Countermeasures against fake news: a Delphi study

Transforming Government: People, Process and Policy Countermeasures Against Fake News: A Delphi Study Journal: Transforming Government: People, Process and Policy Manuscript ID TG-10-2024-0258.R1 Manuscript Type: Research Paper Keywords: Risk, Digital Risk, Fake News, Disinformation, Crime Transforming Government: People, Process and Policy Transforming Government: People, Process and Policy Countermeasures Against Fake News: A Delphi Study Abstract Purpose: This study addresses the growing challenge of fake news in undermining democratic governance. It aims to develop effective strategies to combat fake newsrelated crimes, which digital technology advancements and the proliferation of social media have exacerbated. Design/Method/Approach: The research employs a Delphi study methodology, gathering insights from law enforcement agencies, policymakers, and socio-technological experts. Through three rounds of data collection and analysis, the study builds consensus on critical interventions for mitigating the social risks of fake news crimes. Findings: The study identifies critical interventions such as disinformation account monitoring, legislative reforms, public awareness initiatives, and educational programs to enhance media literacy. These strategies contribute to a comprehensive approach to countering the impacts of fake news. Practical Implications: The research provides actionable recommendations for policymakers and institutions to strengthen resilience against disinformation. It emphasises the importance of legislative, technological, and educational measures to safeguard democratic processes and rebuild public trust. Original Value: This study contributes to the growing literature on fake news mitigation by offering a structured, expert-driven approach to developing countermeasures. Its focus on consensus-building through a Delphi study offers novel insights for enhancing institutional defences against disinformation in the digital era. Key Words: Risk, Digital Risk, Fake News, Disinformation, Crime Page 1 of 56 Transforming Government: People, Process and Policy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 Transforming Government: People, Process and Policy 2 1. Introduction In our current era, the rampant spread of disinformation and fake news (D&FN) has given rise to a critical challengethe need to combat high-risk related crime (Ha et al., 2021). This societal issue, with its far-reaching implications for democracy, public trust, and social cohesion, demands our immediate attention (Huber et al., 2021). Another consequence of D&FN is its threat to the integrity of information and its manipulation of public opinion, affecting the decision-making process (Christodoulou and Iordanou, 2021). Studies consistently highlight the connection between D&FN and high-risk crimes, revealing contrasting yet interconnected perspectives. The author (Hendriks, 1796) shows that Fake News (FN) amplifies fear of crime, distorting perceptions and heightening anxiety, while the European Foundation for South Asian Studies, in its study paper (Efsas, 2021), links disinformation to fuelling hate speech and extremism, inciting real-world violence. Contrastingly, (Holvoet, 2022) ties disinformation to international crimes like genocide and terrorism, advocating accountability for those who weaponise falsehoods. Lastly, research on societal polarisation conducted by (Vasist et al., 2023) further demonstrates how disinformation deepens divisions, escalating tensions into criminal acts. Together, these studies reveal D&FN as powerful catalysts for fear, manipulation, and violence. The advent of new technological advancements and the interconnected nature of online communities suggesting a rapid sharing of D&FN across digital platforms Page 2 of 56Transforming Government: People, Process and Policy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 Transforming Government: People, Process and Policy 3 (Mwangi, 2023), emphasising the urgent need to employ effective countermeasures to mitigate and prevent high-risk associated crime in a community. Despite the growing threat of high-risk D&FN crimes, a significant gap remains in systematically identifying, evaluating, and implementing effective countermeasures, particularly in ensuring law enforcement adaptability, policy alignment, and technological efficacy in mitigating their impact. Our study undertakes a timely and systematic approach through a Delphi Study to select and validate strategies for combating D&FN-related crimes. It aims to produce a set of countermeasures based on the insights and expertise of law enforcement agencies (LEAs), advisory policymakers, and socio-technologic professionals to serve as preventive and actionable measures to tackle D&FN-related crimes and influence policy making actors. This research established a strong consensus while clearly identifying areas of divergence and uncertainty among panellists regarding strategies to effectively combat D&FN-related crime. The Delphi method synthesises the collective knowledge of experts and fosters interdisciplinary dialogue as per (Stone Fish and M. Busby, 2005), this has proven crucial in our objective to provide a set of validated measures against D&FN-driven crimes. Ultimately, this work aims to provide actionable insights and recommendations to inform evidence-based policies and practices that enhance D&FN detection, prevention, and mitigation, ensuring transparency and accountability in addressing digital challenges. The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides the research background, covering fake news, countermeasure selection, and related approaches. Section 3 outlines the methodology, followed by Section 4, which defines the research Page 3 of 56 Transforming Government: People, Process and Policy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 Transforming Government: People, Process and Policy 4 problem. Section 5 details the expert panel selection and data collection process. Sections 6 through 8 describe the three Delphi rounds, including a semi-structured interview in the first round and two subsequent questionnaires. Section 9 discusses the practical implications, and the paper concludes with key findings, limitations, and directions for future research. 2. Research Background This section will present the main research concepts patent in this study, fake news, the design and selection of countermeasures for tackling crime, finalising with literature suggested approaches for tackling fake news crime. 2.1 Fake News The spreading of FN whether deliberate or inadvertent, and its dissemination can have severe consequences, particularly if widely believed, eroding trust in public and private institutions and the media, highlighting its potential harm (Ferreira et al., 2020). It is, therefore, vital to overlook some of the most associated terminology related to FN—that is, disinformation, misinformation, and malinformation. A distinction between key terminology is paramount to comprehending the phenomenon of FN. According to a study defining these terms (Kennerly et al., 2020), misinformation refers to false or inaccurate information shared without intent to deceive, often resulting from misunderstandings or errors. In contrast, disinformation is deliberately false or manipulated content created to mislead or manipulate audiences (Kennerly et al., 2020). Meanwhile, misinformation involves genuine information that is weaponised to cause harm, such as leaking Page 4 of 56Transforming Government: People, Process and Policy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 Transforming Government: People, Process and Policy 5 private data to damage reputations (Kennerly et al., 2020). Similarly, (Princeton Public Library, n.d.) explains that misinformation arises from unintentional mistakes like inaccurate captions or statistics, while disinformation involves fabricated content crafted to deceive, and malinformation takes truthful data and uses it maliciously. The Canadian Centre for Cyber Security echoes these definitions, emphasising the varying intent behind each form: misinformation is false but unintentional, disinformation is deliberate and harmful, and malinformation is true but used to harm (Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, 2024). Regarding the term disinformation there are other different definitions available, such as that of the European Commission in its Code of Practice on Disinformation, defining it as any false or misleading information created, presented, and spread to make money or deceive the public. This type of information can harm individuals and society as a whole and may pose a threat to democratic political processes and public goods, such as the protection of citizens’ health, the environment, and security within the European Union in accordance with the EU Code of Practice on Disinformation on its page 1 (European Commision, 2018). A complementary definition is that of the United Nations Counter Disinformation report, stating in page 3 that disinformation reflects the new and rapidly evolving communications landscape and technologies that enable the dissemination of unprecedented content at exceptional speeds. (Secretary-General, 2022). FN encompasses all these terminologies and more (e.g., manipulated content, false context, imposter content, etc.) (“Understanding Information disorder - First Draft”, n.d.), and can be defined as a mean to employ false or misleading information presented as factual news with an associated intention to deceive (Lazer et al., 2018). Its scope extends beyond social networks and encompasses false or counterfeit information Page 5 of 56 Transforming Government: People, Process and Policy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 Transforming Government: People, Process and Policy 6 disseminated across various media platforms. Recognising the diverse ways in which the spreading occurs, emphasising the importance of the multifaceted nature of the term (Ferreira et al., 2020). When discussing the FN, it is indispensable to consider the underlying motivation behind disseminating false information often involves private interests seeking political or financial gain, often by targeting susceptible individuals to perpetuate the dissemination of misinformation (Huber et al., 2021). The effects of FN can be felt in different areas of our society and organisations, though they are more visible in recent global political events, where one can see the effects of polarisation and the rapid distribution of false narratives. For example, during the COVID-19 pandemic, FN was used to produce an alternative false narrative to that of Government officials in Brazil and other parts of the world (de Regt et al., 2020; Rocha et al., 2023; Rooke, 2021). Other examples of global events where it is possible to observe the same modus operandi were the Brexit referendum and the 2016 election of Donald J. Trump (Yerlikaya and Aslan, 2020). 