENEPRED and INDECI are the national executing agencies, while the regional and local governments are in charge of executing disaster risk management actions. In March 69 Integrative Risk and Security Research Volume 2/ 2017 2015, Peru attended the III UN World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction in Sendai, Japan, where the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 was adopted. In 2016 the latest civil protection decree was issued that covers aspects of modernisation of institutions and stresses a national disaster risk plan (Defensa 2016). Hazards and risk context El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO) in Peru Peru lies in the geographic zone of influence and impact of El Niño, which occurs in the equatorial Pacific Ocean that is mainly the north of Peru. ‘El Niño’ is the Spanish expression for ‘The Child’ which refers to the Christmas child. It is known that fishermen in northern Peru use ‘El Niño’ to refer to the warm water current in the equatorial Pacific and the resulting intense rainfall that lead to flooding at the coast of Peru. Such an episode reaches full intensity towards December. Though still often referred to as a rare ‘phenomenon’, nowadays El Niño is no more described by scientists as an ‘unusual’ event but ‘a recurring climate pattern’, that is the warm phase of El Niño-Southern Oscillation (ENSO), while La Niña is the cool phase across the tropical Pacific (NOAA, 2016). El Niño is characterized by the sea surface temperature (SST) anomalies in El Niño 3.4 region (see figure 1). In Peru, ENFEN defines El Niño event in the coastal region of Peru (also known as 'Coastal El Niño') as the period in which the El Niño Coastal Index (in Spanish: ICEN, Índice Costero El Niño) reaches the category of ‘warm conditions’. ICEN is characterized by a three-month running mean of SST anomalies in the Niño 1+2 region (see figure 1). The ‘warm conditions’ category, which depends on the ICEN, can be of the magnitude: ‘weak’, ‘moderate’, ‘strong’ or ‘extraordinary’ (ENFEN, 2012). Based on this definition, ENFEN classifies El Niño of 1997-1998 as ‘extraordinary’, taking into account the period of 1950-2011 data as the reference (ENFEN, 2012). Figure 1: El Niño Regions Source: National Centers for Environmental Information (2016) 70 Recovery after extreme events - Lessons learned and remaining challenges in Disaster Risk Reduction Demography, topography and hydrography as risk factors in Ica Ica is one of the 25 departments of Peru. It is located about 300 km south of the capital Lima. Various factors have determined the rapid growth of the city and the periphery in the last decades. In the 1980s and 1990s, the violence of the Shining Path among other factors (such as employment opportunities, health care and education) caused internal migration in Peru. Ica received ca. 80% of the 195,000 people who left the departments of Apurimac, Ayacucho and Huancavelica in the period of 1988-1993, fleeing from the violence (INEI, 1995). Further, since the 1990s, the neoliberal model introduced by the government allowed the rapid growth of export agriculture in the valley and people came to Ica looking for work in the field. In Ica, the water resources come from the seasonal rainwater in the Andes, the exploitation of the groundwater and the water transfer from the Choclococha lagoon. Ica River runs ca. 220 km downstream towards the Pacific Ocean. The river tributaries are mainly from the left bank, while the area of the right bank is known for its extreme aridity (see figure 2). Figure 2: Ica River, La Tinguiña, Parcona, Ica (among other districts) and Cansas (in red) Source: prepared with ArcGIS (ArcMap 10.2.2, WGS_1984_UTM_Zone_18S: EPSG Projection) with data from: Descarga de informacion espacial del MED (2015, October 29) with the assistance of Ivan Vilcahuaman 71 Integrative Risk and Security Research Volume 2/ 2017 The tributary gullies on the left river bank are of steep slope with alluvial soil, gravel and rocks. These gullies, such as the Cansas gully (see figure 2), produce under extraordinary rainfall abundant runoff heavily laden with sediment, even huge rocks. The 1997-1998 El Niño affected a large area of the department of Ica, including the districts of Ica, La Tinguiña, Parcona, San José de Los Molinos, Los Aquijes, Santiago and Yauca del Rosario, i.e. ca. 45% of the province of about 7,800 km2 (INDECI-PNUD, 2007). Despite the flood due to El Niño in January 1998, the riversides nearby the city and the periphery are nowadays densely inhabited (see figure 3). The urban population in the districts of Ica, La Tinguiña and Parcona, downstream Cansas, has even increased since the disaster in 1998 (see table 1). Figure 2: Ica River, view downstream the Grau Bridge Source: Dominguez (2013) District La Tinguiña Parcona Ica Census urban rural urban rural urban rural 1993 18,264 3,916 39,345 938 103,797 2,584 2007 27,723 3,179 49,090 1,259 124,789 400 Table 1: Population development in the districts downstream Cansas Source: INEI (1993; 2007) Otherwise, human activities also increase the risk of flooding. People throw domestic and industrial waste into the river, which reduces the river capacity of discharge and increases the risk of overflow. This humanmade aggravation of the flood risk takes place in an environment contributing to this risk. As a coupled social-ecological system, it is important to understand not just the societal share of risk, but also the environmental interaction with this human system (Berkes & Folke 1998, Folke et al. 2007, Djalante et al. 2011). 72 Recovery after extreme events - Lessons learned and remaining challenges in Disaster Risk Reduction The 1997-1998 El Niño disaster in Ica The first forecast for the 1997-1998 El Niño dates to June 1997. The weather forecasting warned that an episode similar to the 1982-1983 El Niño, with floods in the north and extreme drought in the south of Peru, would occur. It failed however, because the 1997-1998 El Niño affected the north as well as down to Ica in the south of Peru (INDECI, 1998). The extraordinary rainfall due to El Niño left the city of Ica under mud and stones on January 29, 1998. The 1998 El Niño flood in Ica is regarded as ‘the most catastrophic in its history for its balance of 120,000 victims and losses of hundreds of millions of dollars’ (INDECIPNUD, 2007). After the flooding, several programs and plans were started. The Executive Committee for the Reconstruction of El Niño (Comité Ejecutivo de Reconstrucción de El Niño - CEREN) and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) launched the Sustainable Cities Program (Programa Ciudades Sostenible - PCS) in October 1998 as a response to the emergency. In this framework, hazard maps of Ica were produced (INDECI, 2001). The Special Project Tambo Ccaracocha (Proyecto Especial Tambo Ccaracocha – PETACC) joined the ‘Support Program to the Emergency of the Phenomenon El Niño’ (Programa de Apoyo a la Emergencia del Fenómeno El Niño). In August 2000, a contract with the Technical Advisors Associates and SWECO International was signed to develop the definitive study ‘Project for control of the Ica River floods and the Cansas Chanchajalla gully’ (Proyecto para el control de inundaciones del río Ica y quebrada Cansas Chanchajalla). Among the technical alternatives for disaster risk reduction, there were weirs, drainage canals, retention ponds, etc. At that time it was decided for the regulation ponds that still have not been realised. More information about the disaster of 1998 can be found in INDECI-PNUD (2007) and INDECI (2012). The ‘Regional Plan for the Prevention and Attention to Disasters Ica Region’ of 2005 to 2008 (Plan Regional de Prevención y Atención de Desastres Región Ica – 2005-2008), prepared by the civil protection system in the department of Ica focused on ‘prevention and attendance of emergencies or disasters to protect the people and the patrimony of the department’ (Defensa Civil, 2005). Almost ten years later, the earthquake of 7.9 Mw (Tavera, 2008) in 2007 killed about 600 people and damaged more than 60,000 buildings. The earthquake´s epicentre was close to Pisco and impacted the neighbouring provinces of Chincha and Ica. Both have still not recovered from this disaster (Diario El Comercio, 2015). In 2009, the regional government of Ica and the regional civil protection (GORE Ica y SINADECI, 2009) presented the ‘Regional Plan for the Prevention and Attendance to Disasters - Ica Region 2009-2019’ (Plan Regional de Prevención y Atención de Desastres – Región Ica 2009-2019), that also considered, in addition to extraordinary floods, river overflow scenarios with smaller and more frequent amounts of discharge flow. Regarding the implementation of the Regional Plan for the Prevention and Attention to Disasters - Ica Region 2009-2019, an INDECI official states (anonymous, interview on August 13, 2015): it 'almost has not been followed', only 'in some aspects, for example, capacity building of emergency brigades'. The 2015-2016 El Niño forecast In July 2015, ENFEN reported ‘consistent conditions’ for a ‘strong’ El Niño (ENFEN, 2015a). The forecast in September 2015 was that a 'strong' or an 'extraordinary' Niño at the Pacific coast –similar to El Niño in 19821983 and El Niño in 1997-1998− had 55% of probability to happen (ENFEN, 2015b). However, already in January 2016 the coastal Niño had only a 20% chance to be 'strong' or 'extraordinary' (ENFEN, 2016a). Indeed, the 2015-2016 El Niño happened to be ‘strong’ in January, but with the trend to reduce its intensity to ‘moderate’ in the following months (ENFEN, 2016b). 