Markets and Forest: Comparative Analysis of the Economic Sectors that Pressure the Amazon Basin

INSTITUTO IGARAPÉ a think and do tank MARKETS AND FOREST: Comparative Analysis of the Economic Sectors that Pressure the Amazon Basin Table of Contents Presentation ...................................................................................1 1. Mining ......................................................................................... 8 1.1. Economic, Social, and Environmental Context.............10 1.2. Regulation and Governance ...........................................11 1.3. Monitoring and Transparency .........................................16 1.4. Law Enforcement .............................................................18 2. Timber ......................................................................................20 2.1. Economic, Social, and Environmental Context.............22 2.2. Regulation and Governance ...........................................23 2.3. Monitoring and Transparency .........................................28 2.4. Law Enforcement .............................................................30 3. Cattle Ranching .......................................................................32 3.1. Economic, Social, and Environmental Context.............34 3.2. Regulation and Governance ...........................................36 3.3. Monitoring and Transparency .........................................41 3.4. Law Enforcement .............................................................43 4. Land .......................................................................................... 45 4.1. Economic, Social, and Environmental Context.............47 4.2. Regulation and Governance ...........................................50 4.3. Monitoring and Transparency .........................................53 4.4. Law Enforcement .............................................................54 Conclusion ...................................................................................55 Appendix I. Methodology ............................................................56 Endnotes ......................................................................................58 IGARAPÉ INSTITUTE | OCTOBER 2025 1 Table of ContentsEndnotes Presentation The Amazon is the largest tropical forest on the planet, harboring about 10% of global biodiversity and playing a vital role in regulating the climate and the carbon cycle. Its vast expanses of dense forest and interconnected rivers sustain millions of people, among them Indigenous and traditional communities whose ways of life are deeply intertwined with the ecological balance of the region. Despite its socio-environmental relevance, the Amazon is under increasing pressure from economic activities that drive deforestation and feed illicit dynamics. The uncontrolled expansion of the gold, timber, cattle, and land markets — sectors that move billions of dollars — is associated not only with environmental degradation but also with the advance of organized crime in the region. These production chains, although legally recognized, coexist with informal, irregular, and criminal practices, becoming frequent targets of environmental crime. Unlike other offenses, environmental crime presents a particular complexity: the natural resources extracted, such as gold and timber, are not illicit by nature. Nor is the transformation of native forest land for agricultural and livestock purposes illicit in itself. Illegality arises in the way these resources are extracted, produced, or cultivated, transported, commercialized, or inserted into production chains, which makes it essential to differentiate between the legal and the illegal. When the criminal origin of a natural product is concealed — whether through false documents, corruption, exploitation in prohibited areas, or failures in oversight — this product circulates in the market as if it were legitimate. Unlike drug or arms trafficking, whose illegality is intrinsic, in environmental crime one of the main challenges lies precisely in tracing and proving illegality. In this context, Indigenous and extractivist communities inhabiting protected areas are frequently exposed to risks. They coexist with criminal groups, informal workers, corrupt public officials, and unscrupulous companies that make up an ecosystem of environmental and related crimes, intensifying social vulnerability and undermining the integrity of Amazonian ecosystems.1 The authorities of the eight countries that make up the Amazon Basin — Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Peru, Suriname, and Venezuela — act, each in their own way, to regulate, control, and oversee these economic activities. However, normative differences, regulatory gaps, and the absence of effective regional cooperation mechanisms hinder coordinated action. Even when control agencies act, the permeability of borders facilitates the movement of supplies, goods, and capital, weakening the capacity to confront illicit flows. In light of this challenge, this study provides a comparative diagnosis of the institutional structures and regulations applicable to the four main markets associated with deforestation in the Amazon: gold, timber, cattle, and land. Although they are not the only markets associated with criminality — activities such as the trafficking of wildlife, sand, drugs, arms, and human trafficking also move large sums — the sectors analyzed in this study constitute the main drivers of illegal deforestation. By generating substantial profits and enabling the concealment of the criminal origin of resources through trade and the financial system, these markets not only degrade the environment but also promote capital flight and corrode legality. 2 Markets and Forest: Comparative Analysis of the Economic Sectors that Pressure the Amazon Basin Table of Contents Endnotes With the aim of understanding to what extent the countries of the Amazon Basin are prepared to regulate and control these markets, and thus distinguish legal from illegal practices, we established a set of thirteen indicators, divided into four key dimensions: • Economic, social, and environmental context • Regulation and governance • Monitoring and transparency • Law enforcement The selection of dimensions and indicators was based on previous studies by the Igarapé Institute, which mapped the illegal dynamics of these markets, as well as the structural and institutional conditions that favor them. The feasibility of adopting uniform criteria — meaning comparable across countries —was also taken into account. With these indicators, we developed a performance dashboard that enables the comparison of regulatory effectiveness and institutional capacity of each country in addressing the illegalities present in these chains. Performance levels (Low, Moderate, High) were assigned by the research team based on the collection and analysis of data relating to each chain in each country, later calibrated through consultations with specialists. Data collection took place between November 2024 and February 2025. IGARAPÉ INSTITUTE | OCTOBER 2025 3 Table of ContentsEndnotes Economic, social, and environmental context 1.1. Economic Autonomy of the Sector Degree of economic dependence of the production chain on national Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and export share (in absolute and relative values). A score of 2 represents greater autonomy of the national economy (sector with reduced weight); a score of 0 represents greater dependence (sector with high weight). 1.2. Sector Formality Comparison of the informality rate in the sector in the analyzed country with the global average. This considers informality, precariousness, overlap with illicit activities, and the involvement of armed actors. A score of 0 indicates a predominantly informal sector; a score of 2 indicates a highly formalized sector with institutional control. 1.3. Ecological Compatibility The degree of socio-environmental impact of the chain, particularly on the Amazon biome, including its contribution to deforestation, greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, and predatory resource use. Scores: 0 = high environmental pressure; 2 = greater ecological compatibility and sustainability. Table 1. Indicators and reference categories for the comparative analysis of production chains that drive deforestation in the Amazon Dimension Indicator Reference Category 4 Markets and Forest: Comparative Analysis of the Economic Sectors that Pressure the Amazon Basin Table of Contents Endnotes Regulation and governance 2.1. Definitions Clarity and comprehensiveness of legal definitions of illicit activity in the sector. Scores: 0 = no definition; 1 = generic or ambiguous definition; 2 = clear legal definition that recognizes illegality and provides for specific sanctions. 2.2. Legislation Existence and robustness of the legal framework in the sector, considering environmental, criminal, and administrative frameworks. This assesses regulatory stability and legislative autonomy. Score 2 = stable and comprehensive legal frameworks. 2.3. Criminal Sanctions Severity of penalties for crimes related to the supply chain. Scores: 0 = maximum penalties below the global average; 1 = penalties within the average; 2 = penalties above the average (in years). Considers only sector-specific crimes. 2.4. Administrative Sanctions Range and variety of applicable administrative sanctions (e.g., fines, default interest, product and machinery seizures, license revocation or suspension, financial freezes). Scores: 0 = absent or ineffective sanctions; 1 = partial sanctions; 2 = broad sanctions with financial disincentives. 2.5. Institutional Competence of Authorities Clarity and functionality of the institutional architecture for regulation and oversight. This includes defined mandates, inter-institutional cooperation, specialized units (e.g., Financial Intelligence Units – FIUs), and technical capacity. Score: 2 = robust institutional framework. continuation Dimension Indicator Reference Category IGARAPÉ INSTITUTE | OCTOBER 2025 5 Table of ContentsEndnotes Monitoring and transparency 3.1. Equipment Control Mechanisms for control, tracking, and registration of critical equipment (e.g., dredgers, chainsaws, trucks, tractors), including monitoring of transporters, fuels, and inputs. Score: 2 = comprehensive and operational systems. 3.2. Transparency Availability and traceability of information on production, transportation, marketing, and financial flows. Scores: 0 = lack of public data; 1 = partial access (upon request); 2 = high transparency and integration with monitoring institutions. 3.3. Stakeholder Engagement Involvement of non-state actors in monitoring and promoting good practices. This includes adherence to initiatives such as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) guidelines, or the International Council on Mining and Metals (CMM), as well as other multistakeholder initiatives. Score: 2 = strong civil society engagement and influence on sectoral policies. 3.4. Mercury Specific to the gold mining chain, this indicator assesses the ratification of international treaties (e.g., Minamata), national regulation, and monitoring of mercury use/import of mercury. Score: 2 = effective control regimes. Law enforcement 4.1. Operational Actions Existence and frequency of policing operations to prevent and investigate crime, and respond to incidents, product seizures, equipment destruction, contractual sanctions, and coordinated action among institutions. Score: 2 = consistent and coordinated action. 