THE END OF "NORMAL TIMES" OR A "NEW NORMAL"? My Experience as the Minister of Economy and Innovation of the Republic of Lithuania

! Armonaite,!A.!(2025).!THE!END!OF!"NORMAL!TIMES”!OR!A!"NEW!NORMAL”?!My!Experience!as!the!Minister!of!Economy!and!Innovation!of!the!Republic!of! Lithuania.!In!Proceedings!of!the!Paris!Institute!for!Advanced!Study!(Vol.!21).!https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.17476178!! This!is!an!open!access!article!published!under!the!Creative!Commons!Attribution-NonCommercial!4.0!International!Public!License!(CC!BY-NC!4.0)! THE END OF "NORMAL TIMES” OR A "NEW NORMAL”? My Experience as the Minister of Economy and Innovation of the Republic of Lithuania Ausrine Armonaite1 1 Policy and Economic Development Consultant; Former Minister of Economy and Innovation of the Republic of Lithuania TO CITE Armonaite, A. (2025). THE END OF "NORMAL TIMES” OR A "NEW NORMAL”? My Experience as the Minister of Economy and Innovation of the Republic of Lithuania. In Proceedings of the Paris Institute for Advanced Study (Vol. 21). https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.17476178 PUBLICATION DATE 29/10/2025 ABSTRACT The past decade in Europe has been marked by recurring crises that have reshaped economies, societies, and policymaking. This paper reflects on the experience of leading Lithuania’s Ministry of Economy and Innovation during three major disruptions between 2020 and 2024: the COVID-19 pandemic, Chinese coercive trade measures, and energy price inflation following Russia’s war in Ukraine. Drawing on first-hand observations, the paper identifies recurring patterns in crisis management, comprising three successive stages—shock and uncertainty; liminality, or temporary measures to buy time; and the implementation of long-term solutions. It argues that while each crisis differed in nature, effective management consistently depended on decisive leadership, institutional cooperation, and the ability to transform challenges into opportunities for structural change. The Lithuanian case demonstrates that diversification, adaptive policymaking, and clear communication can sustain economic resilience even in an era where “normal times” no longer exist. The analysis concludes by outlining broader lessons for democratic governance in the age of permanent uncertainty. INTRODUCTION A look at the past decade in Europe reveals continuous turbulence and crises: the 2008-2009 financial crisis, the illegal Russian annexation of a part of Ukraine, Crimea, in 2014, that caused new dilemmas among European leaders and was followed by sanctions against Russia. The 2015 migration crisis from the Middle East and Africa, the 2016 Brexit vote that was followed by the whole Brexit negotiations process, the 2020 COVID pandemic, and finally, Russia’s 2022 war in Ukraine. All these events had significant implications and spill-over effects for our economies, political systems, and mental health. The only clear thing about the future is that we don’t know what it brings. “Normal times” are over. Policymakers must recognize this and deal with it. ! 2 I began my political career as a city councillor in Vilnius, the capital of Lithuania, and went on to spend ten years in professional politics. This included serving for eight years as a member of parliament, founding and chairing the liberal party Laisvės partija (Freedom Party) with more than 3,000 members that later became a coalition partner, and serving as the Minister of Economy and Innovation from 2020 to 2024. The Lithuanian government I worked in was tested with the ‘new normal’ numerous times when I was in office, between the years 2020 and 2024. We dealt with COVID-19, Chinese coercive measures in bilateral trade, the illegal migration crisis from the Middle East, energy price inflation, and let alone, the war and instability in the neighbouring region with the whole package of disruptions involved. My experience as the cabinet minister is, of course, related to the case of one country— Lithuania. It involved global events and external actors; however, I understand that the small details of our national policy may not be particularly interesting to the foreign reader. Keeping all that in mind, I want to reveal the broader relevance of my experience. I am going to briefly cover three crises and how we addressed them in the government and at the Ministry of Economy and Innovation of Lithuania: COVID-19, Chinese coercive measures in bilateral trade, and energy price inflation that was caused by the Russian attack on Ukraine. These three events are the focus of this article. It felt like all these crises were temporary, and we had to continue with the belief that ‘normal days’ would return. I kept telling my team that it would be easier once COVID passed. It never got easier. Finally, when the war in Ukraine broke out, I realised that ‘business as usual’ and ‘normal times’ as we knew them would never come back. I must note in advance that despite it being an extremely tense time, the Lithuanian economy managed to withstand all of it. Throughout these turbulent years, we not only avoided recession, on the contrary, we managed to sustain the steady growth, be it in purchasing power or GDP overall. In fact, when we left office at the end of 2024, our economy was in the best shape since the restoration of our independence in the 1990s. It did