InvigoratEU Chinese Influence in the Eastern Trio and the Western Balkans: Strategic Fragmentation in the EU's Enlargement Countries (D6.2)

Marko Todorović, Strahinja Subotić, Nona Mikhalidze, Nicoletta Pirozzi, Luca Cinciripini, Miloš Pavković, Julian Plottka, Kai Ole Vorberg, Vladislav Kulminski, Tatiana Nistorica, Vadim Pistrinciuc, Giorgi Khishtovani, Guga Tsukhishvili, Irakli Sirbiladze, Irena Rajcinovska Pandeva, Ivan Damjanovski, Nenad Markovic, A* j^lnvigoratEU 'Invigorating Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy for a Resilient Europe Chinese Influence in the Eastern Trio and the Western Balkans: Strategic Fragmentation in the EU's Enlargement Countries Author Matteo Bonomi Contributors Funded by the European Union Executive summary Chinese Influence in the Eastern Trio and the Western Balkans: Strategic Fragmentation in the EU's Enlargement Countries China's growing presence in Eastern and Southeastern Europe has become a source of strategic concern for the EU, especially as global power dynamics shift under the weight of increasing U.S. -China rivalry. Once seen primarily as an economic partner, China is now viewed by many in Europe as a systemic rival, particularly due to its trade practices, am¬ biguous geopolitical positions - such as its stance on Russia's invasion of Ukraine - and its model of state-led development. Against this backdrop, the report examines China's influ¬ ence in nine EU (potential) candidate countries: the Eastern Trio (Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine) and the Western Balkans (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia), assessing the scope and nature of Chinese involvement. Drawing on the InvigoratEU External Influence Index - an empirically grounded tool for systematically measuring and comparing the political, economic, and societal dimensions of external influence - the report tracks the evolution of China's presence between 2015 and 2025. The findings show that China's approach is flexible, pragmatic, and highly context-specific, rather than driven by a unified regional strategy. It leverages bilateralism, exploiting institutional fragmentation and offering alternatives to the EU's liberal-demo¬ cratic model through infrastructure investments, soft power, and diplomatic engagement, often in ways that align with the interests of local elites. Serbia emerges as China's most deeply embedded partner, showing significant political alignment, high levels of economic engagement - including strategic EDI and a free trade agreement - and a growing societal footprint. In contrast, countries like Kosovo and Mol¬ dova exhibit minimal Chinese presence, largely due to non-recognition in the case of Ko¬ sovo and a sharp political and institutional reorientation toward the EU in Moldova. Georgia and Ukraine present complex cases: both show increasing political and economic influence by China, but with varying degrees of political openness and strategic caution. Among the Western Balkans, Albania and North Macedonia maintain limited but pragmatic relations with China, focusing primarily on trade and infrastructure, while Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro have shown higher levels of economic engagement, often accompanied by governance and debt-related concerns. On the economic front, Chinese engagement increased after the 2008 financial crisis and the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative in 2015. However, one of the report's main findings is that China's actual economic influence in the two regions remains limited and highly uneven. Meaningful economic presence is largely concentrated in a few countries such as Serbia (and Georgia and Ukraine to a lesser extent), while in most other countries it is marginal or symbolic. Despite high-profile announcements and investment promises, eco¬ nomic cooperation remains limited. This weak economic footprint undermines China's abil¬ ity to leverage economic engagement into long-term strategic influence. At the same time, concerns persist regarding issues such as debt sustainability, corruption risks, and the in¬ volvement of Chinese actors in sensitive sectors, including telecommunications. In societal terms, China's approach has been primarily top-down, driven by Confucius Insti¬ tutes, educational exchanges, and symbolic partnerships rather than bottom-up societal engagement. In terms of public perception, though, attitudes towards China are generally tepid to positive in most countries, especially where economic cooperation has been more visible. However, trust in China has significantly deteriorated in Ukraine, largely due to its perceived ambiguity regarding Russia's invasion. Overall, Chinese influence in the region is growing but remains fragmented. It tends to concentrate in environments where governance is weak, institutions are fragile, and EU prospects are either uncertain or distant. China acts less as a direct challenger to Brussels or Washington and more as a strategic opportunist - offering investment and diplomatic support without requiring democratic reform. This approach allows Beijing to reinforce the power of domestic elites in hybrid regimes while promoting its own development model. To effectively respond to these challenges, the report recommends that the EU adopts a more strategic, targeted, and country-specific approach. The EU should strengthen politi¬ cal engagement beyond enlargement rhetoric through concrete diplomatic, institutional, and financial commitments tailored to the individual needs and contexts of partner coun¬ tries. Enhancing internal coherence and strategic coordination among EU member states and institutions is crucial to align policies on China-related issues and integrate them into broader enlargement strategies. Moreover, the EU should strengthen its support for trans¬ parency and resilience in partner countries by promoting anti-corruption measures, inde¬ pendent media, and the vibrant civil society, thereby reducing the attractiveness of opaque and conditional Chinese offers. Author Matteo Bonomi Senior Fellow Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) ć ć Contributors Marko Todorovi Researcher, European Policy Centre (CEP) Strahinja Suboti , Programme Manager and Senior Researcher, European Policy Centre (CEP) DOI 10.5281/zenodo.17338857 Nona Mikhalidze, Senior Fellow, Istituto Affari Intenrazionali (IAI) Nicoletta Pirozzi, Head of Programme on European Union and Institutional Relations Mana¬ ger, Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) Luca Cinciripini, Researcher, Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) Mil š o Pavkovi ć , Researcher, European Policy Centre (CEP) Julian Plottka, Scientific Senior Project Manager, Institut für Europäische Politik (IEP) Kai Ole Vorberg, Institut für Europäische Politik (IEP) Vladislav Kulminski, Executive Director, Institute for Strategie Initiatives (IPIS) Tatiana Nistorica, Expert and Former State Secretary, Institute for Strategie Initiatives (IPIS) Vadim Pistrinciuc, Expert and Former Deputy Prime Minister of Moldova for Reintegration, In¬ stitute for Strategie Initiatives (IPIS) Giorgi Khishtovani, Research Director, PMC Research Center Guga Tsukhishvili, Affiliated Researcher, PMC Research Center Irakli Sirbiladze, Affiliated Researcher, PMC Research Center Irena Rajcinovska Pandeva, Professor, Faculty of Law, SS. Cyril and Methodius University Ivan Damjanovski, Professor, Faculty of Law, SS. Cyril and Methodius University Nenad Markovic, Professor, Faculty of Law, SS. Cyril and Methodius University Approved by: Funda Tekin, Director Institute for European Politics, Scientific Lead, InvigoratEU Michael Kaeding, Professor for European Integration and European Union Politics at the Department of Political Science at the University of Duisburg-Essen, Germany, Project Coordinator, InvigoratEU About InvigoratEU InvigoratEU is a Horizon Europe-funded project, coordinated by the EU-Chair at the University of Duisburg-Essen (UDE) together with the Institut für Europäische Politik (IEP) in Berlin. The project, with a duration of 5 years from January 2024 until December 2026, examines how the EU can structure its future relations with its Eastern neighbours and the countries of the Western Balkans. The consortium has received around three million euros for this endeavour. License: This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 4,0 Unported License. Disclaimer: Views and opinions expressed are however those of the authors only and do not neces¬ sarily reflect those of the European Union or the European Research Executive Agency. Neither the European Union nor the granting authority can be held responsible for them. Funded by the European Union About the project: www.inviqorat.eu ^^InvigoratEU 'Invigorating Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy for a Resilient Europe InvigoratEU | Policy Report Contents 1 Introduction 5 2 Methodological Framework 5 5 China's Ambitions in the Eastern Trio and the Western Balkans 8 4 Dimensions of Chinese Influence 11 Political Influence: Evolution, Patterns, and the Political Sub-Index 11 Economic Influence: Evolution, Patterns, and the Economic Sub-Index 17 Societal Influence: Evolution, Patterns and the Societal Sub-Index 25 Overall InvigoratEU External Influence Index: General Trends of Chinese Influence 27 5 Key Findings 31 6 Recommendations 33 Bibliography 35 A nnex I InvigoratEU External Influence Index: Detailed Breakdown 44 A nnex II InvigoratEU External Influence Index per Candidate Counry 53 Annex II. 1 Albania 53 Annex 11.2 Bosnia and Herzegovina 54 Annex 11.5 Georgia 55 Annex 11.4 Kosovo 56 Annex 11.5 Moldova 57 Annex 11.6 Montenegro 58 Annex 11.7 North Macedonia 59 Annex 11.8 Serbia 60 Annex 11.9 Ukraine 61 1 ^^InvigoratEU 'Invigorating Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy for a Resilient Europe InvigoratEU | Policy Report Figures Figure 1: The Political Influence Sub-Index Over Time (2015-2025) 11 Figure 2: Political Influence Sub-Index Values in 2025 Compared to 2015 17 Figure 5: The Economic Influence Sub-Index Over Time (2015-2025) 18 Figure 4: Economic Influence Sub-Index Values in 2025 Compared to 2015 22 Figure 5: The Societal Influence Sub-Index Over Time (2015-2025) 25 Figure 6: Societal Influence Sub-Index Values in 2025 Compared to 2015 T1 Figure 7: Aggregated Chinese Influence Index by Dimension and Year (2015-2025) 28 Figure 8: Shifts in China's InvigoratEU External Influence Index Across the Region (2015-2025) 50 Figure 9: Country-Level 2025 Scores of Chinese Influence in EU Candidates, Colour-Coded by Influence Intensity 51 Figure 10: China's Influence in Albania (2015-2025) 55 Figure 11: China's Influence in Bosnia and Herzegovina (2015-2025) 54 Figure 12: China's Influence in Georgia (2015-2025) 55 Figure 15: China's Influence in Kosovo (2015-2025) 56 Figure 14: China's Influence in Moldova (2015-2025) 57 Figure 15: China's Influence in Montenegro (2015-2025) 58 Figure 16: Russia's Influence in North Macedonia (2015-2025) 59 Figure 17: China's Influence in Serbia (2015-2025) 60 Figure 18: China's Influence in Ukraine (2015-2025) 61 Tables Table 1: Imports and exports of goods from and to China, as share of total, by country (2015, 2018, 2025) 20 Table 2: Chinese FDI Inflows and Inward Stock, as share of total, by country (2015, 2018, 2025) 20 Table 5: InvigoratEU External Influence Index 44 2 •^InvigoratEU 'Invigorating Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy for a Resilient Europe InvigoratEU | Policy Report 1 Introduction As China expands its global footprint, European policymakers are viewing with mounting con¬ cern at China's growing presence in Europe, including in its Eastern and Southeastern regions. While the United States remains the world's dominant power in military, technological and economic terms,1 the intensifying strategic rivalry between Washington and Beijing is reshaping the global order, moving away from the post-Cold War liberal international system towards a more multipolar and competitive landscape.2 China's increasing weight in trade, investments, technology and diplomacy, is hence being felt more strongly across the European continent, raising urgent questions about strategic autonomy, economic dependency, and the coherence of the transatlantic alliance. For Europeans, this is not merely a matter of external competition, as it also directly affects their internal cohesion and long-term strategic interests. Against this backdrop, the European perceptions of China have evolved significantly over the past decades. In the 1990s and early 2000s, China was largely seen as an economic partner, especially as European companies sought to benefit from China's rapid growth and integra¬ tion into global markets. By 2006, it also had started to be viewed as a trade challenge, as concerns grew over market access, intellectual property rights, and the impact of Chinese exports on European industries.5 In 2019, the EU formally designated China as a "systemic rival" in its strategic outlook,4 while still acknowledging areas of cooperation and competition, signalling that a more strategic and cautious approach toward China had emerged across Europe. Political tensions have further intensified during the COVID-19 pandemic and following Russia's large-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, fuelling distrust over China's lack of transparency in managing the health emergency5 and its ambiguous stance on the war - characterized by rhetorical neutrality but de facto alignment with Moscow. 