2.2 Design and Selection of Countermeasures Building resilience and defining clear objectives for countermeasures is crucial to effectively aid LEAs when addressing crimes linked to the rapid spread of FNs, equally establishing criteria for evaluating potential countermeasures – factors to consider in the decision-making process (e.g., countermeasure's efficacy, scalability, cost-effectiveness, and ethical implications) is paramount. For example, a previous Page 6 of 56Transforming Government: People, Process and Policy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 Transforming Government: People, Process and Policy 7 work (Varela da Costa et al., 2024) projected an MCDA model applying a set criterion to build a model to select countermeasures. The author (Roozenbeek et al., 2023) has identify two levels of countermeasures or interventions (countermeasures) to tackle FN - individual and system levels. Key individual interventions include enhancing individuals' ability to discern truth through critical thinking, media, and digital literacy training to strengthen cognitive resistance, alongside nudging strategies that guide behaviour through choice design and debunking techniques such as fact-checking and content labelling (Roozenbeek et al., 2023). At the system level, algorithms play a crucial role in identification, transparency, and accountability through machine learning and neural networks for automated content moderation, alongside initiatives such as supporting reliable news outlets, enacting legislation, regulating tech platforms, and countering bad actors and geopolitical polarisation. (Roozenbeek et al., 2023). Literature shows us that distinct efforts to combat fake news have employed various educational, platform-based, and legal interventions. For example, in Pakistan, a randomised study found that general educational campaigns had limited impact, but personalised feedback on users’ past engagement with misinformation significantly improved their ability to discern false information (Ali and Qazi, 2023). Social media platforms have implemented content-level flags to reduce the spread of FNs, with research showing that while these interventions influence user behaviour, their effectiveness depends on design and execution (Ng et al., 2023). In Malaysia, the 2018 Anti-Fake News Act criminalised misinformation, leading to Page 7 of 56 Transforming Government: People, Process and Policy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 Transforming Government: People, Process and Policy 8 prosecutions and raising concerns over free speech, ultimately resulting in the law’s repeal in 2019 (Schuldt, 2021). Thus, detecting and addressing FNs requires a multi-level approach involving users, platforms, and regulatory bodies. At the user level, individuals can evaluate shared information, assess sources for bias, and flag misleading content on social media platforms. Fact-checking organisations are crucial in verifying claims through in-depth investigations, ensuring credibility and transparency in news dissemination (Gupta et al., 2022). At the platform level, countermeasures such as crowd-flagging, human content moderation, and AI-driven detection tools enhance the identification and removal of false information, helping mitigate its spread. Meanwhile, governments and legislative bodies have a pivotal role in shaping legal frameworks to combat disinformation. Criminalising the deliberate spread of fake news can enhance public trust in information sources while establishing task forces to investigate and report disinformation strengthens institutional responses. Public awareness campaigns and media literacy initiatives are essential in fostering a wellinformed society equipped to navigate and challenge misleading narratives (Gupta et al., 2022). 3. Methodology This research adopts the Delphi method as its primary methodology, a wellestablished and systematic approach for achieving consensus among experts on complex or contentious issues. Developed by the RAND Corporation in the 1950s, the Delphi method is widely recognised for its iterative nature and ability to synthesise expert opinions in a structured manner (Dalkey and Helmer, 1963). It has Page 8 of 56Transforming Government: People, Process and Policy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 Transforming Government: People, Process and Policy 15 Table 1. Participants’ area of expertise. Areas of Expertise # -Ethical and Policy advisor 2 - LEA Project Office of EU Research Projects 1 - LEA Project Manager of EU Research Projects for EU-funded police research. 1 - Police System Analyst 1 - Police Expert in Legal Administration and Legal Affairs 2 - Police Operation Developer in Cybercrime 1 - Police Research Director 1 - Criminal Researcher 1 - Criminal Psychologist 1 - Counter-Terrorism Unit Judiciary Inspector 1 Total: 12 All participants were selected following a set of predefined criteria illustrated in Table 2 below. Table 2. Predefined Criteria for selection of participants Inclusion Criteria Exclusion Criteria Relevant Area of Expertise Lack of expertise Availability to participate in most of the rounds Unavailability Diversity of Perspectives Bias or prejudice views Commitment Conflict of Interest Clear Communication Skills Language or Communication Barriers (e.g., lack of fluency in English) The Delphi process experienced a gradual decline in participant retention across rounds, reflecting a common challenge in iterative expert consultations. In the transition from round 1 to round 2, one participant dropped out, resulting in a drop-out rate of 8.33%. This moderate decline suggests strong initial engagement, with most experts continuing their participation. However, between round 2 and round 3, two additional participants withdrew, leading to a higher drop-out rate of 18.18%. This increase may indicate factors such as time constraints, survey fatigue, or diminishing perceived relevance of further participation. Overall, from round 1 to round 3, the drop-out rate was 25%, meaning that one-fourth of the initial panel did not complete all rounds. While attrition is expected in Delphi studies, the relatively stable participation throughout the process suggests that the Page 15 of 56 Transforming Government: People, Process and Policy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 Transforming Government: People, Process and Policy 16 consensus reached in the final round remains robust and representative of expert opinion. 5.1 Data Collection Procedures Consensus was operationalised through three integrated discussions during interviews and questionnaires. Firstly, through a semi-structured interview, experts provided qualitative insights and an initial evaluation of the proposed countermeasures. Subsequently, structured questionnaires were employed, incorporating a three-point Likert scale to measure each countermeasure's feasibility, scalability, and ethical considerations. The operationalisation of consensus was achieved by setting a predefined threshold—countermeasures needed to achieve at least 70% agreement among participants to progress to the next round. If consensus was not reached on a particular measure, it was either revised for further consideration or excluded from subsequent rounds. Divergent views were managed by summarising expert feedback between rounds, ensuring that participants could refine their evaluations based on the panel's collective input. The final list of countermeasures reflected those that achieved the highest level of agreement, ensuring that selected interventions were expert-validated and practically relevant for combating fake news-related crimes. 6. First Round The data for the first round was collected through a semi-structured interview. This technique is particularly well-suited for exploring complex and sensitive issues Page 16 of 56Transforming Government: People, Process and Policy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 Transforming Government: People, Process and Policy 17 (Barriball and While, 1994) making it appropriate for discussing high-risk FN-related crimes, where operational discretion is crucial. Given the topic's sensitive nature, an exploratory approach was essential in selecting countermeasures for evaluation. The selection process was informed by the scientific work "Combating Fake News: Stakeholder Interventions and Potential Solutions" (Gupta et al., 2022), ensuring a research-based foundation for expert assessment. Table 3 presents the countermeasures derived from this interpretation, with titles and descriptions detailing their intended impact. Table 3. List of Countermeasures, Source:(Gupta et al., 2022) Countermeasures Description - Understand who communicated the disinformation and how they did it. Identify and analyse individuals or groups spreading disinformation and take targeted action to disrupt their efforts by studying their tactics and methods. - Definition of the source of disinformation. The pinpointing of the exact sources responsible for disseminating false information. - Understand if the source of information is biased. The impartiality or partiality of sources is evaluated to assess the credibility and reliability of information being disseminated, helping to counteract the spread of misleading or manipulated content. - Understand if there are any facts or information missing out. Identify any factual inaccuracies or information gaps in the dissemination process. - Understand the purpose/intention behind the spreading. It entails discerning the motives or intentions driving the dissemination of information. - Invest in a third-party factchecking. Allocate resources to support third-party fact-checking initiatives. An independent verification process can enhance information reliability and combat disinformation spreading effectively. - Use human content reviewers to detect disinformation. Using human content reviewers to detect instances of disinformation. Thus, leveraging human judgment and expertise aids LEAs in effectively detecting and addressing harmful content. - Use machine learning algorithms to detect disinformation. Utilising