Engines under control: The challenge of putting an end to fishing vessel engine power fraud in the Spanish Mediterranean

The challenge of putting an end to fishing vessel engine power fraud in the Spanish Mediterranean Engines under control © OCEANA / Ángeles Sáez © OCEANA / Keith Ellenbogen Table of Contents 1. 5. 7. 8. 2. 3. 6. 4. 3 11 16 18 19 4 7 14 9 4 11 14 18 15 11 8 7 Executive summary Engine power fraud: Comparison between official and unofficial data Challenges and solutions for engine regularisation: The horsepower trading market and fishing capacity limits Conclusions References and notes Origin of the collapse of fishing in the Mediterranean Engine power as a key indicator for measuring fishing capacity Installation and certification process: How does fraud occur? Regulatory framework Increased engine power and overfishing Methodology Steps to be taken and organisations involved Recommendations How does engine power fraud occur? Results Fishing capacity, underestimated as a result of engine power fraud Impact of the Multiannual Plan for Demersal Stocks in the Western Mediterranean Sea Credits October 2025 DOI number: 10.5281/zenodo.17159354 Suggested citation: Fresco Vanzini, I., & Cruz Fornós, J. A. (2025). Engines under control. The challenge of putting an end to fishing vessel engine power fraud in the Spanish Mediterranean. Oceana. This report has been jointly developed by Oceana and Josep Antoni Cruz Fornós, shipowner and technical manager of fishing fleets. Photos and illustrations: © OCEANA and © Shutterstock. Design: Yago Yuste. Views and opinions expressed are however those of the author(s) only and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union or CINEA. Neither the European Union nor CINEA can be held responsible for them. 3 The fishing fleet in the Spanish Mediterranean has been facing a critical situation for decades that threatens its viability, both from an economic standpoint and in terms of the sustainability of marine resources. Despite an enormous effort by the fishing industry and improvements in the state of fisheries, especially since the introduction of the Multiannual Plan for Demersal Stocks in the Western Mediterranean Sea in 2019, low levels of sustainability and profitability remain alarming. Among the factors that worsen this crisis are various irregularities, ranging from the manipulation of the selectivity of fishing gear to the sale of undeclared products. However, the most significant and common irregularity is fraud related to the power of engines installed on fishing vessels. This type of fraud not only compromises the sustainability of species but also causes serious distortions within the industry, leading to inequalities and allowing unfair competition for those who operate using engines that are significantly more powerful than are permitted by law. This study focuses on fraud detected in the trawl and purse seine fleets, two fishing methods that require high engine power to deploy and retrieve fishing gear. Based on the analysis of 50 vessels in the Spanish Mediterranean, many irregularities have been detected, such as the manipulation of engine technical data sheets, the alteration of engine power limiters, and non-compliance with legal limits on the maximum power allowed (904 horsepower for trawlers and 455 horsepower for purse seiners since 2022). 1. Executive summary The evidence is overwhelming: 94% of the vessels analysed appear to have fraudulent engines, with actual power far exceeding the certified power, and 20% of the vessels directly exceed the established legal power limits. In many cases, the difference is not marginal, but rather double, triple, or even up to eight times the power declared in the Fishing Fleet Register. This situation completely distorts the calculation of fishing effort, the main management tool in the Mediterranean for these vessels, and reduces the effectiveness of management and conservation measures, as the official figures seriously underestimate the real impact of fishing activity on the ecosystem. © OCEANA / Juan Cuetos © OCEANA / Marta Carreras 4 Fishing in the Mediterranean Sea as a whole is in a critical state. Sixty-five percent of the stocks assessed in this region are subject to overfishing, with some being exploited at levels between two to five times higher than the maximum sustainable yield.2 This is the result of decades of mismanagement and a lack of effective planning to ensure the sustainability of the fishing sector and marine resources. 