Sentinel Journal; Volume 1, Issue 1

Sentinel Journal Volume 1, Issue 1 | Summer 2025 0 Sentinel Journal A Journal of Strategic Statecraft and Counterintelligence Volume 1, Issue 1 | Winter 2025 ISSN: 3069-0897 Issue DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17274316 Sentinel Journal Volume 1, Issue 1 | Summer 2025 1 Copyright and Administrative Information Sentinel Journal Published by the Sentinel Research Society © Copyright Notice All content published in the Sentinel Journal is protected under international copyright laws. Unless otherwise stated, copyright is held by the Sentinel Research Society. No part of this publication may be reproduced, distributed, or transmitted in any form or by any means, including photocopying, recording, or other electronic or mechanical methods, without the prior written permission of the publisher, except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical reviews and scholarly articles. Authors retain copyright of their individual articles and grant the Sentinel Journal a non-exclusive license to publish and distribute their work. Reuse of published material must include proper citation and acknowledgment of the original source. Administrative Details Publisher: Sentinel Research Society | Journal Title: Sentinel Journal | ISSN: [Insert ISSN here] | Frequency: Biannual | First Published: 2025 | Editor-in-Chief: Shane McNeil | Website: https://sentinel-research.com | Email: [email protected] Open Access & Archiving The Sentinel Journal is Open Access. Articles are archived in Zenodo at https://zenodo.org/communities/srs/records. Privacy & Ethics The Sentinel Journal adheres to the highest standards of publication ethics and integrity. All submissions are subject to peer review and must comply with the journal’s ethical guidelines. Personal data collected during submission and review is handled in accordance with our Privacy Policy. Sentinel Journal Volume 1, Issue 1 | Summer 2025 2 Letter from the Editor .............................................................................................. 3 An Unlikely Ally: How the German Abwehr Aided the Success of Britain’s Double Agents in WWII ........................................................................................................ 5 Arctic Frontier Fortress: The Case for Militarizing Svalbard ....................................... 15 Digital Dictatorship: Laws, Algorithms, and the Rise of Cognitive Governance ........... 25 Preliminary Assessment of Israel’s Intelligence Failure: Strategic Surprise and Deception on 7 October 2023 .................................................................................. 42 Russia is winning the Disinformation War with Ukraine ............................................ 55 The Future of US Military Operations: Coalitions, Alliances, and Advisors ................. 65 The Hidden Gender of Espionage: Exploring the Statistical Probability and Psychological Factors of Female Espionage ............................................................ 86 Sentinel Journal Volume 1, Issue 1 | Summer 2025 3 Letter from the Editor What is counterintelligence? It is a question I return to often, not just as a matter of policy or discipline, but as a matter of principle. For many Americans, counterintelligence still evokes images from the Cold War: traitors, defectors, and hidden microphones. But the modern role of counterintelligence has less to do with nostalgia and far more to do with national survival. Counterintelligence is not simply about catching spies. It is about protecting the foundation of selfgovernment. It is how a free society defends itself from infiltration, distortion, and the erosion of trust. In an era where influence is engineered, alliances are targeted, and truth itself can be manufactured, counterintelligence becomes the strategic function that protects what is real and what belongs to us. These threats are daily, deliberate, and executed by capable adversaries. Foreign intelligence services are actively recruiting American students, penetrating research institutions, embedding operatives inside critical infrastructure, and quietly shaping narratives in ways that fracture unity and weaken resolve. These activities are not random or opportunistic. They are part of a long-term strategy to exploit the openness of liberal democracies in order to degrade their strength. Counterintelligence, at its best, provides more than defense. It provides clarity. It tells us who is targeting us, why, and how. It restores the conditions necessary for strategic judgment. And it reminds us that a republic under pressure must remain vigilant not only at its borders, but in its institutions, its alliances, and its sense of self. This issue of the Sentinel Journal takes that challenge seriously. It features research that explores insider threats, psychological vulnerabilities, doctrinal blind spots, and the emerging risks posed by artificial intelligence and synthetic media. These articles are written by graduate students and earlycareer professionals who understand that counterintelligence is not just a security function. It is a moral and strategic obligation. We believe the idea of America is still worth defending. We believe national identity requires national awareness. And we believe counterintelligence must be restored to its rightful place in the architecture of American statecraft. This journal exists to foster that understanding. Thank you for reading, and welcome to the Summer 2025 issue of the Sentinel Journal. — Shane McNeil, Editor-in-Chief Sentinel Journal Volume 1, Issue 1 | Summer 2025 4 Editorial Board • Dr. John Callahan, Institute of World Politics • Prof. John Tsagronis, Institute of World Politics • Dr. Elena Taube-Bailey, National Defense University • Dr. Maggie Williams, University of Maryland Peer Review Panel This panel is comprised of doctoral students and domain experts who provide rigorous academic review for submitted articles. • Frzand Abdullah • Marcus Birkenmeyer • Anthony Bocchicchia • Eranda Chandradasa • Kerri Gray • Sean McKelvey • Thomas Switajewski • Emil Thomann Mission Statement / Aims & Scope The Sentinel Journal publishes research and commentary on the strategic, psychological, and moral dimensions of intelligence, counterintelligence, and statecraft. We aim to promote clarity, integrity, and strategic insight across the fields of national security, foreign policy, and political philosophy. Submission Guidelines Submissions should be between 3,000–7,000 words, follow Chicago (full note) citation style, and be accompanied by an abstract and author bio. Manuscripts are reviewed by at least two peer reviewers. Submit queries or drafts to: [email protected] Sentinel Journal Volume 1, Issue 1 | Summer 2025 5 An Unlikely Ally: How the German Abwehr Aided the Success of Britain’s Double Agents in WWII AUTHOR: Emily Miller Lewis (ORCID) ABSTRACT This article examines systemic faults in the German Abwehr during WWII, and how those faults were successfully exploited by British intelligence’s Double Cross System. Britain’s double agents were far from perfect and made many mistakes that should have indicated their duplicity to their Abwehr handlers. However, a culture of tolerating poor performance and internal resistance to the Nazi regime within the Abwehr allowed these agents to succeed. Their handlers neglected their duties due to perceived friendship and enjoyment of their post. The three Double Cross Agents examined in case studies are Dusko Popov, agent TRICYCLE, Lily Sergueiew, agent TREASURE, and Elvira de la Fuente Chaudoir, agent BRONX. Despite their tradecraft failures, they became some of the most successful and influential in deceiving the Nazis, especially for the Allied invasion on D-Day, due to Abwehr faults. KEYWORDS: Abwehr, Admiral, Wilhelm Canaris, BRONX, Double Agent, Double Cross System, MI5, TREASURE, TRICYCLET, Twenty Committee DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.15927992 History provides valuable lessons from which to learn. The study of past mistakes is important so that those same mistakes are not repeated. It is especially crucial in intelligence and counterintelligence when national security is at risk. The Double Cross System in World War II is regarded as one of the boldest and most successful counterintelligence efforts ever made. It is important for case officers to understand the history of espionage tradecraft at the agent level and intelligence organization level. In most literature surrounding intelligence in WWII and the Double Cross system, the focus is on Allied intelligence, especially MI5. Studying Sentinel Journal Volume 1, Issue 1 | Summer 2025 6 the case from a different perspective, in this case focusing on the Abwehr, allows a well-rounded understanding of intelligence organizations and tradecraft during one of the most influential periods for intelligence work. Current case officers can use this study to note what did and did not work in running a double agent and apply it to their own cases. Historical studies are a resource for learning and practical application, which is this paper's end goal. This paper explores systemic problems in the German intelligence apparatus, specifically the Abwehr, to understand how British intelligence’s double agents were able to succeed despite unknowingly indicating their duplicity to their German case officers. The three indicators of an agent’s duplicity seen were poor tradecraft, a lavish lifestyle in which the agent lived beyond the means of their German salary, and the failure to produce quality information, or intelligence, for their German handlers. All indicators were consistently overlooked by Abwehr case officers who either thought nothing of them or did not care enough to investigate. Internal resistance to the Nazi regime and a culture of tolerating poor performance in the Abwehr was exploited by British Intelligence’s Double Cross system which succeeded despite the agents’ indiscretion, living beyond their means, and failure to provide intelligence, indicating duplicity to their Abwehr handlers. Methodology This study will employ a variety of primary and secondary sources. To analyze the Abwehr, Lauran Paine’s German Military Intelligence in WWII: The Abwehr, Macquire University student Maria Atkins’ honors thesis, Why Is the Abwehr Misunderstood? Explaining the Historical Controversy over German Military Intelligence, 1935-1945, and Harry Carl Schaub’s General Lahousen and the Abwehr were most useful. These secondary sources describe and analyze Abwehr organization, tradecraft, and leadership. To bring in a different perspective, a declassified Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) report titled The German Intelligence Service and the War examined the Abwehr’s capabilities and failures noticed by United States intelligence. These sources will be used to provide a history and description of the Abwehr to better understand the sprawling, confusing component of the German intelligence apparatus in WWII. A brief history and explanation of the Double Cross system will also be provided, largely coming from a report by the head of the Twenty Committee which ran the system, J.C. Masterman. The case studies of the Double Cross agents TREASURE, BRONX, and TRICYCLE will show Abwehr faults as seen through their German case officers, as well as common indicators that an agent had been flipped, which their case officers missed or ignored. Analysis in this section was derived from declassified MI5 files for the three Double Cross agents mentioned above. Information in the files was cross-referenced with the agents’ autobiographies and diaries, and biographies. These two sections combined create a comprehensive study of how the systemic faults and vulnerabilities of the Abwehr were exploited by MI5 and their double agents, despite the double agents’ indications of their duplicity to their Abwehr handlers. The paper will conclude with a section regarding the study’s usefulness for current case officers and recommendations for further research. Ambiguous Files, Bias, and Vast Literature The first limitation to this research is that the declassified MI5 files were difficult to understand and generally lacked greater context. For example, the file on Elvira de la Fuente Chaudoir, agent BRONX, is a simple summary of her communications to MI5. There were no details to analyze indicators of duplicity to the Abwehr. Some files are handwritten notes, and the writing was often too messy to decipher. Many of the communication transcripts included coded references that cannot be understood without greater context. Therefore, the files have acted as a fact check for information found in other sources when they could Sentinel Journal Volume 1, Issue 1 | Summer 2025 7 not be understood on their own. The most useful source to combat this limitation was J.C. Masterman’s report, The Double Cross System in the War of 1939 to 1945, and Ben Macintyre’s Double Cross: The True Story of the D-Day Spies. Information from the agents’ autobiographies and diaries was also useful but had to be used carefully due to the potential for bias exaggerating each one’s personal success. A second limitation to this research is that the literature on intelligence in WWII, the Double Cross system, the double agents individually, and MI5 is so vast that time did not allow for all of it to be read for this paper. The Abwehr and Double Cross system both have a complicated history and story, which is told slightly differently in each source. This paper emphasizes common points found in all sources and more niche information is cross-referenced with the primary sources to check for and note discrepancies between versions of the story. The three agents to be studied were chosen because they appear in most sources and played a great role in the Twenty Committee’s ultimate goal, deception covering the Allied landings on D-Day. The Double Cross System: The Basics The British Intelligence Services, MI5 (the Secret Service) and MI6 (the Secret Intelligence Service), recognized the value of double agents prior to the beginning of WWII.1 Before war broke out in 1940, there was public fear of a massive German spy ring in Britain.2 The British intelligence services began hunting the spies but found the ring to be much smaller than rumors claimed.3 Realizing they could turn these agents and use them to their advantage; they began doing so 1 Masterman, J.C. The Double-Cross System in the War of 1939 to 1945. London: Yale University Press, 1972. 36. 2 Caddell, Joe. “The Long Armistice.” Lecture, April 4, 2024. 3 Caddell, Joe. “The Long Armistice.” 4 Caddell, Joe. “The Long Armistice.” 5 Macintyre, Ben. Double Cross: The True Story of the DDay Spies. 36, 38. 6 Macintyre, Ben. Double Cross: The True Story of the DDay Spies. 4. and the system grew.4 Guy Liddell, director of MI5 during WWII, divided MI5 into sections. Section B was counterespionage, subsequently subsection B1A became the “Double Cross” Section with Thomas Argyll, “Tar,” Robinson in the lead.5 Within B1A a smaller committee was established to run the Double Cross agents. In a comical play on words, the name “Twenty Committee” was chosen because the roman numerals for twenty, XX, are a double cross, just like their agents.6 The Twenty Committee was comprised of intelligence directors from the military branches, MI5, MI6, Home Forces, and Home Defense, headed by Chairman John (J.C.) Masterman.7 Their first official meeting was on 2 January 1941, after the double agents had been “haphazardly” ran by MI5 and MI6 since 1939.8 In 1941 the XX Committee hesitantly began to guess that they controlled the enemy system; but by1943 Tar Robertson realized that every single German agent in Britain was indeed controlled by MI5.9 The committee continued to meet every week until the war ended in 1945.10 The entire system included thirty-nine double agents, but the three in this study are Dusko Popov, agent TRICYCLE; Elvira de la Fuente Chaudoir, agent BRONX; and Lily Sergueiew, agent TREASURE. The Abwehr: Basics, Structure, and Early (Non)Success The Abwehr was the perfect loophole to start rebuilding the intelligence apparatus in post-World War I Germany. Under restrictions imposed by the Treaty of Versailles, Germany was not allowed to have any offensive intelligence organizations.11 This meant 7 Macintyre, Ben. Double Cross: The True Story of the DDay Spies. 43. 8 Masterman, J.C. The Double-Cross System in the War of 1939 to 1945. 61-63. 9 Macintyre, Ben. Double Cross: The True Story of the DDay Spies. 4-5. 10 Masterman, J.C. The Double-Cross System in the War of 1939 to 1945. 63. 11 Paine, “German Military Intelligence in WWII: The Abwehr” 6. Sentinel Journal Volume 1, Issue 1 | Summer 2025 8 their intelligence services were not to engage in information collection efforts meant to harm an adversary. They could only collect information to protect their nation. The Abwehr was perfect because it was officially classified as a defensive intelligence agency12 The word Abwehr translates to “defense” in English.13 As WWII progressed, the Abwehr became engaged in more offensive intelligence work. From 1935 to 1944 it operated as a secret department under the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW).14 It had headquarters in Berlin and many out-stations in other parts of Germany and several foreign countries.15 The Abwehr followed the pattern of military organization; it was static when the armies were occupational and mobile when they were operational.16 It had three primary sections. Section I controlled branch offices, created espionage networks, and included a counterespionage department.17 Section II focused on sabotage and “special duties,” which had different meanings at different points in the war; and Section III oversaw counter-sabotage, counterespionage, and security.18 In short, they respectively were operational espionage, sabotage and subversion, and counterespionage.19 The Abwehr’s success fluctuated. According to the U.S.’s CIA, Section I was consistently unsuccessful.20 The German intelligence services were never able to develop an adequate training program for their spies.21 Being sent into a hostile country with no proper training lowered the spy’s chance of survival and led to easier capture and turning by the adversary. The fact that all of Germany’s agents in Britain had been turned 12 Paine, “German Military Intelligence in WWII: The Abwehr” 6. 13 Paine, “German Military Intelligence in WWII: The Abwehr” 6. 14 Central Intelligence Agency. CIA-RDP7803362A002500070002-3 “The German Intelligence Service and the War.” December 1, 1945. Released February 3, 2014. 15 CIA, “The German Intelligence Service and the War” 1. 16 CIA, “The German Intelligence Service and the War” 1. 17 Paine, “German Military Intelligence in WWII: The Abwehr” 10-11. and were controlled by British intelligence demonstrates that Abwehr offensive espionage was largely a failure. Sections II and III had better success but still lacked the ability to gain a clear intelligence advantage. Section II, sabotage and subversion, was successful in areas the Germans had diplomatic advantages and/or some control, but not in places where these advantages laid with the Allies.22 If they were unsuccessful in the arena where it mattered most, where Germany had little to no advantage, was the section truly successful at all? The low success rate of section II may also be due to its leader's resistance to the Nazi regime, which will be examined in the next section. Finally, the CIA report stated that section III was “generally successful” because it was able to penetrate Allied intelligence services in the Low Countries in the beginning of the war, and consistently penetrated resistance movements in that area.23 The Abwehr Norm: Internal Resistance in Leadership and Poor Performance Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, head of the Abwehr, saw his appointment, and the organization itself, as a way to preserve Germany and undermine Hitler. In post-war interrogations, former Abwehr officer and close confidant of Canaris, Captain Franz Maria Leidig said “Canaris began conspiring against the Nazis as soon as he assumed Abwehr control.”24 Canaris was a German patriot with the goal of preserving Germany, not the Nazis in charge.25 Canaris disagreed with Nazi ideals but had originally agreed with Hitler’s rearmament and 18 Paine, “German Military Intelligence in WWII: The Abwehr” 11. 19 CIA, “The German Intelligence Service and the War” 1. 20 CIA, “The German Intelligence Service and the War” 2. 21 Paine, “German Military Intelligence in WWII: The Abwehr” 14. 22 CIA, “The German Intelligence Service and the War” 2. 23 CIA, “The German Intelligence Service and the War” 2. 24 Paine, “German Military Intelligence in WWII: The Abwehr” 29. 25 Paine, “German Military Intelligence in WWII: The Abwehr” 28. Sentinel Journal Volume 1, Issue 1 | Summer 2025 15 Arctic Frontier Fortress: The Case for Militarizing Svalbard Author: Jacob Spencer (ORCID) ABSTRACT Svalbard is a sparsely populated collection of islands to the north of Norway and northwest of major naval and air bases in Russia. Given its geographic position and complex international status, regulated by a 1920 treaty, Svalbard has long been a target for Russian and Soviet aggression, and recent developments in the Arctic and in Europe suggest that the threat from Moscow remains relevant today. By examining Svalbard’s geographic position, its history, the presence of Russian assets on the islands, and current Russian stances towards the Arctic, it becomes clear that Svalbard holds considerable strategic significance to Moscow. NATO and the United States must reevaluate their stance towards Svalbard and consider taking steps to militarize the islands and turn them into a fortress against Russian encroachment in the north. KEYWORDS: Svalbard, Russia, Arctic, Norway, Disinformation, Arktikugol’, Franz Josef Land DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.16862757 Scattered among the daily flow of news from Ukraine’s frontlines and China’s harassment of fishing vessels in the South China Sea are stories about Svalbard. This archipelago of large and mostly frozen islands sits roughly 600 miles north of Scandinavia and is the sovereign territory of Norway. However, due to their ambiguous international status and history, these islands have been identified as a potential site for conflict between NATO and Russia. There is indeed reason to pay attention to these islands and Russia’s activities in the Arctic. However, Svalbard is far from NATO’s Achilles heel and should not be treated as such. Rather, the archipelago represents an opportunity greater for NATO than for Russia. This report will thus seek to establish Svalbard’s history, its geopolitical and geographical Sentinel Journal Volume 1, Issue 1 | Summer 2025 16 significance, present-day activities there by relevant actors, and how NATO can turn these remote islands into a vital asset in its competition with Russia. The research below was conducted entirely through opensource means. Secondary source research included examining media reporting and peer-reviewed scholarly journal articles, while primary sources cited include official government statements and social media posts, as well as reporting and interview transcripts from Russian state media outlets, which are, for the purposes of this research, treated as primary sources for analyzing Russian disinformation narratives. Historical Background Svalbard has a peculiar international status. Virtue of a 1920 treaty, the archipelago is sovereign Norwegian territory. However, the citizens of signatories of this treaty enjoy the same rights as Norwegian citizens with regard to residence and economic activity on Svalbard. Among the signatories of this treaty was the Soviet Union, which upon its death passed those signatory privileges to the Russian Federation. And indeed, Russia has paid “particular attention to guarding its interests in the area,” in the words of Lt. Col. Michael Zimmerman.58 In his paper on the Arctic, Zimmerman argues that Svalbard may become the new “epicenter” of Russia-NATO competition in the north, due to its ambiguous international status and potential to create a rift between NATO countries.59 Indeed, Russia is the only signatory of the 1920 treaty, other than Norway, which 58 Michael Zimmerman, “High North and High Stakes: The Svalbard Archipelago Could Be the Epicenter of Rising Tension in the Arctic,” PRISM 7, no. 4 (2018): 10. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26542710. 59 Ibid, 110 and 114. 60 Marian K. Leighton, The Soviet Threat to NATO’s Northern Flank (New York: National Strategy Information Center, 1979), 15-16. 61 Alexandr’ Golts, “The Arctic: A Clash of Interests or Clash of Ambitions,” in Russia in the Arctic, ed. Stephen J. Blank (Strategic Studies Institute, July 2011), 43. https://media.defense.gov/2023/May/04/2003215908/-1/- has taken advantage of its benefits. The Soviet Union established Arktikugol’, a state-owned coal mining company, in 1931, and has continued to operate it ever since. In 1979, about 2,000 Russians lived in the Svalbard settlement of Barentsburg, most of them employed by Arktikugol’. The Soviets, and now Russians, have not been shy about trying to expand those benefits. In 1944, Moscow pushed for joint rule over the islands with Norway, and in 1975 the Soviets established a military colony near the Russian settlement of Barentsburg on Svalbard.60 Russia has also extensively engaged in flag-planting activities in the Arctic more broadly. In 2007, for example, a Russian politician descended in a submarine to the bottom of the Lomonosov Ridge north of Greenland and planted a canister containing a Russian flag. For Victory Day celebrations in 2023, Arktikugol’ displayed several flags of the breakaway “Donetsk People’s Republic,” the infamous Russian-controlled insurrectionist movement in eastern Ukraine.61 It is also worth looking specifically at Arktikugol’. While it has fallen far since the collapse of the Soviet Union, it remains active and has recently signaled its intention to revive its old glory. Its website is modern, active, and regularly posts news releases. Among these are mundane, innocent stories about cultural events in Barentsburg, the opening of gyms, swimming pools, and religious holidays. Earlier in 2024, there was also a story about an “Immortal Regiment” of the “Great Patriotic War,” an annual event in which Russians carry images of their ancestors who fell during World War II, and Arktikugol’s participation in the 2024 Eastern Economic Forum.62 1/0/2146.PDF; Miranda Byrant, “Barentsburg: the Norwegian town feeling the chill of the Ukraine War,” The Guardian, October 10, 2023. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/10/barentsbur g-the-norwegian-town-feeling-the-chill-of-the-ukraine-war. 62 “Basseyn otkryt,” [“The swimming pool is open”] Arktikugol’, March 20, 2024, https://www.arcticugol.ru/news/bassejn-otkryt; “Bessmertnyy polk v Piramidye,” [“Immortal regiment in Piramid”] Arktikugol’, May 13, 2024, https://www.arcticugol.ru/news/bessmertnyj-polk-v-piramide; “Otkryt trenazhyornyy zal ‘Trud,’” [“The gym ‘Labor’ is open”] Arktikugol’, June 14, 2024, Sentinel Journal Volume 1, Issue 1 | Summer 2025 17 Arktikugol’s General Director Dmitry Negrutsa even participated in an interview with Russian propaganda outlet The Arctic Century. During this interview Negrutsa highlighted Russia’s Arctic cooperation with BRICS and other “friendly” (to Russia) countries and Arktikugol’s commitment to providing a “decent level and quality of life” for Russians on Svalbard. Of particular note, however, is Negrutsa’s comment about Arktikugol’s research program, which contains as part of its framework the study of the Russian presence in Svalbard “as a unique discipline.”63 This historical background and Russia’s activities on Svalbard are significant. Russia remains committed, as it has for nearly a century, to maintaining a presence in the region. In recent years, Russia has particularly exploited Svalbard’s potential as an information operation. Lt. Col. Zimmerman astutely points out that the presence of Russians on Svalbard, representing about 10-20% of the population, creates an opportunity for Russia to try to extend its privileges over the archipelago in the name of defending ethnic Russians.64 This fact, among others, explains why Svalbard should remain on the West’s radar. Svalbard’s Significance Before delving deeper into the question of Russian activities in Svalbard, it is worth stepping back to consider why these remote islands are significant at all. Obvious answers include rich oil deposits in the waters surrounding Svalbard and its suitability for fishing. But fish are hardly a key strategic resource and https://www.arcticugol.ru/news/otkryt-trenazhernyj-zal-trud; “V domovoy tserkvi DK v den’ pamayti Svyatykh Ottsov vpervyye za dolgoye vremya sostoyalas’ Bozhestvennaya Liturgiya,” [“In the house church of DK on the Day of Memory of Holy Fathers a holy liturgy was held for the first instance in a long time”] Arktikugol’, June 17, 2024, https://www.arcticugol.ru/news/v-domovoj-cerkvi-dk-v-denpamjati-svjatyh-otcov-vpervye-za-dolgoe-vremja-sostojalasbozhestvennaja-liturgija; “Trest ‘Arktikugol’’ uchastvuyet v Vostochnom ekonomicheskom forume,” [The trust ‘Arktikugol’’ is participating in the Eastern Economic Forum”] Arktikugol’, September 2, 2024, https://www.arcticugol.ru/news/trestarktikugol-uchastvuet-v-vostochnom-ekonomicheskom-forume. Arctic oil remains difficult to obtain under year-long ice. Rather, one should look at the islands’ geographic position to understand their importance. Fears have abounded since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 that Moscow will launch an apocalyptic World War III with NATO by storming Poland and the Baltic States, slicing through the Suwalki Gap, or striking Ukraine with nuclear weapons. Undoubtedly, Russia would like to dismantle NATO. However, such scenarios as those above represent a type of spectacular suicide for Russia that even Vladimir Putin would not wish to experience. Besides, there are far easier ways to destroy NATO’s unity and effectiveness. One possible method: launch an incursion into a remote region, one that would trigger NATO’s Article 5. Nations would be obligated to retaliate against Russia but would be reluctant to send their own soldiers to die over a barren place in the Arctic.65 An additional element of Svalbard’s significance is its proximity to other valuable territories. It is about equal distance (600 miles) from both northern Norway and Murmansk, home of Russia’s North Sea Fleet. Of arguably more importance militarily, it is just 220 miles west of Franz Josef Land, where Russia’s Nagurskoye Air Base is located. This base was constructed in 2014—shortly after Russia's annexation of Crimea—and is home to a contingent of Russian stealth bombers.66 This investment of resources, as well as Russia’s own naval doctrine for the year 2022, show that the Arctic is a vital interest for 63 Rina Rumyantseva, “The Arktikugol’ Trust: Past, Present, and Future in Svalbard,” The Arctic Century, December 28, 2023, https://acentury.online/articles/the-arktikugol-trust-pastpresent-and-future-in-svalbard/. 64 Zimmerman, “High North and High Stakes,” 7. 65 Anders Puck Nielsen, “NATO-Russia war: Can it really happen?” Youtube Video. January 27, 2024. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZY7GPBSyONU. See here for more speculation on the possibilities of a Russian incursion into remote areas of NATO. 66 Nick Paton Walsh, “Satellite images show huge Russian military buildup in the Arctic,” CNN, April 5, 2021, https://www.cnn.com/2021/04/05/europe/russia-arctic-natomilitary-intl-cmd/index.html. Sentinel Journal Volume 1, Issue 1 | Summer 2025 18 Russia. Of particular interest to the Russians are Svalbard and Franz Josef Land.67 As already established, Svalbard is home to a significant Russian diaspora and Russian state interests in the form of Arktikugol’. These alone provide enough justification to the Russians for any form of military action. To Russia and its revisionist regime, a single act of “oppression” towards ethnic Russian would be sufficient provocation to necessitate intervention. This gives Svalbard great potential for Russian disinformation campaigns. Russia has already gone forward with a bizarre claim, reminiscent of those hedged against Ukraine, that Norway is facilitating a U.S. biological weapons program in the Arctic.68 While this claim has not been pushed into the mainstream, Russia has clearly sown the seeds for a more aggressive info operation in the future. The Catch It is so far clear that the Arctic interests the Russians. Their presence there is persistent and growing. They have laid the groundwork for justifying aggressive action: they could concoct stories of the Norwegian government imposing its own oppressive laws on Svalbard, of Norway trying to expel Russians from the archipelago, of Norway disrespecting Russian cultural celebrations on Victory Day, or any other number of misleading and delusional stories. This could be used to justify a special military operation into Svalbard to protect ethnic Russians. But it is difficult to imagine Russia succeeding in such an endeavor. Russia’s naval capabilities are very limited compared to those of the United States (not to mention other NATO allies), and have been dramatically reduced over the past two years by Ukraine sinking ships in the Black Sea. Furthermore, so long as the war in Ukraine 67 Russia Maritime Studies Institute, Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation, July 31, 2022, 22, https://dnnlgwick.blob.core.windows.net/portals/0/NWCDepa rtments/Russia%20Maritime%20Studies%20Institute/20220731 _ENG_RUS_Maritime_Doctrine_FINALtxt.pdf?sv=2017-0417&sr=b&si=DNNFileManagerPolicy&sig=2zUFSaTUSPcOp QDBk%2FuCtVnb%2FDoy06Cbh0EI5tGpl2Y%3D. rages, Russia has no incentive or capability to open a new conflict in the Arctic. Russia currently presents a limited military threat to the Arctic, and it would not be in their interest to dedicate significant amounts of resources to securing dominance in the region while they are engaged in other theaters. Polar Leverage Despite the relative lack of immediate, serious danger to Svalbard and the Arctic from Russia, the West should not assume that the correct course of action is to simply preserve the status quo. Russia certainly has interests in the north. If Russia prevails in Ukraine, Moscow may turn its gaze towards the Arctic as it seeks to further assert itself and strike at NATO unity; Russia has already made it clear that it wants to pursue Arctic ambitions at some point. Therefore, rather than maintain the status quo, NATO should seize the opportunity that Russia’s preoccupation with Ukraine presents and take the initiative in putting Russia on the back foot in the Arctic; Svalbard presents an opportunity to do so. As previously established, Svalbard is closest to Franz Josef Land, a Russian possession—not to mainland Norway, Greenland, or Iceland. This would explain at least in part why Russia has an incentive to either keep Svalbard demilitarized or bring it under Moscow’s own control. Russia certainly recognizes that a NATO military presence in Svalbard could threaten its own ambitions in the Arctic. This further explains why Russia seeks to emphasize its own people’s presence on Svalbard, to stake a claim there without directly trying to occupy it militarily. By primarily focusing on cultural and scientific efforts, Russia can present itself as a legitimate and peaceful 68 Thomas Nilsen, “Isolated Russia invites faraway countries to upcoming Svalbard science center in Pyramiden,” Arctic Today, October 31, 2023, https://www.arctictoday.com/isolated-russiainvites-faraway-countries-to-upcoming-svalbard-science-centerin-pyramiden/. Sentinel Journal Volume 1, Issue 1 | Summer 2025 19 actor in the region; any attempt to militarize the islands would be an example of NATO imperialism that seeks to drive Russian citizens from their homes. This keeps NATO paralyzed, unable to act lest it appear as the aggressor. Despite this, there is considerable incentive for NATO to establish a military presence on Svalbard. The Center for New American Security (CNAS) presents such a scenario in which Russia, bogged down in Ukraine and struggling under the weight of sanctions, tries unsuccessfully to reassert itself as a great power by taking more aggressive action in the Arctic. In the process Russia squanders valuable and increasingly limited resources to maintain a military presence in the Arctic (and specifically a presence on Svalbard).69 If NATO were to apply more pressure on Russia by establishing a military presence on Svalbard, Russia may further escalate its activities as it tries to remain relevant in the Arctic, forcing itself into a hopeless spending war with the United States. This spending could take the form of Russia expanding its navy, transferring additional military resources to Franz Josef Land, investing in the expansion of military infrastructure there, or redeploying naval assets from the Baltic Sea to the Arctic. In the event of a full-scale war between NATO and Russia, Svalbard’s unique position would allow the West to dominate the northern waters between Russia and Iceland. During summer months, the constant daylight of the Arctic would enable Svalbard-based NATO aircraft to dominate the skies and easily target Russian ships. In the winter, the frozen waters north of Svalbard would force Russian vessels trying to break 69 Andrea Kendall-Taylor et. al, “Russia in the Arctic,” Center for a New American Security, September 2022, 6-8, https://s3.us-east1.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/RussiaintheArctic_ 2022_Final.pdf. 70 U.S. Department of Defense, Opening Remarks by Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III at the 24th Ukraine Defense Contact Group (As Delivered), September 6, 2024, https://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech/Article/389 6714/; Foreign, Commonwealth, and Development Office and Nicholas Aucott, Russia’s illegal war continues to be a military disaster: UK statement to the OSCE, September 18, 2024, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/russias-illegal-warinto the arctic to pass directly between the archipelago and mainland Norway. If NATO were to also set up a small observation post on Bear Island, almost equidistant from Norway and Svalbard, it could easily police these waters and keep the Russians blocked in the Barents Sea. Militarizing Svalbard would also reassert NATO’s strength and further undermine Russia’s already weakened status and influence globally. It could cement NATO’s dominance in the north, which has been reinforced by Finland and Sweden’s recent entrances into the alliance. The scenario that CNAS presents for an isolated and declining Russia is already playing out to some extent. Russian forces were quickly driven out of northern Ukraine early in the war, then in the fall of 2024 rapidly lost control of Kharkiv and Kherson Oblasts. Figures vary depending on sources, but Russian casualties since the beginning of the fullscale invasion have been enormous, ranging from about 300,000 to more than 600,000.70 Ukraine’s head of military intelligence claimed in September 2024 that Russia is seeking to end the war before 2026, by which time Russia will be under increasing economic pressure and facing severe manpower shortages.71 Additional pressure from the north could push the 2026 deadline up. Svalbard in the Context of the Trump Administration Since entering office on January 20, 2025, President Donald Trump has expressed significant expansionist tendencies. Regarding the Arctic continues-to-be-a-military-disaster-uk-statement-to-the-osce; Heneral’nyy shtab ZSU [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine]. 2024. “Zahal’ni boyovi vtraty protyvnyka z 24.02.22 po 23.10.24” [“General military losses of the enemy from February 24, 2022 through October 23, 2024”]. October 23, 2024. https://www.facebook.com/share/p/NTiDQvVYcZazd3Zm/. 71 Davit Gasparyan et. al, “Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 15, 2024,” Institute for the Study of War, September 15, 2024, https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensivecampaign-assessment-september-15-2024. Sentinel Journal Volume 1, Issue 1 | Summer 2025 20 specifically, Trump has repeatedly discussed a desire for taking control of Greenland, including a blunt statement on March 26 that the United States “[has] to have” Greenland.72 Trump and many in his administration have additionally adopted a highly Ukraineand Euro-sceptic stance; Trump himself temporarily froze all American aid to Ukraine on March 3, while Vice President J.D. Vance delivered a highly critical assessment of European leadership in a speech in Munich, Germany, on February 14.73 In light of this evolving relationship with the United States, Europe will need to obtain every strategic advantage of its own over Russia. Svalbard can play a role in aiding Europe in its defense without the United States: without possibly American reduced aid in a conflict against Russia, European maritime forces will need additional bases in the north to quickly locate and destroy Russian vessels, particularly submarines. If Trump changes his stance and adopts a warmer tone on Europe and Ukraine, Svalbard could be a good alternative to Greenland for the president’s Arctic focus. Norway and the United States could renegotiate the 1920 Spitsbergen Treaty to ensure greater American economic access to oil within Norway’s maritime exclusive economic zones and open the archipelago to American military bases. This would bring direct American economic involvement to Svalbard, creating an incentive for continued U.S. military involvement in the region. Combined with a possible minerals deal between the United States and Ukraine, a Svalbard deal could serve as a motivator for President Trump to remain committed to NATO and Ukraine. 72 Danny Nguyen, “‘We have to have it’: Trump ups the pressure on Greenland,” Politico, March 2, 2025, https://www.politico.com/news/2025/03/26/trumpgreenland-vance-visit-00004791. 73 Kayla Epstein, “Trump faces pushback in Washington over Ukraine aid freeze,” BBC, March 4, 2025, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cp8l25453l3o; Emily Atkinson, “JD Vance attacks Europe over free speech and migration,” BBC, February 15, 2025, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/ceve3wl21x1o. Conclusion Svalbard is a unique place caught at a unique point in history. Its remoteness and small, sparse population mean that Russia can undertake various covert and information operations without fear of major retaliation. An established national presence on Svalbard gives Putin the oft-cited justification of “protecting” ethnic Russians against foreign oppression/aggression. Its proximity to Franz Josef Land and Russian military assets there means that Russia cannot simply ignore it. Establishing military control of Svalbard would give NATO total gatekeeping powers to the Norwegian Sea, as any Russian ships and aircraft trying to break out into the North Atlantic would have to pass directly between mainland Norway and Svalbard. One should also not forget the impact climate change will have on the Arctic in the long term. The waters north of Svalbard usually remain covered in ice year-round, but warming has resulted in some shrinkage of the ice coverage, and a recent projection suggested that the Arctic could be ice-free during the summer by as early as 2035.74 An ice-free Arctic would allow Russian ships and submarines, in the event of a conflict with NATO, to sail north of Svalbard and thus bypass the northern coast of Norway on their way into the Greenland Sea and North Atlantic. So long as Svalbard remains demilitarized, it cannot blunt any Russian advances deep into the Arctic. There are many incentives for NATO to reconsider Svalbard’s status. Military bases there in the near term could put Russia on the back foot and apply further pressure at a time when Russia is already 74 Alexandra Jahn, Marika M. Holland, and Jennifer E. Kay, “Projections of an ice-free Arctic Ocean,” Nature Reviews Earth & Environment 5 (March 2024), 170, https://www.nature.com/articles/s43017-023-00515-9.epdf. See quote: “Consistently ice-free conditions are expected by midcentury, potentially under all warming scenarios. Predictions for consistently ice-free conditions range from 2023 to 2085, with refined projections of 2035–2067.” Sentinel Journal Volume 1, Issue 1 | Summer 2025 21 struggling in Ukraine. In the long term, Svalbard can serve as a vital NATO asset in the Arctic: a counterweight to Russian bases on Franz Josef Land and a sentry over the northern passages from the Barents Sea into the North Atlantic. There are obviously challenges from a legal standpoint in terms of militarizing Svalbard. It is therefore of vital importance that no single member of NATO, including Norway itself, act unilaterally. NATO should also make it clear that it does not intend to expel Russia from Svalbard. However, in the face of an aggressor that flagrantly violates international law, NATO cannot itself be chained to self-imposed restraints. Svalbard is a crucial asset to both Russia and NATO. The latter should secure it. Sentinel Journal Volume 1, Issue 1 | Summer 2025 22 Author Biography Jacob Spencer is a second-year graduate student at the Institute of World Politics. His key areas of study include cognitive warfare and disinformation, the geopolitics of the post-Soviet sphere, and democratic backsliding and authoritarian creep in the West. He holds a bachelor's degree in history from the University of Arkansas at Monticello and a Teaching English as a Foreign Language certificate from International TEFL Academy. Photo by Francesco Ungaro: https://www.pexels.com/photo/view-of-a-fjord-19968770/ Sentinel Journal Volume 1, Issue 1 | Summer 2025 23 Bibliography Arktikugol’. “Basseyn otkryt” [“The swimming pool is open”]. March 20, 2024, https://www.arcticugol.ru/news/bassejn-otkryt. Arktikugol’. “Bessmertnyy polk v Piramidye” [“Immortal regiment in Piramid”]. May 13, 2024. https://www.arcticugol.ru/news/bessmertnyj-polk-v-piramide. Arktikugol’. “Trest ‘Arktikugol’’ uchastvuyet v Vostochnom ekonomicheskom forume” [The trust ‘Arktikugol’’ is participating in the Eastern Economic Forum”]. September 2, 2024, https://www.arcticugol.ru/news/trest-arktikugol-uchastvuet-v-vostochnomekonomicheskom-forume. Arktikugol’. “V domovoy tserkvi DK v den’ pamayti Svyatykh Ottsov vpervyye za dolgoye vremya sostoyalas’ Bozhestvennaya Liturgiya” [“In the house church of DK on the Day of Memory of Holy Fathers a holy liturgy was held for the first instance in a long time”]. June 17, 2024, https://www.arcticugol.ru/news/v-domovoj-cerkvi-dk-v-den-pamjati-svjatyh-otcovvpervye-za-dolgoe-vremja-sostojalas-bozhestvennaja-liturgija. Atkinson, Emily. “JD Vance attacks Europe over free speech and migration.” BBC. February 15, 2025. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/ceve3wl21x1o. Byrant, Miranda. “Barentsburg: the Norwegian town feeling the chill of the Ukraine War.” The Guardian. October 10, 2023. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/10/barentsburg-the-norwegian-townfeeling-the-chill-of-the-ukraine-war. Epstein, Kayla. “Trump faces pushback in Washington over Ukraine aid freeze.” BBC. March 4, 2025. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cp8l25453l3o. Foreign, Commonwealth, and Development Office and Nicholas Aucott. Russia’s illegal war continues to be a military disaster: UK statement to the OSCE. September 18, 2024. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/russias-illegal-war-continues-to-be-a-militarydisaster-uk-statement-to-the-osce. Gasparyan, Davit, Riley Bailey, Grace Mappes, Christina Harward, and George Barros. “Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 15, 2024.” Institute for the Study of War. September 15, 2024. https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaignassessment-september-15-2024. Golts, Alexandr’. “The Arctic: A Clash of Interests or Clash of Ambitions.” In Russia in the Arctic, edited by Stephen J. Blank, 43-63. Strategic Studies Institute, July 2011. https://media.defense.gov/2023/May/04/2003215908/-1/-1/0/2146.PDF. Heneral’nyy shtab ZSU [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine]. 2024. “Zahal’ni boyovi vtraty protyvnyka z 24.02.22 po 23.10.24” [“General military losses of the enemy from February 24, 2022 through October 23, 2024”]. Facebook, October 23, 2024. https://www.facebook.com/share/p/NTiDQvVYcZazd3Zm/. Jahn, Alexandra, Marika M. Holland, and Jennifer E. Kay. “Projections of an ice-free Arctic Ocean,” Nature Reviews Earth & Environment 5 (March 2024): 164-176. https://www.nature.com/articles/s43017-023-00515-9.epdf. Kendall-Taylor, Andrea, Jim Townsend, Nicholas Lokker, Heli Hautala, and Col. James Frey. “Russia in the Arctic.” Center for a New American Security. September, 2022. https://s3.us-east1.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/RussiaintheArctic_2022_Final.pdf. Leighton, Marian K. The Soviet Threat to NATO’s Northern Flank. New York: National Strategy Information Center, 1979. Nielsen, Anders Puck. “NATO-Russia war: Can it really happen?” Youtube Video. January 27, 2024. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZY7GPBSyONU. Sentinel Journal Volume 1, Issue 1 | Summer 2025 24 Nguyen, Danny. “‘We have to have it’: Trump ups the pressure on Greenland.” Politico. March 26, 2025. https://www.politico.com/news/2025/03/26/trump-greenland-vance-visit-00004791. Nilsen, Tomas. “Isolated Russia invites faraway countries to upcoming Svalbard science center in Pyramiden.” Arctic Today. October 31, 2023. https://www.arctictoday.com/isolated-russiainvites-faraway-countries-to-upcoming-svalbard-science-center-in-pyramiden/. Rumyantseva, Rina. “The Arktikugol’ Trust: Past, Present, and Future in Svalbard,” The Arctic Century. December 28, 2023. https://acentury.online/articles/the-arktikugol-trust-past-present-andfuture-in-svalbard/. Russia Maritime Studies Institute. Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation. July 31, 2022. https://dnnlgwick.blob.core.windows.net/portals/0/NWCDepartments/Russia%20Maritim e%20Studies%20Institute/20220731_ENG_RUS_Maritime_Doctrine_FINALtxt.pdf?sv=2 017-0417&sr=b&si=DNNFileManagerPolicy&sig=2zUFSaTUSPcOpQDBk%2FuCtVnb%2FDoy 06Cbh0EI5tGpl2Y%3D. U.S. Department of Defense. Opening Remarks by Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III at the 24th Ukraine Defense Contact Group (As Delivered). September 6, 2024. https://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech/Article/3896714/. Walsh, Nick Paton. “Satellite images show huge Russian military buildup in the Arctic.” CNN. April 5, 2021. https://www.cnn.com/2021/04/05/europe/russia-arctic-nato-military-intlcmd/index.html. Zimmerman, Michael. “High North and High Stakes: The Svalbard Archipelago Could Be the Epicenter of Rising Tension in the Arctic.” PRISM 7, no. 4 (2018): 106–23. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26542710. Sentinel Journal Volume 1, Issue 1 | Summer 2025 31 Tencent, must share details of their algorithms with the Chinese Communist Party.97 Through the establishment of this regulation, the state strategy lies in ensuring that new technologies align closely with state surveillance and support for the objective of national obedience through SCS. Moreover, CCP is a holder of "golden shares" of the big tech, involving small but critical stakes that give enough power over corporate decisions, particularly revolving around data governance, content regulation, and data collection to align them with state strategies and objectives.98 Such a setup illustrates a profound shift toward a society where corporate technologies are not merely business tools for targeted material promotion but foundational components of the state control apparatus. Corporatestate fusion reshapes political and societal landscapes in the most profound ways, driving society into a new form of digital oppression. China: Legal Architecture of Digital Control This reconfiguration of power through data collection is not incidental—it is legal. In China, the emergence of digital stratification of society can be observed through the National Intelligence Law, the Cybersecurity Law, and the Data Security Law. Together, the three laws establish not only the technical standards for data governance but also progress from enforced cooperation, infrastructural containment, and to extraterritorial data collection. The strategic objective of the Cyberspace 97 Micah Musser, “Don’t Assume China’s AI Regulations Are Just a Power Play,” Center for Security and Emerging Technology, October 3, 2022, https://cset.georgetown.edu/article/donts-assumechinas-ai-regulations-are-just-a-power-play/. 