73 Integrative Risk and Security Research Volume 2/ 2017 With the forecast of a ‘strong’ El Niño, in July 2015 the government declared the 'state of emergency' in the departments under influence, including Ica, `[...] in order to achieve the implementation of immediate and necessary response actions aimed at reducing the very high existing risk and the rehabilitation of areas that may be affected’ (PCM, 2015a, 2015b). Then, the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation (Ministerio de Agricultura y Riego - MINAGRI) announced in September of that year that as a measure to prevent and mitigate the effects of El Niño 2015-2016 'rain gauges and early warning systems [were] going to be installed in 132 vulnerable stream basins in the 14 departments under the state of emergency´ (Radio Nacional, 2015). Rain gauges were going to be installed in the upper stream basins, while the early warning systems (consisting in loudspeakers, sirens and evacuation routes) would activate to evacuate the people, when the gauges registered the rising of water, which might cause the fall of huaicos (local term for landslide). According to the Regional Director of the National Service of Meteorology and Hydrology (Servicio Nacional de Meteorología e Hidrología – SENAMHI), Ica had an Early Warning System (EWS) in place starting from December 2010 (Dominguez, 2014). However, INDECI direction in Ica introduced the flood Early Warning System (Sistema de Alerta Temprana – SAT) in the districts of Ica, La Tinguiña, Parcona and San José de Los Molinos not before September 2015. Concerning the SAT in 2015, GIZ (German International Cooperation) participated in the implementation within its project Adaptación al cambio climático en Ica y Huancavelica (ACCIH). A personal e-mail from a GIZ staff member on 14th April 2016 reported that the protocol of 2015 (Protocolo Operativo del Sistema de Alerta Temprana ante Inundaciones del Río Ica) prepared by the technical team of the EWS −also integrated by INDECI− was put into practice through simulations, where weaknesses were identified, in particular in the response of local people, because people refused to evacuate or because they were not willing to participate in training. The 2016-2017 El Niño Costero In 2016 and 2017, El Niño Costero (the Coastal El Niño) impacted mainly the north of the country, affecting thousands of families (Canal N, 2017). In the case of Ica, the districts of La Tinguiña (see figure 4) and Parcona, downstream the Cansas gully, were flooded on 26th January 2017 (Diario Correo.pe, 2017). Figure 4: El Niño affected area in La Tinguiña Source: Ministerio de Defensa del Perú (2017) (creative commons) 80 Recovery after extreme events - Lessons learned and remaining challenges in Disaster Risk Reduction This perspective note focusses on the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami and the 2008 Cyclone Nargis and aims to discuss the respective damage extent as well as response measures in order to derive lessons learned for effective and sustainable rehabilitation efforts. The presented insights are mainly built upon the practical experiences of the lead author Moe Moe as a national technical specialist for the environment, vulnerability and climate change sector of the National Action Plan for Poverty Alleviation and Rural Development (NAPA) Project funded by the Livelihoods and Food Security Trust Fund (LIFT). 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami and 2008 Cyclone Nargis 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami The 2004 Tsunami moved strongly towards the east and west, but weakly to the north. The arrival time of the tsunami wave towards Myanmar was about three hours and the epicentre was at a distance of about 1,000 kilometres away. The calculated speed of propagation towards the coast was 160 km/hr. Damage extent In comparison to other tsunami affected countries there was less damage in Myanmar. The tsunami caused moderate damage in some parts of the Myanmar Coast, for example Pyinsalu sub-township, Laputta Township, Myaung Mya District and the Ayeyarwaddy Delta. Impacts included the death of 25 people, the destruction of 289 homes and 123 fishing boats. Reasons of the rather in comparison to other countries limited damage extent were the existence of a seismic gap, direction of the waves and the topographic feature of seabed level. The tsunami impacted upon unspoiled mangrove forests and existences of hundreds of uninhabited islands in Myeik Archipelago. Response measures There were two key tsunami rehabilitation objectives to provide support to fishing communities in replacing fishing gear and boats and supporting the replacement of equipment for agriculture. Immediately following the Tsunami, all agencies (including NGOs, government and private sector) pulled together with the communities to support the emergency and rehabilitation efforts. Lessons Learned The lessons learned during rehabilitation were the importance of transparency (the right to information), the constitution of committees and accountability, the use of local materials, gender sensitization, the use of a holistic approach that emphasizes horizontal and vertical as well as a "forward backward" linking. The constraints faced during rehabilitation efforts were the large scale of the damage, much impact on subsistence fishers, the weak capacity of implementing agencies, the inadequate infrastructure, and the lack of availability of materials, understanding of socio-economic and traditional practices, alternative technologies, awareness and a time lag in gearing up the response. Other broad issues considered important to implementation of recovery measures included: commitment to implementation in a time bound manner; coordination, need based approaches, environmental issues, sustainability, gender, value adding, transparency and accountability, credit, quality assurance and sea safety. The programme monitoring mechanisms were outlined with civil society and NGOs should take a major role for effectiveness. 81 Integrative Risk and Security Research Volume 2/ 2017 Myanmar identified valuable lessons for the future which include mangrove reconstruction, appropriate location and construction of buildings, improved communication systems, the development of effective early warning and response systems and the need for relief planning. 2008 Cyclone Nargis Cyclone Nargis caused severe flooding and shifting of sands, which resulted in extensive damage to lives and livelihoods in May 2008. An estimated 84,537 people died, 53,836 remain missing (assumed dead) and 33,754 people were injured. Nearly 18,000 fisheries workers died and 10,000 went missing. Assessment data reveals that of the estimated population of 7.35 million living in affected townships, some 2.4 million individuals were severely affected (Post-Nargis Joint Assessment, 2008). The assessment also indicates that more women and children died than men, which has distorted social structures. Approximately 800,000 people were displaced, of whom 260,000 sought shelter in camps and settlements throughout the delta. The reports indicated that a significant number of displaced persons were traumatized. These people also suffered the total loss of their livelihood (land, housing, tools, equipment and other assets) and may not return to their places of origin, depending, at least for the near future, on their host communities. There had been widespread devastation, with the near-total destruction of fields and shelter in areas that were directly hit by the cyclone. In all, 37 townships were significantly affected in Ayeyarwady and Yangon Divisions, with widespread destruction to homes and critical infrastructure, such as roads, jetties, water and sanitation systems, fuel supplies and electricity. Damage extent with focus on the agriculture sector Major damages and losses in the agriculture sector after Nargis included 63 percent of paddy fields submerged; stored paddy and milled rice destroyed; seed stocks lost; some power tillers and thousands of tilling equipment lost; widespread damage to public and private agricultural infrastructure and buildings; orchard crops and backyard gardening destroyed; draught animals (buffaloes and cattle) lost in the eleven most affected townships; many other animals like pigs, ducks, goats and chickens died; marine fishing vessels, small inland fishing boats and gear were lost; some acres of fish and shrimp ponds were destroyed; severe damage to 14 000 hectares of natural mangrove forest (out of 56 000 hectares, already fragile and weakened by years of over-exploitation); and serious damage to 21 000 hectares of the 63 000 hectares of redeveloped mangrove plantations. 