4.2. Public Integrity Degree of exposure to corruption in public agencies responsible for the supply chain. It considers impunity, whistleblowing, and integrity mechanisms. Scores: 0 = high corruption and institutional fragility; 2 = greater public integrity. continuation Dimension Indicator Reference Category 6 Markets and Forest: Comparative Analysis of the Economic Sectors that Pressure the Amazon Basin Table of Contents Endnotes • Dimension 1: Economic, social, and environmental context In this dimension, we consider aspects such as the country’s autonomy in relation to the market or sector, the economic share of the activity in the national GDP, and exports in absolute and relative terms (indicator 1.1); the degree of sector formality, i.e., labor market characteristics, inherent labor risks, and the lack of legal protection for workers (indicator 1.2); and ecological compatibility, measured by the contribution of economic activity to deforestation and the volume of greenhouse gas emissions, as well as aspects related to protected areas, particularly data indicating the extent to which the activity occurs in the Amazonian portion of the countries (indicator 1.3). Together, the three indicators highlight the economic, social, and environmental context, which can make the country more dependent on market revenues, more vulnerable to the negative impacts of the activity, including deforestation and the conversion of tropical forests to alternative land uses, and more subject to pressure from the economic sector for regulatory weakening. • Dimension 2: Regulation and governance This dimension assesses the normative and regulatory aspects of each sector. The first category examines the clarity and comprehensiveness of legal definitions of illicit activity in the mining, forestry, livestock, and land sectors (indicator 2.1). The second evaluates the robustness of the sector’s legal framework, including its comprehensiveness, autonomy, and stability (indicator 2.2). The third measures the severity of penalties applicable to crimes related to the sector, excluding related offenses such as organized crime or fraud, compared to the global average severity for similar offenses (indicator 2.3). The fourth category assesses the range and diversity of administrative sanctions applicable to actors who violate existing regulations (indicator 2.4). Finally, the fifth considers the institutional architecture for regulation and oversight, the competence of authorities, and the degree of inter-institutional cooperation (indicator 2.5). • Dimension 3: Monitoring and transparency In this dimension, the assessment begins with the control of equipment and supplies used in the production chain (indicator 3.1). The second indicator evaluates the information transparency and the recording of data across distinct stages of the activity — production, marketing, and transportation — assessing whether the databases are public and whether a transparency policy exists (indicator 3.2). The third indicator considers aspects of due diligence, certifications, and initiatives to promote best sectoral practices, in addition to the role of civil society organizations (indicator 3.3). For the gold mining sector, a fourth indicator (3.4) was developed to assess mercury regulation. • Dimension 4: Law enforcement The first indicator in this dimension refers to actions to combat illicit practices, such as police operations, strategies, policies and programmes to counter crime, and technological innovations for mapping and detecting irregularities (indicator 4.1). The second indicator evaluates public integrity, that is, the degree of exposure of public agencies corruption and to regulatory capture (indicator 4.2). IGARAPÉ INSTITUTE | OCTOBER 2025 7 Table of ContentsEndnotes How to Interpret the Dashboard For each of the 14 indicators, the data collected was compared with reference criteria to assign values. Dashboards were developed using a color system in which light blue represents low performance, medium blue indicates moderate performance, and dark blue corresponds to high performance: This classification system allows for comparability of each country’s performance against the benchmark categories. Descriptive information was collected from all sectors and countries, prioritizing those that enabled comparability. In the following chapters, we present the Scorecards for each market. These summarize the analysis derived from the categorization of each indicator, illustrated with selected examples, without intending to provide an exhaustive account of each market. Low = 0 Medium = 1 High = 2 • Low (Light blue) – Low score. Indicates limited presence of the assessed metric and poor performance. Requires improvement. • Medium (Medium blue) – Moderate score. Indicates an intermediate level of the assessed metric and average performance. Can be improved. • High (Dark blue) – High score. Indicates strong presence of the assessed metric and solid performance. Should be maintained and further enhanced. 14 Markets and Forest: Comparative Analysis of the Economic Sectors that Pressure the Amazon Basin Table of Contents Endnotes In Brazil, the maximum penalty is 5 years for the crime of illegal extraction by usurpation against the Union (Art. 2 of Law No. 8,176/1991), which places the country in the low classification, alongside Guyana and Suriname. In Guyana, extracting minerals without a license, sending material outside the mining district where it was extracted, or obtaining mining licenses through false information is punishable by up to one year in prison (Articles 123 and 124, Mining Act of 1989). In Suriname, the 1986 Mining Law establishes a penalty of up to 2 years in prison for those who conduct mining operations without granted mining rights or engage in related acts (Art. 71, Mining Decree). Table 2. Comparison of the maximum criminal penalties applicable to illegal mining across the eight countries analyzed (in years) Bolivia 4 to 8 years Illegal exploitation of mineral resources Article 232 ter of the Criminal Code (as amended by Law No. 367 of 2013) Brazil 1 to 5 years Usurpation of Union assets Article 2, Law No. 8,176 of 1991 Colombia 5 to 12 years Illegal exploitation of mineral resources and other materials Article 332, Criminal Code (as amended by Law No. 2,111 of 2021) Ecuador 7 to 10 years Illicit activity involving mineral resources (aggravated by environmental damage) Article 260, Comprehensive Organic Criminal Code Guyana 5 years Prohibition of mineral alienation Article 70, Mining Law Peru 4 to 12 years Financing illegal mining Article 307-C, Criminal Code (as amended by Decree No. 1,102 of 2012) Suriname up to 2 years Violations of mining operations Article 71, Mining Decree of 1986 Venezuela 5 to 10 years Illegal mining activities in national parks Article 44, Decree No. 2,165 of 2015 Country Penalty Offense Law IGARAPÉ INSTITUTE | OCTOBER 2025 15 Table of ContentsEndnotes The application of administrative sanctions and confiscations measures (indicator 2.4) is essential to curb recidivism and disrupt illegal mining operations. Brazil and Peru apply fines, embargoes on areas, and seizures of assets, which is why they were rated high in this regard. Colombia and Ecuador, classified as moderate, have sanction mechanisms in place but with less financial disincentives — that is, those aimed at decapitalizing companies that violate regulations.22 An interesting example of the application of administrative sanctions is found in Colombia: • 2001 Mining Code, Article 161 - Confiscation Mayors shall provisionally confiscate minerals transported or sold without an invoice or proof of their origin. If the minerals are proven to be of illicit origin, they shall be handed over to the criminal prosecution authority responsible for the case. The provisions of this article do not apply to subsistence mining. • Article 163 - Special impediment Anyone convicted of illicit use or exploitation of mineral resources shall be barred from obtaining mining concessions for a period of 5 years. Brazil and Peru also provide for account freezing, asset forfeiture, and/or restriction on access to credit and financing when a mining company is considered high-risk or has a history of noncompliance. In Brazil, for example, Article 14 of the National Environmental Policy provides for the loss, restriction, or suspension of tax incentives and benefits, as well as credit lines. Guyana and Suriname, on the other hand, lack an efficient system of administrative sanctions, classifying low in this regard. Despite this, in the case of Guyana, it is worth noting the provision of fines and even prison sentences for those who provide false information when applying for mining licenses (Article 124 of the Mining Law of 1989, amended in 2010). 16 Markets and Forest: Comparative Analysis of the Economic Sectors that Pressure the Amazon Basin Table of Contents Endnotes The implementation of these measures, such as account freezing and asset forfeiture (including gold), still faces challenges due to the judicialization of processes and the lack of integration between financial and environmental oversight agencies. For indicator 2.5 (Institutional competence of authorities), innovative initiatives for inter-institutional cooperation and strengthened oversight stand out: In Ecuador, the Special Commission for the Control of Illegal Mining (Cecmi) is led by the Ministry of the Interior and includes administrative agencies, police, and tax authorities.23 In Peru, the High Commission for Combating Illegal Mining, appointed by the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, forms part of the Permanent Multisectoral Commission for Monitoring Government Actions against Illegal Mining and the Development of the Formalization Process, created by Legislative Decree No. 1105 of 2012. These initiatives place Ecuador and Peru in the high category in terms of competent authorities, setting them apart from other countries. The most critical situations are those of Guyana and Suriname: although responsibility for the sector lies with the Ministry of Natural Resources and oversight is assigned to the police, institutional competencies are weak and require improvement. 1.3. Monitoring and Transparency The ability of Amazon Basin countries to monitor, record, and track gold production and trade is critical to curbing illegal mining. The regulation of equipment used in mining varies across countries in the region (indicator 3.1), but overall the rules lack monitoring and enforcement. Bolivia, Guyana, Suriname, and Venezuela require more effective mechanisms to prevent the use of heavy machinery in mining, which makes these nations more vulnerable to predatory exploitation. Brazil, Ecuador, and Peru, by contrast, are more advanced in controlling the possession and use of barges, excavators, and other equipment, and are therefore classified as moderate in this category. In Brazil, restrictions apply to the use of dredges and barges in Amazonian rivers, especially in protected areas. The use of unlicensed equipment may result in confiscation during operations against illegal mining, reinforced by Decree No. 10,965 of 2022, which authorizes the Brazilian Institute of the Environment and Renewable Natural Resources (Ibama) and the Army to destroy irregular machinery and to monitor the sector with drones and satellites.24 In Colombia, similar provisions are established in Decree No. 1035 of 2024, which empowers the police, army, or navy to destroy and deactivate heavy machinery used in illegal mining.25 Decree No. 2261 of 2012 regulates, registers, and controls the importation of certain machines. Classified as high in equipment control, Colombia requires the registration and monitoring of so-called “yellow machines,” some of which can also be used in other economic sectors.26 IGARAPÉ INSTITUTE | OCTOBER 2025 17 Table of ContentsEndnotes In Ecuador, Article 261 of the Comprehensive Organic Criminal Code punishes with imprisonment of 3 to 5 years the financing or supply of machines, equipment, tools, and more generally, any instrument used for the illicit extraction of mineral resources. In addition, under the responsibility of the Ministry of Transport and Public Works, the legal framework for granting mining concessions is Ministerial Agreement No. 002 of December 2016, which regulates the use of machinery and heavy equipment in mining (Articles 10 and 17). Compliance with this regulation by mining rights holders is overseen by the Agency for Mining Regulation and Control (Arcom). A common challenge throughout the region is the enforcement of restrictive norms on equipment use, due to corruption and the difficulty of oversight in remote areas such as the Amazon. In terms of transparency (indicator 3.2), the classification assesses whether recorded data on gold production, trade, and transport are public, and/or whether they can be requested from institutions or accessed in official systems. The classification does not consider whether this information is integrated, i.e., an all-in-one system for handling gold mining data. None of the Amazonian countries achieves a high rating. Brazil is recognized for the transparency of open data, such as those related to mercury contamination, classifying as moderate in this indicator, alongside Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru. In Ecuador, for example, the rule is that reports on gold trade at all stages of the supply chain must be public, whether produced by private companies or government institutions. In practice, transparency needs to be expanded in all countries classified as moderate; there are some positive initiatives, but little implementation and integration among monitoring systems across the mining chain. In Bolivia, Guyana, Suriname, and Venezuela, transparency is low, and the challenge is even greater. The involvement of stakeholders in monitoring mining and promoting good practices (indicator 3.3) is another relevant aspect for reducing the sector’s vulnerability to environmental crime. Brazil, Colombia, and Peru participate in international initiatives such as the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals, which sets standards for tracing the origin of gold and mitigating the risks of illegal mining. In addition, programs such as Fairmined27 encourage the certification of responsibly extracted gold. In Bolivia, Ecuador, and Guyana, some initiatives have been implemented, but