Estimation of the Size of the Second Generation of Migrants in Russia and the West

RESEARCH ARTICLE Copyright Smirnova MA. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC-BY 4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited Estimation of the Size of the Second Generation ofMigrants in Russia and the West Mariia A. Smirnova 1 1 National Research University Higher School of Economics (HSE University), Moscow, 109028, Russia Received 25 August 2024 ♦ Accepted 10 March 2025 ♦ Published 3 October 2025 Citation: Smirnova MA (2025) Estimation of the Size of the Second Generation of Migrants in Russia and the West. Population and Economics 9(3):148-172. https://doi.org/10.3897/popecon.9.e135459 Abstract The article addresses the issue ofstatistical accounting for the population category known assecond generation ofmigrants. Descendants ofmigrants constitute asignificant portion ofthe population inmany countries, often representing agroup ina vulnerable socio-economic position. Integrating this category into national statistical systems enables direct estimates ofsecond-generation migrant populations inseveral countries ofthe West. The study presents acritical analysis ofthe Russian demographic data sources, which lack specialized classifications for identifying second-generation migrants, thereby complicating reliable population estimates. Asan alternative approach, this work employs cohort-component analysis tomodel the number ofsecond-generation migrants born inRussia between 2001and 2020. The model results indicate that this group isover 1million individuals. The findings underscore the need toimprove existing statistical methodologies inRussia. This article isthe output ofa research project implemented asa part ofthe Basic Research Program atthe National Research University Higher School ofEconomics (HSEUniversity). Keywords descendants ofmigrants, statistical category, migrants inthe Russian Federation, migrants from CIS countries and Georgia, current birth statistics, population modelling, cohort-component analysis JEL codes: C80, C81, J11, J61 Introduction The second generation ofmigrants isa special category ofpopulation statistics inmany countries with high migration inflows. Inseveral Western countries, the second generation accounts for more than 10% ofthe total population (Table 1), and this share continues Population and Economics 9(3): 148–172 DOI 10.3897/popecon.9.e135459 Population and Economics 9(3): 148–172 149 togrow. According toEurostat data for 2023, there are more than 21million members ofthe second generation ofworking age (15-64years) living inthe European Union, which is7.5% ofthe total EUpopulation ofthe corresponding age group; over the last two years, the number ofadults belonging tothe second generation has increased by4%. Table 1. Number ofsecond generation ofmigrants inselected countries Country Data source Assessment Year Number ofthe second generation, million Share ofthe country’s population Canada Census 2021 6.4 16.8% Belgium Population Register 2022 2.0 16.4% Netherlands Population Register 2021 2.0 11.4% France Labour force survey 2021 7.4 10.9% Germany Microcensus 2022 8.6 10.4% Estonia Population Register 2021 0.1 7.7% Austria Labour force microcensus 2022 0.6 7.0% Denmark Population Register 2022 0.2 3.5% Sources: Canada: Statistics Canada 2016; Belgium: Statbel 2024; Netherlands: Statistics Netherlands 2021; France: Institut national dela statistique etdes études économiques (INSEE) 2023; Germany: Genesis-online Datenbank; Estonia: Statistics Estonia 2021; Austria: Statistik Austria 2024a; Denmark: Statistics Denmark 2024. The second generation ofmigrants isbecoming increasingly significant indemographic and socio-economic processes. Their reproductive and marital behaviour significantly shapes population dynamics, contributing tobroader societal trends such asfertility rates, family structure, and intergenerational mobility. Furthermore, narratives about migrants and their descendants often serve asa basis for political mobilization inmany European countries, making the second generation animportant demographic interms ofcomprehension. Asmembers ofthe electorate, their political participation and preferences also shape policy directions and social cohesion. Inthis context, the importance ofnot only arealistic socio-economic and political portrait ofthe heterogeneous second generation but also acomprehensive understanding ofits demographic behaviours and the size ofits constituencies cannot beoveremphasized. Such insights are critical for informed policymaking and addressing the challenges ofintegration and social equity. Russia ranks among the global leaders inthe number ofinternational migrants, with asignificant share ofplanning tosettle inthe country permanently (Denisenko and Mukomel 2020). This indicates that Russia’s population includes growing stocks ofboth firstand second-generation migrants. However, second-generation migrants are not identified asa distinct category inofficial statistics, making itimpossible todetermine their numbers through direct observation, asstatistical agencies inseveral European countries do. This paper provides anoverview ofstatistical sources that can beused toestimate the number ofthe second generation ofmigrants, aswell asan attempt tomodel the size ofthis group inRussia based oncohort-component analysis. Mariia A. Smirnova: Estimation of the Size of the Second Generation ofMigrants in Russia and the West 150 The category “second generation ofmigrants” innationalstatisticalsystems ofEurope The