machine learning algorithms to detect disinformation events by leveraging advanced computational techniques. This allows for the swift analysis of large volumes of data and patterns to identify suspicious content and mitigate the spread of false information more efficiently. - Invest in crowd flagging of content. Invest in crowd-flagging mechanisms for content evaluation, harnessing the collective intelligence of users, authorities can quickly identify and flag potentially misleading or criminal content. Page 17 of 56 Transforming Government: People, Process and Policy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 Transforming Government: People, Process and Policy 18 - Invest in an external subject matter expert. Invest in external subject matter experts to obtain specialised insights on disinformation events, leveraging individual expertise outside the agency to enhance LEA's understanding of complex crimes. - Invest in search quality evaluators. Invest in search quality evaluators (internal and external) to assess the relevance and reliability of the investigation work. - Close fake news spreading accounts on social media. Shut down fake news-spreading accounts on social media platforms, mitigating from source the spreading of disinformation. - Elevate relevant and trusted content from trusted sources in search engines. This involves the prioritisation of relevant and reliable content from trusted sources in the main search engines results, this guarantees that internet users are more likely to encounter accurate information from credible sources, thereby reducing the prominence of users being misinformed in search results. - Produce recommendations for low-quality content produced online. Generate recommendations to address low-quality content produced online, providing guidance or standards for content creation, encouraging the production of higher-quality and more reliable informative content, mitigating the risk of spreading falsehoods in the online discourse. - Awareness campaigns. Launch awareness campaigns with the intention to educate the public about the risks and consequences of believing and spreading disinformation related to a particular event or investigation. - Access individual data of the perpetrator. Access individual data of perpetrators/criminals involved in disseminating disinformation by obtaining and analysing relevant data. During ongoing investigations, LEAs can identify and apprehend those responsible for spreading false information, holding them accountable and deterring future instances of disinformation. - Deterrent criminalisation of high-risk disinformation events. Enact laws or regulations that impose severe legal penalties on individuals or entities engaged in specific activities, primarily deterring others from engaging in similar criminal behaviours. This requires the establishment of legal procedures by the LEAs to ensure proper prosecution and effective punishment for individuals or groups involved in spreading harmful disinformation. - Internet shutdown. Involves temporarily shutting down internet access, either nationwide or in a specific region, to prevent spreading or control public unrest. While it can be effective in halting dissemination, it also restricts access to legitimate communication channels and may, in some cases, infringe upon individuals' rights to freely access information. - Social media ban. It comprises imposing a ban on social media platforms within a particular jurisdiction or for specific individuals or groups. - Global government-initiated interventions - introduce new legislation and regulations. Involve the government and legislative power in introducing new legislation and regulations to address the FN phenomenon. It necessitates a comprehensive framework to tackle crime related to FN. It may also refer to the establishment of guidelines and penalties for the dissemination of false information, promoting greater accountability and deterring malicious actors from engaging in deceptive practices. - Global government-initiated interventions - create a task force. This is a collaborative approach initiated by the Government. A task force is created to address the issue of high-risk Page 18 of 56Transforming Government: People, Process and Policy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 Transforming Government: People, Process and Policy 19 disinformation-related crime. It typically consists of experts from various fields (E.g.- technology, law, law enforcement, and academia), working together to develop effective strategies, share intelligence, and coordinate efforts to combat disinformation on a broader scale. - Global government-initiated interventions - public awareness and literacy campaigns A public government intervention focused on public awareness and literacy campaigns to combat disinformation, emphasising educating the public about the risks and consequences of disinformation related crimes. After reviewing the countermeasures in Table 3, participants individually voted on each measure. Before the first round, an analyst explained each countermeasure and all authors were available for clarification throughout the process. Once scoring was completed, experts suggested additional countermeasures. Table 4 presents the results, showing countermeasure titles, total scores, and percentage acceptability. As per the exclusion criteria in Section 5.1, only countermeasures with at least 70% acceptance progressed to the next round, resulting in 13 countermeasures. Table 4. Scoring of the Frist-Round Selected Countermeasures # First-round selected countermeasures Total Scoring % 1 - Use human content reviewers to detect disinformation. 21 87,50 2 - Close fake news spreading accounts from social media. 20 83,33 3 - Awareness campaigns. 20 83,33 4 - Understand who communicated the disinformation and how they did it. 19 79,17 5 - Definition of the source of disinformation. 19 79,17 6 - Understand the purpose/intention behind the spreading. 19 79,17 7 - Invest in a third-party fact-checking. 19 79,17 8 - Global government-initiated interventions - introduce new legislation and regulations. 19 79,17 9 - Understand if the source of information is biased. 18 75,00 10 - Understand if there are any facts or information missing out. 18 75,00 11 - Elevate relevant and trusted content from trusted sources in search engines. 18 75,00 12 - Deterrent criminalisation of high-risk disinformation events. 18 75,00 13 - Global government-initiated interventions - public awareness and literacy campaigns 18 75,00 Table 5 below presents the new countermeasures suggested by the experts that were added to the list for the second round. Page 19 of 56 Transforming Government: People, Process and Policy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 Transforming Government: People, Process and Policy 20 Table 5. Experts Suggested Countermeasures. Suggested countermeasures Description - Fund research on disinformation in a process that involve intel community. Support the intelligence and academic communities by involving law enforcement in research on disinformation tactics and impact. This enables a comprehensive preventive strategy and improves access to specialised knowledge and resources. - Invest in training in the detection of disinformation-related crimes. Provide LEA officials and cybersecurity professionals with specialised training, improving their capacity to identify and investigate disinformation, ultimately strengthening efforts to combat high-risk crime related to disinformation. - Educational programs for the public, educating them on disinformation detection. Create and implement educational programs that teach the public to recognise disinformation and high-risk crimes. These programs equip people with the tools to spot fake news and false information, helping prevent the harmful effects on society. - Promote fact-checking initiatives. Promote fact-checking initiatives to verify the accuracy of information circulating online. - Police public announcement - raising awareness of disinformation crime(s). The widespread public announcements to raise awareness about disinformation-related crimes. Informing the public increases vigilance and encourages reporting of suspicious activities. - Invest in strategic planning for high-level situation assessment. Investing in high-level strategic planning to create long-term solutions for complex issues, including analysing FN and developing safeguards to protect information ecosystems and the public from harm. - Global government-initiated interventions – invest in policies to focus on vulnerable sub-groups (e.g., teenagers). This type of intervention aims to invest in policies specifically tailored to address the vulnerabilities present in specific subgroups, such as teenagers. These policies can better protect individuals. - Training directed to LEAs. Provide specialised training to LEAs to enhance their capacity to combat disinformation-related crimes effectively. - Campaigns directed at internet users, particularly young users. Launch target campaigns aimed at young internet users, raising awareness of the dangers of FN and disinformation. - Partnerships with website and social media providers. Partnerships with social media providers to tackle disinformation. This may involve sharing data, developing algorithms to detect disinformation, implementing fact-checking mechanisms, and promoting responsible content moderation practices. - Direct campaigns with parents, teachers, and social workers. Campaigns directly aimed at parents, teachers, and social workers. These campaigns are designed to raise awareness about disinformation and provide education and resources on recognising and combating it effectively. - Invest in educational programs that highlight the problems surrounding disinformation. Direct LEA participation in educational programs focusing on highlighting the associated problems with disinformation. - Legislative and regulatory changes ensure corporate responsibility in tackling disinformation. Hold corporations accountable for combating false information. Support the government in establishing laws that require companies to meet standards and act against disinformation, encouraging them to take responsibility and act proactively. Page 20 of 56Transforming Government: People, Process and Policy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 Transforming Government: People, Process and Policy 21 - Deterrence messaging in the context of community policing (police officers approaching offenders, particularly minors). Incorporate deterrence messaging into community policing efforts, where police officers engage with offenders, especially minors, to discourage participation in disinformation activities. - Engaging in direct contact with social media platforms (country or European-specific). Formally contact social media platforms at the country or European level. This engagement may include discussions, negotiations, or collaborations to implement measures to combat the spread of FN. - Invest in a common platform for engaging with social media. Investing in creating a unified platform for engaging with social media companies. This will allow LEAs to streamline communication and collaboration with social media platforms, facilitating more efficient coordination of efforts to combat disinformation and the spreading of FN. 7. Second Round For the second Delphi round, the authors decided to use Google Forms to query the experts. Firstly, the authors presented the report findings of the first round, explaining the results in a summary, detailing the way the results were acquired, the exclusion criteria, and illustrating the results presented in Table 4. Table 6 below illustrates the compiled list of countermeasures used for evaluation in the second round comprised with 26 measures; this list includes measures from Tables 4 and 5. Table 6. Second round list of countermeasures. # Compiled List of Countermeasures 1 - Use human content reviewers to detect disinformation. 