GLOBAL STRATEGIC RIVALRY AND THE SECURE ARCHITECTURE: NATO'S INFLUENCE ON THE FORMATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL PEACE

- 30 - Print ISSN 2222-7288 Online ISSN 2518-5551 IMPACT FACTOR VALUE OF 2.329 AALBORG ACADEMY OF SCIENCES – DENMARK law.com/-http://journal [email protected] LEGAL FRAMEWORKS, NATIONAL SECURITY, AND GOVERNANCE IN THE UKRAINIAN EXPERIENCE 2-Global Strategic Rivalry and the Secure Architecture: Nato's Influence on The Formation of The International Peace, By Yevhenii Taran. and others. p. 30. - 31 - SCIENTIFIC AND ACADEMY JOURNAL Print ISSN 2222-7288 Online ISSN 2518-5551 IMPACT FACTOR VALUE OF 2.701 VOL. (47/2) SPECIAL ISSUE OCTOBER 2025 FIRST EDITION 2011 SPECIAL ISSUE LEGAL FRAMEWORKS, NATIONAL SECURITY, AND GOVERNANCE IN THE UKRAINIAN EXPERIENCE A GROUP OF UNIVERSITY GRADUATES IN UKRAINE PREPARED CENTER FOR LAW AND POLITICAL RESEARCH – DENMARK FACULTY OF LAW - ACADEMY OF THE AALBORG – DENMARK http://journal-law.com/ [email protected] - 32 - - 33 - - 34 - - 35 - - 36 - - 37 - Contents of Vol. No. (47/2) of Issue October-2025 1International Security Cooperation of Ukraine in The Face of The RussianUkrainian War: Factors of Historical and Legal Aspects. By Yurii Rusnak and others. p. 10. 2Global Strategic Rivalry and the Secure Architecture: Nato's Influence on The Formation of The International Peace, By Yevhenii Taran. and others. p. 30. 3Multipolarity of the Global Space: Strategic Understanding of Geopolitical Trends. By Viacheslav Kolotov and others. p. 55. 4Mechanisms for Restoring Violated Rights to Intellectual Products: Law Enforcement Difficulties in Ukraine. By Viktoriia Kobko-Odarii and others. p. 82. 5Civic Engagement as a Driver of Political Change in Post-Totalitarian States. Vitalii Kostenko and others. p. 104. 6International Humanitarian Law Implications During the War in Ukraine: Problems and Violations. By Oleksandr Khomenko and others. p. 123. 7Russian-Ukrainian War's Geopolitical Consequences for Eastern Europe. By Vira Kazymir and others. p. 138. 8Constitutional Rights and Freedoms of Citizens: Problems of Protection And Implementation In Ukraine. By Denys Chyzhov . And others. P. 154. 9Criminal Liability for Economic Crimes: Issues of Legal Qualification And Application In Practice. By Volodymyr Myslyvyy and others. p. 176. 10The Dynamics of Public-Private Interaction in Advancing Sustainable Development Through Investment Strategies and Administration. By Myroslav Buryk and others. p. 198. 11Cooperation of Governmental Institutions And Advocacy Associations Within the Framework of The Fundamental Freedoms: Conceptual Perspective. By Olena BondarchukLadna and others. p. 228. 12The Issue of Criminal Liability for Corruption Crimes in The Context of Legal Modernization. By Anfisa Serhiienko and others. p. 250. 13Anti-Corruption Policy and Its Administration in Public Administration: Theoretical Foundations and Practical Aspects of the Legal Framework. By Oleksii Vasyliev and others. p. 276. 14Electoral Behavioral Models in Sweden and Norway: A Psychopolitical Perspective. By Viktor Melnyk and others. p. 299. 15The Evolution of Legal Frameworks in Lithuanian State Formation: Historical Perspectives -and The Impact of European Integration. By Lesia Kotsur and others. p. 325. 16Public Debt and Public Debt Administration Under Martial Law in the Process of Post-War Reconstruction, By Serhii Petrukha and others. p. 341. 17Global Economic Interaction as a Factor of Innovative Progress in Countries with A Transformational Model of Growth. By Yevhenii Kostyk and others. p. 372, - 38 - (2) Receipt 1/8/2025 Approval 18/9/2025 Publishing October 2025 YEVHENII TARAN PhD in Political Science, Associate Professor, Global and National Security Department, Educational and Scientific Institute of Public Administration and Civil Service, Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv, Ukraine https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1822-6978 [email protected] MYKOLA TARANENKO PhD in Law, Senior Lecturer, Department of Information, Business and Administrative Law, Faculty of Sociology and Law, National Technical University of Ukraine "Igor Sikorsky Kyiv Polytechnic Institute", Ukraine https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1594-5598 [email protected] TETYANA KULYK Candidate of Historical Sciences, Senior Research Officer, Associate Professor, Department of International Relations and Audit, Faculty of Finance and Economics, Dnipro University of Technology, Ukraine https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4422-7533 [email protected] This study is relevant due to the transformation of the international security environment caused by Russia’s war against Ukraine, which has heightened strategic competition and underscored NATO’s role in shaping the global order. The research aims to examine NATO’s evolving role post-war by analyzing changes in its strategic