2. Origin of the collapse of fishing in the Mediterranean Increased engine power and overfishing The study is based on information obtained through interviews with fishers, port staff, and experts from the fishing industry, as well as from technical and scientific studies, and official documents obtained through requests for access to information. The findings reveal a systematic, persistent problem that is not limited to fishers but also involves other stakeholders, including the fisheries administration, engine manufacturers and installers, and certification bodies. Oceana has been reporting these irregularities to the maritime and fisheries authorities for years.1 However, to date, the administrations have not taken effective measures to correct the situation. Despite the widespread impact on marine ecosystems and public resources, engine power fraud is still a taboo topic that many prefer not to broach, either because of its complexity or the difficulty of finding viable solutions. In this regard, we advocate strengthening fisheries control systems, adopting an engine regularisation programme, and implementing effective deterrent measures to prevent fraud in the long term. These measures are a key step towards ensuring fairer and more sustainable fishing in the Spanish Mediterranean. With this report, we aim to contribute to a constructive dialogue between administrations, fishers’ guilds, and other key stakeholders, in order to find viable solutions for the industry and for the future of the sea. For decades, national and regional administrations have failed to take the necessary measures to prevent the construction and operation of more vessels than marine resources could sustain.3 Overcapacity has been particularly severe in the Mediterranean, which is considered by the FAO to be the most overexploited sea in the world.2 Nor have measures been taken to prevent the destruction of essential habitats for species (such as breeding, nursery, feeding, and migration areas) and fisheries management has failed to adapt to technological advances that have increasingly allowed fisheries exploit more remote areas, and to do so more easily and precisely. Although ecological deterioration and species declines were already evident in the 1980s, technological innovations managed to temporarily maintain catch levels, masking the scale of the problem.4 However, the ecosystem has reached its limit and fisheries have shown a clear downward trend for roughly two decades. Neither the modernisation of the fleet nor the expansion of markets have managed to curb the loss of economic viability in the industry, which has suffered a steady decline. © OCEANA / Juan Cuetos 5 Between 2006 and 2023, the fleet in the autonomous communities with fishing activity in the Mediterranean (the Balearic Islands, Murcia, Catalonia, the Valencian Community, and Andalusia) experienced a significant reduction in size, going from 4861 vessels with a total engine power of 327 000 kW (445 000 hp) to 3024 vessels with a total engine power of 264 000 kW (359 000 hp). Although both variables decreased, the reduction was not proportional: while the number of vessels fell by 38%, total engine power only decreased by 19%. This difference suggests that, despite the demolition of vessels, the aggregate propulsion capacity of the active fleet remained high. One noteworthy change was the increase in engine power registered between 2020 and 2021, from 201 866 kW to 265 792 kW. This increase of more than 30% in engine power from one year to the next could be related to engine regularisation processes. Evolution of the number of vessels, registered fishing power, and catch volumes for the period 2006-2023 GT & KW 2006 Gross Tonnage (GT) 2010 2015 2020 2023 TOTAL ACTIVE VESSELS 300k 350k 250k 200k 150k 100k 50k 0 2000 3000 3500 4000 4500 5000 2007 2008 2009 2011 2012 2013 2014 2016 2017 2018 2019 2021 2022 Total Power (KW) Total active vessels GT & KW 2006 Gross Tonnage (GT) 2010 2015 2020 2023 TOTAL ACTIVE VESSELS 300k 350k 250k 200k 150k 100k 50k 0 2000 3000 3500 4000 4500 5000 2007 2008 2009 2011 2012 2013 2014 2016 2017 2018 2019 2021 2022 Total Power (KW) Total active vessels Figure 1: Historical record of the maritime fishing fleet across all years, in the autonomous communities of the Balearic Islands, Region of Murcia, Catalonia, the Valencian Community, and Andalusia, for all fishing methods. © OCEANA / Ángeles Sáez Source: Ministerio de Agricultura y Pesca. (2024). Anuario de Pesca Marítima. https://www.mapa.gob.es/es/estadistica/temas/estadistica-digital/powerbi-pesca 6 Until the 2000s, most shipowners chose to modernise their vessels by installing more powerful engines to increase their fishing capacity, maintain catch levels, and add economic value to their vessels. This modernisation was made possible, to a large extent, by public aid and subsidies which facilitated the acquisition and installation of more powerful engines. Added to this was competition among vessels; reaching fishing grounds first meant gaining access to the most valuable resources, contributing to a veritable race for power and further intensifying the pressure on fisheries resources. In 2013, in response to an ecological and economic crisis in fisheries, the European Union’s Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) set as its main objective the restoration and maintenance of fish stocks above levels capable of producing maximum sustainable yield. To achieve this, it committed to setting fishing mortality levels consistent with this objective by 2020, with the aim of ensuring the long-term sustainability of commercial species and fishing activity itself. The CFP forced a significant restructuring of the industry, with adjustments to fishing capacity in an attempt to balance it with the available resources. Although there