Supplementary Data

1 OFFICIAL OFFICIAL Supplementary Data Resistance to Sustainability Transformations and Ways to Overcome It Table of contents • Supplementary Data 1. Case study questions and guideline for inductive case studies. • Supplementary Data 2. System integration steps and guideline for identifying feedback interactions from empirical narratives. • Supplementary Data 3. Detailed empirical narratives explaining how resistance emerge and overcome in nine cases of electricity, livestock, and automobility. • Supplementary Data 4. Detailed description of feedback loops. 2 OFFICIAL OFFICIAL Supplementary Data 1 Questions for case study The sustainability science and policy literature extensively underscores the need for transition and transformation of socio-techno-ecological systems (e.g., energy, mobility, agri-food) to deliver just, resilient, and more sustainable modes of production and consumption. Transition and transformation represent far-reaching and systemic change across multiple (e.g., technological, structural, cultural) dimensions which lead to new patterns of interactions between the society, economy, and the environmental and a shift towards more sustainable outcomes (hereafter, in short, we use the term transition). Research and policy efforts have often focused on stimulating innovation (e.g., technological breakthroughs, new business models) to foster transitions. While harnessing innovation is important in providing the seeds for change, less attention has arguably been given to the resistance of incumbent systems (e.g., because of powerful vested interests, public backlash, sunk capital and investment, actor’s strategies) and their transition towards a more sustainable future. System in this context is defined as the configuration of value chain actors and their strategies, technologies, markets, policymaking processes, infrastructure, networks, natural capitals, institutions, norms, and values that co-evolve over decades. This technical panel report aims to identify and synthesis patterns and underlying mechanisms of resistance and transition in 9 case studies across three systems and six continents, in different phases of transition lifecycle and with different levels of resistance in incumbent systems. By synthesising insights across cases, this report will answer two overarching questions: • What are the recurring patterns of behaviour and underlying root causes that resist sustainability transitions, and how do these manifests across different sectors and geographical contexts? • What are the key leverage points across the system that can be targeted to overcome resistance and facilitate transition towards a more sustainable future? Drawing upon our collective dialogues during past meetings and the integration of scholarly perspectives, we have planned a structured template to guide the case analysis. This template is designed for uniformity across all cases and to facilitate the synthesis of insights throughout the report. While originality and autonomy in discussing case findings are highly valued, following the suggested template is also recommended for consistency and aid in integration and final synthesis across cases in the report. For each case, a document of 6-7 pages (excluding references) would be greatly appreciated, responding to the following questions. We kindly ask you to support your arguments with relevant citations, stats, figures, tables, and examples from your domain expertise or the broader literature. Question 1: What is the state of the system in your case with regard to resistance vs. transition and how has the balance between resistance and transition changed over time? Please summarise your response, ideally supported by relevant stats, in 1-2 pages and in form of a narrative of historical development in the last 10-30 years (depending on relevant milestones in each case) to the current situation with regard to resistance and transition. Consider this as the opening page of your case concisely (1) defining the system under examination (e.g., the electricity system in a specific country), including its composition (e.g., the percentage share of renewable energy sources, the predominance of privatised generators); (2) identifying the primary 3 OFFICIAL OFFICIAL challenges the system has confronted or is currently facing (e.g., bridging the power capacity gap, achieving emissions reduction targets); (3) defining what you mean by ‘resistance’ and ‘transition’ within the context of your case (e.g., in energy, resistance could refer to the reluctance to transition from coal due to economic interests, while transition might involve the shift towards wind and solar); (4) assessing the current balance between resistance to change and the transition towards a more sustainable future, including how this balance has shifted over time. Question 2: Which parts of the system (including but not limited to actor strategies) are driving resistance to change? Please summarise your response in 3-6 bullet points in relation to resistance mechanisms, with a brief description of which parts of the system and how they exercise resistance mechanisms in your case, in 1-2 pages. System in this context is defined as the configuration of value chain actors and their strategies, technologies, markets, policymaking processes, infrastructure, networks, natural capitals, institutions, norms, and values that co-evolve over decades. Based on this definition, the drivers of resistance may be rooted in any of these system components: • Value chain actors and their behaviours/strategies/actions (e.g., firms, policymakers, wider public, NGOs, financial institutions) including active and deliberate resistance tactics and strategies as well as cognitive bias that incumbents use to maintain the status-quo. • Technologies and infrastructure including limited knowledge, skills, capabilities, tools, and physical resources to adopt a more sustainable mode of consumption and production. • Policy and institutions including economic and regulatory frameworks, financial incentive, etc. that underpin current practices. • Natural resources and environment such as water and land availability that can limit the adoption of more sustainable modes of consumption and consumption. • Norms, values, and culture such as belief in technological fixes that can influence resistance. • Other components not mentioned here and relevant in your case. It is important that the drivers of resistance are identified across the entire system, rather than being isolated to individual components, to prevent disproportionately attributing blame to any single element. If some of the system components are irrelevant/less important in your case and the focus is on few, please provide a brief (few words) justification. Question 3: What are the key mechanisms/processes/patterns of resistance in your case? Please summarise your response in 3-6 bullet points with a brief description of what they are and how they manifest in your case, in 1-2 pages. As your guide, the response could cover mechanisms/processes/patterns of resistance in the three following aspects: • Tangible and measurable aspects of resistance shaping direct reactions of an old system to the appearance of a new one. It can have different forms such as drawing on technical capabilities and financial resources to improve efficiency, strategic financial manoeuvres, market specialisation, mergers, and entry into new markets, among others. • The interplay between political processes, institutional structures, and power dynamics shaping the governance and implementation of change. It can appear as powerful vested interests with positions of authority, money, access to media, personnel, and capabilities that lobby against change, structural and institutional forces including regulatory frameworks and financial incentives that underpin current practices and limit shift, specific individuals that champion or block the change, that funnel information, have a disproportionately large influence on the rest of the system, among many other forms. 4 OFFICIAL OFFICIAL • Foundational discourses of individual and their collective narratives shaping actions. This can have many forms, such as the broader public resist change because of concern of unintended consequences, dominant political discourses that define problems and thus setting agendas, uncertainty and lack of consensus regarding the costs and benefits of alternative approaches, limited collective identity to favour benefit to wider society, cognitive bias and justification of current status quo, abdication of responsibility between actors, among others. It is crucial to reflect upon and integrate all three aspects within your case study to ensure a comprehensive perspective that transcends any singular dimension (e.g., political, institutional, financial) that may be influenced by our research predispositions. Should one or two aspects be less significant in your context, please acknowledge and provide a brief rationale for their relative importance. Question 4: What actor strategies/policy pathways/leverage points have been adopted (or should be adopted in the future) in your case to overcome resistance and accelerate transition to more sustainable systems? Please summarise your response in 3-6 bullet points with a brief description of strategies/pathways/leverage points that have been either used or should be used in the future, in 1-2 pages. Similar to Question 2, strategies/pathways/leverage points could cover multiple aspects from those that are tangible and measurable direct reactions, to the interplay between political processes, institutional structures, and power dynamics shaping the governance and implementation of change, and to foundational discourses of individual and their collective narratives. It is important to reflect upon and integrate all three aspects within your case study or provide a brief rationale if the focus is only on one or two aspects. Also similar to Question 3, these strategies/pathways/leverage points can be driven by various components of the system (e.g., actors, market, policy, institutions, norms and values of wider public). It is important that the drivers of transitions are identified across the entire system, rather than being isolated to individual components. 5 OFFICIAL OFFICIAL Supplementary Data 2 Guideline for identifying feedbacks from case studies A set of flexible, qualitative steps is suggested for uniformity of integration across all cases and to facilitate the synthesis of insights across three systems (and their 9 case studies). While originality and autonomy in discussing case findings are highly valued, following the suggested framework is also recommended for consistency and aid in integration and final synthesis across cases in the report. 1. Delineate the system Based on responses to Questions 1 to 4, define the system boundary of each case including sectoral (i.e., what dimensions/sectors), spatial (i.e., what geographical regions/jurisdictions), and temporal (i.e., in what time frame historical and into future) boundaries, and identify the key components which are discussed in relation to case study resistance (e.g., actors, Infrastructure, industry, technology and practice, market and trade, community, natural resources, policy and governance norms and values). The boundaries and components we define will later inform the origins of social tipping dynamics and interventions within the system. 2. Articulate resistance Based on responses to Questions 2 and 3 in the case study template, articulate a set of resistance examples that have been identified across the system components in the case study. For each of the resistance examples, it would be ideal to support the articulation with relevant arguments to provide a better understanding of what they are. 3. Develop a dynamic hypothesis For each resistance example, based on inputs from Questions 2 to 4 in the case study template, develop a dynamic hypothesis that explains how resistance arose. This can be in format of a 2-3 sentence description of what drive each instance of resistance in the case study, with a list of potential cause and consequence variables from across system and scales. They are considered ‘dynamic’ because they are intended to describe the forces which impede or induce change. 4. Map feedback loops Map some stylised depiction of interconnections and feedback interactions, i.e., closed chains of cause and consequence variables, based on the developed dynamic hypotheses across resistance examples in each case. It is important to reflect upon and integrate across different system components in the feedback loop to produce a ‘bigger picture’ integrating different perspectives and placing them into a systemic perspective that transcends any singular dimension (e.g., political, institutional, financial) that may be influenced by case study predispositions. It’s also important to identify and map interactions across multiple scales to consider social contagion among scales that could lead to transformational shift. 6 OFFICIAL OFFICIAL Suggested format is 1-3 causal loops Note on terminology • Feedback interactions are usually depicted using causal loop diagrams. Causal loop diagrams represent feedback relationships among various cause and consequence variables which drive resistance over time. Links between causes and consequences, shown by arrows, represent (hypothesised) causal relationships rather than statistical correlations. • The arrows links are assigned positive or negative polarity. Polarity indicates the nature of their relationship. A positive relationship implies that a change in the cause variable changes the effect variable in the same direction. A negative relationship implies that a change in the cause variable results in a change in the consequence variable in the opposite direction. • A closed chain of causal relationships creates a feedback loop. Feedback loops are also marked with positive or negative identifiers. Note that positive and negative in feedback loops do NOT indicate desirability. They indicate a reinforcing (i.e., exponential) and a balancing (i.e., goal seeking) behaviour over time, respectively. Both negative (balancing) and positive (reinforcing) feedback loops could lead to desirable (i.e., transition) and undesirable (i.e., resistance) outcomes. Some considerations • Feedback interaction mapping is an iterative process. It should ideally start with few and key causes and effects in a very simple causal loop diagram in the first iteration. Further intermediary causal variables could be gradually added in future iterations. • In mapping feedback loops, the following types of interactions between cause and consequence variables could be considered. They could lead to interesting resistance behaviours in transition. o Unanticipated side-effects: transition efforts that can positively impact a system component in the short-term can sometimes result in long-term unintended consequences with other components slowing down or even impeding transformational change; temporary actions which can only deliver moderate progress can misleadingly diminish the need for and undermine the urgency of more fundamental actions which target the root cause, hence creating resistance. o Time-delayed responses: delays in achieving expected progress in transition and uncertainty about the effectiveness of long-term actions can undermine the need for their presence; an issue that may not be initially perceived important can become severe and unmanageable in long-term leading to resistance of the entire system in long-term. o Path dependency: short-term, sectoral siloed approaches can create path dependency and drain resources for taking longer-term and cross-sectoral approaches; hence resulting in progress stagnation and lock-in; efforts to make progress exhibit path-dependency with some priorities which have historically better performance, less uncertain outcome and can take away resources from other priorities and this can impede transitions. o Limiting condition effects: how efforts to make an initial progress may not continue forever if they are strictly reliant on exhaustible resources; working towards competing priorities while sharing limited resources (e.g., natural, financial) in 7 OFFICIAL OFFICIAL isolation could lead to the exhaustion of resources and an overall unsustainable outcome. 5. Identify high-leverage interventions Based on the feedback loops and using response to Questions 4 and 5 in the case study template (see appendix), identify some high-leverage interventions that could be made to trigger and activate relevant cross-system (positive or negative) feedback loops underlying tipping dynamics with cascading effects to overcome resistance. 8 OFFICIAL OFFICIAL Supplementary Data 3 Automobility case study – The United States Author: Peter Wells, Cardiff University, Cardiff, United Kingdom Q1. Introduction As a spatially extensive country with a large, affluent population the US has historically a very high level of car ownership by global standards, and a strong cultural predisposition towards automobility (Guiliano and Dargey, 2006) and a car-dependent transportation system (Mattioli et al., 2020). US auto firms’ hold over the domestic US market started to wane after the 1973 OPEC oil embargo. Table 1 shows that electric vehicles were negligible until the early 2000s, while the growth in battery electric vehicle sales became a feature from 2011 onwards. Table 1. Overview of electric vehicle sales, 2000 to 2021 (Source: https://www.bts.gov/content/gasoline-hybrid-and-electric-vehicle-sales) Prior to 1990 Prior to 1990 there was no substantive US automotive industry interest in electric vehicles. The Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) requirements for cars were introduced in the 1978 model year, responding to the 1973 oil embargo. Japanese, European and then Korean auto imports of fuel-efficient cars grew thereafter, leading to political trade friction that was ameliorated by subsequent inward investment by the Japanese and other auto makers. Regulation over vehicle fuel consumption arose from geo-political resource risks, rather than concern for climate change. Separately, due to petrochemical smog in Los Angeles, the California Air Resources Board (CARB) was established in 1967 with powers to intervene to prevent pollution on public health grounds. By the late 1980s independent scientific opinion agreed that greenhouse gases were responsible for climate change. 9 OFFICIAL OFFICIAL 1990 to 1998 Ford and GM joined the opposition lobby group Global Climate Coalition (GCC, 1989-2001) in 1989. The GCC had a remit to oppose action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (Penna and Geels, 2015). Ford withdrew from the Global Climate Coalition in 1998, GM in 2000,. GM initially developed their ‘Impact’ electric vehicle in 1990 to demonstrate technological prowess, then launched it as the EV-1 in 1996 (Doyle, 2000). Initially CAFE regulations changed little, oil prices were low, and the market was stable. Auto maker resistance grew as the 1990 California Zero-Emission Vehicles (ZEV) mandate approached, coming into force in 1998, with auto makers denying climate change. The Clean Air Act of 1991 included a requirement that one million alternative fuel vehicles be sold by 1997 (Collantes and Sperling, 2008). Limited experimentation with electric vehicles started, with R&D supported by the Federal government through the Partnership for a New Generation of Vehicles (PNGV) launched in 1993 (Sperling, 2001). 1998 to 2003 US auto makers left lobbying groups seeking to discredit climate change science, and experimented with Battery Electric Vehicles (BEVs) that emerged out of the PNGV program. Ford acquired BEV manufacturer TH!NK but kept the mainstream SUV products (Luke, 2001). GM and Ford backtracked on their experimentation with electric cars. Ford sold TH!NK in 2003, while GM recalled and destroyed almost all the EV-1s in use in 2003. Toyota first offered the Prius mild hybrid in the US market (from 2000 onwards). US auto makers embraced the use of E85 (ethanol) in ‘flex-fuel’ vehicles, with US-grown corn as the primary feedstock. In 1998 DCX was formed by merging Daimler, Chrysler and Mitsubishi car interests, though repeated failures at integration resulted in Chrysler being sold off in 2007. GM and Ford premised internationalization strategies in this period on the acquisition of non-US auto makers. 2003 to 2008 US auto makers shifted to a hedging strategy aided by federal support for R&D. While sales of E85 vehicles continued to grow, the success of the Toyota Prius hybrid electric vehicle underlined the need for diversification. Steadily rising oil prices undermined light truck sales and reinforced focusing on fuel efficiency. The period was characterized by the expansion of mild hybrid and E85 vehicle sales. 2008 to 2016 A significant break point was the 2008/9 ‘subprime’ financial crisis, in which GMs’ financial division was heavily involved. Both GM and Chrysler needed to be rescued from insolvency by TARP (Troubled Assets Relief Program). GM had to sell overseas assets, terminate some brands, and close plants in the US. Ford followed a similar pattern. Successful electric vehicles from Tesla and others, along with sales of plug-in hybrids in 2010, made diversification imperative for US auto makers. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (2009) introduced consumer purchase tax credits up to $7,500 for PHEVs and BEVs. The Obama administration in 2011 declared a target of 1 million electric vehicles by 2015, more stringent CAFE regulations, and signed US support for the Paris Agreement1 diluting support for fuel cells and increasing focus on electric vehicles (Bakkar et al., 2012; Dijk et al., 2013) 2016 to 2020 16 OFFICIAL OFFICIAL Wesseling, J. H., Farla, J. C. M., Sperling, D., & Hekkert, M. P. (2014). Car manufacturers’ changing political strategies on the ZEV mandate. Transportation Research Part D: Transport and Environment, 33, 196–209. 17 OFFICIAL OFFICIAL Automobility case study - Japan Author: Gregory Trencher, Kyoto University, Kyoto, Japan Q1. Introduction Automobile manufacturing is the cornerstone of Japan’s economy, anchored by globally renowned passenger car producers such as Toyota, Nissan, Honda, Mazda, Suzuki, Subaru, Mitsubishi and Daihatsu (Marklines, 2024). The domestic market benefits from a large population of 126 million and cultural preference for new vehicles, with 2.65 million light-duty vehicles sold in 2023 (JADA, 2025). Toyota, the world’s largest automaker, dominates the sector, generating over half of domestic sales. Figure 1. Share of light-duty sales in Japan by drivetrain Author based on data from (JADA, 2025). Excludes vehicles in kei (light-duty) category. Hybrid drivetrains are the central pillar of Japan’s electrification strategy. Commercialised in the late 1990s, hybrids constituted 61% of sales in 2024 (Fig. 1) Strong demand coupled with massive supply-side investments in hybrid-focused factories and battery production – particularly by Toyota and Honda – have entrenched a hybrid-centric trajectory. Contrastingly, Japan trails in BEV adoption, despite Mitsubishi and Nissan leading world production in the early 2010s. In 2024, electric vehicles (comprising BEVs, PHEVs and FCEVs) constituted just 3.1% of domestic sales, declining slightly from 2023 (Fig. 1). Furthermore, while hybrids comprise the bulk of new sales for most Japanese automakers, only three (Toyota, Mitsubishi, Mazda) produce plug-in varieties (PHEVs). Consequently, PHEVs are also struggling to gain traction, accounting for only 1.7% of total vehicle sales in 2024 (JADA, 2025). Since around 2010, Japan’s automotive industry has vigorously contested the viability of BEVs as a nearterm electrification solution, while lobbying to ensure conventional hybrids are recognised in domestic and overseas ZEV policies. Industry actors, led by Toyota, have also obstructed policymaker efforts within Japan and abroad to phase out gasoline engines and accelerate BEV adoption. 