Russian Canadians: Views on Politics, History and Society
Abstract
Canada is a multicultural country where migrants with a (Soviet) Russian background are one of many minorities. This community has received scant attention to date, partly because it largely dissolves into the overall population, and the socio-economic integration of newcomers from Russia tends to be relatively smooth. Although people with a (Soviet) Russian background are not a large demographic group, Russian speakers, including migrants from other former Soviet republics, form a sizeable share of the migrants who speak neither of Canada’s two official languages as their first language. The Kremlin views this group as a resource that can potentially be leveraged. This report is one of the first to provide reliable insights into a large sample of respondents with a (Soviet) Russian background relative to the broader Canadian population. We have surveyed over 500 such respondents alongside more than 1,800 Canadians from the general population. Additionally, for a significant share of all respondents, we collected data from two household members: an adult child and a parent. This allowed us to grasp where family dynamics differ between Canadians with and without a (Soviet) Russian background. For respondents with (Soviet) Russian roots, the adult child was socialised in Canada and thus represents the second generation, whereas the parental generation itself migrated from (Soviet) Russia.
Full text
ZOiS REPORT No. 1 / 2025 · April 2025 RUSSIAN CANADIANS: VIEWS ON POLITICS, HISTORY AND SOCIETY Félix Krawatzek, Hakob Matevosyan
ZOiS Report 1 / 2025 Russian Canadians: Views on Politics, History and Society 2 Content 02 ___ Summary 04 ___ Introduction 05 ___ The context: Multicultural Canada 06 ___ Canada’s (Soviet) Russian community 08 ___ Multigenerational research design 09 ___ Findings 09 ______ Political and social attitudes 16 ______ Views on history 20 ______ Transnational connections 24 ______ Intergenerational transmission 26 ___ Conclusions 27 ___ Imprint Summary Canada is a multicultural country where migrants with a (Soviet) Russian background are one of many minorities. This community has received scant attention to date, partly because it largely dissolves into the overall population, and the socio-economic integration of newcomers from Russia tends to be relatively smooth. Although people with a (Soviet) Russian background are not a large demographic group, Russian speakers, including migrants from other former Soviet republics, form a sizeable share of the migrants who speak neither of Canada’s two official languages as their first language. The Kremlin views this group as a resource that can potentially be leveraged. This report is one of the first to provide reliable insights into a large sample of respondents with a (Soviet) Russian background relative to the broader Canadian population. We have surveyed over 500 such respondents alongside more than 1,800 Canadians from the general population. Additionally, for a significant share of all respondents, we collected data from two household members: an adult child and a parent. This allowed us to grasp where family dynamics differ between Canadians with and without a (Soviet) Russian background. For respondents with (Soviet) Russian roots, the adult child was socialised in Canada and thus represents the second generation, whereas the parental generation itself migrated from (Soviet) Russia.
ZOiS Report 1 / 2025 Russian Canadians: Views on Politics, History and Society 3 The key findings are as follows: – Compared to the general Canadian population, respondents with a (Soviet) Russian background, in particular the second generation, have lower trust in Canadian state institutions and the principle of democracy while showing greater support for economic liberalism. – The offspring of Russian migrants is much less likely to participate in Canadian elections than their parents or peers. While one-third of the parental generation usually votes in Russian elections, hardly anyone from the second generation does so. – Individuals with a (Soviet) Russian background tend to be socially conservative. They tend to believe that men should be the main breadwinner and to support traditional gender norms, more so than other Canadians. – Younger people with a (Soviet) Russian background are less politically and socially active than their peers, with the exception of commenting on politics via social media. – While a clear majority of Canadians believes that Russia alone is responsible for the war in Ukraine, two-thirds of individuals with a (Soviet) Russian background disagree with this view. Older respondents are particularly supportive of the Kremlin’s position that the war against Ukraine is in reaction to Western aggression. – Individuals with a (Soviet) Russian background have a rather distant relationship to (Soviet) Russian history and are not very defensive when it is criticised. This suggests that the potential for the Kremlin to invoke patriotic sentiment through historical narratives might be limited. – Compared to other groups with a migratory background, those from (Soviet) Russia have relatively little contact with friends and family members back in Russia. Travel to Russia is also rare. – Families with a (Soviet) Russian background discuss politics more frequently than other Canadian families, with fathers being the dominant figures in these discussions. In addition, for the younger generation in these families, their parents and social media are the most important sources of historical knowledge, whereas other Canadians emphasise the importance of history teaching at school.
