Is Small Beautiful?: Country Size and Governance

1 Is Small Beautiful? Lishan Desta, PhD Collin College Plano, Texas Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting for the Midwest Political Science Association Chicago, IL April 6th, 2018 © TLD, 2018 - 2058. Unauthorized use and/or duplication of this material without express and written permission from this site’s author and/or owner is strictly prohibited. Excerpts and links may be used, provided that full and clear credit is given to Teddy L. Desta and with appropriate and specific direction to the original content. 2 Abstract For developing countries, large state size means greater cultural diversity and core-periphery based development and equity problems. Hence, “large size" is hypothesized to be a drag on nation-, state-, and democracy-building processes. On the other hand, “small size’’ is hypothesized to foster these processes (i) by facilitating exchange and interdependence among diverse social groups, (ii) by enabling rapid responsiveness and public service provision by the government, and (iii) by enhancing the public’s ability to organize and lobby the government for change. On two counts, this study is different from previous studies which investigated the size of countries. First, many studies either used population as a measure of country size, or even when they used land area, they used it as a dependent variable. This study uses land area as a measure of size and uses it as its main explanatory variable. Secondly, by arguing that what is being questioned about the effects of large size can be mitigated by demography, the study also investigates the effects of population settlement patterns. Therefore, it uses population concentration and urbanization rate as alternative dependent variables to investigate the more nuanced aspect of country size. The study analyzes cross-sectional data for some 137 countries for the year 2006. Results from two-way and regression analyses show that land area, population density, and urbanization rate all have the hypothesized effect on political stability and government effectiveness. However, the expected impact of geography and demography variables on democracy is generally absent. 3 Nation-, State-, and Democracy-building: Is Small Beautiful? Introduction Does size of a country has any impact on polity quality, in terms of nation-, state-, and democracy-building? Does small compared to large size (or, vice versa) promote political stability, sense of nationhood among diverse groups, government effectiveness in the form of public services, and democracy? It is such concerns in mind that Robert Dahl and Edward Tufte ask the following question in their seminal book, “Size and Democracy”: Are [ ] differences in population or in any other dimension of size— area for example— of any importance? More specifically, is “democracy” related in any way to “size’? How large should a political system be in order to facilitate rational control by its citizens? What are the comparative advantages and disadvantages enjoyed by political systems of different sizes? (Dahl and Tufte 1973: 1) For example, one major problem large states face is the risk of breakup due to pressures arising from diversity. Compared to smaller states, large countries are more likely to have a heterogeneous population in terms of preferences, cultures, and languages. The issue of heterogeneity of preferences is significant because “Belonging to a country implies agreeing to a set of policies, be they redistributive schemes, public goods, or foreign trade. [And] with increase heterogeneity there are more individuals or regions that are less satisfied by the central government policies. Indeed many violent domestic conflicts around the world associated with racial, religious, and linguistic heterogeneity have threatened the stability of national governments” (Alesina and Spolaore 2003:4-5). 4 The past several years have seen resurgence in democracy, but also at the same time increases in conflict from nationalism and ethnic divide. Diversity can pose a serious risk to the survival of a state as witnessed in the cases of constitutionally democratic regimes in Sri Lanka, Lebanon, and Nigeria. The need to build nations and to hold together ethnically plural states has justified in many places around the world impositions of authoritarian rule (Diamond and Plattner 1994: ixx). Population Concentration and Urbanization Given the possibility that diversity can threaten the unity and stability of a country, one important question to ask will be whether urbanization can help to minimize the risk of disunity due to distance among groups and dissatisfaction with government service. According to sociologists urbanization has the potential to work as a melting-pot to create a new urban or modern identity among diverse groups. Urbanization fosters powerful social forces and processes of modernization that shape, in a new way, the social identity and psychological predispositions of people. Urban centers help heterogeneous social groups to shed their kinship-based relationships, exchanging them for several cross-cutting and overlapping associations based on professional, economic, social, or ideological affinities. Urban centers serve as virtual melting pots to create a common national identity, by potentially obviating conflict-laden kinship-based heterogeneity. The homogenization effect of urban centers, therefore, holds a ray of hope for countries which suffer from the problems of ethnic, linguistic, or religious diversity. As Alesina and Spolaore (2003:4-6) observe, “Homogenous polities function more harmoniously in both large and small countries.” Does urbanization help to answer this perennial worry of political scientists: “How can particularistic and often antagonistic group identities be reconciled with the unifying mission of the modern state? More especially, how can this be done in a democratic 5 state” (Diamond and Plattner 1994: xiv). This study tries to answer whether urbanization fulfils the “unifying mission of the modern state.” Theoretical Framework Dahl and Tufte (1973:12-15) make interesting claims related to country size and polity quality. 