without significant impact on oversight or on strengthening governance in the sector, justifying their moderate classification. Guyana, in particular, has been participating in efforts led by the UNODC to improve its legislation.28 By contrast, Venezuela and Suriname have low participation of NGOs and international organizations in mining governance, which makes them more susceptible to illegal extraction and uncertified gold trade.29 In terms of supplies, the control and oversight of mercury are key factors in assessing the mining sector in the region (indicator 3.4). Venezuela has signed but not ratified the Minamata Convention. Brazil, Colombia, and Peru have national legislation on mercury, reflecting stronger commitment to the Convention’s terms; therefore, they were classified as high in the input-related criterion. Guyana and Suriname lack specific regulation but are in the process of approval, classifying, along with Venezuela, as low in the category. Rules without effective enforcement do not prevent the illegal entry or use of mercury, as in Bolivia and Ecuador, classified as moderate. In Bolivia, the input is used in diesel-powered rotary drums known as chanchas to separate gold from crushed rock.30 18 Markets and Forest: Comparative Analysis of the Economic Sectors that Pressure the Amazon Basin Table of Contents Endnotes There are, however, good examples that can orient regulatory changes in the Amazon Basin. One of them is Colombia’s Law No. 1658 of 2013, which prohibited the use of mercury in any mineral extraction activity, and Decree No. 419 of 2021, which prohibited the manufacture, import, and export of the input, not only its use. In the monitoring and transparency dimension, Suriname and Venezuela are far behind Brazil, Colombia, and Peru. The analysis of monitoring capacity of mining in the Amazon countries shows that countries have different levels of control and transparency, but all still face challenges in enforcing rules and integrating information. Bolivia and Ecuador involve external stakeholders in supply chain monitoring but show gaps in transparency, input regulation, and enforcement effectiveness, resulting in identical overall ratings in this dimension. Venezuela and Suriname, meanwhile, display the greatest weaknesses, with no equipment regulation, poor traceability in the production chain, and little participation of external institutions in controlling the activity. The lack of efficient monitoring in these countries fosters illicit flows, facilitates money laundering, and intensifies the environmental impacts of illegal mining. 1.4. Law Enforcement The effectiveness of actions to combat illegal mining depends on oversight capacity, the application of sanctions, and the existence of institutional mechanisms capable of curbing illicit activities. The fourth dimension assesses two main aspects among the countries: the deployment of operations to suppress illegal mining and the existence of institutional obstacles that favor impunity and regulatory capture. The greater the evidence of corruption, the lower the public integrity, and the greater the challenges and risks of illegality and irregularity in the sector. The fight against illegal mining varies among Amazonian countries (indicator 4.1). Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru have carried out police operations, seizures, and closures of mining areas, being classified as moderate in this indicator. Taken together, these four countries have conducted operations and legal proceedings in the last years, but their enforcement capacities have been overwhelmed by the scale of the problem. In Brazil, operations such as Operation Yanomami and Operation Green Brazil have demonstrated efforts to dismantle criminal networks associated with illegal mining, although the continuity of these actions has been hampered by political and logistical factors. In Peru, large-scale operations, such as the crackdown on mining in the Madre de Dios region during a military intervention in 2022, resulted in the destruction of equipment and the closure of illegal mines.31 Colombia has also intensified actions against illegal mining linked to armed groups but faces difficulties in areas dominated by guerrillas and other criminal organizations. In Ecuador, enforcement operations such as the military Operation Manatí have been reported. On the other hand, Bolivia, Guyana, Suriname, and Venezuela, rated low: the lack of effective oversight in these countries has allowed illegal mining to proliferate without any significant intervention. IGARAPÉ INSTITUTE | OCTOBER 2025 19 Table of ContentsEndnotes Corruption and institutional obstacles represent one of the greatest challenges to countering illegal mining in the region, reflected in the public integrity aspect (indicator 4.2). Regulatory capture, the complicity of public agents, and the influence of criminal groups on political decisions are factors that hinder the fight against illegal mining in several Amazonian countries. Brazil, Colombia, and Peru have institutional mechanisms to investigate cases of corruption but still face difficulties in punishing those responsible and in dismantling political protection schemes for illegal mining. In Ecuador, the lack of coordination between environmental and public security agencies undermines effective enforcement. Overall, there is room to improve public integrity in all eight countries. However, in Bolivia, Ecuador, Guyana, Suriname, and Venezuela, corruption is deeply entrenched, justifying the low rating in the public integrity category. There is compelling evidence of local authorities being involved in facilitating illegal activity, making oversight practically nonexistent. Reports have noted, for example, the payment of bribes in gold to corrupt police in Guyana. An illustrative example of promoting public integrity from a regulatory perspective is Ecuador’s mining law, which establishes administrative, civil, and criminal liability, in addition to sanctions for any person who, in the exercise of competent public functions, fails to comply with legal obligations (Art. 119, Mining Law). In Colombia, there is provision for sanctioning a type of embezzlement or perjury applied to the mining sector. Article 403 of the Criminal Code addresses the “allocation of treasury resources for the undue encouragement or benefit of explorers and traders of precious metals.” This occurs when a public servant fails to collect financial contributions (mining royalties) based on false declarations about the origin of precious metals.32 Greater attention to transportation routes and points where gold is traded and exported is one of the key points recommended to authorities in all eight countries, particularly in those, as Peru, invest little in this stage of the production chain — that is, in the verification of the legal origin of the gold at the first sale. The analysis of law enforcement related to Amazonian mining shows that Brazil, Colombia, and Peru have comparatively stronger mechanisms to address illegal mining; however, they lack integration and continuity in enforcement actions. Ecuador shows occasional efforts, but with limited systemic impact. Bolivia, Guyana, Suriname, and Venezuela are the most vulnerable countries, with no consistent operations, ineffective sanctions, and high levels of corruption, allowing illegal mining to thrive with few obstacles. 20 Markets and Forest: Comparative Analysis of the Economic Sectors that Pressure the Amazon Basin Table of Contents Endnotes Timber2. Logging represents both a significant economic sector and a central driver of socioenvironmental impacts across the eight countries of the Amazon Basin. According to Interpol, the market for illegal logging and trade is estimated to generate between USD 50 and 150 billion annually.33 Despite efforts to strengthen controls during the timber commercialization phase, the situation in the Amazon Basin remains concerning: a considerable portion of timber extraction continues to occur illegally. Studies indicate that 38% of the timber harvested in the Brazilian Amazon is of irregular origin, a pattern repeated in other countries of the region.34 Illegal practices also persist, such as timber laundering, which consists of disguising the illicit origin of timber extraction — whether from protected forests, protected species, or in volumes that exceed authorization documents — thus giving the appearance of legality to the sale of native forest products. This process involves document fraud at different stages of the production chain, including the extraction, transportation, and storage of forest products and byproducts. Therefore, a comparative analysis of this sector in the eight countries of the Amazon Basin is crucial. Below, we present the Scorecard for the timber sector, with the color-coded classification assigned to each of the dimensions in each country (Context, Regulation, Monitoring and Law Enforcement): IGARAPÉ INSTITUTE | OCTOBER 2025 21 Performance Dashboard - Timber Regulation 21 Bolivia Economic, social, and environmental context Regulation and governance Monitoring and transparency Law enforcement Level 2 (High) Level 1 (Medium) Level 0 (Low) Colombia Guyana Suriname Brazil Ecuador Peru Venezuela Source: Internal data processed by the Igarapé Institute 1.1. Economic autonomy of the sector 2.1. Definitions 2.4. Administrative sanctions 3.2. Transparency 1.2. Sector formality 2.2. Legislation 2.5. Institutional competence of authorities 3.3. Stakeholder engagement 4.1. Operational actions 1.3. Ecological compatibility 2.3. Criminal sanctions 3.1. Equipment control 4.2. Public integrity Table of ContentsIndicators 22 Markets and Forest: Comparative Analysis of the Economic Sectors that Pressure the Amazon Basin Table of Contents Endnotes 2.1. Economic, Social, and Environmental Context In indicator 1.1 (economic autonomy), Bolivia, Brazil, Peru, and Suriname were classified as having low autonomy, considering the sector’s contribution to each country’s GDP and the dollar value of timber and forest product exports. The first three are the main exporters of wooden flooring among Amazonian countries. In Bolivia, one risk factor is the export of species listed under the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES). Approximately 35% of exports in 2019 did not declare any species information in shipment data, and 2% were reported as a “mix” of species. A closer review of “undeclared” exports listed in U.S. import data revealed that many corresponded to cumaru and ipê, two species protected under CITES.35 Brazil is one of the world’s leading exporters of tropical timber, with about 90% of production destined for the domestic market and only 10% for export,36 China being the main buyer of raw logs.37 The sector’s economic contribution in Colombia and Venezuela is quite limited compared to other productive sectors, justifying their classification as high autonomy. In Ecuador and Guyana, economic participation is rated as moderate. Formality in the timber sector (indicator 1.2) in Amazon Basin countries is relatively low, with rates above the global informality average, estimated at 55% for the sector by official agencies. The situation is particularly severe in Bolivia, Guyana, Suriname, and Venezuela, which were classified as low. In Venezuela, labor market data show that the informality rate increased from 48.5% in 2015 to 84.5% in 2020,38 negatively affecting the living conditions of forestry workers and undermining sustainable natural resource management. The other four countries — Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru — are classified as moderate. Qualitative data from this study also indicate the use of slave and migrant labor in forestry activities in countries such as Brazil and Colombia.39 Workers are subjected to economic and gender-based violence, sometimes under threats from armed groups, as in Colombia, through the practice of “apadrinhamento” (“sponsorship”), in which financiers handle logistics for transportation and marketing, creating dependency relationships with local communities. Better training of the workforce could promote sustainable exploitation of native forests, as shown by successful experiences in Brazil in disseminating and improving techniques for Sustainable Forest Management (SFM), supported by resources from the Amazon Fund.40 In Guyana and Suriname, however, informal hiring and precarious working conditions were reported, including long workdays, low wages, unsafe situations, and limited oversight of labor relations — justifying the low classification in this category. The environmental context (indicator 1.3) in which the timber sector operates, especially its relationship with protected areas in the Amazon, is concerning. Research found that illegal logging occurs in protected areas in all the countries studied, with conflicts involving Indigenous and traditional communities affected by the environmental and social damage of unauthorized timber exploitation. Examples include