ZOiS Report 1 / 2025 Russian Canadians: Views on Politics, History and Society 4 Introduction Canada stands out globally for its high proportion of migrants, with firstand second-generation immigrants accounting for 39 per cent of the population — a figure expected to rise further in the coming years.1 The arrival of migrants has long been supported politically and socially, with most Canadians viewing them as beneficial to their communities.2 Public sentiment has shifted, however, since 2023, when Canadians began to judge immigration levels as being too high. This recent backlash against migration is palpable in political discourse. Justin Trudeau’s government reduced the number of highly exploited ‘temporary workers’ after being consistently pressurised on this issue by the Conservative Party under Pierre Poilievre. This report focuses on a distinct group within Canada’s migrant population: individuals with a (Soviet) Russian background.3 Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the situation of this group has become more contested. The war and its global repercussions have altered perceptions of people with Russian roots, making their integration more challenging and raising questions about their political loyalties amid escalating geopolitical tensions. These individuals are a particular target of Russia’s attempts to foster certain social and political values among Russian speakers abroad, values that often conflict with those that prevail in Canada. This report is based on a multigenerational survey, conducted using the Léger Online Panel, and several focus groups with individuals living in the Greater Toronto Area and Alberta, conducted with Pivotal Research. We partnered with Decision Point Research to recruit individuals with a (Soviet) Russian background. Together, this data provides unique insights into Canada’s population with a (Soviet) Russian background. Data collection took place in the spring and autumn of 2024. 1 The authors are grateful to Varvara Ilyina and Macha Gharbi for their research assistance. We also want to acknowledge the helpful comments by Ian Garner and Marcus Wong on an earlier version and input provided by colleagues at ZOiS. 2 NeliEsipova,JulieRayandDatoTsabutashvili,‘CanadaNo. 1forMigrants,U.S.inSixthPlace’, Gallup, 23 September 2020, https://news.gallup.com/poll/320669/canada-migrants-sixthplace.aspx. Two-thirds of Canadians view immigrants as a strength rather than a burden. Ana Gonzalez-Barrera and Phillip Connor, ‘Around the World, More Say Immigrants Are a Strength thanaBurden’,PewResearchCenter,14March2019,https://www.pewresearch.org/global-migration-and-demography/2019/03/14/around-the-world-more-say-immigrants-are-a-strengththan-a-burden/. 3 Theterm‘witha(Soviet)Russianbackground’refersheretoindividualswhothemselvesmigrated to Canada from (Soviet) Russia after their secondary socialisation or have at least one parent withsuchamigrationhistory.Wefocusspecificallyonindividualssocialisedinthemulti-ethnic Russian Federation (or, prior to 1991, the Russian Soviet Republic), which is a narrower group than the broader Russian-speaking population. For readability, we occasionally use alternatives totheterm‘witha(Soviet)Russianbackground’inreferencetothesamegroupofpeople.
ZOiS Report 1 / 2025 Russian Canadians: Views on Politics, History and Society 5 The context: Multicultural Canada A close examination of Canada’s population with a (Soviet) Russian background reveals where multiculturalism works well and where tensions arise. According to the 2021 census, Russian Canadians account for about 548,000 individuals, roughly 1.5 per cent of the national population. There is broad acceptance of multiculturalism in Canadian society,4 albeit with significant regional variation. While metropolitan areas like Toronto, Montreal or Vancouver tend to embrace the cosmopolitan understanding of Canada, in Alberta and other more rural provinces, a more conservative political climate prevails, with greater scepticism towards federal immigration policies. Canada’s multicultural approach is rooted in the concept of ‘multicultural nationalism’,5 which encourages newcomers to maintain their distinct ethnic and cultural identities, while rapidly accessing Canadian citizenship.6 This contrasts with countries like Germany, where citizenship is harder for migrants to obtain and cultural assimilation is more strongly emphasised, or the United States with its ‘melting pot’ model that prioritises integration over the preservation of distinct identities. The Canadian approach to migrant integration builds solidarity through shared values rather than a unified identity. As a result, national identity is not tightly connected to historical narratives, and Canada remains cautious about imposing a strong historical vision in general.7 Rather than history serving as a bond between citizens, it is ‘multiculturalism [that] serves as a link for native-born citizens from national identity to solidarity with immigrants.’8 This understanding of multiculturalism is not without challenges. The Conservative Party of Canada under Pierre Poilievre promises to reduce the number of immigrants and has accused Trudeau of ruining the ‘multigenerational consensus’. The Conservative leader has also pushed for a socio-cultural integration of newcomers, demanding that Canada become a ‘hyphenated society’ rather than one where different ethnicities coexist. Meanwhile, discrimination of racialised minorities is undermining their sense of belonging to Canada.9 While the public continues to support immigration, anti-Muslim sentiment is prevalent, with Islam perceived as a threat to Canada’s liberal-democratic identity. The political parties need to balance support for multiculturalism, which appeals to migrant voters, with anti-Muslim sentiment and the realities of the housing and healthcare sector.10 4 Kaylee Brink, ‘Canadian Multiculturalism, Identity, and Reconciliation: Evidence from a National Survey’,AmericanReviewofCanadianStudies53.2(2023):172. 5 TariqModood,‘MulticulturalismasaNewFormofNationalism?’,NationsandNationalism26.2 (2020): 308. 6 WillKymlicka,‘MulticulturalismasCitizenization:PastandFuture’inAssessingMulticulturalism in Global Comparative Perspective, edited by Yasmeen Abu-Laban, Alain-G Gagnon and Arjun Tremblay, (London and New York: Routledge, 2022), p. 24. 7 AnexceptionistherecognitionofhistoricalinjusticestowardstheIndigenouspeopleof Canada. 8 WillKymlicka,‘ThePrecariousResilienceofMulticulturalisminCanada’,AmericanReviewof Canadian Studies 51.1 (2021): 122. 9 Zheng Wu, Maria Finnsdottir, ‘Perceived Racial and Cultural Discrimination and Sense of BelonginginCanadianSociety’,CanadianReviewofSociology/Revuecanadiennedesociologie 58.2 (2021): 229. 10 TriadafilosTriadafilopoulosandJameelaRasheed,‘AReligionLikeNoOther:IslamandtheLimitsofMulticulturalisminCanada’,WorkingPaper2020/14intheRyersonCentreforImmigrationandSettlement(RCIS)andtheCERCWorkingPaperseries:1 – 19. Russian Canadians account for roughly 1.5 per cent of the national population.
