The Backsliding of Israel's Democracy

International Journal of Recent Innovations in Academic Research This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License [CC BY 4.0] E-ISSN: 2635-3040; P-ISSN: 2659-1561 Homepage: https://www.ijriar.com/ Volume-9, Issue-3, July-September-2025: 354-373 354 Research Article The Backsliding of Israel’s Democracy Yair Oppenheim Ph.D. of Tel Aviv University, The Lester and Sally Antin Faculty of Humanities, School of Philosophy, Linguistics and Science Studies, Isreal Email: [email protected] Received: August 24, 2025 Accepted: September 15, 2025 Published: September 21, 2025 Abstract This article examines democratic backsliding in Israel across the 19th–25th Knesset election cycles (2013– 2024) by combining standard democracy indicators with original party-system measures. We integrate external datasets (e.g., Freedom House, EIU, Polity, V-Dem) with a gravity-based framework that models the party system as pulled by three competing poles-Jewish nation-state, liberal democracy, and identity politics-and a composite index (TEN3) that tracks systemic balance/instability. Empirically, we observe a sustained decline in the liberal-democracy gravity share alongside gains for the Jewish nation-state and identity-politics gravities from the 19th to the 25th Knesset; TEN3 edges upward, consistent with a move toward a more tri-polar and potentially less stable configuration. These internal measures align with the late-period deterioration shown by external indices. Substantively, the re-weighting of ideological gravities implies higher coalition-formation costs, greater polarization, and intensifying pressure on liberal-institutional constraints (checks and balances, civil liberties, rule-of-law). Methodologically, the paper contributes a tractable gravity-based lens that can be replicated for other polities. Limitations include the small number of electoral observations and reliance on linear trend fits; future work should add confidence bands, robustness checks, and non-linear dynamics. Keywords: Israeli Politics, Democratic Backsliding, Liberal Democracy, Identity Politics, Jewish Nation-State, Party-System Fragmentation, Coalition Instability, TEN3 Index. 1. Introduction To assess the stability of a democracy, political scientists use a set of indicators and sub-criteria. Here’s the big picture: A. Institutional Stability 1  Longevity of the Constitution: Is there a stable constitution over time, or is it frequently amended?  Continuity of Governing Institutions: Are regular elections held? Is there a peaceful transfer of power?  Separation of Powers: Checks and balances among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches. 2. Political Stability  Number and Frequency of Elections: Frequent or snap elections may indicate instability.  Capacity to Form Stable Governments: Average cabinet duration; do coalitions collapse quickly?  Political Polarization: The extent of fragmentation among ideological or sectoral groups. 3. Rule of Law  Judicial Independence: The judiciary’s ability to review and constrain the executive.  Equal Enforcement of Laws: Are citizens equal before the law?  Corruption: Indices such as Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index. 4. Rights and Liberties 1 Levitsky, S. and Murillo, M.V. 2009. Variation in institutional strength. Annual Review of Political Science, 12(1): 115–133. International Journal of Recent Innovations in Academic Research 355  Freedom of Expression and the Press: Measured by indices like Freedom House and Reporters Without Borders.  Minority Rights: Protection of ethnic, religious, and gender groups.  Civil Liberties: Freedom of association, religion, and protest/assembly. 5. Legitimacy and Public Support  Public Trust in Institutions: Parliament, government, judiciary.  Voter Turnout: Indicates citizens’ commitment to the democratic system.  Willingness to Accept the Rules of the Game: Do parties and citizens accept election results? 6. Widely Used Quantitative Indices  Democracy Index (Economist Intelligence Unit): Five dimensions-electoral process, civil liberties, functioning of government, political participation, and political culture.  Freedom in the World (Freedom House): Rates countries on political rights and civil liberties.  Polity IV: Places political systems on an autocracy–democracy scale.  