18 OFFICIAL OFFICIAL The evolution of this transition and resistance can be demarcated into four distinct phases, beginning in 1990. Obstruction activities were initially limited, since Japanese automakers broadly accepted policy signals towards electrification. Resistance intensified over time, however, triggered by market and policymaker pressures domestically and globally to reorientate away from hybrids to a battery-centric pathway. 1990-1997: Early reorientation toward electrification and hybrids Japan’s shift toward electrification was largely catalysed by California’s Zero-Emission Vehicles (ZEV) mandate, introduced in 1990 (Yarime, Shiroyama and Kuroki, 2008). While Japanese automakers attempted to weaken the mandate – primary by advocating hybrids as a ZEV technology – their resistance lacked the ferocity of their American counterparts, who resorted to litigation and climate misinformation. In contrast, Japanese firms reacted positively, perceiving electrification as a strategic opportunity to enhance their global competitiveness (Schroeder, 2013). Throughout the 1990s, Japanese automakers experimented with several powertrains (Pohl, 2012). Early efforts centred on batteries, resulting in limited-production BEV models from Honda, Toyota and Nissan and investments in battery development (Patchell, 1999; Åhman, 2006). They also experimented with hydrogen (FCEVs) (Ishitani and Baba, 2008). However, the focus shifted to hybrids away from batteries due to barriers like high costs, range limitations, charging times and insufficient charging infrastructure (Yarime, Shiroyama and Kuroki, 2008). The selection of hybrid drivetrains as the core electrification technology was symbolically illustrated by Toyota’s 1997 release of its Prius, the world’s first mass-market HEV. Coinciding with COP3 in Kyoto, the timing of this launch testified how Japanese automakers perceived climate change not as a threat but a business opportunity. 1997-2009: Accelerated reorientation to hybrids The following decade saw rapid growth in hybrid production and sales. By 2010, hybrids reached 10% of new sales domestically (Ishida et al., 2017). Simultaneously, automakers continued to rely on ICEVs as their “cash cow”, while maintaining development of batteries and hydrogen. Reorientation towards hybrids was propelled by successive model launches from Toyota and Honda for domestic and overseas markets, technological improvements including plug-in varieties, vigorous investments in manufacturing capacity (Dijk and Yarime, 2010; JSAE, 2014) and cost reduction efforts (Pohl, 2012; Penna and Geels, 2015). Hybrid vehicles also gave Japanese firms a strategic advantage, evidenced by their domination of global patents and sales (Pohl and Yarime, 2012). 2010-2022: Resistance towards BEVs and defence of HEVs Around 2010, two smaller automakers Nissan and Mitsubishi, having prioritised batteries as their core electrification strategy (Yarime, Shiroyama and Kuroki, 2008) leapfrogged hybrids to launch the world’s first mass-market BEVs – the i-MiEv and Leaf. Although sales remained well below hybrids, the Japanese state supported Japan’s early lead in BEV deployment by expanding funding charging infrastructure and promoting common interfaces and standards across firms (Shimamura, Kuwada and Hashimasa, 2013). With BEV commercialisation demonstrating the mass-market feasibility of battery-powered mobility, Japan’s larger automakers – whose electrification centred on hybrids – mounted a resistance strategy. Led by Toyota, with support from the Japan Automotive Manufacturers Association (JAMA) whose members include automakers lagging in electrification (Mazda) or focused on hybrids (Honda) (Wada and Inoue, 2022), a public messaging campaign (elaborated in 19 OFFICIAL OFFICIAL Section 3) was launched to discredit batteries as an electrification solution. This coalition emphasised the technological and environmental limitations of BEVs and advocated for a “multipronged” electrification pathway (Toyota, 2023). Resistance strategies amplified sharply around 2020–2021, following the Japanese state’s announcement of target for 100% ZEV sales by 2035 (Toyota, 2021b, Wada and Inoue, 2022, Pahwa, 2023). Concurrently, as domestic and overseas ZEV policies increasingly promoted battery-only drivetrains, Japan’s automakers intensified lobbying to ensure continued recognition of hybrid technologies (Tabuchi, 2021). 2022 to present: Serious reorientation towards BEV development while hedging In recent years, Japanese automakers have expanded their electrification focus to include BEVs, responding to multiple pressures discussed in Section 4. Toyota, Honda and Nissan have all announced plans to dramatically scale up BEV and battery production, including next-generation technologies such as solid-state batteries, while reducing ICE output. Yet automakers continue to pursue a multi-pronged pathway, retaining hybrids and plug-in varieties as the core focus alongside development of batteries, e-fuels and fuel-cells. Resistance to completely abolishing gasoline engines remains, with Toyota and JAMA consistently emphasising that the “enemy is carbon”, not the combustion engines itself (Toyota, 2021a; JAMA, 2024b). Q2. Drivers and causes of resistance Technological capacity and historical pathways Japanese automakers’ resistance to a battery-centric pathway reflects historical underinvestment in BEV technology and large-scale battery production (Wada and Inoue, 2022). The situation has eroded the global lead once enjoyed by Japanese battery makers when Mitsubishi and Nissan pioneered mass-market BEVs around 2010. Sluggish growth of the BEV market coupled with low demand for large-scale manufacturing of lithium-ion batteries due to the relatively short electric range of hybrids has left Japan behind other markets in battery production and upstream investments in minerals and components (Takafumi, 2023). Toyota’s resistance to BEVs also likely stems from unsuccessful historical attempts to realise longrange batteries using nickel-metal hydride chemistry (Åhman, 2006), selected for its hybrids. Additionally, during the 2000s both Toyota and Honda bet on hydrogen as their core ZEV strategy, each launching the world’s first mass-market FCEVs in 2014 and 2015 respectively. Despite achieving only limited sales of a few thousand units annually, these launches triggered conflated expectations of a “hydrogen society” (Trencher and Van der heijden, 2019), reinforcing perceptions among many government and industry actors that Japan should not solely focus on batteries in transport electrification. However, the failure of FCEVs to penetrate beyond niche segments in domestic and global passenger vehicle markets (Trencher and Wesseling, 2022) has left Japan’s major automakers without a viable electrification alternative, fostering their resistance to BEV-centric pathways. Governance style While the Japanese state has long promoted BEV development (Patchell, 1999; Åhman, 2006), norms in industrial and environmental policymaking have constrained progress. Japan’s political economy corresponds with a “state-influenced market economy” (Schmidt, 2007), with state bureaucrats actively shaping industrial development by coordinating the interests of competing 20 OFFICIAL OFFICIAL firms, relying on them for policy-relevant information. Moreover, most climate and energy matters are treated as industrial policy and handled by the Ministry of Trade and Economy and Industry (METI), whose core mission of advancing economic development limits its willingness to adopt stringent environmental policies that may impose economic consequences (Trencher et al., 2020). Instead, METI favours voluntary, incentive-based approaches and visions jointly shaped with industry (Åhman, 2006). Weak regulatory pressure Given this governance style, Japan lacks policies capable of forcing automakers to produce electric drivetrains (Trencher and Wesseling, 2022). Although the state aims to reach 100% electrified vehicle sales by 2035 (METI, 2021), this target lacks stringency in two respects. First, its electrification-spurring effect has been diluted by including hybrids. Second, unlike jurisdictions such as California, the EU and China, the target lacks regulatory or penalty mechanisms (Wada and Inoue, 2022). Economic dependence Car manufacturing industry is the largest contributor to Japan’s GDP, particularly following the post-2000 decline of semi-conductors and household electronics manufacturing due lost international competitiveness (Wada and Inoue, 2022). Because shifting to BEV production will likely entail initial losses on each vehicle sold, automotive industry and state actors share a strong economic incentive to delay the transition away from hybrids. Conversely, HEVs remain highly profitable for all Japan’s automakers, with demand growing both domestically (Figure 1) and internationally (Inajima, 2024). Toyota, for example, posted a record profit of ¥4.94 trillion ($US 30.85 billion) for the fiscal year ended in April 2024 – the highest ever by a Japanese company (Mainichi, 2024b). This was largely driven by growing demand for hybrids in foreign markets and increased sales following the yen’s weakening. Norms, values, and culture Japan’s sluggish BEV market is also attributable to low demand, a situation noted by Tesla’s CEO and international media (Randall, 2024). More broadly, Japanese consumers have shown low willingness to pay a premium for environmental benefits in other markets, for instance when choosing an electricity retailer (Chapman and Itaoka, 2018). Another cultural factor is the strong consumer loyalty to domestic brands. Yet consumers have limited choices for domestically made BEV models (Wada and Inoue, 2022) due to automakers’ prioritization of hybrids. Simultaneously, widespread industry and media promotion of hybrids likely reinforces confidence in their environmental benefits, dampening interest in BEVs. Actors and power distribution Political power within Japan’s automotive industry is disproportionately concentrated in Toyota, which accounts for more than half of domestic sales. Toyota also owns Daihatsu and stakes in Suzuki and Mazda. As a strong historical critic of BEVs and efforts to phase out gasoline engines, Toyota’s resistance has strongly influenced electrification strategies across industry and government policy. Until January 2024, Toyota’s chairman, Akio Toyoda, served as the head of JAMA, the primary association representing Japan’s automotive industry. Due to these close ties, the anti-BEV stances and electrification strategies promoted by Toyota and JAMA are virtually identical. Toyota also leverages this alignment in its messaging, for example by featuring JAMA’s resistance to BEVs and phasing out gasoline engines on its Toyota Times website (Toyota, 2021a). 21 OFFICIAL OFFICIAL Q3. Mechanisms and patterns of resistance A distinctive feature of the Japanese case is the absence of explicit resistance to the overarching policy goal of vehicle electrification. Unlike the US, where outright climate denial and disinformation are common, Japan’s automotive industry – and industry more broadly – has not challenged climate science as a means of opposing policy. Instead, resistance has centred on the electrification pathway rather than the direction of travel itself, particularly by defending hybrids and critiquing battery-centric approaches. Furthermore, resistance was minimal in early years, even after Californian policymakers introduced their ZEV mandate in 1990. Resistance intensified only in later years, triggered by emergence of a battery-centric trajectory following the launch of mass-market BEVs by Mitsubishi and Nissan in 2010, and subsequent international pressures against ICEs and hybrid vehicles as BEVs gained traction. The chief resistance strategies employed are elaborated below, each closely aligning with typologies found in the literature (Richter and Smith Stegen, 2022; Gentile and Gupta, 2025). Challenge government regulation To delay, weaken or prevent the introduction of BEV promoting policies, Japanese carmakers have pressured policymakers individually and through their trade association, JAMA. The core objective has been to ensure hybrids are included in ZEV targets (Tabuchi, 2021), though resistance strategies have also targeted emissions regulations for gasoline engines (Influence Map, 2022). Domestic lobbying intensified over 2021–2022 when Toyota and Honda, backed by JAMA, pressured the Japanese state to include HEVs in its 2035 target for 100% ZEV sales (Influence Map, 2022). Reuters reported that Toyota chairman Akio Toyoda personally visited the Ministry of Trade, Economy and Industry following announcement of the initial target, which excluded hybrids (Landers, 2020; Yamazaki, 2022). Following pressure from domestic automakers, this target was subsequently weakened to include hybrids and other alternative-fuel vehicles. Policymaking interference has also affected overseas markets. For instance, at the G7 Meeting on Climate, Energy and Environment in 2022, ministers from the US and Europe proposed a collective commitment to 100% ZEV sales by 2035. The Japanese state blocked this target, pressured by Toyota and its domestic industry (Yamazaki and Abnettt, 2022). Subsequently, a weaker commitment to “collectively reduce by at least 50 percent, CO2 emissions from G7 vehicle stock by 2035” (G7, 2023) was adopted in place. Warn of economic consequences Toyota and industry association JAMA have conducted extensive fearmongering campaigns through television, print and digital media, highlighting the negative economic impacts from transitioning to BEVs. Between 2020 and 2021, one campaign repeatedly claimed that 5.5 million people working in Japan’s automotive sector would face considerable economic harm and job losses if internal combustion engines were phased out too swiftly (Toyota, 2021a). This messaging also featured in a 2021 New Year’s address broadcast on national television and newspapers. Speaking from his position as the chairman of Toyota and JAMA, Akio Toyoda reiterated the economic significance of the 5.5 million working in the domestic automotive industry. Citing the name of Prime Minister Suga and the state’s 2050 climate neutrality target, he argued that this goal should not solely focus on “turning all cars into electrified vehicles”(Toyota, 2021c). Doubt the scientific data JAMA and Toyota have collaboratively leveraged public information campaigns challenging the environmental credibility of BEVs. This strategy gained traction after 2010, when the launch of mass-market BEVs by Mitsubishi and Nissan presented a competing electrification trajectory 22 OFFICIAL OFFICIAL (Valdes-Dapena, 2010; McDonald, 2014). Anti-BEV discourse initially focused on technological limitations like driving range and charging times. However, as improvements in battery technology have made such arguments less tenable, automakers have recently shifted their scepticism towards the environmental merits of BEV diffusion (Pahwa, 2023). This discourse intensified around 2021, following the Japanese government’s announcement of a 100% ZEV sales by 2035 target. In response, Toyota and Mazda argued that EVs offer limited well-to-wheel CO2 reductions (Wada and Inoue, 2022; Satrio, Juned and Salam, 2024), particularly given Japan’s reliance on fossil fuels for electricity generation (Toyota, 2021b). These claims notably contrast with the IPCC’s assessment, which finds that hybrids offer only “limited potential for deep reduction GHG emissions” due to their reliance on combustion (Jaramillo et al., 2022). Reframe polluting technologies Another resistance strategy involves redefining HEVs as “electric” through the domestically conceived category of “electrified” vehicles (dendosha in Japanese), which groups conventional and plug-in hybrids with fully electric BEVs and FCEVs. Initially advocated by Toyota (2021b), this categorisation diverges from international norms, where “ZEVs” typically include only BEVs and FCEVs, while “new energy vehicles” includes plug-in hybrids but exclude conventional varieties. The Japanese state has adopted this stretched interpretation, significantly weaking BEV diffusion ambitions. As noted, the target of reaching 100% electric vehicle sales by 2035 (METI, 2021) was revised to include hybrids following pressure from Toyota and JAMA (Yamazaki, 2022). Q4. Pathways to overcome resistance The analysis reveals important hints for policymakers and stakeholders regarding potential approaches to confront resistance to BEV-promoting policies, or situations where external pressures are weaking resistance dynamics. Foster strengths HEV adoption has grown rapidly in Japan, reaching 61% of new sales in 2024. In contrast, PHEVs accounted for only 1.7% of sales (JADA, 2025). Meanwhile, automakers are yet to commercialise extended-range varieties (EREV), where a small combustion engine recharges the battery. This reveals a significant gap in Japan’s hybrid market. Rather than abandoning Japan’s expertise in hybrid drivetrains, policymakers could further electrification goals by incentivising PHEV and EREV production. Expanding the share of plug-in models would not only strengthen Japan’s competitiveness in overseas hybrid markets, where demand for PHEVs is growing rapidly, but also align with Toyota’s strategy of positioning hybrids as “practical battery EVs” (Toyota, 2023). Notably, policymakers in China and California have stimulated BEV production by linking subsidies and credits to driving range, thereby encouraging innovation and longer-range models (Trencher et al., 2021; Wang, Li and Yang, 2025). Encroachment by foreign competitors Japanese automakers are facing mounting pressure to produce BEVs due to the increasing presence of foreign competitors in the domestic market. Shown in Figure 3, imported models have surged from only 10% of BEV sales in 2019 to reach 55% in 2024. Japan’s BEVs market is thus now controlled by foreign companies like Tesla, Hyundai, and more recently, China’s BYD, which aims to establish 100 showrooms by 2025. These foreign companies are not only expanding BEV model 23 OFFICIAL OFFICIAL availability but also investing in recharging infrastructure and marketing. This growing presence of foreign companies promises to boost public awareness of BEVs while lowering infrastructure and cost barriers. Fig. 3 Share of annual electric vehicle pure BEV sales in Japan by domestic and imported models Note. Author based on data from JADA (2025). Data excludes PHEVs, FCEVs and vehicles in kei (light car) category. International pressure Recent announcements by Japanese automakers to upscale BEV and battery production were chiefly driven by international rather than domestic pressures. Offshore markets are critical to Japan’s automakers, and by extension, the Japanese economy. Until surpassed by China in 2023, Japan was the world’s largest vehicle exporter (Balmer, 2024), with most vehicles produced overseas (JAMA, 2024a). Yet rising regulatory pressure and demand for BEVs in key markets – including California, the US and China – are forcing a reassessment of Japan’s hybrid-centric strategy. The EU, for example, excludes hybrids from its ZEVs targets. Meanwhile, governments in key Southeast Asian markets such as Thailand and Indonesia are also introducing preferential fiscal policies to encourage local BEV production. With specialised Chinese BEV makers rapidly gaining market share at home and across Asia, Japanese vehicles are losing competitiveness, even facing the need to close factories (Itoda, 2024; Mainichi, 2024a). Overhauling outdated charging infrastructure Japan’s limited and outdated charging infrastructure impedes BEV diffusion in two ways (Wada and Inoue, 2022). First, the network lacks density and coverage. As of August 2024,it comprised only 12,600 fast chargers – many concentrated in Nissan and Mitsubishi dealerships – and 25,900 standard chargers (GoGoEV, 2025). Not only has expansion stagnated, but between 2020 and 2023 the network shrank as some municipalities and firms dismantled underused or unprofitable chargers (Une, 2023). Second, Japan’s early leadership in infrastructure deployment resulted in large investments in low-voltage devices, unsuited to the rapid charging capabilities of modern BEVs (METI, 2023b). To address these shortcomings, the Japanese government? announced in 2023 a target to reach 300,000 vehicle chargers by 2030 (Yomiuri, 2023). This will effectively grow Japan’s charging network tenfold and drastically increase the availability of multi-vehicle high-speed (150 kW) 24 OFFICIAL OFFICIAL chargers (METI, 2023a). Simultaneously, the state has begun awarding higher BEV subsidies to models produced by companies that invest in installing public charging installations. Conclusion The analysis illustrates how Japan’s early leadership in BEV development and lithium-ion battery manufacturing gave way to stagnation, as its largest automakers – including Toyota, Honda and Nissan – rapidly embraced a hybrid-based electrification pathway. By reorienting towards electrification much earlier than other markets, the prioritisation of hybrids has limited investments in BEV and long-range battery production as well as supply chains for components and critical minerals. The Japanese case thus underscores how resistance to technological transitions can emerge from path-dependant innovation trajectories. The case also highlights the temporal character of resistance dynamics, since opposition to ZEV policies was low in early years, when the electrification pathway was unsettled, but later intensified, when BEVs emerged as a competing trajectory. While domestic and global demand for hybrids has grown, the Japanese automotive industry’s focus on hybrids as the primary near-term solution is increasingly challenged by regulatory trends abroad. Foreign policymakers, driven by urgent decarbonisation schedules, have little incentive to support bridging technologies dominated by Japanese firms. Despite Japanese automakers recently announcing commitments to expand BEVs production, weak domestic demand, underdeveloped charging infrastructure and limited model choices for consumers constrains growth potential. Meanwhile, the financial success of Japan’s burgeoning hybrid market weakens the momentum to pursue a full transition to battery-only mobility, reinforcing the soundness of industry’s ongoing insistence on a “multi-pronged” approach. With hybrids included in Japan’s 2035 target for 100% electrified vehicle sales, a more pragmatic near-term strategy may lie in accelerating the shift from conventional hybrids to plug-ins, leveraging them as a stepping stone to foster longer-range electrification capability. References Åhman, M. (2006). Government policy and the development of electric vehicles in Japan. Energy Policy, 34(4), 433–443. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2004.06.011 Balmer, E. (2024, January 31). China seized Japan's crown for vehicle exports in 2023, data shows. The Japan Times. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/business/2024/01/31/economy/china-beats-japan-vehicleexports/ Chapman, A., & Itaoka, K. (2018). Curiosity, economic and environmental reasoning: Public perceptions of liberalization and renewable energy transition in Japan. Energy Research & Social Science, 37, 102–110. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2017.09.026 Dijk, M., & Yarime, M. (2010). The emergence of hybrid-electric cars: Innovation path creation through co-evolution of supply and demand. Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 77(8), 1371–1390. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2010.05.001 G7. (2023). G7 2023 Transport Ministers’ Meeting. G7 Transport Ministerial Declaration. 25 OFFICIAL OFFICIAL Gentile, G., & Gupta, J. (2025). Orchestrating the narrative: The role of fossil fuel companies in delaying the energy transition. Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 212, 115359. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2025.115359 GoGoEV. (2025). EV Juden sutando jojo saito (EV charging station information website) [In Japanese]. https://ev.gogo.gs Inajima, T. (2024, May 15). Hybrids delivering cash chest for Toyota, Honda’s EV ambitions. Bloomberg. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-05-15/hybrids-deliveringcash-chest-for-toyota-honda-s-ev-ambitions?embedded-checkout=true Influence Map. (2022). The automotive sector and climate change: Assessing automakers climate strategies against a 1.5°C aligned transition. https://influencemap.org/report/TheAutomotive-Sector-and-Climate-Change-18218 Ishitani, H., & Baba, Y. (2008). The Japanese strategy for R&D on fuel-cell technology and on-road verification test of fuel-cell vehicles. In Making choices about hydrogen: Transport issues for developing countries (pp. 64–84). New York: United Nations University Press. Itoda, T. (2024, February 11). Japanese automakers’ new car market share plummeting in Thailand. Yomiuri. https://japannews.yomiuri.co.jp/business/20240211-168067/ JADA. (2025). Nenryobetsu Hanbaidaisu Jyoyoshya (Passenger vehicles sales figures by fuel type) [In Japanese]. http://www.jada.or.jp/data/month/m-fuel-hanbai/ JAMA. (2024a). Kaigai seisan (Overseas production) [In Japanese]. https://www.jama.or.jp/statistics/facts/foreign_prdct/index.html JAMA. (2024b). Katayama to lead JAMA from January 2024 – JAMA press conference November 2023. https://www.jama.or.jp/english/news/press-conference/2023/423/ Jaramillo, P., Kahn Ribeiro, S., Newman, P., Dhar, S., Diemuodeke, O. E., Kajino, T., Lee, D. S., Nugroho, S. B., Ou, X., Hammer Strømman, A., & Whitehead, J. (2022). Chapter 10: Transport. In Climate change 2022: Mitigation of climate change. Contribution of Working Group III to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge, UK and New York: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009157926.012 JSAE. (2014). Hybrid vehicles, electric vehicles, fuel cell electric vehicles. https://www.jsae.or.jp/files_publish/page/1225/11_hv_ev_fcev.pdf Landers, P. (2020, December 5). Toyota’s chief says electric vehicles are overhyped. Wall Street Journal. https://www.wsj.com/articles/toyotas-chief-says-electric-vehicles-areoverhyped-11608196665 32 OFFICIAL OFFICIAL Q3. Mechanisms and Patterns of Resistance Many of the mechanisms of resistance found in the BEV case appeared in the NOx and diesel soot pollution cases (Richter and Smith Stegen 2022). They are tried and true methods. A significant difference, however, are the changes in playing field and antagonists. Instead of the German government versus industry and lobbyists, centered in Berlin, the BEV case features the EU versus German manufacturers, lobbyists, and government, with the locus in Brussels. “Warn of Economic Consequences” This tactic is typically used by incumbents to rouse fear that changes, if enacted, will result in negative economic consequences, such as unemployment (Denniss 2012), higher prices (Lee and Hess 2019), and diminished customer demand (Richter and Smith Stegen 2022). In the BEV case this tactic was deployed by myriad actors, including German politicians, the VDA, and unions. For example, BMW’s CEO warned that the EU’s ZEV goal will have employment consequences (Appel and Peitsmeier 2024). Germany’s main trade union, IG Metall, has also raised concerns about EVrelated unemployment. IG Metall’s position is complex, however, because it has both promoted the transition to EVs—to secure Germany’s future competitiveness and thus future jobs—and has expressed reservations about the transition’s threat to current jobs. “Criticize External Interference” Incumbents employ this tactic to protest government-selected fixes, which they portray as undermining incumbent expertise and technologically suboptimal (Smink et al. 2015; Richter and Smith Stegen 2022). The VDA has been Germany’s primary critic of the EU’s BEV preference and has argued for neutrality regarding different technologies, such as hydrogen, fuel cells, and e-fuels (VDA 2023). “Formal Lobbying” Lobbyists are often effective because they provide policy makers with alternative interpretations and technical information. Unfortunately, they can also spread disinformation and work against sustainability transitions if these changes threaten their principals. Regarding automaker advocacy, InfluenceMap—which tracks lobbying around the world—states that “negative lobbying by automakers is a key barrier to climate policy and higher electric vehicle uptake (2024, 3).” In the EU, InfluenceMap blames Volkswagen’s Porsche subsidiary, the VDA, and the European Automobile Manufacturers Association (ACEA), for the EU’s weakened ZEV policy. “Revolving Door” or “Informal Lobbying” The “revolving door” concept denotes the movement of personnel between government, firms, and lobbying groups (Schneider et al. 2024). The revolving door in Germany has been particularly successful because of the connections between German politicians and former politicians in industry and lobbying positions and German politicians with positions in the EU. Such dense interconnections allow informal, elite lobbying to influence the EU. In 2017, for example, the EC drafted new legislation for vehicle CO2 targets and contemplated a quota for ZEVs. To stop or at least soften the requirements for ZEVs, VDA’s President, a former German politician, contacted other German politicians, some of whom held EU positions, and was able to get the quota temporarily dismissed (Haas and Sander 2020). 33 OFFICIAL OFFICIAL Q4. Pathways to Overcome Resistance Substantial pressure is the main factor in overcoming incumbent resistance and pushing movement towards transitions. In the NOx and diesel soot emission cases, years of political and public pressure finally forced the automakers to change. In the BEV case, four sources of pressure appear salient: market access, demand, regulations, and competition. Two of these can be directly influenced and one lends itself to indirect influence. Demand Consumer demand rose in Germany after the government provided economic incentives, such as tax exemptions and purchase premiums. An additional factor of BEV demand is the availability of charging stations (Secinaro et al. 2022), which is a weak area of Germany’s transportation infrastructure. By supporting purchase premiums and the development of adequate infrastructure, the German government could significantly help the transition to BEVs. The Chinese experience is illuminating. Between 2009 and 2022, the government spent $29 billion to fund China’s EV industry and stimulate demand, a strategy that paid off in spades. Since 2014 China has been the world’s largest EV market and has become the world’s largest producer of low-cost EVs. Regulations The German government has worked as part of the trifecta to delay or derail EU regulations. However, regulations are one of the most powerful tools for directly influencing incumbents. The EU has consistently pushed EU automakers to reduce their products’ carbon emissions. In addition to the policies already mentioned, from 2026 onwards, the EU will tighten tailpipe emission particle standards and penalize automakers for “excess emissions” (EC 2024). As such policies make ICEs more expensive as well as less likely to meet targets, they increase the attractiveness for automakers to switch from ICEs to BEVs. Competition The rise of new BEV competitors, such as Tesla or China’s companies, have transformed global markets. The EU, alarmed by the rapid market penetration of Chinese car companies, announced higher tariffs in mid-2024, with the justification that Chinese government subsidies constitute unfair trade practices. As of Spring 2025, the EU and China are discussing minimum prices rather than tariffs. However, even if the EU is successful, Chinese companies will challenge EU automakers in other markets. The EU, by removing pressure on its firms to produce less expensive EVs, might jeopardize their ability to compete elsewhere. Indeed, the EU’s companies are already less competitive. In late 2024, Volkswagen’s CEO revealed that the company was in crisis and referred to the challenges posed by new market players. In response, a Volkswagen representative for employees accused management of having been too slow in developing affordable EVs. Conclusion Germany’s auto industry, known for its powerful and popular ICE vehicles, provides five percent of Germany’s GDP and over 800,000 jobs. For decades it has been under market and regulatory pressure to embrace electromobility and, more recently, under EU pressure to phase out ICEs. Despite exploring other propulsion technologies, the manufacturers are still wedded to their ICE cash cows. To resist the EU’s initiatives, Germany’s automobile stakeholders (government, industry, and lobbyists) have deployed numerous tactics, such as warning of economic consequences, criticizing technological interference, and lobbying. As the case history indicates, 34 OFFICIAL OFFICIAL overcoming this resistance requires a high degree of pressure, particularly exposure to competition, consumer demand, and ever more stringent regulations. References Altenburg, T., Schamp, E. W., & Chaudhary, A. (2016). The emergence of electromobility: Comparing technological pathways in France, Germany, China and India. Science and Public Policy, 43(4), 464–475. https://doi.org/10.1093/scipol/scv054 Appel, H., & Peitsmeier, H. (2024, February 7). BMW-Chef Zipse: „Die Einführung des EUVerbrenner-Verbots war naiv“. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. https://www.faz.net/aktuell/wirtschaft/unternehmen/bmw-chef-zipse-die-einfuehrung-des-euverbrenner-verbots-war-naiv-19715843.html Book, S., Demling, A., Fahrion, G., Giesen, C., Hage, S., & Hesse, M. (2024). Electric Shock: An Existential Crisis in the German Auto Industry. Der Spiegel. https://www.spiegel.de/international/business/electric-shock-an-existential-crisis-in-the-germanauto-industry-a-266bd037-b63a-4c9b-97b5-423866d7080f Budde, B., Alekmade, F., & Weber, K. M. (2012). Expectations as a key to understanding actor strategies in the field of fuel cell and hydrogen vehicles. Technological Forecasting & Social Change, 79(6), 1072–1083. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2011.12.012 Bundesregierung. (2009). Nationaler Entwicklungsplan Elektromobilität der Bundesregierung. https://bmdv.bund.de/blaetterkatalog/catalogs/219176/pdf/complete.pdf International Organization of Motor Vehicle Manufacturers. (2024). Deutschland Kraftfahrzeugproduktion. https://www.ceicdata.com/de/indicator/germany/motor-vehicleproduction Denniss, R. (2012). The use and abuse of economic modelling in Australia: Users’ guide to tricks of the trade (Technical Brief No. 12). The Australia Institute. https://australiainstitute.org.au/wpcontent/uploads/2020/12/TB-12-The-use-and-abuse-of-economic-modelling-in-Australia_4.pdf Directorate-General for Climate Action. (2023, March 28). Fit for 55: EU reaches new milestone to make all new cars and vans zero-emission from 2035. European Commission. https://climate.ec.europa.eu/news-your-voice/news/fit-55-eu-reaches-new-milestone-make-allnew-cars-and-vans-zero-emission-2035-2023-03-28_en European Commission. (2024). CO₂ emission performance standards for cars and vans. https://climate.ec.europa.eu/eu-action/transport/road-transport-reducing-co2-emissionsvehicles/co2-emission-performance-standards-cars-and-vans_en Gearino, D. (2020, June 11). Love is Blind: How Germany’s Long Romance With Cars Led to the Nation’s Biggest Clean Energy Failure. Inside Climate News. https://insideclimatenews.org/news/11062020/germany-transportation-auto-industryvolkswagen-tesla-clean-energy/ 35 OFFICIAL OFFICIAL Haas, T., & Sander, H. (2020). Decarbonizing transport in the European Union: Emission performance standards and the perspectives for a European Green Deal. Sustainability, 12(20), 8381. https://doi.org/10.3390/su12208381 Herberg, J., Haas, T., Oppold, D., & Von Schneidemesser, D. (2020). A collaborative transformation beyond coal and cars? Co-creation and corporatism in the German energy and mobility transitions. Sustainability, 12(8), 3278. https://doi.org/10.3390/su12083278 InfluenceMap. (2024). Automakers and climate policy advocacy: A global analysis. https://influencemap.org/report/Automakers-and-Climate-Policy-Advocacy-A-Global-Analysis27906 Kraftfahrt-Bundesamt. (2024). Monatliche Neuzulassungen. https://www.kba.de/DE/Statistik/Fahrzeuge/Neuzulassungen/MonatlicheNeuzulassungen/monatl _neuzulassungen_node.html Krzywdzinski, M., Lechowski, G., Ferdinand, J., & Schneiß, D. (2023). The German path to electromobility and its impacts on automotive production and employment. In B. Galgóczi (Ed.), On the way to electromobility – A green(er) but more unequal future? (pp. 179–206). ETUI. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/369800347_The_German_path_to_electromobility_an d_its_impacts_on_automotive_production_and_employment Lee, D., & Hess, D. J. (2019). Incumbent resistance and the solar transition: Changing opportunity structures and framing strategies. Environmental Innovation and Societal Transitions, 33, 183–195. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eist.2019.05.005 Mazur, C., Contestabile, M., Offer, G. J., & Brandon, N. P. (2015). Understanding the drivers of fleet emission reduction activities of the German car manufacturers. Environmental Innovation and Societal Transitions, 16, 3–21. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eist.2015.06.002 Poplawski, K. (2020). Crisis in the German automotive industry (OSW Centre for Eastern Studies, 79). https://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/PV_At-a-crossroads_net.pdf Richter, I., & Haas, T. (2020). Greening the car? Conflict dynamics within the German platform for electric mobility. Sustainability, 12(19), 8043. https://doi.org/10.3390/su12198043 Richter, I., & Stegen, K. S. (2022). A choreography of delay: The response of German auto incumbents to environmental policy. Environmental Innovation and Societal Transitions, 45, 1–13. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eist.2022.08.002 Schneider, J., Trencher, G., Bsumek, P. K., Downie, C., Gellert, P. K., Mattioli, G., … Youriev, B. (2025). How coal, utilities, and transportation industries impede climate action. In J. T. Roberts, C. R. S. Milani, J. Jacquet, & C. Downie (Eds.), Global assessment of climate obstruction. Oxford University Press. Forthcoming. Secinaro, S., Calandra, D., Lanzalonga, F., & Ferraris, A. (2022). Electric vehicles’ consumer behaviours: Mapping the field and providing a research agenda. Journal of Business Research, 150, 399–416. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusres.2022.06.011 36 OFFICIAL OFFICIAL Smink, M. M., Hekkert, M. P., & Negro, S. O. (2015). Keeping sustainable innovation on a leash? Exploring incumbents’ institutional strategies. Business Strategy and the Environment, 24(2), 86– 101. https://doi.org/10.1002/bse.1808 Verband der Automobilindustrie (VDA). (2023). “Green-Deal-Industrial-Plan” der EU-Kommission. https://www.vda.de/dam/jcr:5b491466-e067-4281-a87dca130a1b2109/Green%20Deal%20Industrial%20Plan.pdf?mode=view Verband der Automobilindustrie (VDA). (2024). Domestic car production declines in first half of year. https://www.vda.de/en/press/pressreleases/2024/240703_Car_production_in_Germany_June_2024 37 OFFICIAL OFFICIAL Electricity case study – South Africa Author: Britta Rennkamp, African Climate and Development Initiative, University of Cape Town Q1. Introduction The progress of decarbonization of South Africa’s electricity sector over the past 30 years has been slow and unsteady, despite abundant renewable energy resources. The transition towards more sustainable electricity systems co-evolved with the global sustainability agenda and the political transition to democracy in the 1990s. The concept of “transition” in South Africa has a strong connotations with historical political struggles against powerful and entrenched interests over long periods of time (Swilling and Annecke 2012). 14 Resistance to sustainability transition in the electricity sectors emerges largely, but not exclusively from the historical beneficiaries of industries, state owned enterprises and mining operations benefiting from coal based electricity. The productive systems evolving from competing dynamics between colonialism and resistance in the mining and energy sectors continue to stand at the core of the transitions away from coal. The ownership models and hiring practices in the mining sector relied on racial segregation and migration shaping a divisive labor and wealth distribution system throughout the 19th and 20th century which continues to characterize the social fabric of the world’s most unequal society of the present (Wilson 2003). Three decades of democracy may have softened, but not yet reversed these dynamics, despite efforts of changing ownership and economic participation through procurement regulations such as Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment (BBBEE) (Busse et al 2025). Two thirds of the population of 63 million South Africans are at risk of poverty and live in a struggle to meet basic needs, with a third of the working population formally unemployed (StatSA 2024). The racial wealth gap persists, with a typical ‘black’ household holding 5% of the assets of a typical ‘white’ household (Chelwa et al. 2023). The transition and resistance in the electricity sector can be characterized in four phases of regime formation (Avelino and Rotmans 2009): Phase I (1990-2007) was a pre-formation phase in the 1990s and early 2000s which co-evolved with nationbuilding, the ambitious constitution, goals to develop renewable energy through white paper processes (RSA 2003) and the electricity act (RSA 2006). The focus during this phase was on grid expansion and electricity access to ensure that historically disadvantaged households could benefit from electricity (Bekker et al 2008). Incumbent actors in the fossil fuel industries did not experience much pressure to change their ‘business of usual’, as South Africa came under the threat of the AIDS epidemic, which required activists and academia to attend to a new social struggle to control HIV/AIDS and to combat state-driven denialism (Fassien and Schneider 2003). Phase II (20072015) marked an acceleration phase in the transition resulting from a combination of events. In 2007, the state-owned utility Eskom could not meet the electricity demand of a growing economy and implemented rolling black outs as their request for new capital to add more generation capacity remained unattended (Eskom 2024). In 2011, the country hosted the 17th Conference of the Parties of the UN Framework Convention in Climate Change which opened up opportunities for the implementation of three main climate mitigation policies: i) the Climate Response White Paper (with a carbon budget approach), ii) a Carbon Tax and iii) the Renewable Energy Independent Power Procurement Program (REIPPPP). The REIPPPP is a competitive auction program which allowed independent power producers (IPPs) to generate electricity from wind, solar, biomass and hydroelectric sources with price guarantees based on price, local content and social development contributions. The program broke Eskom's monopoly on electricity generation and obliged the utility to purchase renewable energy through power purchase agreements. This obligation turned into the program's weak point, as Eskom manifested its resistance in refusing to sign in 2015 (Ting and Byrne, 2020, RSA 2019). 38 OFFICIAL OFFICIAL Phase III (2015-2019) resulted in a deceleration and stagnation phase reversing progress in the transition towards renewable energy quickly, including the impacts of the local content requirements and procurement provisions that aimed to build a domestic industry. The factories for wind turbine towers closed in the response to the delays in procurement windows, the solar PV industry moved to importing predominantly from China (TIPS 2024, Ember 2025). The delays in the procurement of new generation capacity in combination with underinvestment and deviation of public funding allocated to maintenance of the aging coal plants led to supply shortages. Eskom returned to conducting rolling power outages to reduce the risk of a total black out of the system. The period of state capture may sound short, but the impacts on society and public institutions are long lasting and difficult to reverse (Pillay et al 2023). Phase IV (20192025) acceleration through privatization and crises response – The nation-building and anti-corruption agenda under President Ramaphosa aimed to restore the integrity of Eskom and other affected state entities by the operations of state capture (Zondo 2020). The efficiency levels of the coal plants remained low, despite budget allocations for maintenance at competitive levels. As the economic activity resumed after the lock down measures in response to COVID 19, South Africans went through unprecedented levels of loadshedding in the years 2022 and 2023 with high losses to human well-being and economic growth. 15 The severe impacts of the electricity crisis on economic performance and projected losses of electoral support created opportunities to overcome resistance within the government. A bundle of reforms accelerated progress in overcoming the electricity supply shortages through opening up the market for private investors, businesses and residents, catering for those who can invest and already have assets. Banks, for example, facilitated the transition to provide finance for rooftop photovoltaic systems against home loans and access a tax exemption on solar panels (RSA 2023). The electricity sector, in 2024/2025 generated 208 199 GWh, with 54 283 MW installed capacity by the national utility and state owned enterprise Eskom, as well as renewable energy independent power producers (IPPs) (Eskom 2024). Figure 1: An additional 7039 MW of privately installed rooftop photovoltaic solar power was installed mainly in response to the intermittent coal supply during the power crisis in 2022 and 2023. As shown in Figure 2, the rooftop generation provide half of South Africa’s renewable energy capacity in 2025 (Eskom 2025). 