ZOiS Report 1 / 2025 Russian Canadians: Views on Politics, History and Society 6 Canada’s (Soviet) Russian community The population with a (Soviet) Russian background is largely overlooked in today’s Canada.11 It is, however, an important group if we consider Russia’s proactive targeting of ‘compatriots’ in the context of a global competition to control its diaspora populations. Canadians with a (Soviet) Russian background are primarily concentrated in major cities, particularly in Ontario, British Columbia and Alberta. Canada’s landscape of Russian associations is diverse, encompassing cultural and religious organisations, primarily Jewish and Russian Orthodox. It also includes online communities on platforms that cater to a variety of interests. Some online groups focus on exchanging Russian goods and services or promoting cultural activities, such as student movie nights. Others are more overtly nationalistic, organising Victory Day marches and expressing pro-Russian views and criticism of Ukraine.12 At the same time, there are groups within the Russian diaspora that take an oppositional stance and engage in cultural cooperation with Ukrainian or other Slavic diaspora communities. In an attempt to sow confusion over Russia’s war in Ukraine, Russia has been conducting a propaganda campaign targeted at both the Russian diaspora and broader Canadian society. These propaganda efforts span traditional Russian state media outlets, such as Russia Today, new media platforms like Tenet Media, and controversial figures like Lauren Southern. The Kremlin’s framing of the war in Ukraine as a struggle against Western aggression resonates with some individuals on the far right and far left of the political spectrum.13 Russian propaganda has also come in the guise of Anastasia Trofimova’s film ‘Russians at War’, funded by the Canada Media Fund and Ontario’s public broadcaster TVO. The film has sparked a debate over its portrayal of the war in Ukraine, with critics accusing it of whitewashing Russian war crimes.14 Canada is also home to the world’s third-largest Ukrainian diaspora. Ukrainian Canadians represent the tenth-largest ethnic group in the country, with more than 1.2 million people of full or partial Ukrainian origin.15 The Ukrainian com11 But see Marina M. Doucerain, Catherine E. Amiot, and Andrew G. Ryder, ‘Balancing out Bonding andBridgingCapital:SocialNetworkCorrelatesofMulticulturalIdentityConfigurationsamong RussianMigrantstoCanada’,SelfandIdentity21.5(2022):527;JennyGlozmanandSusanS. Chuang, ‘Identity and Belonging: The Role of the Mesosystem in the Adaptation of RussianSpeakingImmigrantYouthinCanada’,ConceptualandMethodologicalApproachestoNavigatingImmigrantEcologies(2021):47.ThiscontrastswithresearchonSoviet-eramigrationto CanadaandthehistoryandculturaleffectsofUkrainianmigrationtoCanada.SeeRobertF. Barsky,‘ArguingtheAmericanDreamàlaCanada:FormerSovietCitizens’Justificationfortheir ChoiceofHostCountry’,JournalofRefugeeStudies8.2(1995):125;TanyaBasok,‘SovietImmigrationtoCanada:TheEndoftheRefugeeProgram?’,Innovation:TheEuropeanJournalof Social Science Research 4.3-4 (1991): 513. 12 Anastasia Rogova, ‘Protectors of the Great Victory: Commemoration of World War II in the RussianCommunityofToronto’,Anthropologica64.1(2022):1. 13 Brian McQuinn, Marcus Kolga, Cody Buntain and Laura Courchesne, ‘Russia Weaponization of Canada’sFarRightandFarLefttoUndermineSupportforUkraine’,InternationalJournal,79(2) (2024):297. 14 StanKutcher,MariaPopova,andIanGarner,‘Russia’sPropagandaMachineisRunningRoughshodinCanada’,PolicyOPTIONS,5December2024,https://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/ december-2024/russia-propaganda-canada/. 15 StatisticsCanada,‘CensusProfile.2021CensusofPopulation’,15November2023,https:// www12.statcan.gc.ca/census-recensement/2021/dp-pd/prof/details/page.cfm?LANG=E&GENDE Rlist=1,2,3&STATISTIClist=1,4&DGUIDlist=2021A000011124&HEADERlist=31,30&SearchText=Ca nada. Russia has been conducting a propaganda campaign targeted at the Russian diaspora and broader Canadian society.