identity, responses to geostrategic challenges, and its institutional adaptation for long-term competition. Historical and civilizational perspectives were applied to trace alliance evolution, alongside analogy methods to compare non-NATO partners, and content and case analyses to assess key developments. The findings reveal NATO’s strategic transformation, the reaffirmation of its security guarantor role in the 2022 Strategic Concept, the bolstering of its eastern flank, and its efforts to counter hybrid GLOBAL STRATEGIC RIVALRY AND THE SECURE ARCHITECTURE: NATO'S INFLUENCE ON THE FORMATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL PEACE - 45 - Western values and promotes the dissemination of expert knowledge among civil society organizations in the member states 27 . It is the formation of NATO’s strategic identity and its transformation in response to new security challenges, caused, in particular, by Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, that is carried out through a constant and multilevel process of interaction between national governments, expert circles and international structures. These provisions ensure not only the Alliance’s adaptation to the new geopolitical reality, but also contribute to the construction of a new model of the global order, in which NATO occupies a central place as an institution capable of political leadership, security responsibility and ideological cohesion in the post-war world. 4.2. NATO’S NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT 2022: RESPONDING TO THE THREATS OF RUSSIA’S WAR AGAINST UKRAINE AND THE CHALLENGES OF THE POST-CONFLICT WORLD ORDER The content of NATO’s new Strategic Concept, adopted in 2022, is based on the key principle of the Alliance’s updated philosophy, which is to assert its role as the main guarantor of security, stability and predictability of the Euro-Atlantic space, which is of particular importance in the context of strategic competition and the formation of the international security environment after Russia’s war against Ukraine. At the same time, the document envisages a significant increase in the influence of this militarypolitical bloc on ensuring a sustainable world order, which is achieved through deepening cooperation with strategic partners, strengthening internal unity and political cohesion of member states, as well as adaptation to new challenges posed by Russia’s aggressive actions and other global threats 28 . When developing new strategic guidelines, NATO experts sought to maintain continuity with the basic tasks defined in the 2010 Lisbon Concept, which include collective defense, crisis management readiness, and expanding cooperation with partners outside the Alliance, but in the current environment, these tasks are taking on a new meaning due to the need to counter hybrid and unconventional threats that have arisen as a result of Russian aggression. One of the central elements of the modernization of NATO’s strategic approaches is the improvement of the political mechanism of interaction between member states, which involves increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of collective decisionmaking in key areas of activity, such as crisis response, deterrence of aggression and maintenance of global stability. The strategic goal of the Alliance for the next decade is to “guarantee collective defense against all threats from all directions”, as stated in NATO’s official documents of 2022, which requires the implementation of a number of interrelated tasks: from improving mechanisms for political consultation and training to 27 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO’s response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine (2025). https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_192648.htm 28 V. V. Makedon, O. H. Kholod and L. I. Yarmolenko, “Model for assessing the competitiveness of high-tech enterprises based on the formation of key competencies”, Academic Review vol. 2, no. 59 (2023): p. 75–89. DOI:10.32342/2074-5354-2023-2-59-5 - 46 - developing defense capabilities, increasing resilience to hybrid threats, maintaining the West’s technological advantage over potential competitors such as Russia or China, and countering destabilizing factors affecting the world. In this context, the new version of the Strategic Concept emphasizes three main areas of activity, deterrence and defense, crisis prevention and conflict resolution, and the development of cooperative security through partnerships, which is especially important in the context of the need to respond to Russia’s aggressive policies and its attempts to undermine international stability 29 . The continuity with previous strategic documents can be seen in the significant attention to “asymmetric” threats to the security of the Euro-Atlantic region, among which terrorism occupies a special place, as stated in the text: “Non-state armed