2 - Close fake news spreading accounts from social media. 3 - Awareness campaigns. 4 - Understand who communicated the disinformation and how they did it. 5 - Definition of the source of disinformation. 6 - Understand the purpose/intention behind the spreading. 7 - Invest in a third-party fact-checking. 8 - Global government-initiated interventions - introduce new legislation and regulations. 9 - Understand if the source of information is biased. 10 - Understand if there are any facts or information missing out. 11 - Elevate relevant and trusted content from trusted sources in search engines. 12 - Deterrent criminalisation of high-risk disinformation events. 13 - Global government-initiated interventions - public awareness and literacy campaigns. 14 - Fund research on disinformation in a process that involves the intel community. 15 - Invest in training in the detection of disinformation-related crimes. 16 - Educational programs for the public, educating for the detection of disinformation. Page 21 of 56 Transforming Government: People, Process and Policy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 Transforming Government: People, Process and Policy 22 17 - Promote fact-checking initiatives. 18 - Police public announcement - raising awareness of disinformation crime(s). 19 - Invest in strategic planning for high-level situation assessment. 20 - Global government-initiated interventions – invest in policies to focus on vulnerable sub-groups (E.g., teenagers). 21 - Campaigns / training directed to LEAs. 22 - Campaigns directed to internet users, in particular young users. 23 - Campaigns / partnerships with website and social media providers. 24 - Campaigns directed to parents, teachers, and social workers. 25 - Invest in educational programs that highlight the problems surrounding disinformation. 26 - Legislative and regulatory changes ensure corporate responsibility in tackling disinformation. 27 - Deterrence messaging in the context of community policing (police officers approaching offenders, particularly minors). 28 - Engaging in direct contact with social media platforms (country or European-specific). 29 - Invest in a common platform for engaging with social media. The scoring of the above list of countermeasures is presented below in Table 7. The same exclusion criteria were applied, resulting in 25 countermeasures that passed the threshold. Table 7. Scoring of the second round # Countermeasures Total Scoring % 1 - Close fake news spreading accounts from social media. 22 100 2 - Use human content reviewers to detect disinformation. 20 90,9 3 - Invest in training in the detection of D&FN-related crimes. 20 90,9 4 - Campaigns directed to internet users, in particular young users. 20 90,9 5 - Campaigns/ partnerships with website and social media providers. 20 90,9 6 - Campaigns directed to parents, teachers, and social workers. 20 90,9 7 - Global government-initiated interventions - introduce new legislation and regulations. 19 86,4 8 - Educational programs for the public, educating for the detection of D&FN 19 86,4 9 - Promote fact-checking initiatives 19 86,4 10 - Deterrence messaging in the context of community policing (police officers approaching offenders, particularly minors). 19 86,4 11 - Understand who communicated the disinformation and how they did it. 18 81,8 12 - Deterrent criminalisation of high-risk disinformation events. 18 81,8 13 - Invest in educational programs that highlight the problems surrounding D&FN. 18 81,8 14 - Legislative and regulatory changes ensure corporate responsibility in tackling D&FN. 18 81,8 15 - Engaging in direct contact with social media platforms (country or European-specific) 18 81,8 16 - Understand the purpose/intention behind the spreading. 17 77,3 17 - Invest in a third-party fact-checking. 17 77,3 18 - Elevate relevant and trusted content from trusted sources in search engines. 17 77,3 19 - Global government-initiated interventions - public awareness and literacy campaigns 17 77, 3 20 - Invest in strategic planning for high-level situation assessment. 17 77, 3 21 - Global government-initiated interventions – invest in policies to focus on vulnerable sub-groups (E.g., teenagers) 17 77, 3 22 - Campaigns / training directed to LEAs. 17 77, 3 23 - Definition of the source of D&FN. 16 72,7 24 - Understand if the source of information is biased. 16 72,7 Page 22 of 56Transforming Government: People, Process and Policy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 Transforming Government: People, Process and Policy 23 25 - Police public announcement - raising Awareness of D&FN crime(s) 16 72,7 8. Third Round Following round 2 and to refine consensus, experts were provided a summary of the results to the experts, allowing them to reassess and align their evaluations based on collective feedback. This iterative process enabled adjustments where countermeasures with substantial disagreement were either re-evaluated for clarity or deprioritised. The final list in Table 8 below reflects countermeasures that met or exceeded the minimum agreement threshold, ensuring consensus was operationalised through a structured, quantifiable approach while still accommodating expert deliberation. The results sum a total of 19 countermeasures. Table 8. Scoring of the third round # Final Countermeasures Total Scoring % 1 - Close fake news spreading accounts from social media. 18 100 2 - Campaigns / training directed to LEAs. 18 100 3 - Use human content reviewers to detect disinformation. 16 88,9 4 - Invest in training in the detection of D&FN-related crimes. 16 88,9 5 - Global government-initiated interventions - introduce new legislation and regulations. 16 88,9 6 - Deterrent criminalisation of high-risk disinformation events. 16 88,9 7 - Legislative and regulatory changes ensure corporate responsibility in tackling D&FN. 16 88,9 8 - Police public announcement - raising awareness of D&FN crime(s) 16 88,9 9 - Campaigns directed to internet users, in particular young users. 15 83,3 10 - Educational programs for the public, educating for the detection of D&FN 15 83,3 11 - Deterrence messaging in the context of community policing (Police officers approaching offenders, particularly minors). 15 83,3 12 - Invest in educational programs that highlight the problems surrounding D&FN. 15 83,3 13 - Invest in strategic planning for high-level situation assessment. 15 83,3 14 - Definition of the source of D&FN. 15 83,3 15 - Understand who communicated the disinformation and how they did it. 14 77,8 16 - Promote fact-checking initiatives 13 72,2 17 - Engaging in direct contact with social media platforms (Country or Europeanspecific) 13 72,2 18 - Elevate relevant and trusted content from trusted sources in search engines. 13 72,2 19 - Global government-initiated interventions - public awareness and literacy campaigns 13 72,2 Page 23 of 56 Transforming Government: People, Process and Policy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 Transforming Government: People, Process and Policy 24 While LEA-focused strategies such as closing FNs-spreading accounts and training LEAs reached complete agreement (100% support), other measures saw a decline in backing. Fact-checking initiatives, for instance, dropped from 86.4% in Round 2 to 72.2% in round 3, suggesting concerns over scalability, effectiveness, and potential biases. Similarly, direct engagement with social media platforms lost traction (81.8% to 72.2%), reflecting scepticism about enforcing stronger platform accountability. Additionally, while identifying disinformation sources remained an area of interest, its perceived importance fluctuated, as evidenced by the slight decrease in support from 81.8% to 77.8%. These divergences highlight a shift toward immediate, enforcement-driven interventions, while preventive measures like fact-checking and social media collaboration faced increased scrutiny, reflecting concerns over their practical implementation and long-term sustainability. While LEA-focused strategies such as closing fake news-spreading accounts and training LEAs reached complete agreement (100% support), other measures saw a decline in backing. Fact-checking initiatives, for instance, dropped from 86.4% in round 2 to 72.2% in round 3, suggesting concerns over scalability, effectiveness, and potential biases. Similarly, direct engagement with social media platforms lost traction (81.8% to 72.2%), reflecting scepticism about enforcing stronger platform accountability. Additionally, while identifying disinformation sources remained an area of interest, its perceived importance fluctuated, as evidenced by the slight decrease in support from 81.8% to 77.8%. These divergences highlight a shift toward immediate, enforcement-driven interventions, while preventive measures like fact-checking and social media collaboration faced increased scrutiny, reflecting concerns over their practical implementation and long-term sustainability. Page 24 of 56Transforming Government: People, Process and Policy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 Transforming Government: People, Process and Policy 31 studies should explore how these measures can be integrated into the daily operations of law enforcement and related practitioners, ensuring they are adaptable to real-world contexts. This interdisciplinary approach requires collaboration between policymakers, technology experts, and industry leaders to develop a more regulated framework that balances accountability with ethical considerations, such as privacy and free speech (Vosoughi et al., 2018). Future research can help refine policy recommendations and create a robust foundation for combating disinformation in an increasingly complex digital environment by addressing these areas. Data Availability Statement Data supporting the findings of this study are available from the corresponding author upon reasonable request. Declaration of Interests The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper. Inform Consent All participants in this study provided informed consent before participation. They were fully briefed on the study's objectives, procedures, potential risks, and benefits. Participants were informed of their right to withdraw from the study at any time without Page 31 of 56 Transforming Government: People, Process and Policy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 Transforming Government: People, Process and Policy 32 any consequences. 