1. Members tend to be more homogenous in smaller systems; and more diverse in larger systems (Dahl and Tufte 1973:92). Which means that smaller countries are likely to be more homogenous with respect to beliefs, values, and goals. Conversely, larger democracies are likely to exhibit diversity in beliefs, values, goals, social and economic characteristics and occupations (Dahl and Tufte 1973:13-14). 2. Smaller democracies are more likely to generate loyalty to a single integrated community. Whereas, larger democracies are more likely to generate multiple loyalties to various “communities” (Dahl and Tufte 1973:14). 3. Smaller democracies make it easier for a citizen to perceive a relation between his own self-interest or understanding of the good and a public or general interests of others. Conversely larger democracies provide more opportunity for divergence of views on individual, group, and general interests and goals (Dahl and Tufte 1973:14). This issue of heterogeneity of preferences is significant because “Belonging to a country implies agreeing to a set of policies, be they redistributive schemes, public goods, or foreign trade. [And] with increase heterogeneity there are more individuals or regions that are less satisfied by the central government policies. Indeed many violent domestic 6 conflicts around the world associated with racial, religious, and linguistic heterogeneity have threatened the stability of national governments” (Alesina and Spolaore 2003:4-5). 4. Leaders are likely to be more responsive to citizen views in smaller democracies for more reasons than this claim can be true for larger democracies (Dahl and Tufte 1973:92). 5. Smaller democracies make possible greater speed and accuracy of communication among members of the system. They provide more opportunities for all citizens to gain knowledge needed for decisions by direct observation and experience (Dahl and Tufte 1973:92). 6. Group conflicts are infrequent but explosive in smaller systems; but frequent but less explosive in larger systems. And group conflicts are more likely to polarize the whole community in smaller systems, but less likely to do so in larger systems (Dahl and Tufte 1973:92). Filling the Research Gap At least there two detailed, book length, studies that investigate the relationship between size and regime type. The first work by Dahl and Tufte (1973) “Size and Democracy” is groundbreaking in this line of research. The authors generate several excellent assumptions and axioms that establish a theoretical foundation to explore the linkage between geography and demography and regime quality. However, they are mostly unable to test their axioms, because as they say, “we cannot go much beyond theory because we lack good data, we nonetheless make an effort to formulate theory in such a way to help future investigators” (Dahl and Tufte 1973:28). 7 The other seminal work, “The Size of Nations” by Alesina and Spolaore (2003), although based much more on the theoretical groundwork of Dahl and Tufte (1973), it is more empirical in its thrust of investigation and output. However, Alesina and Spolaore approach the problem of the size of nations from an economics, specifically public choice theory, perspective. Their main focus, hence, is to develop the mathematical model that establishes the optimal state size given the trade-off polities face between country-size and enclosing a homogenous preference group (Alesina and Spolaore 2003:3). They note this dilemma, writing, “with increased heterogeneity there are more individuals or regions that are less satisfied by the central government policies. […] Concerns about the political costs of large and heterogeneous communities go back a long way in the philosophical and political debate” (Alesina and Spolaore 2003:4-5). Their research, hence, focuses on in finding a formula which works out the mathematical question of: “the optimal size of a country [that] would be characterized by some optimal point between the benefits of size and the costs of heterogeneity. This is precisely our starting point” (Alesina and Spolaore 2003:7). Their study is wanting because their focus is to assess optimal state size for economic outcomes. Interestingly, both Dahl & Tufte and Alesina and Spolaore do not use land area as their measures of state size, but population or GNP, or both. Other studies which evaluate political outcomes based on country size differences (for example, Matsubayashi 2007; Bruckner 2010) use population size as a measure of country size. Those studies which use land area as the basis of measuring the size of a state (for example, Lake and O’Mahony, 2004; and Alesina (2003) attempt to explain the historical, theoretical, and empirical reasons of the size of nations. Hence, in these two and similar studies land size of countries is the variable that is explained. m 8 In short, empirical studies which use land area as a measure of the size of states and in turn investigate its potential impact on state fragility, governance quality, and regime type are nearly absent. Equally, empirical studies which consider the potential impacts of population density and urbanization rate on political stability, government effectiveness, and