6 These developments, along with repeated EU complaints about human rights violations in China7 and growing concerns over peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait,8 have contributed to a shift in perception: China is 1 Latham / Adnan Moeini: Unraveling China's Grand Strategy: Its Aim is to Erode U.S. Global Hegemony, Not Seek World Domination, 26 February 2025, available at: https://peacediplomacy.org/2025/02/26/unraveling-chinasgrand-strategy-its-aim-is-to-erode-u-s-global-hegemony-not-seek-world-domination/ (last accessed: 09.06.2025). 2 Nurullah Gur / Serif Dilek: "US-China Economic Rivalry and the Reshoring of Global Supply Chains", in: The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Spring 2023), p. 61-83. 5 European Commission: EU - China: Closer Partners, Growing Responsibilities, 24 October 2006, available at: https: //eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2006:0631:FIN:EN:PDF (last accessed: 09.06.2025). 4 European Commission: EU-China - A Strategic Outlook, 12 March 2019, available at: https://commission.europa.eu/system/files/2019-05/communication-eu-china-a-strategic-outlook.pdf (last accessed: 09.06.2025). 5 Ettore Greco/ Federica Marcon / Irene Paviotti: Crisis and Geopolitical Reordering. Covid-19 from a Comparative Perspective, in REGROUP Research Papers, No. 1, May 2023, available at: https://www.iai.it/it/ pubblicazioni/c09/crisis-and-geopolitical-reordering-covid-19-comparative-perspective ( I a st a ccessed : 23.06.2025). 6 Yifan Ding / Alice Ekman: China-Europe Relations, Two Years After Russia Invaded Ukraine, 11 March 2024, avail¬ able at: https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2024/03/china-europe-relations-two-years-after-russia-invaded-ukraine?lang=en (last accessed: 09.06.2025). 7 European External Action Service: China - 39th Human Rights Dialogue with the European Union took place in Chongqing, June 2024, available at: https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/china-39th-human-rights-dialogue-european-union-took-place-chongqing en (last accessed: 23.06.2025). 8 Nicola Casarini: China-Taiwan Relations and the EU: How European Soft Power Could Help Reduce Cross-Strait Tensions, in IAI Commnataries 24| 21, May 2024, available at: https://www.iai.it/en/pubblicazioni/c05/china-taiwan-relations-and-eu-how-european-soft-power-could-help-reduce-cross (last accessed: 23.06.2025). 5 ē ņ Č •^InvigoratEU 'Invigorating Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy for a Resilient Europe InvigoratEU | Policy Report increasingly viewed not only as an economic competitor but also as a geopolitical actor whose values and strategic priorities diverge sharply from those of Europe - hence its designation as a "systemic rival."9 A key driver of the EU's reorientation has been the growing securitization of economic rela¬ tions, reflecting heightened concerns about unfair competition, trade dependencies, and the risks posed by Chinese technologies to intelligence and sensitive data security.10 Furthermore, the chip crunch during the COVID-19 pandemic exposed significant vulnerabilities in global supply chains, particularly in critical sectors such as the semiconductor industry. 11 Reflecting this shift, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen in 2025 called for "de-risking" from China, underlining the need to reduce strategic dependencies without severing ties en¬ tirely.12 Given this evolving landscape, this report analyses China's ambitions and influence in nine countries located in Europe's Eastern and Southeastern "peripheries": the so-called EU Eastern Trio (Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine) and the six Western Balkan countries (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia). Despite their differ¬ ences, these nine countries share a common strategic importance for the EU: they are all on the path toward EU membership. In response to Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine, in fact, the European Council extended accession prospects to Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia, while re¬ newing its engagement with the Western Balkans. This revived momentum after more than a decade of enlargement fatigue since Croatia's accession in 2015, 15 represents a key compo¬ nent of EU responses to growing instability and insecurity in the EU's surroundings, underscor¬ ing the EU's recognition that enlargement is not only a political process, but a security imper¬ ative. Indeed, as potential EU members, the political and economic orientation of these countries is not only crucial for shaping the Union's future but also for reinforcing its present structure and enhancing the resilience of its broader system of regional integration.14 As EU candidates, these countries maintain close political, institutional, and economic ties with the EU through Association Agreements and the Stabilisation and Association Process, benefiting from varying degrees of access to the Single Market,15 while already participating in the coordination of a 9 Andreea Brinza / Una Aleksandra B rzi aerenkova / Philippe Le Corre I John Seaman / Richard Turcsänyi / Stefan Vladisavljev: EU-China Relations: De-risking or De-coupling - The Future of the EU Strategy Towards China, 26 March 2024, available at: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/ehjdes/STLJD/2024/Z54446/EXPO STU[2024)Z54446 EhLpdf (last accessed: 09.06.2025). 10 Francesca Ghiretti: Chinese Investments and the Economic Security Turn in Europe. By Bristol University Press 2025. 11 Aurelio Insisa: Italy's De-Risking Efforts in the Semiconductor Industry, the European Chips Act and Sino-American Geo-Economic Competition, in: IAI Papers 25 1 05, 2025, available at: https://www.iai.it/it/pubblicazioni/c03/italys-de-risking-efforts-semiconductor-industry (last accessed: 23.06.2025). 12 European Commission: Speech by President von der Leyen on EU-China Relations, 30 March 2023, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech 23 2063 (last accessed: 23.06.2025). 15 Matteo Bonomi and Irene Rusconi: From EU 'Enlargement Fatigue' to 'Enlargement Enthusiasm'?, Österreichische Gesellschaft für Europapolitik (ÖGfE), October 2023, available at: https://www.oegfe.at/policy-briefs/from-euenlargement-fatigue-to-enlargement-enthusiasm/ (last accessed: 23.06.2025). 14 Frank Schimmelfennig / Thomas Winzen: "Regional Differentiation: Beyond the EU Member States", in: Frank Schimmelfennig I Thomas Winzen: Ever Looser Union? Differentiated European Integration, Oxford, 2020. 15 The six Western Balkan states - except Kosovo - are official candidate countries, while Kosovo is considered a "potential candidate country" under EU terminology. These countries have participated in the EU's Stabilization and 4 ū š ć ^^InvigoratEU 'Invigorating Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy for a Resilient Europe InvigoratEU | Policy Report number of EU policies short of full membership.* 16 A clearer understanding of China's role in these regions is thus essential for formulating a coherent European response that protects shared interests, strengthens resilience, and upholds the credibility and sustainability of the EU enlargement process.17 This policy report draws on the InvigoratEU External Influence Index,18 an original empirical tool developed for this research to systematically measure and compare third actors' influence across political, economic, and societal dimensions. The index maps the external influence of Russia, China and Türkiye in the two regions. Three policy reports provide a detailed assess¬ ment of the respective external influence of the global actors.19 By combining qualitative as¬ sessments with a structured quantification of external leverage, this report identifies key pat¬ terns and variations in Chinese engagement across the two regions. Through such a compre¬ hensive approach, the report aims to formulate actionable policy recommendations to strengthen the EU's resilience and enhance its capacity to engage with China's evolving global strategies. 2 Methodological Framework This report applies a structured and multidimensional framework to assess China's geopolitical influence in the nine EU candidate (and potential candidate) countries across the EU Eastern Trio and the Western Balkans - specifically Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine as well as Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia. The analysis in¬ tegrates both qualitative and quantitative methods to capture the complexity of external in¬ fluence dynamics. At the core of this analytical approach is the InvigoratEU External Influence Index, an empirically grounded instrument developed within the research project "InvigoratEU - How to reform the EU's enlargement and neighbourhood policy for a resilient Europe" funded by the European Commission's Horizon Europe programme.20 Designed to systematically measure and compare the political, economic, and societal dimensions of external influence of China, Russia and Türkiye, the Index allows for both cross-country comparisons and com¬ parisons over time. Developed collaboratively by the European Policy Centre (CEP) and Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), with support from partners including the Institut für Europäische Association Process since 1999 - the main policy framework for stabilizing the Western Balkans and guiding them toward membership in the aftermath of the Yugoslav wars - and have each concluded individual Stabilisation and Association Agreements with the EU, including the establishment of Free Trade Areas. The countries of the Eastern Trio have signed Association Agreements with the EU, which include Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agree¬ ments. In 2022, they also applied for EU membership. The EU has since decided to open accession negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova, while the process with Georgia remains stalled. See European Commission: Enlargement Policy, available at: https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/enlargement-policy en (last accessed: 09.06.2025). 16 Maria Giulia Amadio Vicere / Matteo Bonomi: External differentiation as a strategy of system maintenance: EU enlargement towards the Western Balkans, in: West European Politics, 48(5), 2024, pp. 1159-1185. 17 Hannah Brandt I Funda Tekin / Pol Bargues / Ram nas Vilpi auskas / Luisa Waschke: Growing Resilient Together: Reshaping EU-Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy in a Geopolitical Era, July 2024, available at: https: / /invigorat.eu/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/lnvigoratEU deliverables D5.2 public final-ueberarbeitet.pdf (last ac¬ cessed: 09.06.2025). 18 The InvigoratEU External Influence Index has been developed within the InvigoratEU project to assess and com¬ pare the geopolitical influence of Russia, China, and Türkiye in EU candidate countries. 19 On Russia see Marko Todorovi : Long Policy Report on Russia's Ambitions and Leverage, May 2025, available at: https://invigorat.eu/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/lnvigoratEU D6.1 Lonq-Policy-Report-on-Russias-ambitions-and-leveraqe public.pdf (last qccessed: 09.06.2025); On Türkiye forthcoming. 