39 OFFICIAL OFFICIAL Figure 2 The rapid private response to the reform shows an acceleration in an otherwise slow transition away from a carbon intensive and coal dependent economy. Figure 3 shows the fits and starts in transition to renewable energy. However, only xx % of the total electricity is from renewable sources. There is a long way to go before astabilisation phase in which a new dynamic state of equilibrium with a new renewable electricity regime replaces the existing regime (Rotmans et al., 2001). 40 OFFICIAL OFFICIAL Figure 3 Q2. Drivers and causes of resistance The main drivers and causes of resistance to sustainability transitions stem from the actors in the political economic systems who benefit from fossil fuels and cheap electricity supply. The production and consumption of fossil fuels are closely intertwined. The co-evolution of the state, mining interests and extractive industries in South Africa has been explained as a minerals-energy-complex (Rustomjee and Fine 1996). The interconnected mining, state and energy intensive businesses operations provided capital based on cheap coal based electricity for decades, which is no longer sustainable (Baker et al 2014). Further resistance stems from the incumbents trajectories of technologies and infrastructure, as the combination of abundant coal resources, cheap electricity and government subsidies nurtured one of the largest petrochemical industries in the Global South, which focuses on the production of liquid fuels and byproducts from coal and gas. These industries were historically heavily subsidised through fossil fuel subsidies, which continue to sustain emissions intensive business, despite commitments to change (Burton et al 2018). Similarly, Eskom’s fleet of 15 coal plants with an average age of 41 years and a combined generation capacity of 41 GW (Eskom 2014) run at relatively low efficiency rates, despite internationally competitive budget for maintenance and operation (VGBE 2023). So far, the natural endowments in coal and minerals continue to trump the development of the renewable energy potential. While the contribution of the mining sector to the GDP is declining, with under 10%, gold, platinum, diamond, coal and chrome exports and beneficiation generate government revenue and foreign currency to support the highly volatile rand (DMRE 2025). South Africa produces an average of 224 million tons of coal annually, exports 25% percent as the fifth largest exporter and uses the remainder for electricity 41 OFFICIAL OFFICIAL generation (53%), petrochemical industries (33%), 12% for metallurgical industries and the remaining 2 % for domestic heating and cooking (Eskom 2021). South Africa is endowed with abundant natural resources and an environment that can meet its electricity demand through renewable energy technology (CSAG wind atlas/ CSIR 2016). The annual average solar radiation with 220 w/m per 24h average (DMRE 2024). Similarly, wind resources are sufficiently competitive to achieve a 30% load factor in over 80% of the land mass. The distribution of the wind resources means that on shore wind turbines can generate electricity competitively in most parts of the country, not just along the coastline (CSIR 2016). A major cause of resistance grounds in historical norms, values and culture, which intersect with the struggle against the infrastructure and labour practices established under the colonial and apartheid regimes. Organized labor has been pivotal in both resistance and progress of the transition (Cock 2019). Many of the former trade unionists are serving in today’s political elites and initiated the progress to develop policy and institutions moving away from fossil fuels. At the same time, the energy and mining sectors continue to generate profits, which results in ambivalent directions of both government policy and positioning of labor movements. Finally, the electricity sector itself turns into a driver of resistance, as it absorbs most climate finance and other livelihood dimensions get overlooked. The energy sector accounts for 78% the country’s emissions of 435 827 GgCo2eq (in 2022) and put the country with 0.179 ktoe per unit GDP well above the world average of 0.111 ktoe into the bracket of one of the most energy intensive economies in the world (RSA 2024). As a result, most climate finance focuses on efforts in mitigation (97%), despite the high vulnerability to climate change and needs for adaptation. South Africa is one of 17 megadiverse nations in plant and animal life. Nearly a quarter of South African plant life is classified as either threatened with extinction or of conservation concern, resulting from habitat loss and degradation, natural disasters, harvesting, pollution and climate change (SANBI 2024). The intersecting crisis in climate change, energy supply and inequalities have surfaced the vulnerabilities of human livelihoods and exacerbated existing structures of deprivation. As a result, the discourses for sustainability transition call for justice well beyond the electricity sector. Q3. Mechanism and patterns of resistance Patterns of resistance to the transition towards renewable energy can be understood from the tensions between competing coalitions between protecting tangible benefits emerging between the mining and industrial sectors, with coal at its central fuel and advocacy for decarbonisation and provision of public goods (Rennkamp 2019). Firstly, large parts of the resistance to renewable energy emerge from the conflicting agendas in regime where state system continues to support incumbent fossil fuel industries and infrastructure, despite commitments to decarbonise the same industries. Fossil fuel subsidies take many shapes; direct subsidies include support of coalfired electricity and liquid fuel production, emergency subsidies for diesel-based generation of electricity, emergency bailouts and price guarantees; indirect subsidies are state guarantees and free loans for the provision of supporting infrastructure, such as the state provision of railways, pipelines and other infrastructure central to the core of the minerals-energy complex (Burton et al 2018). The continuous support of the incumbent regime and emergency bailout result in insufficient budget allocation to implement the formal policies and regulations, such as the free basic alternative energy and energy access (Mohlakoane 2014). Secondly, informal networks and benefits outside the legal institutions add another layer to the formal resistance in the value chains and their actors in the coal and mining industries. These unspoken subsidies 48 OFFICIAL OFFICIAL and state governments. Bipartisan commitment to net zero emissions by 2050 also increased investor certainty to pursue renewable energy projects. Continued acceleration of the transition to renewable electricity is threatened by several factors. First, significant investment in transmission infrastructure is needed to support connection of utility-scale wind and solar projects. Not enough has been done to secure social licence for such projects and local opposition to some proposals is growing. Second, electricity grid management has become more complex as a grid designed for centralised generation is retrofitted for distributed generation. Further investments are needed to manage the variability of renewable energy sources. Investments in grid infrastructure are experienced by customers as rises in the network component of electricity bills, which translates to political pressure. Finally, there remains a strong political constituency in support of fossil fuel use which is pushing for greater domestic use of natural gas and even abandonment of net zero emission targets. Q2. Drivers and causes of resistance The actors resisting change include businesses profiting from fossil fuels, their industry associations and lobbyists, and supportive governments. The role of these actors was exposed in 2006 when journalists revealed that a cabal of fossil fuel lobbyists self-described as the Greenhouse Mafia heavily shaped and even wrote climate policy (Baer, 2016; Crowley, 2013; C. Hamilton, 2007; Pearse, 2007; Pearse et al., 2013). Members included the Australian Coal Association, the Minerals Council of Australia, the Business Council of Australia, the Australian Petroleum Production and Exploration Association (now known as Australian Energy Producers), and the Australian Industry Greenhouse Network (whose membership included essentially all fossil fuel companies operating in Australia). Together, these actors perpetuated a fossil fuel hegemony (O. Hamilton et al., 2023). Their motivations for resistance are financial (e.g. the need to maximise profit for shareholders, self-interest) and ideological (e.g. belief in small government, political opportunism). The existing electricity infrastructure itself resists transition because it was designed to meet the needs of large, inflexible coal-fired power stations built close to coal mines rather than variable, distributed renewable energy located throughout the grid. Moving from a grid built and managed for constant oneway flow of electricity to one that must balance fluctuating multi-directional flows is a substantial technical and regulatory challenge. New transmission infrastructure is needed to connect regions rich in renewable energy resources and new grid management technologies are needed to cope with the growing adoption of rooftop solar PV, batteries and electric vehicles by households and businesses. Higher electricity bills resulting from this investment are frequently cited as a reason to slow transition to renewable energy. However, distributed renewables can also reduce grid investment by providing energy locally. The institutional arrangements for electricity governance are complex, with responsibilities split between the Australian Government and State and Territory Governments and three market bodies (Australian Energy Regulator, Australian Energy Market Commission and Australian Energy Market Operator) taking on distinct roles in overseeing the electricity market. Market liberalisation also reduced government ownership in the electricity sector, limiting their potential to directly lead transition. The lack of bipartisan political support for climate action in Australia has contributed to weak and inconsistent energy policy (Lucas, 2017). The National Electricity Law (NEL) governing the sector did not include any objectives relating to climate change or greenhouse gas emission reduction until 2023. Regulators took guidance from the NEL so system planning focused primarily on reliability of supply rather than transition to renewable energy (Riedy et al., 2022). The 2023 revision to the NEL has seen regulators start to shift towards facilitating transition. Australia has abundant wind and solar resources to support transition. However, there are often vast distances between major population centres and ideal generation sites. Connecting renewable energy into 49 OFFICIAL OFFICIAL the grid requires a substantial investment in transmission and distribution infrastructure. Renewable power stations and associated grid infrastructure can compete for farming and grazing land, impact biodiversity, threaten places with cultural significance to First Nations peoples and have visual impacts, provoking local opposition. Australia’s vulnerability to bushfires, flooding, droughts and intense storms linked to climate change has directly influenced the dynamics of transition. The 2007 election of the Rudd Government came towards the end of the long Millennium Drought, which saw some cities and towns running out of water and significant restrictions on water use across much of Australia. Advocates for climate action successfully linked these conditions to climate change in public debate. Electricity transmission and distribution infrastructure can also be directly impacted by climate-related events, leading to power outages. Opponents of renewable energy have used supportive media platforms to incorrectly blame these outages on policies supporting renewable energy, creating public doubt about the reliability of renewable energy (Lucas, 2017). The norms, values and culture of industry actors also drive resistance. Until 2012, predictable demand growth fostered an industry culture focused on building centralised supply to reliably meet ever-increasing demand. Large-scale, centralised power stations became the norm, and the industry developed expertise around these technologies. There was no strong driver to develop innovative or agile organisations, leaving the industry poorly prepared for rapid transition. Meanwhile, both major political parties followed global trends and pursued neoliberal economic agendas, making them reluctant to intervene in liberalised electricity markets, even when it was clear markets would not respond to climate change without regulation. When a Labor Government did intervene to legislate an emission trading scheme in 2012, fierce opposition led by the Coalition parties and supportive media interests opened a deep political divide over climate action. Climate action became a victim of the global culture wars. Conservative politicians and media denied that climate change was real, downplaying its longterm impact and exploiting fear about the short-term cost of climate action. Progressive politicians called for stronger government intervention to respond to climate change. As a result of this polarisation, climate change policy shifted with every election, creating an uncertain investment environment. At a community scale, Della Bosca and Gillespie (2018) show the deep cultural ties to coal in communities that have historically relied on coal mining or coal-fired power stations for employment. This can lead communities to resist transition and influences politicians representing those electorates. Q3. Mechanisms and patterns of resistance Hamilton et al. (2023) show how fossil fuel hegemony has been maintained in Australia through mechanisms of establishment, entrenchment and encroachment. Establishment refers to justification of fossil fuel use through connection to the ‘founding myths of colonialism in Australia’ (O. Hamilton et al., 2023, p. 2301). Fossil fuel proponents argue that Australia’s quality of life and cultural identity, particularly in regional areas where fossil fuel resources are located, is reliant on continued exploitation of those resources. Entrenchment refers to recognised processes of lock-in (Unruh, 2000) that normalise a system of technology and infrastructure around and supported by fossil fuels (O. Hamilton et al., 2023). This system is protected by a tight network of fossil fuel advocates at the nexus of state and industry (Baer, 2016; Biggs, 2016). Encroachment refers to the fossil fuel industry’s use of the problems it has caused as a mechanism for its own expansion, for example through advocacy for carbon capture and storage, ‘clean coal’ and natural gas as a transition fuel, and strategic expansion of their portfolios to include renewable energy (Ford & Newell, 2021; O. Hamilton et al., 2023). Clean coal technologies, for example, have failed to materialise but regime investment in their development creates the impression of action on climate change while diverting resources from support for renewable energy. 50 OFFICIAL OFFICIAL Mechanisms of resistance can also be categorised as political, economic and discursive (Crowley, 2013; Hudson, 2020; Pearse et al., 2013). Political strategies include active lobbying of federal and state governments (often backed up with partisan economic modelling) and coordinated action to present a united political front by mobilising existing organisations, defending these from attack or capture, and creating new organisations (Hudson, 2020). As noted above, fossil fuel lobbyists guided climate change policy during the Howard Government, and they continue to exert political pressure (O. Hamilton et al., 2023; Hudson, 2019, 2020). Lobbying also creates the favourable economic conditions that allow ‘price gouging by the energy utilities, profiteering and tax avoidance by multinational oil and gas companies, [and] rent-seeking by mining companies for public subsidies to build enabling infrastructure’ (Lucas, 2017). Specific strategies include donations to conservative think tanks, lobbying to dilute renewable energy policy, setting up front groups and industry organisations to shape media and public discourse, using scare tactics to cultivate public opinion against renewables, and linking rising energy costs to renewable energy policies (Biggs, 2016). Incumbent actors also make strategic use of their existing market power to make it difficult for new entrants. Fossil fuel generators merged with electricity retailers to create large ‘gentailers’ that hedge risk from volatile markets. Many commentators argue that network service providers, which are regulated monopolies, over-invested in their networks to achieve excessive levels of reliability as a way of increasing revenue, with implicit support from regulators (Hudson, 2020). Wright et al. (2022, p. 549) identify three discursive strategies used by fossil fuel proponents to resist transition: pointing to the historical and current contribution of fossil fuels to Australia’s collective wellbeing; positioning decarbonisation as a threat to that wellbeing; and painting a picture of ‘a fossil fuelled future’. Fossil fuel proponents consistently emphasise the short-term cost of action and Australia’s immediate economic interests rather than the long-term cost of inaction (Crowley, 2017; Warren et al., 2016), linking that cost to household budgets. Further, conservative politicians and media cast doubt on climate science and the need for urgent action (Hudson, 2020; Taylor, 2014) while also promoting a frame of climate action versus jobs (Della Bosca & Gillespie, 2018). These strategies contribute to political polarisation, creating an environment of uncertainty for investors and further delaying action. Q4. Pathways to overcome resistance Despite these drivers and mechanisms of resistance, transition to renewable electricity has proceeded and is accelerating. Advocates for climate action effectively associated the numerous natural disasters that Australia has experienced over the period of transition with climate change, particularly the Millennium Drought and the Black Summer bushfires. This discursive strategy pressured politicians and contributed to changes in government that have strengthened national climate action. Patient incremental action can also overcome resistance. The small RET introduced in 2001 was amplified by later governments, eventually driving significant investment in renewable electricity. Climate and energy institutions introduced in 2012 (ARENA, the CEFC and CCA) have continued to operate and support transition even under governments that were more hostile to climate action. The structure of Australia’s Parliament has been important, with the balance of power in the Senate frequently held by the Greens or independents that have resisted attempts to dismantle institutional structures supporting transition once they were in place. Separation of powers between the Australian Government and State and Territory Governments contributes to a polycentric approach to electricity transition. When the Australian Government was not effectively driving transition, State and Territory Governments filled the gap and maintained momentum, for example by implementing “renewable energy targets, feed-in-tariffs, energy efficiency schemes, and an investigation of the potential for carbon emissions trading” (Warren et al., 2016, p. 5). Later, State and 51 OFFICIAL OFFICIAL Territory Government subsidies were particularly important in driving household uptake of solar PV to the highest levels in the world. The falling global costs of wind and PV electricity generation combined with significant government subsidies overcame key financial barriers to renewable energy penetration. At the same time, the fossil fuel divestment movement created an environment where further investment in fossil fuels for power was associated with reputational risk for major lenders and institutions (Biggs, 2016). This led to a shift from investing in fossil fuel power stations to renewable energy. Almost 40% of Australian households now have rooftop PV and the installed capacity is greater than black coal. This constituency now has a vested interest in an ongoing transition to renewable electricity that allows them to maximise return on their investments. The shift from growing electricity demand to flat and declining electricity demand was a major factor in the acceleration of transition, driven by a combination of landscape factors (e.g. falling demand for coal; falling solar PV prices; global shift towards prosumerism), structural factors (e.g. decline in energy intensive industries such as aluminium smelting in Australia) and policy action (Biggs, 2016). Past resistance to transition has been at least partly linked to concerns about job losses and loss of coal and gas export income. To date, Australia has not had a coordinated policy approach to transition that includes consideration of how to ensure a just transition and how to build new industries consistent with climate action. Taking a proactive rather than reactive approach to electricity transition strategy could be an important step to build on the progress already achieved. The Australian Government’s Future Made in Australia Plan has a significant focus on supporting development of industries supporting net zero transformation. Conclusion Australia's journey towards a renewable electricity system has been a contested and complex process, marked by significant resistance but now rapidly accelerating. Historically, a powerful ‘state/coal industry nexus’ created a fossil fuel hegemony, employing political, economic, and discursive strategies to delay change. This resistance was potent during periods of conservative Federal Government, which actively sought to defend the fossil fuel status quo and unwind climate policy. Despite these headwinds, the transition has been propelled by several key factors. Public pressure, amplified by climate-related disasters, has successfully shifted the political landscape at crucial moments. The establishment of enduring institutions like ARENA and the CEFC, patient state and territory government leadership, and the dramatic global decline in renewable technology costs have been instrumental in overcoming barriers. Furthermore, the rise of ‘prosumers’, with nearly 40% of households now generating solar power, has created a powerful constituency with a vested interest in a decarbonised grid. While significant infrastructural and political challenges remain, the transition has been enabled by a polycentric mix of grassroots action, state-level policy, and global market forces. Future progress now hinges on a coordinated national strategy to manage a just transition and build new industries to leverage Australia’s renewable advantage. References Baer, H. A. (2016). The nexus of the coal industry and the state in Australia: Historical dimensions and contemporary challenges. Energy Policy. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2016.05.033 Biggs, C. (2016). A resource-based view of opportunities to transform Australia’s electricity sector. Journal of Cleaner Production, 123, 203–217. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2015.12.006 52 OFFICIAL OFFICIAL Crowley, K. (2013). Pricing carbon: The politics of climate policy in Australia. Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change, 4, 603–613. https://doi.org/10.1002/wcc.239 Crowley, K. (2017). Up and down with climate politics 2013–2016: The repeal of carbon pricing in Australia. 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Journal of Industrial Relations. https://doi.org/10.1177/00221856211070632 54 OFFICIAL OFFICIAL Electricity case study - Germany Author: Gregor Kungl, Department of Organisational Sociology and Innovation Studies, University of Stuttgart Q1. Introduction Over the course of the past 30 years, the German electricity sector has transitioned from a centralised system based on fossil fuels and nuclear power to a more decentralised system based on renewable energies – with renewable energies accounting for 57 percent of the electricity produced in 2024 (see Figure 1). In the course of this development, the structure of the German electricity sector shifted from an oligopoly of established energy suppliers – which, at the peak of their power in 2003/2004, generated 90 percent of German electricity – to an increasingly heterogeneous structure of actors. In 2023, incumbent utilities produced 61 percent of electricity, with the remainder largely supplied by new players generating electricity from renewable sources (Bundesnetzagentur/Bundeskartellamt 2025: 18). These new players included citizens, farmers, project developers, financial market actors and other actor groups that entered the market in the context of the state support for renewable energies under the Renewable Energy Sources Act (EEG) (see Figure 2). Figure 1: Gross electricity production in Germany by source (in percent). Data: AG Energiebilanzen (2025) 55 OFFICIAL OFFICIAL Figure 2: Ownership structure of renewable energy installations in 2019. Source: trend:research (2020). This system change required overcoming fundamental resistance from incumbent actors. These actors were the incumbent electricity companies on the one hand and, on the other, politicians who were initially opposed to the expansion of renewable energies due to their ties to coal-producing regions or liberal economic ideologies. Looking back at the past 30 years, the developments in this area can be divided into four distinct stages. Stage 1 (1990-2006) was characterised by the expansion and professionalisation of the renewable energy sector, despite ignorance and moderate resistance to these technologies from the incumbents. At the beginning of the 1990s, the established electricity companies were busy taking over the East German electricity industry in the wake of German reunification. Their attention was subsequently occupied by the negotiation of the first nuclear phase-out in 2002. The focus of their resistance was less on renewable energy, as they underestimated its impact. In fact, however, the Renewable Energy Sources Act introduced in 2000 created investment security for renewable energies for the first time by granting renewable energies feed-in priority and guaranteeing technology-specific minimum remuneration for 20 years. This established the starting point for the expansion and professionalisation of the renewable energy sector (Jacobsson/Lauber 2006; Hirschl 2008). Stage 2 (2006-2011) was characterised by incumbents experimenting with renewable energies and an emerging crisis within the established centralised fossil/nuclear electricity system, caused in part by the ongoing expansion of renewables. As the expansion strategies of the incumbent electricity suppliers increasingly reached their limits, they sought alternative fields of activity alongside their traditional business areas. One of these alternative fields was renewable energy. The electricity companies created business divisions for renewables and began to invest considerable resources – albeit mainly abroad. At the same time, the established electricity system was facing an emerging crisis: falling electricity demand in the wake of the economic crisis, turbulence on the commodity markets, past misinvestments and a growing share of weather-dependent renewable energies that pushed conventional power plants out of the market and depressed prices all increasingly called the dominant understanding of electricity production into question (Kungl/Geels 2018). 56 OFFICIAL OFFICIAL Acknowledging that the roles of different technologies in the power system were gradually changing was initially challenging for the incumbents. Gas-fired power plants and flexible coal-fired power plants increasingly had to provide balancing power for volatile renewables, rather than simply serving peak load as before. Distribution grids increasingly became feed-in grids for decentralised renewables, and therefore became much more complex to manage (Ossenbrink et al. 2018; Kungl 2018). 2011 marked a turning point in the transition process in several respects. Firstly, the nuclear phase-out following the Fukushima nuclear disaster was a cultural shock for the incumbent industry and triggered profound self-reflection (Kungl/Geels 2018). Secondly, the dominant cultural interpretation of the electricity system changed from the idea of a centralised fossil/nuclear system to a more decentralised system based on renewable energies. All the key industry players (associations, politicians, companies) recognised this system change. Thirdly, and seemingly paradoxically, political support for the transition moved in the opposite direction, with a reduction in support for renewable energies and attempts to slow their expansion (Lauber 2016). Stage 3 (2011-2017) was characterised by a major restructuring of the sector, including massive organisational measures by the incumbent utilities and a shift in support policies for renewable energies towards an auction system. After Fukushima, all the major energy suppliers undertook a fundamental strategic reorientation with a focus on renewable energy and energy services. This resulted in major organisational restructuring measures, in the course of which some incumbents sold their fossil assets (Kungl/Geels 2018). However, despite lip service to the energy transition, the conservative government adopted a more critical tone towards renewable energies, emphasising high costs and social injustice aspects (Lauber 2016). Finally, it used the threat of EU proceedings against the EEG as an opportunity to abolish the law in its old form and switch to an auction system, which, among other things, was intended to save the conventional energy industry from bankruptcy (Leiren/Reimer 2018). The law now specifies annual expansion corridors for various renewable energy technologies. Which company is awarded the contract is determined in the auction process. Stage 4 (from 2017) is characterised by greater stability and, in particular, incremental progress in the expansion of renewable energies (with the participation of incumbents) alongside simultaneous defensive battles by incumbents aimed at making the scheduled phase-out of old technologies (coal and nuclear) as smooth and lucrative as possible (Bohn/Gümüsay 2023; Duygan et al. 2023). In the following, the drivers and causes and the mechanisms and patterns of resistance are described in more detail. I then go on to expand on the pathways to overcoming resistance in the case of the German energy transition. Q2. Drivers and causes of resistance A key obstacle to change in the German electricity sector lies in its historical tie and co-evolvtion as part of the country’s economic and socio-political structures. The electricity sector has historically been characterised by monopolistic market structures and strong interdependence with the political system. The electricity sector was organised as a politically controlled monopoly for most of the 20th century. Until market liberalisation in 1998, the sector was dominated by eight utility companies which held large shares in regional suppliers and municipal utilities. This created the basis for oligopolistic market structures which were established at the beginning of liberalisation and which allowed the incumbents to exercise market power and control on sectoral change (Kungl 2018). At the same time, ties with political decision-makers had also developed due to the historic origins of electricity supply in municipalities and strong regional links. The Social Democrats, for example, were part of the coal coalition which, together with the incumbent utilities, regional politicians, labour associations and local universities, represented the interests of coal mining and electricity generation from coal (Leipprand/Flachswald 2018). In addition, due to 57 OFFICIAL OFFICIAL personal connections in the electricity industry, the Social Democrats under Chancellor Schröder supported extensive mergers at the beginning of the liberalisation process, despite antitrust concerns (Lobo 2011). Another driver of resistance to system transformation is related to the technologies and infrastructure implemented in the electricity sector. Due to their specific technological characteristics and the legally mandated feed-in priority, renewable energies represented competition for conventional fossil and nuclear power plants. These technological incompatibilities were reflected in the strategies of the electricity suppliers, who initially invested only marginally in renewable energies in Germany as they did not want to “cannibalise” their own assets (Ossenbrink et al. 2018). The technological lock-in was further strengthened by synergies between base load and peak load power plants, and between the electricity and heat markets, which made changing the composition of the technologies used by the established electricity suppliers unattractive (Apajalahti/Kungl 2022). Furthermore, the sustainable transformation of the German electricity sector is limited by factors related to natural resources and the environment. One the one hand, there are geographical factors. Germany is comparatively densely populated, which, together with nature conservation concerns, limits the potential for expanding onshore wind power. In turn, offshore wind power is restricted by limited access to the sea. The potential for expanding hydropower plants was largely exhausted a long time ago. Only for photovoltaics is there significant potential, although the weather conditions in Germany are not ideal for this technology. At the same time, Germany faces potential shortages of relevant mineral resources, for example rare earths and steel, which are necessary for the expansion of renewables (Lee et al. 2020). Finally, there are mechanisms of resistance at play related to norms, values and culture. Two aspects are particularly important here. Firstly, German energy incumbents have chiefly thought within the logic of the traditional electricity system, i.e. in terms of centralised structures with large-scale production plants based on fossil or nuclear fuels (Ossenbrink et al. 2018). This thinking remained stable even once renewable energies took on an increasingly important role in the system from the mid-2000s onwards and many prejudices against renewable energies had been debunked by reality. Secondly, green capitalist norms related to the concept of ecological modernisation (Hajer 1995) have had an inhibiting effect on the sustainable transformation of the German electricity system. Ideas about the effectiveness of market competition, for example – which underpinned European emissions trading and the conversion of the EEG to an auction system – were omnipresent in the political discourse around the energy transition. Historical cases suggest, however, that market-based policy instruments promise only second-rank solutions for effectively pushing sustainable sectoral transformation (Rosenbloom et al. 2020; Geels et al. 2016). Similarly, the notion of the primacy of international competitiveness has been the starting point for many negative developments, such as the introduction and expansion of industrial exemptions within the EEG (see below). Q3. Mechanisms and patterns of resistance Incumbent utilities and their political allies have hindered sustainable transformation through various business, political and communication activities. Firstly, the established electricity suppliers, who formed a market-controlling oligopoly after liberalisation in 1998, tried to protect their interests in a centralised fossil/nuclear electricity system through a variety of business activities. They raised the barriers to market entry for new competitors by imposing high network transmission fees and increased their market power through company mergers and the acquisition of regional suppliers and municipal utilities. These practices were eventually stopped by stricter EU regulation in 2005 and the intervention of cartel authorities in 2009 (Kungl/Geels 2018). In addition, the incumbents launched a series of new coal-fired and gas-fired power plant construction projects in the mid-2000s and invested research funds in optimising the efficiency of 64 OFFICIAL OFFICIAL than $25 million on lobbying. Between 2013 and 2015, food corporations in the United States spent more than $192 million to block various legislations aimed at improving information about food content (IPES ,2017). At COP28 in Dubai in Nov 2023, food and agriculture firms sent 340 delegates in total, amongst which 120 for meat and dairy. Amongst these, more than 100 travelled as part of their official country’s delegations to Dubai, significantly increasing their chance of influencing the content of the final COP declaration. In effect, the COP28 Declaration on Sustainable Agriculture, Resilient Food Systems, and Climate Action (the first of its kind) was completely emptied of terms such as “livestock”, “red meat” or even “protein”, reflecting the request of the industry to see the impact of the livestock sector on the environment and its contribution to GHG emission completely eliminated from the COP food system official documents. 2.3. Non-compliance to existing regulations, corruption and collusion Another way to resist changes is to ignore, or to refuse to comply with existing or new laws. During its rapid rise to become the world’s biggest meatpacker, JBS has been linked to several cases of high-level corruption, modern-day forced labour practices, illegal deforestation, animal welfare violations and major hygiene breaches (Wasley et al., 2019). Amongst the most notable, in March 2017, Brazilian Federal police’s investigation revealed that JBS, along with the three other Brazilian beef producers, had bribed health officials into approving the exports of meat unsafe for consumption. Still in 2017, JBS admitted bribing hundreds of politicians as an attempt to control the market. Later the same year, JBS confessed to paying $148 million in kickbacks to secure loans from the Brazilian National Bank for Economic and Social Development (BNDES) and to access to their state pension funds. Finally in 2019, JBS was charged for buying cattle from ranches grazing cattle on deforested land in the Amazon, a practice prohibited by the Brazilian environmental agency Ibama (Henserson, 2019). 2.4 Co-optation of technological alternative Resistance to change can also take some counterintuitive form, for instance when actors fully embrace the changes that were initially viewed as the foretelling signs of their own fall –only to ensure a better control of the way these changes eventually roll out. In the case of red meat, the co-optation of the technology associated with the production of alternative (plant-based) protein is a good example of this strategy. In Brazil, the main meat producers (JBS, but also Marfrig or BRF, two of the largest food processing companies headquartered in Brazil) rapidly engaged in this new sector. Marfrig, partnered with Archer Daniels Midland Co in 2020 to create PlantPlus Foods and launched its first plant-based burger under the brand name The Revolution. At the same time, BRF invested $2.5 million into the cultivated meat company Aleph Farms while, in 2021, JBS created a plant-based meat brand called Incrivel Seara and in the same year acquired Vivera, the third-largest plant-based food producer in Europe, as part of a joint deal with BRF. Q3. Drivers of resistance In this section the various factors that could be seen as the origins / drivers of the barriers discussed in the previous section are examined. 3.1. Consumers as “driver of no change” and (self)censure of the news-media Trying to engage on, or even just to mention, the need for a reduction in red meat consumption is a major challenge in Brazil where meat eating is a central element of the cultural identity and culinary tradition. A good illustration of this challenge is the peculiar position that the Brazilian news medias have adopted over the years in relation to red meat. Journalists in Brazil have, for decades, downplayed the critical contribution of the red meat industry to climate change, in fear of negative reaction from the general public who “loves” red meat. Analyzing Brazilian newspapers’ climate coverage, Lahsen (2017) reveals for instance how climate change has essentially been framed as an energy problem even though evidence 65 OFFICIAL OFFICIAL shows that, in the case of Brazil, meat production (not energy) is the single largest cause of national emissions of the country. Reinforcing this self-censure is the fact that governments in the region also use their financial and regulatory powers to control or influence the media, for example by using advertising funds and licensing processes to variously reward or punish the media (Reporters without Borders 2013). In Brazil, the distinction between the agricultural lobby and the government is blurred, and a sizeable part of the country’s elected politicians – many of them part of the agribusiness lobby – are also media owners, despite constitutional prohibitions against it. 3.2. National political and financial interests In Brazil, the close bonds between the industry and the different levels of the governmental financial institutions are visible. For illustration, from 2007 to 2013, the Brazilian National Bank for Economic and Social Development (BNDES), through the so-called "national champions” policy, selected certain companies and transform them into large transnational corporations (TNCs). The beneficiaries included some of the largest Brazilian meat packing corporations, including JBS, Marfrig and BRF. By 2015, BNDES held 25% of JBS share capital (Sharma and Schlesinger, 2017). Other Brazilian financial institutions and banks have also heavily invested in the sector such as Banco de Brazil, Bradesco, Banco do Nordeste, Banco de Amazonia. In total, between 2013 and 2020, Brazilian official financial institutions “flooded” the sector with USD 66.2 billion in loans and USD 5.4 billion in underwriting (Ashford and Branford, 2022). They also hold USD 3.0 billion in shares and USD 3.0 million in bonds. Banco do Brazil provided by far the highest amount of financing (USD 27.6 billion). 3.3. Foreign financial interests International financial institutions, particularly from the United States, also play a driving role through their investments in Brazil’s beef sector. More than 250 financial institutions, 41% of them headquartered in the United States and EU, either facilitated or directly provided financial loans to the Brazilian meat sector. These include J.P. Morgan (US), Deutsche Bank (Germany), Santander (Spain), Rabobank and ING (Netherlands), BNP Paribas (France), HSBC, Barclays and Lloyds (UK). In addition to loans, investment and financial institutions also invested in the Brazilian sector by becoming shareholders or bondholders —including these mentioned above as well as other international banks and insurance corporation (e.g. Credit Agricole, AIG, Metlife, etc.), and pension funds (e.g. Vanguard, Fidelity investments, GPIF, etc.) — meaning that these institutions (and their actioners) have now direct interests in the profit of the meat industry (shares) or in their market values (bonds) (Kaynar et al. 2020). 3.4. Hidden drivers – from economic path dependency to social desire to change In addition to the more tangible factors discussed above, other more subtle processes are at play. One of these is Brazil’s national economic model and its associated national trade policy. Building on its size and relative richness in natural resources, Brazil’s economic model has been structured around the large exportation of land-based, natural resource intensive commodities (such as timber, livestock, mineral, oil), and the import in return of more expensive value-added products with higher technology content. This extractivist model, which was the central piece of the so-called "national champions” policy implemented by the BNDES, created a very strong economic path-dependency that prevents any rapid or drastic changes in sectors such as the meat industry from happening. The second hidden driver to resistance (operating at a global level) is the lock-in created by expert and academics’ reputation and career path. It is very difficult for an individual researcher —or for a whole research organization— who devoted and based their entire career or their mission, reputation, list of publications, and source of funding on a particular narrative, to change this narrative. This is, however, what happened to a part of the scientific community after the publication of the 2006 FAO report 66 OFFICIAL OFFICIAL Livestock’s long Shadows (Steinfeld et al., 2006). The Livestock’s long Shadows was the first comprehensive attempt to assess the impact of livestock on climate change. The report is now recognized to have played a pivotal role in raising the awareness of the general public about the link between livestock, climate change and environmental degradation (Salmon et al., 2020). But it also created a substantial challenge —or even a dilemma— for those who had so far dedicated their research career to promoting the role of livestock in poverty alleviation and economic development. It has been difficult for many of these researchers to embrace the new reality and to adjust their narrative. A last important hidden driver of resistance is closely associated to the “desire of change” that characterized the populations in many emerging economies such as Brazil. In these countries, the rapid pace of socio-economic changes (urbanization, increase in income, change in socio-economic mobility) triggers major alterations in lifestyle, social expectations, norms and values, including an increase desire to consume more meat (Popkin 2014; GPAFSN, 2016). This means that as standard of living continues to raise in Brazil, so will the demand for red meat. Q4. Pathways to overcome resistance In this section the question of what to do to overcome the resistances identified in the earlier part of this chapter is addressed. For analytical purpose, causal links between drivers and resulting barriers as identified in Section 2 and 3 are highlighted -see Fig.1. Figure 1. Detailed causal relationships between drivers of resistance and mechanisms of resistances as revealed by the analysis The graph reveals that each barrier/resistance is related to several drivers —suggesting that each barrier is enabled, or supported, by more than one driver/lock-in. Likewise, each of these drivers is linked to several barriers. Note also the self-reinforcing relations between drivers. These different observations suggest that the most effective strategies to remove or to weaken barriers may not lie directly with these barriers but with the different lock-ins, path-dependencies and vested interests that create, enable or support these barriers/resistances. We posit that breaking the causal links between drivers and resistances is the key to unlock the system. Also, breaking these links will require a combination of strategic actions. 