term “second generation ofmigrants” within academic discourse can describe different populations, depending onthe scope ofapplication, the research task, and the availability ofsources (Denisenko etal. 2022). In population statistics, the term has astricter meaning, excluding those descendants ofmigrants who have their own migration experience, regardless ofthe age atwhich it was acquired. Attributing an individual as a second-generation migrant requires acombination oftwo criteria: 1. She/he isa native ofthe host country (native-born) 2. One orboth ofher/his parents are migrants. Inparticular, the term “second generation” is used in Eurostat publications (European Commission. Eurostat 2011; Huddleston etal. 2013). At the same time, peculiarities ofthe migration history ofdifferent countries bring differences inthe definition ofthe second generation innational statistical systems. Even within the national statistical systems ofthe European Union, there are variations inthe definition of the second generation. In particular, the approaches to the descendants ofmixed couples inwhich one ofthe parents isa local native also differ. Asa rule, the statistics ofEuropean countries distinguish the category ofpersons ofmixed descent asa special population, but consider them aspart ofthe second generation (as follows from the Eurostat definition and asrecommended, inparticular, bythe United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (2015). Despite its widespread use, the inclusion ofchildren from mixed-parentage couples inthe second generation has been criticized, asit implies that the migration experience ofone parent outweighs the absence ofsuch experience inthe other. Insome national practices (e.g., Austria), mixed descendants are excluded from the category ofthose with amigration background (Will 2019). This distinction isvery significant for comparing the contribution ofthe second generation tothe total population, asmore than half ofall migrant children inthe EUare born tocouples with different migration statuses (Table 2). A further nuance that distinguishes second-generation definitions isthe procedure for determining the country oforigin ofa migrant child incases where the father and mother hail from disparate countries. Thus, the Austrian statistical system prioritizes the mother’s country oforigin, while the Belgian system prioritizes the father’s country offirst citizenship (Statistik Austria 2024b; Statbel 2024). One ofthe key differences iswhether ornot the parent’s citizenship isincluded asone ofthe criteria. The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe’s recommendations for the 2020round ofpopulation censuses provide for the joint recording ofthe attributes ofthe parent’s country ofbirth and the parent’s citizenship toidentify the second generation. However, indifferent national traditions, the migration status ofa parent may berecognized solely based onhis/her place ofbirth (France), whether he/she has the nationality ofthe host country and how itwas acquired (Belgium), ora combination ofthese attributes (Germany) (United Nations Economic Commission for Europe 2015: 137). The use ofthree variables atonce (“country ofbirth”, “country ofbirth ofthe parent”, “country offirst citizenship ofthe parent”) allows for minimizing the distortion ofthe second generation size due toreturn migration. Thus, inthe case ofGermany, the exclusion ofthe descendants ofrepatriates (meaning not late immigrants, but primarily persons displaced during World War II) isrealized byincluding the attribute ofparents’ citizenship atbirth Population and Economics 9(3): 148–172 151 inthe definition ofmigration background. Persons with amigration background donot include the descendants ofparents born abroad but with German citizenship atbirth (Statistisches Bundesamt (Destatis) 2022). Sources ofData onthe Second Generation’s Population Size In global practice, the primary data sources for estimating the size ofthe second generation include censuses, population registers, microcensuses, and large-scale sample surveys, with the total number derived through extrapolation. Population censuses, microcensuses, and sample surveys In Russian censuses, asin most countries, migration status isidentified through aquestion onthe respondent’s place ofbirth. According toUNECE recommendations (2015), this attribute isconsidered primary, while the place ofbirth ofparents issecondary, and the collection ofdata onthe place ofbirth ofparents isrecommended only for countries with alarge number ofimmigrants living there. When the question about parents’ place ofbirth isabsent from the questionnaire, census data can identify migrant children only ifthey reside inthe same household astheir parents. The significant undercounting ofthe second-generation migrant stock insuch acount isillustrated bythe experience ofGermany, which has been conducting aparallel count ofthe second generation inthe “narrow” and “broad” sense aspart ofthe annual microcensus since 2017(as well asin 2005, 2009, 2013). The first category corresponds tothe number ofdescendants ofmigrants living together with their parents, and the second one– regardless ofhousehold composition. The difference inthe number ofthese categories for 2021amounted to1.4million people (Statistisches Bundesamt (Destatis) 2022). A question onparental origin isincluded inthe expanded census orsurvey program, for part ofthe sample. Inthe 2021Canadian census, questions onthe place ofbirth and citizenship ofparents were included inthe expanded census form for 