groups, including transnational terrorist networks and state-sponsored actors, continue to exploit conflict and weak governance to recruit and expand their influence.” The list of potential dangers also includes illegal migration, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, climate degradation, limited access to resources, international crime and piracy, as well as instability in the “global South”, particularly in the Middle East and North Africa, which has only been exacerbated by the war in Ukraine and its geopolitical consequences. At the same time, countering non-military threats, such as cyberattacks, disinformation and propaganda, which are actively used by Russia, has become a new priority, reflecting the realities of the post-conflict world, and the document emphasizes that “new technologies are changing the nature of conflicts and becoming key arenas of global competition” 30 . When planning NATO’s activities for the next decade, considerable attention is paid to expanding the alliance’s role in addressing energy and environmental issues, which is being implemented, in particular, through the Science for Peace and Security program, which provides for the introduction of environmentally friendly technologies in the military sphere, as well as the creation of a system to counter biogenic threats, which has become especially relevant after the COVID-19 pandemic and Russia’s possible use of such means in hybrid warfare. In response to cyberattacks and other manifestations of hybrid aggression that may come from states like Russia, the document envisages the possibility of activating Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, as well as strengthening consultation mechanisms for rapid response to crisis situations, which should strengthen the unity of the alliance in the face of current challenges caused by the war in Ukraine and broader strategic competition with autocratic regimes. 29 E. Michaels and M. Sus, (2024). Id. 30 NATO, Washington Summit Declaration (NATO, Brussels, 2024). https://www.nato.int/cps/en/ natohq / ofcial_texts_227678.htm. - 47 - 4.3. NATO’S RESPONSE TO GEOSTRATEGIC CHALLENGES AND ESCALATING THREATS FROM RUSSIA AND CHINA: TRANSFORMING THE SECURITY STRATEGY One of the key directions of updating NATO’s strategic vision in the new geopolitical reality was the realization of radical changes in the international security sphere caused by the resumption of a large-scale confrontation between the Alliance and the Russian Federation, which after 2014, and especially after the beginning of fullscale aggression against Ukraine, became a determining factor in the transformation of the Euro-Atlantic security space. Since then, the main focus of the threats and challenges in the Alliance’s strategic documents has been on Russia’s aggressive foreign policy and military behavior, which is seen as the main obstacle to stabilizing the situation on the continent, normalizing dialogue between countries and ensuring the predictable development of the global security system. NATO’s strategic approach to the Russian Federation is based on a combination of tools for targeted political dialogue and a powerful deterrence system, which includes strengthening defense capabilities, a coordinated sanctions policy, and eliminating disagreements between the Alliance member states on the scope and mechanisms of response to Russian aggression. Interaction between NATO and the European Union plays a significant role in ensuring this course, which is gaining a qualitatively new meaning in the context of the need to consolidate efforts in military, sanctions, information and cybersecurity 31 . A decisive catalyst for changes in NATO’s strategic thinking was Russia’s war against Ukraine, which began in February 2022 and forced the Alliance’s governing institutions to quickly review previous formats of cooperation with Russia. This resulted in the adoption of a set of measures to strengthen the Alliance’s eastern flank, expanding its military presence in Central and Eastern Europe, in particular through the deployment of additional rapid response contingents and the creation of new multinational units in Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, and Slovakia. By the summer of 2022, the number of U.S. troops in Europe reached 100,000, and the scale of the Alliance’s exercises in the east exceeded the levels of the Cold War 32 . NATO’s new Strategic Concept 2022 clearly identifies the Russian Federation as a source of multidirectional threats, from traditional military expansion to the use of hybrid instruments of influence, including information destabilization, cyberattacks, and undermining international law. The termination of the partnership with Russia and its official positioning as an adversary reflects the depth of the evolution of the conceptual foundations of the Alliance, which is reorienting itself to a new model of collective defense adapted to the conditions of direct confrontation with authoritarian regimes 33 , 34 . 