democracy are virtually absent. On the other hand, this study investigates the impact of country size, measured in the form of land area, on polity quality represented by state fragility/ political stability, governance/ government effectiveness, and polity/ democracy. Moreover, the paper premises that higher population density and urbanization rate virtually shrink the size of states. Based on this assumption, the study tests the potential impacts of population density and urbanization rate on polity quality. The study premises its empirical analysis on the following theoretical arguments which in turn are used to develop the study’s six hypotheses. Hypotheses Argument 1: Large geographic size can mean the dispersion of people over a larger area. This has the potential to create regional or sectional identities, group’s grievances and elite fragmentation, which all can undermine national cohesion and state unity. Unless handled through federalism or local governance, large country size can encourage separatism or increase the demand for local autonomy. Due to these reasons, large country size will not only increase the chance for political instability, but also can turn the government to more repressive methods to handle restive groups. Hence, large countries have the likelihood to turn or remain authoritarian. 9 Argument 2: Since larger countries have more bordering states than average, size of a country can increase the cost of defending the state. Having several country neighbors increases the chances of political instability and state fragility for the home-country because of cross-border related issues, such as irredentism, and infiltration by separatist, terrorist, or criminal groups. The result will be diverting meager national resources to the military or borrowing externally to acquire military hardware. The security imperative of the state forces it to neglect its economic development projects which can overtime lead to popular grievances about missing economic opportunities. Argument 3: Large developing countries suffer from core-periphery problem due to uneven economic development. Governments of developing countries will be extremely challenged to provide adequate and quality public services to their far-flung population. Developing countries are often caught between the dilemmas of achieving rapid economic development focusing on potentially promising areas or realizing economic distributive justice among all regions. The first option creates a sense of neglect among other regions, while the second option spreads out meager resources over a large country creating disappointing results for all. Both plans leave a large number of people dissatisfied creating the image of an ineffective government. Argument 4: larger countries have the potential to create a diversified economy and the benefits of exploiting a larger domestic market to drive economic growth and prosperity. On the other hand, smaller countries lacking all these need to specialize in one economic area and to rely on foreign investment and trade to drive growth and development. Hence, smaller countries will be more open to forces of globalization and political openness and efficient government functions in order to exploit opportunities the global economy offers. Based on Arguments 1 and 2. 16 Indendenpent Variables taken from. Here , the higher the score, the more politically stable is the country. score in 0-100 scale, where 100 represents for Peace measures for on one hand and state fragility, and democracy on the other hand, I have created four categories. Because of wide variation in size (sd. dev. 939621.4), for graphical and regression analysis, I have used the natural log of the land area measure of countries. Results Table 1: Relationship between Country Size and Political Stability (N=137) (2006) Source: World Bank, WDI & WGI Countries described as as large and very large for their size (i.e., land area greater than 155,00 sq. km), have a probablity more than 40% to be politically unstable. These countries score less than - 0.81 points on the World Governance Indicator -2.5 to 2.5 scale. On the other hand, smaller countries (i.e., land area less than 24,000 sq.km), show less than 10% chance of political instability. The relationship between country size and political stability is statistically significant. The smaller the size of a country, the more likely that it could be stable, and vice verse. 17 The same analysis is replicated below (Tabel 2) using a different measure of state stability. Based on the Fund for Peace measure of State Fragility Indicator, a staistically significant relation is found between state size and political stability. Here again, all other things being constant, the smaller the state size, the less likely it to suffer from state failure. Table 2: Relationship between Country Size and State Fragility (N=132) (2006) Sources: World Bank WDI and The Fund for Peace Accordingly, among small countries (i.e., land area less than 24,000 sq. km.), the probability of seeing the highest degree of state failure is less than 10%. That gives indications that small countries such as Lebanon, Qatar, Kuwait, Djibouti, and Jamaica are relatively politically stable. On the other hand, more than a third of the countries with more land than 23,000 sq. km. are categorized as most fragile. However, the analysis also points towards a certain paradox. Beyond a certain country size, the degree of political instability for larger states falls (see Figure 1). 