25% ofthe sample. Inthe U.S., questions about parental origins are asked inthe U.S. Census Bureau’s Current Population Survey (CPS), also inan expanded program for aportion ofthe sample (Denisenko etal. 2022). Germany’s annual microcensus covers 1% ofthe population, Austria’s 0.6%. Since 2021, the large-scale European Union Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS) permanently includes questions onthe country ofbirth ofthe mother and father (except incountries with small numbers ofmigrants– Bulgaria, Malta, Romania, and Slovakia). However, although the survey collects demographic information onall household members, most ofthe data iscollected only for the adult population. Asa result, the second-generation population estimates published byEurostat are currently extrapolated solely for individuals aged 15 to74(Table 2). It should benoted that despite the international nature ofthe survey, the data onstocks are not fully comparable– for example, due tothe specific approach ofGerman statistics todefining the population that can beattributed tothe second generation ofmigrants, inthe Eurostat Labour Force Survey the second generation criterion was not the country ofbirth (as inthe case ofother member states), but the nationality ofthe parents (European Commission. Eurostat 2011). Mariia A. Smirnova: Estimation of the Size of the Second Generation ofMigrants in Russia and the West 152 Table 2. Adult population (15–65years) ofselected countries byimmigration status Country Share ofthe second generation inthe population (1or2parents are migrants) Share ofchildren from mixed parental pairs (only one ofthe parents has migration experience) inthe second generation EC-27 7.4% 57.3% Latvia 21.00% 59.20% Estonia 19.60% 55.10% Switzerland 18.80% 54.60% Luxembourg 18.40% 40.90% Belgium 13.00% 59.60% Germany 12.80% 52.50% Netherlands 12.80% 57.30% France 12.70% 53.90% Sweden 11.40% 64.20% Austria 10.80% 51.70% Croatia 10.50% 67.30% Slovenia 10.40% 66.40% Norway 7.10% 72.30% Ireland 6.40% 51.70% Denmark 5.90% 63.70% Cyprus 5.60% 76.30% Portugal 5.60% 81.40% Iceland 4.50% 90.70% Lithuania 4.10% 76.00% Czech Republic 3.90% 75.80% Spain 3.20% 65.20% Greece 3.10% 54.00% Italy 3.10% 66.80% Finland 2.80% 79.10% Hungary 1.50% 71.80% Poland 1.40% 72.70% Source: compiled bythe author according toEurostat data, population bysex, age, migration status, country ofbirth, and country ofbirth ofparents (Eurostat 2025). Population registers Population registers are the main data source onthe second generation ofmigrants incountries where such registers are successfully maintained (e.g. Denmark, Sweden, and Belgium). Registers are considered tocontain accurate and up-to-date information because the provi- Population and Economics 9(3): 148–172 153 sion ofaccess tosocial services and benefits isdone through the register; accordingly, inaddition tothe obligation toreport up-to-date information (in particular onmovements), the population has anincentive todo so. Since family records are linked inregisters, the second and third generations ofimmigrants can beidentified based onthe country ofbirth oftheir parents and grandparents. Citizenship information isalso available; however, this attribute does not reliably distinguish immigrants and their descendants. Ifa person acquires Swedish citizenship, only this status isrecorded, while any previous oradditional citizenships (if applicable) are disregarded (Careja and Bevelander 2018). Registers asa source ofdata onsocio-economic characteristics and the number ofdescendants ofmigrants have several undeniable advantages: coverage ofthe general population; prompt updating ofdata; and the possibility oflongitudinal analysis inthe absence ofthe problem ofsample fudging. Interms ofestimating the size ofthe first-generation migrant stock, registers have some disadvantages (inclusion ofimmigrants inthe register after aconsiderable time after arrival; undercounting ofdeparting migrants), but these factors donot affect the estimation ofthe second-generation population (Careja and Bevelander 2018). Current birth records asa source ofdata onthe number ofsecond-generation migrants inRussia Until 2010, birth statistics were compiled based onthe ethnic affiliation ofthe parents. This approach does not allow for reliable identification ofmigrant parents, asit leads toan unwarranted expansion ofthe migrant population byincluding ethnic groups that predominantly reside abroad but have along-standing multigenerational presence inRussia (such asGermans, Assyrians, Greeks, etc.). Aneven more significant limitation isthe completeness and quality ofthe records, which are affected, among other things, bya large number oferrors inthe primary documentation ofcivil registry offices (Biryukova and Chudinovskikh 2011). According tothe current birth records for 2010, information onthe ethnic affiliation offathers and mothers ismissing inmore than half ofthe cases (Table 3). Moreover, itcannot beassumed that the individuals who did not report their ethnicity are distributed proportionally tothose who did, thus distorting the overall picture. Table 3. Proportion of parents whose ethnicity was unknown when registering the child’s birth (forselected years) Percentage ofparents 2000 2006 2010 Mothers 10% 48% 56% Fathers 16% 54% 61% Source: author’s calculation based onRosstat data. Since 2011, Rosstat (the Federal State Statistics Service ofRussia) has been collecting data onthe citizenship ofparents aspart ofthe current birth registration. The change inmethodology has had apositive impact onthe