V-Dem (Varieties of Democracy): Provides multiple indices (liberal, egalitarian, participatory, deliberative, etc.). Table 1. Democracy stability-comparative table: A practical framework of pillars, sub-criteria, operationalization, indicators, sources, and scoring notes. Pillar Sub-criterion Operational definition Suggested indicators/metrics Primary data sources Scoring / aggregation notes Caveats / limitations Institutional stability Longevity of the constitution2 Durability of the constitutional order and resistance to frequent overhauls.  Years since adoption/last major overhaul  Amendments per decade  Entrenched clauses/ supermajority for change Constitutional texts; Comparative constitutions project; national legislation repositories Normalize each indicator (0–1) and combine (e.g., average with higher weight on overhaul frequency). Amendments can be qualityimproving; past changes may not imply current fragility. Institutional stability Continuity of governing institutions3 Regularity of elections and peaceful alternation in power.  Share of cycles held on schedule  Deviations from statutory inter‑election interval  Binary/weighted score for peaceful transfer in each cycle Election commissions; International IDEA election calendar; national records Compute schedule adherence index (0– 1) + transfer score; average across last N cycles. Snap elections may be legitimate tools; interpret in context. Institutional stability Separation of powers4 Existence and effectiveness of checks and balances  Judicial review power (yes/no, scope)  Legislative oversight tools Statutes; parliamentary records; V‑Dem Create a composite (0–1) using normalized De jure ≠ de facto; usage matters as much as formal 2 Polity Project: https://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html | Manual (pdf): https://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p5manualv2018.pdf Polity emphasizes institutional design and constraints on the executive-core features of constitutional durability and separation of powers. 3 Same link as comment 2, however, polity tracks formal executive constraints and competitiveness; complements election-regularity indicators. 4 Same links as comment 2, however institutional constraints are central to polity; use V-Dem for de facto. International Journal of Recent Innovations in Academic Research 356 among branches. used per year (inquiries, hearings)  Independence of key appointments indicators (checks, judicial independence) sub‑indicators; expert validation recommended. powers. Political stability Number and frequency of elections5 Stability of the electoral timetable and avoidance of persistent early dissolutions.  Average inter‑election interval (years)  Count of early elections per decade Election commissions; historical election data Z‑score vs. peer countries or rescale to 0–1 (more frequent → lower score). Parliamentary systems can legitimately call early elections. Political stability Capacity to form stable governments6 Government durability and coalition cohesion.  Average cabinet duration (months)  Share of minority governments  Cabinet breakdowns per term ParlGov; official gazettes; government registries Survival analysis or rescaled duration index; penalize frequent breakdowns. Short cabinets aren’t always negative (e.g., deliberate caretaker phases). Political stability Political polarization7 Fragmentation and ideological distance across parties/groups.  Effective Number of Parties (Laakso–Taagepera)  Vote–seat disproportionality (Gallagher index)  Survey‑based affective polarization Election results; Manifesto project; academic surveys Report each indicator; optionally average after normalization. High ENP can reflect pluralism; interpret with disproportionality. Rule of law Judicial independence8 Ability of the judiciary to review and constrain the executive.  Expert indices (e.g., judicial independence)  Case outcomes that overturn executive actions Court rulings; V‑Dem; World Justice Project (WJP) Combine expert index (0–1) with case‑based rate where available. Case counts may be noisy; expert scores can be subjective. Rule of law Equal enforcement of laws9 Equality before the law across groups and individuals.  