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(2018), “Fake News: A Survey of Research, Detection Methods, and Opportunities”, ACM Comput. Surv, Vol. 1, p. 1. Page 38 of 56Transforming Government: People, Process and Policy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 Transforming Government: People, Process and Policy 39 Zhou, X. and Zafarani, R. (2020), “A Survey of Fake News”, ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR), ACMPUB27New York, NY, USA, Vol. 53 No. 5, doi: 10.1145/3395046. Page 39 of 56 Transforming Government: People, Process and Policy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 Transforming Government: People, Process and Policy 3rd of February 2025 Dr. Anna Visvizi, Editorial Office Transforming Government: People, Process and Policy Re: Transforming Government: People, Process and Policy - Decision on Manuscript ID TG-102024-0258 Dear Dr. Anna Visvizi, I am delighted to present the revised manuscript " Countermeasures Against Fake News: A Delphi Study". I want to express my profound gratitude to the reviewers for their invaluable feedback and suggestions, which have been instrumental in enhancing our final work. We have incorporated all the reviewers' feedback and made the necessary revisions to address their concerns. As a result, I am resubmitting the manuscript for your review. I have included a marked-up in bold Word version of the manuscript. Please refer to table below, where I have comprehensively responded to each reviewer's comment. Once again, I want to express my sincere appreciation for the reviewers' meticulous review and insightful comments, which have significantly contributed to the quality of our manuscript. Thanks. Regards, Corresponding Author Page 40 of 56Transforming Government: People, Process and Policy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 Transforming Government: People, Process and Policy and improvements are required, examples of some areas where references are required: “ the rampant spread of disinformation and fake news (D&FN) has given rise to a critical challengethe need to combat high-risk related crime.” - page 2. Claims such as this require evidence from the literature, you might consider looking at Ha, Perez and Ray 2021 (DOI: 10.1177/0002764219869402) and considering the increases in FN&D studies over the past decade, for example. body of work to provide stronger support for its claims. The authors have revised the statement on page 2, editing Section 1, addressing the societal challenges posed by the spread of D&FN to include appropriate evidence from the literature. Moreover, we incorporated the suggested reference (Ha, Perez, and Ray 2021) to substantiate this claim and explore additional recent studies that emphasise the link between disinformation and high-risk crime. Lastly, we expanded the literature in Section 2 to reflect the substantial growth in D&FN research. On page 5, your citation for the European commission should be improved, such as referring to the document and page where the definition is provided (the documents on the European Commission website contain publication dates, which should be used for your reference). We appreciate the reviewer’s comment and agree that the citation for the European Commission requires improvement. In response, we revised the citation to include the specific document title, publication date, and the exact page where the definition is provided, thus ensuring accuracy, traceability, and alignment with proper referencing standards. The relationship to literature for this paper is considerably weak and presents some critical gaps. For instance, on page 5, you mention that fake news can harm individuals, society, and democratic processes. Your background literature would substantially benefit with greater engagement on the recent impacts of fake news, as currently your paper does not adequately reason why greater countermeasures to fake news and disinformation is required with reference to the recent literature. Expanding on your background literature to perhaps demonstrate the societal impact FN&D had during covid, for example, would strengthen your discussion on the importance of tackling FN&D in contemporary times. You might wish to look at Rocha et al. 2021 (https://doi.org/10.1007/s10389-021-01658-z) and Pulido et al. 2020 (doi:10.3390/ijerph17072430) The authors agree that the background literature requires strengthening to address the critical gaps highlighted in the comment. We expanded both the Research Background – section 2 and the Discussion – Section 9 to include recent studies that illustrate the societal impact of fake news and disinformation, particularly during the COVID-19 pandemic. This provides a more robust reasoning for the necessity of countermeasures to combat D&FN. Specifically, we incorporated the suggested references (Rocha et al., 2021, and Pulido et al., 2020) along with additional relevant literature to contextualise the harms caused by D&FN and the urgency for effective solutions in contemporary times. Sections 2.2 and 2.3 is considerably light in supporting literature and requires greater explanation to a number of points made. On page 5, you state “Equally important is to establish criteria for evaluating potential countermeasures. Factors to consider include the proposed countermeasure’s efficacy, scalability, costeffectiveness, and ethical implications.” – this statement requires further supporting literature, where have these factors been established previously? The authors acknowledge the need for greater depth in Sections 2.2 and 2.3 to enhance their rigour and support for this research findings. Authors have incorporated subsection 2.3 into 2.2 and expanded this section with additional supporting literature to provide a more robust foundation for the points made. Specifically, regarding the statement on page 5 about evaluating countermeasures with a set criterion, authors have cited a recent study where criteria was used to allocate countermeasures through an MCDA model aiding LEA decision support. For both sections 2.2 and 2.3, each section only appears to reference one paper, which is quite limited given that the literature on FN&D is a relevant and considerably active research field. Which leads me on to my next point, the references are often placed at the end of paragraphs, it is Authors thank the reviewer for their detailed feedback, acknowledging that Sections 2.2 and 2.3 are under-referenced, especially considering the active research field of D&FN. To address this, we incorporated a broader range of relevant and recent Page 47 of 56 Transforming Government: People, Process and Policy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 Transforming Government: People, Process and Policy unclear whether this denotes that the reference is supporting the entire paragraph or just the final statement – for example, on page 7 “By criminalising the spread of fake news through a legislative process, we can install a sense of security and trust in our information sources.” – this statement lacks supporting evidence, with the only literature in the paragraph appearing at the end (Gupta et al., 2022) which appears to support your claim surrounding the importance of public awareness and literacy campaigns. This approach to referencing literature appears to occur frequently – I suggest ensuring all claims, including these listed here, have stronger supporting literature. literature to support the discussions in Section 2 comprehensively. Furthermore, authors acknowledge that placing citations at the end of paragraphs might create ambiguity. To resolve this, we revised the manuscript ensuring that references are clearly associated with the specific claims or arguments they support. For example, the statement on page 7 regarding criminalising fake news will be revised to include supporting evidence or additional literature to substantiate the claim. Another example of it being unclear which references support which arguments can be seen later in the discussion section at the top of page 24, it is unclear from your references which literature supports the advocate for technical solutions, and which literature questions the effectiveness and potential for unintended consequences; as I assume the two references listed at the end of the paragraph are intended to support these claims. Authors have rewritten Section — 9 and believe that proper referencing is now applied throughout the entire manuscript. A critical gap of your background literature that I believe is particularly instrumental to this research is greater discussion on the limitations of technology in combatting disinformation, where you may consider recent empirical studies of how disinformation is currently being handled and the countermeasures, real-world cases of policy intervention or discussing the ongoing debates surrounding accountability and privacy concerns with FN&D. This is a major weakness in your paper as it fails to highlight from your findings which countermeasures identified by the end of the study have not previously been adequately explored as potential countermeasures. If it is within the scope of the paper, improving the literature to analyse the current approaches more substantially and then incorporating this aspect into your research findings to highlight which countermeasures identified are currently overlooked within the literature would be very interesting to see, and potentially highlight critical gaps in the existing approaches towards combatting FN&D. Authors agree that a more thorough discussion of the limitations of technology in combating disinformation, as well as real-world cases of policy intervention and debates surrounding accountability and privacy concerns, would significantly strengthen the research. To address this issue, we rewritten Section 9 to reflect this, and amended subsection 2.2. incorporating recent case studies that examine how D&FN is currently being handled. and the efficacy of existing countermeasures. 