is still some way to go, the achievements of the CFP are undeniable, with an increasingly sustainable and profitable fishing industry. However, such progress has come at a great cost, forcing many operators to reduce their activity or, in some cases, to abandon fishing altogether. Tonness 2006 2010 2015 2020 2023 25k 50k 75k 100k 125k 150k 130 700 119 094 105 225 105 820 100 288 103 505 78 985 82 999 78 467 76 415 81 774 86 851 87 443 75 928 65 636 61 059 61 657 53 071 0k 2007 2008 2009 2011 2012 2013 2014 2016 2017 2018 2019 2021 2022 Catch volume (tonnes) Tonness 2006 2010 2015 2020 2023 25k 50k 75k 100k 125k 150k 130 700 119 094 105 225 105 820 100 288 103 505 78 985 82 999 78 467 76 415 81 774 86 851 87 443 75 928 65 636 61 059 61 657 53 071 0k 2007 2008 2009 2011 2012 2013 2014 2016 2017 2018 2019 2021 2022 Catch volume (tonnes) Figure 2: Temporal trend in catches by the Spanish fishing fleet in the Mediterranean Sea Catch volumes have also fallen sharply, from 130 000 tonnes in 2006 to 53 000 tonnes in 2023. In recent years, a significant reduction has occurred, which was necessary to curb overfishing. This reduction was largely due to the entry into force of the Multiannual Plan for Demersal Stocks in the Western Mediterranean Sea. © OCEANA / Pilar Marín Source: Eurostat. (2025). https://doi.org/10.2908/FISH_CA_ATL37 7 The entry into force of the Multiannual Plan for Demersal Stocks in the Western Mediterranean Sea in 2019 has had a profound impact on bottom trawlers targeting demersal species such as hake, red shrimp, deep-water rose shrimp, and Norway lobster. Although the overall objective of the CFP was to achieve sustainable exploitation levels by 2020, in the case of the Western Mediterranean, the deadline was extended to December 2025. Despite this extension, the target is still far from being met. As a result, in December 2024, the Council of the European Union was obliged to approve a drastic reduction in fishing effort (measured in fishing days) for 2025. In the case of the Spanish bottom trawling fleet, the initial allocation was limited to an average of only 27 working days per year. However, as a result of the compensation mechanism approved, Impact of the Multiannual Plan for Demersal Stocks in the Western Mediterranean Sea Fishing restrictions are not limited to setting Total Allowable Catches (TACs; i.e. the maximum tonnage of a given species that can be fished), but also include the control of fishing effort through regulations on a fleet and its activity, such as the number of fishing days authorised. In the Mediterranean Sea, where fishing is mostly multi-species (i.e. various species are caught in the same operation), TACs are seldom applied. The main management system in this region for fisheries with multi-species gears, such as bottom trawls, is the control of fishing effort. Since the adoption of the 2006 Mediterranean Regulation, and more recently, the MultiAnnual Plan for Demersal Stocks in the Western Mediterranean Sea in 2019, measures to adjust 3. Engine power as a key indicator for measuring fishing capacity Reducing the total number of vessels operating in the region; Limiting the time available for fishing (days or hours) for each vessel; Establishing catch limits (TACs) for certain commercial species; Restricting fishing activities in essential fish habitats. Encouraging the use of more selective and less harmful fishing gears, such as by increasing the mesh size of nets; vessels can maintain virtually the same number of fishing days as in the previous year if they adopt sustainability measures such as improving gear selectivity, reducing impacts on the seabed, or adopting new fishing closures. This situation has provoked a strong reaction from the industry, which has expressed its dissatisfaction through demonstrations and strikes. Without denying the huge efforts made by the industry over the last five years, unfortunately, overfishing continues and resources are still far from sustainable levels.5 Future fisheries management in the Mediterranean must focus on striking a real balance between the economic viability of the industry and the conservation of marine ecosystems. © OCEANA / Juan Cuetos fishing effort to available fishing opportunities have focused on: 8 Irregularities in engine power, where the actual power of the engine installed is much higher than that certified in the fishing fleet register, seriously distort the system of fishing effort management, as the actual fishing capacity of a vessel also depends on the power of its engine. How is it possible that, in a context of historical overexploitation in which fishing must be drastically reduced, that action is being taken to reduce fishing effort but not to reduce the actual fishing capacity of the fleet? How can it be that no action is being taken against the use of illegal engines, and that it is even permitted to increase the maximum permitted power? Simply put, it is because this fraud is so widespread that the solution is complex. None of the actors involved wishes to take on this responsibility and, in the end, the fisheries resources and the industry itself pay the price. This study does not attempt