require substantial effort, though. I am grateful to the Paris Institute for Advanced Studies for giving me the space to reflect on my experience and share it with a wider audience. I first heard a powerful metaphor from Professor Barry Rogers of the London School of Economics, whom I met during my time at the Paris IAS—one that describes the process of moving from the ‘swamp’ to the mountain-top, and back again (Rogers, 2025). Public policy ‘swamp’ is the daily flow of ongoing operations, mostly within the organisation itself: it is usually full of details, nuances, interests, intrigues, failures, and successes. When you are in the midst of the crisis, it is difficult to leave the swamp and come up on the mountain top, but it is possible. From the mountain top, one may see the full picture of what is happening, as ! 3 well as what has happened, and the horizon – what may come next. Then you have to return to the swamp again to the swamp again. My experience in politics was mostly operating in the swamp. Only now I have the privilege to leave the swamp of details and nuances, come up on the mountain top, to see the whole picture, what actually happened. What I see is that, despite the fundamentally different nature of these crises, managing them often followed very similar patterns and stages. The same stages recurred throughout all three events: 1) Shock, uncertainty, and chaos; 2) Liminality or temporary measures implemented to buy time; 3) Long-term solutions developed to address the problems, as well as new horizons that emerged when solving them. Once you realise it, it may be easier to handle critical situations in the future. At least this is how it felt at the very end. I hope this personal experience may be of some universal use both for decision makers who deal with difficult situations in their office and political scientists who analyse public policy. PART 1 Shock, Uncertainty and Chaos The President of Finland, Alexander Stubb, often says that we human beings tend to overrationalise the past, over-dramatise the present, and underestimate the future. I believe this is the universal truth, especially regarding the overdramatisation of current events. The three major crises of my time in office — COVID-19, Chinese coercive measures in bilateral trade, and energy price inflation — each provoked a strikingly similar public response. This may be characterised by shock and confusion among the public and businesses. COVID-19 We took over the office in December 2020, when COVID was already there. In 2020, the number of COVID-related deaths reached hundreds, but the situation began to deteriorate significantly in the autumn. By the time we started working in December, the death toll was already being counted in thousands. Ironically, despite the fact that deaths caused by the virus were growing rapidly, some of our voters hoped that we would lift quarantine restrictions immediately after taking the government. It was never our promise, but somehow it felt like people were already fed up with the new reality and wanted some change. What we did was the contrary. On the very first meeting of the new cabinet, we were presented with the new numbers of cases and a couple of alternatives to tighten the quarantine rules. December is normally a cold winter in Lithuania, and as always in autumn and winter, all the viruses thrive. Let alone the pandemic. ! 4 When we took over the government, the renewed quarantine had already been in place for over a month. However, the outgoing government surprisingly (or not) did not provide much assistance to those most affected by the restrictions. We had to plan finances, develop financial instruments, secure the EU Commission's approval, and build consensus among institutions and the business community to ensure that these tools were sufficient, all from scratch. Finally, we had to put everything into effect. We took office in mid-December 2020. In the second half of December and the beginning of 2021, it appeared that we were already late with the state aid schemes that would help respond to the stricter quarantine rules. Typically, new governments have their first 100 days in office, during which they are not heavily criticised. That was not the case for us. In these kinds of situations, nobody is happy; you must choose among bad alternatives. The anticipation among people and businesses for an easier quarantine was met with a rise in new COVID cases, new restrictions, and financial support that, at the time, was perceived as insufficient. As elsewhere at that time, every decision was followed by immediate criticism coming from different actors, be it the stakeholders like business organizations, opinion leaders, influencers, or the public on the socials or the streets. The business community also proposed conflicting solutions. Representatives of shopping centres argued that a shopping centre is a safer place than an outdoor market and vice versa. Which is safer - a rural tourism homestead or an art gallery? Which should be opened first? How many square meters of retail space should we fence off to be safe? Everyone wanted quick and highquality, and most importantly - favourable solutions for them. Different actors made conflicting statements and shared conflicting and contradictory proposals and strategies. When the crisis hits, everybody knows how to handle it. It