31 G. Grgić, (2024). Id. 32 J. Subotic, (2023). Id. 33 G. Bou Serhal and A. Alkhaja, (2024). Id. - 48 - A priority has been the consistent strengthening of defense capabilities on NATO’s eastern flank, which involves the integrated interaction of conventional and nuclear forces, as well as the formation of a new command and control architecture, such as from rear structures in Germany to operational centers in Poland, Romania, Hungary, and the United States. At the same time, there has been a rethinking of the training of the armed forces, which are now focused on large-scale high-intensity combat operations with an enemy equal to the Alliance in terms of military potential. Significant emphasis is also placed on information confrontation, with special strategic communication units, centers of excellence for countering disinformation, and institutions responsible for monitoring cyber threats and protecting critical infrastructure being created. At the same time, the implementation of long-term military assistance programs for Ukraine continues, aimed not only at supporting defense capabilities but also at ensuring full interoperability with NATO in the future. Particularly noteworthy is the change in the strategic balance in the Asia-Pacific region, which has resulted in a gradual expansion of NATO’s geopolitical focus beyond the traditional Euro-Atlantic area. For the first time at the level of official doctrine, in the Strategic Concept 2022, China was recognized as a factor that threatens the interests and values of the Alliance. Although these challenges are mainly non-military in nature and are related to information influence, technological dominance and economic pressure, the growing cooperation between China and Russia is a concern for NATO in the context of the risk of destroying the rules-based international order 35 . Despite the declared readiness for a selective dialogue with China, the Alliance’s key goal remains to strengthen its resilience to hybrid influence, in particular through the creation of structures to monitor Sino-Russian military and political cooperation. At the same time, mechanisms are being developed to respond promptly to Beijing’s possible asymmetric actions, which creates conditions for the formation of a new, globalized strategic thinking within NATO. 4.4. NATO’S STRATEGIC PLANNING IN A LONG-TERM COMPETITION: PRIORITIES, CONSTRAINTS, AND PRAGMATISM IN THE POST-WAR WORLD ORDER The key advantage of NATO’s new strategic model is its long-term and principled nature, which does not simply respond to short-term subjective features of political processes or military logic, but aims to create a stable basis for the development of the Western coalition’s policy and strategy in the context of the transformation of the global 34 H. Sytnyk, M. Orel, V. Ivanova and Y. Taran, “Conceptual understanding of the relationship between political and administrative processes in the context of social systems security”, Cuestiones Políticas vol. 40, no. 74 (2022): p. 631–647. DOI:10.46398/cuestpol.4074.34 35 A. Mossalanejad, “Ukraine Crisis and Iran’s Balancing Regional Role in International Competitions”, Journal of Iran and Central Eurasia Studies vol. 7, no. 1 (2024): p. 81-94. http//doi.org/10.22059/jices.2024.371423.1062 - 49 - order, which has been significantly affected by Russia’s aggressive actions against Ukraine. Although this model is not without its practical shortcomings, which may complicate its implementation in the short term, it allows us to outline the strategic boundaries of the alliance, which become clearer through the prism of long-term planning aimed at countering Russia as the main destabilizing factor in the current international security environment. To do this, it is proposed to adapt the existing model of the West’s foreign policy strategy, which largely echoes previous approaches, but at the same time takes into account new realities, in particular the concept formulated by Anthony Cordesman, a respected expert from the International Institute for Strategic Studies (CSIS), who emphasized the “priorities” of strategic planning as a crucial element of American policy in the context of global competition 36 (Table 1). Table 1. NATO’s Strategic Planning in a Long-Term Competition: Key Priorities, Goals and Challenges Priority Description. Objective Limitations Adapting to a real threat Assessment of Russia’s economic and military capabilities in view of the war Creating a costeffective counteraction structure Reassessing Russia’s potential Strengthenin g the eastern flank Expanding presence and interoperability with Ukraine Deterring aggression and supporting partners Limited resources of member states Countering hybrid threats Developing cyber defense and countering disinformation Increasing resilience to unconventional