Yasuní National Park and Cofán Bermejo Ecological Reserve in Ecuador, which lost 1.16 million hectares of natural forest between 1985 and 2022, 40% of it within protected areas.41 IGARAPÉ INSTITUTE | OCTOBER 2025 23 Table of ContentsEndnotes Half of the Basin countries were classifyed as moderate in this indicator: Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, and Peru. Only Suriname was classified as high ecological compatibility, as traditional small-scale exploitation predominates there, and both the percentage of deforestation attributed to the timber sector and the environmental impact, measured in GHG emissions, remain within the global average. Still, given the increasing pressures to clear primary forests for agricultural activities, Suriname’s classification should be interpreted with caution. The impact of illegal timber exploitation goes beyond the loss of vegetation cover: it affects hydrological cycles, biodiversity, and carbon emissions, since logging accounts for more than half of global emissions from forest degradation. • Organic Environmental Code of 2017. Article 318 – Very serious infractions. The following infractions will be considered very serious and, in addition to economic fines, the following sanctions will be applied: 1. The exploitation, possession, use, transport, movement, storage, processing, and commercialization of timber and non-timber forest products from native species that are under some category of threat, conditioned or restricted, without administrative authorization. For this infraction, the sanction provided for in item no. 2 of Article 320 will apply, as appropriate; (...); 3. Irregular settlements that affect biodiversity within protected areas or National Forest Heritage areas. For this infraction, the sanction provided in no. 7 of Article 320 will apply; (...); 5. Providing incorrect information, or information not corresponding to the truth of facts or persons, in order to obtain administrative authorization or to comply with monitoring and control mechanisms, thereby inducing the competent Environmental Authority to make errors. For this infraction, the sanction provided in item no. 5 of Article 320 will apply, as appropriate; (...); 9. Establishing forest plantations in prohibited locations, according to the provisions of this Code. For this infraction, the sanction provided in no. 2 of Article 320 may apply, as appropriate; In Bolivia, Brazil, and Venezuela, the low classification is a warning sign, as deforestation rates attributed to the timber sector are at least 10% above the global average. 2.2. Regulation and Governance In the first category of this dimension, concerning the definition of illegal activity (indicator 2.1), Guyana and Suriname received low scores, since the definition of what is legal is not explicit and there is a lack of clarity on what constitutes illegal logging in these two countries. Ecuador, classified as moderate, considers forest use without a title or exploitation permit a serious or very serious offense under its Organic Environmental Code. 30 Markets and Forest: Comparative Analysis of the Economic Sectors that Pressure the Amazon Basin Table of Contents Endnotes In 2009, it was estimated that between 6% and 13% of timber imports into the EU came from illegal sources, justifying the partnership with Guyana, as well as the adoption of the European Timber Regulation (EUTR), of 2013, designed to prevent the trade of illegally harvested timber in the European market. Foreign regulations applicable to the sector, such as those of the European Union and the United States Lacey Act, establish the responsibility of purchasing companies when acquiring timber of illegal origin. Such measures may result in infringers losing customers, but the process of confirming that timber products originate from sources that comply with all applicable laws depends on a joint implementation between exporting and importing countries. As seen in the previous dimension, regarding regulation, there are differences in official guidelines on how to conduct forestry in a nonpredatory manner. Indicator 3.3 shows that there are also divergences regarding unofficial guidelines, but among the good practices identified, there is potential for learning to guide regional cooperation. 2.4. Law Enforcement Entering the law enforcement dimension, indicator 4.1 (operational actions) shows that half of the countries are classified as low and the other half as moderate. Initiatives to combat crimes and irregularities in the timber sector were reported in all countries. In Colombia, the 2022 Artemisa Campaign stands out, an intervention strategy of the National Council for the Fight against Deforestation (Conaldef), composed of the Ministry of the Environment, Justice and Defense, the Office of the Attorney General, the Office of the Prosecutor General, the Armed Forces, and the National Police. More than two dozen operations to combat deforestation were carried out, with seizures of illegal timber and control of vessels that did not present the documentation or environmental licenses required for timber transport, in accordance with current regulations. In Peru, joint operations between Osinfor, the National Service of Natural Protected Areas (Sernanp) and the Ministry of the Environment stand out, with the support of Interpol to deal with cross-border routes of illegal timber movement. Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru are classified as moderate in operational actions, while Bolivia, Guyana, Suriname, and Venezuela appear as low performance. According to an investigation by Amazon Underworld, at least six operations against illegal logging were carried out in Bolivian territory between 2020 and 2025, with the participation of the Authority for the Supervision and Social Control of Forests and Lands (ABT), the Army and forest rangers of the Manuripi Reserve. The Public Prosecutor’s Office of the Department of Pando, however, filed formal charges in only one of the cases.55 IGARAPÉ INSTITUTE | OCTOBER 2025 31 Table of ContentsEndnotes Measures such as improving timber traceability, stricter enforcement and increased transparency in production chains are essential. However, corruption and the limited effectiveness of sanctions against environmental crimes hinder efforts to combat illegal exploitation in Amazonian countries. These aspects are assessed under indicator 4.2 (public integrity), which highlights the opacity in the functioning of institutions. All countries received a low rating in this regard, indicating that illegal exploitation is facilitated by deficiencies, deliberate omission, or corruption in regulatory and/or enforcement agencies. This manifests itself, for example, through bribery of competent authorities, manipulation and fraud of documents, or phantom shipments. As an example, reports of corruption in the Bolivian Forest Agency (ABT) undermine sectoral policies in the country. Nevertheless, this reality coexists with positive practices. In the last five years, Bolivia approved a National Voluntary Forest Certification Program (2020), the National Plan for Integral Management of Forests and Land (2021), the Plurinational Strategy for Forests and Climate Change (2024), and institutionalized the “Forest, Life Systems and Climate Crisis Roundtable,” aimed at strengthening inter-institutional coordination and promoting intercultural dialogue on climate territorial governance. The process of “laundering” timber takes multiple forms: through falsification of management plans, fraud in declaration of origin (such as the DOF in Brazil) when involving a forest species protected by the State and of high economic value; or through the distribution of large lots of illegal timber in small shipments, in order to attract less attention from the authorities. It is insufficient to invest in regulation alone. A poorly implemented regulatory model can even favor the expansion of illegal logging and disguised exports, with one species substituted for another. An example of this was the ban on the trade of mahogany, one of the most valuable species in the world, which was not accompanied by effective monitoring. This gap resulted in an increase in exports of “other tropical timber species,” used to mask the origin of mahogany destined for the foreign market. It also exacerbated violence in municipalities in Pará (Brazilian Amazon), due to insufficient supervisory capacity.56 Among the main catalysts of forest crime are falsification, fraud and corruption, which allow criminal networks to circumvent legal requirements and transport shipments of timber products across borders.57 In this sense, it is important to advance in the regulation of the sector so that the different links in the chain, from licensing to export, are supervised. This reduces the margin of doubt about what is illegal, strengthens institutional capacities so that authorities can monitor economic activity, investigate and sanction irregularities, and reward integrity practices along the production chain. 32 Markets and Forest: Comparative Analysis of the Economic Sectors that Pressure the Amazon Basin Table of Contents Endnotes Cattle Ranching3. Among agricultural commodities, cattle production is the main driver of deforestation in the Amazon. Globally, between 2001 and 2015, most forest replacement occurred for cattle ranching, surpassing land-use changes for soybean, timber, palm oil, or cocoa production.58 The conversion of forests to pasture occurs despite the small profit margins of cattle ranching for producers, whether because it represents a form of real estate speculation, a means of securing land tenure, or other reasons beyond immediate profit. In the Amazon, according to ranchers’ calculations, each cow requires, on average, one hectare of pasture, and each pasture is laid out by clearing the forest.59 Livestock farming, both around and within protected areas, is closely linked to the expansion of road networks and the conversion of forest cover into pastureland for livestock and agribusiness.60 Attempts to conceal the association of cattle with illegally occupied areas throughout the production chain constitute another challenge for the sector. Monitoring remains limited — in Brazil, it is restricted to suppliers who sell directly to slaughterhouses — reinforcing the need to expand traceability and subject the activity to stricter regulatory oversight by the relevant authorities.61 Below, we present the Scorecard for the livestock sector in all eight Amazon countries, with low, moderate, and high scores assigned for each of the thirteen indicators. IGARAPÉ INSTITUTE | OCTOBER 2025 33 Performance Dashboard - Cattle Ranching Regulation 33 Bolivia Economic, social, and environmental context Regulation and governance Monitoring and transparency Law enforcement Level 2 (High) Level 1 (Medium) Level 0 (Low) Colombia Guyana Suriname Brazil Ecuador Peru Venezuela Source: Internal data processed by the Igarapé Institute 1.1. Economic autonomy of the sector 2.1. Definitions 2.4. Administrative sanctions 3.2. Transparency 1.2. Sector formality 2.2. Legislation 2.5. Institutional competence of authorities 3.3. Stakeholder engagement 4.1. Operational actions 1.3. Ecological compatibility 2.3. Criminal sanctions 3.1. Equipment control 4.2. Public integrity Table of ContentsIndicators 34 Markets and Forest: Comparative Analysis of the Economic Sectors that Pressure the Amazon Basin Table of Contents Endnotes 3.1. Economic, Social, and Environmental Context Livestock farming represents a vital sector for many Amazonian countries, both for its contribution to GDP and for ensuring food sovereignty. With vast territories and a history of agricultural development, Amazon Basin countries such as Bolivia, Brazil, and Colombia participate directly in the international production of animal products. For this reason, they were classified as having low autonomy in terms of economic participation (indicator 1.1). Understanding the economic context of this chain and its characteristics helps assess the degree of autonomy these countries hold over the livestock economy. Brazil stands out as the world’s largest exporter of beef and the holder of the largest live herd, making livestock a major contributor to national revenue. As a leader in the sector, agribusiness — of which livestock farming is a part — represents about 21% of Brazilian GDP, with a market valued at USD 18 billion in beef exports. Accordingly, Brazil was classified with low autonomy. In addition to Brazil, the complexity of livestock chains in Bolivia and Colombia also led to a low classification for this indicator, highlighting that more attention needs to be directed to prevent irregular and illicit practices. The situation is different in Guyana and Suriname, which were classified with high autonomy. In these countries, the industrial sector is quite limited and meat consumption is reduced,62 whether due to religious factors (such as among Hindu communities) or non-religious ones. The average level