does not matter whether it's a global pandemic or a football match. Most of us are experts. And politicians are doing it all wrong! How to contain the virus without hurting your business? Especially services that are small, self-employed, or family owned and naturally most sensitive and affected. Businesses such as restaurants and bars, tourism, beauty services, culture, sports, and any other activities that involve human contact. How to preserve people's lives without killing your economy and putting people out of work? These were questions and dilemmas for us to consider in the beginning of 2021. Later, it was worse. When introducing the national vaccination certificate in May 2021 and the vaccination strategy in the second half of 2021, it was the gates of hell that were opened. These were tough decisions that were followed by protests, hate, and riots. At that time, it seemed essential to look for and identify decisive, although potentially unpopular, solutions that could inspire hope for change. It became clear only sometime later that we risked our political popularity by proposing a vaccination passport. This proposal was not ! 5 immediately welcomed by either some actors within the ruling coalition or government institutions. Meanwhile, our argument was simple: we must try. If there is a vaccine available, why should we sit back and do nothing? In other sections of this paper, I will share more about the vaccination passport and the measures taken to address the COVID crisis, as well as how it all eventually ended. As COVID continued, at the very peak of decision-making, there was a complete fog. There was no light at the end of the tunnel. No one knew how much longer it would last. I somehow dismissed the possibility that it could go on for about a year more. In times of crisis, you just focus on surviving through another day. Ultimately, we managed to get back on the path of economic growth, avoiding waves of bankruptcy while maintaining one of the softest quarantines in Europe. That is a fact. But it was an extremely tense time. COVID was a horror series that we all lived through, and most of us want to forget about it as soon as possible. For my team and me, we had to brace ourselves for another situation waiting just around the corner. Chinese coercive measures in bilateral trade Since the end of 2020, Lithuania has begun to intensify economic relations with Taiwan. This seemed reasonable, as Taiwan is one of the most advanced economies in the world, particularly known for its robust semiconductor and electronics industry. Other EU countries had been actively strengthening their relationships with Taiwan for quite some time; naturally, we wanted to promote our bilateral relationship. For instance, Lithuania is recognized for its niche expertise in ultra-short pulse laser technology, which we aimed to promote further in Southeast Asia. The fast and progressive Lithuanian fintech ecosystem has become a gateway to the Eurozone for many companies around the world. We aimed for more cooperation with Taiwan in these and many other industries. In addition, Lithuania gradually began to withdraw from the international cooperation format known as 17+1. It was an odd platform where Central and Eastern European countries and the People’s Republic of China built their bilateral cooperation. Personally, I found it completely incomprehensible why such a divisive format existed at all. Central and Eastern European countries were striving for their place in a strong, united Europe for decades, so why weaken and divide it with a separate format with China? It made sense to keep a distance from this arrangement, as the united Europe should communicate with China in one voice. Brussels should represent the EU Single Market in discussions with Beijing. Thus, Lithuania withdrew from “17+1” and subsequently allowed Taiwan to open its representative office in Vilnius. In my view, these two decisions were not directly related. ! 6 The nuances of the Taiwanese representation office name sparked China's dissatisfaction. In Lithuanian and English, the office was called "Taiwanese," while in Mandarin, its name was translated into "Taiwan." According to the Chinese side, this violated the “One China” principle, as it implied recognition of Taiwan's statehood. It should be emphasized that Lithuania has never targeted China in its decisions. Our aim was to increase our overall cooperation with Taiwan at all levels, as well as to diversify and strengthen economic cooperation (we later opened our trade office in Taipei as well). However, this had economic repercussions. On the 1st of December 2021, at the customs of Chinese seaports, an odd and unusual thing happened. All of a sudden, it was impossible to declare goods originated from Lithuania as such a country simply ‘did not exist’. Obviously, it was very much alive, but as it was for the digital customs system in China, our country ceased to exist. Thus, our technologies, food, beverages, and even peat stopped at the customs in China. It was an attack not only on Lithuania but also on the European Single Market, as everything is well integrated and linked here in Europe. Obviously, it hurt our investment climate, our image, and our businesses, including both local and multinational companies that had operations in Lithuania. Shock and uncertainty among businesses