18 Figure 1: Relationship between Country Size and State Fragility 70 75 80 85 1234 Country Size (log sq. km) Sources: World Bank WDI and the Fund for Peace In general, there is a positive relationship between state size and state fragility (Figure 1). This could be because very large states are either (i) a near homogenous population, (ii) most of their people lives in few urban areas, or (iii) they mitigate political instability through federalism or local governance. The other potential explanation is the argument Alesina and Spolaore (2005) advance that beyond a certain point, country size bestows the advantages of economies of scale. Larger countries can handle various pressure on the state through decentralization and democratization; or, if resource rich, through state largess that can buy individual and group acquiesces. Country size and Governance Does the size of country limit the effectiveness of government in providing basic services to the public and hence to be in return perceived by them as competent? There is preliminary evidence 19 here that the smaller the size of a state, the more likely it is to have an effective government, and vice verse. Figure 2: Goodness of Fit: Country Size and Government Effectiveness (N=137) (2006) -.6 -.4 -.2 0.2 1234 Country Size (log sq. km) Sources: World Bank, WDI and WGI Table 3: Relationship between Country Size and Government Effectiveness (N=137) (2006) Source: World Bank: WDI & WGI The graphical analysis suggests a potential negative relationship between country size and government effectiveness. The two-way analysis confirms that such a relationship exists and is 20 statistically significant. That means size of country negatively affects the capacity of governments to provide the demanded amounts of public goods to their populace. This situation can lead to a core-periphery problem as it is usually outlying regions which fail to receive adequate government services. Dissatisfied group of people can pose danger to the state because the group assumes that they have been intentionally neglected by their government. Country Size and Democracy Other things constant, are smaller countries more democratic? Yes, it is more than accidental that smaller countries are relatively more democratic than geographically large countries. The likely dispersion of the populace over a larger space limits their communication and organizational capacity to engage in politics. Moreover, a larger geographic space has the tendency to encourage regional and ethnic identities and divisions that may slow down the concerted movement of the whole nation towards democratic change. The regime in power may find regional unrest or ethnic aspirations a cause to initiate authoritarian laws. On the other hand, larger population concentration, as in urban centers, could lead collective action collaboration, to solve common political and administrative problems, by making the government more accountable to the people. 21 Figure 3: Goodness of Fit: Country Size and Democracy (N=137) (2006) 4567 1234 Country Size (log sq. km) Sources: World Bank WDI and Freedom House Table 4: Relationship between Country Size and Democacy (N=137) (2006) Sources: World Bank WDI and Freedom House The graph reveals interesting relationship. Beyond a certain point, large size starts to have a positive relationship with the level of democracy in a country. This may suggest that possibility that in practice of politics there too exists the equivalent of “economies of scale”, wherein the 22 larger the polity (all other things remaining constant) can deliver political goods, such as freedoms and rights, to the populace more efficiently. This can be a possibility as Alesina and Spolaore (2003) indicate countries often overcome the negative impacts of large size by configure the state as a federal system. A federal system creates the best of two worlds for diverse communities living in a large nation. Federalism allows heterogeneous groups to exploit the advantages of being parts of small regional state and at the same time belonging to the “large federal state. In some policy jurisdictions (such as education, law and order, and utilities) the regional state setup has advantage, while in other policy areas (such as defense, trade, and foreign relations) the bigger federal arrangement remains attractive. Population Concentration and the State Sometimes what matters might not be the size of the country, but the pattern of population distribution over the land. If in a large country, most of the people live in urban areas, particularly concentrated in a few large cities that means less a problem in state and democracy building, a better chance to develop national cohesion. But the ideal is small country with a high urbanization rate. On the extremes, at least we can imagine four major scenarios in size-urbanization combinations. The first type is a large country with a high urbanization rate, such as Brazil and Argentina, with urbanization rate of 88% and 90%, respectively. There are also large countries with relatively low urbanization rate, such as India (30%) and Congo Democratic Republic (38%). On the other side, there are small countries such as Singapore and Malta whose urbanization rate is more than 23 90%. But there are also small countries such as Trinidad and Tobago and Burundi whose urbanization rate does not exceed 10%. It is possible to create an index that reflects the pattern of country size and urbanization rate combinations. In Table 5, the variable “population concentration” is an interaction term based on four categories of country size and four levels of urbanization rate. The resulting 9 permutations are next collapsed into three main categories for ease of analysis using two-way crosstab method. Guided by the assumption that (keeping all other things constant) a small country with a high urbanization rate will have the greatest