of formality in livestock farming (indicator 1.2) is low, with an informality rate around 60%. In Amazonian countries, the situation is even more concerning. In Bolivia and Colombia, classified with low formality, informality reaches 80% and 85%, respectively. This situation is linked to low worker qualifications and precarious working conditions. Informal activity is especially concentrated in inland and remote regions, making oversight difficult for the relevant institutions. In Colombia, dissident groups from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia — People’s Army (Farc-EP), such as the Jorge Briceño Suárez Bloc (BJBS), are involved in livestock in two ways. First, by charging “taxes” and “vaccines” from farmers (colonos), they generate revenue to offset losses from the decline in coca cultivation in the region. Second, the presence of colonos allows these groups to establish a social base, which is fundamental to maintaining territorial control in areas where they operate, including obstructing police operations.63 Formality is high in Brazil, Guyana, and Suriname. In Brazil, livestock has generated formal jobs, supported by public policies.64 In Guyana, the activity is linked to subsistence farming involving Amerindian populations, while in Suriname it is tied to family-based production. A key point is the role of cooperatives and producer associations, which bring together small informal farmers, enabling a more efficient distribution of production and protecting their rights. Venezuela, in turn, was classified with moderate formality. IGARAPÉ INSTITUTE | OCTOBER 2025 35 Table of ContentsEndnotes In the Amazon region, forest conversion into pasture for intensive livestock is the main driver of deforestation. Of the 39 million hectares (Mha) of deforested Amazon land between 2001 and 2022, 38 Mha are attributable to agriculture and forestry; of this, 83% corresponds to pasture expansion and the rest to agriculture.65 Six of the eight countries were classified with low or moderate ecological compatibility (indicator 1.3), showing how much still needs to be done to reduce livestock’s impact on biodiversity. In countries where livestock has significant economic weight, cattle raising is associated with extensive pastures that require vast land areas for beef production. This is the case in Bolivia (55%), Brazil (65%), and Colombia (50%), all above the global average of deforestation attributable to the sector (45%). Brazil leads in absolute GHG emissions, with livestock emitting 503.5 MtCO2 in 2023, equivalent to 80% of emissions from agriculture and livestock — the sector that emits the most CO2 — while agriculture alone represents only 20% of total emissions. Since 1970, agricultural emissions have nearly tripled in Brazil, with the cattle herd as the main source of sectoral carbon emissions.66 In Colombia’s Amazon, the cattle herd doubled in eight municipalities of the Caquetá, Guaviare, and Meta departments, rising from 1.143 million in 2016 to 2.091 million in 2021. In one protected area, Chiribiquete National Natural Park, the herd grew from 14,200 in 2016 to 28,200 recorded in vaccination campaigns in 2023. This expansion has driven deforestation, which accumulated 8,180 hectares between 2017 and 2022 in the same region.67 Pressure from livestock on protected areas and Indigenous lands has been reported in all eight countries analyzed, such as the Isiboro Sécure Indigenous Territory and National Park (TIPNIS) in Bolivia and the Nukak National Natural Park in Colombia. In terms of ecological incompatibility, one problem identified was livestock activity in buffer zones of environmental protection areas — an issue that must be addressed by the competent authorities in each country. Peru, Ecuador, and Venezuela were classified as moderate, as they have fewer pasture areas dedicated to cattle raising within the Amazon portion of their territories. By contrast, livestock’s ecological compatibility is high in Suriname and Guyana, where deforestation is more associated with mining than with agriculture or cattle raising, unlike the rest of the Amazon Basin.68 Considering the economic and social dimension, which addresses the context of the activity, the best-classified countries are Guyana and Suriname, with high autonomy of economic activity, high formality, and high ecological compatibility. On the other hand, the countries requiring the most progress — Bolivia, Brazil, and Colombia — were classified with low performance across different indicators, characterized by high deforestation rates and pressure on protected areas, factors that point to a risk of expanding criminal activities. 36 Markets and Forest: Comparative Analysis of the Economic Sectors that Pressure the Amazon Basin Table of Contents Endnotes 3.2. Regulation and Governance The regulation of livestock in the Amazon Basin countries has specificities that distinguish it from the other extractive chains analyzed, involving sanitary, land, and environmental aspects that directly impact the ability to control the activity. While some countries have more structured legislation and higher penalties covering various elements of the chain, others face normative gaps and difficulties in law enforcement, requiring greater regulatory effort for the sector. There is little clarity about how illegal livestock is defined (indicator 2.1) in the eight countries analyzed, all of which were classified between low and moderate in this item. Indirectly, illegal livestock is understood to mean any productive activity that violates current legal regulations, in contravention of environmental, sanitary, fiscal, and land use laws. The expression “livestock with contamination in the chain” more precisely reflects what was found in the analysis of this sector in the region. Five of the countries are classified as moderate in terms of definition. In Amazon Basin countries with an exportoriented market, the sector’s economic participation increases the scale of production and the size of the land used for cattle ranching, encouraging stricter control methods on sanitary issues. In others, the focus on food sovereignty and production to meet domestic demand stimulates small informal producers, who often operate outside the law. Suriname, classified as low in regulatory definition, deals exclusively with livestock in protected areas. In Ecuador, also classified as low, the concept of illegality is equally imprecise, and the responsible authorities (Customs and the Ecuadorian Agency for Agricultural Health — Agrocalidad) focus their efforts on combating smuggling. As for the modus operandi of smugglers acting in Ecuador, one practice identified is the entry of Peruvian cattle through illegal border crossings, later transferred to farms that raise animals destined for meat production. These farms send the smuggled cattle both to legal and illegal slaughterhouses. When sold to legal slaughterhouses, the documentation is falsified or tampered with, allowing the meat to be marketed at low prices but without any sanitary control. For indicator 2.2, which classifies legislation on the activity, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, and Peru were evaluated as high, indicating legal stability and detailed regulation of the chain. Legislation considered includes land tenure, environmental protection, and sanitary regulations. In general, these standards address problems and irregularities in cattle raising and trading, in addition to establishing sanctions that criminalize cattle theft. Venezuela, classified as moderate in this regard, has been discussing since 2023 a proposal to reform the Criminal Law on Livestock Protection.69 IGARAPÉ INSTITUTE | OCTOBER 2025 37 Table of ContentsEndnotes Examples of applicable legislation in Colombia: • Decree No. 1500 of 2007 Establishes the creation of the Official System of Inspection, Surveillance and Control of Meat, Edible Meat Products and Derivatives Intended for Human Consumption (Sistema Oficial de Inspección, Vigilancia y Control de la Carne, Productos Cárnicos Comestibles y Derivados Cárnicos Destinados para el Consumo Humano), defining sanitary and food safety requirements to be met in the productive stages of the livestock chain. • Law No. 1944 of 2018, Art. 243 Establishes that anyone who appropriates, for themselves or others, large or small cattle species, equines, or swine, shall incur imprisonment of sixty (60) to one hundred and twenty (120) months and a fine. Furthermore, Colombian legislation considers livestock in protected areas to be illegal. • Law No. 2111 of 2021, Art. 336 Condemns livestock in protected areas with imprisonment from forty-eight (48) to one hundred and forty-four (144) months and a fine. The regulation of cattle transport is an essential element in the rules applicable to the sector. Colombia has infra-legal norms on the subject, as does Brazil, where the Animal Transit Guide (GTA), a document that informs the origin, destination, and purpose of the transport, is mandatory and must be issued by state animal health control agencies.70 In Bolivia, animal movement guides are regulated by Supreme Decree No. 27291 of 2003. In addition, Law No. 1333 on the Environment of 1992 provides that “agricultural production must be developed in such a way as to allow sustainable production and use systems” and determines that the land use must be subject to the conservation of agroecosystems (Art. 66). The country was classified as high since, in addition to these regulations, the Law on Protected Natural Areas (Supreme Decree No. 038-2001-AG) establishes that certain protected areas depend on authorization for local populations to carry out agricultural and livestock activities of an integral nature, on land with such aptitude. The analysis of laws applicable to livestock highlights a lack of regulation of the production chain beyond cattle raising. Greater control over the transport and marketing of animals could raise the classification of some countries from moderate to high in this regard. In the Amazon Basin countries, criminal sanctions (indicator 2.3) related to livestock are associated with land misuse, environmental and water contamination, mistreatment of wild and domestic animals, and cattle theft. In comparative terms, the average global penalty for illegal livestock offenses is 6 years in prison. Five 38 Markets and Forest: Comparative Analysis of the Economic Sectors that Pressure the Amazon Basin Table of Contents Endnotes countries were classified as high. Bolivia (Art. 105, Environmental Law) and Colombia (Art. 331, Penal Code)71 have the highest penalties associated with environmental contamination, ranging from 1 (one) to 10 years of imprisonment and from 5 to 9 years, respectively. Venezuela punishes certain types of cattle appropriation Examples of applicable legislation in Colombia: • Criminal Law on Livestock Protection (Ley Penal de Protección a la Actividad Ganadera). Art. 13 Shall be punished with imprisonment of 4 to 6 years: 1. Whoever provides false documents or alters genuine documents to obtain cattle transport guides or subproduct permits derived from them; and 2. Whoever uses falsified or altered purchase, sale, or transport documents or guides with the objective of transporting cattle or disposing of them, or their derivatives. Peru punishes qualified cattle theft (abigeato) in its Penal Code, which can carry up to 25 years of imprisonment when committed by a leader of a criminal organization (Art. 189-C, Penal Code). Ecuador also provides criminal punishment for cattle theft, with a minimum sentence of 1 year, which can reach up to 26 years when committed with violence and resulting in death. For this reason, Ecuador and Peru are also classified as high. Brazil and Suriname are classified as moderate. In Suriname, violation of the Meat and Other Animal-Origin Products Inspection Law is punishable by up to 4 years of imprisonment.72 Brazil, in turn, provides milder penalties for environmental crimes (Law No. 9.605 of 1998), with imprisonment not exceeding 4 years, and cattle theft (abigeato) (Law No. 13.330 of 2016) with imprisonment from 2 to 5 years. Classified as low, Guyana has lenient penalties. The country’s legislation provides for up to 5 years of imprisonment in cases of environmental damage (Environmental Protection Law – Law No. 11 of 1996), but does not mention livestock. The environmental impact of this activity is sanctioned under another provision of the same act, with imprisonment of 6 months. with up to 16 years in prison when carried out under serious threat (Art. 7, Criminal Law on Livestock Protection — Ley Penal de Protección a la Actividad Ganadera of 1997), and for this reason was also classified as high. The same law punishes the falsification of animal transport documents with 4 to 6 years of imprisonment. IGARAPÉ INSTITUTE | OCTOBER 2025 39 Table of ContentsEndnotes Bolivia 1 to 10 years Poisoning of water intended for agricultural purposes and violation of animal health standards Article 105, Environmental