4.1. Strengthening accountability and the rule of law Making local, national and federal officials accountable for their actions should help reducing the instances where these official actors continue supporting the industry even though laws and regulations related to 67 OFFICIAL OFFICIAL the protection of the environment, public health or labour rights have been ignored, infringed or disregarded, or in clear circumstances of corruption. This would address the “non-compliance (corruption)” barrier discussed earlier and help reinforce the rule of law. In parallel, reducing the control these same local or national powerful actors (corporations and government officials) have on other actors of the system (in particular the news media and environmental/social activists) would open a space for a more disruptive discussion where the official position of the government with regard to the country’s current economic model and its “national champions” could start being challenged. 4.2. Disclosure of financial and economic interests Financial investments made in the meat industry by national and international banks and other financial institutions should be made public. Exposing the magnitude of their direct financial links with the sector and widely published these figures (in national news media) would force these institutions to revisit their own business model. Subsequent cuts or reductions in the flows of financial resources directed at the red meat industry would contribute to limit its capacity for future expansion. On the international scene, the denial or disregard of the scientific evidence that highlights the detrimental effects of red meat production and consumption has been a widespread strategy adopted by different actors. Obliging scholars and experts/advisors to fully disclose their potential financial links with the industry (a practice already adopted by many peer-reviewed journals) and making them accountable for failing to do so not just in peer-review journals but also in the technical reports that they produce to lobby decision-makers, would help exposing more openly their conflicts of interests and reduce their ability to denigrate those who contest their position. 4.3. Impose more stringent regulations on lobbying activity Regulating more strictly the way private actors can lobby public servants and official institutions (governments, inter-governmental agencies, UN, EU, etc.) is a priority at the global level. In the case of the Brazilian meat sector, such restriction would certainly contribute to reduce the influence that the industry has on the state and federal governments and facilitate the emergence of alternative narratives and disruptive legislations or policies. 4.4. Reduce interference with international scientific assessments The outcomes of recent events (COP26, COP28, UNFSS 2021, etc.) stress the urgency to reconsider thoroughly the process by which the final versions of these official reports are drafted. The data presented earlier in this chapter reveals how far some governments are willing to go to ensure that the responsibility of the red meat industry in GHG emission and, in the case of Brazil, in deforestation, is “swept under the carpet”. The increasing meddling of government officials and private sector actors in the drafting of these international reports need to be more systematically exposed if we want these documents to continue playing their role in providing evidence-based recommendations and, when justified, challenge the business-as-usual scenarios. 4.5. Challenge the societal meatification trend Disrupting the meatification trend and the cultural and institutional normalization of red meat consumption in Brazil will be challenging but is key to the transition to a more sustainable regime. Opening a safe space in the national news media for a heathier debate about the red meat industry and its current unsustainability should be a first important move in that direction. 4.6. Combining actions to break barriers 68 OFFICIAL OFFICIAL Taken individually, these different strategic actions would not be sufficient to destabilize the system. But implemented together, they can reinforce each other and work across several barriers. For instance, controlling more closely lobbying activities and at the same time strengthening the rule of the law, can greatly impair the strategies used by incumbent actors to influence the debate and to silence alternative positions. Stronger control of the way these same powerful actors interfere with science and dominate news media will help open a more inclusive debate, counteract the discursive influence of the industry and its governmental allies and challenge the cultural and institutional normalization of the meatification characterizing the Brazilian society. In the meantime, disclosing financial interests of national and international institutions and strengthening accountability will reduce the structural power of the corporations, preventing them from further expanding their control over the market. References Afshin, A., et al. (2019). Health effects of dietary risks in 195 countries, 1990–2017: A systematic analysis for the Global Burden of Disease Study 2017. The Lancet, 393(10184), 1958–1972. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(19)30041-8 Ashford, M., & Branford, S. (2022, June). Foreign capital powers Brazil’s meatpackers and helps deforest the Amazon. Mongabay. https://news.mongabay.com/2022/06/foreign-capital-powers-brazils-meatpackersand-helps-deforest-the-amazon/ Béné, C. (2022). Why food systems’ Great Transformation may not happen: A deep-dive into food systems’ political economy, controversies and politics of evidence. World Development, 154, 105881. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2022.105881 Global Panel on Agriculture and Food Systems for Nutrition (GPAFSN). (2016). Food systems and diets: Facing the challenges of the 21st century. London, UK. Henderson, G. (2019, July 31). Report claims JBS SA buying cattle from forbidden Amazon. Farm Journal. https://www.drovers.com/markets/report-claims-jbs-sa-buying-cattle-forbidden-amazon Hiar, C. (2024, January 28). The world’s biggest meat processor — a major polluter — is coming to Wall Street. Politico. https://www.politico.com/news/2024/01/28/meat-giant-deforestation-jbs-00137084 Hilborn, R., Banobi, J., Hall, S. J., Pucylowski, T., & Walsworth, T. E. (2018). 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Domestic banks finance 74% of Brazilian beef & soy. Chain Reaction Research. https://chainreactionresearch.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Domestic-BanksFinance-74-of-Brazilian-Beef-Soy-.pdf Lahsen, M. (2017). Buffers against inconvenient knowledge: Brazilian newspaper representations of the climate–meat link. Desenvolvimento e Meio Ambiente, 40, 17–35. https://doi.org/10.5380/dma.v40i0.49258 Mialon, M., Swinburn, B., & Sacks, G. (2015). A proposed approach to systematically identify and monitor the corporate political activity of the food industry with respect to public health using publicly available information. Obesity Reviews, 16(7), 519–530. https://doi.org/10.1111/obr.12289 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (OECD/FAO). (2018). Meat consumption (indicator). OECD Data. https://data.oecd.org/agroutput/meat-consumption.htm Parzianello, L., & Carvalho, T. S. (2024). What if Brazilians reduce their beef consumption? Ecological Economics, 218, 108132. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2024.108132 Popkin, B. (2014). Nutrition, agriculture and the global food system in low and middle income countries. Food Policy, 47, 91–96. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.foodpol.2014.05.001 Reporters Without Borders. (2013). Brazil, the country of thirty Berlusconis. Paris, France: Reporters Without Borders. https://rsf.org/en/brazil-country-thirty-berlusconis Sharma, S., & Schlesinger, S. (2017). The rise of big meat: Brazil’s extractive industry (Executive summary). The Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy. https://www.iatp.org/documents/rise-big-meat-brazilsextractive-industry-executive-summary Steinfeld, H., Gerber, P., Wassenaar, T., Castel, V., Rosales, M., & de Haan, C. (2006). Livestock’s long shadow: Environmental issues and options. Rome, Italy: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. 70 OFFICIAL OFFICIAL Wasley, A., Heal, A., et al. (2019, July 2). JBS: The Brazilian butchers who took over the world. The Bureau of Investigative Journalism. https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/stories/2019-07-02/jbs-brazilianbutchers-took-over-the-world/ Willett, W., Rockström, J., Loken, B., Springmann, M., Lang, T., Vermeulen, S., et al. (2019). Food in the Anthropocene: The EAT–Lancet Commission on healthy diets from sustainable food systems. The Lancet, 393, 447–492. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(18)31788-4 Why Livestock Matter (WLM). (n.d.). Why livestock matter. https://whylivestockmatter.org/about 71 OFFICIAL OFFICIAL Livestock case study - Australia Authors: Peat Leith and Michelle Miller, The Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO), Australia Q1. Introduction This case focuses on resistance to GHG emissions reduction in the Australian red meat sector, following early and proactive moves by industry to position itself as a global leader. We view resistance as an interaction between current lock-ins (causes), related path dependencies (effects), and how actors respond to these (responses), drawing on the framework in Conti et al (2021). The analysis includes livestock (cattle and sheep) and red meat (beef, veal, mutton and lamb as boxed meat or live animal export) for domestic consumption and export, and is based on diverse public documents, news and journal articles, and reports. With major export markets developing prospective carbon border adjustments, other non-tariff trade barriers (Fell & Creed, 2024) Australia’s meat and livestock industry took early and pre-emptive steps to position the sector as a leader in greenhouse gas (GHG) reductions to secure the industry’s competitiveness. In 2017, the industry’s Research and Development Corporation (RDC), Meat and Livestock Australia (MLA), set targets for the sector to be GHG neutral by 2030 (CN30). Farm-gate value of red meat accounts for 36% of agricultural commodity production in Australia (ABARES, 2024, p. 3), with well over 60% of red meat exported annually. Australia has consistently been the second or third-largest beef exporter globally, even as global demand has recently increased year on year by around 1%. Australian red meat production and emissions come largely from extensive grazing. In 2023, Australia had 28.7 million head of cattle on native vegetation (about 80% or 286.69 million hectares of the total agricultural land) and modified pastures (12.5% and 45.18 million hectares) (ABARES 2024, p 2). Red meat production uses more than 40% of Australia’s total landmass. Feedlots play a small but growing role. Since 2005 agriculture has accounted for 12 to 17% of Australia’s annual GHG emissions—almost 80% of which are methane (ABARES, 2024, p. 2, 9). Figure 1. Enteric methane (kt CH4/year) from beef cattle, dairy cattle and sheep by Natural Resource Management region in 2021. Emissions are calculated using livestock population data from ABS (2022) and average emissions per head per year from DCCEEW (2022). Credit: Andy Wilkins, CSIRO. 72 OFFICIAL OFFICIAL Recognising trade risks of not acting early on GHG emissions, the MLA CEO began promoting a carbonneutral target at the 2017 AGM and in their 2017-18 annual report. Drawing on MLA-funded research, the CN30 Roadmap (2020) ambitiously aimed for net-zero GHG emissions on an annual basis by 2030 (CN30). In joining the Global Methane Pledge, the Australian Government further embedded CN30 by voluntarily committing to a 30% reduction in methane emissions by 2030 (from 2020 levels), reiterating assurances from the National Farmers Federation President that “the pledge will not negatively impact on farmers or the agriculture sector” (The Hon Angus Taylor MP, 2022). Optimism around CN30 targets persisted in the face of identified challenges (Mayberry 2019), including economic trade-offs of a rapid transition, and a variety of practical, social, political, and other barriers (Meyer et al 2020). An influential report (Mayberry et al. 2018) argued that carbon neutrality was technically possible through a combination of improved vegetation management (primarily halting deforestation) and rapid deployment of anti-methanogenic technologies—currently far from market-readiness. CN30 work areas focused on different aspects of abatement. For example, Carbon Storage focused on legumes, pastures, shrubs, trees, woody thickening, dead woody biomass, and dung beetles to improve sequestration. Work area two, Emissions Avoidance, precipitated substantial public and private investment in anti-methanogenic technologies, including a $24 million Federal Government methane emissions reduction program (MERiL) (DCCEEW, 2024). Despite challenges, early progress appeared promising. Industry claimed that net GHG emissions “have fallen 57% since 2005” (MLA, 2020). These early wins were almost entirely driven by land use change (Fig 2), and relatively high rainfall years and associated vegetation growth, which offsets cattle number increases16. Enteric methane emissions remain largely a function of herd size and closely connected to changing climate and market conditions (Meyer et al 2020). This has led some scientists to suggest CN30 is untenable (Brown, 2024). Figure 2: Total GHG emissions in CO2 equivalents from all agriculture, including contributions form enteric fermentation and all other agricultural emissions, and compared to the LULUCF emissions that are associated with red meat (data from Mayberry 2024). Amidst growing pushback on CN30, CSIRO research (Ridoutt, 2023, 2024) highlighted an alternate climateneutral objective. Climate neutrality is achieved “when a system makes no net contribution to additional temperature increase or no net contribution to increase in radiative forcing” (Ridoutt, 2024, p. 398) positioning methane differently from other (potent but less longer-lived) emissions like carbon dioxide. 73 OFFICIAL OFFICIAL Climate-neutral was hailed by some industry actors providing a better option, partly because it “would provide greater scope for producers to monetarise their GHG mitigation and sequestration actions” (Nason, 2023). The Cattle Australia Board, representing pasture-raised cattle growers, called for re-evaluating CN30 and “endorsed a new climate-neutral target” (Herrick, 2023). Other scientists argued that Climate-neutral may lack alignment with the Paris Agreement (articles 2,4,6) and might “not hold weight for any international comparison” (Strong, 2023), alongside risk that a walkback from CN30 could be seen as greenwashing (Donnison & Murphy-Bokern, 2023, p. 4), or impede investment in methane reduction technologies (Brown, 2024), and risk “extremely unfavourable” outcomes “should Australian herd and flock numbers increase” (Strong, 2023). MLA consistently defended the CN30 target across three successive managing directors, with the incoming director, in 2024, reiterating how the target had driven new investment and positioned the industry as a global mitigation leader, whilst declaring that 80 percent of the target would be “unbelievable progress” (Condon, 2024). In June 2025, the Red Meat Advisory Council shifted away from the CN30 targets to focus on reducing emissions intensity. Q2. Drivers and causes of resistance Behind this very brief history sit diverse drivers of lock-ins and path-dependencies that start to elucidate the foundations of resistance to transition for the case. Institutions and policies De-regulation of agriculture from the 1980s onwards created a sector commitment to minimal government intervention, especially those that create additional cost burdens for farmers. Along with a contraction in public sector extension, this reduced policy leverage over land management for public good outcomes. A general cost-price squeeze and lack of protectionism encouraged the consolidation of holdings and the growth of larger family and corporate businesses in the sector. Part of this shift saw the Primary Industries Research Development Act (PIRD Act, 1989) (DAFF, 1989) establish Research Development Corporations (RDCs) as the key agricultural research and development and marketing mechanism, funded by levies from farmers and matching Federal Government funds. For red meat, farmers are levied per head of stock sold, which is distributed to MLA. The resulting system has been successful at improving farm-level productivity, with gains only slowing in the last decade (Chancellor & Boult, 2024). Research and innovation priorities, practices, and narratives Under the PIRD Act, RDCs have supported Australian agricultural industries to become among the most efficient in the world. One effect is that marketing and research are tightly connected and oriented to short-term returns on investment, incremental, low-risk, and productivity-oriented improvements, often via technological change and adoption. Any focus on longer-term, systemic, and cross-sectoral issues is limited. For example, although CN30 work area 1 is Leadership, systems-oriented R&D and institutional change are not part of this mandate. Capability in the R&D system, including at CSIRO and universities, appears to respond and ultimately align with R&D priorities. Attitudes and culture The attitudes and culture(s) of farmers are rooted in place, the history of agriculture, and Australia’s national psyche and identity. After colonisation, Australian industry, culture and identities revolved around agricultural autonomy and self-reliance. This shifted through the 20th Century as mining and manufacturing became the centre of the economy. Populations became largely urban as agriculture intensified. Demand for cheap food and structural trends intensified economies of scale. Limited public intervention in a highly 80 OFFICIAL OFFICIAL Policies like the MINAS (‘Manure Accounting System’) program (1998) and the PAS (‘Programmatic Approach Nitrogen’) program (2010) attempted to address these issues but failed to bring emissions under control. The PAS program allowed future-oriented nitrogen reduction promises to justify current farming permits – a practice the European court of justice ruled unlawful in 2019 (Beekman et al. 2025; Van der Ploeg 2020). The nitrogen crisis and its political fallout The court’s ruling, based on the Habitats-directive17 (1992), triggered the Dutch ‘Nitrogen crisis’ (Stokstad 2019; Schoukens 2017). It mandated the halt of nitrogen-emitting activities near Natura-2000 sites, where emissions were undermining ecosystem restoration (see figure X1). As the livestock industry emits the most nitrogen (52%) (CLO 2023), it became the centre of both a public and policy debate on nitrogen reduction. Figure X1. Exceedance of the critical deposition value in nitrogen-sensitive Natura 2000 areas (source RIVM 2023) A government’s advisory committee proposed a 50% nitrogen reduction compared to 2019, focussing on cutting emissions from livestock farms near protected areas. This sparked widespread protests and led to a dramatic political shift (Van der Ploeg 2020). A populist, right-winged party BBB (‘Farmer Citizen Movement’) centred on the interests of conventional farms gained major support. First entering provincial politics and later national level politics, by entering the ruling cabinet and even providing a minister for Agriculture, Food Security, Fisheries and Nature. This reshaped the political landscape in the Netherlands. Previous cabinets had sought collaborative solutions, aligned with EU legislation - this included phased reductions in livestock near Nature-2000 sites, backed by a large buy-out fund. Shortly after being appointed as Minister of Agriculture, the BBB minister cancelled the plan, and with no replacement strategy in place, little progress has been made since. As a result, the Netherlands remains deeply entrenched in the nitrogen crisis. 