3. Methodology: Is the paper's argument built on an appropriate base of theory, concepts, or other ideas? Has the research or equivalent intellectual work on which the paper is based been well designed? Are the methods employed appropriate?: Your reasoning for why the Delphi study is an appropriate method for this research could be improved. On page 7, the second paragraph of the methodology section would critically benefit from providing examples of The authors recognise the need to provide a stronger justification for the use of the Delphi study in their research in Section 3. Therefore, authors have rewritten the methodology section to provide greater justification why this methodology suits this research, as well as a detail explanation of Delphi method undertaken Page 48 of 56Transforming Government: People, Process and Policy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 Transforming Government: People, Process and Policy literature using Delphi studies to support your claims of the benefits of this approach, and the areas in which it is primarily used. Greater justification on why a Delphi study is more beneficial than alternative methodologies, such as a large-scale survey, for example, would be beneficial. The methodology that you applied requires greater clarity and explanation. The methodology states that another round is conducted if a consensus is not achieved, your paper requires greater clarity on what constitutes a consensus, as the final round demonstrates that consensus was achieved with 88.9% of participants finding the results from that round to be satisfactory. However, it is unclear what the participant satisfaction in the previous rounds was, or if a consensus can be achieved only after 3 rounds, nor what percentage threshold is deemed as a ‘consensus’ in your study. In previous Subsection 5.1 authors ensure to write how consensus was created throughout the rounds and how data was collected. This subsection was rewritten to ensure data collection procedures was clearer. Furthermore, the entire Section 3 — Methodology was also rewritten and Figure 1was redone to demonstrate how the rounds were built up and hoe consensus was built. Do note the following: 1the 1st round aimed to assert and validate countermeasures from a set-list previously prepared and based on the literature, specifically (Gupta et al.,2022), where authors ensured to add newly proposed countermeasures by the panellists, and thus the requirement was to understand which countermeasures from the set list uphold the necessary 70% acceptance rating and add new suggestions from the panellists to the list. that was presented in the second round. Therefore, no question was asked in this round about the satisfaction of the 1st round list. 2The 2nd round required a ponderation between two types of countermeasures: the newly proposed ones by the panellists and the ones from the literature that passed the first round, thus it was only in the 3rd round that it was required to ask the panellist if they agree with the final list to assess whether or not to formalise another round 3On the Section 8 authors amended the manuscript to highlight points of divergence throughout the rounds and an explanation how consensus was operationalised . It is not made explicitly clear how many participants took part in the Delphi study, I believe it is important to clearly state the number of participants present as this may also identify limitations of the study if a particularly small number of participants took part. Authors agree that it is not immediate apparent the initial number of participants, as well as the total number of participants in each round. To clarify this, matter the initial number of participants of this study was clarified in Table 1, adding an extra column on the right-hand side indicating the number of participants per area of expertise as well as a total number of participants. Furthermore, on Section 5 — Selection of experts, authors have added a paragraph explaining the drop-down rate throughout the different rounds illustrating how it affected the overall results. Greater clarity within the paper about the conduction of the rounds would be highly beneficial, on page12 you state “all participants must be available to participate in most rounds”, I am curious to the use of ‘most’ rounds. This leads into my next concern about the quality of the study, We thank the reviewer's comment. A decision was made that the initial round was conducted using an interview, precisely the semi-structured interview format. The first part of the interview was focused on validating the list of countermeasures derived from the literature, and in the second part, we Page 49 of 56 Transforming Government: People, Process and Policy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 Transforming Government: People, Process and Policy which round 1 takes place in person I believe, but switches to a google form for round 2, the paper does not state what format round 3 took. This should be clarified and if participants were not present for all three rounds, it should be stated how many participated in each round to demonstrate more transparently how the research was conducted. invited each participant to contribute with suggestive countermeasures; the validated measures and the newly suggested ones were added to a pool and later validated by all participants. Moreover, the second and third rounds aimed to promote consensus and due to the geographic dispersion and lack of agenda of some major participants, a decision was made to use Google Forms for both the second and third rounds. You state that a “four-point Likert scale” was utilised, but the following sentence lists three values, was a three-point Likert scale utilised, this should be clarified. We thank the reviewer for pointing out this discrepancy, and we appreciate the opportunity to clarify. The study utilised a three-point Likert scale, not a four-point scale as mistakenly stated. We will revise the manuscript to accurately reflect the use of a three-point Likert scale and ensure consistency in the description of the methodology throughout the text. Thank you for catching this error, and we will make the necessary corrections to avoid any confusion. On page. 14 you state that the semi-structured interview approach is more effective and equitable than other traditional methods – can just justify this argument? We appreciate the reviewer’s comment and the opportunity to clarify our reasoning. The statement that the semi-structured interview approach is more effective and equitable than traditional methods is based on its inherent flexibility and adaptability. Semi-structured interviews allow researchers to explore topics in depth while providing participants with the opportunity to express their perspectives more freely compared to rigid, structured formats. This adaptability makes the approach particularly effective in capturing nuanced, context-specific insights. We revised the manuscript to include these points and provide supporting literature to strengthen this argument. Page 50 of 56Transforming Government: People, Process and Policy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 Transforming Government: People, Process and Policy 4. Results: Are results presented clearly and analysed appropriately? Do the conclusions adequately tie together the other elements of the paper?: Results are mostly presented clearly through the rounds of study, with a few aspects that would improve clarity which I list below. However, I note that the discussion of the results are not adequately analysed and this section could substantially be improved to draw more meaningful insights from your study, I have included the points covering these below: For each round of the study, it would enhance the clarity of the results by detailing the change in the number of countermeasures between each round. For example, it might be worth stating that there are 22 countermeasures at the starting point (Table 3), then for the first-round results stating how many countermeasures did not meet the 70% threshold to pass to the following round and incorporating this throughout your study. Applying my previous comment on explicitly stating the number of countermeasures present at each round might also help to clarify your results from round 2 which states on page 21 that it resulted in a much smaller list of countermeasures. It’s quite unclear how this is a much smaller list, does your point relate to the difference between table 6 and 7, which appears to only have a few less countermeasures, more explicit discussion of results and clarity is required. We thank the reviewer for their suggestions to improve the clarity and analysis of the results section. We agree that providing a more detailed breakdown of the changes in the number of countermeasures across each round of the study would enhance the clarity and allow for a more meaningful analysis of the findings; to do that the authors have edit Tables 4,6,7, 8.and detailed the number of countermeasures that passed each round in Sections 6, 7 and 8. Lastly, as previously mentioned in the action points above authors have rewritten Section 9 to provide a greater discussion of the results. While the discussion section does align with identifying practical strategies for combating fake news, the results lean heavily on descriptive statistics without providing depth to the analytical insights. For example, more explicit discussion of the results and how they tie to the different approaches which you briefly discuss would be interesting to see, such as perhaps looking at if all the approaches could be thematically categorised into the different approach types. I mentioned in a previous point that the lack of discussion on existing countermeasure strategies being utilised is a weakness in your literature, your results section would greatly benefit from providing some comparative analysis to these approaches and identify which selected countermeasures have been overlooked. This would also improve the practical implication of the study and help to guide future studies towards focusing on particular countermeasures for FN&D. Authors have changed the discussion, Section — 9, addressing: 1) key divergent areas withing the findings, 2) the role of technology in detecting and in tackling D&FN, 3) detecting malicious actors that propagate crime-related FN and 4) projecting towards an interdisciplinary framework for tackling D&FN. Authors also incorporated more literature, contrasting different use cases enriching (the multidimensional approach to disinformation suggested by the European Commission, the COVID19 infodemic use case by Pulido, et al., 2020, etc) Concerning the categorisation of the different approaches authors have decided to categorised the countermeasures into two broader categories — actionable and preventive measure, a discussion of such approaches is enhanced in the 1st paragraph of Section 9. 