82 Recovery after extreme events - Lessons learned and remaining challenges in Disaster Risk Reduction Table 1: Estimates of damage and losses in the agriculture sector (currency Kyat million) Source: Post-Nargis Joint Assessment (2008) Response measures The government and the international community mobilized significant resources to address the immediate needs of populations affected by Cyclone Nargis. The achievements have been notable despite the various logistical constraints and other impediments during the process. International partners faced difficulties and limitations in accessing the affected areas, which also influenced the type and scale of assistance that could be provided. The agriculture sector is the mainstay of the economy in the cyclone-affected areas. Post-Nargis rehabilitation efforts, particularly in terms of agriculture, were done based on the results of rapid need assessment by different Local and International NGOs after emergency responses. The institutions that serve and govern the agriculture subsectors (i.e. crops, livestock, fisheries/aquaculture and forestry) were also necessary to rehabilitate. Understanding and restoring institutions and production systems are a prerequisite to rehabilitating livelihoods in a sustainable way with a view to build back better and to improve the resilience of vulnerable populations. Further, Disaster Risk Management (DRM) issues also need to be an integral part of effective and sustainable rehabilitation efforts. This is particularly important in the context of climate change and the specific risks and vulnerability of livelihood systems in Nargis-affected areas. A holistic programme approach was established, which streamlines DRM and institutional capacity building in rehabilitation plans. At national level, the National Committee on Disaster Prevention and Management was founded in January, 2005 chaired by Prime Minister and members from ministers of 16 different ministries and by the secretary from the Deputy Minister for Home Affairs. There are Central Committee and 10 Sub-committees on Disaster Prevention Management Central Working Committee and they coordinate the roles and strategy for the whole country. At community level, some Local and International NGOs try to implement responses and preparedness on Disaster Risk after the Cyclone Nargis and communities are also included. For example, World Vision Myanmar (WVM) implemented the Myanmar Disaster Risks Reduction (MDRR) Project in its areas. It was conducted to increase awareness, understandings and practices of the target communities on Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) by means of increasing awareness, understandings and practices of the target communities mainly through the trainings and seminars and information, education, and communication materials of the Disaster Management Committees (DMCs). Quality of DMCs and interests and attitudes of local authority on DRR activities were also one of the important factors in achieving DRR. The communities have already identified and located the safer places to evacuate for their community members in the case of the next disasters to happen. Disaster impact on private sector (including households) Assets Damage Losses Total Field crops 65 336 159 929 - 283 000 225 265 - 348 336 Farm equipment 24 046 n/a 24 046 Plantations 22 043 65 209 87 252 Livestock 45 190 30 775 75 965 Capture fisheries 22 609 99 932 125 541 Fish farms 4 120 29 394 33 514 Total 186 344 571 583 - 694 654 571 583 - 694 654 83 Integrative Risk and Security Research Volume 2/ 2017 Nowadays communities in the Ayeyarwaddy delta hit by the 2004 Tsunami and Cyclone Nagis are aware of those risks. The communities are listening to news of cyclone and weather reports from radio and transfer the weather news to each other. The communities identified and constructed evacuation places in each village and built a cyclone shelter house for 5-10 villages for common use. The numbers of shelter are not enough for the communities still, because of limited financial support. Worries about the next disaster and loss of lives exist. Some villagers, who faced the tsunami and the cyclone experienced shock and trauma due to loss of many lives and all properties. Communities hold myths that they did something wrong and received punishment by the sea through the Tsunami. Lessons Learned After Cyclone Nargis, the government is aware that it is necessary to prepare, for example, through cyclone warning and alert to native people. This did not happen during the cyclone and it was evident that when the next cyclone in Rakhine occurred, even when it had the same strength, it did not reach the same death toll. Fewer people were affected and the government recognized that it is necessary to protect from disasters, also related to climate change. The communities in delta areas affected by the Cyclone Nargis could not forget that sort of disaster and recognize that it was more severe because of no existence of windbreak trees like mangrove forest. Some villages were less affected due to bamboo plantation around their compound. Lives were saved because bamboo trees were not uprooted when the cyclone hit. Persisting current disaster risks During a fact finding mission of TH Köln in August 2016, we could observe some of the natural and manmade conditions in Myanmar that play a role in the construction of natural disaster risk. In the south of Myanmar, Myeik, mangrove forests are still intact along large areas along the coast (Figure 2). However, in the future, the area might be under development for increasing tourism and also, plantation of cash crops such as palm oil production, which might result in conflict with natural resource management and protection from cyclones and tsunami. Figure 2. Intact mangrove forest along the coast in the southof Myanmar, close to Myeik Source: own photograph by Fekete (2016) 84 Recovery after extreme events - Lessons learned and remaining challenges in Disaster Risk Reduction In the south, but also on the field trip to areas around Nay Pyi Taw and Yezin in the country centre, traces of landslides and erosion within dense vegetation could be observed, typical for rainfall-triggered gravitational mass movements, but of course also due to a range of other factors such as farming and cutting of vegetation (Figure 3). Agricultural lands are on the one hand exposed to erosion, but practices of farming are at the same time in interplay with creating or aggravating certain risks for landslides. Figure 3. Traces of vegetation cover loss probably related to gravitational mass movements in the south of Myanmar, close to Myeik Source: own photograph by Fekete (2016) Natural hazards are not an issue of rural areas in Myanmar only, also cities are facing impacts of weather events such as intensive rain falls or flash floods (Figure 4). In Yangon (formerly Rangoon), the largest city in Myanmar with around 7 million inhabitants, traffic increases and cars are rapidly replacing former means of transportation such as scooters or bicycles. Next to traffic jams as a daily burden, impacts of meteorological events such as rain or storm or floods are likely to increase interruptions of transportation and logistics. While urban infrastructure is exposed to meteorological hazards, it is also how such infrastructure is technically constructed but moreover, how it is used or even used beyond planned capacity that contributes to risk of interruption in daily life as well as in a severe disaster situation. Figure 4. Intensive rain falls submerging roads in Yangon Source: own photograph by Fekete (2016) 85 Integrative Risk and Security Research Volume 2/ 2017 Conclusion According to the insights presented all stakeholders and authorities have to have a master plan for Disaster Risk Management. There is a continuing need for community awareness on conservation of natural resources and systematic Disaster Risk Management to mitigate disasters related to climate change in Myanmar. Until now, in Myanmar, practice is applied when disaster strikes. In the future, it will be also necessary to act before disaster risk turns into disaster damages. It is necessary to cooperate and study Disaster Risk Reduction in Myanmar by interested institutions from inland and outside of the country. Regarding the validity of the arguments and findings presented here please note that they are mainly based on the lead author’s working experience as a national technical specialist for the environment, vulnerability and climate change sector of the National Action Plan for Poverty Alleviation and Rural Development (NAPA) Project funded by the Livelihoods and Food Security Trust Fund (LIFT) and need further empirical research in order to derive general conclusions. Acknowledgements We are grateful to DAAD for enabling the Alumni Seminar in 2015 and therefore establishing the contact between the authors. We would also like to thank DAAD and TH Köln for the Fact Finding Mission and, Jan Bäumer for support with the literature database and citations. References CIA 2017, The World Factbook: Burma Available from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/geos/bm.html. [24 August 2017]. Emergency Communication System in Myanmar, ITU/ESCAP Disaster Communication Workshop. Tun Win (2006): 12-15 December, 2006 Bangkok, Thailand. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations – Post-Nargis Recovery and Rehabilitation Programme, Myanmar, January 2009. Myanmar Disaster Risks Reduction (MDRR) Evaluation Report (Draft). Khin Maung Lwin, 6 January 2014, Yangon, Myanmar. Assessment Report. Coordinated by the Food Security Sector and led by FAO and WFP in collaboration with the Government of Myanmar, UN women, World Vision, CESVI, CARE, JICA, LIFT, 2015. Post-Nargis Joint Assessment 2008, Post-Nargis Joint Assessment Report. Available from http://documents.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/ena/wfp189113.pdf?_ga=2.17160697.1 594788223.1504532072-521411957.1504532072 [24 August 2017] UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 2017, Myanmar: Recent natural disasters overview (as of 28 June 2017). Available from: http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/MMR_Snapshot_Preparedness_5Years_280617. pdf [24 August 2017]. World Bank 2017, Myanmar. Available from: https://data.worldbank.org/country/myanmar. [24 August 2017]. 86 Recovery after extreme events - Lessons learned and remaining challenges in Disaster Risk Reduction Evaluation of efforts: perceptions of satisfaction and long-term effects 87 Integrative Risk and Security Research Volume 2/ 2017 Studying extreme events from the perspective of the disaster relief workers involved in 2013 floods in Germany Christian Baumgartner, Christian Bentler & Alexander Fekete1 1Institute for Rescue Engineering and Civil Protection, TH Köln - University of Applied Sciences, Germany Email: alexander.[email protected] Introduction In 2013, floods affected several regions of Germany and caused billions of euros in damage (Center for Disaster Management and Risk Reduction Technology 2013). These devastating floods in Central Europe have become a strong reminder of the impact such calamities can have on all groups of society. To prevent further damage, save lives and support the affected people, about 100,000 disaster relief personnel from different organizations were sent on mission (Federal Office of Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance 2013). The German disaster relief system is mainly comprised of voluntary members who conduct training programmes and different operations besides their normal occupation, their family commitments and other hobbies. There is no fixed monetary contract between these volunteers and their respective organizations. Therefore, it is not possible to oblige members to go on a rescue mission — they need to be motivated. The German disaster relief system is generally based on the principle of high motivation, which can be influenced in a positive or negative way through different parameters (Francis & Jones 2012, and Figure 1), such as a mission of an enormous dimension. Since the German disaster system needs a great number of volunteers, these forces need to be highly motivated. However, during and after the floods there were both positive and negative voices regarding various organizational issues and the effectiveness of the deployed relief forces. Therefore, this ‘lessons learned’ study analyses the satisfaction of the disaster relief personnel with the mission during the flood disaster in Germany in 2013, as well as the implications for further commitment to the disaster relief system. Furthermore, the study aims to increase awareness of the topic of ‘personal satisfaction of relief forces’ in civil protection.   Figure 1. Factors potentially influencing satisfaction of relief workers Source: own elaboration  88 Recovery after extreme events - Lessons learned and remaining challenges in Disaster Risk Reduction The survey In order to analyse the satisfaction of the disaster relief forces and to identify important criteria of this satisfaction, a questionnaire was formulated. This questionnaire is based on hypotheses developed based on literature research and exploratory peer-group discussions (Baumgartner & Bentler 2014b) To obtain significant and detailed results, it was necessary to reach disaster relief forces affiliated to different organizations across Germany. Therefore, an online questionnaire was made available over a period of six months, and the information was spread by email and social media. The results of this study are based on 3,377 completed and analysable datasets (Baumgartner & Bentler 2014a). These datasets show that most of the relief forces were at least satisfied with the flood mission (Figure 2) and the motivation for further mission has increased (Table 1). Moreover, the study identifies some important points of satisfaction related to missions such as information management or alerting and advanced information (Tables 1 & 2). The cooperation between the disaster relief forces and positive behaviour of the residents are mentioned as additional main criteria. The study also shows criteria that affected the satisfaction in a negative way such as problems with coordination or a long standby time (Baumgarten & Bentler 2014b).  Figure 2. Personal satisfaction of disaster relief forces during the flood mission in 2013 (N=3377) Source: Baumgarten & Bentler (2014b)  The overall picture of personal satisfaction of the relief workers after the flood mission in 2013 can be further broken down to several factors contributing to it, as displayed below in Tables 1 and 2. Criterion Categories Responses N = 3377 Leadership level and training Group commander (Verbandführer) or higher (highest degree of leadership) 11% Platoon leader (Zugführer) 15% Group leader (Gruppenführer) 26% Squad leader (Truppführer) 20% other training 11% none 17% Personal motivation change due to operation Yes, my motivation increased 53% No influence of operation on my motivation 42% 89 Integrative Risk and Security Research Volume 2/ 2017 My motivation decreased 5% Age group (in years) < 25 26% 25-30 34% 36-45 22% 46-60 17% > 60 1% Gender Female 10% Male 90% Table 1. Selected questions and responses from the survey regarding relief workers’ satisfaction with the operation Source: own elaboration Table 1 shows that regarding leadership level and training, all ranks participated in the survey. Overall, motivation has increased or remained, and only few (5%) reported decreased motivation after this event. A relatively high degree of younger persons participated in the survey, which may be due to familiarity with online surveys and media, but also represents the amount of persons active in such organisations. 90% male participants can also be expected in a still heavily male dominated field. Criterion Categories Responses N = 3377 Information provision Very good 13% Good 32% Fair 32% Bad 16% Very bad 6% No judgment 1% Alarm and information beforehand Very good 16% Good 36% Fair 28% Bad 13% Very bad 7% No judgment 0,5% Operation recapitulation Very good 18% Good 37% Fair 23% Bad 11% Very bad 5% 96 Recovery after extreme events - Lessons learned and remaining challenges in Disaster Risk Reduction Finally, the happy day of the inauguration ceremony was to come on 13 August, 2008 (he present author was fortunately able also to attend the opening ceremony of Ankokkawala village. Some of his personal impressions are given above). The settlers enthusiastically applauded when the ribbon was cut to signal the official hand-over of the houses to them. Happy wishes were expressed by several personalities, including religious dignitaries and public service representatives when the settlers proudly took over their new houses. Lucky faces of the people, both of parents and children, were to be seen as their desperate homelessness had come to an end. The settlers were hardly able to express in words how fortunate and thankful they were about their new houses. They seemed to understand that they could start a new life and to look with confidence towards a safe and happy future. Hopefully the houses of the villagers would soon change into their homes. Remembering the sad saying among the tsunami-afflicted people: “We have lost not only our houses, but even more our homes.” Improvement of housing conditions In the years to come after the opening of Ankkokawala village, several improvements were carried out in order to create better living and housing conditions to the villagers. Funded by the SLCNC, the following measures were carried out:  tiling of the veranda floor  tiling in the kitchen and bathroom/toilet,  digging of a well for safe supplementary water besides the public running water system,  building of a drainage system to prevent the sloppy terrain in the village from erosion after heavy rainfall,  providing seeds and plants to the settlers for developing their gardens. The government provided a new tarred road from a nearby village to Ankokkawala passing through the remaining rubber plantation. On this road a regular public bus service was also introduced that connected Ankokkowala village with Galle town. All the additional improvements were happily welcomed by the settlers in Ankokkawala village. … a decade under review Reviewing the past nearly ten years, the focal questions arise:   Were the tremendous efforts - including the high amount of money, respectively funds, involved in the village project - worth or not?  