20 See InvigoratEU: Invigorating Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy for a Resilient Europe project's website at https://invigorat.eu (last accessed: 09.06.2025). 5 ć š ć ćĐ ć 46 Embassy of Ukraine in the People’s Republic of China: Legal Basis of Ukraine and China, 27 October 2020, available at: https://china.mfa.gov.ua/en/partnership/184-dogovirno-pravova-baza-mizh-ukrajinoju-ta-kitajem (last accessed 09.04.2025). 47 •^InvigoratEU 'Invigorating Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy for a Resilient Europe InvigoratEU | Policy Report In terms of multilateral and bilateral cooperation, all countries except Kosovo have partici¬ pated in the Belt and Road Initiative, having signed individual Memoranda of Understanding and various bilateral agreements with China. Beijing's engagement in the Western Balkans is comparatively more institutionalized, as these countries have joined the 14+1 cooperation for¬ mat (formerly 17+1), a multilateral initiative launched in 2012 to foster economic collaboration with EU member states in Central and Eastern Europe, five Western Balkan countries, and was later expanded to include Greece. A similar pattern is evident also in China's outreach to Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova, where all countries have been seeking Chinese capital through Belt and Road's projects, but they do not participate in China's led multilateral formats such as 14+1. This divergence reflects the region's more complex geopolitical landscape, marked by tensions with Russia and more intricate pathways toward Euro-Atlantic integration. In this context, China has adopted a more nuanced and politically cautious approach, focusing primarily on the economic dimension of its engagement. Among all countries, Serbia stands out as China's most engaged partner in bilateral cooper¬ ation. Serbia was the first, among the countries analysed, to sign a Strategic Partnership Agreement with China in 2009, upgraded to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in 2016, 42 and culminating in a Free Trade Agreement in 2023.45 High-level visits, numerous intergovern¬ mental agreements, and close ties between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Ser¬ bian Progressive Party (SNS) underscore the strategic nature of this relationship. Ukraine and Georgia have also signed Strategic Partnership Agreements with China - in 201144 and 2023, 45 respectively. In 2013, Ukraine and China also signed a "Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation," marking a high point in a relationship governed by over 300 agreements.46 However, bilateral cooperation weakened after the 2014 Euromaidan revolution, with China adopting a cautious stance.47 Since then, China's ambiguous position on Russian aggressions - especially the SinoRussian critique of NATO - has further strained diplomatic relations, but not diminished their importance. Georgia's early engagement with China focused primarily on trade and invest¬ ment, but bilateral and high-level political visits have been steadily on the rise. The 2017 Free Trade Agreement spurred economic exchange.48 Following Russia's 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine and the ensuing war of aggression, bilateral cooperation with Georgia accelerated, culminating in the 2023 declaration of a strategic partnership aimed at expanding collabo¬ ration across political, economic, and cultural domains. Bilateral relations between China and Bosnia and Herzegovina have been also on the rise, but showing a more segmented pattern: while state-level relations remain limited, China has cultivated strong ties with Republika 42 Strahinja Suboti /Milo Janji : Serbia at the Crossroads between the West and the East, European Policy Centre (CEP), 2020, available at https://cep.org.rs/en/publications/serbia-at-the-crossroads-between-the-west-andthe-east/ (last accessed: 09.06.2025). 45 Nikola Beli : Si inping u poseti Srbiji siede e godine, 7 November 2023, available at: https://www.politika.rs/sr/clanak/582581/Si-Dinping-u-poseti-Srbiji-sledece-godine (last accessed: 09.06.2025). 44 Embassy of Ukraine in the People's Republic of China: Political Relations between Ukraine and China, available at: https://china.mfa.gov.ua/en/partnership/political-relations-between-ukraine-and-china (last accessed: 23.06.2025). 45 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia: Foreign Policy Strategy, 2019, available at: https://mfa.gov.ge/en /For¬ eign-PolicyStrategy (last accessed: 09.06.2025). Andriy Goncharuk / Elina Hobova I Viktor Kiktenko / Andriy Koval / Serhiy Koshovyi: Foreign Policy Audit: UkraineChina, Institute of World Policy, 2016, available at: https://sinologist.com.ua/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/Audyt-zovnishnoi-polityky Ukr Kytayeng inet.pdf (last accessed: 23.06.2025). 48 Civil Georgia: PM Kvirikashvili: Free Trade with China Opens 'New Door' for Georgia, 19 May 2017, available at: https://civil.ge/archives/126410 (last accessed: 09.06.2025). 12 ć ć ć •^InvigoratEU 'Invigorating Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy for a Resilient Europe InvigoratEU | Policy Report Srpska (Serb-dominated part of Bosnia and Herzegovina), including party-level cooperation with the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats party (SNSD) and selective political and economic exchanges.49 In other Western Balkan countries and Moldova, bilateral cooperation initiatives with China have stagnated or even cooled in recent years. North Macedonia, after signing Chinesefunded infrastructure deals (notably a controversial highway project), shifted decisively toward Western partners, reducing its engagement with China to a symbolic level.50 Albania, despite initial enthusiasm marked by its 2017 Belt and Road Initiative cooperation agreement, scaled back its cooperation after 2018, with Prime Minister Edi Rama openly distancing the country from Chinese investment.51 Montenegro experienced a surge in cooperation centred on a Chi¬ nese loan for highway construction but has recently changed course, aligning more closely with EU norms following political turnover in late 2020.52 Also Moldova's cooperation with China remains limited and economically focused. While the country participates in the Belt and Road Initiative, it has not developed broader strategic or institutional ties with Beijing, and engagement is confined to a modest set of trade and investment agreements. Kosovo, lastly, is largely excluded from any bilateral or multilateral political cooperation with China, which does not recognize its independence and maintains only a Liaison Office under UNMIK ac¬ creditation.55 When it comes to internal politics, Chinese influence across the Eastern Trio and the Western Balkans remains generally limited and non-intrusive. There is little to no evidence of direct interference in elections, legislative processes, or domestic political affairs in Albania, Kosovo, Moldova, Montenegro, or North Macedonia, where China's role remains restrained. Beijing has not made significant efforts to embed itself within political structures, with interactions largely confined to diplomatic dialogue and occasional ceremonial exchanges with political parties. Albania, in particular, has consistently upheld political autonomy, maintaining formal relations with China without allowing substantial political influence. In Moldova, the continued emphasis on European integration has curtailed Chinese leverage, although President Maia Sandu's re¬ cent calls for a more pragmatic and balanced foreign policy - including toward China - sug¬ gest a potentially more flexible approach moving forward.54 In contrast, Serbia and, to some extent, Republika Srpska have seen a more pronounced, albeit indirect, Chinese political engagement. Here, institutionalized cooperation between local rul¬ ing parties and the CCP has taken root, marked by regular exchanges and formalized ties. This 49 Goran Kati : Komunisti iz Kine na Dodikovom 'terenu', 28 April 2023, available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/bosna-hercegovina-kina-republika-srpska-snsd-dodik-komunisticka-partiia/32383867.html (last ac¬ cessed: 09.06.2025). 50Ana Krstinovska I Zlatko Simonovski / Aleksandra Davitkovska-Spasovska: Hope for the Best, Prepare for the Worst: Is North Macedonia Vulnerable to Economic Pressure by the People's Republic of China?, available at: https://estima.mk/static/c2.2a1.15 xqiv9t3kenqsccsdmit8/sl/files/rte/documents/EconomicCoertion/HopeForTheBest EN.pdf (last accessed: 09.06.2025). 51 Alice Taylor-Bra e: Albanian PM: No Economic Benefits from Chinese Cooperation, 23 February 2023, available at: https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/albanian-pm-no-economic-benefits-from-chinese-cooperation/ (last accessed: 09.06.2025). 52 Jovana Bogojevi : Montenegro's Growing Distance from China, 6 May 2022, available at: https: //chi naobservers.eu/monteneqros-qrowing-distance-from-china/ (last accessed: 09.06.2025). 55 Support4Partnership: What is the Chinese Office Doing in Pristina?, 17 May 2024, available at: https: //support4partnership.org/en/news/what-is-the-chinese-office-doing-in-pristina 54 Denis Cenusa: Moldova's Foreign Policy after 2024 Presidential Elections: Staying on the EU Path, Moving East¬ wards or Becoming Multi-vector? IFRI, 2024 https://www.ifri.org/en/editorials/moldovas-foreign-policy-after2024-presidential-elections-staying-eu-path-moving (last accessed: 09.06.2025). 15 ć š ć ć Sergiy Gerasymchuk/Yurii Poita: Ukraine-China after 2014: a new chapter in the relationship, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Kyiv, 2018, p. 7. •^InvigoratEU 'Invigorating Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy for a Resilient Europe InvigoratEU | Policy Report reflects a strategic effort by Beijing to foster political alignment without overt interference in domestic governance. Similarly, in Georgia, China's political role is more nuanced. While there is no clear evidence of direct influence over domestic politics, close ties have been cultivated with the ruling Georgian Dream party. As Georgia's political trajectory drifts toward authori¬ tarianism, the CCP's governance model has found a degree of quiet resonance. Though China refrains from explicitly promoting its political values, its silent support and growing economic presence offer an implicit alternative to Western liberal norms, potentially reinforcing local political trends. Chinese engagement in the military sphere across the considered countries remains, in most cases, non-existent or modest. None of the countries have hosted a Chinese military presence, and the majority of them have had no significant military cooperation or arms trade with China - except for Serbia and, with some qualifications, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Ukraine. Serbia, in fact, has engaged in some arms deals and technological exchanges with China in recent years,55 though these remain secondary to its military ties with Russia.56 Bosnia and Herzegovina has received minor arms donations and conducted limited military cooperation with China during the period considered.57 Ukraine, however, holds a distinct position. Prior to 2014, it was a crucial supplier of military and aerospace technology to China, providing Beijing access to post-Soviet defence capabilities that were instrumental in advancing its military and space programmes. Following Russia's annexation of Crimea and its aggression in Eastern Ukraine, cooperation with Russia collapsed, and China briefly became a key alternative market for Ukrainian defence exports.58 However, with the onset of large-scale war in 2022 and China's increasing self-sufficiency, this has ended, and Beijing now functions more as a competitor than a partner in the global defence sector.59 Other countries in the two regions - most of them either NATO members (Albania, Montenegro, North Macedonia) or aspiring members - have generally avoided military entanglements with China. Kosovo, in particular, receives no military attention from Beijing; China does not partic¬ ipate in KFOR nor does it engage with the Kosovo Security Force. This absence of military cooperation reflects both China's broader preference for economic and diplomatic influence, and the pro-Western orientation of the Western Balkans' security frameworks. In Moldova, mil¬ itary engagement is virtually non-existent, consistent with both countries' preferences-Moldova's constitutional neutrality and China's non-interventionist approach. Similarly, Georgia has deliberately avoided military cooperation with China, given Beijing's sensitivity to Russian security interests in the South Caucasus. Nonetheless, Chinese investment in critical infrastruc¬ ture - such as the Anaklia Deep Sea Port, through a Chinese-Singaporean consortium - could 55 In 2020, Serbia bought the FK-5 air defence missile system from China, as well as sic CH-92A armed drone systems. See Strahinja Suboti /Milo Janji : Serbia at the Crossroads between the West and the East, European Policy Centre (CEP), 2020, available at: https://cep.org.rs/en/publications/serbia-at-the-crossroads-betweenthe-west-and-the-east/ (last accessed: 09.06.2025). 