challenges Different national priorities Balance of global and regional goals Attention to competition with China alongside European stability Maintaining leadership in a multipolar world Allocation of resources between regions Flexible short-term planning Annual review of strategies to adapt to Ensuring efficiency and realism in the Risk of underestima ting long36 The geopolitical implications of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine (Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2022). https://www.aspi.org.au/report/geopolitical-implications-russias-invasion-ukraine - 50 - changes face of unpredictability term threats Source: compiled by the author on the basis of Australian Strategic Policy Institute 37 These priorities indicate the formation of a new concept of the use of military force in the United States, which is of direct importance for NATO’s future strategy in the Ukrainian theater of operations, where Russia’s war against Ukraine has become a catalyst for rethinking approaches to deterrence and defense, although this concept has not yet been finalized in legislation. It is important to emphasize that these principles, as noted by E. Cordesman, are aimed at avoiding vague and overly ambitious interpretations of the US military strategy, especially given that the European Union countries are increasingly forming their own, relatively autonomous strategic positions, which complicates coordination within the alliance after the beginning of the RussianUkrainian conflict. The first key aspect of this model is the need to adapt the strategy to the real scale of the Russian threat, which implies a comprehensive assessment of Russia’s economic and military capabilities, its reaction to the war in Ukraine, and the long-term consequences of this aggression, with an emphasis on creating a costeffective countermeasure structure that does not seek to solve all problems at once, but focuses on pragmatic goals such as supporting Ukraine and deterring further escalation 38 . The second principle emphasizes that NATO should not try to solve all the problems related to the conflict in Ukraine or the broader security situation in Europe, but should focus on the most practical tasks, such as strengthening the defense capabilities of the Alliance’s eastern flank or countering hybrid threats from Russia, while recognizing that member states’ resources are limited and cannot cover all possible areas at once. This implies a rational approach to the distribution of efforts that takes into account both the national interests of individual NATO states and the collective needs of the alliance, avoiding overestimation of Russian capabilities and not wasting resources on secondary programs, which became especially evident after Russia demonstrated its real, not perceived, military capabilities in the war against Ukraine. The third priority focuses on optimizing NATO’s military policy, adapting it to the needs of modern development and the real scale of the threat, where instead of inflated intelligence estimates that exaggerated Russia’s strength until 2022, a rational approach is proposed that takes into account both the need to respond effectively to military challenges and the balancing act with civilian costs, which is critical to maintaining support for the Alliance in member countries 39 . 37 Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2022. Id. 38 A. Gheciu and S. von Hlatky, (2024). Id. 39 P. García-Berdoy and C. Samitier, NATO’s strategy after 75 years of adaptation (LLYC, 2024). https://llyc.global/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/NATOs-strategy-after-75-years-of-adaptation-1.pdf - 51 - Finally, the fourth aspect combines long-term goals with the need for flexible short-term planning, because, as Cordesman notes, attempts to forecast strategy for many years ahead in the current environment, when the war in Ukraine and rapid technological changes are constantly adjusting reality, are risky, so effective planning should be based on annual review of priorities and be prepared for unforeseen events. All of this together forms an approach in which NATO plays a central role in shaping the world order after Russia’s war against Ukraine, balancing deterrence against the aggressor, support for partners such as Ukraine, and adaptation to the new conditions of strategic competition, where cost-effectiveness, pragmatism and flexibility are crucial to the Alliance’s success in confronting global challenges. 