81 OFFICIAL OFFICIAL Q2. Drivers and causes of resistance A policy regime favouring agricultural interests After WWII, Dutch and later EU policy took a directive role in promoting agricultural modernization to ensure food security. Spearheaded by Agriculture Minister Sicco Mansholt, this led to intensification, specialization, and scaling up, facilitated by strong institutional ties between government, interest groups, and knowledge institutes (Grin 2012; Beekman et al. 2025). Despite early environmental concerns in the 1970s, political responses downplayed impacts and delayed manure-focused policies. The manure issue persisted, and successive policy responses—such as MINAS and PAS—attempted to mitigate it through technical innovations rather than structural changes (Rabbinge et al. 2017). Political compromises weakened these policies, both of which were ultimately ruled unlawful by the EU Court of Justice (Borger 2020). Although policy narratives now recognize the complexity of sustainability, actual implementation remains fragmented (Biesbroek and Candel 2020). Fragmentation in policy and governance The transition to nature-inclusive agriculture requires a systems view, but both EU and Dutch policy remain siloed (Schutter et al. 2020; Biesbroek and Candel 2020). On the one hand this fragmentation has enabled powerful actors from across the ‘agro-complex’ to shape food and farming debates through their framing and proposed solutions (Schutter et al. 2020); e on the other it has led to clashes between DirectoratesGenerals (DGs) with competing priorities. For example the Natura 2000 network, which in many parts overlaps with agricultural lands. While DG ENV sought to enforce restrictions on intensive agricultural practices that negatively impact the environment, DG AGRI succeeded in limiting restrictions – often backed by national governments and farming lobbies. Similarly, some member states have been granted ‘derogations’ – exemptions – from implementing Natura 2000 protections in agricultural areas (Weber and Christophersen 2002; IEEP 2023). The same sectoral divide existed within the Netherlands since WII, until recently, when the ministries of agriculture and environment were merged—yet the focus still leans heavily toward productivity (Schebesta and Candel 2020; WRR). Research and innovation silos Research and innovation priorities illustrate similar ‘sectoral siloing’ as the policy and institutional landscape. Agricultural R&D still heavily favours technological innovation and productivity. Public funding (e.g., National Growth Fund) and private investment primarily support conventional agriculture. Wageningen University & Research is central in these efforts. Research on alternatives receives less support, while institutes like National Institute for Public Health and the Environment (RIVM) and Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (PBL) consistently document the harms of intensive farming. In contrast, fringe reports from dubious sources claim agricultural impacts are overstated. Though regularly fact-checked and debunked, they influence public debate, especially among agrarian populists, undermining trust in scientific institutions (FTM 2020). Culture and attitudes The resistance to nature-inclusive agriculture in the Netherlands is deeply rooted in identity, political disconnection, and cultural norms. While farmers once had strong political representation, this bond has weakened since the 1990s. By 2018, nearly 78% of farmers no longer felt represented by their unions (Van der Ploeg 2020). The EU court’s rejection of the PAS and the government’s livestock phase-out plans triggered widespread frustration. Framed as unfair and restrictive, these measures fuelled protest movements that later gained support from agribusiness actors, such as the fodder industry, further amplifying resistance and feeding rural discontent (Beekman 2024; NRC 2022). This resistance is deeply rooted in farmers’ identities. Farming is not seen merely as an occupation, but as a way of life tied to land and region (Janssen et al. 2022). State-led interventions are therefore perceived as existential threats. Consumer attitudes further reflect this cultural tension. While many Dutch citizens are 82 OFFICIAL OFFICIAL shifting toward more sustainable diets (PBL 2020), a proportion of Dutch consumers opposes dietary change, defending meat consumption and expressing scepticism toward environmental concerns. For instance, 82% of respondents in a conservative newspaper poll rejected the idea of eating less meat for environmental reasons, arguing agriculture has a positive impact (Telegraaf 2022). These identity-driven and cultural dynamics form a powerful undercurrent of resistance to agricultural transition. Lobbying and policy influence Agricultural interest groups have longstanding access to policymakers (Beekman et al. 2025) and have strongly influenced the framing of food security in EU and Dutch contexts. For example, by emphasising the “we feed the world” frame for EU agriculture (De Schutter et al. 2020). These groups—backed by agribusiness and research allies—promote technological "solutions" that maintain conventional practices (FTM 2020). Successfully pushing the food security frame, they conveniently overlook the environmental and human health risks that stem from the ‘solutions’ offered by these powerful actors (De Schutter et al. 2020). Financial lock-In Dutch farmers, particularly in livestock, are heavily indebted, especially to banks like Rabobank, which historically encouraged expansion (FTM 2021). Encouraged by banks and enabled by increasing landprice, the average debt of a dairy farmer grew to 1.3 million euros in 2019 (Ftm 2021; Marsden et al. 2018). With finance actors highly dependent on the conventional and intensive agricultural model, the transition towards nature-inclusive agriculture is considered leading to “standed assets” (Marsden et al. 2018), illustrating the bind that agricultural finance is now in. Moreover, by perceiving the transition from conventional farms to nature-inclusive as risky, few farmers are granted the funds to make the transition to nature-inclusive (Vermunt et al. 2022). Technological choices After WII, Dutch agriculture shifted toward intensification and large-scale production, prioritizing food safety and security. This historical focus has shaped a system heavily reliant on technological solutions and external inputs. In response to the current challenges in the Netherlands, conventional farms are predominantly looking to technological innovations for an answer. Conventional farms increasingly adopt technologies like air washers, low-emission flooring, and manure scrapers to manage nitrogen emissions. While such innovations appear to offer solutions, RIVM studies show their benefits are overstated and insufficient. The underlying model of high-output, intensive agriculture remains unchanged. Some farmers adopt nature-inclusive practices: smaller herds, grass-fed systems, and diversified outputs (GaitánCremaschi et al. 2019). These alternatives challenge the dominant model but receive little institutional or financial support. Infrastructure and system lock-In The broader "agrocomplex" surrounding Dutch agriculture—including suppliers, processors, and exporters—adds significant value to the national economy and reinforces export-driven production. This creates a powerful vested interest in maintaining conventional practices. Feedback loops from past policy decisions have created a structural lock-in around intensive agriculture, making transitions extremely difficult. Reflecting global trends These dynamics reflect a wider European and global pattern (Clapp 20xx). The dominance of economic interests over environmental integrity is evident not only in CAP but also in recent debates around the European Green Deal and the Nature Restoration Law. Despite widespread acknowledgement of the need for “sustainability” and “transition,” these concepts are diluted in practice by sectoral silos and lobbying pressure. The food system remains shaped by a small number of powerful actors who resist meaningful change. Populist narratives that simplify complex environmental issues—reducing biodiversity or climate 83 OFFICIAL OFFICIAL crises to single-issue framing like nitrogen or CO₂—enable a continued reliance on technological fixes (Nightingale et al 2020). This entrenched dynamic is not unique to the Netherlands but part of a broader structural challenge globally. Q3. Mechanisms and patterns of resistance Pattern #1: Technocratic policy cycles and lack of vision The historical separation of agriculture and environment, coupled with strong agricultural interests in decision-making, has led to policy cycles optimizing conventional farming systems (Beekman et al. 2024; Vermunt et al. 2022). This shows consistent resistance to nature-inclusive policies and a tendency towards technocratic policy cycles seeking legislative loopholes (Beekman et al. 2024). Such dynamics downplay the relationship between environment and agriculture, complicating policy alignment and frustrating transitions (Candel 20xx). The absence of a shared vision for nature-inclusive agriculture (Candel 20xx) has hindered effective policy implementation and investments in R&D and the agricultural sector from truly targeting nature-inclusive practices. For instance, CAP subsidies mainly benefit large-scale, intensive farms, undermining CAP's stated goal of promoting environmental protection through agriculture (EEA 2023; FT 2024). The lack of vision has led to confusion about the agricultural sector's role within the agri-food system. Over the past five years, the European Green Deal highlighted the need for more sustainable systems, with policy development reflecting this shift and the concept of transition becoming mainstream. However, unclear visions of this transition and poor communication about the distribution of its benefits and burdens have sparked resistance across society and the system. Additionally, the latest policy attempt to reduce livestock included a transition fund focused narrowly on financial compensation, which failed to appeal to farmers, even those struggling, as it did not consider various types of loss during the transition. Pattern #2: Financial barriers and perceived risk The transition of conventional farms to nature-inclusive models is seen as risky by both farmers and banks, lacking financial incentives or transition funds (Vermunt et al. 2022). A key issue is the insufficient earning capacity of nature-inclusive agricultural business models (Janssen et al. 2023). The lack of earning capacity is the result of diverse dynamics influenced by powerful food system actors including subsidies favoring large-scale, intensive farms (EEA 2023; FTM 2024), retailers and consumers not willing to pay the "true price of food" (Vermunt et al. 2022), and entrenched practices in agro-finance (Marsden et al. 2021). Such dynamics hinder farmers from adopting nature-inclusive practices, and despite some government vision, regulations supporting earning capacity for ecosystem services are inadequate and non-competitive with conventional agriculture (Beers et al. 2024). Exemptions negotiated in EU environmental legislation have also failed to encourage transitions to nature-inclusive models (Beekman et al. 2024; Rabbinge et al. 2017). Additionally, most R&D funding still focuses on optimizing conventional agriculture, leading to a lack of knowledge about nature-inclusive farming among the broader farming community, increasing perceived risks for individual farmers (Vermunt et al. 2022). Although Dutch farmers show interest in transitioning, current funding structures send misleading signals (Beers et al. 2024). Pattern #3: ‘Agricultural populism’ and rural-urban divide The interest groups and actors coalitions pursuing conventional agricultural interests have a major influence on both policy, the public debate, and framing of the transition to nature-inclusive agriculture (Beekman et al. 2024; FT 2024). In recent years this took on a more populist dynamic, which effectively put the broader farming identity as being at risk at the centre of the transition to nature-inclusive agriculture (Janssen et al. 2023; Van der Ploeg 2020). They successfully diverted the conversation away from the key 84 OFFICIAL OFFICIAL role that the sector has in both enabling the status quo in the agricultural sector and the root causes of the crisis itself. As a result, they garnered much support from broader rural dwellers, which ultimately fed into a broader feeling of discontent of the rural areas paying the price for wellbeing in the urban areas. In the elections that followed, this discontent was made visible in the arrival of a new farmers-centred populist party, winning many seats at a regional level. This resistance is further reinforced by long-standing structural neglect in rural areas, especially at the periphery. Past decades saw a withdrawal of the state from key public functions, with municipalities increasingly relying on citizen initiative to fill the gaps. Recent dynamics, such as rising housing costs driven by affluent urban migrants relocating to rural areas, have only strengthened perceptions of displacement and inequality. Together, these factors contribute to a powerful narrative that frames the transition not as an opportunity for regeneration, but as yet another threat imposed from above. Q4. Pathways to overcome resistance Integrated food policy aligned with a strong vision A systems perspective is required to address the complex sustainability challenges that agriculture and the environment face (Hebinck et al. 2022). This in turn must foster integrated food policy, one that shifts the balance away from agriculture as its focus. At a European level, many scholars have been arguing more rigorous reforms: e.g. by proposing to reform the CAP to a ‘Common Food Policy’ (De Schutter et al. 2020; Barling et al. 2002), by addressing the incoherencies between the core EU food policy goals as captured in the Farm to Fork strategy, the CAP and the Common Fisheries Policy (EEA 2023), where others stress reform to tackle the focus on land and risk management (RISE 2017). Member states, like the Netherlands, should follow suit and similarly bring these sectoral concerns together in one policy domain. Not only should food policy foster better integration between domains, it should also communicate a clearer systemic vision—one that provides farmers something to aspire to, rather than emphasizing only what they must give up. The urgency for such a vision is growing: policy inertia is allowing problems to mount. While the nitrogen crisis persists, the Netherlands also risks breaching the Water Framework directive. A dedicated transition fund – tied to true pricing mechanisms – is therefore essential, both to ensure fair compensation for the costs of transition and to incentivize sustainable practices. Moreover, R&D funding needs to be more clearly directed towards nature-inclusive innovation, rather than vaguely supporting ‘innovation’ that often reinforces conventional models. True pricing of agricultural products Introducing ‘true pricing’—accounting for environmental and social externalities—can reshape market incentives. This would encourage consumers to choose sustainable products, especially plant-based ones, while motivating the agrifood industry to reduce impacts (Michalke et al. 2023). True pricing could lower perceived transition risks for farmers by increasing demand for sustainable produce and boosting earning capacity. When combined with subsidies for low-income households, it would make sustainable food accessible while accelerating transition. Place-based approaches Third, a place-based approach can overcome resistance rooted in both identity-politics – in this case the farmer's identity being perceived as under threat - as well as navigate the complexity of diverse interests in the food system (Horlings ; Marsden ; Sonnino). Here, place-based approaches look beyond administrative regions – such as a city, municipality, or province – but instead look to delineate a place by its socio-cultural relevance (Janssen et al. 2023). This could be based on the type of landscape – e.g. peat areas – or based on the specific types of agriculture that is predominant. The place-based approach presents a arena in which 85 OFFICIAL OFFICIAL diverse actors can deliberate strategies forward in addressing sustainability problems as well as enabling nature-inclusive agriculture (Janssen et al. 2023). Rethinking funding and procurement Fourth, agri-food funding schemes should be redirected to reward farmers adopting nature-inclusive practices (Beers et al. 2024). Currently they mostly benefit conventional large-scale and intensive farmers. As such, transitioning towards nature-inclusive agriculture is deemed too risky and lacks institutional support. Shifting these funds would encourage more diverse and sustainable business models to emerge. Additionally, sustainable public procurement can serve as a direct lever to boost demand for nature-inclusive products and ensure that public funds support farmers delivering environmental benefits. Together, these measures would improve the earning capacity of sustainable farms and help shift the system toward ecological resilience. Conclusion The transition to nature-inclusive agriculture in the Netherlands faces resistance stemming from institutional lock-ins, vested interests and lobbying, siloed policymaking, and a lack of coherent vision. Technocratic policy cycles have repeatedly optimized conventional farming rather than enabling meaningful change, while subsidy structures and R&D investment continue to reinforce intensive models. Efforts to introduce environmental reforms are often met with confusion or opposition, largely due to unclear narratives about the future of farming and who benefits or bears the costs. This has created distrust among farmers, particularly in rural areas where identity and economic insecurity intersect. Transitioning towards nature-inclusive agriculture requires more than technical fixes. A shared vision is essential: one that acknowledges farmers not as obstacles, but as crucial partners in solving environmental challenges. Place-based approaches, true pricing, and better-targeted funding can help accelerate a transition to nature-inclusive agriculture. References CBS. (2021). The Netherlands is the EU’s largest meat exporter. 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Acta Agriculturae Scandinavica, Section B—Soil & Plant Science, 63(Suppl. 1), 2–7. 96 OFFICIAL OFFICIAL Supplementary Figure 1c. Causal loop diagram of feedbacks in South Africa’s electricity sector. State capture and energy crisis (R2, R3, R4, R5, R10, B4): The higher the fossil fuel share of the electricity supply, the greater its market power, oligopoly structures, and market concentration. Through corporate lobbying, stakeholders in coal mining, energy-intensive industries, and the State create favourable regulatory and economic conditions, such as rent seeking, interest-free loans, and state guarantees for supporting infrastructure. Elites have even directly influenced government decisions and state-owned enterprises, further strengthening and manipulating the state-mining-industry nexus, along with oligopoly structures and market concentration. Over time the appointment of aligned individuals to influential positions appeared to affect institutional independence, leading to reduced transparency and oversight and strengthening of informal networks. Concerns have been raised about the influence of informal networks within the public electricity utility, which appear to have contributed to irregularities in procurement processes and resource allocation. Challenges related to governance and financial management have contributed to decreased revenue in the electricity sector, limiting resources available for critical maintenance and upgrades. Aging infrastructure and a lack of maintenance also resulted in the mothballing of assets. This mismanagement of the system has affected its reliability, necessitating frequent load-shedding. Moreover, load shedding has impacted middle and high-income households, who, in search of energy independence to avoid load shedding, have increased their investments in solar rooftop PV. Power poverty trap and resistance (R5, R6, B5, R8, R9, B3): The state capture pattern described earlier increases the system’s revenue loss, driving up electricity prices and decreasing infrastructure investment. Consequently, there is more need for social protection measures such as the Free Basic Electricity or Free Basic Alternative Energy policy. However, social protection measures in such an environment can drive further ineffectiveness of policies and mismanagement, increasing procurement fraud and manipulation. This increases the dependency of intended beneficiaries on subsidised fuel and informal connections. 97 OFFICIAL OFFICIAL Similarly, the lack of a safe and reliable energy supply, due to insufficient infrastructure connections and high electricity prices, increases power theft and safety hazards. This is evident in illegal connections, network equipment theft, vandalism, meter bypasses and tampering, unauthorised network operations, and illegal electricity vendors. All these factors combined create a power poverty trap, with the consequences of energy poverty and dependency, as well as adding another layer to the formal resistance in the value chains and among their actors in the coal and mining industries. Shifting the burden and decoy transition (R11, R12, R13, B6, R15, B8): Continuous socio-economic disruptions, such as load shedding and other events, increase public discontent, thereby creating political tensions and opportunities for government change. This is evident in the changes in government, with the new administration initiating its anti-corruption agenda and nation-building plans, increasing law enforcement effectiveness and prosecutions, improving governance, oversight, transparency, accountability, and limiting influential networks and public discontent. The decreased ability of incumbent to manage social and political acceptance also impacts their ability to influence policy, posing barriers to political influence, potentially strengthening institutions, limiting the effects of political networks, and decreasing public discontent. Political tensions resolved only by addressing supply shortages have prompted reforms to increase and diversify supply, leading to policy support for integrating renewable energies into existing systems via the private sector. The increased supply and participation of independent private providers enhanced market competition, lowering electricity prices and easing public concerns, ultimately reducing political tensions and decreasing the pressure to address state capture and corruption. The utility sector’s high public debt also affected network infrastructure investments, increasing grid integration challenges due to the high costs of adding more renewables without addressing debt and delaying actions to address the fundamental issue of state capture. Procurement delays and barriers to connecting and integrating more renewable energy affected supply growth, increasing the supply gap. The persistent revenue loss of the centralised public utility created financial instability and pressure for sector reforms, which have not occurred, further creating resistance to structural reforms. Minerals-energy complex barriers (R16, B9): The growth of renewable energy supply has decreased the fossil fuel share of the electricity supply, thereby diminishing the market power of fossil fuels and threatening the Minerals-Energy Complex (MEC) 's coal-based business model and political control. Actions included refusing to sign power purchase agreements, delaying or denying grid connections, controlling dispatch and planning in favour of coal generation. Policy support and investment certainty, however, drove the development of local industries supplying renewable energy technologies, helping to reduce technology costs and increase private investments despite MEC interference with procurement provisions. Although policy support for renewables imposed a local content requirement, delays in infrastructure deployment harmed local industries, leading to job losses and deskilling the sector, while simultaneously contributing to the stagnation of renewable energy growth. Just transition mirage (R17, R18, R19, R20): The 17th Conference of the Parties (COP) hosted by South Africa in 2011 mobilised increased climate finance and changed public discourse in South Africa, supporting climate-aligned planning, including the kick-start of REIPPP, and redirected institutional attention to justice issues—e.g., Eskom’s Just Energy Transition Office, enabled by international finance support through the “Just Energy Transition Partnership.” However, climate finance mobilisation deployed in a context still struggling with corruption, poor governance, and oversight increases the risk of being captured by elites and the usual coal-mineral complex beneficiaries, who can proactively control the pace and direction of the transition. As mitigation programs 98 OFFICIAL OFFICIAL channel finance to fund megaprojects and increase transmission to integrate renewables, these do not address structural issues such as the centralisation and grid monopoly of the utility sector. Their control of the transition’s pace and direction is also evidenced by the well-resourced and organised resistance front, which mobilises and creates organisations to defend their corporate interests, such as Business Unity South Africa (BUSA) and the Energy Intensive User Group (EIUG). The focus on changes at utility-scale excludes the underserved population from the decision and benefits of the transition, reinforcing inequality and poor well-being, adding to the persistent social struggle. 