What were the benefits of the project? What were deficits?  What about the villagers satisfaction, respectively dissatisfaction? It seems important that the SLCNC has regularly, year by year, paid inspection visits to Ankkokawala village aiming:  to meet the villagers,  to look into their well-being,  to note the progress of the village development and the societal process of harmonisation among the settlers  and to note the settlers' satisfaction, respectively dissatisfaction. The following achievements at Ankokkawala village can be stated: 97 Integrative Risk and Security Research Volume 2/ 2017  the village has obtained a well-functioning infrastructure by transport as well as electricity and water,  all ten families who live in the village have meanwhile become a community with a highly developed spirit for communal responsibility. People do meet, they come together, sit together, talk together  settlers have also well developed a good taste of a reliable neighbourhood and even close friendship and understanding,  people trust each other and are good partners,  people pay much attention to their gardens by planting fruit trees and vegetables. People love their gardens and most of them are paying proud attention to them. Bananas and other fruit trees, like papaya and passion tree, are thriving well and bearing rich fruits. Meanwhile, even coconut trees have grown up and have become adult for rich harvests. Year by year, it has been possible to observe to which extent gardening was successfully intensified and developed,  most villagers have even planted ornamental flower plants, including flower pots and orchids in baskets in front of the verandas,  it is highly encouraging to observe to which extent the settlers have put all their efforts to make their homes and homestead gardens as nice as possible,  the village is moving forward to become a 'green village', rich and prosperous in nature's blessings under tropical skies. Yet, there must also be recognized some deficits at Ankokkawala village and to the settlers:  the location of the village is obviously in the hinterland and hence off the main road as well as off the sea,  the fishermen are quite far away from their fishing sites and they must travel every day some seven to eight kilometres to the sea as well home to Ankokkawala village,  it is most important to maintain the access road to Ankokkawala village in good condition in order to continue a regular bus service,  there is no shop or store as part of the village because it may be too small for same. Shopping even of the daily need must therefore be done in a village some kilometres away from Ankokkawala,  there is no playground for the kids and also no sports field for the youth.  life has obviously been changed; the open ocean and sea is no longer part of the family life. Considering all the deficits, they are comparably small compared with the achievements. Comparing both, the achievements and the deficits, it can be followed that Ankokkawala represents a village worth all the efforts that have been put in during the past ten years. Summary Considering the achievements of Ankokkawala village over the past decade, it can be followed that the village has developed towards a true village with a strong communal responsibility among the settlers. It can also be noted that happiness and satisfaction is around among all the people in the village. It can hence be strongly stated that houses have meanwhile successfully turned into homes to the tsunamiafflicted people where to live happily with confidence and faith. 98 Recovery after extreme events - Lessons learned and remaining challenges in Disaster Risk Reduction The happy facesof the settlers are expressing the best evidence of the successful village implementation and village development so far. It must be appreciated as a sign of happiness to the Ankokkawala villagers that no family who settled down at the opening of the village a decade ago has left the place. All the 'pioneer' families still live in Ankokkawala. The SLCNC must pay further continuous attention to the development of Ankokkawala village and to assist the villagers, as far as possible, in their needs for a pleasant and prosperous future. 99 Integrative Risk and Security Research Volume 2/ 2017 Bring back the lessons learned to the beneficiaries! Pia Hollenbach1 & Gabriela Neuhaus2 1 Department of Geography, University of Zurich, Switzerland 2Offroad Reports, Switzerland Email: [email protected]h; offroadrep[email protected] Introduction In the aftermath of the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami, about 70’000 people were relocated in Sri Lanka, most of them due to the implementation of a Buffer Zone by the government, which prohibited the reconstruction of permanent housing along the coastline. Relocation of such a huge number of people was made possible through the involvement and financial support of International Aid Organisations. In this paper we first want to highlight the difficulties and long term impacts of (forced) relocation, asking why former lessons learned have not been sufficiently and sustainably incorporated in project planning and implementation, and second, why Aid Organisations did not accept weaknesses and directly attend to upcoming shortcomings. Finally, we show that they even were not ready to revive their projects and repair back better after evaluations/impact studies proved that beneficiaries and local governments suffer from long-term consequences of aid interventions. Inexcusable errors Qualitative, multidisciplinary and action research over a time period of almost 10 years resulted in a scientific PhD thesis0F 1 and a journalistic documentary film1F 2 on the one hand analysing, on the other hand documenting shortages and failures of how aid has being done and which sustainable and long-lasting impact it has on the lives of aid recipients in post-tsunami Sri Lanka. With the help of qualitative interviews (170) of aid recipients but also with local government authority, politicians and international/national aid workers (35) we visited more than 20 relocation villages and – to compare – about 10 places with in situ reconstruction. Finally we worked out oral and visualized histories from 6 relocation localities (South and East Sri Lanka) that were donor-driven managed by international but also national donors. All these examples clearly show weaknesses in project planning and implementation as well as too early withdrawal of donors. Fact is: 10 years post-tsunami we see a majority of relocation projects facing huge social, economic and technical difficulties. One of the best researched examples of post-tsunami relocation failure is German Haritha Gama in Southern Sri Lanka: 90 houses co-financed and planned through a German Emergency Aid Organisation with the vision to create an eco-friendly and autarkic model village, built by a contractor, up to 18 kilometres away from the beneficiaries’ former homes. Until today the village has no proper water supply, no decent access road and public transport; the remoteness hampers social and economic development. Half of the houses are abandoned and many of the others only temporarily used. Just 12 houses are permanently inhabited, and even those not all by the first recipients. The planned bakery has been alienated and is today the temple of a Buddhist monk and the kindergarten, the doctor’s room and the market place have never served their purposes. 