ZOiS Report 1 / 2025 Russian Canadians: Views on Politics, History and Society 7 munity mobilised extensively in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and began to cooperate more intensely with other Slavic groups, including people of Russian descent who oppose the actions of the Russian state.16 Brief historical overview The history of migration from the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union to Canada spans over a century. In the 1870s, approximately 7,000 German Mennonites from Russia settled in Manitoba.17 Around the same time, Russian Jews began migrating to Montreal and Toronto, and in 1899, around 7,500 Doukhobors (Doukhobortsy or Spirit Wrestlers) — persecuted religious pacifists opposed to the tsarist government and the Orthodox Church — initially settled in Saskatchewan before moving to British Columbia.18 Following the 1917 Russian Revolution and the Civil War, about one million people emigrated from the Soviet Union to Canada. In the aftermath of World War II, Soviet emigration remained limited, with the exception of two significant waves of Jewish migration: from 1973 to 1980 and from 1988 to 1996. Motivated by economic factors and antiSemitism,19 these migrants largely settled in Toronto, Montreal, and major cities in Western Canada.20 Non-Jewish migration to Canada grew in the context of perestroika and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. These migrants — among them many professionals, academics, and entrepreneurs — entered Canada through non-refugee channels focused on economic potential.21 Since 2001, just over 53,000 Russian-born individuals have been admitted to Canada. Two-thirds of them arrived as economic migrants under Canada’s ‘points system’, which assesses potential newcomers based on their education, work experience, and language skills. The majority of the remaining newcomers were sponsored by family members already in Canada.22 16 Natalia Goodwin, ‘Why these Russians Living in Canada have Joined Protests Supporting Ukraine’,CBC,1March2022,https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/ottawa/ottawa-ukraine-russiaprotests-1.6367853. 17 JohnWarkentin,‘TheMennoniteSettlementofSouthernManitoba’(DoctoralDissertation, UniversityofToronto,1960,p.2). 18 Adam Burke Carmichael, ‘Problematic Settlers: Settler Colonialism and the Political History of theDoukhoborsinCanada’(DoctoralDissertation,UniversityofVictoria,2016). 19 Roberta L. Markus and Donald V. Schwartz, ‘Soviet Jewish Émigrés in Toronto: Ethnic Self-IdentityandIssuesofIntegration’,CanadianEthnicStudies/ÉtudesEthniquesauCanada16.2(1984): 71. 20 RobertJ.Brym,‘JewishImmigrantsfromtheFormerSovietUnioninCanada’,EastEuropean Jewish Affairs 31.2 (2001): 34. 21 CharlesShahar,‘CanadianJewishPopulation,2020’,inAmericanJewishYearBook2020:The Annual Record of the North American Jewish Communities Since 1899, edited by Arnolds Dashefsky and Ira M. Sheshkin (Berlin, Heidelberg, New York: Springer, 2022), p. 285. 22 Statistics Canada, ‘Immigrant Population by Selected Places of Birth, Admission Category and PeriodofImmigration,2021Census’,20October2022,https://www12.statcan.gc.ca/censusrecensement/2021/dp-pd/dv-vd/imm/index-en.cfm.
ZOiS Report 1 / 2025 Russian Canadians: Views on Politics, History and Society 8 Multigenerational research design The primary objective of the study is to deepen our understanding of Canadians with a (Soviet) Russian background relative to the broader society. The multigenerational study includes a disproportionately high number of respondents with a connection to Russia.23 For the purposes of this study, a (Soviet) Russian background is defined as: – Parental generation: aged 35 or older. The respondent must have spent most of their formative years, specifically between the ages of 7 and 18, in (Soviet) Russia. – Young adult generation: aged 18 to 34, socialisation took place primarily in Canada. The family must have relocated to Canada before the respondent was 11 years old, and at least one parent must fit the definition of the parental generation above. The research project furthermore aims to better understand family dynamics within both the population with a (Soviet) Russian background and the general Canadian population. For this reason, two members of the same family were invited to participate, one from the parental generation and one from the generation of young adults. The survey of the general population was carried out using the Léger Opinion Panel (LEO), the largest panel in Canada, comprising over 500,000 members. Given the diversity of Canadian society, the general population has various cultural backgrounds: Nearly 90 per cent of the young respondents have Canadian-born parents, and nearly 8 per cent have one parent born in South Asia. To reach the population with a (Soviet) Russian background, Léger partnered with Decision Point Research, a company specialised in studying ethnic minorities in Canada. Respondents had the option of completing the survey in English, French or Russian, and it took them on average 25 minutes to complete it.24 The survey was conducted from spring to early summer 2024. The total sample includes 2,345 individuals, of whom 509 have a (Soviet) Russian background. As part of the survey, we collected 718 dyadic (parentchild) interviews — 519 with families recruited from the general population and 199 with families from the population with a (Soviet) Russian background. The remaining interviews were with a representative of either the parental generation or the generation of young adults only. The multigenerational focus group discussions were realised by Pivotal Research, again using Decision Point Research to recruit respondents with a (Soviet) Russian background. In a first round, groups comprised either members of the parental generation or the younger generation, and in a second round we mixed both generations. In total, we conducted discussions with 23 FélixKrawatzekandHakobMatevosyan,‘MethodologicalNoteonCanada’,https://osf.io/ymjxw. 24 Two-thirds of the parents with a Russian background in our sample took the survey in Russian, compared to just 6 per cent of their children. Of the respondents recruited from the general population, 22 per cent took the survey in French, in line with Census data on the proportion of Canadians whose mother tongue is French. Two members of the same family were invited to participate.