Non‑discrimination measures (WJP)  Case clearance rates / access to counsel  Complaint success rates by group WJP rule of law index; justice ministry stats Normalize components; consider distributional gaps (penalize disparities). Administrative data may underreport marginalized groups. Rule of law Corruption10 Perceived/observed  Transparency International TI; World Bank WGI; Use CPI (rescaled 0– Perception indices 5 Democracy Index (EIU): https://www.eiu.com/n/campaigns/democracy-index-2024/ EIU covers the functioning of government and electoral process; tracks frequency alongside cabinet durability. 6 Same link as comment 5; however, EIU incorporates the functioning of government, combined with duration metrics. 7 Same link as comment 5; however, political culture and participation dimensions proxy polarization dynamics. 8 V-Dem Methodology (pdf): https://www.v-dem.net/documents/56/methodology.pdf. V-Dem's liberal component captures judicial checks and constraints. 9 Same link as comment 8; however, use V-Dem (liberal index) plus WJP outcome metrics for balance. 10 Same link as comment 8; however, use V-Dem (liberal index) plus WJP outcome metrics for balance. International Journal of Recent Innovations in Academic Research 357 misuse of public power for private gain. CPI (0–100)  World Bank WGI: Control of corruption national audit institutions 1) and/or WGI; triangulate where possible. reflect elite/business views; complement with audits. Rights and liberties Freedom of expression and press11 Protection of speech, media pluralism, and journalist safety.  Freedom House (expression/press items)  Reporters Without Borders (RSF) Press Freedom Index Freedom House; RSF Use standardized scores (rescale 0– 1); average across sources. Indices may weigh legal and safety aspects differently. Rights and liberties Minority rights12 Legal protections and real‑world outcomes for minority groups.  Anti‑discrimination laws (exist/scope)  Representation share vs. population share  Hate‑crime reporting rates Statutes; electoral data; police/ombudsman reports Blend legal (de jure) and outcome (de facto) measures; cap dominance of any single metric. Under‑reporting common; representation varies by system design. Rights and liberties Civil liberties13 Freedom of association, religion, assembly/protest.  Freedom House civil‑liberties subscore  Count/severity of restrictions on assembly Freedom House; government decrees; NGO monitoring Normalize counts; combine with FH subscore. Emergency powers can be temporary; track duration and oversight. Legitimacy and public support Public trust in institutions14 Citizen confidence in parliament, government, and courts.  Survey trust scores (0–100) by institution  Trend over last 5 years National surveys; WVS; Gallup Average across institutions; weight recent years more heavily. Survey wording and samples affect comparability. Legitimacy and public support Voter turnout15 Participation rate in national elections.  Turnout as % of registered voters  Adjusted turnout vs. voting‑age population Election authorities; IDEA turnout database Use adjusted turnout where possible; trend over last N elections. Compulsory voting regimes aren’t directly comparable. Legitimacy and public support Acceptance of rules of the game16 Willingness of parties/citizens to accept results and norms.  Survey items on accepting outcomes and constraints  Incidence of post‑election violence/contestation Surveys; conflict/incident datasets; media monitoring Binary/graded scoring per election cycle; rolling average. Rare events but high salience; contextualize. 11 Freedom in the World-Methodology: https://freedomhouse.org/reports/freedom-world/freedom-world-research-methodology. Freedom House directly scores civil liberties and political rights. 12 Same link as comment 11; Use FH civil liberties subcomponents; complement with representation stats. 13 Freedom in the World–Methodology: https://freedomhouse.org/reports/freedom-world/freedom-world-research-methodology/ 14 V-Dem Dataset and Methodology: https://v-dem.net/data/the-v-dem-dataset/ | https://www.v-dem.net/documents/56/methodology.pdf 15 V-Dem Dataset and Methodology: https://v-dem.net/data/the-v-dem-dataset/ | https://www.v-dem.net/documents/56/methodology.pdf 16 Methodology: https://v-dem.net/data/the-v-dem-dataset/ | https://www.v-dem.net/documents/56/methodology.pdf International Journal of Recent Innovations in Academic Research 358 B. Laakso–Taagepera Index 17 Additional dimensions for assessing the stability of parliamentary democracies analyze the composition of the parliament-namely, the number of parties, their size, and their ability to form a stable government. One of the most widely used measures for assessing political stability via the number of parties is the Laakso–Taagepera Index, also known as the Effective Number of Parties (ENP). Laakso–Taagepera index formula calculation is: The index considers not only the official count of parties but also their relative sizes: 𝑁 = 1 ∑𝑝𝑖2 𝑘 𝑖=1  𝑁-Effective number of parties.  