hit again. Did they lose the Chinese market for good? What about their partners in China and their expectations? What about our partners around the world who integrate Lithuanian-made components and deliver them to China? Too many unknowns. Now, suddenly, everyone on social media became an expert on Lithuania-China relations, an expert on Taiwan, and again, an expert on how to handle the burning situation at the Chinese customs. Some of the COVID state aid measures still existed but it seemed that we needed additional actions. I will tell you later how we finally dealt with the Chinese coercive measures. However, any problem we had at that time turned out to seem small on the 24th of February 2022. That morning, Russia invaded Ukraine and attacked its capital, Kyiv. Energy price inflation Any person from Central and Eastern Europe remembers that day vividly. My generation was lucky to be born into peaceful Europe. In February 2022, it seemed this peaceful world was over. All these stories our grandparents and parents told us are coming back. It can’t be! It's a different world now! Denial. Sadness. Anger. It’s been four years now with the Ukrainians fighting this war. War is always a multi-layer reality. As most neighbouring countries, we welcomed the refugees, planned and provided aid, both military and humanitarian, provided help for the ! 7 businesses that were temporarily forced to relocate from their country, and many more things happened. The focus of this article is on energy price inflation that was caused primarily by this war. In 2022, the inflation rate in the EU was about 9.32 % compared to the previous year. Skyrocketing. In my country, it was 19.71 %. The key driver for the inflation was not the oversupply of money. The war led to reduced natural gas supplies and volatility in oil markets, impacting energy costs across Europe. Being a small open economy - primarily an exporting country - that imports a great share of its energy consumption and does not have sufficient resources of its own resulted in double-digit inflation. Our manufacturers were among those who were hurt the most. This is what we call ‘a traditional industry’, for instance, producers of glass, furniture, chemicals, and other energy intensive sectors. These are complex factories that consume a lot of energy. Some of them were smart to go green long ago. Some didn't do it because of their business model, and it was impossible to transfer quickly. The manufacturing industry was the driver of our exports and at that time composed around 23 % of our GDP. Late summer 2022, these companies faced particularly dark days. There was a feasible probability that most of our key manufacturers would simply go out of business. No one wants to be the minister of economy that day. What did the three crises have in common at the very beginning? Shock, uncertainty, and chaos—these are the common elements that all three crises we managed shared throughout. At the very beginning of each crisis, everything feels overwhelming. Uncertainty surrounds the decision-making process; stakeholders and the public are anxious, criticism, noise, social media, and conventional media attention are all coming from every direction at the same time. It especially becomes heated on social media; in the Lithuanian case, at the time, Facebook was the most popular social media channel. Opinion leaders, politicians, analysts, decisionmakers, and citizens use this channel to express themselves. It has taken on the role of a public “agora.” This space is usually intense, and during times of crisis, it becomes even crazier. Clearly, nobody really knew how to deal with COVID or the consequences of war. These were force majeure events, and there was no detailed playbook or experience on how to navigate through them. Everything seems simpler on social media, though. Naturally, every piece of news is discussed instantly, and every step taken by the government is criticized by opponents or praised by supporters. Sharp criticism always attracts more attention and spreads faster. ! 8 It was quite fascinating to learn how the highest-ranking decision-makers are affected by this environment. Essentially, people with the largest number of followers, who use the sharpest language, and who share their reactions promptly, can drive the entire government crazy. They are not briefed or fully informed; they are not responsible for solving the problems, nor are they experts. Yet, they hold tremendous influence. As social media becomes the primary news channel, traditional media follows this flow. There are no breaks in this constant stream. It creates an extremely noisy environment in which you operate. This environment impacts your day as a decision-maker, as you and your team try to stay as open as possible, communicating and explaining the situation and your decisions. However, the pace is so rapid that it is almost impossible to keep up. It influences the decision-making process, as opinions can lead you and your colleagues to reconsider proposed decisions and your reactions to them. This is how democracy works — sometimes it is a positive thing, but at other times, it may cost us the best decisions. In these situations, continuous chaos becomes business as usual. Your ongoing attempts to manage the fire become your daily routine. At first, it seems extremely new and unusual, but