56 See the report on Russia: Marko Todorovi : Long Policy Report on Russia's Ambitions and Leverage, cit. 57 Xinhua News Agency: China, EU agree to strengthen cooperation amid COVID-19 outbreak, 7 March 2020, avail¬ able at: http://www.news.en/english/europe/2020-05/07/c 15885ll87.htm (last accessed: 25.06.2025). 58 59 Helena Legarda / Jacob Gunter: China's Arms Industry Is Increasingly Global, but Don't Expect It to Supplant NATO's Counterparts Any Time Soon, Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS), August 2024, available at: https://merics.org/en/tracker/chinas-arms-industry-increasingly-global-dont-expect-it-supplant-natos-counterparts-any (last accessed: 25.06.2025). 14 ć š ć ć •^InvigoratEU 'Invigorating Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy for a Resilient Europe InvigoratEU | Policy Report carry long-term strategic and military implications, potentially shaping Georgia's security dy¬ namics.60 In the domain of foreign policy and core national interests, China's influence across the Eastern Trio and the Western Balkans varies widely, largely depending on each country's align¬ ment with the EU, NATO, and the United States, as well as the domestic salience of unresolved national issues. Thus, Serbia has been the most receptive to Chinese support, particularly on the Kosovo issue, over which Beijing has constantly voiced its support for Serbia's sovereignty and territorial integrity.61 This has translated into a consistent reluctance to align with EU state¬ ments critical of China and has fostered a narrative of diplomatic reciprocity.62 Ukraine also refrains from aligning with EU positions on China, reflecting its traditional multi-vector foreign policy approach.65 At the same time, China's ambiguous stance on Russia's annexation of Cri¬ mea and its subsequent de facto support for Russia following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 have strained political relations, placing pressure on diplomatic ties. However, this shift has also increased the relevance of China's position and, thus, its influence on key na¬ tional issues. Georgia, while officially committed to Euro-Atlantic integration, has also seen growing Chinese engagement, especially following the war in Ukraine. It has avoided endors¬ ing EU positions critical of Beijing, opting instead for pragmatic bilateral relations. China's nuanced stance - supporting Georgia's territorial integrity while avoiding friction with Russia - has enabled it to maintain favourable relations without becoming entangled in local conflicts. Bosnia and Herzegovina presents a more ambivalent picture. Although it upholds the OneChina policy and receives rhetorical support from Beijing on its territorial integrity, its institu¬ tional commitment to EU and NATO integration, particularly within the Federation, limits deeper alignment.64 Nonetheless, recent trends - such as China's opposition to the appoint¬ ment of High Representative Christian Schmidt and Bosnia's decreasing alignment with EU statements on China - suggest a subtle shift toward a more opportunistic and pragmatic ap¬ proach.65 In this context, China could increasingly act as a spoiler to the country's Euro-Atlantic orientation. In Moldova, China has maintained a consistent position, at least rhetorically, in support of the country's sovereignty and territorial integrity, especially concerning the Trans¬ nistrian conflict.66 This aligns with Beijing's broader foreign policy principles of non-interfer¬ ence and territorial unity. Conversely, Montenegro and North Macedonia have increasingly distanced themselves from Beijing on foreign policy issues. Montenegro's full alignment with the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy - including its condemnation of China's human rights record - has strained 60 RFE/RL's Georgian Service / Reid Standish: Chinese-Led Consortium To Build Massive Port Project On Georgia's Black Sea Coast, 29 May 2025, available at: https:/ /www.rferl.org/a/anaklia-georgia-china-port-winner/32970697,html (last accessed: 09.06.2025). 61 Strahinja Suboti /Milo Janji : Serbia at the Crossroads between the West and the East, European Policy Centre (CEP), cit. 62 Calculated for the index on the basis of extensive list of HR declarations regarding China. 63 Calculated for the index on the basis of extensive list of HR declarations regarding China. 34 Jasmin Hasi : The Role of China in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 31 July 2022, available at: https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Jasmin-Hasic/publication/362388665 The Role of China in Bos¬ nia and Herzegovi na /links /62f 368340b37cc34478466f7 /The-Role-of-China-i n-Bosnia-and-Herzegovina.pdf (last accessed: 09.06.2025). 65 Radio Slobodna Evropa: Ambasada Kine u BiH: Imenovanje visokog predstavnika nije legitimno, 17 August 2021, available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.Org/a/schmidt-kina-ohr-bih/31414439.html (last accessed: 09.06.2025). 66 Infotag: The First Bilateral Political Consultations Between Moldova and China in the Last 12 Years Were Held in Beijing, 3 December 2024, available at: https://www.infotag.md/politics-en/320782/ (last accessed: 09.06.2025). 15 ć •^InvigoratEU 'Invigorating Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy for a Resilient Europe InvigoratEU | Policy Report bilateral ties.67 North Macedonia's participation in the U.S. -led Clean Network Initiative and its legal exclusion of Chinese telecom firms from the 50 market reflect a clear strategic pivot.68 Albania has adopted a more ambivalent approach. While formally part of the Belt and Road Initiative and maintaining diplomatic openness, it has shown limited interest in deeper political engagement, as reflected in public statements downplaying future Chinese investment.69 Ko¬ sovo stands in direct opposition to China's foreign policy due to Beijing's refusal to recognize its independence and its opposition to Kosovo's integration into NATO and the EU. Yet, pre¬ cisely because of Beijing's support for Belgrade, China retains leverage over a key national issue for Kosovo. Overall, as shown by Figure 2, China's political influence in 2025 follows a clear gradient: high in Serbia, moderate in Ukraine and Georgia, low in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Mol¬ dova and Kosovo, and very low in North Macedonia and Albania. Yet, if we look at the evolution since 2015, the nine countries now show a clear polarization. Four countries - Serbia, Ukraine, Georgia, and to a lesser extent, Bosnia and Herzegovina - exhibit comparatively high levels of engagement, due to sustained bilateral ties, strategic partnerships, or selective alignment on key foreign policy issues. In contrast, Albania, Kosovo, Moldova, Montenegro, and North Mac¬ edonia form a group with lower or more limited political influence, reflecting either a deliber¬ ate distancing from China, institutional constraints, or geopolitical priorities more closely aligned with the EU and NATO. This divergence reflects China's emphasis on bilateral engage¬ ment, which allows for tailored, flexible partnerships that respond to the specific political and economic context of each country. Rather than following a unified regional strategy, China's approach appears pragmatic and opportunity-driven, favouring cooperation where interests align and conditions are favourable. As a result, its influence remains uneven and contingent, shaped both by local dynamics and broader geopolitical developments. 67 Calculated for the index on the basis of extensive list of HR declarations regarding China. 68 Krach Institute for Tech Diplomacy: The Construction of the 5G Network Brings the Demise of the Chinese Domi¬ nation in North Macedonia's Telecommunications, 1 May 2023, available at: https://techdiplomacy.org/news/theconstruction-of-the-5g-network-brings-the-demise-of-the-chinese-domination-in-north-macedonias-telecommunications/ (last accessed: 09.06.2025). 69 Alice Taylor-Bra e: Albanian PM: No Economic Benefits from Chinese Cooperation, 23 February 2023, available at: https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/albanian-pm-no-economic-benefits-from-chinese-cooperation/ (last accessed: 09.06.2025). 16 ć ć •^InvigoratEU 'Invigorating Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy for a Resilient Europe InvigoratEU | Policy Report Figure 2: Political Influence Sub-Index Values in 2023 Compared to 2013 Economic Influence: Evolution, Patterns, and the Economic Sub-Index China's global ambitions have grown steadily since the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, with a clear focus on expanding its economic influence. Central to this strategy are the Belt and Road Initiative, launched in 2015, and the Digital Silk Road, introduced in 2015, which aim to extend China's global reach through large-scale infrastructure and digital networks. Europe has emerged as a key region in this vision. While major Western economies - particularly the UK, Germany, and France - have historically attracted the bulk of Chinese investment,70 infra¬ structure and connectivity projects have increasingly targeted Central, Eastern, and South¬ eastern Europe as part of a broader effort to deepen China's presence across the continent.71 This trend is particularly evident in the Eastern Trio and the Western Balkan countries, where China's economic engagement has intensified since the aftermath of the 2008 crisis. As these regions faced a sharp decline in foreign direct investment, reduced export demand, and lim¬ ited access to affordable credit - largely due to their close economic ties with the EU markets, which already constituted their main economic partner for most of these countries - Beijing positioned itself as an alternative source of capital, infrastructure financing, and political en¬ gagement.72 The crisis revealed deep-seated structural weaknesses, such as low competitive¬ ness, high unemployment, and ongoing deindustrialization, creating fertile ground for China's strategic economic entry. Through trade relations, concessional loans, and high-profile 70 Xavier Richet: Chinese Presence in the Western Balkans: Competition, Complementarity, Cooperation, in: Eco¬ nomic Studies journal 6, pp. 3-25. 71 Danijela Ja imovi / Joel I. Deichmann /Kong Tianping: The Western Balkans and Geopolitics: Leveraging the European Union and China, in Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, 25(4), 2023, pp. 626-643. 72 Matteo Bonomi / Milica Uvalic: The economic development of the Western Balkans: The importance of non-EU actors, in F. Bieber and N. Tzifakis (eds), 2019), cit. pp. 36-58. 