1Hollenbach, 2014: The Paradox of Good Intensions: private-giving in post-tsunami Sri Lanka 2Neuhaus, G. and Scudeletti, A. 2014: Buffer Zone. Sri Lanka – 10 years after the Tsunami, Documentary Film 100 Recovery after extreme events - Lessons learned and remaining challenges in Disaster Risk Reduction This unacceptable situation is not a singular case but is found in various locations in Sri Lanka as well as in post-tsunami Aceh and Tamil Nadu (Barenstein & Pittet 2007; Duyner Barenstein 2015; Daly & Feener 2016; Jha et al 2010). Research shows that similar problems, in combination of other socio-economic and structural problems occur, in other post disaster relocation projects e.g. in Haiti or New Orleans (Chamlee-Wright & Storr 2010). Left alone The community of German Haritha Gama tried very hard to solve the problems after the implementing NGO closed their 3 years commitment in 2009. Villagers called attention for their non-liveable situation on different levels: they wrote letters to local politicians and administration, the NGO headquarter, private donors and even organised public protests in front of the Galle District Secretariat. Unfortunately without success! Even an enquiry of a private donor, who co-funded the project and is engaged in the village till today, to re-establish technical and financial support solving the water problem created by the project, received a negative answer from the organisation’s headquarter in Germany. And long term strategies to stay involved creating a sustainable community, proposed by a former project manager, have also been rejected. The organisation’s main argument for its non-reaction was that they wanted to avoid long term aid dependency of the beneficiaries and that humanitarian assistance would have a limited time frame – after which the local government needs to take over the long term responsibilities of development. A similar answer was given to the film team, requesting a comment to the outcome and obvious failures of the project. In the end, all activities to bring back support to the people of German Haritha Gama remained unattended, although current studies prove that existing problems – mainly the lack of water and infrastructure - exceed the technical and financial capabilities of the housing beneficiaries as well as of the local government. We find such devastating situations island wide, where implementing organisations refuse to face their mistakes and to repair back better. No learning Although several pre-Indian Ocean Tsunami studies emphasize the specific difficulties and complexities of post-disaster and development induced relocation (Cernea 1999; Fernando et al 2010), there was and there still is obviously no learning of lessons learned. We ask: Why not? Although it was known that relocation projects need more time than in-situ reconstruction, Aid Organisations withdrew in most cases after maximum 3 years, after the houses were built. Their engagement did not take sufficiently into account the socio-economic development and integration of a decent livelihood in the new places. Based on our experiences, we state that the majority of stakeholders in the Aid Industry are not willing to look at long term developments of projects once they have been handed over. They are even less ready to openly accept failures and mistakes and to change their implementing habits. In our opinion, one of the driving reasons is the competitiveness of the Aid Business: The donors’ priority is to sustainably generate funds to keep their business going. Therefore, they put in front their own visibility and interests in Public Relation instead of prioritising the beneficiaries’ needs and demands. Furthermore international organisations tend to ignore or in cooperate local knowledge and expertise, especially in the identification, planning and developing phase of projects. They come in with their own standardised methods and products and devalue the importance of the socio-political, economic and 101 Integrative Risk and Security Research Volume 2/ 2017 cultural context. The assumption is – even in complex relocation situations – that handing-over houses is a sufficient base to form a community. Therefor donors often phase out and hand over projects too quickly and most critically without sufficient knowledge-transfer into the responsibilities of local governments and beneficiaries. Given time constrains highlight that a truly participatory and integrated process is not possible, and even so-called owner-driven projects become a farce, as the owner is mainly driven by the donor’s vision. In fact flexibility and adjusting to unforeseen circumstances is categorically denied as all decisions are subordinated to the so-called «goal-oriented process planning». Or as Ramlingam (2013) notes “…organizations spend all their time looking for the single right answer rather than diverse solutions; people spend more time trying to do things right than doing the right things; there is much more focus on knowledge transfer than on knowledge creation…” (26, emphasis added). Need for change What needs to be changed to overcome the existing rigid structures in the Aid Business? – The main problem: Aid Organisations are driven by own interests rather than the actual demands of beneficiaries. As a result, reconstruction projects targeting Disaster Risk Reduction often sustain the everyday disasters of the beneficiaries in the long run. To really fulfil their claim improving the lives of those in need – «to build back better» – Aid agencies and NGOs need to give up their resistance to honest self-development and selfreflection. If they are really ready to learn their lessons from existing findings, the first logical step would be, to give the profit of these learnings back to the former beneficiaries: Aid Organisations need to go back into their old fields of interventions and make justice to their failures. It is important to admit that there is no blueprint solution to post-disaster reconstruction. Real partnership therefor means that new contextualized knowledge needs to be created by local experts, governments and the recipients, together with their donors. We strongly urge to bring back the so-called beneficiaries back into the driver’s seats of post-disaster reconstruction. This needs time and multidisciplinary skills, including intercultural communication, social science, transparency and project planning that allow agility in any project phase. Literature Barenstein, J & Pittet, D 2007 ‘Post-Disaster Housing Reconstruction. Current Trends and Sustainable Alternatives for Tsunami-Affected Communities in Coastal Tamil Nadu’ Lausanne: EPFL. Cernea, M 1999 ‘The economics of involuntary resettlement: Questions and challenges’. World Bank publication. Chamlee-Wright, E & Storr, VH 2010, The Political Economy of Hurrican Katrina and Community Rebound, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK. Duyne Barenstein, J 2015. Does relocation violate people’s right to adequate housing? The case of posttsunami reconstrution in Tamil Nadu, India. In: P. Daly and M. Feener (eds). Rebuilding Asia following natural disasters: Approaches to Reconstruction in the Asia-Pacific Region. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (forthcoming). Daly, P & Feener RM, 2016, Rebuilding Asia Following Natural Disasters: Approaches to Reconstruction in the Asia-Pacific Region, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Fernando, N et al 2010 ‚Migration and Natural Hazards: Is relocation a secondary disaster or an opportunity for vulnerability reduction’ In Afifi, T & Jager, J (eds) “Environment, Forced migration and Vulnerability. Springer, Heidelberg. Jah Abhas et al 2010 ‘Safer Homes, Stronger Communities. A Handbook for Reconstructing after Natural Disasters. GFDRR/World Bank. Ramalingam, B 2013, Aid on the Edge of Chaos: Rethinking International Cooperation in a Complex World, OUP Oxford, Oxford. 102 Recovery after extreme events - Lessons learned and remaining challenges in Disaster Risk Reduction Lessons on relief and recovery after disastrous events – Perception and satisfaction of relief workers Alexander Fekete1, Celia Norf1, Christiane Stephan1 & Karolina Bednarska2 1Institute for Rescue Engineering and Civil Protection, TH Köln - University of Applied Sciences, Germany 2Institute of Fire Safety Engineering, Main School of Fire Service, Poland Email: [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected] Abstract The perception and satisfaction of relief helpers and managers engaged in different forms of domestic and foreign aid concerning disastrous events is a crucial aspect in evaluating disaster relief actions and deriving lessons learned for future projects. This article firstly summarizes findings on the perception and satisfaction of relief workers presented in grey and scientific literature and highlights the literature’s focus on recovery efforts concerning housing, logistics and planning as well as on the different stakeholders involved. Secondly, these findings from the literature are supported by insights from a survey carried out amongst different actors involved in disaster relief in several countries and cases. The results underline time constraints and information management as central aspects for limiting relief enablement. Moreover, contrary to other observations, certain key documents regarding Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR), especially the Sendai and Hyogo Frameworks are well known and also, at least to 61% evaluated as general useful by relief workers. This paper serves as a starting point for in-depth research on the satisfaction with disaster relief activities as one important part of effective DRR that includes immediate