then you start to get used to it. As human beings, we have a deep-seated desire to be liked by others. We tend to avoid dealing with excessive criticism from those around us. Now imagine politicians. They are also human beings with the same desire, but in addition, they are political animals. There is always a game going on in how the public, your supporters, stakeholders, colleagues, and opponents portray you. Are you defining yourself, or is anybody else going to define you? Then imagine any crisis on top of it. Frank Underwood from 'House of Cards' has put it simply: "Hunt or be hunted." This ‘industry’ is always a jungle. However, in times of crisis, your role isn't just to survive or be liked by others; it's to actually solve the problem and deliver results. Now you can’t get too much involved in social media, reading what other people are talking about you and your decisions. That may be tempting in the very beginning, but then you will simply lose yourself. Do not pay too much attention to what is going on there; turn off that noise. Someone once said, ‘what other people think of me is none of my business’. In the meantime, it is crucial to keep in touch with the public and your stakeholders. Not only publicly but also off-the-record. Both media and your stakeholders need a more complete picture of what is behind the situation. Every proposal or decision must be explained not only in the public press conferences, but also off the record for journalists and the media. It is important to provide them more background, while in press conferences you provide more concentrated information. Same with the ! 9 stakeholders. In my case, it was the business community. Constant meetings and public consultations were essential. I have heard that it was ‘not enough’, but with these volumes of information and the pace at that time, we did what we could. Every critical situation we dealt with was even more difficult because of the constant lack of support across the political spectrum, within the government apparatus or even the ruling coalition. A series of power games is the daily routine. Unfortunately, too often, it was a “zero-sum game,” where someone's problem is always someone else's victory. So why help? I am not only referring to the classic political spectrum divide: position versus opposition. But also, to the dynamics within the ruling coalition and the government apparatus itself. If one coalition partner faces difficulties and bears responsibility, another sees this as an opportunity to appear on the side, comment on the situation, and share advice in a way that potentially gains more points in the public. Thus, you not only deal with the crisis itself and the system you are directly responsible for, but also, centres of power within the coalition and the government, opposition, the president, your own political party, and the public opinions. Basically, all the time we were muddling through the swamp with the frequent lack of cooperation. Someone always tries to drag you back. Sometimes it is just for the sake of bureaucracy. Sometimes they don’t feel they support your proposals, as the government is not a single unit; it may have different visions within. Sometimes, they simply do not support you. We found both short-term and long-term solutions only when we succeeded in building broader support for them. For example, the national vaccination passport would never have seen the light of day had the Ministry of Economy and the Prime Minister’s Office not worked in full alignment. Even though the Ministry of Health was particularly skeptical at the very beginning, and other coalition partner party openly expressed their criticism for our proposal, we began building consensus through an alliance between my-led coalition partner Laisvės Party and the major coalition partner, the Conservative Party, along with their leaders. Then the rest followed. There was significantly less resistance in the cases of trade diversification and energy. Essentially, the criticism was mainly about the problem-solving pace being “too slow,” rather than the core of the proposals themselves. I will present them in the following parts of this paper. PART II Liminality Or Temporary Measures to Buy Time We tend to think that many crises have one or two major solutions that must be pursued immediately. Being at point A we must reach Z. However, there is the whole trip through the rest of the alphabet in between. It is not so black and white; there are many shades and colours in the process. ! 16 This positive trend was not solely due to the expansion of the local ecosystem; it was also attributed to Vilnius emerging as a regional hub for the digital technologies sector. We managed to attract international talent and technology companies, many of which relocated from neighbouring Belarus due to the oppressive dictatorship. The shifting geopolitical landscape prompted companies to seek more stable environments, making Lithuania an attractive destination for those looking to continue their operations in a secure and progressive setting. Over the past five years, the Lithuanian startup scene has increased in value seven times, now reaching €16 billion. In managing COVID-19, we reached decent vaccination numbers and finally fully lifted quarantine restrictions. Simultaneously, there were more impressive things happening. Lithuania’s