𝑝𝑖-the seat share of party i out of the total seats in the Knesset (120).  𝑘-the number of parties that won representation. If all parties are equal in size, 𝑁 is close to the actual number of parties. If one party is dominant, 𝑁 is much lower. Implications for Stability  High ENP → Significant fragmentation of the party system, making it harder to form stable governments and leading to a proliferation of fragile coalitions.  Low ENP → Indicates dominance by one or two parties, which tends to facilitate governmental stability but reduces political representation. Let us add a new index to measure index, which reflects the non-commitment of the political system-as represented in the parliament-to the rules and norms of democracy. 𝐷𝐶 =1 1−∑ 𝑝𝑖∗ 𝛼𝑖 𝑘 𝑖=1  𝑁-Effective number of parties.  𝑝𝑖-the seat share of party i out of the total seats in the Knesset (120).  𝛼𝑖-the level of commitment and trust of party i in Israeli democracy.  𝑘-the number of parties that won representation. C. The Three-Body Problem Briefly, the three-body problem is a well-known physics problem that describes a physical system moving under the influence of three centers of gravity (for example, three suns). Systems that move around three centers of gravity 18 are characterized by persistent, extreme instability 19 . In chaos theory, a system with three centers of gravity (attractors) can be characterized as oscillating among three attractors. 17 Laakso, M. and Taagepera, R. 1979. Effective number of parties: A measure with application to West Europe. Comparative Political Studies, 12(1): 3–27. 18 Borderes-Motta, G. and Winter, O.C. 2018. Poincaré surfaces of section around a 3D irregular body: The case of asteroid 4179 Toutatis. Monthly Notices of the Royal Astronomical Society, 474(2): 2452–2466. 19 Given three massive bodies (e.g., three suns) that exert mutual gravitational forces according to Newton’s law of gravitation, the question is: can their trajectories be predicted exactly over time? It has been shown, mathematically and physically, that there is no general analytic solution to this problem. In chaos theory, this is a system with three attractors, where an attractor is a state or set of states toward which the system tends over time. Here we are dealing with a strange attractor-a chaotic trajectory that does not repeat yet remains within a bounded region. When a system has three (strange) attractors, its behavior becomes highly complex.  The system can “jump” among attractors depending on the initial conditions.  The boundaries of the basins of attraction become intricate, making it difficult to predict which attractor the system will reach. International Journal of Recent Innovations in Academic Research 359 In what follows, we model Israel’s political-institutional system as one that behaves analogously to a physical system orbiting three centers of gravity and is therefore fated to a state of inherent instability. These centers of gravity are the three core principles on which Israel’s identity rests: (1) a religious-nation state (Jewish), (2) a liberal-civic democracy, and (3) identity/tribal politics. Each of these centers has an underlying ideology, laws, and institutions that support it, yet among them, there are built-in, persistent tensions that appear, at least ostensibly, irresolvable. The use of the three-body analogy is an extension-indeed a further extension-of a model in which populations behave according to laws of “social gravity” 20 . According to chaos theory, a chaotic system is non-stable and highly sensitive to change; that is, it exhibits the “butterfly effect,” whereby small differences in initial conditions (e.g., political, security-related, or legal events) can produce dramatic differences in outcomes. Schematically, the three-body problem as applied to Israel’s socio-political structures can be presented as follows: Figure 1. Conceptual framework of Israel’s socio-political structures. . 