ZOiS Report 1 / 2025 Russian Canadians: Views on Politics, History and Society 9 16 groups with a (Soviet) Russian background and with 8 groups representing the general Canadian population, with a total of 62 unique participants. Group discussions with the parental generation from (Soviet) Russia were conducted in Russian, while all other focus groups took place in English. The first round of focus groups was with people residing in Ontario, notably the Greater Toronto Area, and a second round was with people from Alberta, notably Edmonton and Calgary. Given that individuals with a (Soviet) Russian background are hard to reach, it is important to underline that the sample does not offer a strictly representative image of this population. Insights into this segment of the Canadian population based on such a sample may not capture the full range of perspectives or the popularity of specific viewpoints. Nevertheless, this data covers a wide range of respondents in both the survey and the focus groups and it reveals important tendencies in the views of this minority. Findings Political and social attitudes Democracy and society Canadians with a (Soviet) Russian background are generally more sceptical about the principle of democracy than the general population. While positive perceptions of democracy outweigh negative ones across all groups, approval is lower among those with a (Soviet) Russian background ( FIGURE1). There is also a generational divide over the extent to which democracy is a good form of government. Regardless of whether they have a migratory background or not, roughly one-third of younger respondents consider democracy a very good form of government. Yet only a quarter of the parental generation with a (Soviet) Russian background feel the same way, compared to half of the parental generation without a migratory background. At the same time, younger individuals with a Russian background are the most likely to be critical of democracy. The daughter of a Russian father and a Russian-Canadian mother spoke to this generational divide: ‘I find older people here really believe more in democracy and that having seen all the history that they have actually had, like completely different leaders be in power and do completely different things. They saw more of it being effective. [...] I find old people really still believe in democracy a lot more and using it as a real power.’ female, 33 years, Alberta A 28-year-old focus group participant in Alberta further illustrates this critical stance among the young. Born in Russia, he arrived in Canada at the age of six and speaks about the economic success of friends back in Russia, suggesting that the authoritarian system was no barrier to that. In his words, the younger generation in Russia ‘just kind of want to live their life. [...] So as long as that system allows you to do that [...].’ He goes on to express his annoyance with democratic politicians in Canada, who ‘flip back and forth between what would get them the most popularity’ (male, 29 years, Alberta). Younger individuals with a Russian background are the most likely to be critical of democracy.
ZOiS Report 1 / 2025 Russian Canadians: Views on Politics, History and Society 16 On the question of what qualifies as ‘normal’ today in terms of gender identity, respondents with a (Soviet) Russian background differ markedly from the Canadian reference population. We asked our respondents whether men should have the freedom to wear dresses, makeup, and nail polish. On a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 10 (strongly agree), first-generation (Soviet) Russian migrants scored an average of just over 3, compared to an average of nearly 7 among other Canadians aged 35 and older. The younger generation with a (Soviet) Russian background scored an average of slightly over 5, whereas their age peers in the general Canadian population scored over 7. While the parental generation with a (Soviet) Russian background is very divided on this issue, it is not as polarising for their offspring. Canada was the first country in the world to include a question on nonbinary sexual identity in its census.32 According to official statistics, of the nearly 30.5 million people in Canada aged 15 and older in May 2021, 0.33 per cent were non-binary. More than half of respondents from the national reference population state that they would be willing to accept such a person — on a 10-point scale they score upwards of 7 on average. The reverse holds for people with a Russian background, where more than two-thirds of respondents aged 35 and older score 3 or lower. Younger respondents with a Russian background score 4 on average. While there is broad agreement on this question among the general Canadian population, our survey finds that gender issues remain deeply divisive for respondents with a (Soviet) Russian background. Views on history When we asked respondents about historical events that make them proud or ashamed to be Canadians, we found a striking absence of a centre of gravity when it comes to moments of historical pride and a convergence when it comes to historical shame. The dispersed moments of pride across the population with and without a (Soviet) Russian background include Canada’s involvement in World War I and World War II, alongside Canada’s commitment to guaranteed rights and freedoms, exemplified by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and progress in the area of LGBTQ+ rights, women’s equality, and anti-discrimination. Conversely, when asked about shame, a majority of respondents mentions the persecution of Indigenous peoples, in particular the enduring legacy of residential schools, systemic land dispossession, and colonial exploitation. The fragmented historical pride is also a reflection of Canadian multiculturalism. In the absence of a single cohesive historical narrative, a more decentralised mnemonic landscape has emerged with different ways of engaging or ignoring history. While this openness allows multiple perspectives to coexist, it also makes it easier for historical disinformation to circulate. Nevertheless, both central and provincial governments have tried to achieve some ‘mnemonic integration’, for instance with regard to Canada’s 150th anniversary in 2017 or the centenary of World War I. An initiative of the government of 32 Statistics Canada, ‘Canada Is the First Country to Provide Census Data on Transgender and Non-binaryPeople’,27April2022,https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/daily-quotidien/220427/ dq220427b-eng.htm. The fragmented historical pride is also a reflection of Canadian multiculturalism.