17 Invigorating Enlargement and Neignbc Policy for a Resilient Europe InvigoratEU | Policy Report infrastructure investments - mainly linked to the Belt and Road Initiative - China has established itself as an increasingly relevant, and at times competitive, economic partner in the EU's im¬ mediate neighbourhood, complementing or even challenging the Union's traditional influ¬ ence.75 However, as illustrated in Figure 5, China's tangible economic influence between 2015 and 2025 remained limited across most of the nine countries. While Chinese engagement has been highly visible and initially raised considerable expectations, the anticipated benefits often failed to materialize. The evolution of economic linkages reveals a fragmented and asymmet¬ rical landscape. A few countries - most notably Serbia, Georgia, and Ukraine - stand out for having experienced a marked increase in Chinese economic influence, reflecting deeper and more sustained patterns of engagement over the decade. In contrast, Montenegro, North Mac¬ edonia, and Moldova experienced a rapid increase in Chinese economic presence between 2015 and 2018, followed by a significant reversal of this trend. Meanwhile, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo exhibited only modest or relatively static patterns of engagement. Nevertheless, outcomes across the two regions were, in many cases, modest. Figure 3: The Economic Influence Sub-Index Over Time (2013-2023) As far as trade and investment relations are concerned, exchanges from/to China have in¬ creased across various countries in the two regions, albeit unevenly (see Tables 1 and 2). Serbia has emerged as the most deeply integrated partner, attracting substantial Chinese conces¬ sional loans and investments within Belt and Road Initiative, becoming the leading regional destination for Chinese capital - which accounted for over 50% of Serbian FDI inflows and 10% of its FDI stock in 2025. The signing of a Free Trade Agreement in 2025 further consoli¬ dated these ties, although the bilateral trade balance remains heavily skewed in China's fa¬ vour. Georgia, while adopting a more cautious approach, has also developed a solid economic partnership with Beijing. The 2018 Free Trade Agreement facilitated consistent growth in bi¬ lateral trade, with Chinese investments primarily concentrated in infrastructure, including stra¬ tegically significant port development projects. Ukraine plays a central role in China's regional trade network. Even before the Russian invasion in 2022, China had become an important 75 Xavier Richet: Chinese Presence in the Western Balkans: Competition, Complementarity, Cooperation, cit. 18 •^InvigoratEU 'Invigorating Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy for a Resilient Europe InvigoratEU | Policy Report trading partner for Ukraine. Among the countries under review, Ukraine stood out as both the top importer of Chinese goods and the leading regional exporter to China, driven mainly by agricultural products and industrial raw materials.74 Despite this dynamic trade relationship, Chinese FDI in Ukraine remained relatively limited. Although Chinese firms expressed interest in strategic sectors such as aerospace and defence - as exemplified by the attempted acqui¬ sition of Motor Sich75 - Ukrainian authorities adopted a cautious stance, blocking the transfer of ownership in sensitive industries. Other countries, including Albania, North Macedonia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, have fol¬ lowed a markedly different trajectory. In these countries, Chinese presence has remained modest. While imports from China have steadily increased, exports remain negligible, and Chi¬ nese investments have lacked both scale and strategic focus. Despite some visibility of Beltand-Road-related infrastructure projects between 2015 and 2018 - particularly in the transport and energy sectors - these initiatives soon lost momentum due to growing concerns over debt sustainability, tighter regulatory scrutiny, and unmet expectations. The projects typically pro¬ duced limited FDI, weak local economic spillovers, minimal technology transfer, and low job creation, while also raising alarms about long-term public debt burdens and potential political dependency.76 Moldova presents a slightly more limited profile. Chinese economic activity has extended into sectors such as renewable energy, tourism, and telecommunications, but remains narrow in scope and impact. In Kosovo, the situation is even more constrained: China's refusal to recog¬ nize Kosovo statehood effectively blocks formal economic engagement. As a result, Chinese goods reach the Kosovo market only indirectly through neighbouring states, with virtually no investment, no bilateral debt exposure, and no cooperation in strategic sectors. 74 Kateryna Oleksandrivna Kravchenko / Zheng Yu I Nataliia Viacheslavivna Dobrovolska / Iryna Anatoliivna Skryl: Ukraine-China Strategic Partnership: Current Situation, Problems and Prospects, in: Visnyk of V. N. Karazin Kharkiv National University, Series "Geology. Geography. Ecology", Issue 53, 2020, available at: https: //periodi¬ cals, karazin.ua/geoeco/article/view/17065 (last accessed: 23.06.2025). 75 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL): Ukrainian Court Seizes Aerospace Company Motor Sich From Chinese Investors, 21 March 2021, available at: https://www.rferl.Org/a/ukraine-seizes-motor-sich/3116180l.html (last ac¬ cessed: 09.06.2025). 76 Ana Krstinovska / Ioannis Alexandris: Chinese Direct Investment in South-East Europe: The Story Behind the Num¬ bers, ELIAMEP | Policy Paper 158/2023, June 2025, available at: https://www.eliamep.gr/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/Pol icy-paper-138-Chinese-direct-investment-Balkans-.pdf (last accessed: 09.06.2025). 19 •^InvigoratEU 'Invigorating Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy for a Resilient Europe InvigoratEU | Policy Report Table 1: Imports and exports of goods from and to China, as share of total, by country (2013, 2018, 2023) 2015 2018 2025 Country Imports (% of total imports of goods) Exports (% of total exports of goods) Imports (% of total imports of goods) Exports (% of total exports of goods) Imports (% of total imports of goods) Exports (% of total exports of goods) Albania 6,8 4,6 8,4 1,8 10,7 2,5 Bosnia and Herzegovina 6 0,1 6,9 0,5 9,5 0,2 Georgia 7,6 1,2 8,9 5,9 8,5 5,1 Kosovo 7,5 0,4 7,9 0,4 10 0,1 Moldova 8,7 0,5 10,4 0,7 11,7 0,2 Montenegro 8,1 1 10 5,5 11,2 0,4 North Mace¬ donia 5,7 2,5 5,8 1 9 1,2 Serbia 8,6 0,1 9,2 0,5 15,5 4,2 Ukraine 10,5 4,5 15,5 4,6 16,4 6,7 Source: Wiiw Annual Database http://wiiw.ac.at/annual-database.html and National Statistics Office of Georgia: https://www.qeostat.ge/en/modules/categories/657/ Table 2: Chinese FDI Inflows and Inward Stock, as share of total, by country (2013, 2018, 2025) fice of Georgia https://www.geostat.ge/en/modules/categories/191/foreign-direct-invest2015 2018 2025 Country FDI inflows (% of total annual FDI inflows) FDI inward stock (% of total FDI in¬ ward stock) FDI inflows (% of total annual FDI inflows) FDI inward stock (% of total FDI in¬ ward stock) FDI inflows (% of total annual FDI inflows) FDI inward stock (% of total FDI in¬ ward stock) Albania 0,4 0 -0,1 0,1 0,1 0 Bosnia and Herzegovina - - 0 0,1 4,7 0,5 Georgia 2 7,6 3,2 8,9 2,8 8,5 Kosovo -0,1 00 0 0 0 Moldova - 0,1 - 0 - 0 Montenegro 000 1,1 0 0,9 North Mace¬ donia 00 3,7 2,5 -6,9 1,3 Serbia 0 0,1 17,2 4,1 50,4 11,5 Ukraine - 00 0,1 -0,1 0,1 Source: Wiiw FDI Database ittp://wiiw.ac.at/fdi-data case.html anc National Statistics Ofments 20 € ć š ć •^InvigoratEU 'Invigorating Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy for a Resilient Europe InvigoratEU | Policy Report Alongside growing trade and investment, China's engagement in the Eastern Trio and the Western Balkans has increasingly raised concerns over strategic dependencies, both in geoeconomic terms and more traditionally security-related issues. In Serbia, Chinese engagement has significantly increased the country's economic and strategic exposure to Beijing, through concessional loans and strategic investments77 in major infrastructure projects, such as the construction of roads and energy facilities, supported acquisitions like the Smederevo steel plantand the Kostolac B power station,78 investments in Serbia's mining sector, notably in cop¬ per,79 and the opening of industrial parks.80 At the same time, the deployment of Huawei's surveillance technologies and smart-city infrastructure in Belgrade has sparked concern over data sovereignty and the influence of Chinese technology in critical public sector systems.81 These developments illustrate how economic cooperation can carry direct security implica¬ tions. Montenegro offers another telling example. A 670 million loan from China's ExportImport Bank to fund the Bar-Boljare highway project significantly raised the country's debt-toGDP ratio 82 triggering concerns about fiscal sustainability and sovereignty. The lack of trans¬ parency in the deal, including clauses assigning jurisdiction to Chinese courts, deepened anx¬ ieties about accountability and political leverage.85 In North Macedonia, a highway project awarded to Sinohydro became entangled in corruption scandals,84 underscoring how Chinesefunded infrastructure initiatives can intersect with local governance vulnerabilities.85 Elsewhere, reactions have varied. Georgia's recent awarding of the Anaklia Deep Sea Port project to a Chinese-Singaporean consortium has been interpreted as part of a broader trend in which port and transport infrastructure become strategic assets amid geopolitical flux. Meanwhile, Ukraine blocked the sale of the aerospace firm Motor Sich to a Chinese buyer over national security concerns, highlighting Beijing's growing interest in dual-use and high-tech 77 Ana Krstinovska I Ioannis Alexandris: Chinese Direct Investment in South-East Europe: The Story Behind the Num¬ bers, Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy ( E LI AME P), Policy Paper #158/2025, June 2023, available at: https://www.eliamep.gr/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/Policy-paper-158-Chinese-direct-investment-Balkans-.pdf (last accessed: 25.06.2025). 78 Wouter Zweers / Vladimir Shopov / Frans-Paul van der Putten / Mirela Petkova / Maarten Lemstra: China and the EU in the Western Balkans: A Zero-Sum Game?, Clingendael Report, August 2020, available at: https://www.clingendael.org/pub/2020/china-and-the-eu-in-the-western-balkans/ (last accessed: 09.06.2025). 79 Katarina Baleti : Chinese Mining Giant Expands in Serbia Despite Pollution Fears, Balkan Insight, 11 April 2024, available at: https://balkaninsight.com/2024/04/ll/chinese-mining-giant-expands-in-serbia-despite-pollutionfears/ (last accessed: 25.06.2025). 80 Valentina Bajic: Chinese Firms to Invest 400 Million Euro in Belgrade Industrial Park - Minister, 15 September 2024, available at: https://seenews.com/news/chinese-firms-to-invest-400-mln-euro-in-belgrade-industrial-park-minister-1265596 (last accessed: 09.06.2025). 81 Maja Bjelo I Vuk Vuksanovi : Geopolitics is Local - Ramifications of Chinese Projects for Human Security in Serbia, Belgrade Centre for Security Policy, available at: https://bezbednost.org/en/publication/geopolitics-islocal-ramifications-of-chinese-projects-for-human-security-in-serbia / (last accessed: 09.06.2025). 82 Government of Montenegro: China's Exim Bank Approves Loan Worth EUR 687 Million for Highway's Construction, 18 September 2014, available at: https://www.gov.me/en/article/141755--china-s-exim-bank-approves-loanworth-eur-687-million-for-highway-s-construction (last accessed: 09.06.2025). 85 Bojan Stojkovski / Ivana Jeremie / Samir Kajosevic / Ivana Nikolic / Ivan Angelovski / Fatjona Mejdini / Irvin Pekmez: China in the Balkans: Controversy and Cost, Balkan Insight, 15 December 2021, available at: https: / /fa rrightmap.balkaninsight.com/2021/12/15/china-in-the-balkans-controversy-and-cost/ (last accessed: 09.06.2025) and Digdem Soyaltin-Colella: The Eli Accession Process, Chinese Finance and Rising Corruption in Western Balkan Stabilitocracies: Serbia and Montenegro, Europe-Asia Studies, 75:8, 1511-1555, 2025. 84 Ana Krstinovska: Exporting Corruption? The Case of a Chinese Highway Project in North Macedonia, China Ob¬ servers, 6 November 2019, available at: https://chinaobservers.eu/exporting-corruption-the-case-of-a-chinesehighway-project-in-north-macedonia/ (last accessed: 09.06.2025). 85 Ana Krstinovska: China's Aid in the Western Balkans: Supporting Development, Undermining Good Governance, China Observers, February 2022, available at: https://chinaobservers.eu/chinas-aid-in-the-western-balkans-supporting-development-undermining-good-governance/ (last accessed: 09.06.2025). 