to reformulate the calculation of fishing effort or capacity, nor to analyse whether the calculation method used is the most appropriate from an equitable point of view. It does, however, emphasise that engine power is an essential parameter in any naval engineering project and must be taken into account in any fisheries management strategy. It is true that engine power can be a more or less relevant variable depending on the fleet segment, the area of operation, and the type of fishery. Fishing capacity, underestimated as a result of engine power fraud For example, in goose barnacle fisheries, harvesting is carried out manually on the rocks, and the vessel’s engine is used mainly for safety purposes (i.e. to keep the vessel close to the coast and allow for a rapid response to adverse conditions). Another example is that of octopus pot fisheries, where fishing capacity does not depend on engine power, but on the number of pots that can be legally deployed. However, in most types of fishing, and particularly trawling, it is undeniable that engine power directly influences the speed, time, and use of fishing gear, as well as the size and weight of the gear that can be used. Therefore, it is a key factor for calculating fishing effort and capacity. Underestimating effort and capacity will always result in underestimating the real impact of the fleet, which inevitably leads to overfishing. These initiatives to limit fishing effort are, however, directly linked to vessels’ fishing capacity. Indeed, the number of fishing days allowed multiplies their impact depending on the size, engine power, and characteristics of each vessel. The fishing capacity of a vessel is influenced by various factors, of which the following are the most widely accepted in the scientific and technical literature and by fisheries managers: The size of the vessel, measured in gross tonnage (GT); The power of the engine installed on the vessel, measured in kilowatts (kW) or horsepower (hp); The types, models, and sizes of the fishing gear used, such as nets, longlines, purse seines, or trawls, among others. Of the above variables, engine power is a key indicator of a vessel’s fishing capacity, as it directly influences its efficiency, range, and catching potential. Studies such as those by the European Commission6 and Eigaard et al,7 confirm that the relationship between engine power and catching capacity is clear, particularly in bottom trawl fishing. Engine power translates directly into thrust capacity, resulting in higher maximum navigation speeds and allowing the use of larger and heavier gear. Faster navigation speeds allow vessels to travel more quickly between fishing grounds and ports, while faster speeds while fishing and the deployment of larger gear allow vessels to fish across a greater volume of water or a broader area of the seabed. Despite this, and the measures that have been adopted to reduce fishing effort, a key obstacle to achieving truly sustainable exploitation of marine resources continues to be ignored: fraud in vessel engine power. © OCEANA / Carlos Suárez 9 The control of engine power is regulated by a set of European and national regulations that establish certification and verification procedures to ensure that fishing capacity complies with authorised limits. At the European level, Regulation 1224/2009 on fisheries control establishes that it “shall be prohibited to fish with a fishing vessel that is equipped with an engine the power of which exceeds the one established in the fishing licence” (Article 39.1). This regulation has recently been amended by Regulation 2023/2842, which adds an incentive to regularise engines whose power exceeds the authorised limit: “When a catching vessel exceeds the authorised engine power set out in the fishing licence, a regularisation may be carried out” (Art. 39). Likewise, it introduces the obligation to install systems for continuous monitoring of engine power on certain vessels (Art. 39a.2). However, this obligation will not enter into force until January 2028, and the development of specific criteria on how these systems should work and on which vessels they should be installed is still pending. Some of these rules are defined in more detail in Articles 61-63 of Implementing Regulation 404/2011, which establish certain procedures for certifying engine power, as well as the need to establish a verification plan for inspectors to physically inspect certain vessels and verify their actual power. This new limit of 904 hp for bottom trawlers represents a very significant increase with respect to the previous regulation. Between 1988 and 2022, the legal limit was 500 hp, close to half the current limit.8 The reason for this increase in the legal limit is unclear, as no public justification has ever been provided. According to some fishers interviewed for this study, the increase could be an attempt by the Spanish administration to regularise a widespread situation of non-compliance. For decades, many vessels have operated with engines that far exceeded the previous limit, with the apparent consent of the authorities. If the 500 hp threshold had been maintained, most of the fleet