Law of 1992 Brazil 2 to 5 years Cattle theft/qualified theft; receiving stolen animals Articles 155, § 6, and 180-A, Criminal Code, as amended by Law No. 13,330 of 2016 Colombia 4 to 12 years Cattle ranching in protected areas Article 336, Criminal Code as amended by Law No. 2111 of 2021 Ecuador 22 to 26 years Cattle theft resulting in death Article 199, Comprehensive Organic Penal Code Guyana 6 months Non-compliance with environmental licensing Article 4, § 4, Annex of Environmental Protection Law No. 11 of 1996 Peru 15 to 25 years Aggravated form of cattle theft committed by the head of a criminal organization Article 189-C, Criminal Code (amended by Law 26326, of 1994) Suriname up to 6 years Cattle theft in pasture Article 371, § 1, Criminal Code (Wetboek van Strafrecht - GB 1911) Venezuela 8 to 16 years Aggravated cattle theft Article 7, Criminal Law for the Protection of Livestock Table 4. Comparison of the highest criminal sanctions applicable to livestock farming among the eight countries analyzed (in years) Country Penalty Offense Law Markets and Forest: Comparative Analysis of the Economic Sectors that Pressure the Amazon Basin 46 Performance Dashboard - Land Regulation 46 Indicators Bolivia Economic, social, and environmental context Regulation and governance Monitoring and transparency Law enforcement Level 2 (High) Level 1 (Medium) Level 0 (Low) Colombia Guyana Suriname Brazil Ecuador Peru Venezuela Source: Internal data processed by the Igarapé Institute 1.1. Economic Autonomy of the Sector 2.1. Definitions 2.4. Administrative sanctions 3.2. Transparency 1.2. Sector Formality 2.2. Legislation 2.5. Institutional competence of authorities 3.3. Stakeholder engagement 4.1. Operational actions 1.3. Ecological compatibility 2.3. Criminal sanctions 3.1. Equipment Control 4.2. Public integrity Table of Contents IGARAPÉ INSTITUTE | OCTOBER 2025 47 Table of ContentsEndnotes 4.1. Economic, Social, and Environmental Context Low market autonomy implies that a greater economic share of this sector contributes to total GDP (indicator 1.1), while high autonomy indicates less dependence on revenues from this sector. Brazil leads the Amazon land market, both in terms of the average price of land and the area available for commercialization, followed by Colombia and Peru. These countries, classified as low autonomy, show high economic dependence on the land sector. In economic terms, Brazil has the highest value associated with the land market (USD 6,000/ha),87 compared to other Amazon Basin countries, although this value corresponds to half of the global average (USD 12,000/ ha).88 Despite the unique natural wealth of the Amazon region, other elements influence land valuation, such as lack of infrastructure, logistical access difficulties, inefficient governance, uncertainty about land regularization, and conflicts over land and natural resources. The price of land in countries such as Bolivia, Guyana, and Suriname is lower than in those classified as low autonomy, but the sector’s economic participation is still moderate, maintaining pressure on this resource. Lower economic autonomy represents a greater risk of irregularities and illegalities, such as the illegal occupation of protected areas and land grabbing of public lands — practices reported in all eight countries of the region, which fall only between classifications of low and moderate economic autonomy. The formality criterion in the production chain (indicator 1.2) does not apply to the land market,89 which is why this indicator was nos evaluated. For the other economies related to this market and involving land use, such as gold mining, cattle ranching, and timber exploitation, the results have already been presented. The land market and ecological conservation are closely linked (indicator 1.3), though not always in a compatible way in the Amazon. For this reason, the eight countries fall between low and moderate classifications for this indicator. Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, and Suriname were classified as low compatibility, highlighting the risk of the economic sector advancing over the Amazon biome. Illegal deforestation often precedes illegal appropriation and the consequent appreciation of land. The illicit appropriation of natural resources and the expansion of the agricultural frontier occur mainly in public forests, state-protected areas, and Indigenous territories. The absence of adequate monitoring and protection of these territories, combined with corruption and weak state control, facilitates both deforestation and the expansion of illegal activities. In Bolivia, in the last 15 years, more than 225,740 hectares were irregularly sold in the lowland regions, especially in the Chiquitania area.90 In Brazil, in 2022, 2,789 registrations overlapping with Indigenous lands were identified, totaling 380,500 hectares, concentrated in the states of Mato Grosso, Pará, and Rondônia.91 Similarly, in Colombia, land grabbing by large landowners fragmented protected ecosystems, such as the Cerro Los Picachos National Natural Park and the Serranía de Chiribiquete, for the establishment of pastures. According to the descriptive data collected, all countries reported land grabbing in protected areas and Indigenous territories, due to monitoring difficulties and barriers associated with land regularization. 48 Markets and Forest: Comparative Analysis of the Economic Sectors that Pressure the Amazon Basin The forest economy in protected areas and Indigenous territories To illustrate the presence of the economic activities analyzed in the Amazon region, we prepared a map of the localities mentioned in the study. From the collected material and after filtering the observations related to Indigenous territories, national parks, and other conservation units, we arrived at 131 protected areas and Indigenous lands cited. Discarding geographic units mentioned more than once, we reached a total of 109 unique localities, complemented with georeferenced information from other sources.92 The following map shows the 96 Protected Areas and Indigenous Territories where gold mining, timber exploitation, cattle ranching, or land grabbing — or a combination of two or more of these activities — were reported during the research. Source: Prepared by Igarapé based on the GIS project. Available at: https://geoigarape.online/portal/home/ webmap/viewer.html?webmap=d63f9f8aaac24027916426ddc6bc2829&extent=-69.5182,-12.7623,-64.1294,-9.7619 Sumário Notas de fim The four economic activities analyzed are present in protected areas across the eight Amazon Basin countries, in addition to French Guiana. Points were identified in border regions between Colombia and Peru, Ecuador and Peru, Peru and Bolivia, and Bolivia and Brazil. There are also records in protected areas of triple border regions: Venezuela, Brazil, and Guyana (near Mount Roraima); Brazil, Suriname, and French Guiana (Tumucumaque Mountains); and Colombia, Peru, and Brazil (between the Solimões and Içá rivers). Land Timber Mining Cattle Ranching Cattle Ranching, Land Mining, Cattle Ranching, Timber Cattle Ranching, Timber Mining, Cattle Ranching, Timber, Land Cattle Ranching, Timber, Land Mining, Land Mining, Timber Mining, Timber, Land 49 Table of ContentsEndnotes Some protected areas are located in transitional zones between biomes (or ecotones), such as Canaima National Park, which combines tropical forest and savanna. The park, larger than Belgium or Armenia, is located in the Venezuelan portion of the Guiana Shield, making the territory favorable for gold mining. In addition to this activity, timber and land exploitation were also mentioned. Another park in a biome transition zone is Noel Kempff Mercado National Park in Bolivia, connected by the Guaporé River to Serra Ricardo Franco State Park in Brazil. This transition region between Amazon, Cerrado, and Pantanal records timber exploitation, cattle ranching, and land appropriation activities. At least three dozen natural areas and Indigenous Lands were cited across the studied sectors — mining (30), timber (37), cattle ranching (36), and land (39). In different locations in Bolivia, all four activities were reported (brown category in the legend). Among them are Madidi National Park, Isiboro Securé Indigenous Land and National Park, Tariquía Flora and Fauna National Reserve, and Manuripi Reserve, between the Beni and Madidi rivers. The border region between Peru and Bolivia shows a concentration of protected areas including Bahuaja Sonene National Park, Manú National Park, and Tambopata Reserve in southern Peru, as well as Madidi, Manuripi Reserve, and Tacana Indigenous Territory in northern Bolivia. This cross-border zone, where mining, cattle ranching, timber, and land appropriation are recorded, requires attention, investments from authorities, and regional cooperation efforts to strengthen security in the Amazonian portions of Peru and Bolivia. The illicit exploitation of biodiversity resources in the Amazon affects Indigenous peoples living in vast territories with limited state presence, a condition that favors market entry and exploitation by criminal groups. One example is the Tacana people, present on the Peruvian, Bolivian, and Brazilian sides of the border. Another example of an Indigenous territory under risk is Igarapé Lage Indigenous Land in Rondônia, near the border with Bolivia. The territory of the Wari people, surrounded by farms, has been impacted by environmental crimes and was recently the target of a Federal Police operation against land grabbing.93 An important aspect, reflected in the environmental context of the four sectoral markets (indicator 1.3), is that the study focused specifically on the Amazon. For this reason, the map does not show mining in the Ecuadorian provinces of Azuay, El Oro, Esmeraldas, and Imbabura, nor cattle ranching in the Peruvian departments of Piura, La Libertad, and Cajamarca, even though these localities have records of gold mining and extensive cattle ranching. The risks of illegality, irregularity, and informality in the activities analyzed here tend to be greater in the Amazonian portion of the countries than in other regions. 50 Markets and Forest: Comparative Analysis of the Economic Sectors that Pressure the Amazon Basin Table of Contents Endnotes 4.2. Regulation and Governance The definition of what constitutes illegal land is not clear (indicator 2.1), though it is generally understood as any land acquired or occupied improperly. In practice, this translates into the commercialization of public lands, protected areas, and territories demarcated for Indigenous peoples, as well as the falsification of land titles. In Suriname, illegality is defined as the sale, lease, or transfer of land without official documents — a practice that can occur in Indigenous Territories, protected areas, or public concessions, generating land disputes and unauthorized deforestation. In Bolivia, Law No. 477 of 2013 added land trafficking and land grabbing to the catalog of crimes in the Penal Code (Arts. 337 bis and 351 bis). The Penal Code of Ecuador also typifies the crime of “occupation, illegal use of land, or land trafficking”.94 Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Suriname were classified as high performers for this indicator. Guyana, whose legislation only addresses irregular land trade, was classified as low. The other countries — Brazil, Peru, and Venezuela — were classified as moderate. The legal framework (indicator 2.2) of the land market in the countries analyzed encompasses land titling, the regulation and demarcation of protected areas and Indigenous Territories, and, in certain cases, the expropriation of private land for agrarian reform purposes. Legislative instability explains the classification of some countries as moderate. An example of pressure for reforms to land laws occurs in Suriname, where arguments around protecting Indigenous and tribal communities and ensuring autonomy over natural resources have paradoxically been used to justify the opposite: placing communal lands on the market. This explains its moderate classification.95 In Colombia, classified as high, the main laws address agrarian reform, land restitution, and redistribution, with the armed conflict forming the backdrop for part of this legislation.96 A bill currently under discussion in the Colombian Congress (Bill No. 183, 2024) seeks to define the competencies of the Agrarian and Rural Jurisdiction and to establish a special agrarian and rural procedure.97 A reform that led to Brazil’s classification as moderate was the approval of Law No. 14,701 of 2023 (the “Marco Temporal” Law), which stipulates that Indigenous peoples have the right to exclusively occupy the lands they inhabited or disputed at the time of the promulgation of the 1988 Federal Constitution. The new law is considered a setback for the demarcation of Indigenous Lands. Peru was also classified as moderate. The new Agrarian Law of 2024 has been linked to fostering land trafficking, as it allows invaders