98 Brian Evans, “China's Government Is Buying Alibaba and Tencent Shares That Give the Communist Party Special Rights over Certain Business Decisions, Report Says,” Markets Insider, January 13, 2023, https://markets.businessinsider.com/news/stocks/chines e-government-alibaba-tencent-stock-purchasescommunist-p arty-tiktok-bytedance-2023-1. Administration of China, the primary regulator of the cyber field, is to create a “comprehensive cyber governance system,” which would include overseeing online content, ensuring data security, and managing the overall digital space to align with the CCP’s ideologies.99 Upon detailed examination of these laws, the institutionalization of informational caste takes place. While it does not sort individuals by blood or title, it creates a greater gap between the governments and citizens by enforcing the system of conditioning and inevitability of maintaining data privacy. What was once engraved on stone under Hammurabi is now encoded in law and policy frameworks that change the very meaning of citizenship. National Intelligence Law (2017) The National Intelligence Law mandates unconditional cooperation between all citizens, private firms, and the Chinese state apparatus. The law compels companies and individuals to support and assist with national intelligence efforts, which include obligatory data sharing with minimal oversight. In addition, the legislation creates a carrot and stick approach, as it rewards compliance and imposes consequences for the failure to comply, highlighting that the PRC “praises and honors individuals and entities that have significantly contributed to national intelligence efforts.”100 The newer instruments outlined in the 2022 CAC Algorithmic Regulation Measures mandate that content algorithms promote “positive energy” and uphold “socialist values,” and suppress elements that disrupt social order.101 Under 99 CMP Staff, “Comprehensive Cyber Governance System,” China Media Project, May 1, 2021, https://chinamediaproject.org/the_ccp_dictionary/compr ehensive-cyber-governance-system/. 100 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Data Security Business Advisory: Risks and Considerations for Businesses Using Data Services and Equipment from Firms Linked to the People’s Republic of China, December 22, 2020, https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/20_1 222_data-security-business-advisory.pdf. 101 Cyberspace Administration of China, Provisions on the Management of Algorithm Recommendations for Internet Sentinel Journal Volume 1, Issue 1 | Summer 2025 32 these measures, companies must submit their algorithms to CAC audits and demonstrate that their systems are not only secure but ideologically aligned with CCP narratives. A notable example of the international ramifications of this law can be seen on TikTok. The Chinese-owned application has been under intense scrutiny due to concerns that user data could be accessed by Chinese intelligence, highlighting the global impact and reach of China's internal regulatory environment.102 The TikTok controversy is not merely about geopolitical rivalry or data privacy concerns—it is emblematic of a deeper trend in state governance models: the normalization of government access to private data. Cybersecurity Law (2017) Following the National Intelligence Law, the Cybersecurity Law reinforces data sovereignty by mandating that all personal and critical data collected within China be stored domestically. This law also grants power to the Chinese authorities to conduct security reviews of network products and services, embedding state influence deep into the infrastructure of both domestic and foreign companies. For example, Apple and Microsoft had to adjust data operations, often forming data partnerships with Chinese firms to meet compliance thresholds.103 Such an approach, while pragmatic and attractive for conducting business, raises many unresolved questions about user privacy, transparency, and corporate responsibility in Information Services, January 4, 2022, https://www.cac.gov.cn/202201/04/c_1642894606364259.htm. 102 Patricia Moloney Figliola, TikTok: Technology Overview and Issues, Congressional Research Service, R46543, June 30, 2023, https://www.congress.gov/crsproduct/R46543. 103 Felipe Zárate, "All That Is Gold Does Not Glitter," Fluid Attacks Blog, May 25, 2021, https://fluidattacks.com/blog/apple-data-centerchina/.Fluid Attacks+1Fluid Attacks+1 authoritarian regimes. A stark example took place in April 2025, when former Meta executive, Sarah Wynn-Williams, testified before the U.S. Senate that Meta collaborated with the Chinese government to develop advanced AI tools and complied with censorship demands,104 including the deletion of dissident accounts.105 This case shows how foreign firms may compromise ethical standards to retain market access. Additionally, it has drawn international criticism for challenging global norms on digital openness and data governance. Data Security Law (2021) Building upon the foundation laid by earlier legislation, the Data Security Law introduces more stringent controls over the classification, processing, and cross-border transfer, aiming to turn data into a sovereign asset. It mandates regular risk assessments for companies that handle data deemed vital to China’s national economic or security interests and prohibits its export to foreign entities without prior government authorization. Unlike the Western frameworks, where data rights tend to revolve around individual consent and corporate transparency, China’s system codifies data governance as a matter of national security. Multinational companies now navigate an environment where compliance is not only a regulatory obligation but a geopolitical negotiation. A prominent example is Didi Chuxing, a ridesharing company, which is a China-based and U.S.-listed company. Didi conducted its initial public offering 104 Alan Lu, “Facebook’s Zuckerberg Oversaw Censorship Tool for China: Whistleblower,” Radio Free Asia, April 11, 2025, https://www.rfa.org/english/china/2025/04/11/chinameta/. 105 Louis Casiano, “Whistleblower Tells Senate Committee That Meta Undermined US National Security to Cozy Up to China,” Fox Business, April 9, 2025, https://www.foxbusiness.com/politics/whistleblowertells-senate-committee-meta-undermined-us-nationalsecurity-c ozy-up-china. Sentinel Journal Volume 1, Issue 1 | Summer 2025 33 (IPO) on the New York Stock Exchange in June 2021, which gave American investors exposure to a company managing sensitive user data of China. Having triggered a sharp backlash from Beijing, within days of the IPO, the Chinese authorities launched a cybersecurity probe, citing concerns over the potential leakage of critical data abroad.106 The Didi app was removed from Chinese app stores, new user registration was halted, and the company lost approximately $22 billion in market capitalization.107 The Didi Chuxing case also drew attention in Washington. While the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission did not formally investigate Didi specifically, the IPO heightened scrutiny of Chinese companies listing on American exchanges.108 Lawmakers raised concerns about the lack of transparency regarding Chinese regulatory risks, prompting renewed support for the Holding Foreign Companies Accountable Act, whose aim is to ensure that foreign firms comply with U.S. audit statement requirements.109 Such an episode further proves that the Data Security Law functions not only as a tool of domestic control but also as an instrument of geopolitical signaling, widening the disconnect between Chinese and American regulatory regimes, particularly on the matters of data sovereignty, investor protection, and national security. 106 Vincent Ni, “Didi Ride-Hailing Service Pulled from App Stores in China,” The Guardian, July 5, 2021, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/jul/05/didiride-hailing-service-pulled-from-app-stores-in-china. 107 Divya Balji and Filipe Pacheco, “Didi Loses $22 Billion in Market Cap after China Crackdown,” The Economic Times, July 6, 2021, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/markets/stocks/n ews/didi-loses-22-billion-in-market-cap-after-chinacrackdown/articleshow/84171914.cms. 108 Dan Sullivan and John Kennedy, “Sullivan, Kennedy Call on SEC to Enforce Transparency Laws for Chinese Companies Following Didi IPO Debacle,” U.S. Senate, July 29, 2021, https://www.sullivan.senate.gov/newsroom/pressreleases/sullivan-kennedy-call-on-sec-to-enforcetransparency-law s-for-chinese-companies-followingdidi-ipo-debacle. Neurotechnology and Cognitive Monitoring The rapid advancements in neurotechnology are adding another layer of complexity to the transformation of surveillance and governance, as well as the interplay of the two. State and corporate actors are now exploring the capabilities of monitoring, influencing, and optimizing human cognition. This emerging capability marks a turning point in the evolution of digital control, collapsing the boundary between mind and machine and transforming the ethics behind innovation. The base for neuro-surveillance is only enhanced by the systematization of digital monitoring. More than half of the world’s CCTV cameras are located in China,110 many of them enhanced with AI-backed facial recognition capabilities.111 Such developments have not only been used to track criminals but also to detect abnormal behavioral patterns in public areas by analyzing facial expressions to predict antisocial tendencies. Facial recognition capabilities help identify individuals in a crowd even when masked, through gait analysis and thermal imaging, which turns anonymity into an unknown concept, especially in urban centers.112 While such technologies have the potential to improve workplace safety and efficiency, there is a lack of safeguards against unauthorized surveillance 109 Paul, Weiss, “U.S. Congress Passes Holding Foreign Companies Accountable Act,” December 4, 2020, https://www.paulweiss.com/practices/transactional/capi tal-markets/publications/us-congress-passes-holdingforeigncompanies-accountable-act?id=38728. 110 Anika Binnendijk, Timothy Marler, and Elizabeth M. Bartels, Brain-Computer Interfaces: U.S. Military Applications and Implications, An Initial Assessment (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2020), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2996.ht ml. 111 Pooja Rao, "How DARPA Drives Brain Machine Interface Research," From the Interface, November 22, 2020, https://www.from-the-interface.com/DARPA-funding-BCIresearch/. 112 Geographical, “Who’s Watching: The Cities with the Most CCTV Cameras.” Sentinel Journal Volume 1, Issue 1 | Summer 2025 34 and discrimination stemming from the broadness of the collected data. The power dynamics of institutions often compel citizens to comply in silence, undermining the very concepts of autonomy and consent. The U.S. Department of Defense 2024 report on China attests that such evolutions are not isolated incidents but part of a greater strategic objective to integrate cognitive monitoring into both military and civilian applications, supporting the CCP’s long-term ambitions for “intelligentized warfare” and population management through dual-use technologies.113 In essence, this doctrine allows the state to blur the distinction between domestic governance and the superiority of the battlefield. Chinese industries have begun implementing the use of EEG (electroencephalogram) sensors114 in wearable devices to assess workers' brain activity in real time, tracking attention, stress, and fatigue, which are then analyzed to adjust workloads or break times to enhance productivity.41 However, the experiment is also about social monitoring, involving identifying distracted employees and intervening before the loss of productivity occurs. The RAND Corporation brings the U.S. Department of Defense report even further by exploring the importance of human-machine collaborations, especially in the military applications of braincomputer interfaces (BCIs), which include enhancing situational awareness, speeding decision making, and detecting concealed intentions.42 Back in 2009, the U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) funded the Silent Talk Program, which pioneered nonverbal battlefield communication through neural signals, enabling soldiers to exchange 113 Jared Genser, Stephen Damianos, and Rafael Yuste, Safeguarding Brain Data: Assessing the Privacy Practices of Consumer Neurotechnology Companies (Washington, D.C.: Neurorights Foundation, April 2024), https://perseus-strategies.com/wpcontent/uploads/2024/04/FINAL_Consumer_Neurotechno logy_Report_Neurorigh ts_Foundation_April-1.pdf. basic commands without speaking, a precursor to the popular term of “synthetic telepathy.”43 In the present day, however, DARPA still stands at the forefront of neurotechnology advancement by introducing programs like Next-Generation Nonsurgical Neurotechnology (N3) and Targeted Neuroplasticity Training (TNT) by shifting to non-invasive brain-computers.44 Much like the intelligentized warfare of China, the United States is exploring scientific innovation, enhancing performance, but also operationalizing the brain itself as a node within the broader military command concept. The reality of the future makes cognitive monitoring a strategic asset, as the world becomes more militarized, necessitating the evolution of war tactics that slowly shift from biological and cybernetic warfare. The most pressing concern, however, arises in the civilian contexts as such technologies enter educational and corporate environments. The Neurorights Foundation 2024 report echoes this concern: it touches upon ethical, legal, and social implications of cognitive monitoring, since 90% of scientific companies appear to have access to the consumer’s neural data without any substantial access limitation.45 Unlike traditional biometrics, neural data touches on the most intimate domains of identity, memory, and intention. To contribute to the discussion of transformation of control, the report calls for recognizing mental privacy as a fundamental human right, proving that the dystopian narratives leave the pages of books and become a reality. Findings and Analysis 114 Glenn A. Fine, Statement of Glenn A. Fine, Inspector General, U.S. Department of Justice, before the House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, July 27, 2005, https://oig.justice.gov/news/testimony/statement-glennfine-inspector-general-us-department-justice-housejudiciary. Sentinel Journal Volume 1, Issue 1 | Summer 2025 35 United States: Legal Architecture of Digital Control While China’s digital governance model is often portrayed as authoritarian, key structural parallels are emerging in liberal democracies. To illustrate this trend, while the United States' surveillance is not centralized through state decree, it is distributed across commercial platforms and affirmed through legal instruments that prioritize national security and market regulation components. Unlike China’s overt assertion of territorial sovereignty over data, the U.S. model masks coercion behind contractual consent, embedding surveillance deep within terms of service, user authentication permissions, and cross-border data requests. Yet, from a functionality standpoint, both regimes rely on behavioral traceability as a condition of access to services, and both subordinate privacy to a broader project of control—China through state mandate, the U.S. through legal-market fusion. The following legislation will parallel the Chinese legal framework discussed earlier under 'China: Legal Architecture of Digital Control' in the corresponding order. USA PATRIOT Act (Section 215) Passed in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, the Act authorizes the U.S. government to obtain “any tangible things” relevant to national security investigations, including phone metadata and internet records, from private companies without notifying the individual concerned.46 The law institutionalizes mass warrantless data collection, often under suppression orders that prohibit disclosure. Though framed as counterterrorism, it effectively conscripts private tech infrastructure into intelligence operations. By naming an inherently unpatriotic law – patriotic, Congress voted on trading individual privacy 115 U.S. Senate, "Roll Call Vote 107th Congress - 1st Session," Vote Number 313, October 25, 2001, https://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_votes/vot e1071/vote_107_1_00313.htm. for national security, giving the American state and intelligence apparatus nearly limitless surveillance power. It is worth noting that out of 100 senators, Russ Feingold, the Democrat from Wisconsin, was the only one who voted against this Act.115 The CLOUD Act (2018) The Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data Act extends U.S. jurisdiction over digital data stored by U.S.-based companies, even if that data is held on servers abroad. It allows federal agencies to demand access to foreign-stored user information, bypassing local jurisdiction. Though positioned as a legal modernization effort, the CLOUD Act, in essence, asserts global data dominance, treating information as an extension of the American territorial sovereignty. In 2019, this law was used to compel access to emails stored on Microsoft servers in Ireland, raising immense concerns in the European Union over privacy and data sovereignty.116 Export Control Reform Act (2018) The Export Control Reform Act (ECRA) enables the U.S. government to regulate the export of emerging technologies, such as artificial intelligence, surveillance softwares, and facial recognition systems in the name of national security. This Act expands beyond physical goods, encompassing intangible data and software, asserting control over the dissemination of critical technologies that may be used in military and intelligence applications abroad. According to a 2023 CSIS analysis, ECRA has become a cornerstone of the U.S. strategy to curtail authoritarian access to strategic technologies, especially in the AI and semiconductor sectors. Not less importantly, through the ECRA regulatory framework, the United States has set de facto global standards by pressuring allies to follow its 116 Jennifer Daskal, "Microsoft Ireland, the CLOUD Act, and International Lawmaking 2.0," Stanford Law Review Online, March 29, 2018, https://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/microsoftireland-cloud-act-international-lawmaking-2-0/. Sentinel Journal Volume 1, Issue 1 | Summer 2025 36 export rules through shared licenses and diplomacy. Discussion Following China’s lead, governments around the world are now exploring the potential of scientific innovations under compulsory conditions to enforce conformity, control, and ease of access, all under the pretext of societal advancement, scientific innovation, and national security. Such an evolution raises profound anthropological questions on the matter of diminishing personal freedoms and the increasing control of states to manipulate and monitor their citizens. Together, these aforementioned laws create a potent infrastructure of surveillance and influence, comparable in ambition to the centralized model of China, marking the global normalization of data-based governance. Despite divergent ideologies, both states are constructing systems that prioritize traceability, prediction, and data sovereignty. The main difference lies in optics, not outcomes. This is not a matter of political style, but of structural evolution: digital control is no longer a feature of authoritarianism alone—it is becoming foundational to modern statecraft. This framework positions digital dictatorship not as a violation of democratic norms but as a logical evolution of technopolitical consolidation. Whether framed as national security in the U.S. or social harmony in China, the underlying goal is the same: to turn human behavior into an optimizable variable. Conclusion The implementation of China’s Social Credit System represents more than a domestic governance tool. The system promises a narrative for the creation of a new model of digital authoritarianism. Upon collapsing boundaries between personal data, moral judgment, and political conformity, the Chinese Communist Party is constructing a framework where the state becomes the sole arbiter of ethical behavior. Within such a system, individuals are not merely observed but molded, rewarded for compliance, and penalized for dissent in ways that reform everyday actions into acts of ideological allegiance. The erosion of ethical pluralism under such a model poses a high risk of leading a society to be governed by fear, suspicion, and transactional loyalty, mirroring the darkest projections of the dystopian reality. What emerges is not just a traditional totalitarian regime, but a technopolitical order engineered to preempt disobedience through analytics, predictive surveillance, and social scoring. The convergence of biometric surveillance, AI-driven technologies, and even experimental neurotechnology raises immense concerns about the future of autonomy, identity, and human agency. Without ethical regulations and public awareness in place, such systems risk becoming blueprints for control beyond the borders of China. As access to opportunity, mobility, and even thought itself becomes mediated by algorithms, the digital age presents a foundational dilemma: Will technology serve as an instrument of liberation or subjugation in the world of the future? The answer will depend not only on how humanity understands the subject matter described in these pages, but also on whether it continues to accept the veil of national security as an unquestioned justification for the unchecked power. When wielded without transparency, national security ceases to protect the public and instead becomes a cover for power that isolates itself from the people and from the peace it claims to uphold. Sentinel Journal Volume 1, Issue 1 | Summer 2025 37 Author Biography Inna Vladimirovna Osetrova is an international student and graduate researcher at the Institute of World Politics in Washington, D.C., where she studies statecraft and international affairs, with a specialization in economics. She serves as Internship Programs Coordinator at IWP, speaks four languages, is an active member of the Latin social dance community, and aspires to apply her skills in project management. Her work focuses on how culture and digital systems, through an anthropological lens, reshape governance and global power dynamics. Photo by Matias Mango: https://www.pexels.com/photo/numbers-projected-on-face-5952651/ Sentinel Journal Volume 1, Issue 1 | Summer 2025 38 Bibliography Beattie, Andrew. “Alibaba IPO: Why List in the U.S.?” Investopedia, August 2, 2023. https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/112614/alibaba-ipo-why-list-us.asp. Bertelsmann Stiftung. BTI 2008 | China Country Report. 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Ma, Alexandra. “China Has Started Ranking Citizens with a Creepy 'Social Credit' System — Here's What You Can Do Wrong, and the Embarrassing, Demeaning Ways They Can Punish You.” Business Insider India, March 7, 2018. https://www.businessinsider.in/china-has-started-ranking- Sentinel Journal Volume 1, Issue 1 | Summer 2025 40 citizens-with-a-creepy-social-credit-syst em-heres-what-you-can-do-wrong-and-theembarrassing-demeaning-ways-they-can-punish-you/a rticleshow/63666457.cms. Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT). "Notice on Cleaning Up and Regulating the Internet Access Service Market." January 17, 2017. Translated by China Law Translate. https://www.chinalawtranslate.com/en/miit-notice-on-cleaning-up-and-regulating-theinternet-acc ess-service-market/. Musser, Micah. “Don’t Assume China’s AI Regulations Are Just a Power Play.” Center for Security and Emerging Technology, October 3, 2022. https://cset.georgetown.edu/article/donts-assume-chinas-ai-regulations-are-just-a-power-play/. Ni, Vincent. “Didi Ride-Hailing Service Pulled from App Stores in China.” The Guardian, July 5, 2021. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/jul/05/didi-ride-hailing-service-pulled-from-app-storesin-china. Paul, Weiss. “U.S. Congress Passes Holding Foreign Companies Accountable Act.” December 4, 2020. https://www.paulweiss.com/practices/transactional/capital-markets/publications/uscongress-pass es-holding-foreign-companies-accountable-act?id=38728. Rao, Pooja. "How DARPA Drives Brain Machine Interface Research." From the Interface, November 22, 2020. https://www.from-the-interface.com/DARPA-funding-BCI-research/. Sharma, Riya. “Alibaba Shares Soar 74% in 2025 amid the Latest AI Bet, DeepSeek Rivalry. China Stocks Turning a Corner?” The Economic Times, March 7, 2025. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/markets/stocks/news/alibaba-shares-soar-74-in-2025amidthe-latest-ai-bet-deepseek-rivalry-china-stocks-turning-acorner/articleshow/118778507.cms. Shen, Fei. "The Complex Truth About China's Social Credit Scheme." GovInsider, August 28, 2018. https://govinsider.asia/intl-en/article/the-truth-about-chinas-social-credit-scheme. South China Morning Post. Hu Jintao Escorted Out of Party Congress. October 22, 2022. Video, 1:01. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QtpGkgabpcU. Statista. “Number of Active WeChat Messenger Accounts from 2nd Quarter 2011 to 2nd Quarter 2024.” Accessed April 29, 2025. https://www.statista.com/statistics/255778/number-of-active-wechat-messenger-accounts/. Stevenson-Yang, Anne. “Keeping the Flies Out.” ChinaFile, February 3, 2022. https://www.chinafile.com/reporting-opinion/viewpoint/keeping-flies-out. Sullivan, Dan, and John Kennedy. “Sullivan, Kennedy Call on SEC to Enforce Transparency Laws for Chinese Companies Following Didi IPO Debacle.” U.S. Senate, July 29, 2021. https://www.sullivan.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/sullivan-kennedy-call-on-sec-toenforc e-transparency-laws-for-chinese-companies-following-didi-ipo-debacle. Umar, Awn. Obfuscating Network Traffic to Circumvent Censorship. MEng dissertation, University of Bristol, 2021. https://spacetime.dev/papers/obfuscating-network-traffic.pdf. U.S. Department of Defense. Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China. Annual Report to Congress. December 18, 2024. https://media.defense.gov/2024/Dec/18/2003615520/-1/-1/0/MILITARY-AND- Sentinel Journal Volume 1, Issue 1 | Summer 2025 47 tatzpitaniyot. They reported activity along the southern border with Gaza, but their warnings were disregarded.152 The women reported to Haaretz that their warnings were not moved up the chain of command because of inherent sexism: “chauvinism”153 was potentially one of the key failures in Israel’s inability to defend against Hamas’s attack. Furthermore, Egyptian and American intelligence sources provided Israeli officials with early warning, albeit ambiguously on the part of the Egyptians. An Egyptian intelligence agency informed Israel that ‘something big’ was going to happen soon.154 This advance warning was vague, and therefore hard to act upon, but it was still not taken seriously. The CIA warned of possible violent flare-ups in Gaza twice before 7 October 2023: the first classified report was issued on September 28th, 2023 and noted potential rocket launchings by Hamas; the second one was issued just two days before the attack on October 5th, 2023.155 None of these warnings were delivered to high Israeli government officials or taken at face value as imminent threats.156 Money trails stemming from Iran directly to Hamas also could have provided warning, but they too were disregarded.157 While the warnings were registered, they were not agreed upon, believed, or moved up the chain of command. The different actors involved in decision-making in Israel and the various intelligence and IDF units issuing warnings neither coordinated responses to the alerts nor acted uniformly to prepare defensively. As noted by Lani 152 Review of Surveillance Soldiers Charge Sexism a Factor in Their Oct. 7 Warnings Being Ignored. The Times of Israel. November 19, 2023. 153 Lecker, Maya. “On October 7, Sexism in Israel’s Military Turned Lethal.” Haaretz, November 20, 2023, sec. Haaretz Today. 154 “Egypt Intelligence Official Says Israel Ignored Repeated Warnings of ‘Something Big.’” 2023. The Times of Israel. October 9, 2023. 155 Barnes, Julian E., Adam Entous, Edward Wong, and Adam Goldman. “C.I.A. Reports Contained General Warnings of Potential Gaza Flare-Up.” The New York Times, October 13, 2023. Kass and Jack London, coordination between the military and the intelligence community are essential in forming grand strategy and countering surprise, denial, and deception.158 Israeli forces lacked alignment except in the case that this brush aside of alarm was uniformly justified by an inaccurate belief that Hamas was inferior to Israel. Additionally, Hamas was in transition to apparent governance of the Gaza Strip, constraining its use of force to deceive Israel and confirm bias. Overall, the IDF did not trust any departmental analysis of Hamas’s capabilities to attack on such a scale: the Israeli military was incapable of imagining the unimaginable. Whether this was a failure of intelligence or a cognitive bias, analytic managers conflated assessments, building intentions solely off capabilities: this was a failure of structural policy and assessment in practice. Intelligence officials failed to implement the practices put into place after the Yom Kippur War to prevent strategic surprise and deception. The IDF had the steps in place to prevent another surprise, but a breakdown of the Devil’s Advocate system—whether due to bias or the misinterpretation and combination of capabilities and intent—led to the IDF ostensibly dismissing the warnings. Hamas’s ‘Transition’ While Hamas did not hide its military exercise, it did maintain a public impression of refraining from engagement with Israel. Hamas began its deception in its ‘transition’ from militancy to governance of the Gaza Strip. It campaigned for 156 Beaumont, Peter. “Israeli Intelligence Leak Details Extent of Warnings over Hamas Attack.” The Guardian, November 28, 2023, sec. World news. 157 Samuels, Ben. 2024. “‘Notoriously Opaque’: The Money Trails Linking Hamas, Al-Qaida, Sudan and Iran.” Haaretz, January 9, 2024, sec. Middle East. 158 Lani Kass, J. Phillip “Jack” London, Surprise, Deception, Denial and Warning: Strategic Imperatives, Orbis, Volume 57, Issue 1, 2013: 61. Sentinel Journal Volume 1, Issue 1 | Summer 2025 48 Gazans to work in Israel: by harnessing social improvement, Hamas tricked Israel into thinking its ideological violence was contained.159 Furthermore, these workers were recruited by Hamas to supplement open-source intelligence to assist in mapping out kibbutzim and Israeli territory to attack on 7 October 2023.160 Hamas also listened to Israeli political and military commentary on news outlets, and used Google and other search engines to obtain public information that would be beneficial in their attack plans. Meanwhile, the IDF believed that Hamas was complacent and therefore they refocused their resources on the West Bank.161 Many reservists were moved from Gaza. This decrease in monitoring was one factor leading to Israel’s downfall: in addition to minimal surveillance of Gaza, the IDF ceased keeping track of handheld radios, judging the signals monitoring a “waste of effort.”162 Instead, the IDF began to over-rely upon signals intelligence (SIGINT) and communications intelligence (COMINT) from phones. Little did they know, Hamas explicitly told its military branch to cease communication regarding attacks on phones and to only use walkie-talkies.163 Technology Reliance Additionally, the IDF believed that its ubiquitous border technology and Iron Dome air defense system would deter Hamas. On October 1st, 2023, Tzachi Hanegbi, Israeli National Security Advisor, said, “Hamas is very, very restrained.”164 Even Jake Sullivan, U.S. National Security Advisor, believed that Hamas was adamant on avoiding war, 159 Nakhoul, Samia, and Jonathan Saul. “How Hamas Duped Israel as It Planned a Devastating Attack.” Reuters, October 9, 2023, sec. Middle East. 160 Hubbard, “Behind Hamas’s Bloody Gambit to Create a ‘Permanent’ State of War.” 161 Bergman, “How Years of Israeli Failures on Hamas Led to a Devastating Attack.” 162 Rathbone, John Paul, and Neri Zilber. 2023. “How Israel’s Spymasters Misread Hamas.” Financial Times, November 9, 2023. 163 Shultz, “Strategic Surprise and Deception.” “bolster[ing]” its rule of governance over military action.165 Israeli defense and security officials relied upon the concept of mitigation of conflict, with the mistaken belief that the Israeli border defenses “were enough to keep Hamas contained.”166 However, the most important misjudgment of Israeli defense decision-makers was regarding Hamas’s employment of weapons and technology. Israeli leaders “failed to grasp the way Hamas would combine relatively simple tools into a sophisticated, multi-pronged attack that outmaneuvered a much larger, more powerful army.”167 This technological pomposity led to Israel’s failure to defeat otherwise ‘inferior’ technology.168 Hamas even engaged in operational deception during the 7 October 2023 attack when it deployed rockets, underlining the misperception that attack was not the goal—Hamas was merely continuing the ceasefire status-quo of the occasional rocket launching. Through its deception, Hamas exposed the fragile state of Israeli defense, reliant on technology and failures in intelligence-gathering to understand the true intentions and capabilities of its adversary. Vulnerabilities Hamas also exploited Israeli vulnerability for its own advantage. Israeli news, social media, and commentary on political ongoings provided opensource intelligence into Israel’s fragility. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government is controversial: he has been involved in multiple corruption trials and his global approval ratings are 164 Robbins, James S. n.d. “Hamas Thinks They Are Winning - the American Spectator | USA News and PoliticsThe American Spectator | USA News and Politics.” The American Spectator | USA News and Politics. Accessed April 4, 2024. 165 Hubbard, “Behind Hamas’s Bloody Gambit to Create a ‘Permanent’ State of War.” 166 Hubbard, “Behind Hamas’s Bloody Gambit to Create a ‘Permanent’ State of War.” 167 Hubbard, “Behind Hamas’s Bloody Gambit to Create a ‘Permanent’ State of War.” 168 Rathbone, “How Israel’s Spymasters Misread Hamas.” Sentinel Journal Volume 1, Issue 1 | Summer 2025 49 low.169 The polar divide in Israeli civilian dialogue and support prior to 7 October 2023 provided for vulnerability. Hamas was “embolden[ed]”170 by Israel’s weakness and attacked its typically stronger counterpart, shattering Israeli morale. Denial Denial, a tactic to achieve deception, was twofold in relation to the events of 7 October 2023. First, Hamas denied information access and intelligence to Israel. Its ability to do so highlights its incredible counterintelligence capabilities. Second, the Israeli mentality denied the creative possibility that Hamas could indeed attack in such a manner. An Israeli hubris and superiority complex led to the denial of fact: cognitive bias proved detrimental when IDF officials received warnings and chose to believe that Hamas was incapable of grand-scale attack. 7 October 2023 proved Hamas’s sophisticated capabilities, destructive intent, and the manners in which the Israeli government failed to overcome a groupthink mentality of being an impenetrable military superpower. The attack occurring despite early warning is proof of an Israeli failure of imagination. Additional denial transpired when the political wing of Hamas was left unaware of the attack plan, and the militants involved were kept in the dark until the morning of the attack.171 They were denied information about the attack so that they could hold reasonable guilt and not be intercepted by Israeli intelligence. Nonetheless, the militants still practiced military exercises in public, and some IDF border guards noted this with concern.172 However, an adversary’s strategic changes in deception are slow and incremental, done 169 Dagres, Holly. 2024. “Netanyahu Might Be Losing Ground, but His Politics Still Resonate with Most Israelis.” Atlantic Council. March 6, 2024. 170 Bergman, “How Years of Israeli Failures on Hamas Led to a Devastating Attack.” 171 Hubbard, “Behind Hamas’s Bloody Gambit to Create a ‘Permanent’ State of War.” so in an overt manner to justify unalarming behavior.173 Hamas practicing military exercises in public led the IDF to deem these alerts of deviation from the norm as alarmists instead of realistic.174 Plans of attack were not discussed on mobile phones, and the handheld radios that Israeli Intelligence Combat Unit 8200 recently stopped monitoring were used instead for communication.175 This ensured that Israeli intelligence was denied further information about the attack. These means of deception proved imperative in creating a false sense of security and complacency within the IDF and the Israeli government. Lessons in Intelligence Studies and Tradecraft 7 October 2023’s intelligence failure underscores the critical importance of embedding devil’s advocacy and continuous questioning into analytic tradecraft to mitigate systemic biases. The attack’s occurrence can largely be attributed to systemic issues, the sophisticated denial and deception employed by Hamas, an overreliance on supposed technological superiority, and a dismissive attitude toward certain intelligence inputs. These factors converged, creating a blind spot that facilitated large-scale surprise. Systemic failures in Israeli intelligence highlight how the absence of structured devil’s advocacy and/or red cells may allow flawed assumptions to persist unchallenged. The breakdown of a rigorous analytic process inhibits critical examination of capabilities and intent. In the case of 7 October 2023, early warnings, including explicit intelligence from Unit 8200, reports from IDF surveillance units, and signals from American 172 Beaumont, “Israeli Intelligence Leak Details Extent of Warnings over Hamas Attack.” 173 Shultz, “Strategic Surprise and Deception.” 174 Shultz, “Strategic Surprise and Deception.” 175 Bergman, “How Years of Israeli Failures on Hamas Led to a Devastating Attack.” Sentinel Journal Volume 1, Issue 1 | Summer 2025 50 and Egyptian intelligence, were largely ignored. This was compounded by a deep-seated cognitive bias within Israeli decision-making circles that underestimated Hamas as a serious military threat. Assumptions of a Hamas shift from militancy to governance further reinforced a false sense of security. Cognitive biases entrenched within Israeli leadership led to the dismissal of credible indicators, such as the ‘Jericho Wall’ plan and overt military exercises by Hamas. Without the deliberate incorporation of dissenting perspectives, Israeli intelligence failed to disrupt the collective overconfidence that left the nation vulnerable. Strengthening systemic practices of devil’s advocacy is essential in analytic tradecraft to ensure that all threats, regardless of initial plausibility, are evaluated rigorously. Hamas’s use of deception demonstrates how adversaries can exploit gaps in tradecraft. Through its careful control of operational details and dissemination of intent, Hamas effectively bypassed Israeli monitoring systems. Communications were deliberately conducted over unmonitored channels, while overt political and social activities created an illusion of governance. These calculated efforts to mislead analysts capitalized on Israeli internal divisions, as well as overconfidence in the Israeli assessment of Hamas. This deception succeeded in part due to it not being countered by critical intelligence scenarios. The incorporation of devil’s advocacy is therefore imperative to countering adversarial attempts of deception. The overreliance on technology within Israeli intelligence underscores how tradecraft can falter without a strong emphasis on analytic questioning. Israeli agencies leaned heavily on signals intelligence (SIGINT) and communications intelligence (COMINT), while overlooking other critical sources, such as human intelligence 176 Kass, Surprise, Deception, Denial and Warning: Strategic Imperatives: 59. (HUMINT) and open-source intelligence (OSINT). This narrow focus failed to detect Hamas’s unconventional preparations, such as the use of Gazan workers and publicly available maps to aid their attack. The events of 7 October 2023 illustrate the essential need for comprehensive tradecraft to counter overconfidence. Addressing these failures requires a fundamental shift in intelligence practices toward a culture of humility and rigorous selfcritique. The embedding of reform into the core of analytic tradecraft may facilitate governments reducing their susceptibility to strategic surprises while strengthening their overall preparedness. Conclusion Israel’s false belief that Hamas was deterred led to its falling victim to Hamas’s scheme of deception. Hamas’s catastrophic success “capitaliz[ed] on hubris… and self-delusion.”176 According to three Israeli defense officials in an interview with the New York Times, “nobody believed the situation was serious enough to wake up Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.”177 They could not comprehend that Hamas had successfully attacked one of the greatest contemporary military forces, Israel, and was even able to catch it off-guard. Conclusions of the 7 October 2023 events indicate that, while strategic surprise occurred, it should not have been a tactical surprise. Israel’s intelligence failure and susceptibility to Hamas’s 7 October 2023 attack is attributed to the conflation of capabilities and intent, misapprehension of threat levels, and cognitive bias. Overall, Hamas’s success highlights the challenge of asymmetric warfare and countering ideological actors. The intelligence failure of 7 October 2023 evidences the imperative nature of remaining vigilant, utilizing all-source intelligence, and preparing robust strategic planning for all possible national security events—including the unimaginable. The events of October 7 demonstrate 177 Bergman, “How Years of Israeli Failures on Hamas Led to a Devastating Attack.” Sentinel Journal Volume 1, Issue 1 | Summer 2025 51 the dangers of cognitive bias and overconfidence in intelligence and decision-making processes. Moving forward, intelligence agencies and policymakers must adopt a posture of humility and rigorously challenge their own assumptions to avoid future strategic surprises. The use of all-source intelligence, alongside a culture of robust internal critique, will be essential in adapting to evolving threats and safeguarding national security. The most important takeaway from 7 October 2023 on a strategic level is that, for effective military and political planning, humility is key: hubris is disastrous. Sentinel Journal Volume 1, Issue 1 | Summer 2025 52 Author Biography Julia Shufro is a Senior Consultant in the Washington, D.C. metro area who specializes in emerging technologies, counterterrorism, and irregular warfare. Prior to her time in DC, Julia worked at the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), where she was a Secretariat member of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) Implementation Support Unit (ISU), Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS), and Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW). Julia received her Master of Arts in Law and Diplomacy (MALD) from The Fletcher School, with focus on international security and law. This publication was her final research submission for her graduate studies. Julia obtained her bachelor’s degree in history and French from Tufts University. Photo by Tomer Dahari: https://www.pexels.com/photo/soldiers-walking-on-a-brown-field-11452420/ Sentinel Journal Volume 1, Issue 1 | Summer 2025 53 Bibliography Barnes, Julian E., Adam Entous, Edward Wong, and Adam Goldman. “C.I.A. Reports Contained General Warnings of Potential Gaza Flare-Up.” The New York Times, October 13, 2023. Beaumont, Peter. “Israeli Intelligence Leak Details Extent of Warnings over Hamas Attack.” The Guardian, November 28, 2023, sec. World news. Bergman, Ronen, and Adam Goldman. 2023. “Israel Knew Hamas’s Attack Plan More than a Year Ago.” The New York Times, December 1, 2023, sec. World. Byman, Daniel, Riley McCabe, Alexander Palmer, Catrina Doxsee, Mackenzie Holtz, and Delaney Duff. “Hamas’s October 7 Attack: Visualizing the Data.” CSIS. 19 December 2023. Chadwick, Andrew, and James Stanyer. 2021. “Deception as a Bridging Concept in the Study of Disinformation, Misinformation, and Misperceptions: Toward a Holistic Framework.” Communication Theory 32 (1). https://doi.org/10.1093/ct/qtab019. Cohen, Raphael S., David E. Johnson, David E. Thaler, Brenna Allen, Elizabeth M. Bartels, James Cahill, and Shira Efron. “Lessons from Israel’s Wars in Gaza.” Santa monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2017. Dagres, Holly. 2024. “Netanyahu Might Be Losing Ground, but His Politics Still Resonate with Most Israelis.” Atlantic Council. March 6, 2024. “Doctrine of Hamas.” 2023. Wilson Center. October 20, 2023. “Egypt Intelligence Official Says Israel Ignored Repeated Warnings of ‘Something Big.’” 2023. The Times of Israel. October 9, 2023. Erdman, Shelby Lin. 2014. “Israeli Authorities Identify the Suspects in Teens’ Kidnapping.” CNN. June 26, 2014. Flamer, Netanel. “Counterintelligence: the Case of Hamas on 10/7.” 21st Century Intelligence Seminar. Class lecture at the Fletcher at Tufts University, Medford, MA, 8 April 2023. Hubbard, Ben, and Maria Abi-Habib. 2023. “Behind Hamas’s Bloody Gambit to Create a ‘Permanent’ State of War.” The New York Times, November 8, 2023, sec. World. Hu, Hadas, Gold, Shirin Faqiri,Helen Regan,Jessie Yeung,Caitlin. 2023. “Israel Formally Declares War against Hamas as It Battles to Push Militants off Its Soil.” CNN. October 8, 2023. Lani Kass, J. Phillip “Jack” London, Surprise, Deception, Denial and Warning: Strategic Imperatives, Orbis, Volume 57, Issue 1, 2013. Lecker, Maya. “On October 7, Sexism in Israel’s Military Turned Lethal.” Haaretz, November 20, 2023, sec. Haaretz Today. Michman, Dror and Yael Mizrahi-Arnaud. “The fog of uncertainty: learning from the intelligence failures of the 1973 war.” Brookings. 23 October 2017. Nakhoul, Samia, and Jonathan Saul. “How Hamas Duped Israel as It Planned a Devastating Attack.” Reuters, October 9, 2023, sec. Middle East. “National Counterterrorism Center | Foreign Terrorist Organizations - Hamas.” National Counterterrorism Center, Director of National Intelligence. September 2022. https://www.dni.gov/nctc/ftos/hamas_fto.html. “Only 15% of Israelis Want Netanyahu to Keep a Job after the Gaza War, Poll Finds.” 2024. Reuters. January 2, 2024. Sentinel Journal Volume 1, Issue 1 | Summer 2025 54 Rabinovich, Itamar. “Israel’s 1973 October War: A 50-Year Perspective.” Brookings. October 3, 2023. Rathbone, John Paul, and Neri Zilber. 2023. “How Israel’s Spymasters Misread Hamas.” Financial Times, November 9, 2023. Review of Head of IDF Devil’s Advocate Unit Tried Repeatedly in September to Warn of Possible Hamas Attack. 2024. The Times of Israel. January 4, 2024. Review of Surveillance Soldiers Charge Sexism a Factor in Their Oct. 7 Warnings Being Ignored. The Times of Israel. November 19, 2023. Riedel, Bruce. “Enigma: The Anatomy of Israel’s Intelligence Failure Almost 45 Years Ago.” Brookings. September 25, 2017. Robbins, James S. n.d. “Hamas Thinks They Are Winning - the American Spectator | USA News and PoliticsThe American Spectator | USA News and Politics.” The American Spectator | USA News and Politics. Accessed April 4, 2024. Robinson, Kali. “What Is Hamas?” Council on Foreign Relations. Council on Foreign Relations. October 31, 2023. Samuels, Ben. 2024. “‘Notoriously Opaque’: The Money Trails Linking Hamas, Al-Qaida, Sudan and Iran.” Haaretz, January 9, 2024, sec. Middle East. Sherwood, Harriet, and Hazem Balousha. “Gaza Ceasefire: Israel and Palestinians Agree to Halt Weeks of Fighting.” The Guardian. The Guardian. August 27, 2014. Shulsky, Abram. Elements of Strategic Denial and Deception. Trends in Organized Crime, Volume 6, 2000. Shultz, Richard. “Strategic Surprise and Deception.” 21st Century Intelligence Seminar. Class lecture at the Fletcher at Tufts University, Medford, MA, 1 April 2023. “Simchat Torah: A Jewish Holiday of Reading, Renewal and Resilience.” Colorado Arts and Sciences Magazine. October 14, 2022. Vinograd, Cassandra, and Isabel Kershner. 2023. “Israel’s Attackers Took about 240 Hostages. Here’s What to Know About Them.” The New York Times, November 4, 2023, sec. World. Zonszein, Mairav. 