would have been rendered inoperable, as the engines would have had to be replaced to comply with this limit. With the increase in the maximum permitted limit to 904 hp, it has been easier for shipowners to regularise the actual power of their engines without having to change them or replace them with new ones. On the other hand, Royal Decree 1044/2022 of 27 December on the regulation of the fishing fleet establishes the possibility of developing verification plans involving the various competent authorities, with the aim of ensuring that engine power does not exceed the limits set out in fishing licences. Article 5.3 underlines the European ban on fishing with a fishing vessel equipped with an engine whose power exceeds that established in the licence, and Article 15 details the procedures for regularising engine power. 4. Regulatory framework For vessels engaged in bottom trawling in the Mediterranean, Article 12.1 stipulates that the engine power may not exceed 665 kW, which is equivalent to 904 hp. For vessels engaged in purse seine fishing in the Mediterranean, Article 18 sets a limit of 330 kW, equivalent to 445.5 hp. In the Spanish context, Royal Decree 502/2022 of 27 June, which regulates fishing in national fishing grounds, establishes specific engine power limits according to the type of vessel: © OCEANA / Enrique Talledo 16 Beyond the economic challenges, there are two additional obstacles. On the one hand, there is not enough horsepower available on the market to regularise all vessels, and on the other, there is an overall limit on the maximum total horsepower of the Spanish fleet. In fact, according to the CFP (Regulation 1380/2013, Annex II), Spain has a maximum fishing capacity limit of 964 826 kW, which is equivalent to 1 311 796 hp. In 2024, the fishing capacity declared by Spain11 amounted to 776 332 kW (1 055 516 hp), leaving a legal margin of 256 280 horsepower available for new allocations. Taking into account the size of the Spanish fleet and the volume of undeclared engine power identified in this study, this margin is likely to be insufficient to cover the excess engine power and undeclared fishing capacity. Amnesty and automatic regularisation: legalising additional horsepower already installed in engines at no cost to shipowners. Although this would be the quickest and easiest solution to implement, it would create and enormous and unfair disadvantage for those shipowners who have been complying with the regulations for years or have made great financial efforts to regularise their situations. The findings presented here highlight the need for a massive regularisation of engine power. However, this poses serious structural and economic challenges for the industry, in which the horsepower trading market and maximum fishing capacity limits (‘capacity ceilings’) imposed by the CFP play a crucial role. This is because the CFP sets a maximum limit on the fishing capacity for each Member State, expressed in both tonnage and engine power. Therefore, any increase in engine power on a given vessel must be accompanied by an equivalent reduction on another vessel, which has led to a limited and highly speculative market for the sale and purchase of horsepower among shipowners. One of the greatest obstacles for an individual shipowner to regularise their situation is the high market price of horsepower. In our case study, each shipowner would need to acquire, on average, an additional 372 hp to regularise their situation, although this number varies greatly depending on the vessel. With an estimated price of 200 euros per horsepower, the total cost per vessel would be around 75 000 euros. This estimated price may in fact be significantly lower than the actual price, as there have been cases in which prices could exceed 500 euros per horsepower, further increasing the economic burden of regularisation. The high economic costs associated with the regularisation of engines make it essential to launch a state intervention programme to help allocate the horsepower currently not declared in the registers and to legalise existing engines. 7. Challenges and solutions for engine regularisation: The horsepower trading market and fishing capacity limits Regulation of the horsepower market: establishing a maximum price for the transfer of horsepower between vessels, to prevent speculative practices and facilitate access to the horsepower required for regularisation. Interest-free loans: offering soft loans to buy horsepower. These instruments must be designed including criteria that reduce the risk of generating market inflation and further increasing the price of horsepower. Possible financing solutions include: © OCEANA / Juan Cuetos 17 A horsepower reallocation mechanism: designing a transparent mechanism to manage excess fishing capacity and redistribute horsepower fairly. Strengthening capacity controls: implementing effective mechanisms to prevent future irregularities and ensure that fishing capacity remains within the limits established by the CFP, promoting long-term sustainability. Transition to low-impact fishing methods: facilitating and incentivising the adoption of more selective fishing gear