21 •^InvigoratEU 'Invigorating Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy for a Resilient Europe InvigoratEU | Policy Report While political influence represents the highest index values among the three dimensions (3.58), it still falls within the "low influence" category on average -possibly reflecting China's emergence as a stable global actor whose political presence is increasingly acknowledged, though not dominant. The political index exhibited the most linear growth, rising by 10.78 per¬ cent in the first period (2015-2018) and by 15.42 percent in the second (2018 - 2025). Economic influence saw the sharpest acceleration between 2015 and 2018 (+58.25%), fol¬ lowed by a markedly slower increase from 2018 to 2025 (+11.66%). Despite the high visibility of Chinese economic initiatives and the intense debate they have generated, the absolute values remain within the "very low" category. This suggests that, at an aggregate level, the outcomes have not fully matched the ambitious rhetoric or expectations. Societal influence, while also accelerating in the earlier period (+41.5%) and slowing thereaf¬ ter (+16.92%), has shown a gradual but meaningful rise. Notably, it made a categorical leap from "very low" to "low" influence, indicating some progress in China's soft power projection, even if its overall societal impact remains limited. Figure 7: Aggregated Chinese Influence Index by Dimension and Year (2015-2025) The heatmap displays arithmetic means of country-level index scores across political, economic, and societal dimensions, offering a composite view of regional trends over time. Chinese External Influence by Dimension and Year 2013 2018 2023 Year 28 - - - - - •^InvigoratEU 'Invigorating Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy for a Resilient Europe InvigoratEU | Policy Report However, when looking at Figures 8 and 9, which present the evolution of Chinese influence across the Eastern Trio and the Western Balkans between 2015 and 2025 and in the year 2025 alone, it becomes evident that aggregate data offer limited explanatory value. This is primarily due to the considerable variation across countries, the absence of a coherent regional strat¬ egy, and China's growing reliance on bilateral relationships to advance its strategic interests. As these figures show, Chinese influence in the region is highly uneven-both in magnitude and in trajectory-highlighting the importance of country-specific dynamics. Serbia clearly stands out as an outlier. Chinese influence there had already reached moderate levels by 2018 and has continued to rise since. Over the past decade, Serbia has become China's most strategically relevant partner among the nine countries. What began as a relationship grounded in political support - especially with regard to Serbia's position on Kosovo - has evolved into a multidimensional partnership. Political influence, already high, has further strengthened. Economically, China's position in Serbia started from a very low base in 2015, but its presence has grown rapidly, reach¬ ing moderate levels by 2025. The social dimension has also become increasingly rele¬ vant, with a marked rise in Chinese cultural and educational initiatives, greater media presence, and a significantly more positive public perception. These trends are re¬ flected in Serbia's position at the top of the ranking, with a score of 5.02. Ukraine registers a lower overall influence score - 5.04 in 2025 - but holds the secondhighest position. Interestingly, the total score remained constant over time, yet this masks divergent trends across the three dimensions. Political influence was already moderate in 2015 and remained stable until 2018, before rising further as China's stance on the Russian invasion became a matter of strategic interest for Ukraine (de¬ spite alienating political linkages). Economic influence has followed a steady upward trajectory, largely driven by trade in agricultural products and raw materials, sectors of strategic importance to both countries. However, the social dimension tells a very different story: whereas public perceptions of China were relatively positive in 2015, by 2025 they had turned strongly negative, reflecting growing scepticism and disap¬ proval among the population. Georgia follows closely behind, with a 2025 score of 5.05. Unlike Ukraine, Georgia's influence score reflects a clear upward trajectory across all dimensions. Political influ¬ ence has grown most significantly, driven by domestic political developments, followed by economic and, to a lesser extent, social engagement. China sees Georgia as a strategic platform for expanding its presence in the South Caucasus, gaining access to critical infrastructure and enhancing trade connectivity with the EU. At the same time, building ties with Georgia is part of a broader strategy aimed to balance other geopolitical actors in the region, including the West and Russia. Further down the ranking, Bosnia and Herzegovina shows lower levels of Chinese in¬ fluence, scoring 2.90 in 2025. Here, political and social influence have grown steadily, but the economic dimension has remained weak, often falling short of political rhetoric and public expectations. China's engagement has focused on maintaining political goodwill, particularly with the Republika Srpska leadership, and investing selectively in infrastructure. Nonetheless, the country's complex governance structure and pro-European orientation continue to limit the depth of Chinese involvement. Montenegro represents the last country within the "low influence" category, with a score of 2.54. Chinese influence grew rapidly between 2015 and 2018-especially in the political and social realms-but has since experienced a slight decline. While polit¬ ical and societal ties have remained on a slow but steady rise, economic influence 29 - ^^InvigoratEU 'Invigorating Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy for a Resilient Europe InvigoratEU | Policy Report peaked in 2018 and has decreased in the following years, likely reflecting growing concerns over debt sustainability and stalled infrastructure projects. The remaining countries - Moldova, Albania, North Macedonia, and Kosovo - are characterized by very low levels of Chinese influence. Moldova, with a score of 1.74, experienced a cooling of relations after 2018, particularly in the economic and political domains. Albania (1.64) and North Macedonia (1.58) show similar trajectories. All three countries saw an initial period of modest engagement with China, followed by stag¬ nation or decline after 2018. In these cases, China has neither gained meaningful eco¬ nomic leverage nor developed strong cultural or social ties. Kosovo ranks last, with a score of just 1.55. China does not recognize Kosovo's independence and engages with the territory almost exclusively through its support for Serbia's position. As a result, there are virtually no direct political, economic, or social interactions between China and Kosovo. Taken together, the figures illustrate not only the fragmented nature of China's influence across these nine countries, but also the importance of understanding the local context. China's ap¬ proach is clearly pragmatic and bilateral, targeting specific countries based on their strategic value rather than promoting a uniform regional presence. This has led to a highly asymmetrical distribution of influence, where only a few of countries - most notably Serbia, and to certain extent Georgia - have seen the emergence of a truly multidimensional relationship with China. Figure 8: Shifts in China's InvigoratEU External Influence Index Across the Region (2015-2023) 50 Belt and Road Initiative Digital Silk Road Serbia Ukraine Georgia Kosovo North Macedonia Albania Moldova individualized bilateral partners ^^InvigoratEU 'Invigorating Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy for a Resilient Europe InvigoratEU | Policy Report Figure 9: Country-Level 2023 Scores of Chinese Influence in EU Candidates, Col¬ our-Coded by Influence Intensity Chinese Influence in EU Candidate Countries (2023) - Influence Categories Highlighted Serbia Ukraine Georgia Bosnia and Herzegovina Montenegro Moldova Albania North Macedonia Kosovo 10 External Influence Index (2023) 5 Key Findings This report examines how China's influence in the Eastern Trio and the Western Balkans is ex¬ panding, illustrating how it remains extremely uneven, transactional, and shaped by local po¬ litical, economic, and societal dynamics. Drawing from the InvigoratEU External Influence In¬ dex and qualitative research across nine countries, the following key insights emerge: 1. China's influence is growing - but remains fragmented and asymmetrical Over the past decade, China has sought to expand its global role through economic, political and societal influence, particularly under the and the . However, China's influence in the two regions is far from uniform. Among the nine countries studied, only exhibits consistently high levels of influ¬ ence across all dimensions. Others - including and - display selective engagement, while countries like , , , and the influence remains marginal. China treats countries not as blocs, but as , shaping a flexible and asymmetric influence spectrum based on po¬ litical receptiveness, institutional capacity, and local demand. 2. Economic ambitions are clear - but influence remains surprisingly limited and po¬ liticized Despite China's global narrative of economic partnerships, its economic influence in the two regions is weaker than expected - though highly visible. Infrastructure and connectivity initiatives - such as the highway project in Montenegro - have positioned China as an alternative funder, offering capital without requiring governance reform. Yet overall, economic ties remain concentrated and uneven. While Serbia and Georgia stand out for their high levels of bilateral cooperation, other countries have seen stag¬ nation or a decline in Chinese economic presence, often due to institutional weak¬ nesses, external constraints, or shifting domestic preferences. This confirms that 31 •^InvigoratEU 'Invigorating Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy for a Resilient Europe InvigoratEU | Policy Report Chinese influence is neither linear nor automatic, but shaped by a mix of domestic agency and geopolitical conditions. 5. Serbia as an economic outlier: From infrastructure loans to strategic FDI Serbia represents the clearest example of China's adaptive and increasingly diversi¬ fied economic strategy in the region. While the country initially attracted Belt-andRoad-style investments in infrastructure and energy, often underpinned by conces¬ sional finance, China has more recently expanded into FDI, including in manufacturing, mining, and industrial parks. This evolution is particularly striking in light of the decline of greenfield investments by Chinese firms in Western Europe."4 The 2025 Free Trade Agreement and ongoing large-scale projects suggest that Serbia has become a pre¬ ferred platform for China's longer-term ambitions in Southeastern Europe, combining economic scale with political receptiveness and strategic location. 4. Political influence relies on elite alignment and symbolic reciprocity China avoids overt interference in domestic politics, but actively cultivates elite ties and symbolic legitimacy. In Serbia, this includes party-to-party relations and support of Beijing on the Kosovo issue. In Georgia and Ukraine, political cooperation is more functional and constrained, reflecting strategic hedging rather than alignment. In Re¬ publika Srpska (Bosnia and Herzegovina), China engages subnational elites to bypass the central government. Elsewhere - like in Albania, North Macedonia, Moldova and Kosovo - political ties are weak or cooling. Beijing's bilateralism allows for tailored engagement and has proven to be attractive to leaders in hybrid or fragile democra¬ cies, who leverage China's no-strings-attached approach to consolidate domestic au¬ thority without liberal oversight. 5. Societal influence is modest but widespread and pragmatic China's societal outreach is largely instrumental and state-led, centred on Confucius Institutes, scholarships, cultural diplomacy, and pro-China narratives in local media. While Serbia leads in societal penetration, most countries have shown consistent levels of engagement through university partnerships and exchanges. Ukraine has seen a steep decline in societal ties since 2022 due to the war and China's perceived pro¬ Russia stance. Kosovo remains virtually disengaged. Despite limited depth, China's nor¬ mative discourse resonates in post-socialist societies that still grapple with the socio¬ economic consequences of transitions and Western conditionality. 