21 Political Structure-Israel’s Socioof Gravity of Three Centers the Briefly Present In the Israeli context, I would like to note the studies by Ilan Peleg and Ruth Amir 22 . In their comprehensive book, The Crisis of Israel’s Democracy, 1948–2025, they provide extensive explanations for the causes of Israel’s democratic crisis. For our purposes, the principal explanations in the book concern: an ethnonational structure lacking a full constitutional foundation; sharp social cleavages; and charismatic populismwith Netanyahu at its center. In his “Tribes” speech, President Reuven Rivlin 23 argued that “demographic and cultural processes have reshaped the face of Israeli society in recent decades: from a society composed of a clear majority and minority to a society composed of four sectors, or tribes.” 20 Vecchia, K.J. and Stewart, J.Q. Papers (C0571) 1907–1970s. 2007. A finding aid, manuscripts division department of rare books and special collections, Princeton University Library, 2004 "John Q. Stewart Papers". Archived from the original on 2007-06-10. Retrieved 2007-10-22. 21 For details of the three centers of gravity of Israel’s socio-political structure, please look at: Oppenheim, Y. 2025. The impact of deep social, cultural, and political structures on the stability of democracy in Israel. International Journal of Social Science, Management and Economics Research, 3(5): 25-36. 22 Peleg, I. and Amir, R. 2025. The crisis of Israel's democracy, 1948–2025: Origins, developments, and consequences. Bloomsbury Publishing USA. 23 Rivlin, R. 2023. “The ‘tribes’ speech”-former President Reuven Rivlin | The State’s Speech, Knesset Channel, April 9, 2023. The Jewish nation-state Identify politics A liberal democratic state International Journal of Recent Innovations in Academic Research 360 Meir Elran and Kobi Michael 24 describe an elite struggle as “a power confrontation conducted mainly, though not exclusively, between the new elite (which tends to the right) and the old elite (which tends to the center– left).” In addition to the unique Israeli democracy, we briefly present the three centers of gravity in Israel’s sociopolitical structure. Among the three centers of gravity, there are built-in conflicts. To gain an in-depth understanding of the scope and breadth of the conflicts among Israel’s three centers of gravity-and their impact on the weakening of Israeli democracy-see my article "The Impact of Deep Social, Cultural, and Political Structures on the Stability of Democracy in Israel" 25 . Underlying each of these centers are ideologies and worldviews regarding the future vision of the State of Israel-its character and its objectives. Israel as a Jewish Ethno-Religious Nation-State Essence of the Principle: The State of Israel is defined as a Jewish, religiously inflected nation-state, with its national-religious identity enshrined in law, symbols, and institutions (Book Review: Agmon, 2020). Israel is a Liberal Democratic State 26 Essence of the Principle: Israel is a liberal democracy that combines popular sovereignty (encompassing free and competitive elections, political representation, and the alternation of power) with institutional protection of individual and minority rights through the rule of law and the separation of powers. It is not enough that the majority decides; the majority’s authority is limited by a constitution/basic laws, judicial review, and parliamentary and public oversight-so that fundamental liberties (freedom of expression, religion, association, press, due process, and property) are preserved for all 27 . Identity Politics Essence of the Principle: Identity politics is a mode of political organization and discourse in which individuals and groups formulate public claims primarily based on identity affiliation (ethnic/national, religious, gender, sexual, racial, and more), arising from experiences of deprivation, exclusion, or lack of recognition. It aims to secure recognition of identity and collective dignity, fair representation in institutions, and, at times, redistribution of resources and powers-not in terms of the “universal citizen,” but in terms of a distinct group (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2002). The “Three Centers” Index (TEN3) Party Assignment  Parties emphasizing a Jewish–national identity (Likud, Religious Zionism, Shas, United Torah Judaism) → high weight in the “Jewish nation-state” center.  