ZOiS Report 1 / 2025 Russian Canadians: Views on Politics, History and Society 17 Ontario is noteworthy: From September 2025 onwards, Holodomor education will be mandatory in the Grade 10 Canadian History course.33 The central holiday in the Russian mnemonic calendar is 9 May or Victory Day, which marks the end of the ‘Great Patriotic War’ in Russia and other post-Soviet states. Most Russians in Russia associate Victory Day primarily with the ‘destruction of the Hitler regime’ followed by the ‘liberation of European countries from Nazi occupation’.34 Our survey finds that this memory differs among Russian Canadians. Although the victory over Nazi Germany is the most frequent association with 9 May, only about one in five Canadians with a (Soviet) Russian background cite it. The memory of war victims, the multi-ethnic composition of the Red Army, and the joint efforts by the USSR and its Western allies also feature prominently, each mentioned by around 15 per cent of the respondents with a (Soviet) Russian background. The death of more than six million Jews out of a pre-war European Jewish population of 9.5 million people is a defining element of cosmopolitan memory after World War II. This memory is, however, contingent on an awareness of the scale of this mass murder and the historical continuities of the Holocaust with, for instance, colonial violence. Our survey shows the extent to which young respondents with a Russian background cannot relate to that event. Indeed, when asked how many people perished, nearly a quarter indicate that it was either a ‘small fraction’ or that ‘nobody really knows’, as opposed to just 8 per cent of first-generation migrants with a (Soviet) Russian background and about 15 per cent of the Canadian reference population with similar views. The high level of awareness among the parental generation with a (Soviet) Russian background is consistent with the Soviet-era emphasis on Nazi atrocities. In contrast, the older generation in the general population is more likely to hold views that are potentially denialist or minimise the violence of the Holocaust. The liberation of the Auschwitz death camp on 27 January 1945 by Red Army soldiers has emerged as a central episode in the remembrance of World War II in post-Soviet Russia. Coincidentally, the Siege of Leningrad ended on the same day in 1944, and in recent Russian war memory the two events — Holocaust and Siege — reinforce one another in a combined narrative of the ‘genocide against the peoples of the Soviet Union’ and the liberation of Europe from fascism. Awareness of the Red Army’s role in liberating Auschwitz is low across Western countries, highlighting a divergence in historical memory between Russia and the West. When asked who liberated Auschwitz, nearly all Sovietborn Russian respondents and 90 per cent of their offspring mentioned the Red Army. This knowledge is not widespread among the general population: Only slightly over a quarter of respondents mentioned the Red Army, with a similar share admitting they did not know who liberated Auschwitz, and about 20 per cent mistakenly attributing the liberation to the United States. 33 NewsOntario,‘OntariotoMakeHolodomorEducationMandatoryforHighSchoolStudents’, 28 November 2023, https://news.ontario.ca/en/release/1003893/ontario-to-make-holodomoreducation-mandatory-for-high-school-students. 34 Всероссийскийцентризученияобщественногомнения(ВЦИОМ),‘ДеньПобеды—2023’, 4 May 2023, https://wciom.ru/analytical-reviews/analiticheskii-obzor/den-pobedy-2023. See alsoЛевада-Центр,‘ДеньПобеды’,5August2020,https://www.levada.ru/2020/05/08/denpobedy-4/.
ZOiS Report 1 / 2025 Russian Canadians: Views on Politics, History and Society 18 Associations with the Soviet Union In today’s Russia the Soviet Union continues to evoke overwhelmingly positive sentiments. It is most commonly associated with ‘faith in a bright future’, followed by ‘positive emotions’ and the notion of a ‘multinational state’.35 Unlike their peers in Russia, even Canadians who were socialised in Soviet Russia tend not to be nostalgic about the Soviet Union. As our research shows, ‘friendship of the peoples’, a key positive association with the Soviet era in Russian society, holds little significance for Russian migrants in Canada (FIGURE4). Russian Canadians also place no great value on other qualities often attributed by Russians in Russia to that period of history: economic stability and social justice. The lack of positive associations is even more pronounced among other Canadians, who emphasise the lack of political choice and economic freedoms. This is the view of the Soviet Union that emerges most strongly in the focus groups. Tellingly, one participant mentions that his family came from the Soviet Union, which was ‘not a fun place to live’, and criticises people back in Russia for being nostalgic while his assessment of that period is overwhelmingly negative (male, 52 years, Alberta). Emotions and history Mentions of Canada’s involvement in World War II trigger different emotions in Canadians with and without a (Soviet) Russian background. Among the latter, hope and pride prevail, while respondents with a (Soviet) Russian background are more likely to feel indifference. This is important when we consider the issue of their deeper emotional belonging to Canadian society. While Canadians of (Soviet) Russian origin embrace Canadian traditions, entering into the history-based realm of the social contract remains more difficult. This may also be symptomatic of the weak extent to which Canadian national identity is based on history. The persecution of Indigenous peoples is an emotive topic that has received greater attention from Canadian governments since the early 1970s. In general, newcomers tend to have more negative views of Indigenous people. The Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (2015) underscores that newcomers may bring their own traumatic experiences, which affect their interactions with Indigenous communities.36 Even if the issue of Indigenous people is an important part of citizenship education for newcomers, our survey data confirms how difficult it is to pass on deeper normative commitments to migrant groups. For respondents with a (Soviet) Russian background, recognition of the suffering of Indigenous people is not something they consider essential to being part of Canadian society. This contrasts with the broad consensus on this issue among respondents in the national reference population. 35 Всероссийскийцентризученияобщественногомнения(ВЦИОМ),‘Тридцатьлетспустя, иливспоминаяизабываяСССР’,6December2021,https://wciom.ru/analytical-reviews/ analiticheskii-obzor/tridcat-let-spustja-ili-vspominaja-i-zabyvaja-sssr. 36 The Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, ‘Honouring the Truth, Reconciling for theFuture’,2015,https://ehprnh2mwo3.exactdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Executive_Summary_English_Web.pdf. See also Rebecca Kuropatwa, ‘The Connection between ImmigrantsandAboriginalPeopleinCanada’sMosaic’,16December2015,https://canadianimmigrant.ca/living/community/the-connection-between-immigrants-and-aboriginal-people-incanadas-mosaic. Even Canadians who were socialised in Soviet Russia tend not to be nostalgic about the Soviet Union.