chance of political stability, as well as government effectiveness and democracy building, the index assigns it the highest possible value. On the contrary, the index gives the lowest score to a large country with low urbanization rate. Population Concentration and State Stability Figure 4: Goodness of Fit: Population Concentration and State Fragility (N=132) (2006) 70 75 80 85 90 11.5 22.5 3 Population Concentration Sources: World Bank WDI and the Fund for Peace 24 The preliminary analysis (Figure 4) provides some support to the theoretical claim that a compact state (i.e., small and highly urbanized) has a better chance of experiencing political stability compared to a large country whose population is thinly scattered over the land. At least for reason, the state finds easier to exercise power, to provide public services, and to be responsive to the people’s needs when the country is small or most of the people are in concentrated in a few urban centers. Table 5: Relationship between Population Concentration and Political Stability (N=137) (2006) Source: World Bank, WDI and WGI The two-way analysis (Table 5) statistically verifies the theoretical expectation that small is beautiful to ensure political stability and state survival. Countries which are designated as small and highly urbanized has only about 11% chance of seeing political instability compared to the 54% chance of large states with low urbanization rate. On the other hand, more than 46% of countries small and highly urbanized are highly stable, whereas only about a quarter of the large and little urbanized states are so. These findings have huge implications for a country’s economic futures, as for example, in highly globalizing world where foreign direct investments (FDI) looking for host countries, they look for politically more stable countries. In that sense, small and highly urbanized countries have an inherent advantage to win in the competition for 25 FDI. This possibility is further enhanced once we also consider the comparative merits of “compact” and urbanized countries in running an effective government. Population Concentration and Government Effectiveness Figure 4: Goodness of Fit: Population Concentration and Government Effectiveness (N=137) (2006) -.8 -.6 -.4 -.2 0.2 11.5 22.5 3 Population Concentration Sources: World Bank, WDI and WGI At first blush we notice that (Figure 4) there is a positive relationship between being a compact country (in terms of small size and urbanization) and running an effective government. 32 Urbanization Rate and Democracy Table 9: Relationship between Urbanization and Democracy (Freedom House) (N=137) (2006) Sources: World Bank WDI and Freedom House The relationship between urbanization rate and democracy using the Freedom House measure (Table 9) is not statistically significant. I repeat the analysis using with Polity IV dataset which weighs heavily on the side of the institutional and procedural character of democracy, compared to rights-based measure of Freedom House. Table 10: Relationship between Urbanization and Democracy (Polity IV) (N=137) (2006) Sources: World Bank WDI and Polity IV Here again the relationship between urbanization rate and democracy is tenuous. Both results defy modernization theory’s expectation about urbanization and democracy. The disappearing result may be due to two factors. First, this could be tied to the moment in history. The wave of democratization unleashed by the end of the Cold War, by mid-2000s has started to stall, and 33 even in many places started to reverse as authoritarianism seemed to revive across the globe.3 The second reason could be the “resource curse” democracy suffers. Many raw material rich small countries are authoritarian. These countries buy the support of their populace through largess or enforce stability through state repressive apparatus. Size and Nation-building If the axiom that a large country size premises more heterogeneity, does it follow that such heterogeneity also leads to more heightened group grievance and possibly to greater elites fractionalization? If we take the levels of group grievance and fractionalized elites as the measure of national unity (i.e., nation-building), how much do these conditions (or, trends) are affected by geographic and demographic variables? Does large size foster sectionalism, hence divergent policy preferences, which can be a source of conflict in the polity? Theory provides a “yes” answer; but what does empirical analysis show? 3 The stalling or reversal of democracy may be observed in later year data. For example, Freedom House (2018) reports that for the last 12 years democracy has been on the retreat. The trend seems to persist for some time given the nationalist and populist backlash observed in many European elections. 34 Table 11: Relationship between Country Size and Groups Grievances Index (N=137) (2006) Sources: World Bank WDI and the Fund for Peace Clearly, small countries, compared to large countries, show lower scale of group grievances. This can be taken as positive indication that smaller countries have succeeded in solving the problems of heterogeneous groups or that they are on their way to effectively create one nation out of many. Given the fact that it is groups’ grievances that later can erupt into violence and separatism, this findings provide some evidence that small countries have the potential to survive as states compared to their larger countries counterparts. Table 12: Relationship between Country Size and Groups Grievances Index (N=137) (2006) Sources: World Bank WDI and the Fund for Peace The effect of country size on elites fractionalization is not as strong as theoretically expected. 