Parties emphasizing liberal–democratic principles (Yesh Atid, Labor, parts of National Unity) → high weight in the “liberal democracy” center.  Parties with a distinct sectoral representation (Arab parties, and some other identity-based parties) → high weight in the “identity politics” center. Mixed parties receive fractional assignments (e.g., National Unity: 70% liberal, 30% Jewish-national). Weight in the Knesset For each center 𝑐 ∈{𝐽,𝐿,𝐼}: 𝑆𝑐=∑𝑤𝑝,𝑐 𝑠𝑝, 𝑝 𝑞𝑐=𝑆𝑐 120. 24 Elran, M. and Michael, K. 2023. The formative socio-political crisis in Israel: Implications for national security. Strategic Assessment, 26(2): 137-145. 25 Oppenheim, Y. 2025. The impact of deep social, cultural, and political structures on the stability of democracy in Israel. International Journal of Social Science, Management and Economics Research, 3(5): 25-36. 26 It has not been definitively resolved, legally or socially, whether Israel is a liberal democracy or another type of democracy (conservative, authoritarian). For the purposes of this discussion, however, we will assume that the definition of a liberal democracy is the appropriate “center of gravity” for our purposes. 27 Coglianese, C. 1990. Review of democracy and its critics, by R.A. Dahl. Michigan Law Review, 88(6): 1662–1667. International Journal of Recent Innovations in Academic Research 361 Where 𝑆𝑡 is the weighted seat total for center 𝑡; 𝑤𝑝,𝑡is party 𝑝’s affiliation weight to center 𝑡 (typically 0 ≤ 𝑤𝑝,𝑡 ≤1, with ∑𝑤𝑝,𝑡 𝑡=1); and 𝑠𝑝is the number of seats held by party 𝑝. Then 𝑆𝑐 us seats per center and 𝑞𝑐 is normalized seat share for center out of the Knesset’s 120 seats. Effective-Number Index TEN3= 1 ∑𝑞𝑐 2 𝑐, 1≤TEN3≤3.  1= a single dominant center (uni-polar system).  3= three equal centers (maximal fragmentation). Interpretation  High TEN3: The system is fragmented across the three centers → harder to reach constitutional or coalition consensus.  Low TEN3: Dominance of one center (e.g., “Jewish nationalism”) at the expense of the others. 1. Israel’s Socio-Political Situation for the Years 2013–2025 In this section, we will compute the dimensions we presented for Israel’s socio-political situation for the years 2013–2025. Our research hypothesis is that Israeli democracy has significantly weakened during this period. A. Israel's democratic stability is assessed according to a set of indicators presented in Section 1. A. Table 2. Freedom in the World–Israel (2013–2025). Year PR (0–40) CL (0–60) Total (0–100) Source 2013 36 45 81 Freedom House-Freedom in the World: Israel 2013 (PR/CL breakdown) 2014 36 45 81 Freedom House - Freedom in the World: Israel 2014 2015 36 45 81 Freedom House - Freedom in the World: Israel 2015 2016 36 44 80 Freedom House - Freedom in the World: Israel 2016 2017 36 44 80 Freedom House - Freedom in the World: Israel 2017 2018 36 43 79 Freedom House - Freedom in the World: Israel 2018 2019 35 43 78 Freedom House - Freedom in the World: Israel 2019 2020 33 43 76 Freedom House - Freedom in the World: Israel 2020 2021 33 43 76 Freedom House - Freedom in the World: Israel 2021 2022 34 42 76 Freedom House - Freedom in the World: Israel 2022 2023 34 43 77 Freedom House - Freedom in the World: Israel 2023 2024 34 40 74 Freedom House - Freedom in the World: Israel 2024 2025 34 39 73 Freedom House - Freedom in the World: Israel 2025 Scores split: Political rights (PR, 0–40) + Civil liberties (CL, 0–60). Total = 0–100. Each row includes the source line for that year's country report. Note: Sources refer to Freedom House's 'Freedom in the World' Israel country pages for the corresponding year. International Journal of Recent Innovations in Academic Research 362 Table 3. Israel–democracy index (economist intelligence unit), 2013–2024. Year EIU democracy index (0–10) Regime type Notes/sources 2013 7.53 Flawed democracy EIU Democracy Index 2013 (report/summary); Our World in Data – 'democracy-index-eiu' (ISR). 2014 7.63 Flawed democracy EIU Democracy Index 2014 (report/summary); Our World in Data – 'democracy-index-eiu' (ISR). 2015 7.77 Flawed democracy EIU Democracy Index 2015 (report/summary); Our World in Data – 'democracy-index-eiu' (ISR). 2016 7.85 Flawed democracy EIU Democracy Index 2016 (report/summary); Our World in Data – 'democracy-index-eiu' (ISR). 