4.5. INSTITUTIONALIZING NATO’S STRATEGIC FLEXIBILITY: BALANCING RESOURCE PRAGMATISM, GLOBAL LEADERSHIP, AND RESPONSE TO THE WAR IN UKRAINE A feature of modern strategic thinking within the Western military-political coalition led by NATO is a gradual shift away from an ideologized approach to assessing international threats in favor of a more pragmatic, functional and economically balanced planning model based not on rhetorical escalation or demonstration of force, but on a rational analysis of real capabilities, current resources and priorities within the existing security architecture. This analytical approach, developed by leading Western experts in the field of defense and international security, envisages the creation of a flexible model of short-term strategic planning, focused not on the total solution of all problems, but on achieving realistic goals through the effective use of existing instruments of deterrence, rapid response and optimization of military presence. This model is based on the realization that NATO’s military strategy should not absolutize the threat posed by the Russian Federation or create the illusion that it can be completely neutralized through large-scale rearmament or political pressure, but instead focuses on a flexible balance between short-term tactical solutions and long-term infrastructure projects that both meet real security challenges and do not overburden the financial systems of Allies. This strategic logic, which combines elements of the “war of resources” and the “war of endurance”, was partially implemented in NATO’s decisions of 2023-2024, when, in parallel with the launch of large long-term infrastructure modernization programs, short-term operational measures were taken to strengthen support for Ukraine and deter potential escalation by Russia 40 . At the same time, there is an obvious contradiction between strategic documents and political rhetoric that dominated the information space in late 2023 and early 2024. 40 H. Hardt, “NATO after the invasion of Ukraine: How the shock changed alliance cohesion”, International Politics (2024). DOI:10.1057/s41311-024-00629-x - 52 - Against the backdrop of temporary failures of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, particularly in the context of offensive actions, NATO countries stepped up their public support for Kyiv, using the rhetoric of uncompromising solidarity, while more restrained and pragmatic decisions were made at the level of strategic centers, based on an objective analysis of resource capabilities and constraints. From this point of view, the growth of public confrontation on the part of Western leaders can be seen as an element of political tactics aimed at preserving the internal unity of the Alliance and signaling resolve to the Russian leadership in order to encourage it to conclude a truce on terms favorable to the West 41 .An in-depth analysis of NATO’s policy on the RussianUkrainian war reveals a multidimensional structure of the coalition, which includes not only 32 Allies and EU members, but also other partner states, including neutral countries, as well as a number of non-state actors such as think tanks, transnational corporations, and defense companies, which form a wide range of influence on military policy, financing, and the supply of defense technologies 42 . The uneven distribution of power in NATO has allowed Europe to benefit from American protection while keeping its own defense spending significantly lower than the United States as a percentage of GDP, making it easier to finance social programs. While not all NATO allies have cut back on defense, many have done so despite the opportunity to spend more (Figure 1). Against this backdrop, the overall effectiveness of the Western coalition’s strategy in 2024 largely depends on the coherence of actions between these actors, as well as on NATO’s ability to conduct adaptive strategic planning in the face of unpredictable combat dynamics 43 . 41 A. Mazurkiewicz, (2024). Id. 42 V. V. Makedon, O. H. Kholod and L. I. Yarmolenko, (2023). Id. 43 J. Kinninmont and I. Werenfels, Regaining NATO’s southern neighbours: the alliance should seize the opportunity to jointly reshape southern partnerships (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik - SWPDeutsches Institut für Internationale Politik und Sicherheit, 2024). DOI:10.18449/2024C25 - 53 - Figure 1. Defense spending by NATO member states as a percentage of GDP at the end of 2022 44 The key challenge for the Western strategy was that the initial plan of the United States and its allies, which was to inflict economic, financial, and military blows on Russia during the first half of 2022, did not bring the expected result: the sanctions pressure was not destructive enough, the Russian economy adapted, and the country’s military-industrial complex was able not only to maintain combat capability but also to increase production. In this situation, Washington, seeking to maintain its global leadership and at the same time send a signal to China that it is ready to respond to challenges, found itself in need of a revision of its strategic line. On the one hand, the United States needs to demonstrate power to assert its status as a security guarantor in the face of strategic competition, especially in the Asia-Pacific region; on the other