that is less powerand fuelintensive, in line with a just transition towards sustainable and climateresponsible fishing. This transition may be accompanied by benefits such as increased access to resources or additional fishing days for vessels that demonstrate a real reduction in their fishing capacity and effort. Incentives for engine replacement: replacing existing engines with more efficient ones that significantly reduce fishing capacity. This means that, in order to regularise the situation of the fleet without exceeding the limits established by EU regulations, it would be necessary to reduce the declared capacity of certain segments of the fleet or to proceed with the selective withdrawal of vessels. At the same time, this situation highlights the fact that the effective fishing capacity of the Spanish fleet is much higher than that officially registered. This discrepancy generates a significant distortion in the data used for fisheries management, which raises questions about the validity of fishing effort control measures applied on the basis of an evidently underestimated fishing capacity. In view of this situation, and regardless of the mechanism used to regularise vessels and obtain reliable data on excess fishing capacity, it will be necessary to develop a comprehensive plan to manage the fishing sector. This plan should include: Finally, it is essential to develop a vessel scrapping plan specifically aimed at decommissioning the fishing segments with the highest levels of fraud and where fishing capacity has been identified as being incompatible with resource availability. This approach would allow the fleet to adjust to the reality of marine ecosystems, progressively and permanently eliminating excess capacity and ensuring more sustainable exploitation of resources. To guarantee the effectiveness of this plan, it is essential to establish clear conditions to ensure that capacity withdrawn through vessel scrapping cannot be recovered or reused in the fleet, thus preventing covert increases or fraudulent substitutions of capacity. It should be emphasised that the problem of engine power underreporting is not unique to Spain. Previous research and the European Commission’s audit have highlighted similar irregularities in virtually all Member States. In this regard, any regularisation and capacity adjustment processes at the national level should be accompanied by discussions at the EU level to ensure fairness, avoid competitive distortions among fleets, and strengthen the integrity of the European fisheries control framework. © OCEANA / Ángeles Sáez 18 The results of this study reveal the systematic underreporting of engine power and a significant gap between the officially declared fishing capacity and the actual capacity of the Spanish Mediterranean fleet. Ninety-four percent of the vessels analysed have allegedly fraudulent engines, with actual power well above the certified power, while 20% of vessels directly exceed the legal power limits. This massive distortion exposes serious flaws in the engine power verification system and poses a considerable risk to the sustainability of fisheries, the fair distribution of public aid, and the integrity of fisheries management. Engine power, as argued in Section 3, is a key indicator of actual fishing capacity, especially in trawl fisheries. Experience from the Mediterranean confirms that reducing fishing effort, one of the pillars of the Multiannual Plan for Demersal Stocks 8. Conclusions Launching a national programme to regularise engine power, with clear objectives, defined deadlines and adequate funding. This programme should consider the following options: Legalising engines that are currently in an irregular situation, in an orderly and transparent manner. Regulating the horsepower market, establishing a maximum price for the transfer of horsepower between vessels, in order to prevent speculative practices and facilitate access to the horsepower required for regularisation. Establishing financing mechanisms, such as interest-free loans, for the acquisition of horsepower on fair terms. Carefully evaluating any measures for amnesty and the automatic regularisation of engine power, avoiding sending signals that would reward non-compliance over those who abide by the rules. in the Western Mediterranean Sea, will only be effective if accompanied by a rigorous estimate of installed capacity and, therefore, of actual engine power. In this context, the regularisation and verification of engine power are essential conditions for limiting actual fishing capacity. © OCEANA / Carlos Suárez Recommendations of the vessels analysed directly exceed have allegedly fraudulent engines the legal power limits 94% 20% 19 References and notes Designing a structural management policy for excess fishing capacity, including: A transparent mechanism to manage excess fishing capacity and redistribute horsepower equitably among the different segments of the fishing fleet, in accordance with social, environmental, and compliance criteria. Engine replacement programmes to reduce effective engine power without compromising vessels’ technical viability. A vessel decommissioning