of uncultivated public lands occupied until December 2023 to register them in their own name or acquire them for 30% of the market value.98 Regarding criminal sanctions applicable to land-related offenses (indicator 2.3), Guyana, Suriname, and Venezuela were classified as low, due to weak or nonexistent punishments.99 With high ratings, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru impose maximum penalties exceeding 7 years.100 Brazil was classified as moderate, with penalties ranging from 6 months to 3 years in prison for the crime of usurpation of federal, state, or municipal lands with the intent to occupy them (Law No. 4,947 of 1966, Art. 20). Colombia has the maximum penalty compared to other countries, which can reach up to 15 years in prison. Law No. 2,111 of 2021 amended the Colombian Penal Code to criminalize the illegal appropriation of stateowned lands and the financing of land grabbing, holding accountable anyone who directly or indirectly provides, collects, delivers, IGARAPÉ INSTITUTE | OCTOBER 2025 51 Table of ContentsEndnotes receives, manages, contributes, stores funds, goods, or resources, or performs any act that promotes, organizes, supports, finances, sponsors, induces, orders, or directs the illegal appropriation of public lands.101 The same Colombian law also criminalizes the promotion and financing of deforestation, and provides for increased penalties when deforestation is carried out to appropriate land, cultivate illicit crops, prospect and exploit minerals illegally, or build unlawful infrastructure.102 This provision makes explicit the connection between the four economic activities analyzed in this study and other economies, both licit and illicit, such as drugs, as well as other drivers of deforestation that affect Amazonian communities. Table 5. Comparison of the highest criminal sanctions applicable to land among the eight countries analyzed (in years) Bolivia 3 to 8 years Land trafficking Article 337 b, Penal Code as amended by Law No. 477 of 2013 Brazil 6 months to 3 years Invasion of public lands Article 20, Agrarian Law No. 4,947 of 1966 Colombia 8 to 15 years Financing the illegal appropriation of public lands Article 337-A, Criminal Code as amended by Law No. 2,111 of 2021 Ecuador 5 to 7 years Occupation, illegal use of land or land trafficking Article 201, Comprehensive Organic Criminal Code Guyana 2 months Invasion of public lands Article 20, State Land Act Peru 5 to 12 years Aggravated forms of usurpation of real estate Article 204, Criminal Code, as amended by Law No. 30,556 of 2017 Suriname up to 1 year Trespassing/Property invasion Article 412, Criminal Code (Wetboek van Strafrecht – GB 1911) Venezuela 5 to 10 years Aggravated land invasion Article 471-A, Criminal Code Country Penalty Offense Law 52 Markets and Forest: Comparative Analysis of the Economic Sectors that Pressure the Amazon Basin Table of Contents Endnotes Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru also impose sanctions on financiers who facilitate illicit access to land. In Colombia, criminal law applies the harshest penalty among offenses associated with the land market and increases sentencing by one-third to one-half when the conduct is linked to money laundering (Art. 323, Penal Code). In Ecuador, Article 245 of the Comprehensive Organic Penal Code establishes a three-year sentence for anyone who promotes, finances, or directs the invasion of ecological protection areas, exploiting individuals through deception or false promises. In Peru, legislation punishes those who organize, finance, facilitate, promote, direct, provoke, or instigate land usurpations of public or private property with prison terms of 5 to 12 years, as set forth in Article 204 of the Penal Code. Regarding administrative sanctions (indicator 2.4) applicable to land market illegalities, notable measures include suspension of activities, revocation of permits, confiscation of assets and land, and obligations to repair environmental damage. Most of the countries analyzed impose fines for failure to comply with tax and environmental regulations. In Guyana and Suriname, however, fines are relatively low compared to countries such as Colombia and Ecuador, which link penalties to the minimum wage or other economic metrics. In Bolivia, Peru, and Venezuela, noncompliance with legal norms can lead to restrictions on access to credit and financing, which is why these countries were rated as high performers. According to Venezuela’s Land and Rural Development Law, amended in 2010, anyone who violates land use rules (Articles 147 and 148), including through simulation or fraud, may lose rights granted by the National Land Institute (Inti) and be barred from obtaining loans from public agencies or governmental financial entities.103 By contrast, Guyana and Suriname were classified as low due to weak or nonexistent administrative penalties. Overall, the landscape of sanctions in Amazonian countries reveals a lack of robust administrative disincentives capable of preventing the sale of public lands and increasing the accountability of intermediaries who facilitate land registration and manage property chains. As for the authorities responsible for land market oversight (indicator 2.5), the Amazon Basin countries show significant differences in structure and distribution of responsibilities. Some maintain more centralized administrative networks, while others distribute responsibilities among multiple agencies operating at various levels. Bolivia has regulatory bodies spanning administrative, fiscal, environmental, and legal sectors, such as the National Institute of Agrarian Reform (Inra) and the Agro-Environmental Court, created under the 2009 Plurinational Constitution. Brazil has a robust network of institutions, including agencies for land regulation (Incra), environment (Ibama, ICMBio, Funai), cultural heritage (Iphan, Fundação Palmares), and the Public Prosecutor’s Office. Both countries, Brazil and Bolivia, were classified as high. Ecuador, on the other hand, has a relatively lean structure, concentrating responsibilities in the Subsecretariat of Lands and Agrarian Reform and the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock, and was thus classified as moderate. Colombia, where the Agustín Codazzi Geographic Institute plays a role, was also rated as moderate. Guyana and Suriname, by contrast, were classified as low due to the absence or inefficiency of their land governance systems, plagued by reports of inspector recruitment, excessive bureaucracy, and favoritism toward interest groups in governmental institutions, such as cases involving the Guyana Lands and Surveys Commission (GLSC).104 A relevant aspect is the role of the judiciary in land governance decisions. In Suriname, a court granted an injunction filed on behalf of twelve Indigenous and Maroon groups who claimed the loss of approximately 535,000 hectares of rainforest to Mennonite agricultural development projects, the Ministry of Agriculture, and private entities.105 In Brazil, the “Marco Temporal” Law, mentioned under indicator 2.2, is also under judicial review. IGARAPÉ INSTITUTE | OCTOBER 2025 53 Table of ContentsEndnotes 4.3. Monitoring and Transparency The equipment used for land exploitation (indicator 3.1) is associated with deforestation and timber extraction, livestock raising, and illegal mining. Since this information was already covered in previous analyses, it was not repeated here. With respect to transparency (indicator 3.2), all countries record land market transactions, although none reached a high classification. The structuring of this information and its availability in public sources remain significant challenges. In Venezuela, for example, in addition to restrictions on public information, data from the Mercantile Registry, which documents legal transactions, has not been fully digitized. This limits access to information, and the country also lacks specific regulation obliging real estate sector entities to report suspicious operations to the FIU, leading to a low classification. By contrast, Bolivia has a National System of Rural Environmental Cadastre (Sinacar), developed by the Inra in partnership with the Inter-American Development Bank. Although the information is not fully public, it is accessible to the competent authorities. Similarly, Peru has specific registries for land market intermediaries, demonstrating a structured information system with detailed records of transactions, though still restricted to the competent authorities. In Ecuador, the Organic Law to Prevent, Detect, and Combat Money Laundering and the Financing of Other Crimes assigns responsibility to multiple entities, including notaries, to report suspicious activities to the FIU, which earned the country a moderate rating. In addition to Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru, Brazil and Colombia were also classified as moderate in terms of information availability. In all cases, access may still be hindered by bureaucratic restrictions, revealing room for improvement in transparency and system integration. The involvement of stakeholders in monitoring activity (indicator 3.3) varies among countries. Owing to the greater presence of actors engaged in monitoring, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Suriname were classified as high. While Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru promote the integration of multiple actors, Bolivia and Guyana present more fragmented models or limited engagement in land monitoring. Actors involved include government agencies, Indigenous organizations, international NGOs, multilateral organizations (such as the World Bank and FAO), and technological monitoring systems such as MAAP, maintained by Amazon Conservation. Peru stands out for its good practices aligned with international guidelines and for already having implemented ambitious projects aimed at land regularization.106 Comparatively, Ecuador and Suriname have court cases at both the federal and regional levels and are notable for strong civil society engagement.107 In the regional context, traditional communities play an active role in defending their territories, especially in Colombia and Peru, where there is explicit mention of community councils and autonomous territorial monitoring. 54 Markets and Forest: Comparative Analysis of the Economic Sectors that Pressure the Amazon Basin Table of Contents Endnotes 4.4. Law Enforcement The protection of land and the proper use of soil and natural resources depend not only on a specific and functional legal framework, but also on efficient and inter-institutional action. As in other markets, indicator 4.1 in the land sector ranges only between low and moderate. In Ecuador, for example, law enforcement is limited, with few complaints and a small number of cases resulting in penalties. By contrast, in Brazil, 39 Federal Police operations were identified between 2019 and 2025 related to the illegal appropriation of public lands, justifying its moderate classification. In 2024, Brazil’s Ministry of the Environment and Climate Change (MMA), the National Council of Justice (CNJ), and the National Real Estate Registry Operator (ONR) signed an agreement to strengthen inter-institutional cooperation to combat deforestation and land grabbing. Another noteworthy initiative involving notary offices was an official directive issued by the Colombian Attorney General’s Office, which linked sectoral entities, including the Superintendency of Notaries and Registry, to develop an action plan against land grabbing in the country.108 Only Brazil and Colombia were rated as moderate. There is therefore scope for progress in law enforcement and in the implementation of public policies that strengthen land oversight, particularly in the Amazon. On public integrity (indicator 4.2), the outlook is quite negative, marked by the capture of administrative bodies through bribery or co-option by actors with interests in the land market. This situation reported in all countries analyzed, with the most critical cases in Guyana, Suriname, and Venezuela, classified as having low integrity. In some instances, land grabbing may be linked to illegal cattle ranching, illicit crop cultivation, corruption networks, and money laundering. The problem is particularly severe in border regions, which are poorly supervised, difficult to access, but rich in biodiversity — areas where the expansion of illegal agriculture, cattle ranching, and mining is alarming and requires stronger action by the eight countries. Given this outlook, efforts should focus on improving land governance, bringing greater clarity and transparency to land registries, implementing information systems capable of monitoring irregularities in land use, and promoting greater coordination among responsible authorities so that they feed into, use, and act upon intelligence regarding land governance. It is also necessary to recognize that groups and individuals interested in changes to land use also interfere in the drafting