5. Implications for research, practice and/or society: Does the paper identify clearly any implications for research, practice and/or society? Does the paper bridge the gap between theory and practice? How can the research be used in practice (economic and commercial impact), in teaching, to influence public policy, in research We thank the reviewer for acknowledging the strengths of the study, including its interdisciplinary approach and potential for societal impact. We agree that the implications for research and practice could be significantly strengthened through greater analysis of the results. To address this, we revised the Discussion Page 51 of 56 Transforming Government: People, Process and Policy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 Transforming Government: People, Process and Policy (contributing to the body of knowledge)? What is the impact upon society (influencing public attitudes, affecting quality of life)? Are these implications consistent with the findings and conclusions of the paper?: A strength of the study is its ability to bridge theory and practice, offering somewhat actionable recommendations, with the potential for direct societal impacts. I also note the interdisciplinary approach of collaborating with different stakeholders to tackle this challenge is a particularly relevant and important point. However, as noted above, the implications for research and practice could be significantly strengthened with greater analysis of the results, explicitly highlighting some of the key findings with regard to less considered countermeasure strategies and emphasising the implications for research and practice by incorporating these strategies. section. We also edited Section 10 – Conclusion in its subsection 10.1 analysing the results in more detail, emphasising their potential relevance and applicability to research and practice. Additionally, we outlined how these findings can guide future research, inform public policy, and support the development of effective tools and frameworks for combating D&FN in the subsection 10.3. 6. Quality of Communication: Does the paper clearly express its case, measured against the technical language of the field and the expected knowledge of the journal's readership? Has attention been paid to the clarity of expression and readability, such as sentence structure, jargon use, acronyms, etc.: Generally, the communication would benefit from greater clarity by implementing my prior comments, where the paper currently lacks sufficient supporting literature and detail of the methodology to make for a smooth and clear read to the audience. However, I do note the language used is generally well structured and expressed clearly. I have highlighted a few areas of improvement for the quality of communication below: - End of introduction states “followed by section four, which seeks to define the problem statement”, the authors may wish to consider bringing their research problem/gap/question to the introduction section to improve clarity on what the research purpose is to the forefront of their article. As it is quite unclear on the exact research problem/gap/questions that this paper is examining. We thank the reviewer for their feedback on the quality of our communication and for highlighting specific areas of improvement. To address the noted issues, we made the following revisions: -Clarification of the research purpose in the introduction succinctly stating the research problem and clearly articulating the research gap. - As suggested in prior action points, we have strengthened the manuscript incorporating additional support in the literature in different sections including Sections 1, 2, 3 and adding also relevance to the discussion in Section 9 and subsection 10.1 and 10.3 On page 12, you state “an effort was made to select those who could bring a diverse opinion to the table, thus ensuring a rich contribution”. Does this mean that you attempted to avoid overlapping areas of expertise, or how was this applied? The intention was not to avoid overlapping areas of expertise but rather to ensure a diverse panel that could provide a range of perspectives on the topic. Efforts were made to include participants from various fields and backgrounds relevant to combating fake news and disinformation, such as technology, policymaking, education, and media, to enrich the discussion and capture the multifaceted nature of the issue. While some overlap in expertise was inevitable and even desirable to validate shared viewpoints, the focus was on creating a panel where diverse professional experiences and perspectives could Page 52 of 56Transforming Government: People, Process and Policy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 Transforming Government: People, Process and Policy contribute to a more comprehensive and balanced consensus. On page 13, “as illustrated below in Figure 1”, in the current manuscript Figure 1 is above. We revised the text to accurately reflect the position of Figure 1 in the manuscript, ensuring clarity and alignment with its actual placement. If your Delphi study requires 3 rounds before a consensus can be achieved (as noted in my comment under the methodology surrounding this), it would be beneficial to improve the clarity of the Figure 1 flowchart to highlight this process within it. We agree that enhancing the clarity of Figure 1 to better illustrate the three-round Delphi process would significantly improve the reader's understanding of the methodology. In response, we updated the flowchart to explicitly highlight the iterative nature of the process, including the number of rounds conducted, the flow of each round. For Table 3, changing the heading from ‘title’ to ‘countermeasure’ would be more appropriate and align with the format the Tables which follow utilise. We agree and change the heading accordingly on Table 3. A couple of minor notes: -It appears that part of figure 1 may have been cutoff with the box on the right of the flowchart. Authors have thoroughly revised the flowchart present in Figure 1 improving its clarity and readership. -On page 25 you raise the question “Is a social media account considered virtual propriety?” Should this be virtual property? Thank you for catching this typo. You are correct; the term should be "virtual property" rather than "virtual propriety." We will revise the manuscript to correct this error and ensure the terminology is accurate. We appreciate your attention to detail in highlighting this issue. Editor’s Comment Summary of the Paper The paper addresses a critical societal issue: the proliferation and impact of fake news (FN) and its potential to undermine democratic governance, erode public trust, and polarize online communities. The study applies a Delphi methodology, engaging experts from law enforcement agencies (LEAs), policymakers, and socio-technological specialists to create a comprehensive, consensus-driven set of countermeasures against FN-related crimes. The key contributions include strategic interventions such as the monitoring of disinformation accounts, legislative reforms, educational campaigns, and public awareness initiatives. By synthesizing expert perspectives across three rounds of data collection, the paper aims to provide actionable recommendations that address the complexities of mitigating digital misinformation crimes. Comments for each section is detailed below. Major Comments Comment Action 1. The paper does a commendable job of highlighting the significance of fake news as a threat to public trust and governance, but the connection between the identified problem and the proposed countermeasures could be more explicitly and robustly articulated. The introduction establishes the urgency and scope of the problem, but it does not clearly demonstrate how each proposed countermeasure directly addresses the outlined challenges. This leaves the transition between problem identification and intervention proposals somewhat abrupt. To Thank you for the editor's insightful comments. We agree that the connection between the identified problem and the proposed countermeasures can be more explicitly articulated to enhance coherence and clarity. To address this, we took the following actions: - Revision of the Introduction: establishing a more direct link between the societal implications of fake news and the actual use cases. Authors also have clearly outlined the research gap and problem Page 53 of 56 Transforming Government: People, Process and Policy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 Transforming Government: People, Process and Policy enhance coherence, I recommend revising the introduction and subsequent sections to draw more explicit connections between the societal implications of fake news and how each countermeasure mitigates specific aspects of the problem. Consider providing detailed examples or case studies that illustrate the effectiveness of similar measures in real-world contexts, which would strengthen the argument for their adoption in a problem statement in the 2th pargraph of the introduction. - Strengthen Transitions: improving the transitions between problem identification and intervention proposals, ensuring a smoother and more logical progression of ideas. - Incorporation Real-World Examples and case studies: providing a detailed example or case studies to illustrate how similar measures have been effectively implemented in real-world contexts. - Enhance Discussion: In Section 9, we explicitly analyse the divergence of approaches form the panel, the suggested technology approach and actor responsibility how the proposed countermeasures address the multi-dimensional impacts of fake news on public trust and governance, providing a more robust connection between the findings and their implications. 