completeness ofthe record and onthe possibility ofanalysing dynamics and cross-country comparisons (although the share ofbirths for which the nationality ofone orboth parents– primarily the father– isunknown isquite high). However, foreigners and migrants cannot beconsidered identical. Mariia A. Smirnova: Estimation of the Size of the Second Generation ofMigrants in Russia and the West 154 In addition, the current record collects information onthe parents’ place ofbirth. This feature allows for the direct identification ofmigrants. These data are limited bythe lack ofinformation onthe time ofmigration; this does not allow distinguishing between those who changed their place ofresidence during the Soviet period, those who came toRussia asrepatriates, and those who came toRussia aslabour migrants. Data onplace ofbirth are also incomplete: insome years upto 20% offathers and upto 10% ofmothers lack information ontheir place ofbirth. Number of children born to foreigners (2011-2022) A total of 20.3 million births were registered between 2011 and 2022; of this number, 513.000children (2.6%) were born toforeign-born mothers. The annual absolute number oflive births toforeign mothers during this period ranged from 30.000to54.000(Figure 1). The annual contribution offoreign women tototal births over the entire period increased from 1.7% (2011) to3.8% (2022). Figure 1. Dynamics ofthe number ofnewborns inRussia, bymother’s Russian citizenship, thousands. Source: Rosstat. Total births (including children of foreign mothers), thousand people. 2100 +30 2000 1900 1800 1700 1600 1500 1400 1300 1200 1100 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 Born to mothers – citizens of the Russian Federation, thousand people. +38 +44 +49 +54 +53 +51 +40 +30 +41 +35 +48 1233 1340 1366 1421 1540 1635 1831 1882 1859 1846 1856 1761 Foreign fathers were recorded for 480.000 births, accounting for 2.7% of all births where the father’s citizenship isknown. The annual number ofsuch births ranges between 27.000and 51.000. However, the absolute number ofchildren born toforeign fathers isunderestimated, asstatistical data lacks information onthe citizenship of10% to13% offathers annually. This limitation makes itchallenging toaccurately assess the contribution offoreign fathers tothe total number ofbirths. Additionally, the citizenship ofboth parents was not identified for 123.000live births registered between 2011and 2022. Since asignificant number oflive births cannot beattributed tospecific citizenships due toincomplete data– distorting the overall picture– these cases are categorized separately (Figure 2). Population and Economics 9(3): 148–172 155 Cumulatively, between 2011and 2022, 203.000children were registered ashaving both parents who were foreigners atthe time ofbirth (1% ofall births), and almost 783.000children were born tocouples inwhich atleast one parent was foreign atthe time ofbirth (3.8% ofall births). The share ofbirths inwhich atleast one parent was aforeigner increased from 3% in2011to5.9% in2022, but this increase cannot becalled sustainable since 2017 (Figure3). Figure 2. Number oflive births byparental foreign citizenship (thousands). Source: Rosstat. At least one parent is a foreigner year 2500 2000 1500 1000 500 0 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 Both parents are Russian citizens Citizenship of one or both parents is unknown thousands of live births Figure 3. Proportion ofbirths with atleast one foreign citizen parent. Source: Rosstat. 7.0% 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 Including cases where the citizenship of one or both parents is unknown Excluding cases where the citizenship of one or both parents is unknown 6.0% 5.0% 4.0% 3.0% 2.0% 1.0% 0.0% 3.0% 3.5% 4.0% 4.4% 4.8% 4.9% 5.3% 4.5% 3.7% 5.0% 4.4% 5.9% 5.1% 3.9% 4.4% 3.2% 4.0% 4.8% 4.4% 4.3% 3.9% 3.5% 3.1% 2.6% Parental couples inwhich only one ofthe parents isa foreigner are numerically significantly larger than those inwhich both parents donot have Russian citizenship: considering only those parental couples whose citizenship isknown, 28% ofthem are homogeneous Mariia A. Smirnova: Estimation of the Size of the Second Generation ofMigrants in Russia and the West 156 (foreign), and 72% are mixed. The latter are distributed bythe composition ofthe parental couple asfollows: 47%– only mothers are citizens ofa foreign country, 53%– only fathers (Figure 4). Itis important tonote that the mixed nature ofparental couples does not exclude the possible presence ofmigration experience ofboth parents, asstatistics donot contain information onhow citizenship was acquired (by birth orthrough naturalization). It should also benoted that in4% ofcases, statistics contain information onthe foreign citizenship ofone parent, while the citizenship ofthe second parent (mainly the father) isunknown. Figure 4. Number oflive births toforeigners, byparental citizenship (thousands). Source: Rosstat. Mother is a foreign citizen, father is unknown year 90 80 70 60 50 40 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 Father is a foreign citizen, mother is a Russian citizen Both parents are foreign citizen thousands of live births Mother is a foreign citizen, father is a Russian citizen 30 20 10 0 91% ofall foreign parents are citizens ofCIS countries; atotal of713.000live births were registered where one orboth parents were citizens of CIS countries (excluding Russia), which is3.5% ofall births between 2011and 2022). The leaders inthe number ofchildren born inRussia are citizens ofTajikistan (151thousand) and