response but also long-term effectiveness of recovery measures and thus makes disaster relief not an isolated activity but integrated into DRR and development aspects. Introduction Disasters such as the Indian Ocean Tsunami in 2004, the earthquake in Haiti 2010, the Nepal Earthquake 2015,or many other so-called natural hazards (also cyclones, floods etc.) do not only attract global attention but also domestic as well as foreign aid in different forms. A few months or years after a disaster however this attention and aid decreases, as the mandates of humanitarian organizations end and media attention switches to other places or topics. This article based on a survey generates an overview to which extent these different forms of domestic and foreign aid interventions were satisfying from the point of view of those persons who helped. Help and aid can come in different forms to a disaster stricken community; search and rescue teams, people organising the logistics from abroad or, crowd sourced even from their home office. Consultants of NGOs, government, private sector and individuals, affected or not affected all belong to a world-wide community of people involved in aid and recovery after severe events such as a tsunami, cyclone or earthquake. Goods and services offered to improve immediate situations can vary strongly and the length of the recovery phase can be extended up to decades. Small-scale provision of food and water, but also large-scale housing projects or hazard barriers, just as less physically tangible services like knowledge or donations in form of money all belong to disaster aid and recovery. While quite a number of lessons learned studies exists that address the time immediately after an event, as in the case of the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami, the number of studies published to reflect long-term learning 103 Integrative Risk and Security Research Volume 2/ 2017 decreases significantly over the years after an event. In order to foster long-term learning and share experience on which recovery effects were effective and which were not sustainable, we carried out two activities; an expert seminar and a survey. Background and motivation: Alumni Seminar In context of the DAAD Alumni Seminar on the topic “11 Years After the Indian Ocean Tsunami 2004 – Lessons of Disaster Recovery, Rehabilitation and Resilience”, carried out by TH Köln - University of Applied Sciences, Institute of Rescue Engineering and Civil Protection, the United Nations University - Institute for Environment and Human Security (UNU-EHS) and the Social Policy Analysis and Research Centre, University of Colombo (SPARC), 20 international participants from Asia, Latin America and Africa and various German and international experts in the field of Disaster Risk Management and Humanitarian Aid discussed topics of social resilience, buffer capacities of certain ecosystems to tsunami waves and the challenges of donation management and long-term ownership and responsibility for relief activities. Especially two pressing questions were put into focus: 1. Have the different actors learned from the disaster and 2. Have processes of Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) and livelihood improvement been implemented successfully and in a sustainable manner? In discussing these questions, the satisfaction of helpers and managers who were engaged in providing different forms of domestic and foreign aid was highlighted - especially the need to evaluate these processes, thereby deriving certain lessons on how to improve them for future projects. The outcome of the seminar is documented by several scientific papers in this volume and in articles published in other journals (e.g. Stephan, Norf & Fekete, 2017). The aim of this paper is to add empirical evidence to the main questions; answering which are different actors or stakeholder groups and investigating learning that takes place when critically reviewing and evaluating specific processes that take place during the recovery phase. Success and constraint factors for DRR are analysed, mainly regarding long-term learning and transfer lessons learned on DRR to other future events. In order to achieve these objectives, this short paper firstly looks into a selected body of literature and secondly adds some insights from a broadly designed survey carried out amongst different actors involved in disaster relief in several countries and cases. Literature review on recovery efforts related to disasters In order to provide a background for the specific research questions that will be addressed in the subsequent chapter, firstly it is relevant to describe the thematic frame of this paper. The literature review is limited in scope and depth, since the main intention is to identify key themes already existing, before future research will look into specific aspects in more depth. Method of literature review Literature review was conducted in January 2017 using the search engines Google Scholar and Google and analysing each 100 first hits regarding specified search terms such as „Satisfaction of Disaster Relief Helpers“. One search process has been conducted in Google (not Google Scholar) with identical search words in order to analyse the differences in hits. The results showed that in regular Google search only few additional valuable scientific journal articles were found, however, substantially more surveys and grey literature 104 Recovery after extreme events - Lessons learned and remaining challenges in Disaster Risk Reduction reports. While there is a breadth of reports from NGOs and others, such reports have not been included in this review, since it would exceed the scope of this overview paper. The first 100 search hits were analysed regarding their relevance with regard to the scope of our paper. All abstracts have been analysed, stored and their key conclusions excerpted. Most articles were fully accessible through various university platforms, but not all, hence abstracts allowed for a comparable text source. However, relevant articles were also stored and analysed regarding full text. The selection of ‘relevance’ of course is highly subjective but is mainly an indication for the readers, which articles conduct research in a domain similar to our research direction in this paper. It should not be misunderstood as a general judgement on usability or quality. In order to remain consistent, search terms were used consistently, even if grammatically slightly incorrect or incomplete in certain variations such as ‘satisfaction of disaster relief’. Each paper appears only once in the resulting selection, even when it would fit to several search term combinations (see table below). Only the search term combinations as shown in table 1 were used, no synonyms or British English equivalents such as ‘organisations’ – therefore, these articles might be missing. The literature review focuses on scientific journal articles and includes some edited books, monographies and different types of grey literature. Using only one specific search term such as “satisfaction” is limiting, other synonyms for satisfaction would be contentment, or gratification, for example. However, they were found even less frequent than satisfaction and therefore excluded in order to obtain a first consistent overview. Search words Search engine Papers analysed in depth and finally selected for this chapter SATISFACTION OF DISASTER RELIEF HELPERS Google Scholar 3 out of 17 SATISFACTION OF DISASTER RELIEF SURVEY Google Scholar 4 out of 13 SATISFACTION OF DISASTER RELIEF Google Scholar 3 out of 12 SATISFACTION OF EMERGENCY ORGANIZATIONS IN DISASTER Google Scholar 4 out of 9 SATISFACTION WITH THE HELP OF AID ORGANIZATIONS AFTER DISASTER Google Scholar 1 out of 5 SATISFACTION OF DISASTER RELIEF SURVEY Google 2 out of 11 Table 1. Search term combinations used to identify the publication basis for the literature review Source: own elaboration The sample is clearly too small to make statistically viable statements. Mainly, the preselection helps to separate papers more relevant to this literature review. Results of literature review The topic of satisfaction related to disaster relief is widely described in the literature as the brief literature search reveals. It is observed that disasters of recent times are analysed by various types of governmental and non-governmental organisations. Various aspects of disasters are analysed in the selected number of articles 105 Integrative Risk and Security Research Volume 2/ 2017 (see Table 1). Many of them give overall summary descriptions of hazardous events, their processes, damages and counter measures. However, there also exists literature dealing not just with the disaster description or process analysis, but present reflections on how the event was handled and, identifying at the same time relevant gaps and future priority areas. As an example, the report entitled "Weaving Hopes after Disasters" (Xavier 2015) discusses long-term impact and beneficiary