2. The Delphi methodology used is appropriate and offers a structured means to build expert consensus. However, there is insufficient detail regarding how consensus was defined, operationalized, and measured. For instance, it remains unclear how divergent views were managed and what thresholds were used to determine whether a consensus had been reached. More granular details on the scoring process, including illustrative examples of disagreements and how they were resolved, would add rigor to the methodology section. Including an in-depth discussion of the quantitative and qualitative aspects of the data collection process, supported by excerpts from expert feedback, would provide a clearer view of the Delphi study's iterative nature and enhance transparency. We agree that providing more detail about how consensus was defined, operationalised, and measured will strengthen the rigour and transparency of the Methodology section. To address this, we will take the following steps: -Include a detailed explanation of the thresholds used to determine consensus, such as the percentage of agreement among participants required for a countermeasure to proceed to subsequent rounds. -An enhancement of the Methodology section including adding more granular detail into Figure 1. - An explanation on how divergent views were resolved in subsection 5.3. - Scoring Process and Iterative Nature: elaborating on the scoring process, describing how countermeasures were evaluated and scored by experts across rounds. Additionally, we improved the analysis of how the iterative process evolved in the methodology and in subsection 5.3 and improved the results presentation and consequent discussion of sections 8 and 9. 3. While the identification of countermeasures through the Delphi rounds is comprehensive, the paper lacks a clear validation framework for these measures. It is not apparent how these countermeasures have been tested or evaluated for real-world applicability. This leaves readers questioning their practical relevance and effectiveness. Consider expanding the discussion by including examples of where similar countermeasures have been applied or piloted, detailing any successes or challenges encountered. Additionally, outlining specific criteria or metrics for assessing the feasibility and impact of the proposed interventions would add a layer of The Delphi study aimed not to demonstrate how countermeasures can be operationalised but to identify and validate a structured set of expertapproved countermeasures for tackling high-risk disinformation crimes. Some of these countermeasures are preventive, and their implementation and evaluation would require a different research approach, potentially involving longitudinal studies or field experiments. Nevertheless, this study has successfully validated a feasible and interdisciplinary framework of countermeasures, laying the groundwork for future research to assess their practical effectiveness and integration within law enforcement, policy, and technological ecosystems. Authors have also: Page 54 of 56Transforming Government: People, Process and Policy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 Transforming Government: People, Process and Policy practical relevance to the findings and improve their utility for practitioners and policymakers. -Expanded the Discussion section as previously noted with real-world examples of similar applications of countermeasures. - Noted the necessity of working towards a unified framework to tackle D&FN related-crime in Section 9 and subsection 10.3 4. The selection process for the expert panel is mentioned but requires greater depth to demonstrate the diversity and representativeness of the perspectives captured. While the inclusion criteria are outlined, more detail on the backgrounds, areas of expertise, and perspectives of the panel members would improve the reader's confidence in the comprehensiveness of the study's findings. Consider addressing how the composition of the panel ensured a balance of viewpoints, including geographical, professional, and ideological diversity. Furthermore, detail any measures taken to mitigate potential biases, such as overrepresentation of specific viewpoints, that could have influenced the consensus. Clarifying this aspect would strengthen the validity and credibility of the study's conclusions. Thanks for the feedback. Authors recognise the importance of demonstrating the diversity and representativeness of the panel to strengthen the validity and credibility of the study’s findings. To address this, authors will amend Section 5 – Selection of Experts to provide more detail on the panel composition expanding backgrounds, areas of expertise and perspectives of the panel members. Authors also highlighted the balance of viewpoints describing the geographic, professional diversity, thus providing a clearer understanding of how diverse perspectives were incorporated to produce a well-rounded finding. Finally, in the same section, address potential biases by detailing measures taken to prevent overrepresentation of a specific viewpoint. 5. The paper presents several policy recommendations, but some measures, such as social media bans, content monitoring, and legislative interventions, could face significant ethical, legal, and practical hurdles. These interventions may raise concerns about free speech, privacy rights, and constitutional constraints. The paper would benefit from a more thorough examination of these issues, discussing the potential challenges and limitations in implementing such measures and proposing alternative or supplementary strategies. For example, exploring how existing legal frameworks might be adapted or supplemented to accommodate new challenges posed by disinformation would strengthen the recommendations. Additionally, consider integrating perspectives from legal experts or case studies that have navigated similar challenges to offer practical guidance on overcoming potential obstacles. The authors acknowledge that certain policy recommendations, such as social media bans, content monitoring, and legislative interventions can indeed raise significant ethical, legal and practical challenges. To address authors amended Section 9 adding paragraphs to include a thorough discussion of the potential challenges in implementing these measures. Furthermore, authors explore how existing legal frameworks might be adapted of supplemented to address the unique challenges posed by disinformation, offering practical solutions that align with existing laws and values. Minor Comments Comment Action The literature review is robust and demonstrates a solid understanding of the landscape of fake news and disinformation, but it could be further enriched by incorporating recent studies and emerging technological interventions for disinformation detection. This would demonstrate a comprehensive understanding of both theoretical and practical developments in the field. Consistency in terminology is crucial; terms such as "fake news," "disinformation," and "misinformation" are sometimes used interchangeably, which could lead to reader Thank you for the detailed and thoughtful feedback, which highlights several areas for improvement. Authors are committed to addressing each of these points to enhance the robustness and clarity of the manuscript. Below is how we revised the manuscript accordingly: 1-Enriching the Literature Review: We updated the literature review to incorporate recent studies, particularly those exploring emerging technological interventions for disinformation detection. Clarifying and Consistently Using Terminology: Page 55 of 56 Transforming Government: People, Process and Policy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 Transforming Government: People, Process and Policy confusion. A clear distinction between these terms and consistent usage throughout the text is recommended. Ensure that all figures, tables, and diagrams are clearly labeled and properly referenced within the text, as some appear without sufficient context. Consider adding narrative explanations for each visual element to enhance reader understanding. Minor grammatical and formatting issues were noted throughout the text, including inconsistent use of italics and minor typographical errors. A thorough editorial review focused on language clarity and consistency would improve the overall readability. The participant consent and ethics statement, while commendable, could be better integrated into the methodology section, offering more context about the ethical considerations and any measures taken to mitigate bias during data collection. Providing further detail on how informed consent was obtained and how participant autonomy and confidentiality were preserved would strengthen the ethical foundation of the study. 2-We ensured clear distinctions between "fake news," "disinformation," and "misinformation" by defining these terms explicitly early in the text. Consistent usage was maintained throughout the manuscript to avoid reader confusion. 3-Enhancing Figures, Tables, and Diagrams: We reviewed all figures, tables, and diagrams to ensure they are clearly labelled, referenced appropriately within the text, and provided with narrative explanations. 4-Addressing Language and Formatting Issues: We conducted a thorough editorial review to address minor grammatical, typographical, and formatting issues, including inconsistent use of italics, improving the manuscript's overall readability and presentation. 5-Improving the Ethics Statement: We integrated the participant consent and ethics statement into the methodology section, providing more context about the ethical considerations. This includes detailing how informed consent was obtained, the measures taken to protect participant autonomy and confidentiality, and steps to mitigate bias during data collection. 6-Ensuring Consistency and Readability: A comprehensive review ensured consistent formatting and clear language across the manuscript. Any ambiguous phrasing or inconsistencies was amended to improve clarity and coherence. Page 56 of 56Transforming Government: People, Process and Policy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60