biotechnology sector experienced remarkable growth, expanding by 87% in 2022, with an average growth rate of 22% from 2020 to 2023. This sector now contributes approximately 3% of our GDP, significantly higher than the EU average of 1%. Notably, Thermo Fisher Scientific expanded considerably. The Lithuanian plant produced components for COVID-19 vaccines that were exported worldwide and used mostly by Pfizer. Ultimately, it became the first corporate income taxpayer in Lithuania. But it was not only them, of course. Lithuanian companies like Northway Biotech expanded both in Lithuania and the US. Our life science startup ecosystem experienced substantial growth. When I look back at these events, it seems that our economy proved resilient thanks to its diversity and diversification. Throughout the years of crisis, both GDP and exports continued to grow. In 2023, our GDP per capita in purchasing power standards reached 87% of the EU average, higher than in several older EU member states — a result not all countries achieved4. Diversification is a crucial factor not only in exports but also in the broader economic context. During the COVID-19 lockdown of the services sector, manufacturers continued to operate and export. When the energy crisis struck and our manufacturers faced uncertainties, the growing tech sector helped the Lithuanian economy thrive. The crises have presented new opportunities not only for the economic life of the country but also for the public sector. The Prime Minister's office has taken significant steps to improve crisis management and enhance coordination among institutions. For instance, the National Crisis Management Centre was created to not only coordinate actions and consolidate functions but also analyse data in real time, enabling decision makers to make informed and timely decisions. The creation of the Centre is one of several examples of how the crisis has led to lasting institutional learning. The experience and knowledge we have accumulated through these crises, along with the lessons we have learned together, are already helping to respond proactively to potential crisis situations now. Public service that was highly influenced by these challenging circumstances has 4 Eurostat. (2025, July 10). GDP per capita in PPS (EU27 = 100) [Data set]. European Commission. https://doi.org/10.2908/tec00114 ! 17 developed into even more competent professionals. I believe that this acquired know-how will ease everyone's work when faced with larger, similar challenges in the future. LIMITATIONS When reading this paper, one may get the impression that the author thinks all the decisions were excellent and all crises ended well for Lithuania. This is only partially true. On the one hand, Lithuania has maintained its economic growth, competitiveness, and attractiveness for investment, and remains a success story in the region. On the other hand, each of these events caused conflicts within the society, the business community, divided the political arena, and ultimately cost the ruling coalition the 2024 parliamentary elections. The pandemic and its management in general have driven a wedge between the government and society around the world. We are still dealing with the consequences, and Lithuania was no exception. Looking back from today’s perspective, not all of our government’s decisions were also effective. For example, restricting movement between municipalities in Lithuania proved to be completely unreasonable. However, this was one of the trial-and-error methods proposed by the Ministry of Interior to try to stop the spread of the virus. In the case of China's trade restrictions, the Lithuanian business community was anxious that the government did not explain its decisions on the opening of the Taiwanese representative office in more detail, which partly provoked China's reaction. This later created a context of mistrust, with some feeling that the decisions were insufficiently explained and unpredictable. The outbreak of war in Europe and its consequences probably did the most to unite a divided society. We had to deal with its repercussions together, whether it was energy price inflation or the relocation of war refugees. Although government intervention is fully justified in modern democracies and has become the norm, people have an instinctive desire to resist changing circumstances and new regulations. This is understandable and natural, and it has followed us throughout our government’s mandate. CONCLUSIONS The past decade has been a relentless series of crises, each leaving its mark on economies, political systems, and mental well-being. From financial meltdowns to pandemics and geopolitical conflicts, the world has been in a state of constant flux. The illusion of “normal times” has shattered, replaced by a "new normal" characterized by uncertainty, volatility, and the need for constant adaptation. ! 18 The experience of leading through these turbulent times revealed several universal insights applicable to navigating this new reality. Despite the diverse nature of crises, a recurring pattern emerges in their management, with three successive phases: 1. Shock, Uncertainty, and Chaos: The initial phase is characterized by confusion, conflicting information, and a sense of being overwhelmed. 