and implementation of land and environmental laws and policies, protecting their interests and ensuring impunity. In the context of new carbon projects and reduced emissions through deforestation — which carry risks of “green land grabbing”109 — it is urgent to address the improvement of land governance in the Amazon Basin. IGARAPÉ INSTITUTE | OCTOBER 2025 55 Table of ContentsEndnotes Conclusion This study sought to understand the extent to which Amazon Basin countries possess institutional and regulatory conditions to confront the illicit economies associated with deforestation, focusing on the four sectors that exert the greatest pressure on the Amazon rainforest: gold, timber, cattle, and land. Using 13 indicators, structured around four central dimensions — economic, social and environmental context; regulation and governance; monitoring and transparency; and law enforcement — we developed a comparative dashboard that helps to understand the relevance of each economic sector in the countries analyzed, how they are regulated, including from an environmental perspective, and the existing mechanisms that enable the State to exercise effective control over these activities. Our starting point was the recognition that environmental crime presents particular challenge since the boundary between the legal and the illegal is tenuous. Regulation is the instrument that defines the frontier of legality and, at the same time, is capable of creating incentives and disincentives that can foster sustainable practices or, conversely, facilitate abuses and irregularities. As each country adopts its own regulations, comparing them is essential to mapping the gaps that crime exploits. Given the importance of the Amazon rainforest for global climate regulation and the risk of reaching a point of no return, we chose to examine the economies that most drive forest loss. We worked from the premise that analyzing the role of these sectors and their regulatory regimes — their flaws, overlaps, and contradictions — makes it possible to understand how countries position themselves in the face of economic pressures and what capacities they do (or do not) have to contain illicit markets. To carry out a comparative study, we prioritized a broad overview of these sectors, rather than a deep dive into each specificity. In addition, the lens adopted for the classification presented in the dashboards was to assess the extent to which regulatory frameworks allow for the adequate prevention and/or accountability of irregularities and illegalities. Our objective was not to detail implementation strategies nor to provide an in-depth assessment of the concrete application of legal frameworks. An assessment of their enforcement appeared only indirectly, within the scope of the law enforcement indicators, but we did not go further into analyses of operational effectiveness or the day-today functioning of control institutions. This limitation was deliberate: our goal was to build a diagnostic tool that could serve as a comparative basis between countries, rather than to design specific action plans. The sources used to develop the tool were stored and catalogued in a digital repository, which can be made available for consultation and should inform future initiatives aimed at improving the regulation of the sectors that drive deforestation. We believe that the value of the performance dashboards and the indicators lies precisely in their ability to offer a common baseline. Just as satellite monitoring systems allow to track the advance of deforestation in the Amazon Basin in real time, a shared repository of data on State capacities in economic sectors paves the way for regular, comparable, and verifiable diagnostics, while also serving as an essential instrument to strengthen regional cooperation and the work of civil society. Ultimately, this study reaffirms the urgency of strengthening not only the repression of illicit activities but also the regulatory arrangements that shape the dynamics of markets in the Amazon. Reducing environmental degradation and weakening the organized crime that profits from these flows will require progress in building robust regulatory regimes that are compatible with economic sectors. This is a task that demands regional coordination, normative alignment, and, above all, political commitment to the protection of the forest, its populations, and the rule of law. 62 Markets and Forest: Comparative Analysis of the Economic Sectors that Pressure the Amazon Basin Table of Contents 83. Ministry of the Environment and Climate Change of Brazil (2024). Operação do Ibama retira 550 animais criados ilegalmente na TI Apyterewa 84. Ministry of the Environment and Climate Change of Brazil (2024). Operação Carne Fria 2 do Ibama identifica 23 frigoríficos que compravam gado produzido em áreas embargadas 85. Amazon Institute of People and the Environment (Instituto do Homem e Meio Ambiente da Amazônia - Imazon - 2023). Pecuária 86. MapBiomas (2024). Mais de 90% do desmatamento da Amazônia é para abertura de pastagem 87. The estimate was made by Scot Consultoria and can be found in Agricultural land prices more than double in five years, Valor International (2025). However, other studies indicate that the price per hectare could be even higher, as pointed out in Brazilian Farmland Still Cheap, but Price Rally Likely to Slow, SLC Says, The AgriBiz (2025). 88. In Europe, the average value was below EUR 12,000.00 in 2023, as stated in the article Agricultural land prices and rents - statistics, European Commission, 2025. For a comparison of land prices in different countries, see Global Farmland Index, Savills, 2020. 89. It is important to emphasize, however, that some activities related to land management, treatment, and transformation can be classified as formal or informal. Although not directly within the scope of this work, activities such as earthmoving, soil enrichment for agriculture, civil construction, land clearing, and waste management are regulated by government or professional bodies. The use of these services influences land prices, as their costs affect the ultimate profitability of the activity. Therefore, the use of irregular techniques, informal labor, or even practices analogous to slavery in land transformation is a topic that deserves further study. 90. Fundación TIERRA (2022). Investigación revela el lado oculto del comercio ilegal de tierras en las TCO de las tierras bajas 91. Senado Agency (2022). Relatório aponta desmonte de órgãos e grilagem na Amazônia com uso de cadastro ambiental 92. The Shapefiles were collected on the Protect Planet platform and in consultations directed to partners with georeferenced databases. 93. Ministry of Justice and Public Security of Brazil (2025). PF combate grilagem de terras na Terra Indígena Igarapé Lage em Rondônia 94. Article 201 - Illegal occupation, illegal use of land, or land trafficking. Any person who, for the purpose of obtaining personal gain or that of a third party, promotes or organizes the illegal occupation or settlement of another’s land shall be punished with a prison sentence of 5 to 7 years. The maximum penalty shall be imposed on any person who, without having the necessary administrative authorization for the subdivision of urban or rural land, offers lots or parcels of land for sale and receives, directly or indirectly, money or any other asset from the public. If the criminal liability of the legal entity is established, it shall be sanctioned with the dissolution of its business and a fine of one hundred to two hundred times the standard basic wage of the general worker. 95. The Amazon Conservation Team. The Unresolved Fight For Indigenous Land Rights In Suriname: UPDATE 96. Colombia´s Victims and Land Restitution Law 1448 of 2011. 97. The bill that regulates agrarian and rural jurisdiction is part of the Peace Agreement in Colombia. El proyecto de ley que reglamenta la Jurisdicción Agraria y Rural avanza en su fase final en el Congreso, Radio Nacional de Colombia, 2025. 98. Nicknamed the “Chlimper Law,” it refers to legislation passed in 2000, during the Fujimori government, on the initiative of then-Minister of Agriculture José Chlimper, himself an agro-exporting businessman. Ley Chlimper 2.0 también legaliza el tráfico de aguas en el Perú: especuladores se alistan para concentrar el recurso en pocas manos, Infobae, 2025. 99. There are offenses such as fraud and document forgery in the legislation, and sanctions for irregularities in the use of public lands in the Guyana Lands Act 1903 (Chap. 62:01), as in sections 20-24. 100. In Colombia, Article 263 of the Penal Code and its paragraphs punish land invasion. In Bolivia, Article 337 bis. of Law No. 477 (Law Against Land Invasion and Trafficking) punishes land trafficking. In Ecuador, the aforementioned Article 201 of the Comprehensive Penal Code punishes the illegal occupation and use of land. In Peru, Article 204 of the Penal Code punishes aggravated land grabbing. 101. Article 337, penalty of 5 to 12 years imprisonment, and Article 337A of the Colombian Penal Code, penalty of 8 to 15 years imprisonment, respectively. 63 IGARAPÉ INSTITUTE | OCTOBER 2025 Table of Contents 102. Article 330A, 1 and 2 of Law No. 2,111 of 2021, of the Colombian Penal Code 103. Venezuelan Land and Rural Development Law (2010). Gaceta Oficial de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela 104. Find out more about the complaint involving the Guyana Lands and Surveys Commission (GLSC). Nigel Hughes secured 75 acres of State land from APNU/AFC after NCM, 2020 elections – Jagdeo, Guyana Times, 2025; and Lands and Surveys Commission fires three staffers over corruption, News Source Guyana, 2025. 105. For more information on the injunction filed in Suriname on behalf of twelve Indigenous and Maroon groups alleging the loss of approximately 535,000 hectares of rainforest to agricultural development projects by Mennonites, the Ministry of Agriculture, and private entities, see Landmark ruling in Suriname grants protections to local and Indigenous communities — for now, Mongabay, 2025. 106. Examples of good practices include the GCS-Tenure project, Advancing tenure security for forest landscapedependent communities in Indonesia, Peru, and Uganda (GCS-Tenure), and United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) regulations on land rights and women in Peru, Land Titling in Peru: What Future for Women’s Tenure Security? and the Guia do IISD (International Institute for Sustainable Development) to Negotiating Agricultural Land and Water Investment Contracts. 107. The Amazon Conservation Team (2025). The Unresolved Fight For Indigenous Land Rights In Suriname: UPDATE y Mongabay (2025). Ecuador must improve conditions for uncontacted Indigenous communities, human rights court rules 108. Learn more about Directive 9 of 2024 from the Colombian Attorney General’s Office at Combatir el acaparamiento de tierras en la Amazonía: nueva estrategia de la Procuraduría 109. For more information on “green land grabbing,” see iPes Food (2024): El acaparamiento verde: Una amenaza creciente para la biodiversidad y las comunidades 110. We thank the consultants who participated in the data collection, without whom this work would not have been as thorough as it was. 64 Markets and Forest: Comparative Analysis of the Economic Sectors that Pressure the Amazon Basin Table of Contents Endnotes Institutional Office Igarapé Institute Ilona Szabó de Carvalho Co-Founder and President Robert Muggah Co-Founder and Chief Innovation Officer Melina Risso Research Director Leriana Figueiredo Programs Director Maria Amélia L. Teixeira Operations Director Laura Trajber Waisbich Deputy Director of Programs Carolina Torres Graça Green Bridge Facility Program Director Credits General Coordination Melina Risso and Maria Eugênia Trombini Research Antonella Di Ciano, Fernanda Harumi, João Caetano, Lucas Alves, Vitória Lorente and Wendell Fabrício Editing Débora Chaves Graphic Project Raphael Durão and André Guttierrez How to cite: IGARAPÉ INSTITUTE. Markets and Forest: Comparative Analysis of the Economic Sectors that Pressure the Amazon Basin. Rio de Janeiro. Igarapé Institute, 2025. Available at: https://igarape.org.br/ publicacoes DOI Number: 10.5281/zenodo.17529304 IGARAPÉ INSTITUTE a think and do tank Rio de Janeiro - RJ - Brazil Tel.: +55 (21) 3496-2114 [email protected] igarape.org.br Press Office pr[email protected] Social Media E facebook.com/institutoigarape D x.com/igarape_org C linkedin.com/company/igarapeorg M youtube.com/user/InstitutoIgarape Q instagram.com/igarape_org The Igarapé Institute is an independent think-and-do tank that conducts research, develops solutions, and establishes partnerships to influence public and corporate policies and practices, addressing key challenges related to nature, climate, and security in Brazil and worldwide. Igarapé is a nonprofit, nonpartisan organization based in Rio de Janeiro, operating at both local and global levels. 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