Ukraine (129 thousand). In addition to the CIS countries, citizens of Georgia (13 thousand live births), Turkey (7 thousand), China (4 thousand) and Vietnam (5thousand) made asignificant contribution tothe number ofbirths inthe period from 2011to2022(Figure 5). A high share ofbirths inmixed couples, when one ofthe parents has Russian citizenship, istypical for all donor countries. Slightly less than half ofit isamong citizens ofUzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, inall other cases such couples prevail. The leaders interms ofparticipation inmixed parental couples are citizens ofKazakhstan, Georgia, and Belarus– more than 80% ofyoung parents were paired with citizens ofthe Russian Federation (Figure 6). Among the citizens ofcountries that made asmaller but still noticeable contribution tothe number ofbirths, wecan note the citizens ofTurkey (almost exclusively fathers)– for them share ofmixed couples is97%. Vietnamese and Chinese, onthe contrary, more often create homogeneous parental couples– the share ofmixed couples is27% and 47% respectively. Population and Economics 9(3): 148–172 163 This methodological issue isnot unique toRussia.. Inother known cases (e.g. France and Germany– Silberman etal. 2007), inorder toexclude from the second generation the descendants ofrepatriates from the ethnic majority and tobring the studied populations closer tomore culturally homogeneous ones, the criterion ofthe presence ofcitizenship ofthe host country bythe parent atbirth isused. However, for Russia, identification ofrepatriates through citizenship isimpossible, assuch data are not collected. One solution that can beproposed for the model isbased onthe analysis ofmigration flows after 1991. In1992, the migration increase was fully provided byRussians; other dominant ethnic groups ofpost-Soviet countries showed anet outflow. Until 1995, the inflow ofRussians from post-Soviet countries was particularly intensive, asit was associated with the partition ofthe army and the flight ofRussians from the territories ofarmed conflicts (Population ofRussia 2003-2004, 2006). Gradually, this proportion decreased but remained atover 50% until the end ofthe 90s. Atotal of2.7million ethnic Russians entered Russia between 1992and 1999, accounting for 68% ofall net migration; inaddition, other ethnic groups traditional toRussia, especially those previously deported, such asTatars, Germans, Koreans, and Greeks, accounted for asignificant share ofthe migration increase (Population ofRussia 2000,2001). Since 2000, labour migration rather than repatriation has become the prevailing trend, soit seems appropriate toassume that the accumulation ofthe second generation starts from this point. Thus, the chronological framework ofthe analysis (starting from 2000) isintroduced toseparate repatriates from the population ofnon-ethnic migrants. Migration growth differentiated bysex, age, and country oforigin istaken asthe base population. Table 5. Population born outside ofRussia according tothe Russian Population Census 2020 Country ofbirth Number (people) Share ofthe Russian population (%) Foreign countries 6895947 4.69 Including: Azerbaijan 392575 0.27 Armenia 373943 0.25 Belarus 348925 0.24 Georgia 196610 0.13 Kazakhstan 1547167 1.05 Kyrgyzstan 380441 0.26 Latvia 47498 0.03 Lithuania 33833 0.02 Moldova 189444 0.13 Tajikistan 422904 0.29 Turkmenistan 105548 0.07 Uzbekistan 843498 0.57 Ukraine 1686769 1.15 Source: All-Russian Population Census 2020. Mariia A. Smirnova: Estimation of the Size of the Second Generation ofMigrants in Russia and the West 164 Assumptions about fertility parameters Reproductive strategies ofmigrants inthe host country may differ significantly both from the patterns observed among their compatriots inthe country oforigin and from those prevailing inthe host society (Kazenin 2017; Impicciatore etal. 2020). The ability toestimate age-specific fertility rates (ASFRs) ofmigrants isseverely limited due tothe challenging issue ofcalculating the denominator. Despite this, anattempt toestimate age-specific fertility rates offoreigners was made inthe work ofS. Biryukova (2013), but the ASFRs were proposed for the entire population offoreigners without differentiation bycountry oforigin. Given the lack ofdata onmigrant fertility inRussia, weadopted age-specific fertility rates asthe average values between the rates observed inthe country oforigin and those inRussia. The model assumes age-specific fertility rates asthe average values between the rates inthe country oforigin and the rates inRussia asthe low variant ofthe projection (1) and age-specific fertility rates corresponding tothe values ofthe country oforigin asthe high variant ofthe projection (2). Notably, under the low projection scenario, the coefficients depend onthe relative fertility intensities inthe country oforigin and inRussia. Insome cases, the average value used for the low scenario exceeds the fertility rates ofthe country oforigin, soit isapplied inthe high projection scenario. Assumptions about migration flows Migration growth isthe only component ofchanges inthe size ofmigrant populations that isdirectly observed and recorded incurrent statistical records. The cumulative migration growth from 2001to2020amounted to3.9million people and was fully provided bythe inflow ofmigrants from CIS countries (including Ukraine) and Georgia; Central Asia and Kazakhstan alone provided 53% ofthe total (Figure 10). Figure 10. Net migration resulting from exchange with CIS countries and Georgia, byregion (million persons). Source: Rosstat. Net migration, million persons Region of Origin 2001–2005 South Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia) 0.7 European CIS Central Asia (incl. Kazakhstan) 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.0 2006–2010 2011–2015 2016–2020 Population and Economics 9(3): 148–172 165 Assumptions about the mortality regime ofmigrants andtheirdescendants Current mortality records donot record the migration status ofthe deceased (only citizenship), and therefore the observed data, asin the case offertility, cannot beused inthe construction ofthe population model. Since life expectancy isless influenced bycultural factors than fertility, the mortality impact was estimated using the coefficients observed for the entire Russian population. Asimilar solution isused inthe Edmonston and Passel (1992) models, which assume that mortality does not vary across generations. Results Based onthe above data, low and high retrospective projections were constructed, differing inthe selected fertility rates. According tothe models, between 2001to2020(inclusive), immigrant women from the CIS and Georgia who arrived inRussia noearlier than 2000gave birth tobetween 600.000to700.000children (Tables 6and 7). The majority ofthem (45% ofthe average projection) were born inthe latest projection period (2016-2020) and were between 2and 7years old bythe end of2022. Almost asmany (38% ofthe average projection) belong tothe 2011-2015five-year cohort; their ages atthe end of2022were between 8and 12years old. 16% ofchildren were born between 2006and 2010. The oldest (born between 2001and 2005), who have now reached adulthood, represents the smallest cohort (about 5% ofthe total estimated population). During the next two projection periods (2021–2025and 2026–2030), between 180.000and 510.000children are expected tobe born tomigrant women who arrived inRussia between 2000and 2020. This calculation excludes the descendants oflater migrant cohorts due tothe lack ofdata onnet migration for the ongoing and upcoming projection periods. The presented model isbased onmothers’ fertility and does not include children born infamilies where only the father isa migrant. Meanwhile, there are reasons toassume that most children are born inmixed couples where only one ofthe spouses (partners) isa migrant. Torealize the calculation ofthe number ofchildren born ina couple “immigrant + native-born woman” within the framework ofthe cohort-component model, age-specific fertility rates for men would berequired. Since such data are not available, the estimation relies onthe necessary assumption that the ratios between the number ofchildren born tocouples “migrant father + native-born Russian mother” and the number ofchildren born tomigrant mothers are approximately equal tothe corresponding ratios observed for births byparental ethnicity and byparental citizenship, that is, for overlapping but not identical populations. For the period 2001–2010, these ratios were estimated using data onbirths byparental ethnicity (numerator: children born tofathers belonging totitular ethnic groups ofCIS countries and Georgia and toRussian mothers; denominator: children born tomothers from titular ethnic groups, regardless ofthe father’s ethnicity; cases with unknown ethnicity were excluded). For the period 2011–2020, analogous ratios were calculated using data onparental citizenship (numerator: foreign father and mother who isa citizen ofthe Russian Federation; denominator: foreign mother, regardless ofthe father’s citizenship). Information onthe number oflive births byparental ethnicity and citizenship was obtained from unpublished Rosstat materials. The absence ofconsistent statistics covering the entire time series necessitated the use ofdifferent sources. Mariia A. Smirnova: Estimation of the Size of the Second Generation ofMigrants in Russia and the West 166 Table 7. Estimates ofthe number ofchildren born toimmigrant women from the CIS and Georgia inRussia in2001-2020(the high variant ofthe forecast, assuming ASFR values equal tothe coefficients ofthe mother’s country oforigin) Mother’s country oforigin Number ofbirths byforecast periods (thousand people) 20012005 20062010 20112015 20162020 20212025* 20262030* Total Azerbaijan 1.1 4.7 11.6 13.1 11.1 7.3 48.9 Armenia 1.1 6.4 16.0 20.6 19.8 13.3 77.2 Belarus 1.0 1.5 3.5 4.8 3.7 2.3 16.8 Kazakhstan 12.9 30.8 59.5 79.6 82.6 63.4 328.8 Kyrgyzstan 3.3 13.2 32.4 40.5 33.6 24.9 147.9 Moldova 1.2 4.3 11.4 15.7 12.8 9.0 54.4 Tajikistan 1.9 7.6 17.4 33.0 36.5 28.5 124.9 Turkmenistan 1.5 4.0 6.7 8.3 8.5 6.3 35.3 Uzbekistan 6.8 23.2 37.5 47.6 50.0 35.5 200.6 Ukraine 4.5 11.2 31.4 39.9 28.7 20.6 136.4 Georgia 1.2 3.3 6.6 7.4 5.5 3.6 27.6 All CIS countries and Georgia: 36.5 110.2 234.0 310.5 292.8 214.7 1198.8 Source: author’s calculations. Note: *For the period 2021–2030, the calculation assumes zero net migration, i.e., itaccounts for children born tomothers who arrived before 2021and excludes children born during this period tonewly arrived migrant women. Table 6. Estimates ofthe number ofchildren born toimmigrant women from the CIS and Georgia inRussia in2001-2020(the low variant ofthe forecast, assuming ASFR values that are the average between the ASFR ofthe mother’s country oforigin and Russia) Mother’s country oforigin Number ofbirths byforecast periods (thousand people) 20012005 20062010 20112015 20162020 20212025* 20262030* Total Azerbaijan 0.9 4.0 10.6 13.3 11.3 7.7 47.9 Armenia 1.1 6.0 16.2 21.4 18.9 12.9 76.6 Belarus 1.1 1.8 3.5 4.9 4.0 2.5 17.7 Kazakhstan 10.6 25.2 47.7 62.0 