ZOiS Report 1 / 2025 Russian Canadians: Views on Politics, History and Society 19 Source: ZOiS survey, spring-summer 2024 FIGURE4 What do you associate with the period between 1953, Stalin’s death, to 1985, when Gorbachev came to power? (Russian background) / What associations come to mind with the Soviet Union? (general population) 10% 10% 10% 3% 14% 16% 17% 18% 0% 0% 11% 10% 6% 4% 14% 17% 16% 14% 0% 7% 2% 4% 6% 2% 7% 20% 36% 11% 3% 8% 3% 5% 8% 3% 6% 18% 31% 12% 2% 13% Economic stability Social equality International importance of the Soviet Union Friendship of the people Travel restrictions No economic freedom Lack of political choice Restrictions on religion Other Don't know Parental generation (Russian background) Young adults (Russian background) Parental generation (general population) Young adults (general population) Parental generation Young adults Parental generation Young adults Russian background General population Percentage of all mentions
ZOiS Report 1 / 2025 Russian Canadians: Views on Politics, History and Society 20 Speaking to the general lack of emotion that history arouses in them, respondents with a (Soviet) Russian background are also unlikely to feel anger when Canadians speak negatively about Soviet-Russian history. Fewer than 10 per cent of older respondents and an even smaller share of younger respondents say they would definitely feel angry. In fact, 20 per cent of respondents with a Russian background explicitly state that they do not feel angry at all in such situations. Similarly, Canadians in general are not particularly defensive about history. Among older respondents in the general population, just over 20 per cent report feeling angry when other Canadians speak negatively about Canadian history, with even fewer younger respondents admitting to feeling the same. Transnational connections Activities of Russian-speaking people in Canada Families with a (Soviet) Russian background in Canada consider traditions from their country of origin important. More than 80 per cent of older respondents and over 50 per cent of younger respondents say that such traditions are somewhat or very important. This mirrors the views of other Canadians with a migratory background on their respective traditions. Several focus group participants mention hybrid cultural practices: ‘We do two Christmases in my household, so one in December and then one later in January, like Orthodox Christmas.’ female, 25, Alberta Other participants in Toronto and Alberta talk about how they sing Russian songs, eat Russian food and read Russian literature, particularly on major holidays. For younger respondents with a (Soviet) Russian background, Canadian traditions are more important than Russian ones: Nearly 90 per cent state that they are somewhat or very important, similar to the share of the overall Canadian population that values Canadian traditions. They also matter to the parental generation with a Russian background: Around 70 per cent of these respondents indicate that they consider them somewhat or very important. These figures highlight one area where Canadian multiculturalism has been successful. Newcomers identify strongly with a loose notion of Canada, and the second generation is similar to the broader reference population in this regard. Symbols such as the flag or the national anthem are considered more important among migrants than non-migrants, and the same applies to the official commitment to multiculturalism.37 Attendance of cultural, sports or youth events with co-nationals is an indicator of connectedness within the (Soviet) Russian community. Almost 40 per cent of the parental generation with a (Soviet) Russian background say they participate at least occasionally in such events — a value that is only marginally higher among other ethnic minorities in Canada. Among the younger generation, about one-third attend these events occasionally, irrespective of their migration background. 37 EnvironicsInstitute,‘TheEvolutionoftheCanadianIdentity’,22December2022,p.12,https:// www.environicsinstitute.org/projects/project-details/the-evolution-of-the-canadian-identity. For younger respondents with a (Soviet) Russian background, Canadian traditions are more important than Russian ones.
ZOiS Report 1 / 2025 Russian Canadians: Views on Politics, History and Society 21 29% 31% 26% 2% 1% 12% 8% 32% 6% 0% 0% 53% 35% 24% 31% 3% 7% 1% 45% 30% 17% 1% 4% 2% Immediate family More distant relatives Friends Business, economic investment Own property I do not have any connections Parental generation (Russian background) Young adults (Russian background) Parental generation (general population) Young adults (general population) N = 1.316 Parental generation Young adults Parental generation Young adults Russian background Other migratory background Links to Russia Canadians with a (Soviet) Russian background are largely disconnected from Russia. Younger individuals in particular have either cut ties or never had them to begin with ( FIGURE5). They are far less likely than young people with other migratory backgrounds to have immediate family members or friends in the ancestral homeland (under 10 per cent). Among the older respondents, approximately one-third have immediate family members or friends in their country of origin, similar to people with other migratory backgrounds. A similar share in both generations, about one-third, still has connections to more distant relatives in Russia. Source: ZOiS survey, spring-summer 2024 FIGURE5 What connections do you have in Russia? (Russian background) / What connections do you have in your home country? (other migratory background)
ZOiS Report 1 / 2025 Russian Canadians: Views on Politics, History and Society 22 The lower overall density of ties to Russia is also reflected in a reduced frequency of contacts with friends and family members, even among those who report maintaining connections. This trend sets Canadians with a (Soviet) Russian background apart from Canada’s non-Russian migrant population. Only a small fraction of people with a (Soviet) Russian background are in regular contact with family members in Russia — slightly over 20 per cent of the older generation and less than 10 per cent of the younger generation. In contrast, nearly three-quarters of other migrant respondents maintain such regular communication with family members in their country of origin. Travel to Russia is also rare. More than 80 per cent of the young adults with a Russian background mention that they have not visited Russia in the last five years. The same is true for half of the older respondents. Of those who have travelled to Russia, visits were usually short, no longer than three months. The picture looks very different for other minorities, where only one-third has not returned to their country of origin in the last five years. Relevance of language To better understand how Canadians with a (Soviet) Russian background relate to other Russian speakers, we asked how important it would be for respondents to speak with someone in Russian in various situations ( FIGURE6). Both generations with a (Soviet) Russian background would have no particular desire to speak with someone with a Russian-language background in several different contexts. For example, when looking for a new job or seeking medical help, around 20 per cent of the parental generation and slightly more than 40 per cent of the second generation consider this to be completely irrelevant. The situation is slightly different when it comes to talking about personal matters or political issues. More than 50 per cent of the parental generation and 20 per cent of the second generation think it is somewhat or very important to turn to fellow Russian speakers when discussing politics. We identified a significant generational shift when it comes to language use among Canadians with a (Soviet) Russian background ( FIGURE 7). Threequarters of older respondents report speaking Russian with their children. However, communication between siblings in the second generation is more likely to be in English. The shift towards English is even more pronounced in the case of partners. While most older respondents speak Russian with their partners, this is the exception to the rule among respondents from the second generation. Russian is also not commonly used in professional settings.