satisfaction of relief, rehabilitation and development programmes in India. The author realises that organisations need to introspect periodically how effective their interventions are in terms of reducing the adverse effects of disasters and the underlying social and economic inequalities, defining priorities and facilitating people’s access to rights and entitlements by government. In order to accomplish this, there is a need to access systematic feedback by beneficiaries on their perception and appreciation of these activities. The report aims to attain this objective as it mainly intends to obtain a critical scientific analysis of the impact of different relief, rehabilitation and development activities within the Indian post-emergency rehabilitation programmes, focusing on the beneficiaries’ perceptions and satisfaction. It further aims at recommending priorities in the combination of different intervention strategies in future post-disaster programmes. Critical evaluation of recovery efforts – housing, logistics and planning A critical review of temporary housing as a typical means of rapid relief for residents losing homes identifies as critical the issues of suitability (costs and environmental issues) and user-needs (cultural sensitivity) (Félix, Branco & Feio 2013). This is widely in line with a range of other studies showing that temporary housing projects, although designed by donors with good intentions, often lack the necessary sensitivity for local contexts and therefore does not consider user-needs adequately; other problems are lack of maintenance, proper integration with infrastructure and poor living conditions (Geipel 1982; Fernando 2012). While logistics are a key resource for effective recovery, constraints in this area can be a lack of cooperation between logistics companies and users as well as a lack of transparency, trust, awareness of cultural specifics but also conflicts arising from relief capacities, role and interests of the companies (Schulz & Blecken 2010). The dependence of disaster relief logistics on the process chain and ‘business continuity’ in situations where disasters can also hamper the (critical) infrastructure and services themselves seems to be lacking awareness (Bozorgi-Amiri et al. 2012). Lifeline reconstruction as well as business reconstruction however, are key topics identified in a number of studies and reports (Brown et al. 2015; Giovinazzi et al. 2016; Seville et al. 2014, Suppasri et al. 2015). Local differences concerning the measures applied also play an important role as to how effective or satisfactory relief processes are perceived. As an example, satisfaction with disaster relief after floods varied significantly between two affected communities in Kansas in 1998. A study showed that residents in Augusta were less satisfied than those in Arkansas City due to shorter lead-time for warnings issued by city officials (Paul 2002). Local differences and different contexts are a general major aspect to observed not only in disaster-relief activities but also in cases of long-term recovery and planning. For example, application of measures after the Indian Ocean Tsunami in 2004 such as buffer and risk zonation levels vary in locations and countries affected by the Tsunami (Fernando 2012, Suppasri et al. 2015). Planning and land use management are however just one part of issues next to internal conflicts and education, this study finds. Different stakeholders under analysis Quite a number of studies focus on the perceptions of and satisfaction with disaster relief and recovery from the perspectives of victims or people affected. For example, studies elaborated after the earthquake in Nepal 112 Recovery after extreme events - Lessons learned and remaining challenges in Disaster Risk Reduction 7) Were you mainly working alone or in a group of helpers? 38 out of 40 people answered this question 8) In what type of organizational structure had you been working within this operation? 39 out of 40 people answered this question 9) What kind of work did you do in this operation? 39 out of 40 people answered this question 10) Have you been working in a similar operation again? 39 out of 40 people answered this question 11) Would you be willing to work in a similar operation in the future? 39 out of 40 people answered this question 12) What personal constraints did you experience during the operation? 36 out of 40 people answered this question 5 Untrained volunteer 3 / 8% 6 Untrained and sel f -or g anized helper (from the countr y )1 / 3% Larger group or organisation 1 30 / 79% 2-3 People 2 5 / 13% 4-6 3 5 / 13% 4 Alone 2 / 5% Non Governmental organisation 1 17 / 44% Governmental institution 2 16 / 41% Other 3 3 / 8% Private 4 3 / 8% Desktop work (planning, analysis, decision-making) 1 23 / 59% Social Work 2 8 / 21% 3 Ph y sical work (for example, construction, transport). 5 / 13% 4 Medical aid and treatments 2 / 5% 5 Administrative 1 / 3% Yes 1 28 / 72% No 2 11 / 28% Yes 39 / 100% 1 2 No 0 / 0% Time constraints 1 21 / 58% Uncertainty by lack of information and guidance 2 19 / 53% 113 Integrative Risk and Security Research Volume 2/ 2017 13) From which sources did you receive information about your operation area after your help? 38 out of 40 people answered this question 14) Did you find this information sufficient and the way it was provided satisfying? 37 out of 40 people answered this question 15) Have you heard about the “Hyogo Framework for Action” or the “Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction”? 38 out of 40 people answered this question 16) In case you know the Hyogo Framework for Action” or the “Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction” do you know operations where it was/is used? 34 out of 40 people answered this question 17) If yes, what is your impression on their usefulness and influence for your actions in this event? 23 out of 40 people answered this question Obligations with main job 3 12 / 33% Psychological and emotional stress 4 12 / 33% 5 Problems with lod g in g , food or health 6 / 17% 6 Aid re j ected b y the people 5 / 14% 7 Ph y sical or mental violence a g ainst y ou or other people 5 / 14% 8 Obli g ations with own famil y 3 / 8% Colleagues 1 21 / 55% Public media 2 18 / 47% Public/ private Officials 3 18 / 47% Your funding agency/ operation leader 4 17 / 45% 5 Friends or famil y 5 / 13% yes 1 24 / 65% partly 2 10 / 27% no 3 3 / 8% Sendai Framework 1 26 / 68% Hyogo Framework 2 24 / 63% No 1 17 / 50% Yes 2 17 / 50% Generally useful 1 14 / 61% Not very useful 2 5 / 22% Played a key role 3 4 / 17% 114 Recovery after extreme events - Lessons learned and remaining challenges in Disaster Risk Reduction 18) What type of supporting documents did you find helpful? 37 out of 40 people answered this question 19) What is your age? 36 out of 40 people answered this question 20) Gender 37 out of 40 people answered this question 1 Practical Guidelines (related to crisis mana g ement, emer g encies, risks, safet y & securit y )18 / 49% Academic publications 2 10 / 27% Risk maps (risk areas) 3 7 / 19% 4 Maps 2 / 5% 5 Social Media 0 / 0% 6 T ravel g uides 0 / 0% 50-59 1 11 / 31% 40-49 2 10 / 28% 30-39 3 8 / 22% 20-29 5 2 / 6% 6 1-19 1 / 3% 7 70-79 0 / 0% 8 80 up 0 / 0% Male 1 21 / 57% Female 2 16 / 43% 3 Other 0 / 0% 115 Integrative Risk and Security Research Volume 2/ 2017 Publication List - Integrative Risk and Security Research Volume 1/2017 Norf, C, Stephan C & Fekete, A (Eds.) 2017 Interdisziplinäre Perspektiven des Risikound Krisenmanagements - Beiträge aus Wissenschaft und Praxis im Rahmen der Veranstaltungsreihe „Risky Monday“. In: Integrative Risk and Security Research, 1/2017, Cologne. Volume 3/2015 Fekete, A, Grinda, C & Norf, C (Eds.) (2015), Macht allein Schaden klug? Wissen, Erfahrung und Lernen im Umgang mit Risiken – Beiträge aus Wissenschaft und Praxis zum 27. Treffen des Arbeitskreises Naturgefahren/Naturrisiken. In: Integrative Risk and Security Research, 3/2015, Cologne. Volume 2/2015 Baumgarten, C & Bentler, C (2015), Analyse der persönlichen Zufriedenheit von Einsatzkräften während der Hochwasserkatastrophe 2013 in Deutschland. Eine Umfrage zur Steigerung der Motivation von Helfern im Bevölkerungsschutz. In: Integrative Risk and Security Research, 2/2015, Cologne. Volume 1/2015 Grinda, C, Norf, C, Blätgen, T & Fekete, A (Eds.) (2015), Country Profiles of Climate and Disaster Extremes in 16 Countries. Results of the DAAD Alumni Summer School 2013. In: Integrative Risk and Security Research, 1/2015, Cologne. Volume 1/2014 Norf, C; Blätgen, T, Grinda, C & Fekete, A (Eds.) (2014), Coping with Disasters and Climate Extremes – Challenges & Cooperation Potential. Research Contributions to DAAD Alumni Summer School 2013. In: Integrative Risk and Security Research, 1/2014, Cologne. All publications can be downloaded from https://www.th-koeln.de/anlagen-energie-undmaschinensysteme/schriftenreihe-integrative-risk-and-security-research_17446.php; or you use http://tinyurl.com/oaj4r7a Cologne, November 2017