2017 7.79 Flawed democracy EIU Democracy Index 2017 (report/summary); Our World in Data – 'democracy-index-eiu' (ISR). 2018 7.79 Flawed democracy EIU Democracy Index 2018 (report/summary); Our World in Data – 'democracy-index-eiu' (ISR). 2019 7.86 Flawed democracy EIU Democracy Index 2019 (report/summary); Our World in Data – 'democracy-index-eiu' (ISR). 2020 7.84 Flawed democracy EIU Democracy Index 2020 (report/summary); Our World in Data – 'democracy-index-eiu' (ISR). 2021 7.97 Flawed democracy EIU Democracy Index 2021 (report/summary); Our World in Data – 'democracy-index-eiu' (ISR). 2022 7.93 Flawed democracy EIU Democracy Index 2022 (report/summary); Our World in Data – 'democracy-index-eiu' (ISR). 2023 7.80 Flawed democracy EIU Democracy Index 2023 (report/summary); Our World in Data – 'democracy-index-eiu' (ISR). 2024 7.80 Flawed democracy EIU Democracy Index 2024 (report/summary); Our World in Data – 'democracy-index-eiu' (ISR). The EIU Democracy Index measures five dimensions: electoral process and pluralism, civil liberties, functioning of government, political participation, and political culture. General sources: Economist Intelligence Unit, Democracy Index reports (2013–2024); Our World in Data ‘democracy-index-eiu’ series for Israel. Table 4. Israel–polity IV/polity5 (polity2) scores, 2013–2018 28 . Year Polity2 (-10 to +10) Notes/source 2013 6 Polity5 annual time-series (polity2), Center for Systemic Peace; also via Our World in Data 'democracy-index-polity' (ISR). 2014 6 Polity5 annual time-series (polity2), Center for Systemic Peace; also via Our World in Data 'democracy-index-polity' (ISR). 2015 6 Polity5 annual time-series (polity2), Center for Systemic Peace; also via Our World in Data 'democracy-index-polity' (ISR). 2016 6 Polity5 annual time-series (polity2), Center for Systemic Peace; also via Our World in Data 'democracy-index-polity' (ISR). 2017 6 Polity5 annual time-series (polity2), Center for Systemic Peace; also via Our World in Data 'democracy-index-polity' (ISR). 2018 6 Polity5 annual time-series (polity2); 2018 Polity IV aggregation confirms Israel +6; also available via OWID 'democracy-index-polity' (ISR). Polity rates political systems on an autocracy–democracy scale (polity2: -10 to +10). Sources: Center for Systemic Peace (Polity5), Our World in Data 'democracy-index-polity' series. 28 There are no data for the years 2019-2024 International Journal of Recent Innovations in Academic Research 369 Table 17. 2019 election-22nd Knesset (17 Sep 2019) 44 . Party Seats Jewish nationstate Liberal democracy Identity politics Jewish nationstate Liberal democracy Identity politics 𝑤𝑝,𝐽 𝑤𝑝,𝐿 𝑤𝑝,𝐼 𝑆𝐽 𝑆𝐿 𝑆𝐼 Blue and White 33 0.4 0.6 0 13.20 19.80 0.00 Likud 32 0.3 0.3 0.4 9.60 9.60 12.80 Joint List 13 0 0.5 0.5 0.00 6.50 6.50 Shas 9 0.5 0.1 0.4 4.50 0.90 3.60 Yisrael Beiteinu 8 0.4 0.4 0.2 3.20 3.20 1.60 United Torah Judaism 7 0.4 0.1 0.5 2.80 0.70 3.50 Yamina 7 0.6 0.4 0 4.20 2.80 0.00 Labor–Gesher 6 0.4 0.6 0 2.40 3.60 0.00 Democratic Union 5 0.2 0.8 0 1.00 4.00 0.00 TEN3 = 2.84 Normalized Seats 40.90 51.10 28.00 Center gravity shares 34.08% 42.58% 23.33% Table 18. 2020 election-23rd Knesset (2 Mar 2020) 45 . Party Seats Jewish nationstate Liberal democracy Identity politics Jewish nationstate Liberal democracy Identity politics 𝑤𝑝,𝐽 𝑤𝑝,𝐿 𝑤𝑝,𝐼 𝑆𝐽 𝑆𝐿 𝑆𝐼 Likud 36 0.4 0.3 0.3 14.4 10.8 10.8 Blue and White 33 0.3 0.7 0 9.9 23.1 0 Joint List 15 0 0.5 0.5 0 7.5 7.5 Shas 9 0.4 0.1 0.5 3.6 0.9 4.5 United Torah Judaism 7 0.4 0 0.6 2.8 0 4.2 Labor– Gesher– Meretz ("Emet") 7 0.3 0.7 0 2.1 4.9 0 Yisrael Beiteinu 7 0.4 0.5 0.1 2.8 3.5 0.7 Yamina 6 0.7 0.3 0 4.2 1.8 0 TEN3 = 2.82 Normalized Seats 39.80 52.50 27.70 Center gravity shares 33.17% 43.75% 23.08% 44 All the wp,c values are based on my estimations from my knowledge of the Israeli parties. 45 All the wp,c values are based on my estimations from my knowledge of the Israeli parties. International Journal of Recent Innovations in Academic Research 370 Table 19. 2021 election-24th Knesset (23 Mar 2021) 46 . Party Seats Jewish nationstate Liberal democracy Identity politics Jewish nationstate Liberal democracy Identity politics 𝑤𝑝,𝐽 𝑤𝑝,𝐿 𝑤𝑝,𝐼 𝑆𝐽 𝑆𝐿 𝑆𝐼 Likud 30 0.4 0.3 0.3 12.00 9.00 9.00 Yesh Atid 17 0.3 0.7 0 5.10 11.90 0.00 Shas 9 0.4 0.1 0.5 3.60 0.90 4.50 Blue and White 8 0.4 0.6 0 3.20 4.80 0.00 Yamina 7 0.7 0.3 0 4.90 2.10 0.00 Labor 7 0.3 0.7 0 2.10 4.90 0.00 United Torah Judaism 7 0.6 0.1 0.3 4.20 0.70 2.10 Yisrael Beiteinu 7 0.4 0.5 0.1 2.80 3.50 0.70 Religious Zionist Party 6 0.7 0.1 0.2 4.20 0.60 1.20 Joint List 6 0 0.4 0.6 0.00 2.40 3.60 New Hope 6 0.5 0.5 0 3.00 3.00 0.00 Meretz 6 0.1 0.9 0 0.60 5.40 0.00 Ra’am 4 0.1 0.6 0.3 0.40 2.40 1.20 TEN3 = 2.75 Normalized Seats 46.10 51.60 22.30 Center gravity shares 38.42% 43.00% 18.58% Table 20. 