ZOiS Report 1 / 2025 Russian Canadians: Views on Politics, History and Society 23 Source: ZOiS survey, spring-summer 2024 FIGURE6 Thinking about the following situations, how important is it for you to turn to a fellow Russian-speaker in Canada? B Getting a new job 13% 39% 32% 16% 3% 17% 41% 38% Very important Somewhat important Somewhat not important Not important at all Parental generation (Russian background) Young adults (Russian background) A Discussing politics 6% 34% 39% 20% 1% 11% 41% 45% Very important Somewhat important Somewhat not important Not important at all Parental generation (Russian background) Young adults (Russian background) C Finding a medical doctor 6% 34% 40% 20% 4% 13% 39% 42% Very important Somewhat important Somewhat not important Not important at all Parental generation (Russian background) Young adults (Russian background) Parental generation (Russian background) Young adults (Russian background) n = 509 FIGURE7 What language do you normally speak with … Source: ZOiS survey, spring-summer 2024 English French Russian 22% 7% 1% 1% 77% 88% your children? your partner? English French Russian n = 238 Parental Generation (Russian background) 40% 42% 1% 1% 28% 4% your siblings? your partner? English French Russian n = 271 Young adults (Russian background)
ZOiS Report 1 / 2025 Russian Canadians: Views on Politics, History and Society 24 Intergenerational transmission Discussing politics within the family and with peers Political discussions at home are critical for the transmission of political ideals. We asked respondents to assess the frequency of political discussions at home when their child (for the parental generation) or they themselves (for the young adult generation) were 14 years old. On a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 indicates that political discussions never occurred and 10 indicates that they occurred very frequently, Russian parents and their offspring reported significantly more frequent discussions (average score well above five) than the other Canadians surveyed (average score well below five). Furthermore, approximately 20 per cent of non-Russian Canadians in each generation reported never discussing politics, a figure that is only half as high among those with a (Soviet) Russian background. When our respondents were asked with whom they were most likely to have discussed politics with at the age of 14, the dominant influence of fathers becomes clear, in particular among respondents with a (Soviet) Russian background ( FIGURE8). Nearly three-quarters of these respondents indicate that they mainly discussed politics with their fathers, while around onefifth did so with their mothers. When asked about the second-most likely person they discussed politics with, more than half of the respondents with a (Soviet) Russian background mention their mothers. Among non-Russian Canadians, siblings and friends played an important role in political discussions, but this was not the case for respondents with a Russian background. FIGURE8 With whom were youfirstmost likely to talk about politics when you were about 14? Source: ZOiS survey, spring-summer 2024 72% 23% 1% 3% 1% 51% 26% 8% 4% 10% My father My mother My siblings My grandparents My friends Young adults (Russian background) Young adults (general population) Young adults (Russian background) Young adults (general population) n = 1.190 Russian parents and their offspring reported significantly more frequent political discussions than the other Canadians surveyed.
ZOiS Report 1 / 2025 Russian Canadians: Views on Politics, History and Society 25 Agreement within the family, disagreement among friends When asked about the extent to which the generations agree on political matters, the parental generation with a (Soviet) Russian background perceives a higher degree of cross-generational agreement than other respondents do. This minority is also more likely to talk about politics in the first place. Nearly 20 per cent of the older respondents with a (Soviet) Russian background say their child always agrees with their political views, compared to 7 per cent of parents in the general population. However, when the younger generation with a Russian background is asked the same question, only just over one in ten say they always agree with their fathers, while levels of agreement with mothers are slightly lower (7 per cent). In the general population, younger people tend to agree more often with their parents: 15 per cent with their mothers and 11 per cent with their fathers. The family is a relatively harmonious space for political debate. In contrast, young respondents — especially those with a Russian background — are more likely than their parents to disagree with friends on political matters. And those with a (Soviet) Russian background also mention political disagreement with colleagues more frequently than respondents from the national reference population. Younger respondents with a (Soviet) Russian background also recall a greater diversity of political opinions among their childhood friends in Canada. Around one-third report disagreements most of the time or always, compared to just 15 per cent of respondents from the national reference population. This difference speaks to the diversity of political perspectives within migrant communities and the fact that migrant families are more likely to bring distinct political views that deviate from those that prevail in the host society. When asked where they get their historical knowledge from, a remarkable split becomes apparent between respondents with and without a (Soviet) Russian background. For approximately one-third of the latter, particularly younger respondents, school is the primary source. Yet this is the case for only just over 10 per cent of respondents with a (Soviet) Russian background. For older respondents with a (Soviet) Russian background, parents and family documents are the most frequently mentioned sources. Younger respondents with a Russian background, meanwhile, turn to social media, with about one-third identifying it as their main source. School is the primary source of historical knowledge for only 10% of respondents with a (Soviet) Russian background.