60.4 46.3 252.2 Kyrgyzstan 2.5 9.9 25.2 31.0 25.6 19.0 113.2 Moldova 1.1 4.1 11.5 15.0 12.1 8.5 52.4 Tajikistan 1.3 5.1 13.2 25.0 27.4 21.7 93.7 Turkmenistan 1.1 3.0 5.3 6.5 6.4 4.9 27.2 Uzbekistan 5.1 17.5 32.7 38.9 36.8 26.4 157.4 Ukraine 4.8 12.1 34.2 45.4 36.3 26.0 158.9 Georgia 1.1 3.1 6.0 6.6 5.0 3.3 25.0 All CIS countries and Georgia: 30.8 91.8 206.2 270.1 244.2 179.2 1022.3 Source: author’s calculations. Note: *For the period 2021–2030, the calculation assumes zero net migration, i.e., itaccounts for children born tomothers who arrived before 2021and excludes children born during this period tonewly arrived migrant women, while maintaining age-specific fertility rates atthe levels observed in2021–2023. Population and Economics 9(3): 148–172 167 Ratios were calculated separately bycountry oforigin and for each projection period (2001–2005, 2006–2010, 2011–2015, 2016–2020). For the projection periods 2021–2025and 2026–2030, the values estimated for the most recent observed period (2016–2020) were used. Applying these ratios tothe numbers ofbirths obtained from the cohort-component analysis, weobtain anadditional 400.000to450.000children born between 2001and 2020(Tables 8and 9). For the projection periods 2021–2025and 2026–2030, the model, under the same assumptions, predicts the birth ofan additional 240.000to300.000children inmixed couples with migrant fathers, who arrived between 2000and 2020, and native-born mothers. Table 8. Estimated number ofchildren with amigrant father and anative mother (the low variant ofthe forecast), thousand people Father’s country oforigin: Number ofbirths byforecast periods (thousand people) Total 20012005 20062010 20112015 20162020 20212025* 20262030* Azerbaijan 0.3 1.0 5.0 7.0 6.0 4.1 23.4 Armenia 0.5 2.1 9.6 10.3 9.1 6.2 37.9 Belarus 1.1 1.9 5.2 3.8 3.0 1.9 17.0 Kazakhstan 10.1 22.7 47.0 48.7 47.4 36.3 212.1 Kyrgyzstan 0.5 2.2 9.6 9.3 7.7 5.7 35.0 Moldova 0.2 0.3 12.5 12.3 9.9 6.9 42.1 Tajikistan 1.2 4.8 7.0 10.0 11.0 8.7 42.5 Turkmenistan 1.9 3.3 4.8 3.9 3.8 2.9 20.6 Uzbekistan 2.2 7.6 29.4 17.9 16.9 12.1 86.1 Ukraine 3.6 4.9 27.8 26.1 20.8 14.9 98.2 Georgia 1.1 3.1 4.6 6.7 5.0 3.3 23.7 All CIS countries and Georgia: 22.8 53.9 162.4 155.8 140.6 103.1 638.7 Source: author’s calculations. Note: *For the period 2021–2030the calculation assumes zero net migration, i.e., itaccounts for children born tofathers who arrived before 2021and excludes children born during this period tonewly arrived migrants. The estimated number of children born in Russia with at least one migrant parent by2021ranges from 1million to1.15million. By2030, the size ofthe second generation isprojected torange between 1.7million and 2million, assuming current fertility parameters remain unchanged and excluding children born tomigrants who arrived after 2021. An overwhelming number ofchildren have only one migrant parent: based onthe ratios ofchildren born toforeign parents, only athird ofchildren have both immigrant parents. Moreover, 65% ofthe descendants ofmigrants are related tothe countries ofCentral Asia, with alarge skew towards Kazakhstan, which accounts for almost athird ofthe entire second generation inthe assessment covering the period upto 2021(Figure 11). Mariia A. Smirnova: Estimation of the Size of the Second Generation ofMigrants in Russia and the West 168 Table 9. Estimated number ofchildren with amigrant father and anative mother (the high variant ofthe forecast), thousand people. Father’s country oforigin Number ofbirths byforecast periods (thousand people) Total 20012005 20062010 20112015 20162020 20212025* 20262030* Azerbaijan 0.4 1.2 5.5 6.9 6.1 3.8 23.9 Armenia 0.5 2.2 9.4 9.9 9.7 6.4 38.2 Belarus 1.0 1.6 5.2 3.7 2.9 1.8 16.2 Kazakhstan 12.3 27.7 58.6 62.4 67.6 49.7 278.3 Kyrgyzstan 0.7 3.0 12.3 12.1 10.4 7.5 46.0 Moldova 0.2 0.3 12.4 12.8 10.7 7.3 43.8 Tajikistan 1.8 7.1 9.2 13.2 15.0 11.4 57.6 Turkmenistan 2.6 4.4 6.1 4.9 5.4 3.7 27.1 Uzbekistan 2.9 10.0 33.8 21.9 24.4 16.3 109.3 Ukraine 3.4 4.5 25.5 22.9 16.8 11.8 85.0 Georgia 1.2 3.4 5.0 7.4 5.8 3.6 26.4 Total 26.9 65.4 182.9 178.2 174.8 123.5 751.7 Source: author’s calculations. Note: *For the period 2021–2025, the calculation assumes zero net migration, i.e., itaccounts for children born tofathers who arrived before 2021and excludes children born during this period tonewly arrived migrants. Azerbaijan Armenia Belarus Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Moldova Tajikistan Uzbekistan Ukraine Georgia 7.4% 15.7% 14.1% 6.2% 2.1% 28.9% 9.7% 5.4% 3.2% 3.2% 4.1% Turkmenistan Figure 11. Distribution ofmigrants’ childrenbyparents’ country oforigin: for those born ina couple where only the father isa migrant– the father’s country oforigin; for the rest– the mother’s country oforigin, assuming cohorts ofchildren born before 2021. Source: author’s calculations. Population and Economics 9(3): 148–172 169 Discussion This research has allowed usfor the first time toobtain detailed estimates ofthe number ofsecond-generation migrants inRussia, which isimportant for both the scientific community and practitioners involved inthe development ofpublic policy. Itis important tonote that the data obtained, despite some methodological limitations, confirm the significant demographic effect ofmigration, even inthe absence ofofficial statistical records ofthis population group. Interpretation ofthe results Our results show that the number ofsecond-generation migrants inRussia ismore than one million. The data onthe size ofthe second generation obtained inthe course ofthe study are comparable toestimates