2015. “Israel Killed More Palestinians in 2014 than in Any Other Year since 1967.” The Guardian. The Guardian. March 27, 2015. Sentinel Journal Volume 1, Issue 1 | Summer 2025 55 Russia is winning the Disinformation War with Ukraine Author: Sean G. McKelvey (ORCID) ABSTRACT Russian Foreign Malign Influence (FMI) campaigns include propaganda, weaponized information, and disinformation. Russian disinformation is content developed explicitly by Russian intelligence services and/or their proxies to intensify the effect of FMI and Weaponized Information on American society, as well as all other Western-style democratic societies. One method Russia uses to spread disinformation is by using fake news sites. Russian fake news sites typically masquerade online as USbased news sites and propel false narratives to their audience. The content on Russian faux news sites is often used as a method to manipulate the American public by creating discord. However, discord is not the only upside for Russian leaders. Russia’s goal is to influence American citizens, U.S. domestic policy, and U.S. foreign policy, specifically as it relates to the war in Ukraine. For this strategy to be effective, the disinformation aimed at the American public must appear to be authentic. Also, elected officials must amplify and repeat the information to reinforce confirmation bias in the U.S. citizenry who may have voted for those same political leaders. Towards this endeavor, disinformation flows consistently from Russian state-controlled media such as Russia Today News (RT News) and Sputnik News that is intended to capture the attention of U.S. based media outlets. Furthermore, Russia funds large swaths of fake and legitimate news media outlets such as Tennessee-based Tenet Media, which, according to U.S. prosecutors, is a front for a Russian influence operation. Regrettably, Tenet Media is not a rarity. There are a significant number of fake news outlets in the U.S. that are funded, heavily influenced by, and/or outright controlled by Russian security services. As a result, fraudulent sites are very successful at masquerading as legitimate sites. These faux sites influence social media personalities and their audiences to believe wildly inaccurate disinformation, especially regarding Russia’s war with Ukraine. Most alarming is the fact that far too many American citizens are not only susceptible to this manipulative strategy but are also unwitting co-conspirators. KEYWORDS: Disinformation, Russian, Foreign Malign Influence, Propaganda Sentinel Journal Volume 1, Issue 1 | Summer 2025 56 DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.15206735 On February 24, 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine, and media outlets worldwide covered the Russian invasion, providing 24/7 coverage. On February 19, 2025, President Donald Trump blamed Ukraine’s leaders for Russia’s invasion. “You should have never started it,” Mr. Trump said, referring to Ukraine’s leaders. “You could have made a deal.”178 This remark by Trump was preceded by and followed up with a blitzkrieg of Russian propaganda and disinformation. Ukrainian President Volodymir Zelenskyy responded Wednesday to President Trump’s accusation overnight that Ukraine started its war with Russia, saying that Trump is trapped in a “Russian disinformation bubble.”179 If Zelenskyy is correct and Trump does live in a disinformation bubble, he’s not there alone. A YouGov poll published Wednesday, February 19th, shows that while most Americans believe that Russia started the war with the Ukraine at 61 percent, 6 percent believe it was Ukraine who began the conflict. Fifteen percent of Americans think both countries shared equal blame, and 18 percent said, “not sure.”180 Figure 1.0: YouGov Survey on “Who do you think started the war between Russian and Ukraine?”181 178 https://www.nytimes.com/2025/02/19/world/europe/trumpzelensky-ukraine-comments.html 179 https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2025/02/19/zelensky y-hits-back-at-trump/79176501007/ 180 https://today.yougov.com/topics/politics/surveyresults/daily/2025/02/20/05ee7/4 The numbers in figure 1.0 may seem insignificant, considering only 6 percent of adults surveyed agree with President Trump about who started the war. However, the 18 percent of Americans who are “not sure” should be jarring to those who believe that foreign malign influence doesn’t have a significant impact. This survey reveals three levels of effectiveness of Russian malign influence campaigns. Eighteen percent represent uncertainty, level three. The 15 percent who believe both nations started the war represent bewilderment, level two. Lastly, the percent who blame Russia represents the holistically inaccurate, level one. Arguably, the 18 percent in level three could graduate to level 2, and maybe even level one if saturated with enough disinformation. However, even if these numbers remain fixed, this survey reflects a win for Russian disinformation campaigns. Russian malign influence has successfully created an environment where nearly 39 percent of American adults surveyed believe something that is not aligned with reality. How did we arrive at this juncture? This article will explore the timeline of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, some of the more egregious false narratives disseminated by Russia’s disinformation campaign against Ukraine to date, the accurate information, and the primary sources of Russian disinformation. A Brief History – The Warsaw Pact and NATO In 1955, the Soviet Union formed a military alliance with Eastern European countries during the 181 https://today.yougov.com/topics/politics /surveyresults/daily/2025/02/20/05ee7/4 Sentinel Journal Volume 1, Issue 1 | Summer 2025 63 digital devices. News websites or apps and search engines are the most common: About two-thirds of U.S. adults sometimes get news in each way. A little more than half 54 percent at least sometimes get news from social media, and 27 percent say the same about podcasts.”205 Finally, other media platforms deceptively present themselves as legitimate news source outlets when they are fake news sites set up by U.S. citizens who are working with Russian intelligence services. While all the distribution methods of the information warfare ecosystem are important, the fake news sites are one of Russia’s most brazen yet effective tactics. Therefore, while media literacy is crucial for Americans and has always been, it is now more critical than ever. Too many Americans find themselves in a monsoon of information, struggling to decipher fact from fiction. For the U.S. to win the information warfare game in the future, we must have a relentless and well-defined strategy, especially for combating foreign malign influence. If we do not, Americans will likely accept the narrative from the loudest and most repetitive influencers in media. Influencers, whether knowing or unknowing agents of hostile states, have proven that they can persuade our entire nation that it is not in our best interest to support an allied nation. This is an anathema to our values, erodes trust with our allies, and strengthens our enemies. Therefore, the U.S. Government must be vigilant and proactive in its struggle to win the information warfare game. 205 News Platform Fact Sheet, 2024 | Pew Research Center Sentinel Journal Volume 1, Issue 1 | Summer 2025 64 Author Biography Sean McKelvey is a Doctoral student at the Institute of World Politics with a focus on Russian foreign malign influence operations, and disinformation campaigns. In his career, Sean is a strategic communications/public affairs consultant with Science Applications International Corporation, (SAIC) supporting the Department of Defense. Specifically, Sean's SAIC contract title role is head of digital media supporting the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, (OUSD R&E). Photo by Markus Winkler: https://www.pexels.com/photo/close-up-shot-of-a-typewriter-4160060/ Bibliography https://www.nytimes.com/2025/02/19/world/europe/trump-zelensky-ukraine-comments.html https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2025/02/19/zelenskyy-hits-back-attrump/79176501007/ https://today.yougov.com/topics/politics/survey-results/daily/2025/02/20/05ee7/4 NATO Speech: The Atlantic Alliance and European Security". Nato.int. Retrieved 2 July 2022. Itzkowitz Shifrinson, Joshua R. (Spring 2016). "Deal or No Deal? The End of the Cold War and the U.S. Offer to Limit NATO Expansion". International Security. 40 (4). Belfer Center for Science and International Blomfield, Adrian; Smith, Mike (6 May 2008). "Gorbachev: US could start new Cold War". The Daily Telegraph. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c36wn949jxno https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-praises-trump-saying-nato-was-major-cause-warukraine-2025-02-19/ "Ukraine applies for Nato membership after Russia annexes territory". The Guardian. 30 September 2022. Archived from the original on 1 October 2022. Retrieved 30 September 2022. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/finland-set-join-nato-historic-shift-while-sweden-waits2023-04-04/ https://www.newsweek.com/marjorie-taylor-greene-applauds-russia-protecting-christianity-1888145 https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2025/01/02/sought-to-divide-the-american-people-u-s-sanctionsiranian-and-russian-entities-pushing-disinformation/ Steven Lee Myers, Spate of Mock News Sites with Russian Ties Pop Up in U.S. March 7, 2024 Spate of Mock News Sites With Russian Ties Pop Up in U.S. - The New York Times (nytimes.com) Anne Applebaum, “The New Propaganda War” The Atlantic June 2024 Issue Suzanne Spaulding, Devi Nair and Arthur Nelson, “How the Kremlin Works to Undermine the U.S. Justice System” Center for Strategic and Internation Studies (CSIS) (2019) http://www.jstor.com/stable/resrep22556.6 News Platform Fact Sheet, 2024 | Pew Research Center Sentinel Journal Volume 1, Issue 1 | Summer 2025 65 The Future of US Military Operations: Coalitions, Alliances, and Advisors Author: Corey Shiver (ORCID) ABSTRACT Coalition warfare stands as the primary mode for future US conflicts. Success demands effective collaboration with allies, rooted in the nation’s historical experience and General Fox Conner’s dictum: “Never fight unless you have to. Never fight alone. Never fight for long.” I propose that adherence to these principles can be facilitated through effective collaboration. This article delineates guidelines for US leaders on establishing and navigating coalitions within alliance structures and emphasizes the importance of military advisors in unconventional warfare. Drawing on qualitative interviews with military personnel and scholarly sources, this study aims to enhance future leaders’ understanding of coalition dynamics and strengthen US relationships with allies and partners. KEYWORDS: Military, Coalitions, Alliances, Advisors, International, Partnerships DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.15928192 Fighting within coalitions is the future of warfare. While historical records document coalition warfare, the contemporary landscape accentuates the primacy of alliances and coalitions owing to the deeprooted entrenchment of globalization and the leaps in communication technologies. The integration of transportation systems, trade dynamics, and other economic facets has intricately intertwined nations, amplifying the equilibrium of power among different Sentinel Journal Volume 1, Issue 1 | Summer 2025 66 alliance factions and their sway over individual countries.206 Consequently, the unilateral exercise of national agency, particularly in the theater of war, is progressively daunting. A grasp of the nuances delineating coalitions from alliances proves pivotal. Though often conflated, these terms diverge significantly. Primarily, coalitions tend to be transitory, assembled to achieve specific objectives, and may disband upon their attainment.207 Conversely, alliances typically exhibit enduring commitments. To simplify, alliances are strategic constructs aimed at mutual defense among states, while coalitions are tactically focused on accomplishing particular goals.208 Furthermore, member states within these frameworks adopt distinct nomenclature. In coalitions, states commonly designate each other as partners, whereas those within alliances typically identify themselves as allies. Although these terms may be used interchangeably, especially when alliances and coalitions synergize toward similar strategic aims, the operational context dictates their usage. For instance, in a coalition operation devoid of alliance structure, servicemembers are more inclined to refer to counterparts from other states as partners, and vice versa in purely alliance-based operations. This article will predominantly employ the terms coalitions and advisors, contending that their utilization is indispensable for advancing US interests abroad. In addition, the tool of military advisors to achieve foreign policy goals will be discussed. Through the effective deployment and usage of advisors, coalitions, and alliances, the United States 206 Walt, Stephen M. The Origins of Alliances. Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1987. 207 Henke, Marina E. Constructing Allied Cooperation: Diplomacy, Payments, and Power in Multilateral Military Coalitions. Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 2019. and its allies will better ensure global security and stability. All three tools of multinational cooperation allow the United States to build upon the existing security framework, while also extricating resources to be obligated towards other defense initiatives and programs. While there is extensive pre-existing academic literature discussing the use of multilateral military partnerships, this article utilizes such literature in tandem with historical case studies and interviews with current practitioners from the United States and its allies to inform and present solutions and novel initiatives that may benefit the United States military in its multinational operations in the contemporary. This article aims to contribute to the discourse on traditional and military diplomacy by presenting empirically informed, historicallygrounded solutions, novel approaches, and innovative initiatives that synthesize theoretical insights from realism with practical expertise garnered the experiences of practitioners currently engaged in the field. The Role of Coalitions and Alliances Alliances and coalitions serve not only as instruments of warfare but also as potent deterrents. The establishment of a robust alliance presents a formidable obstacle to potential adversaries contemplating military aggression, particularly when alliance members are strategically positioned within the adversary’s sphere of influence.209 Assessing America’s military prowess, adversaries scrutinize our capability and resolve. Perceiving our armed forces, populace, and international military relationships as 208 Walt, Stephen M. The Origins of Alliances. 209 Walt, Stephen M. The Origins of Alliances. Sentinel Journal Volume 1, Issue 1 | Summer 2025 67 resolute and formidable in designated theaters, adversaries naturally balk at engaging. Moreover, alliances play a pivotal role in fortifying the defense of US spheres of interest without necessitating extensive deployments of military personnel. However, US leadership must exercise judiciousness in committing military forces, mindful of the historical pitfalls exemplified by the overextension of alliances leading to the cataclysm of World War I. While cultivating numerous allies is advantageous, caution must prevail to avoid entanglements in conflicts where America lacks the capacity or will to engage. As General Fox Conner, the esteemed mentor of Generals Dwight Eisenhower and George Patton, sagely advised, “Never fight unless you have to. Never fight alone. Never fight for long.”210 Adhering to General Conner’s wisdom, both military and political leaders can mitigate the recurrence of past military setbacks in America’s recent history. Simply put, an effective coalition hinges on robust capabilities and shared commitment. Consequently, the United States should forge alliances and coalitions exclusively with nations capable of meaningful contributions and a steadfast determination to achieve common operational objectives. A shared purpose among coalition members, coupled with substantial contributions, is imperative for the success of collaborative military endeavors. Currently, a balance of power, or as Stephen Walt posits, a balance of threat, continues to characterize the geopolitical landscape.211 NATO’s eastward 210 David T. Zabecki, “3 Warfighting Lessons from Patton’s Mentor Fox Conner,” Historynet, 5 April 2022, https://www.historynet.com/. 211 Walt, Stephen M. The Origins of Alliances. expansion and the formation of anti-Western alliances by several of America’s adversaries underscore the convergence of nations with shared adversaries to bolster their defense capabilities. Fortunately, the United States boasts a multitude of allies worldwide. Nonetheless, the efficacy of these alliances hinges on the ability of US forces to effectively collaborate with them. When the United States military undertakes operations necessitating cooperation with partners or allies, US military and political leadership must adeptly navigate cultural and political disparities to ensure operational success. Understanding how to surmount these differences necessitates leveraging insights from our storied military history. In essence, US leaders must continually draw lessons from history to effectively address contemporary challenges, particularly within coalition frameworks.212 This study will scrutinize pivotal factors influencing the outcomes of coalition operations, including cultural dynamics, rules of engagement, and communication protocols. Additionally, it will feature case studies elucidating both the triumphs and setbacks of past coalition military endeavors. Understanding Our Friends When collaborating with allies or partners, comprehending their cultural nuances is imperative.213 Culture profoundly shapes the behavior of allies both prior to and throughout an operation. Allies from diverse backgrounds seldom conform to American cultural norms and persist in maintaining their own cultural identities despite efforts to assimilate them 212 Brig Gen Thomas V. Draude, USMC, retired, interview by author, University of South Florida, 2022. 213 Ibid. Sentinel Journal Volume 1, Issue 1 | Summer 2025 68 into the US military milieu. Thus, fostering effective interaction with our partners necessitates a genuine effort to grasp their cultural contexts. Before delving into an understanding of our allies, introspection into our own national identity and the trajectory that has brought the United States to its present circumstances is essential. Historically, the United States has operated under what retired lieutenant General H.R. McMaster terms strategic narcissism, as delineated in his book Battlegrounds.214 Following the Cold War triumph, America ascended to the status of sole superpower, precipitating the emergence of a unipolar world order. Within this paradigm, US leadership operated under the assumption that no external entity, be it a nation-state or nonstate actor, could challenge the United States politically, economically, or militarily.215 However, this self-assured approach to foreign policy unwittingly paved the way for the resurgence of geopolitical adversaries such as Russia and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), precipitating the transition from a unipolar to a multipolar world order. Considering this evolving geopolitical landscape, it is imperative for the United States to relinquish the constraints of past modes of thinking and confront the challenges that lie ahead. Embracing a paradigm of understanding and cooperation is paramount, rather than seeking to impose American cultural norms on our allies. Within the realm of military affairs, adopting this new ethos entails recognizing the intrinsic value of understanding the diverse cultures of both allies and adversaries, rather than imposing our own cultural hegemony. 214 H.R. McMaster, Battlegrounds: The Fight to Defend the Free World (New York: Harper, 2020), 15. 215 H.R. McMaster, Battlegrounds. To gain insight into the culture of our partners, a comprehensive study encompassing their religion, history, and language is imperative.216 These three facets constitute the cornerstone of cultural understanding, providing a foundational framework for navigating the complexities of diverse partner cultures, given the impracticality of intimately grasping every culture allied with America. Yet, by focusing on these key elements, a foundational understanding can be established, paving the way for successful intercultural relationships. Religion stands out as the foremost aspect to explore, serving as the bedrock of perspective for nations with strong religious affiliations. While working alongside European partners may pose fewer challenges in this regard due to shared religious beliefs akin to those of Americans, collaborations with nations in regions such as the Middle East and the Indo-Pacific require a nuanced approach due to the heightened societal emphasis on religion. In these contexts, religion assumes a significant role in shaping both daily interactions and broader military operations. Understanding the religious underpinnings of partner nations is essential for navigating cultural sensitivities and fostering effective cooperation.217 Throughout the history of the Middle East, the ongoing confrontation between Christians and Muslims has left an indelible mark, inevitably influencing operations in the region.218 Thus, fostering partnerships with Muslim-majority countries and collaborating within the area alongside them is crucial to mitigate the longstanding stigma that has persisted for centuries between these religious communities. 216 Dr. Mohsen Milani, interview by author, University of South Florida, 2022. 217 Ibid. 218 Ibid. Sentinel Journal Volume 1, Issue 1 | Summer 2025 69 In addition to the Middle East, understanding the religious dynamics holds significance for strengthening relations between the United States and regional partners in the Indo-Pacific. Unique religious affiliations characterize this region, necessitating a nuanced approach. For instance, Japan, bound by the United States’ longest-standing mutual security treaty, predominantly adheres to Shintoism or Buddhism.219 Consequently, US servicemembers must possess a basic understanding of these faiths, alongside awareness of Hinduism, pertinent for engagements with Indian counterparts.220 Moreover, with an estimated 1.5 million followers of Islam scattered across the Indo-Pacific, servicemembers must also factor in considerations related to this religion in their operations.221 Religion not only shapes the overarching alliance dynamics but also influences day-to-day operations. An examination of a devout Muslim’s daily regimen reveals stark disparities compared to those of non-Muslims. For instance, Muslims are obligated to perform five daily prayers, requiring allocated time for this ritual, unlike their non-Muslim counterparts. Rather than displaying annoyance, Americans should proactively accommodate these religious practices as a gesture of respect toward our partners. For instance, designating prayer rooms for Muslims in applicable buildings can demonstrate sensitivity to their religious needs. While numerous differences exist between American religious beliefs and those of our partners, such measures represent a 219 George R. Packard, “The United States-Japan Security Treaty at 50: Still a Grand Bargain?,” Foreign Affairs 89, no. 2 (March–April 2010): 92–103, https://www.jstor.org/. 220 Biswas, Soutik. “Pew Study: Little Change in India’s Religious Make-up in 70 Years.” BBC News, September 21, 2021. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india58595040. 221 Conrad Hackett et al., The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2010–2050 positive stride toward cultural understanding. In the words of Edward Lansdale, a pivotal figure in the early stages of the Vietnam War and the Cold War era, it is imperative for us to “Like, Learn, and Listen” when collaborating with partners, especially when navigating divergent cultural and religious landscapes.222 In contrast to America’s Middle Eastern and Indo-Pacific partners, adversaries exploit these religious differences to garner local support, leveraging them to their advantage. Such circumstances pose significant challenges for coalitions and monocultural military entities reliant on local populations for assistance during operations. The repercussions of misunderstanding this dynamic are underscored by America’s recent missteps in the Middle East. The failure of America’s nation-building efforts in Afghanistan stemmed from various factors, chief among them being a failure to comprehend the culture and religion of the populace in whom we sought to instill democracy. Our endeavor to impose democracy on a non-Western nation faltered, as we underestimated the entrenched tribal governance system that has historically defined Afghan society and will persist despite our interventions. Understanding the religion of a partner or adversary necessitates delving into the realm of history. As Americans, our historical perspective differs markedly from much of the world, given our (Washington: Pew Research Center, 2 April 2015), https://assets.pewresearch.org/. 222 Mathews, Jay. “Perspective | Half of the World Is Bilingual. What’s Our Problem?” The Washington Post. WP Company, April 25, 2019. https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/halfthe-world-is-bilingualwhats-ourproblem/2019/04/24/1c2b0cc2-6625-11e9-a1b6b29b90efa879_story.html. Sentinel Journal Volume 1, Issue 1 | Summer 2025 70 relatively young nationhood of only 350 years. In contrast, the Indo-Pacific region boasts a rich historical tapestry spanning millennia, profoundly shaping contemporary events.223 While America’s genesis is rooted in conflict and is underscored by a robust military history, the Indo-Pacific region also harbors a wealth of military narratives, often stemming from ethnic and religious conflicts. By comprehending the historical context of the IndoPacific and other regions pivotal to US interests, Americans can glean insights into the motivations underlying interand intra-state conflicts. Another crucial aspect to consider when striving to grasp cultural dynamics is language. In addition to religion, language forms a fundamental component of individual identity.224 Regrettably, Americans often fall short in their efforts to acquire proficiency in foreign languages. According to the US Census Bureau, a mere 20 percent of Americans can converse in two or more languages, a stark contrast to most Europeans who possess multilingual capabilities.225 Enhancing relationships with allies necessitates a concerted investment in linguistic education, extending beyond civilian populations to encompass the military as well. While the US Department of Defense (DOD) already boasts exemplary language programs, a renewed commitment to fostering interpersonal connections with other nations warrants increased resource allocation to these initiatives. Historically, Americans have leaned on their status as a global power, often expecting political and 223 Dr. Milani, Mohsen, interview by author, University of South Florida, 2022. 224 Ibid. 225 Jay Matthews, “Half of the world is bilingual. What’s our problem,” Washington Post, 25 April 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/. military leaders from other nations to communicate in English. However, in the race to forge robust relationships with other nations ahead of our adversaries, our linguistic limitations may emerge as a vulnerability. Hence, initiating a concerted effort to promote widespread language learning within our military and society at large is imperative to fortify our communication skills in anticipation of future conflicts. As the onset of conflict invariably necessitates seamless communication with our allies across all military echelons, preparedness is paramount. A poignant illustration of how breakdowns in communication can precipitate failure lies beyond the realm of international coalitions, exemplified by the intelligence community’s shortcomings leading up to 9/11. Despite sharing a common language, the CIA and FBI’s failure to exchange critical information and collaborate effectively on matters of national security created vulnerabilities that were exploited by terrorists.226 In solemn reflection of this reality, prioritizing effective communication among organizations and allies is essential to avert future calamities. To advance our understanding of religion, history, and language, thereby enhancing our relationships with allies, this article proposes initiating curriculum revisions in our military academies. While many academies already include requirements for history and foreign language courses, there is a need for expansion, particularly in the realms of foreign language acquisition, world history, and cultural studies. This study advocates for augmenting these 226 The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the U. 2004. The 9/11 Report: The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. N.p.: St. Martin’s Press. Sentinel Journal Volume 1, Issue 1 | Summer 2025 71 studies within the curriculum, with a specific emphasis on instruction delivered by foreign officers who can provide authentic insights into the cultures being studied. By equipping young leaders with prior education on the cultures they will engage with and facilitating early connections with foreign military members, we can mitigate errors and safeguard relationships from potential harm. Similar initiatives have been implemented previously. Prior to the Vietnam War, the Naval Academy institute a policy of ensuring each midshipman had basic proficiency in either French or Vietnamese.227 This was critical for the development of our military’s development of young leaders heading into the conflict and can be replicated in the contemporary to ensure our military possesses similar advantages and access to critical language proficiency. Moreover, enlisted military personnel, who often find themselves on the frontlines interacting with diverse cultures, must also receive comprehensive training in cultural understanding. This can be achieved through the incorporation of targeted courses into professional military education programs. For instance, existing senior noncommissioned officer and noncommissioned officer academies across military branches could integrate cultural education modules into their curricula or establish specialized schools dedicated to cultural education. Offering incentives such as compensation or proficiency pay upon achieving language proficiency could incentivize participation in these programs. 