6. China blurs the line between economic and security influence China follows a state-centric model that integrates infrastructure, trade, digital tech¬ nologies, and security interests. Surveillance partnerships in Serbia, Huawei-related concerns in North Macedonia, and interest in port access and logistics hubs across the region exemplify how economic tools serve strategic goals. Chinese state-owned en¬ terprises dominate large-scale projects, often lacking transparency or competitive procurement. Concerns over the transfer of dual-use technologies, access to critical 1,4 Agatha Kratz / Max J. Zenglein / Alexander Brown / Gregor Sebastian / Armand Meyer: Dwindling Investments Become More Concentrated - Chinese FDI in Europe: 2025 Update, MERICS & Rhodium Group, 6 June 2024, available at: https://merics.org/en/report/dwindling-investments-become-more-concentrated-chinese-fdi-europe-2025-update (last accessed: 23.06.2025). 32 •^InvigoratEU 'Invigorating Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy for a Resilient Europe InvigoratEU | Policy Report infrastructure, and cyber and intelligence risks are growing across Europe. These fears are heightened by China's ambiguous positions on the war in Ukraine and global se¬ curity alignments. 7. China acts as a strategic opportunist - not as a coherent challenger to the West China does not seek to displace Western actors outright, nor does it offer a clear ide¬ ological alternative. Rather, it adapts to institutional gaps, exploits elite interests, and leverages its development-without-democracy offer. In places like Serbia, Republika Srpska, and Georgia, this enables local actors to co-produce influence, using Chinese capital and technology to reinforce power structures. Far from being passive recipi¬ ents, domestic elites actively shape the terms of engagement, especially where EU enlargement fatigue, hybrid regimes, or contested geopolitical orientations prevail. The region thus serves as a laboratory for China's state-centric model, showing how external influence can be embedded gradually without central coordination, yet still support long-term strategic positioning. 6 Recommendations As China's presence in Eastern and Southeastern Europe becomes more visible, the European Union must respond with a coherent and forward-looking strategy. While Chinese engagement in the region remains uneven and often opportunistic, it has already exposed a number of vulnerabilities - especially in terms of governance, economic dependence, and institutional resilience. In this context, the EU must rethink how it engages with candidate countries, not only to address external influence but to support long-term democratic and economic consol¬ idation. A key starting point is to move beyond broad regional categories and engage instead with countries based on their specific contexts. China has been adept at adapting its approach to local conditions - for instance, cultivating close political ties with Serbia while maintaining only minimal involvement in Moldova or Kosovo. The EU should take note and adopt a similarly tai¬ lored strategy, building flexible, country-specific policies that reflect local needs, risks, and opportunities. This will require moving past generic regional initiatives and investing instead into in-depth expertise and partnerships that reflect the diversity of the countries in the two regions. At the same time, the EU must recognise that institutional fragility is the most fertile ground for external authoritarian influence. Therefore, strengthening governance, the rule of law, and institutional transparency should become central priorities in EU enlargement policy. Rather than viewing these as merely normative aspirations, they must be treated as strategic, security, imperatives. This includes reinforcing oversight in public procurement, supporting independent media and civil society, and conditioning EU support on tangible governance reforms. Moreover, the EU should extend the logic of its internal regulatory protection to pre-accession countries. Currently, tools such as the EDI Screening Mechanism or the Foreign Subsidies Reg¬ ulation apply only within EU borders, leaving neighbouring countries vulnerable to unregulated foreign influence. The Union should work to close this gap by offering legal and technical assistance to help these countries screen foreign investments, regulate subsidies, and enhance 35 •^InvigoratEU 'Invigorating Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy for a Resilient Europe InvigoratEU | Policy Report economic sovereignty. Doing so would significantly reduce exposure of these countries to opaque deals and politically driven partnerships. However, regulatory tools alone are not enough. The EU must also respond to one of the core reasons why China remains attractive in the region: its ability to deliver fast, visible investment, particularly in infrastructure. Even when such investments come with long-term risks, they often address real needs. The EU must ensure that its own funding instruments are not only more generous, but also more accessible, efficient, and responsive. This includes simplifying proce¬ dures, speeding up implementation, and communicating the benefits of EU-backed projects more clearly to local populations. Finally, while China's societal and cultural influence in the region is still limited, it is growing through Confucius Institutes, media collaboration, and scholarship programs. The EU must not overlook this soft power dimension. It should invest more in public diplomacy, support inde¬ pendent journalism, and fund local civil society initiatives that build trust and shared values. Equally important is crafting narratives that resonate with everyday concerns, addressing so¬ cio-economic gaps, rather than relying solely on abstract references to European norms or geopolitical threats. Ultimately, the challenge posed by China's presence in Eastern and Southeastern Europe is not merely a matter of power politics, but one of institutional strength, public trust, and stra¬ tegic vision. While opening accession paths is an important first step, it is not sufficient. The crucial test for the EU will be its ability to transform this perspective into concrete and credible accessions - starting with Montenegro and possibly Albania in the coming years. Only by doing so can the EU reinforce its legitimacy, respond to the aspirations of its neighbours, and build a more democratic and resilient European future. 54 ć ē ņ Č Invigorating Enlargement and Neignbc Policy for a Resilient Europe InvigoratEU | Policy Report Bibliography Agatha Kratz / Max J. Zenglein / Alexander Brown / Gregor Sebastian / Armand Meyer: Dwindling Investments Become More Concentrated - Chinese FDI in Europe: 2025 Update, MERICS, 6 June 2024, available at: https:// merics.org/en/report/dwindling-investmentsbecome-more-concentrated-chinese-fdi-europe-2025-update (last accessed: 25.06.2025). 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Detailed Breakdown Table 5: InvigoratEU External Influence Index Element of analysis Indicator Sources of evidence Indicator scale (0-5) Weighting the indicator POLITICAL-SECURITY DIMENSION Bilateral and multilateral platforms (overall 25%) Level of bilateral partnership Depth and breadth of formal cooperation Number and importance of signed agreements, presence of joint initia¬ tives 0 - No close partnership 1 - Partnership in development 2 - Limited partnership, e.g., agreements in particular ar¬ eas 3 - Deep, long-term strategic partnerships across multiple sectors 15% Participation in Russia/China/Turkey-led multilateral political initiatives Extent of participation in multi¬ lateral initiatives Membership or observer status, participation in key summits, decision-making roles 0 - No participation 1 - Observer status or ad hoc participation 2 - Membership but limited participation 3 - Membership and signifi¬ cant contributions 5% Bilateral high level visits Frequency and level of state visits Number and level of visits (head of states and gov¬ ernments, ministers) 0 - No visits recorded 1 - Occasional high official and ministries visits 2 - Regular high official visits and ministries visits 3 - Frequent high official and ministerial and visits and by head of states and/or govern¬ ments 5% Internal politics (overall 25%) 44 •^InvigoratEU 'Invigorating Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy for a Resilient Europe InvigoratEU | Policy Report Relations with political parties Political influence through party channels Support, funding, or ideo¬ logical alignment with ex¬ ternal actors of key politi¬ cal parties 0 - No significant relations among parliamentarian par¬ ties (PP) 1 - Ideological alignment and cooperation with opposition parties 2 - Ideological alignment and cooperation with junior par¬ ties in government coalition 3 - Ideological alignment and cooperation with major par¬ ties in government coalition 5% Parliamentarian cooperation Engagement in inter-parlia¬ mentary networks Joint parliamentary ses¬ sions, parliamentary dele¬ gation visits, formal coop¬ eration platforms 0 - No cooperation estab¬ lished 1 - Limited cooperation through delegations or infor¬ mal networks 2 - Formalised cooperation 3 - Institutionalised coopera¬ tion with regular exchanges 5% Election interference Evidence of meddling in the election process Instances of cyberattacks, disinformation or foreign funding 0 - No interference recorded 1 - Minor interference in infor¬ mation channels (e.g., disin¬ formation campaigns) 2 - Isolated, uncoordinated interference attempts 3 - Coordinated and signifi¬ cant interference with elec¬ tion outcomes at risk 10% Legislative interference Influence on domestic lawmaking process Lobbying, pressure to pass or reject laws, foreignsponsored policies 0 - No interference recorded 1 - Minimal lobbying or indirect influence 2 - Occasional influence on particular laws 3 - Direct involvement in shap¬ ing key national legislation 5% Military sphere (overall 25%) 45 •^InvigoratEU 'Invigorating Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy for a Resilient Europe InvigoratEU | Policy Report Military cooperation Depth and frequency of mili¬ tary collaboration Joint exercises 0 - No cooperation 1 - Military drills in discussions 2 - Bilateral military drills 3 - Bilateral and multilateral military drills 5% Military presence Degree of permanent /tempo¬ rary foreign military presence Troops, foreign bases, joint defence installations 0 - No active presence 1 - Military presence discussed but not implemented 2 - Short-term or semi-perma¬ nent deployments or symbolic presence 3 - Permanent bases or signif¬ icant foreign military infra¬ structure 15% Arms trade Volume and strategic value of equipment trades Volume of arms traded, defence contracts 0 - No notable cooperation 1 - Discussions on arms trade 2 - Notable arms trade 3 - Significant and sustained arms trade with strategic value 5% Foreign policy (overall 25%) CFSP alignment in relation to Russia/China/Turkey Degree of alignment with CFSP on Russia/China/Turkey issues Alignment with High Rep¬ resentative's declarations 0 - Full alignment with CFSP 1- >0; <20% of non-alignment 2 - >20%; <60% of non-align¬ ment 3 - >60% of non-alignment 10% 46 •^InvigoratEU 'Invigorating Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy for a Resilient Europe InvigoratEU | Policy Report Involvement in the pursuit of key national interests (e.g. EU/NATO membership, territorial integrity, etc.) - contestation or support Degree of contestation of key national policies or the degree of support for key national pol¬ icies115 Public critics, hostile dip¬ lomatic actions, coercive economic measures, sup¬ port for secessionist movements, etc. (in case of contestation) or Public endorsements, dip¬ lomatic assistance in mul¬ tilateral forums, non¬ recognition of seceding entities etc. (in case of support 0 - No involvement or neutral stance 1 - Low-level involvement through rhetoric 2 - Moderate involvement, characterised by consistent contestation or support 3 - Significant involvement, where external actors actively and strategically support or contest key national interests 15% 115 This indicator evaluates the extent of