35 Figure 8: Goodness of Fit: Group Grievances and Country Size (N=132) (2006) 5.5 6 6.5 7 1234 Country Size (log sq. km) Sources: World Bank WDI and the Fund for Peace Figure 9: Goodness of Fit: Country Size and Fractionalized Elites Index (N=132) (2006) 6 6.5 7 7.5 1 2 3 4 Country Size (log sq. km) Sources: World Bank WDI and the Fund for Peace 36 Urbanization and Fractionalization As various sociological theories suggest does urbanization lead individuals from kinship-based mechanical solidarity to group’s cross-cutting and overlapping organic solidarity? This is the assumption that through symbolic interactions and shared values acquired from close contact and common socializing forces (such as the workplace, schools, and the mass media, etc.) is that diverse groups will tend to develop a common national identity. Hence, urbanization and city life are premised to facilitate elite interaction and cooperation as well as group’s tolerance and cooperation across many endeavors. Table 13: Relationship between Urbanization Rate and Group Grievance Index (N=132) (2006) Sources: World Bank WDI and the Fund for Peace Interestingly, urbanization rate has little impact on the observed scale of groups’ grievances in countries. In the developing countries context, group grievances can be obviated by the effects of urban living only over time and under an integrating and growing economy condition. If urban centers are virtually segregated cultural enclaves, or have a large slum area where the poor live, or there is little economic growth, they can experience simmering group grievances, which can erupt into explosive violence from time to time (Dahl and Tufte 1973:92). 37 Table 14: Relationship between Urbanization Rate and Fractionalized Elites (N=132) (2006) Sources: World Bank WDI and the Fund for Peace As mostly observed, elite politically activity is an urban phenomenon. Urbanization provides various groups elites the right conditions and resources to mobilize their supporters to political activism. Historically, urban centers, as centers of education, communication, and policy making, are places where elites get their political education, hone their organization and communication skills. 38 Multivariate Regression Analysis Table 15: Relationship between State Stability and Regressors (N=137) (2006) Sources: World Bank WDI and WGI, the Fund for Peace, the CIA Factbook Comment: state size (i.e., land area), urbanization rate, population density, and democracy are properly signed and statistically significant. Larger state size and population density potentially hamper state’s satiability. This could be due to the heterogeneity effect large state can foster and the resource competition among groups a higher population density enables. Urbanization by concentrating the population in smaller geographic areas enhances the controlling power of the state, and alternately the effectiveness and responsiveness of the government. 39 Table 16: Relationship between Governance and Regressors (N=137) (2006) Sources: World Bank WDI and WGI, the Fund for Peace, the CIA Factbook When we control for other variables, the hypothesized effect of large size on the effectiveness of government vanishes. However, population density and urbanization show the expected effect, and their effect is statistically significant. Democracy and trade openness are also a plus for government effectiveness. Government effectiveness is important in two respects. First, it generates support for the state because the populace is satisfied with the job their government is doing. Secondly, an effective government drives economic growth and efficiency, and creates a positive image of the country abroad, enabling the government to attract FDI into the country. 40 Table 17: Relationship between Democracy (Freedom House) and Regressors (N=137) (2006) Sources: World Bank WDI and WGI, the Fund for Peace, the CIA Factbook The expected effects of state size, population density, and urbanization on democracy are noshows (Table 17). What emerges as important factors to influence democracy are the variables representing elites fractionalization and groups grievances. The statistical significance of these two variables lend credibility to those who say what matter about heterogeneity is not static measures of diversity (i.e, ethno-linguistic fractionalization (ELF)), but the quality of the relationships among the diverse groups (Gerring et al. 283). Interestingly, also a country with many neighbors have a difficulty in establishing democracy or remaining one. More neighbors mean more border to defend and bi-lateral relations to sort out. Here a state may find a justification to be authoritarians in the name of national security. The variable for number of country neighbors is properly signed and statistically significant. 41 Table 18: Relationship between Democracy (Polity IV) and Regressors (N=137) (2006) Sources: World Bank WDI and WGI, the Fund for Peace, the CIA Factbook Using the alternative method democracy, the Polity measure which focuses on the institutional and procedural aspects of democracy, does not improve results. So the tentative conclusion could be that the relationship between democracy and state size and demographic settlement patterns is not straightforward as assumed. Instead of more static or endogenous factors, what happens to affect democracy seems to be more dynamic and relational variables such as groups grievance and elites fractionalization. It is also possible a different analytical model and statistical tool may be able to capture better the hypothesized relationship between the geographic and demographic variables, such as state size, population density, and urbanization rate.