ofthe size ofsimilar groups inother countries, although they reveal differences instructural characteristics. This can beexplained bydifferences inmigration flows, cultural and economic conditions, and migrant policies. Comparison with previous studies Compared toleading European countries inreceiving immigrants, the second generation inRussia remains relatively small, accounting for less than 1% ofthe total population. The accumulation ofthe second generation began only recently– after 2000, excluding the descendants ofrepatriates– with approximately 80% ofbirths occurring inthe last decade ofthe projection. By2020, fewer than 50.000descendants ofmigrants had reached adulthood, and the average age ofthe estimated population was just 7years. However, the accumulation ofthe second generation continues, albeit atan unstable rate (in the period 2006-2010, the number ofbirths was almost three times higher than inthe previous projection period; inthe next period (2011-2015), the number ofbirths tripled again, but later the number ofbirths, according toour estimates, remained stable). By2030, the number ofdescendants ofmigrants who arrived between 2000and 2020will reach 1.9million. Since Russia has astable positive migration balance, including children ofnewly arrived cohorts, and according tothe most conservative estimates, the second generation will exceed 2million inthe coming years. Restrictions The proposed model implies unavoidable assumptions about migrants’ fertility and mortality regimes; the numbers ofthose born inmixed couples (to parents with different migration statuses) are also determined byindirect data; atthe same time, the descendants ofmigrants ofmixed origin constitute the overwhelming majority ofthe total estimates. The most difficult methodological problem isthe identification ofthe descendants ofrepatriates, whose inclusion inthe number ofthe second generation deprives this statistical category ofmuch ofits social content. The limitation ofthe chronological framework, which “cuts off” migrants during the mass repatriation ofthe 1990s, leads toundercounting the descendants oflabour migrants ofthis period. Mariia A. Smirnova: Estimation of the Size of the Second Generation ofMigrants in Russia and the West 170 Reflections The obtained estimates ofthe second-generation population partially clarify the scale ofthe challenges that need tobe addressed onthe way toan inclusive society. The findings have important implications for the development ofpublic policies onmigrant integration. Given the importance ofthe second-generation migrants for the demographic development ofthe country, itis necessary todevelop and implement measures aimed attheir integration and social support. This isespecially important inthe context ofan increase inthe number ofmigrants’ descendants inthe future. Conclusion The study allowed usto estimate for the first time the second-generation migrant stock inRussia, which ismore than one million people, which indicates asignificant demographic effect ofmigration even inthe absence ofofficial statistical records ofthis group. The use ofcohort-component analysis tomodel the number ofdescendants ofmigrants made itpossible toobtain more accurate data inconditions oflimited data and toestimate the structure ofthe second-generation migrants taking into account their origin (by the country oforigin oftheir parents). The results ofthe study have applied value tothe development ofstate policy inthe field of integration of migrants and their descendants. The obtained estimates can beused toadjust the representativeness ofsamples when conducting social surveys, aswell asfor more accurate planning ofsocial support measures and educational programs. Key findings 1. The number ofthe second-generation migrants inRussia issignificantly lower than inEuropean countries, but itcontinues togrow, which requires attention from government agencies and researchers. 2. The method ofcohort-component analysis has shown its effectiveness and can berecommended for use instudies ofmigrant stock inconditions oflimited data. 3. The estimates obtained can serve as a basis for the development of social policies aimed atthe integration ofthe second-generation migrants and their successful inclusion insociety. The study emphasizes the need for further development ofthe national statistical system and the integration ofnew methodologies for amore accurate analysis ofmigration processes and their long-term consequences for Russian society. This will make itpossible toform amore inclusive society and create conditions for the successful integration ofmigrants and their descendants. References Biryukova SS(2013) Methodology for assessing the contribution ofmigrants tothe reproduction ofthe population ofRussia onthe basis ofthe data from civil registry. Voprosy Statistiki 4: 38-44. (In Russ.) 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Bevölkerung mit Migrationshintergrund: Ergebnisse des Mikrozensus 2021. https://www.destatis.de/DE/Themen/ Gesellschaft-Umwelt/Bevoelkerung/Migration-Integration/Publikationen/Downloads-Migration/ migrationshintergrund-2010220217004.pdf?__blob=publicationFile Acknowledgments This work isthe output ofa research project implemented aspart ofthe Basic Research Program atthe National Research University Higher School ofEconomics (HSE University). Information about the author Mariia Alekseevna Smirnova– PhD student, Doctoral School of Sociology, National Research University Higher School of Economics. Moscow, 109028, Russia. E-mail: maria[email protected]