interest that foreign actors have in the key national interests of individual states. A foreign actor's influence is likely to be less intensive if it shows less interest in a state's key national interests. However, when a foreign actor actively opposes a state's national interests, its influence tends to increase due to deeper engagement. Conversely, there are instances where foreign actors actively support specific key national interests, thereby gaining leverage and fostering closer ties with those states, which also leads to significant influence. For example, Russia's influence in Moldova is considerable as it 47 •^InvigoratEU 'Invigorating Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy for a Resilient Europe InvigoratEU | Policy Report ECONOMIC DIMENSION Trade and investment relations (overall 67%) The official level of economic/trade partnership Strength of formal economic/trade agreements Signed trade agreements, economic treaties, cus¬ toms unions, trade promo¬ tion frameworks 0 - No formal economic part¬ nership or negotiations ongo¬ ing 1 - Trade agreements in partic¬ ular sectors 2 - Free trade agreements 3 - Deep and comprehensive free trade agreements (sec¬ ond generation free trade agreement) 5% Foreign Direct Investments FDI inflows Annual FDI inflows as a percentage of total FDI inflows 0 - No FDI >1% of total FDI 1 - FDI 1-5% of total FDI 2 - FDI 5-20% of total FDI 3 -FDI >20% of total FDI 7% FDI Stock FDI stock as a percentage of total FDI stock 0 - No FDI >1% of total FDI 1 - FDI 1-5% of total FDI 2 - FDI 5-20% of total FDI 3 -FDI >20% of total FDI 15% Trade Intensity (goods and ser¬ vices trade) Exports Share of exported goods and services as a per¬ centage of total exports 0 - Trade <5% of total 1 - Trade 5-10% of total 2 - Trade 10-20% of total 3 - Trade >20% of total 25% Imports Share of imported goods and services as a per¬ centage of total imports 0 - Trade <5% of total 1 - Trade 5-10% of total 2 - Trade 10-20% of total 3 - Trade >20% of total 15% Strategic economic dependence (overall 35%) supports secessionist movements, thereby opposing the country's aspirations for territorial integrity and sovereignty. In contrast, in Serbia, Russia's influence remains strong due to its substantial backing on Serbia's position on the Kosovo issue, making it an appealing partner. 48 •^InvigoratEU 'Invigorating Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy for a Resilient Europe InvigoratEU | Policy Report Strategic assets ownership and presence of foreign firms Ownership of key sectors/assets by foreign actors, as well as presence of foreign-owned or partnered firms Control of strategic sec¬ tors (e.g., energy, tele¬ com, transport, banking) by foreign firms/governments 0 - No foreign ownership or minimal ownership of minor assets 1 - Relative majority ownership in one sector 2 - Relative majority owner¬ ship in several sectors 3 - Absolute majority owner¬ ship in at least one sector 11% Energy dependence Share of energy imports from foreign actors Percentage of total en¬ ergy imports coming from one external actor 0 - Energy imports <5% 1 -5-20% energy imported 2 - 20-35% of energy im¬ ported 3 - >35% of energy imported from a single actor 15% Official foreign debt Foreign debt to external actors Foreign debt to a specific country as a percentage of total dept 0 - No foreign debt 1 - Foreign debt <5% of total 2 - Foreign debt <15% of total 3 - Foreign debt >15% to¬ tal 7% SOCIETAL DIMENSION Mobility and connectivity (overall 27%) Diaspora Size and influence of the dias¬ pora community Size of the diaspora pop¬ ulation and their level of influence in local politics, economy and culture 0 - No significant diaspora 1 - Small diaspora with mini¬ mal influence 2 - Moderate diaspora with some influence 3 - Large diaspora with signif¬ icant influence 6% 49 •^InvigoratEU 'Invigorating Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy for a Resilient Europe InvigoratEU | Policy Report Visa requirement Ease of travel between coun¬ tries Visa requirements for citi¬ zens, presence of visadree agreements or re¬ laxed visa policies 0 - No visa-free access 1 - Visa required with some fa¬ cilitation 2 - Visa-free access for a shorter stay (up to 50 days) 3 - Visa-free access for a longer stay (more than 50 days) 5% Tourism Volume and impact of tourism coming from China, Turkey or Russia Number of tourists from the external actor and their economic impact 0 - Negligible tourism interac¬ tions 1 - Low tourism interaction (15% of total tourism) 2 - Moderate tourism interac¬ tion (5-10% of total tourism) 5 - High volume of tourism (>10% of total tourism) 5% Education/student exchanges Scale and impact on educa¬ tional exchanges Number of exchange pro¬ grammes, students partic¬ ipating and institutional partnerships as share of total 0 - No notable exchanges 1 - Minimal exchanges or pro¬ grams 2 - Moderate exchanges with some impact 5 - Extensive exchanges with significant impact 10% 50 •^InvigoratEU 'Invigorating Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy for a Resilient Europe InvigoratEU | Policy Report Local/provincial government partnership, city twinning Number and effectiveness of local/provincial partnerships Number of twinning agreements and their ef¬ fectiveness 0 - No partnerships or twin¬ ning 1 - Few, ineffective partner¬ ships 2 - Moderate number with some effectiveness 3 - Significant partnerships with proven effectiveness 5% Cultural and informational sphere overall 55%) Foreign media presence and in¬ fluence Extent and nature of foreign media presence Number of foreign media outlets, their reach, and influence on public opin¬ ion 0 - No notable foreign media presence 1 - Minimal presence with lim¬ ited reach 2 - Moderate presence with some influence 3 - Extensive presence with a noticeable influence on shap¬ ing public opinion 20% The presence of foreign cultural centres Impact of foreign cultural insti¬ tutions Number of cultural centres and their role in promot¬ ing foreign culture and language 0 - No foreign cultural centres 1 - Existing but with limited im¬ pact 2 - Existing with moderate im¬ pact 3 - Existing with substantial impact 5% 51 •^InvigoratEU 'Invigorating Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy for a Resilient Europe InvigoratEU | Policy Report Religious bonds and cooperation Level of religious ties and co¬ operation Depth of religious collab¬ orations and partnerships 0 - No religious ties 1 - Different religion but some ties with local minorities 2 -Majority religion, moderate church relations 3 - Majority religion, well-de¬ veloped church relations 30% Public perceptions (overall 18%) Perception/Public Opinion (on cooperation benefits, on dona¬ tion intensity, on global influ¬ ence, on leader popularity, donor perception) Public opinion on selected as¬ pects Opinion on cooperation benefits, donation inten¬ sity, global influence, leader popularity, and do¬ nor perception 0 - Mostly negative opinion 1 - Mostly neutral or mixed opinions 2 - A generally positive opin¬ ion with some criticism 3 - Mostly positive opinion with broad support 18% 52 ^^InvigoratEU 'Invigorating Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy for a Resilient Europe InvigoratEU | Policy Report Annex II InvigoratEU External Influence Index per Candidate Counry Annex II. 1 Albania Figure 10: China's Influence in Albania (2015-2025) Bilateral partnership Military presence Level of economic partnership Diaspora Public percepti on Multilateral platforms Arms trade FDI Inflows Visa High-level visits CFSP alignment FDI Stock Tourism Political parties Key national interests Trade eiports Education Parliamentarian coop. Trade imports City twinning Election interference Energy dependence Foreign media Legislative interference General debt I Foreign cultural centres Military cooperation Foreign firmsand strategic assets ownership Religion 55 ^e^lnvigoratEU 'Invigorating Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy for a Resilient Europe InvigoratEU | Policy Report Annex 11.8 Serbia Figure 17: China's Influence in Serbia (2015-2023) China's influence on Serbia io 9 8 Political dimension Economic dimension Societal dimension Average Public perception Bilateral partnership Multilateral platforms High-level visits Political parties Parliamentarian coop. Election interference Legislative interference Military cooperation Diaspora Visa Tourism Education City twinning Foreign media Foreign cultural centres Religion Military presence Level ofeconomic partnership Arms trade FD I Inflows CFSP alignment aFDI Stock Key national interests «Trade eiports Trade imports Energy dependence General debt Foreign firmsand strategic assets ownership 60 JnvigoratEUU “Invigorating Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy for a Resilient Europe InvigoratEU | Policy Report Annex 11.9 Ukraine Figure 18: China's Influence in Ukraine (2013-2025) Political dimension Economic dimension Societal dimension Average Bilateral partnership Multilateral platforms High-level visits Political parties Parliamentarian coop. Election interference Legislative interference Military cooperation Military presence Arms trade CFSP alignment Key national interests Level of economic partnership FDI Inflows FDI Stock Trade e^orts Trade imports Energy dependence General debt Foreign firmsand strategic assets ownership Diaspora Visa Tourism Education City twinning Foreign media Foreign cultural centres Religion Public perception 61 ^^InvigoratEU 'Invigorating Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy for a Resilient Europe InvigoratEU | Policy Report About InvigoratEU InvigoratEU is a Horizon Europe-funded project, coordinated by the EU-Chair at the Uni¬ versity of Duisburg-Essen (UDE) together with the Institut für Europäische Politik (IEP) in Berlin. The project, with a duration of 5 years from January 2024 until December 2026, examines how the EU can structure its future relations with its Eastern neighbours and the countries of the Western Balkans. The consortium has received around three million euros for this endeavour. How can the EU invigorate its enlargement and neighbourhood policy to enhance Europe's resilience? Our first goal is to investigate how to re¬ form the EU's enlargement strategy in a new geopolitical phase, HOW TO RE¬ SPOND to other actors' geopolitical am¬ bitions in the Eastern Neighbourhood and Western Balkans, and HOW TO RE¬ BUILD the EU's foreign policy arsenal in view of a new era of military threats (tri¬ ple "R" approach) combining the mod¬ ernisation and geopolitical logics of EU enlargement, leading to new data - e.g. a public opinion survey in Ukraine, a set of scenarios, an external influence index (Russia, China, Turkey), and a social policy compli¬ ance and cohesion scoreboard. 62 Our second goal is to elaborate an evidence-based, forward-looking vision for the EU's political agenda and institutional frameworks for co-designing a multidimensional toolbox (i.e. two tailor-made toolkits), together with InvigoratEU s Expert Hub, Civil Society (CS) Network, Youth Labs, Workshops for Young Professionals and Policy Debates in a gaming set up, which will result in context-sensitive and actionable policy recommendations for Euro¬ pean and national political stakeholders and (young) European citizens in particular. Funded by the European Union Our third goal is to deploy a CDE (communication, dissemination and exploitation) strategy aiming at recommendations from Day 1 to maximize our scientific, policy and societal im¬ pact in invigorating the EU's enlargement and neighbourhood policies to enhance Europe's resilience. Ultimately, InvigoratEU is a deliberately large consortium respecting the diversity of Europe and political perspectives; 7 out of 18 are from Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, and the western Balkans (North Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia), complemented by our Civil Society Network of 9 representatives from all Western Balkan countries, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. InvigoratEU is funded by the European Union. Disclaimer: Views and opinions expressed are however those of the author(s) only and do not nec¬ essarily reflect those of the European Union or the European Research Executive Agency. Neither the European Union nor the granting authority can be held responsible for them.