227 Brig Gen Thomas V. Draude, USMC, retired, interview by author, University of South Florida, 2022. 228 Defense Manpower Data Center. June 2024. https://dwp.dmdc.osd.mil/dwp/app/dod-datareports/workforce-reports. In ensuring all categories of personnel across the Department of Defense become more able practitioners of military diplomacy, language training opportunities must be extended to the civil service. The Department of Defense employs around 800,000 civilian personnel across various agencies and branches, with many involved in security cooperation activities.228 While the Department of Defense offers language learning opportunities and incentives to active duty servicemembers, civilian employees have limited to no access to comparable resources, creating a disparity in professional development opportunities. Effective Communication in Coalitions After gaining insight into the culture of coalition partners and adversarial nations, the next crucial step is understanding how to effectively communicate within a coalition framework. Effective communication lays the foundation for trust within a coalition, without which the coalition’s purpose is undermined.229 Therefore, it is imperative to analyze the factors that foster effective communication to cultivate trust. Numerous strategies can be employed to enhance communication within a coalition, with technological advancement emerging as paramount. Whether on the battlefield or within headquarters, advancements in communications are indispensable for fostering trust and operational efficiency. Continual investment and innovation in communication technology are essential to fortify the military’s communication infrastructure, ensuring its 229 USCENTCOM Coalition Interviews, interview by author, (MacDill Air Force Base, 2022). Sentinel Journal Volume 1, Issue 1 | Summer 2025 72 resilience against adversary interference. Equally vital is ensuring that our allies have access to similar technological capabilities to mitigate miscommunication risks amid the chaos of conflict onset. While maintaining security protocols, it is imperative not to hoard technological advancements but rather to share them generously with allied forces. In this regard, establishing routine exercise programs in collaboration with our allies is vital to fostering effective communication on the battlefield. These exercises, such as the DefenderEurope22 conducted in the spring of 2022, serve as invaluable opportunities for joint training and coordination between the United States and several NATO countries. Such exercises facilitate the refinement of communication protocols and interoperability, thereby strengthening the cohesion and effectiveness of coalition operations. Large-scale exercises akin to DefenderEurope22 are equally imperative for engagement with partners in the Indo-Pacific region. In 2023, the United States, alongside several partners, participated in Super Garuda Shield 2023, a military exercise held in Indonesia, aimed at showcasing multilateral partnerships.230 While the primary objective of such exercises is to deter adversaries, they also serve as invaluable platforms for joint training in the utilization of advanced communication methods. To ensure sustained solidarity and efficacy in future conflicts within the Indo-Pacific region, regular exercises like Super Garuda Shield 2023 should be conducted, involving key partners of the United States. 230 Niniek Karmini /. “Global Allies Join U.S. in Indo-Pacific Military Drills amid Rising China Concerns.” Time, August 31, 2023. https://time.com/6309993/us-indonesiamilitary-exercise-china/. In addition to investing in technological communication infrastructure, attention should also be directed toward physical infrastructure to foster interpersonal relationships and trust within coalitions. Over the course of a prolonged coalition, efforts should be made to convene representatives from various coalition members in shared spaces to facilitate intermilitary relationships. For instance, the Multinational Coordination Center (MNCC) at MacDill Air Force Base in Florida serves as a nexus where military officers from over forty nations are stationed.231 While the US Central Command (USCENTCOM) coalition primarily focuses on operations in the Middle East, its members engage in discussions on global events and collaborate on shared objectives.232 Co-locating these officers fosters daily interactions, facilitating the establishment and maintenance of trust.233 Throughout their interactions, officers discuss their respective countries’ interests and assist one another in achieving their governments’ objectives through military diplomacy.234 Grounded in shared military experiences, these relationships are characterized by practicality and efficacy, contrasting with the complexities often associated with political diplomacy. While the presence of coalition members at MacDill Air Force Base under USCENTCOM is invaluable, there are infrastructure challenges that warrant attention. For instance, the coalition building is situated across the street from the USCENTCOM headquarters, nestled within a sprawling compound at the base’s epicenter. While the headquarters boasts robust security measures, the physical separation 231 USCENTCOM Coalition Interviews, interview by author, (MacDill Air Force Base, 2022). 232 Ibid. 233 Ibid. 234 Ibid. Sentinel Journal Volume 1, Issue 1 | Summer 2025 79 military and government to gravitate toward the allure of tactical engagements due to their immediacy and excitement. While tactical tools like advisors are crucial, equal emphasis should be placed on prioritizing the long-term strategy they serve. As aptly stated by General Draude, “tactics without strategy is the noise you hear before defeat.”258 In essence, if leaders lose sight of the strategic purpose behind deploying tactical tools in a military conflict, their actions risk being futile. In addition to their role in fostering relationships with partners and advancing the goals outlined in an ICS, advisor units also offer a costeffective solution. Despite the vast annual budget allocated to the DOD, there is widespread consensus among taxpayers and policy makers regarding the importance of leveraging cost-effective measures in fulfilling military missions. While advisors may not be applicable in all scenarios, their deployment often presents a more economically viable option compared to establishing new bases or deploying naval groups. Hence, decision makers responsible for military budget allocation should reassess the opportunity cost between investing in new carrier construction and bolstering the advisor corps, as the latter may yield broader effectiveness, particularly in times of relative peace. Although the prevailing international landscape is fraught with conflicts in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and escalating tensions in the South China Sea, the significance and utility of SFABs and advisor units should not be overshadowed by the emphasis on armament buildup. Having examined the current operational framework of advisor units embodied by SFABs, it is 258 Brig Gen Thomas V. Draude, USMC, retired, interview by author, University of South Florida, 2022. 259 Myers, Meghann, Why 20 years wasn’t enough to train the Afghan army to win, (Marine Corps Times, April 2023). imperative to reflect on past instances, both positive and negative, to glean insights for their application in future scenarios. Over the past two decades, both exemplary and detrimental cases have emerged. A negative instance unfolded during the GWOT in Afghanistan, where a multitude of factors, including inadequate planning and limited political support, hindered the effectiveness of US military advisors. John Sopko, Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, remarked on the fragmented approach characterized by short-term planning, stating, “we basically had 20 oneyear plans, or 10 two-year plans.”259 Moreover, it was observed that US military units assigned to train Afghan forces lacked sufficient advisor or pre-deployment training.260 Consequently, advisors found themselves trapped in a cycle of short, one-year rotations, attempting to impart basic soldier duties and tactics to Afghan counterparts. However, the Afghan Army struggled to adapt to the frequent turnover and substandard training, resulting in advisors assuming operational responsibilities originally designated for Afghan forces.261 Ultimately, this unsustainable approach contributed to the rapid collapse of the Afghan National Army and government following the US military withdrawal. Having delved into the shortcomings of advisor operations in Afghanistan, we can now pivot to examine a more auspicious example of such endeavors. A compelling case emerges in the collaborative efforts between the SFABs and the Ukrainian Defense Force amid the ongoing conflict with Russia. As of the time of this publication, the war in Ukraine remains ongoing, and the commendable 260 Myers, Meghann, Why 20 years wasn’t enough to train the Afghan army to win, (Marine Corps Times, April 2023). 261 Ibid. Sentinel Journal Volume 1, Issue 1 | Summer 2025 80 performance of the Ukrainian military is, to some extent, attributable not only to the provision of equipment—whether sold or donated—but also to the extensive developmental support orchestrated by the US Army National Guard. Since 2015, various branches of the United States military have been actively engaged in aiding the training and enhancement of the Ukrainian Defense Force. Operating within the framework of the Joint Military Task Group Ukraine, the National Guard has deployed multiple units and entities in nine-month rotations to Ukraine.262 Throughout these rotations, the respective task forces have played a pivotal role in refining the capabilities of the Ukrainian Defense Force through strategic organizational reforms, key leader engagements, and comprehensive tactical instruction.263 In the initial phases of the program, US advisors focused on imparting fundamental soldiering skills and tactics to Ukrainian military personnel. As the proficiency of the Ukrainian forces burgeoned, the curriculum transitioned from individual and small unit tactics to more complex group-level maneuvers. Subsequently, the collaborative effort facilitated the establishment of a dedicated combat training center within Ukraine, aimed at cultivating proficiency in brigade-level tactics among Ukrainian troops.264 Furthermore, as the Ukrainian forces demonstrated increased competency, US advisors assumed an observer role, serving as mentors to ensure the accurate and efficient dissemination of knowledge by Ukrainian instructors.265 262 US National Guard, Task Force Gator Interview, interview by author (Online, 2023). 263 US National Guard, Task Force Gator Interview, interview by author (Online, 2023). 264 US National Guard, Task Force Gator Interview, interview by author (Online, 2023). At the organizational level, senior US advisors played a pivotal role in spearheading institutional reforms within the Ukrainian military through Key Leader Engagements. These strategic initiatives fostered a transformative shift within the Ukrainian Army, imbuing it with traits more akin to those of Western armed forces, in stark contrast to the Soviet military structure it had hitherto mirrored. Notably, US advisors played a crucial role in cultivating a robust noncommissioned officer corps—an aspect conspicuously absent in the Russian military.266 This decentralized command framework equipped Ukrainian troops with the agility to make prompt and decisive decisions during combat scenarios. In contrast, the Russian military relies heavily on officerled decision-making processes, often resulting in delays in critical decision-making during combat engagements. As the threat of Russian invasion loomed ominously, the imperative to relocate the current rotation of US advisors from Ukraine became increasingly evident. Swift action was necessitated, leading the current contingent of advisors from the Florida National Guard, operating under Task Force Gator, to expeditiously transition to a US military installation in Germany. Upon establishing themselves at this new locale, Task Force Gator devised an innovative approach to continue training Ukrainian forces. As the United States and other Western nations began sharing and supplying military equipment and capabilities to Ukraine, Task Force Gator assumed the role of facilitating the movement 265 US National Guard, Task Force Gator Interview, interview by author (Online, 2023). 266 US National Guard, Task Force Gator Interview, interview by author (Online, 2023). Sentinel Journal Volume 1, Issue 1 | Summer 2025 81 of Ukrainian military personnel from the frontline to the installation. Subsequently, after undergoing a brief training regimen, these personnel would seamlessly transition back to the frontline armed with enhanced capabilities. Even following the conclusion of the training phase, Ukrainian forces continued to lean on their former US advisors for technical support with the newfound capabilities, often seeking guidance on field repairs and operational intricacies. For instance, advisors reported receiving urgent calls from their Ukrainian counterparts during live artillery engagements, underscoring the enduring reliance on US mentorship and expertise in critical moments of conflict. Upon learning about Task Force Gator’s accomplishments during the last advisor rotation in Ukraine, it becomes perplexing why their contributions didn’t garner more recognition and appreciation. It is imperative to dissect the factors underpinning their success to ascertain replicable strategies for future advisor missions. In stark contrast to the Afghan advisor experience, members of the Florida National Guard attached to Task Force Gator underwent extensive advisor and predeployment training before their deployment to Ukraine. Mandatory attendance at the Combat Advisor Training Course at Fort Benning (now Fort Moore), Georgia, equipped them with the requisite skills to effectively mentor foreign military personnel. Furthermore, members of Task Force Gator were deployed to Ukraine while the preceding rotation of National Guardsmen was still active. This transitional overlap facilitated knowledge transfer, allowing Task Force Gator to glean insights into Ukrainian progress and assimilate lessons learned from their predecessors’ training methodologies. To replicate the success achieved by advisors in Ukraine, a meticulous examination of their operational lessons is imperative. Remarkably, many of the insights gleaned by members of Task Force Gator closely mirror those observed within the USCENTCOM coalition. Central to their success, akin to other coalition endeavors, is the establishment of trust. Since 2015, the US Army SFABs and National Guard have diligently cultivated trust with Ukrainian counterparts, fostering a robust partnership and receptivity to US guidance. Regrettably, this reciprocal dynamic was not evident in Afghanistan, potentially due to various factors such as pervasive anti-American sentiment in the Muslim world, cultural disparities, or resistance to foreign military presence within Afghanistan. Conversely, Ukrainian forces actively sought US mentorship, viewing it as pivotal to enhancing their combat proficiency in potential conflicts with Russia—an aspiration predominantly embraced in western Ukraine. This shared resolve to defend against Russian aggression stands as a cornerstone of the advising mission’s success in Ukraine, reaffirming the pivotal role trust and a unifying purpose play in fostering effective multi-national military operations, mirroring the dynamics observed within coalitions. The imperative of recruiting our most skilled and capable military personnel for SFAB advisor roles should be underscored, particularly considering their proven efficacy in advancing strategic objectives at the tactical level. Currently, the prestige associated with advisor duties within our military ranks appears diminished, with many aspiring for positions within conventional US units for career advancement purposes. It is time to shift this paradigm and actively encourage our top military talent to leverage their expertise in training and mentoring our allies. To achieve this, we must enhance growth opportunities and implement more stringent selection criteria to Sentinel Journal Volume 1, Issue 1 | Summer 2025 82 ensure we deploy our finest individuals to guide and support our allies. As previously noted, deploying advisors to train foreign militaries serves as a crucial aspect of military diplomacy. By dispatching seasoned soldiers who demonstrate unwavering dedication and competence, America upholds its armed forces’ professional and disciplined image, bolstering confidence and cooperation among our allies. Regrettably, it appears that America’s policy makers have strayed from the wisdom espoused by luminaries such as General Lansdale and General Conner, as evidenced by the missteps observed in America’s engagements in Afghanistan and the Middle East. Hopefully, akin to the lessons gleaned from Operation Desert Storm, US leaders will heed these historical insights in future military endeavors. Ideally, diplomatic, informational, and economic efforts would preempt the need for military intervention. Nevertheless, the United States must remain vigilant and prepared to defend itself, equipped with the knowledge necessary to engage in conflict effectively, ensuring a swift and decisive victory. Conclusion In conclusion, alliances, coalitions, and advisor missions are poised to shape the future landscape of US military operations. As the world becomes further entrenched within the Great Power Competition, the significance of these partnerships, resources, and collective strength continues to escalate. In today’s context, forging alliances with nations sharing similar values emerges as a potent strategy for countering our adversary’s burgeoning influence throughout the world. China’s ascent, Russia’s expansionism, and Iranian sponsorship of terror all pose a direct challenge to US interests, necessitating a proactive stance involving deterrence and concerted action alongside regional allies. Effectively collaborating with our allies demands a paradigm shift, requiring Americans to embrace cultural understanding, language proficiency, and adept interpersonal and technical communication. Furthermore, drawing lessons from our storied military history offers invaluable insights into navigating future conflicts. While the tools of warfare evolve, the echoes of past engagements resonate, guiding our strategic approach. Crucially, success in any coalition, alliance, or advisory mission hinges on a foundation of shared purpose and mutual trust. Therefore, fostering unity and confidence among partners remains paramount for achieving collective goals. As we confront the challenges ahead, it behooves Americans to immerse themselves in the annals of history, gleaning wisdom to confront and overcome the obstacles on the horizon. Sentinel Journal Volume 1, Issue 1 | Summer 2025 83 Author Biography Corey Shiver is a Foreign Affairs Specialist with the United States Air Force, actively engaging with international partners through security cooperation efforts. He is also a graduate student at the Institute of World Politics and an alumnus of the University of South Florida where he received his bachelor's degree in political science. The contents of this article are of the opinion of the author, and do not represent the views of the United States Air Force, United States Department of Defense, or any other departments or agencies within the United States Government. Photo by Agata Cetta: https://www.pexels.com/photo/man-leaning-on-a-military-truck-talking-on-a-smartphone17314534/ Sentinel Journal Volume 1, Issue 1 | Summer 2025 84 Bibliography Biswas, Soutik. “Pew Study: Little Change in India’s Religious Make-up in 70 Years.” BBC News, September 21, 2021. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-58595040. Brig Gen Thomas V. Draude, USMC, retired, interview by author, University of South Florida, 2022. Conrad Hackett et al., The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2010– 2050 (Washington: Pew Research Center, 2 April 2015), https://assets.pewresearch.org/. David T. Zabecki, “3 Warfighting Lessons from Patton’s Mentor Fox Conner,” Historynet, 5 April 2022, https://www.historynet.com/. Defense Manpower Data Center. June 2024. https://dwp.dmdc.osd.mil/dwp/app/doddatareports/workforce-reports Dr. Mohsen Milani, interview by author, University of South Florida, 2022. George R. Packard, “The United States-Japan Security Treaty at 50: Still a Grand Bargain?,” Foreign Affairs 89, no. 2 (March–April 2010): 92–103, https://www.jstor.org/ H.R. McMaster, Battlegrounds: The Fight to Defend the Free World (New York: Harper, 2020), 11, 15 Henke, Marina E. Constructing Allied Cooperation: Diplomacy, Payments, and Power in Multilateral Military Coalitions. Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 2019. Kerber, Ross, and Sarah N. Lynch. 2023. “U.S. arrests 21-year-old National Guardsman for online intelligence leaks.” Reuters, April 14, 2023. https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-air-nationalguardsman-suspected-leakingintel-be-arrested-thursday-source-2023-04-13/. Mathews, Jay. “Perspective | Half of the World Is Bilingual. What’s Our Problem?” The Washington Post. WP Company, April 25, 2019. https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/half-theworld-is-bilingual-whatsour-problem/2019/04/24/1c2b0cc2-6625-11e9-a1b6b29b90efa879_story.html. Niksch, Larry, and Robert Sutter. “Japan’s Response to the Persian Gulf Crisis: Implications for U.S.- Japan Relations.” Washington D.C., May 23, 1991. https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metacrs8/m1/1/high_res_d/91444f_1991May23.txt. Niniek Karmini /. “Global Allies Join U.S. in Indo-Pacific Military Drills amid Rising China Concerns.” Time, August 31, 2023. https://time.com/6309993/us-indonesia-military-exercise-china/. Rice, Athony J. Command and Control: The Essence of Coalition Warfare. US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters. 1997. Doi:10.55540/0031-1723.1817. The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the U. 2004. The 9/11 Report: The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. N.p.: St. Martin’s Press. USCENTCOM Coalition Interviews, interview by author, (MacDill Air Force Base, 2022). USMC Lieutenant Colonel Charles H. Cureton, U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991. With the 1st Marine Division in Desert Shield and Desert Storm (History and Museums Division Headquarters, Washington D.C, 1993), 23. Walt, Stephen M. The Origins of Alliances. Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1987. Sentinel Journal Volume 1, Issue 1 | Summer 2025 85 “War Overview.” National Desert Storm and Desert Shield War Memorial. Accessed December 9, 2022. http://www.ndswm.org/war-overview. Sentinel Journal Volume 1, Issue 1 | Summer 2025 86 The Hidden Gender of Espionage: Exploring the Statistical Probability and Psychological Factors of Female Espionage AUTHOR: Shane McNeil (ORCID); Carla Renner (ORCID) ABSTRACT This paper examines the statistical probability of more women engaging in espionage than those charged or convicted. The investigation focuses on psychological factors associated with espionage, including psychopathy, narcissism, immaturity, grandiosity, ideology, a desire for excitement or adventure, a need for revenge or to feel important, and a willingness to engage in risky behavior. Additionally, it explores psychological disorders such as depression, ADHD, and PTSD, which increase the likelihood of criminal behavior, although they are not directly associated with espionage. These disorders are more prevalent in women, suggesting a potential link to illegal activity. The article presents an algorithm for determining the probability of women committing espionage based on the rates of these psychological disorders and the percentage of women with access to sensitive or classified national security information. Furthermore, it examines the differences between espionage and leaking and the psychological factors associated with each. The gender ratio of individuals with access to sensitive information is explored, as well as the reasons behind the lower number of women charged or convicted of espionage despite the expected rates based on psychological factors. Finally, the article proposes future studies to delve deeper into this complex topic. KEYWORDS: Counterintelligence, Espionage, Intelligence, Leaking, National Security, Psychological Disorders, Women DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.16924083 Sentinel Journal Volume 1, Issue 1 | Summer 2025 87 Espionage, a significant national security concern, often involves adversarial nations exploiting psychological factors in individuals with access to sensitive information that motivates their involvement in illicit activities. This article investigates the statistical probability that more women engage in espionage than those charged or convicted for such crimes. By examining various psychological factors associated with espionage, including psychopathy, narcissism, immaturity, grandiosity, ideology, a desire for excitement or adventure, a need for revenge or to feel important, and a willingness to engage in risky behavior, we aim to shed light on the potential gender disparities in espionage cases. Additionally, we explore psychological disorders, such as depression, ADHD, and PTSD, which increase the likelihood of criminal behavior and are more prevalent in women. Although not directly associated with espionage, these disorders may contribute to criminal involvement. By utilizing an algorithm, we determine the probability of women committing espionage based on the rates of these psychological disorders and the percentage of women with access to sensitive or classified national security information. Significance of Espionage as a National Security Concern Espionage threatens a nation's security by jeopardizing its defense capabilities, military strategies, intelligence operations, and diplomatic relations. Adversaries accessing stolen or compromised information can use it to develop countermeasures, exploit vulnerabilities, or gain insights into classified operations, undermining a nation's security apparatus. Furthermore, espionage has severe economic consequences, targeting intellectual property, trade secrets, and cutting-edge technologies. The theft of proprietary information or technological advancements can harm domestic industries, weaken competitiveness, impede innovation, and result in economic losses and job displacements, hindering a nation's economic growth. Espionage activities targeting diplomatic channels can strain international relations and erode trust between nations. The revelation of confidential negotiations, diplomatic cables, or sensitive discussions undermines diplomacy, impedes cooperation, and adversely impacts diplomatic efforts, potentially leading to diplomatic tensions or breakdowns in relations. Critical infrastructure sectors, such as energy, transportation, telecommunications, and financial systems, are at risk from espionage activities. Adversaries seek to exploit vulnerabilities in these sectors, potentially causing disruptions, compromising safety, or gaining leverage in times of geopolitical tensions, which can directly impact a nation's stability and functioning. Espionage extends beyond traditional military or political arenas and encompasses non-traditional security threats. Cyber espionage, for example, involves exploiting technological vulnerabilities to infiltrate computer networks and steal sensitive data. The consequences of such cyber espionage activities can be far-reaching, including financial losses, compromised infrastructure, and damage to public trust in online systems. Additionally, espionage targeting political processes and democratic institutions undermines the integrity of elections, erodes public trust, and disrupts governance systems. The manipulation of information or interference in political affairs can erode democratic principles, disrupt social cohesion, and undermine the functioning of democratic institutions, posing a threat to the democratic fabric of a nation. Though not considered espionage, leaking of classified information to the media poses a grave threat to U.S. national security by allowing foreign governments and intelligence services easy access to sensitive information that is out in the open, and without necessarily playing a direct role facilitating the leak. Given these implications, espionage requires significant attention and robust counterintelligence efforts to protect national security interests. Measures such as intelligence gathering and analysis, enhancing Sentinel Journal Volume 1, Issue 1 | Summer 2025 88 cybersecurity defenses, strengthening legislation and enforcement against espionage activities, promoting international cooperation, and fostering a culture of vigilance and awareness among government agencies, private entities, and the public are crucial. Understanding the significance of espionage enables nations to proactively address the evolving challenges, mitigate risks, and protect critical assets, information, and democratic values in an increasingly interconnected and competitive global landscape. Literature Review One of the most comprehensive data sources on espionage by American citizens is the paper "Espionage Against the United States by American Citizens 1947-2001" by Katherine Herbig and Martin Wiskoff, which analyzes 150 cases of espionage committed between 1947 and 2001.267 The paper provides detailed information on American spies' demographic and employment characteristics, such as gender, race, marital status, education level, and affiliation with the U.S. government or military. The paper also describes the means and methods American spies use to access and transmit classified information, such as copying documents, taking photographs, using computers, and meeting with handlers. Moreover, the paper examines the motivations and consequences of espionage, such as money, ideology, disgruntlement, ego, coercion, arrest, prosecution, imprisonment, and loss of citizenship. Some of the crucial findings of the paper related to gender are: ● Out of the 150 cases, only 11 involved female spies, accounting for 7.3%. This is consistent with the general pattern that espionage is a male-dominated activity.268 267 Katherine L. Herbig and Martin F. Wiskoff, “Espionage against the United States by American Citizens, 1947-2001,” Semantic Scholar, ahead of print, OSD or Non-Service DoD Agency, July 1, 2003, https://doi.org/10.21236/ADA411004. 268 Herbig and Wiskoff, “Espionage against the United States by American Citizens, 1947-2001.” 269 Herbig and Wiskoff, “Espionage against the United States by American Citizens, 1947-2001.” ● The female spies were more likely to be married than the male spies (90.9% vs. 76.9%) but less likely to have children (54.5% vs. 66.7%). They were also more likely to be younger than the male spies (average age of 33.6 vs. 38.9).269 ● The female spies were less likely to be employed by the U.S. government or military than the male spies (36.4% vs. 75.6%). They were more likely to be used by private companies or organizations (45.5% vs. 16.4%) or unemployed students (18.2% vs. 8%).270 ● The female spies were more likely to commit espionage with a partner than the male spies (81.8% vs. 40%). They were also more likely to have a personal relationship with their partner, such as being married, engaged, or romantically involved (72.7% vs. 15%).271 ● The female spies were less likely to use sophisticated methods or technologies to commit espionage than the male spies. They were more likely to rely on copying documents, photographing, or meeting with handlers.272 ● The female spies were more likely to be motivated by ideology or coercion than the male spies (54.5% vs. 32%). They were less likely to be inspired by money or disgruntlement than the male spies (27.3% vs. 52%).273 ● The female spies were less likely to be detected or arrested than the male spies (36.4% vs. 64%). They were also less likely to be prosecuted or imprisoned than the male spies (27.3% vs. 56%). They were more likely to 270 Herbig and Wiskoff, “Espionage against the United States by American Citizens, 1947-2001.” 271 Herbig and Wiskoff, “Espionage against the United States by American Citizens, 1947-2001.” 272 Herbig and Wiskoff, “Espionage against the United States by American Citizens, 1947-2001.” 273 Herbig and Wiskoff, “Espionage against the United States by American Citizens, 1947-2001.” Sentinel Journal Volume 1, Issue 1 | Summer 2025 95 The willingness to engage in risky behavior and its link to espionage Risk tolerance is a recurring psychological theme in espionage, cutting across nearly every case and profile. The very act of espionage demands a level of comfort with high-stakes uncertainty, violating legal, ethical, and professional boundaries with the everpresent possibility of catastrophic consequences. While some individuals are coerced or manipulated into these situations, many enter them voluntarily, driven by an inherent or developed willingness to engage in risky behavior. Understanding this trait, and how it manifests differently across genders and psychological profiles, is essential to assessing espionage risk. Willingness to take risks is not, in itself, pathological. It can be a hallmark of leadership, innovation, or courage. However, when coupled with underlying psychological vulnerabilities, such as narcissism, thrill-seeking tendencies, or emotional instability, risk-taking can become a gateway to selfdestructive or criminal behavior. In the context of espionage, this trait often functions as both a motivator and an enabler. Individuals may be drawn to the adrenaline and secrecy of clandestine activity, or they may overestimate their ability to manipulate outcomes and avoid detection, especially if grandiosity or psychopathy is present. Studies suggest that the propensity for risktaking is not evenly distributed across genders. Herbig’s analysis shows that men are statistically more likely than women to engage in crime, violence, and other forms of risky behavior such as gambling.294 This pattern carries over into espionage, where men constitute more than 90 percent of those convicted of the crime. Such figures underscore the degree to which risk-taking serves as a driver of espionage activity, though it is important to note that gender influences not the existence of the behavior, but often the form it takes. 294 Herbig and Wiskoff, “Espionage against the United States by American Citizens, 1947-2001.” From a gender perspective, the expression of risky behavior may differ in form, but not necessarily in intensity. While male spies are often associated with overtly aggressive or operationally bold acts, such as contact with foreign agents, travel to hostile regions, or the physical transfer of documents, female spies have also demonstrated significant risk-taking behavior, albeit often through more relational or covert channels. For example, women involved in espionage have engaged in romantic entanglements with foreign assets, participated in illicit financial arrangements, or exploited access to internal systems under the assumption of being underestimated or overlooked. These are not lesser risks, they are calculated maneuvers that require a willingness to violate rules and norms under constant threat of exposure. Importantly, the willingness to engage in risky behavior is not always driven by excitement. In many cases, it stems from desperation, alienation, or a diminished sense of consequence. Individuals with unresolved trauma, untreated psychological disorders, or a history of instability may become desensitized to danger. For them, risk becomes normalized or even preferable to the monotony of conventional life. This can be especially relevant in cases involving PTSD, ADHD, or depression, where impulsivity, emotional dysregulation, or fatalism may override traditional deterrents. Foreign intelligence services exploit these traits deliberately. Recruitment strategies often include gradual escalation, beginning with minor rule-breaking, flattery, or favors, that desensitize individuals to larger violations over time. The aim is to test and cultivate their risk tolerance, drawing them into deeper levels of complicity. This approach is particularly effective with individuals who already show signs of impulsivity or a history of risky choices, whether in their personal relationships, professional conduct, or financial decisions. In conclusion, the willingness to engage in risky behavior is not merely a side effect of espionage, it is a Sentinel Journal Volume 1, Issue 1 | Summer 2025 96 precondition for it. It functions as both a psychological vulnerability and a behavioral indicator, often signaling a person's susceptibility to recruitment or inclination toward betrayal. Recognizing this trait in personnel with access to classified information is not an indictment, but a critical step in mitigating insider threats. By identifying patterns of impulsivity, unmanaged risk-taking, or emotional volatility, counterintelligence efforts can move from reactive to proactive, ultimately enhancing national security resilience. Additional Psychological Disorders and Criminal Behavior Not all individuals with the below-identified disorders exhibit criminal behavior, and most individuals with these disorders do not engage in illegal activities. Many factors contribute to the association between these disorders and criminal behavior, including individual characteristics, environmental influences, and access to appropriate support and treatment. Factors such as socioeconomic status, family dynamics, education, and access to mental health services can also impact the likelihood of criminal involvement among individuals with these disorders. Depression The association between depression and rates of criminal behavior is a complex and multifaceted topic that requires careful examination. While research suggests a correlation between depression and criminal behavior, it is essential to note that various factors, including gender differences, influence the relationship. For both men and women, depression is associated with an increased risk of engaging in criminal behavior. Depression can contribute to hopelessness, desperation, and a lack of self-control, which may increase the likelihood of individuals resorting to criminal acts to cope or seek relief. Some common criminal behaviors associated with depression include property crimes, substance abuse, and violent offenses. However, it is crucial to recognize that the relationship between depression and criminal behavior differs between genders. Studies have shown that women with depression may be more prone to engage in non-violent crimes, such as theft or fraud (or espionage?). In contrast, men with depression may exhibit higher rates of violent offenses. This disparity can be attributed to various social, cultural, and psychological factors that influence the expression of depression and subsequent criminal behavior in men and women. Furthermore, it is crucial to consider that depression is often comorbid with other mental health disorders, such as substance use disorders or personality disorders, which can further increase the risk of criminal behavior. These co-occurring disorders may interact complexly, amplifying the association between depression and criminal tendencies. Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder The association between AttentionDeficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) and rates of criminal behavior has received considerable attention. Research suggests that individuals with ADHD may be at a higher risk of engaging in criminal behavior than those without the disorder. However, it is crucial to examine this association for both men and women separately, as there may be gender differences in the manifestation and impact of ADHD on criminal behavior. For both men and women with ADHD, studies have shown an increased likelihood of engaging in illegal activities compared to individuals without ADHD. ADHD is characterized by impulsivity, inattention, and hyperactivity, contributing to difficulties in self-control and decision-making. These difficulties may increase the risk of impulsive and antisocial behaviors, including theft, substance abuse, and aggression. However, gender differences exist in how ADHD is expressed and how it relates to criminal behavior. Research suggests that men with ADHD may exhibit higher rates of criminal behavior, including violent offenses, than women with ADHD. This disparity could be influenced by societal expectations Sentinel Journal Volume 1, Issue 1 | Summer 2025 97 of male behavior, differences in socialization, or variations in how ADHD symptoms manifest in males versus females. Additionally, it is essential to consider that ADHD is often comorbid with other mental health disorders, such as conduct or substance use disorders, which can further increase the risk of criminal behavior. These comorbid conditions may interact with ADHD symptoms, exacerbating impulsive and antisocial tendencies and leading to an increased likelihood of criminal engagement. Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder The association between Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and rates of criminal behavior requires careful examination. PTSD is a mental health condition that can develop following exposure to traumatic events, and it is characterized by symptoms such as intrusive memories, hyperarousal, and avoidance. Understanding the association between PTSD and criminal behavior for both men and women is crucial to inform interventions and support for individuals with PTSD. Research suggests a relationship between PTSD and an increased risk of criminal behavior. Individuals with PTSD may be more vulnerable to engaging in illegal acts due to several factors associated with the disorder. The symptoms of PTSD, such as hypervigilance, impulsivity, and emotional dysregulation, can contribute to difficulties in self-control, decision-making, and managing impulses, which may increase the likelihood of engaging in criminal behavior. For both men and women with PTSD, studies have found an association between the disorder and certain types of criminal behavior. Common criminal behaviors associated with PTSD include substance abuse, domestic violence, and aggressive acts. These behaviors may serve as maladaptive coping mechanisms or attempts to manage distressing symptoms and emotions associated with the disorder. 295 Michael Morell, “Leaks of Classified Information: Lessons Learned from a Lifetime on the Inside,” in National Security, Leaks However, it is crucial to recognize gender differences in the expression and impact of PTSD on criminal behavior. Research suggests that men with PTSD may be more likely to engage in violent criminal acts than women with PTSD. This discrepancy could be influenced by various factors, including societal expectations of male behavior, differences in coping strategies, or variations in the traumatic experiences and contexts that contribute to the development of PTSD. Like the other addressed disorders, PTSD is often comorbid with other mental health conditions, such as substance use disorders or depression, which can further increase the risk of criminal behavior. These comorbid conditions may interact with PTSD symptoms, exacerbating emotional dysregulation, impulsive behaviors, and aggression, which can contribute to criminal engagement. Espionage vs. Leaking: Psychological Factors and Distinctions When examining the legal, ethical, and psychological differences between an individual who commits espionage for an adversarial nation-state and an individual who leaks classified information online or to a media organization, notable distinctions emerge. From a legal standpoint, espionage involves gathering, transmitting, or providing national security information to a foreign government or entity intending to harm one's country. It is a severe crime typically prosecuted under espionage laws or related national security legislation. On the other hand, leaking classified information entails the unauthorized disclosure of sensitive or classified information to the public or media organizations. Leaking has the capability to cause widespread harm to U.S. national security by bringing sensitive information out in the open that multiple adversaries can exploit for strategic advantage.295 While also considered a national security offense, the legal consequences can vary depending on jurisdiction and specific laws. and Freedom of the Press, 1st ed., ed. Geoffrey Stone and Lee Bollinger (Oxford University Press New York, 2021), https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197519387.003.0004. Sentinel Journal Volume 1, Issue 1 | Summer 2025 98 Ethically, the disparities arise due to the differing motivations and intentions of the individuals involved. Espionage is commonly driven by loyalty to an adversary, financial gain, ideological reasons, or a combination thereof. Individuals engaged in espionage often betray the trust and loyalty owed to their country, raising significant ethical concerns. In contrast, those who leak classified information may be motivated to expose wrongdoing, promote transparency, or share information they believe the public has a right to know. In 2010, Chelsea (formerly Bradley) Manning engaged with WikiLeaks to leak thousands of pages of classified material about the war in Iraq, claiming the American people had the right to know of the injustices perpetrated by the U.S. government.296 While their actions may still violate laws and compromise national security, their intentions can be rooted in a perceived higher moral purpose. Psychologically, individuals engaged in espionage and those involved in leaking classified information tend to exhibit different traits and motivations. Espionage often attracts individuals with psychological traits such as a willingness to betray their own country, allegiance to an adversary, a sense of adventure, a desire for power, or financial incentives. These individuals may demonstrate characteristics associated with psychopathy, narcissism, grandiosity, and a calculated, long-term approach to achieving their objectives. In contrast, those who leak classified information are often driven by personal convictions, a sense of moral obligation, or a belief in exposing wrongdoing. Their motivations can be rooted in principles such as transparency, accountability, or challenging perceived injustices. Psychological traits observed in leakers may include moral courage, a sense of justice, or idealism. 296 Christina Adams, “Bradley Manning and a History of Intelligence Leaks,” USNI News, November 28, 2012, http://news.usni.org/2012/11/28/bradley-manning-andhistory-intelligence-leaks; Grant Schneider et al., “Panel Discusses Insider Threat,” Defense Intelligence Agency, July 17, 2014, https://www.dia.mil/News-Features/Articles/ArticleView/Article/567002/panel-discusses-insiderthreat/https%3A%2F%2Fwww.dia.mil%2FNewsRecognizing these distinctions is crucial for legal proceedings, policy considerations, and public discussions surrounding espionage and leaking classified information. While both acts constitute national security crimes, the motivations, intentions, and psychological profiles of the individuals involved significantly differ. Understanding these differences helps provide a nuanced perspective in addressing the legal, ethical, and psychological dimensions of these distinct forms of unauthorized information disclosure. Exploring the psychological factors aligned with each activity Though espionage and leaking both involve the unauthorized disclosure of classified or sensitive information, they diverge sharply in the psychological profiles, motivations, and behavioral patterns of the individuals involved. Understanding these differences is vital not only for legal classification and prosecution, but also for developing accurate psychological assessments and preventive strategies tailored to each threat. Espionage, particularly when conducted on behalf of a foreign state, tends to involve individuals who are calculated, often long-term actors motivated by power, ideology, money, or revenge.297 The psychological factors most commonly associated with espionage include narcissism, grandiosity, psychopathy, and a willingness to engage in risky, morally disengaged behavior.298 These individuals often have well-developed compartmentalization abilities, allowing them to lead double lives without cognitive dissonance. They may exhibit traits of antisocial personality disorder or manipulative behavior consistent with psychopathy, masking internal resentments or motivations behind an outward Features%2FArticles%2FArticleView%2FArticle%2F567002%2Fpanel-discusses-insiderthreat%2F. 297 Burkett, “An Alternative Framework for Agent Recruitment.” 298 Wilder, “The Psychology of Espionage”; David Charney and John Irvin, “The Psychology of Espionage,” Inteligencer: Journal of U.S Inteligence Studies, Guide to the Study of Espionage, vol. 22, no. 1 (2016): 71–77. Sentinel Journal Volume 1, Issue 1 | Summer 2025 99 appearance of loyalty. In some cases, especially those driven by ideological commitment, spies may also display rigid belief systems, obsessive moral frameworks, or the psychological need to be part of a cause greater than themselves, regardless of the national consequences. Female spies, as noted in previous research, often display motivations that are more relational or emotionally driven than their male counterparts. While not universally true, there is a documented pattern of female espionage occurring in conjunction with romantic involvement, coercion, or interpersonal dynamics. These cases often blend high emotional intelligence with deception, suggesting a psychological profile that includes risk tolerance, emotional detachment, and strategic manipulation. Regardless of gender, however, espionage typically requires the psychological capacity to violate institutional norms with intent and foresight, often repeatedly and in coordination with external entities. By contrast, leaking is frequently an impulsive or emotionally reactive act, often rooted in perceived injustice, moral outrage, or personal disillusionment. The psychological profile of a leaker tends to include idealism, moral absolutism, and in some cases, naiveté.299 These individuals are often less concerned with secrecy or operational tradecraft and more concerned with making a public statement, exposing wrongdoing, or triggering institutional reform. Unlike spies, leakers rarely seek financial gain or foreign allegiance. Instead, they may experience internal pressure to "do the right thing," even at personal cost, indicating high levels of moral sensitivity, guilt, or cognitive dissonance with the classified actions they observe.300 Psychologically, leakers may demonstrate a high degree of openness and conscientiousness, particularly if they wrestled with the ethics of their 299 Ursula M Wilder, “The Psychology of Espionage and Leaking in the Digital Age,” Studies in Intelligence 61, no. 2 (2017), https://www.csis.org/analysis/discussion-national-security-ciadirector-mike-pompeo. 