plan focused on removing those vessels or segments with the highest levels of fraud or discrepancies between fishing effort and resource availability, accompanied by fair transition measures for affected crews and communities. A plan to facilitate and encourage the adoption of more selective and less powerand fuelintensive fishing gear, accompanied by benefits such as increased access to resources or additional fishing days for vessels that demonstrate a real reduction in fishing capacity and effort. New tools for monitoring, verifying, and certifying actual fishing capacity, to prevent future irregularities and ensure that fishing capacity remains within the limits set by the CFP. This report highlights that engine power is an essential variable for the success of any fishing effort control policy, and that engine power manipulation has allowed fishing capacity to remain well above officially recognised levels. In this context, although all debate is legitimate, the current capacity limits established in the CFP should not be relaxed, but rather reinforced. If decisive action is not taken, not only is the sustainability of the Mediterranean Sea at stake, but also the legitimacy of the fisheries governance model as a whole. Bouzada, E. (2010). Vías de actuación jurídica para evitar la manipulación de motores de embarcaciones pesqueras. Instituto Internacional de Derecho y Medio Ambiente. https://europe.oceana.org/wp-content/uploads/ sites/26/2025/09/Manipulacio-nmotores-InformeIDMA-2010.pdf ; Carreras, M. (2014). Evolución de la pesca en Baleares en el último siglo: reconstrucción de capturas, potencia real del arrastre y especies desaparecidas. Oceana. https://oceana.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/18/evolucion_ de_la_pesca_en_baleares_en_el_ultimo_siglo_0.pdf Royal Decrees 1440/1999 and 679/1988, which between 1988 and 2022 regulated fishing with bottom trawl gear in the national fishing grounds of the Mediterranean Sea. For the purposes of verifying engine power in accordance with Article 41 of the Fisheries Control Regulation, Member States should establish a sampling plan to identify those fishing vessels or groups of fishing vessels in their fleet for which there is a risk that the propulsion engine power is declared to be lower than the actual power. In response to a complaint from individuals about trawlers operating in the Cantabrian Sea (complaint 8091/15/ MARE), the Spanish authorities carried out physical inspections of 12 of the vessels reported, without finding any irregularities, which led to the closure of the case. However, four of these trawlers were later inspected as part of the European Commission audit mentioned previously, and it was found that the actual engine power exceeded the certified power in all of the cases inspected. Engine power was between 50% and 200% higher than that certified. How can the enormous difference between the two inspection processes be explained? Although answers may vary, one plausible possibility is that the shipowners had been informed in advance of the inspection and decided to adjust the engine power settings to limit the power. Secretaría General de Pesca. (2024). Informe Anual de la Actividad de la Flota Pesquera Española 2024 (Datos 2022). Ministerio de Agricultura, Pesca y Alimentación. https://www.mapa.gob.es/es/dam/jcr:44256c36-b545-4aeaa9d9-64db36ce86bc/informeanualflota2024conpa.pdf European Court of Auditors. (2011). Have EU measures contributed to adapting the capacity of fishing fleets to available fishing opportunities? Special Report No. 12/2011. Publications Office of the European Union. https://doi.org/10.2865/20007 Terrasa Pont, B., & Olivier Reus, P. (2024). Les barques del bou de Mallorca. Edicions UIB. Guadagnoli, G., & López, J. (2024). Rebuilding western Mediterranean fisheries: has the western Mediterranean multiannual plan delivered? 2019–2024. Oceana. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.11260869 European Commission, Directorate-General for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, & Roos Diesel Analysis B.V. (2019). Study on engine power verification by Member States: final report. Publications Office of the European Union. https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2771/945320 Eigaard, O.R., Rihan, D., Graham, N., Sala, A., & Zachariassen, K. (2011). Improving fishing effort descriptors: Modelling engine power and gear-size relations of five European trawl fleets. Fisheries Research, 110(1), 39-46. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.fishres.2011.03.010 Sharma, R., Barange, M., Agostini, V., Barros, P., Gutierrez, N.L., Vasconcellos, M., Fernandez Reguera, D., Tiffay, C., & Levontin, P., (Eds.). (2025). Review of the state of world marine fishery resources – 2025. FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Technical Paper, No. 721. https://doi.org/10.4060/cd5538en 1 8 9 10 11 3 4 5 6 7 2 OCEANA IN EUROPE European Headquarters: Madrid, Spain eur[email protected]g European Union Office: Brussels, Belgium [email protected]g Baltic and North Sea Office: Copenhagen, Denmark copenhag[email protected]g europe.oceana.org © OCEANA / Alberto Iglesias