2022 election-25th Knesset (1 Nov 2022) 47 . Party Seats Jewish nationstate Liberal democracy Identity politics Jewish nationstate Liberal democracy Identity politics 𝑤𝑝,𝐽 𝑤𝑝,𝐿 𝑤𝑝,𝐼 𝑆𝐽 𝑆𝐿 𝑆𝐼 Likud 32 0.4 0.2 0.4 12.80 6.40 12.80 Yesh Atid 24 0.3 0.7 0 7.20 16.80 0.00 Religious Zionist (incl. Otzma Yehudit and Noam) 14 0.7 0 0.3 9.80 0.00 4.20 National Unity 12 0.4 0.6 0 4.80 7.20 0.00 Shas 11 0.4 0 0.6 4.40 0.00 6.60 United Torah Judaism 7 0.4 0 0.6 2.80 0.00 4.20 Yisrael Beiteinu 6 0.4 0.5 0.1 2.40 3.00 0.60 Ra’am 5 0 0.8 0.2 0.00 4.00 1.00 Hadash–Ta’al 5 0 0.5 0.5 0.00 2.50 2.50 Labor 4 0.3 0.7 0 1.20 2.80 0.00 TEN3 = 2.94 Normalized Seats 45.40 42.70 31.90 Center gravity shares 37.83% 35.58% 26.58% 46 All the wp,c values are based on my estimations from my knowledge of the Israeli parties. 47 All the wp,c values are based on my estimations from my knowledge of the Israeli parties. International Journal of Recent Innovations in Academic Research 371 Figure 4. TEN3 and gravity shares by Knesset. Summary Findings of Paragraph 2.C Direction of Change (19th → 25th Knesset)  Liberal democracy (gravity share) falls markedly-roughly ~52% → ~36%.  Jewish nation-state rises-roughly ~31% → ~38%, and by the 25th it overtakes liberal democracy.  Identity politics rises as well-roughly ~16% → ~27% (the steepest relative gain). TEN3, that is, the index for the system stability, edges up slightly (~0.25 → ~0.29): toward the maximum instability point of 3. Structural Rebalancing of the System The ideological “center of gravity” shifts away from the liberal-democratic pole and toward national and identity poles. This trend is toward the chaotic system of "Three centers of gravity". Political and Governance Implications  Coalition Formation: Centrist, rights-first coalitions become harder to assemble; coalitions anchored in national/identity agendas become easier.  Policy Tilt: More emphasis on sovereignty, identity, and particularistic claims; relatively less weight on liberal-institutional constraints.  Institutional Pressure: As liberal-democratic gravity weakens, checks and balances, civil liberties, and judicial/administrative independence may face greater strain.  Volatility Risk: The dual rise of national and identity poles tends to raise polarization, transaction costs, and the chance of episodic instability. These dynamics find support for my research hypothesis: Israeli liberal-democratic gravity weakens over these six elections, while religious-national and identity-politics gravities strengthen, consistent with a system trending toward heightened instability (what you term a “chaotic state”). Conclusions  The ideological center of gravity shifts away from liberal-democratic norms and toward national/identity poles; by the 25th Knesset, the Jewish nation-state pole is the largest share while identity politics shows the steepest relative gain.  TEN3 rises modestly, indicating a more tri-polar configuration that tends to elevate fragmentation and reduce systemic stability.  Coalition formation is likely to become harder for centrist rights-first blocs and easier for coalitions anchored in national/identity agendas.  Institutional pressure increases: checks and balances, civil liberties, and judicial/administrative independence face heightened stress as liberal-democratic gravity weakens.  Polarization and transaction costs grow, implying episodic instability and governance volatility in the near term.  Monitoring the joint trajectory of gravity shares, TEN3, and external democracy indices can indicate whether 2024–2025 marks an inflection or a continuation of backsliding.  Future research should incorporate uncertainty quantification (confidence bands), non-linear trend modeling, and cross-national applications of the gravity framework. 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The Backsliding of Israel’s Democracy. International Journal of Recent Innovations in Academic Research, 9(3): 354-373. Copyright: ©2025 Yair Oppenheim. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.