99 OFFICIAL OFFICIAL Brazil’s livestock sector The Brazilian case study is focused on the contribution of red meat and livestock to the food system. The red meat and livestock sector in Brazil has managed to continue expanding its activities almost exponentially but with contested sustainability outcomes for the environment (e.g., Amazon’s deforestation) and broader societal justice (e.g., forceful land use change and property rights). The case study discusses reasons preventing transformation from being envisaged let alone initiated. One influential factor that amplifies resistance in this context is the systemic phenomenon of eroding ambition, influenced by a series of reinforcing and balancing feedback interactions. Achieving sustainability across socioeconomic, environmental, and public health goals within the red meat sector in Brazil demands profound, long-term changes, for example shifts in land use, reductions in deforestation, alignment with climate goals, improved labour conditions, and dietary changes. Because the tangible benefits of these long-term changes will take years (if not decades) to materialise, and because of persistent uncertainty about how such transformations could be operationalised at scale, there is increasing pressure to scale back expectations. This is particularly evident in Brazil, where shorter-term economic growth, employment concerns, and the political influence of agribusiness actors continue to dominate the policy agenda. In response, more politically palatable and economically viable short-term goals are often pursued, such as marginal improvements in supply chain transparency, while more ambitious targets aligned with international agreements (e.g. Paris Agreement) are often deprioritised or postponed. Drawing on information from the last two decades such as recent investments and government policies, as well as information on multidecadal scales, such as national economic and export ambitions, the case study highlights several deeper structural patterns leading to this eroding ambition and mainly resulted from private-public actor interactions within the context of national and international financial institutions. Resistance was also seen at different scales from local to international (Supplementary Figure 2a). Technology co-optation (R1, B3): The push for a more sustainable livestock sector has opened new market opportunities for alternative proteins, leading to increased competition with the red meat industry. This competition can positively impact and limit the production of industrial red meat, thereby contributing to sustainability. However, this positive feedback can be undermined by another, more powerful feedback dynamic: the co-optation of alternative technologies by the livestock sector. As established players invest in plant-based and lab-grown proteins, they maintain control over market narratives and dynamics. As some examples, JBS launched plant-based and cultivated meat brands in Brazil, the U.S., and Europe; Marfrig partnered with ADM to establish PlantPlus Foods; and BRF invested in Israeli cultivated meat technology. This integration of new alternatives into the existing system slows the pace of change compared to if nonincumbent actors were driving the development of a new market without interference. These actors may monopolise or distort the market, forcing new products to align with their interests. Without the constraints of dominant players, these alternatives could scale more quickly. From a transformation perspective, this slows the pace of change, limiting the sustainability impacts of plant-based or lab-grown alternatives. 100 OFFICIAL OFFICIAL Supplementary Figure 2a. Causal loop diagram of feedbacks in Brazil’s livestock sector. Economic and financial path dependency (R2, B4): Brazil’s reliance on an extractive economic model creates a strong path dependency based on delivering to the red meat export market (e.g., China, the US, Philippines, Chile, Russia), making significant shifts toward sustainability that could reduce red meat production politically contentious and challenging. This dependency fosters a close relationship between the livestock industry and government institutions, driven by shared economic interests. Such connections generate a feedback loop where political decisions prioritise industry growth, further entrenching financial investments that emphasise short-term economic gains over long-term sustainability. Political-financial collusion (B4, B6): In Brazil, the economic and political path dependencies that have shaped the red meat sector have created a tight interdependence between powerful livestock companies and government institutions. This entanglement can potentially foster a governance environment where non-compliance with regulations is often tolerated or politically shielded, enabling large layers to bypass accountability (i.e., as seen in the repeated scandals involving corruption, deforestation, and unsafe meat exports). The sector’s historical significance to Brazil’s economy through exports, rural employment, and influence over public finance has also made it politically sensitive, making meaningful transitions toward sustainability particularly difficult to achieve. Lobbying and corporate control (B7): Brazil’s path dependency has also led to a concentration of economic power and political connections that shape the industry’s lobbying efforts. These lobbying activities that are formally established (unlike political-financial collusion) grant the private sector privileged access to 101 OFFICIAL OFFICIAL policymaking and diplomatic negotiations, significantly influencing policy processes. Favourable regulations reinforce the industry’s hold, creating a disconnect between industrial meat production and climate change. This dynamic makes it increasingly difficult for sustainable practices to gain traction. Media influence (B8): The influence of industry lobbying, combined with governmental financial and regulatory power, has led to media censorship and distorted narratives regarding the impacts of industrial livestock production on climate change. This distortion perpetuates the status quo and fosters pressure to lower ambition, hindering progress towards sustainability. Scientific controversy (R3): As awareness of the sustainability impacts of industrial livestock production grows, so does controversy around its contribution to climate change. The corporate influence supported by the media promotes alternative narratives that challenge established evidence, often leading to the funding of research projects that support these alternative views. This creates additional pressure for lower sustainability ambitions and complicates efforts to address the industry's environmental impact. Consumer norms and values: Public attachment to red meat creates barriers to discourse around consumption reduction. This is driven by cultural norms and emotional connections to food, resulting in self-censorship among media and advocates, which hinders progress towards sustainable dietary shifts. Socioeconomic changes in emerging economies and ingrained cultural values also create a persistent demand for meat, and therefore adding to pressure for lowering ambition. This resistance is driven by consumer identity and tradition, making it difficult to shift perceptions and behaviours, even in the face of compelling evidence about the environmental impacts of meat consumption. In addition, sustainability practices such as limiting land for livestock to reduce deforestation can drive up production costs and, in turn, consumer prices. When faced with higher prices, many consumers are unwilling or unable to pay more for sustainably produced meat, reinforcing resistance to change. This resistance is shaped not only by consumer identity and tradition but also by economic considerations, making it even more difficult to shift consumer perceptions and behaviours. The Netherlands’ livestock sector The Dutch case study explores the dynamics of the livestock industry, which is for a large extent export oriented and responding to growing demands for meat and dairy beyond European borders. Over the past 22 years, the Dutch livestock industry has experienced significant changes, characterised by a decrease in the number of farms (down nearly 60%) while livestock numbers have remained stable, indicating increasing farm consolidation. This shift is part of a broader trend within the 'agro-complex' that aims to support the Dutch economy through agricultural export, mechanisation, and technological innovation. However, the intensified farming system has led to mounting environmental concerns, particularly regarding nitrogen emissions. The livestock sector, which contributes the most (52%) to these emissions through the production of surplus manure, failing to adhere to European Agreements on protecting vulnerable habitats and species. In response, the Dutch state formulated a series of policies were introduced, including the abolition of dairy quotas in 2015 and the 'Manure Reduction Plan' in 2017, but these have faced challenges in curbing environmental damage. The lack of change and ultimately and European Court order initiated the 2019 “nitrogen crisis”, leading to a controversial government plan to cut nitrogen emissions by 50% by reducing heavy-emitting livestock farms near protected areas. This policy triggered widespread protests and a shift in the political landscape, with a populist party gaining influence by championing farmers' interests. While initial plans aimed to buy out farmers with a 'nitrogen fund', the Dutch government recently cancelled this trajectory, leaving the transition to more a sustainable farming system uncertain, and reinforcing a cycle of eroding ambition and locking the sector into less sustainable practices. This erosion of ambition reflects a broader political and economic struggle between 102 OFFICIAL OFFICIAL environmental goals and the broader (economic) interests of the agricultural sector (Supplementary Figure 2b). Supplementary Figure 2b. Causal loop diagram of feedbacks in the Netherlands’ livestock sector. Assets and investment path-dependency (R1-R4): Financial institutions have long supported conventional, intensive farming models with sunk investments, debts, and assets due to historically better earning capacity for intensive vs. nature-inclusive farming. This has created a lock-in effect that makes transition to nature-inclusive agriculture appear too risky for both farmers and financiers. Public subsidies, including those from the EU, continue to favour large-scale, conventional farms, leaving smaller, sustainable models underfunded. This entrenched financial support further reinforces conventional farming practices and weakens incentives for meaningful change. Technology and knowledge path-dependency (R5, R6, R10): Research and innovation have primarily focused on enhancing productivity in conventional farming, which has reinforced a technological lock-in. Large agribusinesses and their focus and research funding on intensification limit the scope for developing nature-inclusive alternatives. Despite advances in technology for conventional systems, such as nitrogen reduction measures, these innovations have had limited impact on broader environmental issues, perpetuating the dominance of the intensification model. In addition, Nature-inclusive farming is still rarely taught, and most farmers adopting more sustainable practices are newcomers to the sector rather than part of multi-generational farming traditions. Technocratic policy regime (R8, R9): Dutch agricultural policy has historically prioritised economic growth, food security, and farmers' livelihoods, often at the expense of environmental sustainability. Sectoral siloes 103 OFFICIAL OFFICIAL in policymaking have led to fragmented debates, allowing powerful agricultural interests to dominate the conversation, reinforcing the priority of economic growth. This resistance to integrating environmental goals with agricultural policies has delayed significant progress in reducing nitrogen emissions, reinforcing the status quo. Market and economic forces (B3, R12): The increasing global demand for livestock products has reinforced the export-oriented nature of Dutch farming, further locking the sector into conventional, intensive practices. While there has been some shift in consumer preferences towards less animal protein and more environmentally conscious diets as a result of awareness about environmental and public health impacts of animal protein, the growth of the export market has overshadowed these changes, making it more difficult to generate political support for ambitious environmental targets. Corporate influence on politics and policy (R10, R13): The intensification of Dutch farming and the consolidation of smaller farms into larger units has led to the rise of a few powerful agro-businesses, with strong ties to the agro-complex and significant influence over policy, reinforcing conventional farming practices and limiting the integration of environmental sustainability measures. By prioritising productivity, they direct private sector funding towards research that supports intensification which could also sometimes lead to the creation of counter-environmental reports based on dubious data, fuelling agrarian populist movements and public resistance to stricter environmental regulations. The influence of these powerful corporate actors also extends to financial support for agrarian lobby groups, which shape public attitudes and political discourse, putting pressure on policymakers to relax nitrogen emissions reduction targets and policies. This cycle reinforces conventional practices, hinders meaningful environmental change, and shifts public and political support away from sustainable agricultural transitions. Human attitudes and agricultural populism (B4, R7, R11, R14): The strong cultural identity tied to farming and the rural landscape plays a significant role in resistance to policy changes. The government's nitrogen reduction plans, which threaten a large-scale phase-out of livestock farms, are seen as a direct challenge to farmers’ way of life, escalating agrarian populist movements. The rise of populist parties emphasising food security and rural identity has complicated the transition, portraying nature-inclusive policies as an existential threat to farmers’ livelihoods and identities. At the same time, a deepening political divide and rural-urban divides, exacerbated by agrarian populism, have resulted in significant farmer protests and a disconnect between farmers and political institutions, giving support to the emergence of populist rightwinged parties in support of a protectionism approach. Together, cultural attachment to farming, combined with political pressures, has hindered constructive dialogue on transition and pushed to reduce or delay ambition targets and measures. Australia’s livestock sector The Australian case study explores the dynamics of the red meat industry, which primarily serves export markets while also addressing the demand of a significant domestic market for red meat. Emissions reduction for this sector focuses primarily on methane generated largely by cattle grazing the extensive production systems of northern Australia (79.5% of agricultural land) and modified pastures (12.5% of agricultural land). Land clearing is the second-largest source of agricultural emissions in Australia, making improved vegetation management including halting deforestation a critical part of agricultural emissions reduction and climate resilience. As export markets increasingly consider carbon border adjustments, Australia’s livestock industry has taken proactive steps to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, exemplified by Meat and Livestock Australia's (MLA) CN30 Roadmap, which aims for greenhouse gas neutrality by 2030. This roadmap focuses on both carbon storage and emissions avoidance, driving significant investment in anti-methanogenic technologies, particularly in dairy and intensive livestock systems. Achieving carbon neutrality in the sector would require rapid scaling of existing practices and technologies to reduce emissions effectively. However, this ambitious target requires significant changes within the sector, 104 OFFICIAL OFFICIAL involving both carbon storage and emissions avoidance strategies. Over time, there has been increasing recognition that the target and pathway proposed by CN30 are highly ambitious, resulting in pressure to lower expectations and set more attainable goals. Any revised targets, though potentially more achievable in the short term, may fall short of what is necessary for long-term sectoral contributions to GHG reductions and for market access. This dynamic is a symptom which is being driven by a series of drivers and their reinforcing and balancing feedback loops, risking a gradual shift towards lower-ambition targets that no longer align with international climate commitments (Supplementary Figure 2c). Supplementary Figure 2c. Causal loop diagram of feedbacks in the Australia’s livestock sector. Lock-in of traditions and attitudes (B3-B5): In rural Australian agriculture, a strong cultural identity is built around autonomy, self-sufficiency, and resourcefulness, with land stewardship and the legacy of family farms central to farmers’ sense of identity. Media narratives often reinforce these cultural values and goals. Where climate change policies are perceived as external impositions, farmers' resistance to such policies may grow. This resistance is often framed politically, with climate change mitigation seen as a cost and a threat to farmers' autonomy, livelihoods, and land use practices. The threat to livelihoods has led to differences in perspective as to whether emissions reduction ambitions will advantage or disadvantage Australian producers. A perception of disconnect between climate change solutions and agricultural realities hinders broader acceptance of these solutions. Such attitudes contribute to the pressure to lower emissions reduction ambitions and hinder the broader acceptance of climate change solutions. 105 OFFICIAL OFFICIAL Scientific controversy (B6): The push for ‘climate-neutral’ objectives, defined as having no additional net contribution to global temperature rise or radiative forcing, is perceived by some as better reflecting the behaviour of methane and the potential positive contributions agriculture and land management can make to climate change mitigation, but the concept faces public and scientific scrutiny. Many experts argue that this target is disconnected from the core principles of the Paris Agreement, particularly regarding how emissions reductions are accounted for across sectors. The ensuing debate and the misalignment with international climate frameworks risk eroding public trust, potentially undermining long-term credibility and support for emissions reduction targets in the agricultural sector. Community polarisation (R1, B7): The red meat sector in Australia is fragmented, with multiple representative organisations advocating for different approaches to emissions mitigation, often reflecting divergent capabilities and interests. At the same time, many farmers see themselves as custodians of the land and are motivated to respond to climate change in ways that protect the land for future generations. However, some members of the agricultural community with strong support for industry growth via intensification, may view emissions reduction policies negatively. These conflicting perspectives, combined with diverging capabilities, have the potential to polarise the sector, limiting coordinated action on climate issues and entrenching existing practices. Cattle number lock-in (R2, R3, B8, B9): Various factors contribute to maintaining herd size. These include growth in export demand, disincentives to reduce the national herd to maintain industry levies, an industry focus on feed use efficiency. Cattle grazed in the extensive rangelands of northern Australia, predominantly of the Bos indicus breed, tend to produce lower-quality meat and are less likely to be affected by trade barriers, as they are typically exported to markets less sensitive to emissions. As a result, there is less immediate pressure to reduce emissions from these cattle. There are complex and contested relationships between livestock numbers and land clearing, the second-largest source of emissions in Australian agriculture, after methane from livestock. Narrow technological focus (R4, B10, B11): The national priority and focus on export markets, especially premium-quality meat, has driven emissions reduction strategies in Australian agriculture towards narrow technological solutions, such as anti-methanogenic feed additives for cattle in intensive systems. This market-driven approach, influenced by non-tariff trade barriers imposed by OECD or higher income countries on Australian livestock industry, has led to a preference for technologies that align with interests of exporters to more premium markets, such as methane-reducing additives. However, this focus may reduce attention given to broader environmental outcomes, such as habitat preservation and climate resilience, particularly in extensive rangeland systems where anti-methanogenic technologies may not be applicable. The sector’s narrow framing of emissions reduction creates path-dependency and could limit its ability to adopt more holistic, landscape-level solutions. Deregulation and market power (R5, R6): Deregulation since the 1980s has led to a focus of government intervention through research and development to improve productivity, and a consolidation of capital and land in fewer hands, especially among larger and more productive farms. The tendency for short-term efficiency gains is prioritised by a research and development system geared to demonstrating value to levy payers (farmers), which tends to exacerbate the sectoral focus on technological addition and replacement over wider systemic approaches. Increasingly, large corporations are shaping R&D and policy reinforces a preference for technological solutions, such as anti-methanogenic technologies, which align with their capital interests, and risk mitigation approaches. In these terms reducing GHG emissions is seen primarily as a future business risk for market access rather than a means of accessing premium markets. Replacing than smaller family farm rowing prevalence and market and political power of corporate and large family holdings see a replacement of inter-generational owner operators with profession managers. Over the long term this appears to reenforce focus on technology addition over broader, more systemic approaches to sustainability.