300 Morell, “Leaks of Classified Information”; Wilder, “The Psychology of Espionage and Leaking in the Digital Age.” actions prior to disclosure. Some may suffer from anxiety or depression, especially if they feel isolated or unsupported within their institutional environment. Others may exhibit traits associated with whistleblower identities, such as resilience, stubbornness, and an intense internal moral compass. Unlike espionage, which often follows a methodical and sustained behavioral arc, leaking tends to be acute, emotionally driven, and sometimes poorly planned, suggesting a distinct psychological pathway. The implications of these psychological distinctions are critical. Espionage prevention requires long-term behavioral monitoring, attention to manipulative tendencies, and surveillance of external affiliations. Leaking prevention, by contrast, demands an understanding of organizational morale, internal transparency, and the psychological well-being of employees. Espionage is predatory; leaking is often reactionary. Recognizing this distinction allows for more precise investigative models and more appropriate institutional responses. Gender Ratio and Access to Sensitive Information In the United States, the representation of female personnel in the military and the intelligence community varies across different sectors. As of the available data, approximately 16.5% of military personnel are female, while females represent around 40.8% of the intelligence community. Women make up approximately a third of the senior workforce in the intelligence community, with 41.6% at senior levels of government and 34.3% at the GS/GG-15 level.301 These numbers provide a snapshot of the gender distribution within these sectors. Regarding security clearances, it is reported that approximately 2.9 million 301 Office of Intelligence Community Diversity, Equity, Inclusion, and Accessibility, Annual Demographic Report: Fiscal Year 2023 (Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2023), https://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/library/reports/2024/fy2 3_ic_annual_demographic_report_odni_240823.pdf. Sentinel Journal Volume 1, Issue 1 | Summer 2025 100 individuals are holding security clearances as of 2021.302 However, specific data on the gender breakdown of individuals with security clearances are not provided in the given information. Looking at the officer ranks across the different branches of the military in 2021, the number of male and female officers is as follows: in the Army, there are 76,495 male officers and 17,275 female officers; in the Marine Corps, there are 19,720 male officers and 1,981 female officers; in the Navy, there are 44,600 male officers and 11,444 female officers; and in the Air Force, there are 49,548 male officers and 14,529 female officers. These figures highlight the gender distribution among officers in the respective branches of the military.303 Beyond the military and intelligence community, additional statistics shed light on the workforce within the National Intelligence Program and the private contractors working for the intelligence community. In fiscal year 2018, the total workforce of the National Intelligence Program amounted to 107,777 employees.304 Furthermore, the five largest private contractors employed 44,600 cleared personnel, which accounts for approximately one-fifth of the total workforce of 183,000 civilians, contractors, and uniformed soldiers engaged in national and military intelligence operations, as reported by The Nation.305 302 National Counterintelligence and Security Center, Fiscal Year 2017 Annual Report on Security Clearance Determinations (Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2017); Lindy Kyzer, “How Many People Have a Security Clearance? - ClearanceJobs,” ClearanceJobs News and Career Advice, February 9, 2021, https://news.clearancejobs.com/2021/02/09/how-manypeople-have-a-security-clearance/. 303 U.S. Department of Defense, “Department of Defense Releases Annual Demographics Report — Modest Increase of Women in the Active Duty Force > U.S. Department of Defense > Release,” Press Release, November 10, 2021, https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/284 1124/department-of-defense-releases-annual-demographicsreport-modest-increase-of-wo/; Amanda Barroso, “A Look at the Changing Profile of the U.S. Military | Pew Research Center,” Pew Research, September 10, 2019, https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2019/09/10/thechanging-profile-of-the-u-s-military/. Considering the potential impact of gender disparities on espionage rates The potential impacts of a gender disparity in rates of espionage charges and convictions, where women may be engaging in espionage at a higher rate than they are being charged or convicted, can have significant implications on various levels. Firstly, from a national security perspective, such a disparity can effectively undermine efforts to protect sensitive information and national interests. It suggests potential vulnerabilities in security systems and intelligencegathering capabilities that must be addressed. Secondly, a gender disparity in charges and convictions leads to an incomplete intelligence picture, hindering accurate assessments of espionage threats. Understanding the extent of female involvement in espionage is crucial for developing effective strategies and allocating resources appropriately. Furthermore, a gender disparity raises concerns about fairness and equality in treating espionage cases, potentially eroding public trust in the justice system. It is vital to ensure that all individuals, regardless of gender, are subject to fair scrutiny based on evidence and intelligence. Moreover, biases and stereotypes about women's involvement in espionage can perpetuate, hampering efforts to identify and assess potential threats accurately. Addressing these biases is essential for unbiased investigative processes 304 Office of Intelligence Community Equal Employment Opportunity and Diversity, Annual Demographic Report: Fiscal Year 2018 - Hiring and Retention of Minorities, Women, and Persons with Disabilities in the United States Intelligence Community (Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2018); Ron Kness, “The True Scale of U.S. National Security: Inside the Defense and Intelligence Community,” ClearanceJobs, August 1, 2025, https://news.clearancejobs.com/?p=1154883; Zippia, “Number Of Intelligence Officers In The US,” Intelligence Officer Demographics and Statistics, 2024, https://www.zippia.com/intelligence-officerjobs/demographics/. 305 Tim Shorrock, “5 Corporations Now Dominate Our Privatized Intelligence Industry | The Nation,” The Nation, September 8, 2016, https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/five-corporationsnow-dominate-our-privatized-intelligence-industry/. Sentinel Journal Volume 1, Issue 1 | Summer 2025 101 and intelligence analysis. Additionally, a gender disparity suggests missed opportunities for prevention and early intervention. Understanding the factors contributing to higher female engagement in espionage can inform targeted prevention programs and intervention strategies. Identifying and addressing these factors early on is crucial to mitigate the risk of espionage activities. Moreover, a gender disparity calls for a review of policies and practices within intelligence agencies, law enforcement, and the justice system. Implementing gender-sensitive approaches, improving recruitment strategies, and ensuring equitable treatment throughout the investigative and judicial processes are necessary. Algorithm for Determining Probability of Women Committing Espionage While historical espionage data suggest that men dominate the field of state-sponsored betrayal, the psychological, demographic, and institutional factors discussed throughout this paper indicate that the true rate of female involvement may be significantly underrepresented in prosecution and conviction statistics. If we accept the premise that psychological risk factors, such as certain personality traits, mental health disorders, and emotional motivators, are equally or more prevalent in women with access to sensitive information, then the question arises: Why are women not proportionally represented in espionage cases? Is it that they are not engaging in the activity, or is it that they are not being caught? To explore this discrepancy, we must move beyond descriptive assessments and attempt a predictive analysis, one that incorporates known psychological risk factors, gender representation within national security institutions, and historical espionage outcomes. By synthesizing this data into an algorithm, 306 National Center for Health Statistics, “New Reports Highlight Depression Prevalence and Medication Use in the U.S.,” U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, April 17, 2025, https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/pressroom/nchs_press_releases/20 25/20250416.htm; American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. we can begin to estimate the statistical probability that more women are engaging in espionage than the legal system currently acknowledges. While such an algorithm cannot offer absolute proof, it can serve as a valuable heuristic tool, one that guides further inquiry, informs counterintelligence strategies, and prompts reconsideration of investigative biases that may be obscuring female participation in this national security threat. Presenting an algorithm to estimate the probability of women engaging in espionage To establish a more accurate estimate of the likelihood that women are engaging in espionage at rates higher than prosecution data suggest, we propose a multi-variable algorithm. This model integrates psychological, demographic, and institutional data to approximate probability, allowing for a comparison between expected engagement rates and actual conviction statistics. The algorithm is not intended to predict individual behavior but rather to identify systemic discrepancies in detection, investigation, or reporting. Step 1: Assess the prevalence of psychological disorders associated with espionage. Using nationally reported data, we calculate the average prevalence of disorders linked to criminal or risky behavior, specifically depression, ADHD, PTSD, and narcissistic traits, focusing on their rates among women. These disorders are not direct indicators of espionage but are statistically associated with increased risk of illegal behavior. ● Depression: 10.5% of adult females306 ● ADHD: 3.2% of adult females307 ● PTSD: 10% of women308 307 National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH), “AttentionDeficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD),” accessed August 20, 2025, https://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/statistics/attentiondeficit-hyperactivity-disorder-adhd. 308 Amy Novotney, “Women Who Experience Trauma Are Twice as Likely as Men to Develop PTSD. Here’s Why,” American Sentinel Journal Volume 1, Issue 1 | Summer 2025 102 ● Narcissism: 4.8% of females309 Using these values, we compute a weighted average to gauge the relative psychological predisposition among women toward behavior patterns that may facilitate espionage. The weighted prevalence across these disorders for women averages approximately 7.13%, compared to 5.83% for men. This suggests a 1.22:1 female-to-male ratio in the prevalence of the psychological traits considered relevant for espionage risk. This means women show roughly 22% higher prevalence across the selected disorders than men. Step 2: Determine the proportion of women with access to sensitive information. Based on workforce data, women constitute approximately 16.5% of the U.S. military and 40.8% of the intelligence community. Weighting these figures by institutional size (with an estimated 70% contribution from the military and 30% from the intelligence community), we calculate a weighted access rate of 23.34% for women. This means that, across the national security workforce, women represent approximately 1 in 4 individuals with potential access to classified or sensitive information. Step 3: Assign weighted significance to the psychological factors. To reflect the varying degrees to which different disorders may influence espionage-related behavior, we assign heuristic weights based on empirical associations from literature and practitioner assessments: ● Narcissism: 1 (baseline, most directly linked to espionage) ● Depression: 2 (more likely to correlate with non-violent crime) ● ADHD: 3 (associated with impulsivity and poor judgment) Psychological Association, April 13, 2023, https://www.apa.org/topics/women-girls/women-trauma. 309 Megan Hull and Anna Pickering, “Narcissistic Personality Disorder (NPD) Statistics,” The Recovery Village, May 8, 2023, ● PTSD: 4 (linked to emotional dysregulation and risky behavior) These weights are then adjusted for gender using the 1.22 female-to-male disorder ratio to calculate gendermodified influence scores. Step 4: Combine psychological prevalence, gender access rate, and behavioral weightings. The algorithm integrates the weighted psychological scores and access data to yield a composite likelihood estimate of female espionage engagement. This process does not assume causality but rather uses a correlational framework to project a theoretical engagement rate. Given the psychological disorder ratio (1.22:1), the workforce access disparity (approximately 1:3.3), and the existing conviction data (where women constitute only ~7.3% of prosecuted cases), the modeled probability suggests a significant underrepresentation of female espionage in conviction statistics relative to estimated risk. Step 5: Compare the model’s estimated rates with historical conviction data. The final step involves comparing the algorithm’s predicted rate of espionage engagement among women with the actual rate of prosecutions. If the algorithm indicates a higher statistical likelihood of female involvement than historical conviction data shows, this discrepancy may point to detection or investigative blind spots, potential institutional biases, or sociocultural assumptions that shape the profile of a “typical” spy. Utilizing rates of psychological disorders and women's access to sensitive information To estimate the likelihood that more women engage in espionage than are charged or convicted, it is essential to integrate two key variables: the prevalence https://www.therecoveryvillage.com/mental-health/narcissisticpersonality-disorder/npd-statistics/; Matthew Biddle, “Study: Men Tend to Be More Narcissistic than Women - University at Buffalo,” University of Buffalo, March 4, 2015, https://www.buffalo.edu/news/releases/2015/03/009.html. Sentinel Journal Volume 1, Issue 1 | Summer 2025 103 of psychological disorders associated with criminal behavior, and the proportion of women who occupy positions granting access to sensitive or classified information. When these factors are examined together, they suggest a statistically plausible, if not probable, underrepresentation of female espionage in public legal outcomes. As established earlier, psychological traits and disorders such as narcissism, depression, ADHD, and PTSD have been associated with increased risk of impulsive, antisocial, or high-risk behavior. While not deterministic, these conditions can increase the probability of engaging in unlawful conduct under certain environmental or occupational stressors. Notably, several of these disorders, particularly depression and PTSD, are more prevalent among women. The average weighted prevalence of these psychological disorders among adult women is approximately 7.13%, higher than the 5.83% rate for men. This suggests that, on a purely psychological risk basis, women may be equally or more predisposed to engage in behaviors that could include or enable espionage, especially when combined with emotional triggers such as perceived injustice, alienation, or unresolved trauma. However, psychological predisposition alone is insufficient to commit espionage; access to sensitive information is a necessary enabling condition. Women currently represent roughly 23.34% of the national security workforce when weighted across both military (16.5%) and intelligence community (40.8%) roles. Though still underrepresented compared to men, this percentage is significant and steadily increasing. Importantly, women are also more likely to be employed in administrative, analytical, and support roles that may provide broad or backend access to classified data, particularly in digital systems or logistical support functions. When combining these two factors, psychological risk prevalence and access opportunity, an incongruity emerges. If women account for nearly a quarter of those with classified access and exhibit equal or higher rates of certain psychological risk factors, but comprise only 7.3% of historical espionage convictions, a discrepancy of at least twofold is evident. This gap cannot be explained solely by lack of opportunity or a presumed greater loyalty among women; instead, it points to systemic under-detection, investigative bias, or alternative forms of espionage behavior that evade traditional metrics. Moreover, the nature of psychological disorders in women may influence the type of espionage engagement, rather than its frequency. For instance, women with depression or PTSD may be more susceptible to recruitment through emotional manipulation, exploitation of interpersonal vulnerabilities, or relational coercion rather than financial or ideological inducements. These more subtle or socially driven pathways to espionage are harder to detect using traditional red-flag criteria like sudden wealth, travel to adversary nations, or blatant ideological expression, metrics that tend to dominate current counterintelligence screening models. In conclusion, the dual consideration of psychological disorder prevalence and access to sensitive roles provides a data-informed rationale to question the assumption that women are rarely involved in espionage. Rather than proving inherent differences in ethical disposition or loyalty, the statistical mismatch likely reveals blind spots in detection frameworks. This insight warrants a more nuanced approach to insider threat analysis, one that accounts for gendered differences in motivation, access, and behavioral presentation, thereby strengthening counterintelligence posture across the national security enterprise. Examining Discrepancies in Charges and Convictions The algorithmic model presented above suggests that, when psychological predispositions and access to sensitive information are considered together, the expected rate of female engagement in espionage is higher than the historical rate of female prosecutions. This statistical gap prompts a necessary inquiry: why are women so significantly Sentinel Journal Volume 1, Issue 1 | Summer 2025 104 underrepresented in espionage convictions? While there are multiple plausible explanations, the most compelling lie in the interplay of societal perception, institutional bias, investigative priorities, and cultural archetypes. First, gendered assumptions in law enforcement and counterintelligence may result in women being systematically underestimated as espionage threats. The traditional archetype of a spy, calculating, detached, and operationally bold, is often associated with masculine traits. This unconscious bias can shape risk assessments, hiring practices, and investigative focus, leading to fewer women being scrutinized despite meeting psychological or situational criteria associated with insider threat behavior. Even when warning signs exist, women may be given the benefit of the doubt more readily or interpreted as victims rather than perpetrators, particularly in cases involving romantic entanglements or emotional distress. Second, investigative blind spots may arise from structural norms within intelligence and law enforcement institutions. Analysts and investigators rely on behavioral indicators and threat profiles often derived from historical data, data which itself is skewed by decades of male-dominated espionage prosecutions. As a result, case criteria may be disproportionately calibrated to detect male-pattern behavior, such as financial desperation, overt disgruntlement, or ideological extremism. Female espionage, which may be more relational, emotionally motivated, or socially embedded, can escape traditional detection frameworks. This misalignment contributes to lower rates of both identification and prosecution. Third, there is the question of how espionage is conducted. Female spies have historically relied more on passive methods: exploiting access through administrative roles, leveraging social networks, or operating in partnership with a male counterpart. These methods often leave fewer digital or forensic traces, especially in contrast to the overt handling, couriering, or document theft common in many maleled cases. The more nuanced and socially embedded tactics used by women may render their activities harder to detect using conventional counterintelligence tools, which are optimized for surveillance, communication intercepts, or anomaly detection in technical systems. Finally, legal and political factors can play a role. Prosecutors may be less inclined to pursue espionage charges against women, especially in borderline cases, due to concerns over jury perception, public scrutiny, or the optics of appearing overly punitive. Additionally, in some cases, women may be more likely to cooperate with authorities once discovered, trading information, confessing early, or providing access to co-conspirators. Such cooperation can result in reduced charges or the avoidance of formal prosecution altogether, further skewing conviction statistics. Taken together, these factors suggest that the disparity between expected and actual female espionage convictions is not merely an artifact of coincidence or measurement error, it is likely a product of systemic under-detection and cultural assumptions. To address this gap, intelligence and law enforcement agencies must revisit their profiling assumptions, integrate gender-neutral behavioral indicators, and reassess training and detection frameworks that may unconsciously exclude female suspects from scrutiny. Failure to do so risks leaving a significant segment of the threat landscape unmonitored and unmitigated. Exploring Societal, Cultural, and Institutional Factors Understanding the underrepresentation of women in espionage convictions requires moving beyond individual psychological and access-based factors to examine the broader societal, cultural, and institutional dynamics that shape investigative outcomes. These factors, often operating subconsciously, can skew how female suspects are perceived, monitored, and prosecuted within national security and intelligence systems. One of the most enduring cultural narratives is the perception of women as inherently less threatening Sentinel Journal Volume 1, Issue 1 | Summer 2025 111 Moore, Lance. “Motivations of an Ideologue: A Case Study of Cuban Spy Ana Belen Montes.” Active Measures. Active Measures, September 8, 2019. https://www.iwp.edu/activemeasures/2019/09/08/motivations-of-an-ideologue-a-case-study-of-cuban-spy-ana-belenmontes/. Morell, Michael. “Leaks of Classified Information: Lessons Learned from a Lifetime on the Inside.” In National Security, Leaks and Freedom of the Press, 1st ed., edited by Geoffrey Stone and Lee Bollinger. Oxford University PressNew York, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197519387.003.0004. National Center for Health Statistics. “New Reports Highlight Depression Prevalence and Medication Use in the U.S.” U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, April 17, 2025. https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/pressroom/nchs_press_releases/2025/20250416.htm. National Counterintelligence and Security Center. Fiscal Year 2017 Annual Report on Security Clearance Determinations. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2017. National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH). “Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD).” Accessed August 20, 2025. https://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/statistics/attention-deficithyperactivity-disorder-adhd. Novotney, Amy. “Women Who Experience Trauma Are Twice as Likely as Men to Develop PTSD. Here’s Why.” American Psychological Association, April 13, 2023. https://www.apa.org/topics/women-girls/women-trauma. Office of Intelligence Community Diversity, Equity, Inclusion, and Accessibility. Annual Demographic Report: Fiscal Year 2023. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2023. https://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/library/reports/2024/fy23_ic_annual_demographic_r eport_odni_240823.pdf. Office of Intelligence Community Equal Employment Opportunity and Diversity. Annual Demographic Report: Fiscal Year 2018 - Hiring and Retention of Minorities, Women, and Persons with Disabilities in the United States Intelligence Community. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2018. Schneider, Grant, Lee Worthman, Michael Buckley, and Philip Quade. “Panel Discusses Insider Threat.” Defense Intelligence Agency, July 17, 2014. https://www.dia.mil/NewsFeatures/Articles/Article-View/Article/567002/panel-discusses-insiderthreat/https%3A%2F%2Fwww.dia.mil%2FNews-Features%2FArticles%2FArticleView%2FArticle%2F567002%2Fpanel-discusses-insider-threat%2F. Shorrock, Tim. “5 Corporations Now Dominate Our Privatized Intelligence Industry | The Nation.” The Nation, September 8, 2016. https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/fivecorporations-now-dominate-our-privatized-intelligence-industry/. Shute, Rosalyn H. “Was British Cold War Spy and Double Agent Kim Philby a Successful Psychopath? A Psychobiographical Analysis.” In Psychobiographical Illustrations on Meaning and Identity in Sociocultural Contexts, edited by Claude-Hélène Mayer, Paul Fouché J.P., and Roelf Van Niekerk. Springer International Publishing, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-81238-6_9. Sentinel Journal Volume 1, Issue 1 | Summer 2025 112 U.S. Department of Defense. “Department of Defense Releases Annual Demographics Report — Modest Increase of Women in the Active Duty Force > U.S. Department of Defense > Release.” Press Release, November 10, 2021. https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/2841124/department-ofdefense-releases-annual-demographics-report-modest-increase-of-wo/. Wilder, Ursula M. “The Psychology of Espionage.” Studies in Intelligence 61, no. 2 (2017). Wilder, Ursula M. “The Psychology of Espionage and Leaking in the Digital Age.” Studies in Intelligence 61, no. 2 (2017). https://www.csis.org/analysis/discussion-national-security-cia-directormike-pompeo. Zippia. “Number Of Intelligence Officers In The US.” Intelligence Officer Demographics and Statistics, 2024. https://www.zippia.com/intelligence-officer-jobs/demographics/. Sentinel Journal Volume 1, Issue 1 | Summer 2025 113