hand, the available resources and political fatigue of its allies limit their ability to sustain a long-term military confrontation in Eastern Europe 45 . The current stage of NATO’s strategic evolution, which was clearly manifested during the anniversary summit in Washington, marks not just a continuation of the previously chosen course, but the actual institutionalization of already established practices, policies and security strategies, which, in turn, is intended to demonstrate the irreversibility and consistency of the Alliance’s transformational trajectory in the face of dynamic international turbulence. The methodology of “strategic posturing” currently used by NATO is not only aimed at protecting the organization from potential internal or external challenges, but also serves as a tool to strengthen its presence in key conflict zones that determine the global security configuration of the 21st century. Given the priority of the European direction in the light of Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine, as well as the growing geostrategic importance of the Indo-Pacific region, the Alliance has significantly narrowed the list of thematic emphases, leaving 44 R. Menon, Reconfiguring NATO: The case for burden shifting (Defense Priorities, (2022). https://www.defensepriorities.org/explainers/reconfiguring-nato/ 45 H. Chae, (2024). Id. 3.6 3.3 2.4 2.32.3 2.1 1.91.91.91.9 1.8 1.71.7 1.61.61.6 1.51.51.51.5 1.41.41.4 1.31.31.3 1.2 1.1 0.7 0. 1. 2. 3. 4. Greece U.K. France Albania Portugal Turkey (% of GDP) Country - 54 - out a number of other pressing issues, including the ongoing Palestinian-Israeli conflict. This limitation was partly due to the position of Turkey, whose President Recep Tayyip Erdogan openly opposed any form of rapprochement between NATO and Israel before a sustainable and just peace in Palestine was achieved. As a result, most delegations decided to move the discussion of relations with Israel to a bilateral format, and the mention of the Middle East in the final declaration of the summit was minimal, limited to one paragraph out of 38 and fitted into the framework of the general, value-neutral format of the Mediterranean Dialogue, which provides for only symbolic interaction with the countries of the region 46 . However, in the context of strengthening NATO’s institutional presence in the Southern Mediterranean, the Allies reached a consensus on the establishment of a special representative of the Alliance in this area, as well as the opening of a Liaison Center in Jordan, which allows for the maintenance of a regional presence without direct political interference. The final part of the summit was devoted to internal organizational issues, including the election of a new NATO Secretary General. Former Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte was nominated for the post, whose political experience, authority and pragmatism are expected to help Brussels maintain the necessary balance between the Alliance’s European vision and its Atlantic component in the next decade. Regardless of the challenges that the Alliance may face in the coming years, NATO is steadily approaching the conventional “fourth age” of its organizational history, as a symbolic limit of political maturity, which, unlike biological aging, is not manifested in decline, but in the need to update its forms of activity and increase efficiency in response to new global threats 47 . Despite the significant number of crises that NATO has already experienced in more than seven decades of existence, the Alliance has not only remained relevant since the end of the Cold War, but, on the contrary, has received a new justification for its mission (raison d’être) in the context of escalating international instability, growing authoritarian threats and strategic revisionism on the part of Russia. Strengthening institutional capacity, expanding functional tasks and doubling the number of members from 16 to 32. The Alliance demonstrates political flexibility, resilience, and the ability to adapt to changes in the international security environment 48 . The anniversary summit in Washington once again confirmed the determination of NATO member states, in particular those in North America and Europe, to continue 46 NATO, NATO’s response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine (NATO, 2025). https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_192648.htm 47 V. Nadkarni, P. D’Anieri, S. Kerr, G. Sharafutdinova, X. Pu, D. M. Ollapally, P. Velasco Junior, C. Moore and A. Divsallar, “Forum: The Russia–Ukraine War and Reactions from the Global South”, The Chinese Journal of International Politics vol. 17, no. 4 (2024): p. 449–489. DOI:10.1093/cjip/poae021 48 NATO Defense College Foundation, “NATO 2024: Beyond the 75th anniversary” (NATO Defense College Foundation, 2025). https://www.natofoundation.org/wpcontent/uploads/2025/02/NDCF-NATO-2024_web.pdf