2. Liminality and Temporary Measures: This stage involves implementing short-term solutions to buy time, stabilize the situation, and create space for developing long-term strategies. 3. Long-Term Solutions and New Horizons: The final phase of addressing the root causes of the crisis, adapting to the new reality, and identifying opportunities for growth and innovation. This is the moment to use the crisis as an opportunity to build. Thus, while each crisis presents unique challenges, the underlying principles of effective crisis management remain consistent. In the complex arena of politics, there are rarely perfect solutions. You don’t find good solutions; you find good compromises or choose the best alternative among the imperfect options that are available. Now looking back, I ask myself: Were the decisions we made truly correct and unquestionable? They seemed so, but overall, it is impossible to tell. No one knows; perhaps if the government had simply vanished, the situation would have resolved itself anyway. However, I personally do not believe in ‘garbage can’ decision-making (Cohen et al., 1972), which refers to a model where decisions are made in a seemingly random manner, with bearers of problems (decision-makers) randomly meeting bearers of solutions. Leadership and clear responsibility are essential. Public policy during crises often feels like navigating a swamp, filled with intricate details, competing interests, and the constant pressure of immediate demands. It's crucial to periodically ascend to the “mountain top” – to gain a broader perspective, analyse the overall situation, and anticipate future challenges. Moreover, the best way to truly understand a complex system is to actively try and change it5. In the face of uncertainty, the temptation to overthink and analyse endlessly can be paralyzing. While thorough consideration is important, decisive action is necessary. Leaders must be willing to make decisions, even with incomplete information, and avoid the trap of analysis paralysis. This requires embracing "cognitive closure" – the ability to reach a resolution and move forward. Recently, the world has entered a new normal of “war economy”. It is driven by geopolitical tensions, tariffs, and trade disputes. 5 Attributed to Kurt Lewin in: Charles W. Tolman (1996) Problems of Theoretical Psychology - ISTP 1995. p. 31. ! 19 Europe must use the current crises as the opportunity to build. First, to build a truly competitive Europe with less bureaucracy and regulation. We, Europeans, were always the best regulators in the world. Now it is time to accelerate if we simply want our economies to survive this madness. Most of the time, our companies do not need financial aid. They need speed, talent, and freedom. Let’s get back to it. Second, it is time for us to build a Silicon Valley of our own. The Cold War era was marked by the competition between the US and the Soviet Union, driving significant investments in technology and research, and development. This period of rivalry not only fostered innovation in critical areas such as semiconductors but also established a technological landscape that supports entrepreneurship and economic growth. It has laid the groundwork for the tech industry of today. Let’s learn from it. Up until today, the defence industry in Europe has been perceived as a gambling or illegal drug business, facing various restrictions and extremely limited access to capital. Let’s change it fundamentally. In Lithuania, we have streamlined the development of defence industry projects by eliminating numerous bureaucratic procedures and making the process of developing of large-scale investments substantially speedy. We can do more. We not only need the 'Rearm Europe' plan and establish European financial instruments, but also create a 'Défense Schengen' where countries can swiftly move technologies and defence equipment. We need substantial investment in talent and R&D in areas such as robotics, space, AI, cybersecurity and renewable energy. Third, it is the best time to build new friendships. From our experience, we know that diversification—whether in export markets, energy sources, or economic sectors—is crucial for building resilience and mitigating risk. Let’s work on that. If the United States withdraws from development cooperation in Africa and around the world, let’s step in. Let’s open more doors for economic cooperation and trade; let’s invest not only at home but also overseas. Let’s not give up on Ukraine, Europe’s most important ally. It is not only a nation of freedom fighters, but also a land of opportunities, a digital economy rich with new ideas and talent. As the saying goes, hard times create strong people. References Cohen, M. D., March, J. G., & Olsen, J. P. (1972). A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice. Administrative Science Quarterly, 17(1), 1–25. https://doi.org/10.2307/2392088 Kruglanski, A. W., & Webster, D. M. (1996). Motivated closing of the mind: “seizing” and “freezing”. Psychological Review, 103(2), 263–283. Rogers, B. M. (2025). Beyond the illusion of change: bridging the “classroom” and the workplace via processes of temporal re-contextualisation. Proceedings of the Paris Institute for Advanced Study, 21. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.14729747 ! 20 Turner, V. (1974). Liminal to Liminoid, in Play, Flow, and Ritual: An Essay in Comparative Symbology. Rice University.