Amazon Climate Security: challenges amid the expansion of illicit economies and state weakness in the Caquetá–Japurá and Puré–Puruê corridor

Table of Contents 1. Introduction: The need to Ensure Climate Security in the Face of Illicit Economies and State Fragility .....................................1 2. Socio-environmental and Institutional Context of the Caquetá–Japurá and Puré–Puruê Circuit ........................................3 2.1. Protected Areas ............................................................................4 2.2. Environmental Wealth and Hydrography ........................................4 2.3. Geographic Isolation and Indigenous Settlement Patterns .............5 2.4. Socioeconomic Vulnerabilities .......................................................6 2.5. Limited Infrastructure .....................................................................8 2.6. Limited State Oversight .................................................................8 3. Illegal Mining and Drugs: Cross-Border Flows .......................................9 3.1. Expansion of Illegal Gold Mining ....................................................9 3.2. Drug markets in the Caquetá–Japurá and Puré–Puruê Corrridor ...13 3.3. Actors Associated with Illegal Markets ......................................... 14 4. Traces of Gold and Drug Trafficking: Contamination, Threats, and Violence in Communities ....................................................16 4.1. Environmental Impacts: Deforestation and Pressure on Biodiversity ..............................................................16 4.2. Public Health Impacts: Mercury Contamination among Local Populations ...................................................................18 4.3. Social, Economic and Cultural Impacts .......................................19 4.4. Escalation of Violence and Territorial Threats ...............................20 5. Conclusions and Strategies to Guarantee Climate Security and Basin Conservation in the Face of Illicit Economies ..........................23 Endnotes ................................................................................................29 1 Table of ContentsEndnotes IGARAPÉ INSTITUTE – FCDS | NOVEMBER 2025 The transboundary region between the Caquetá–Japurá and Puré–Puruê rivers, stretching from southern Colombia to northern Brazil’s Amazonas state, is one of the most well-preserved yet vulnerable ecological corridors in the Amazon. Home to extensive primary forests and Indigenous territories, this area is vital for climate regulation and maintaining biological connectivity between the Andes and the central Amazon basin. However, its geographic isolation, limited government presence, and the growth of illegal economies have made the region a center of socio-environmental degradation. In this landscape of interconnected rivers and porous borders, the intersection of illegal mining and drug trafficking leads to mercury contamination, speeds up deforestation, fuels armed violence, and severely harms Indigenous communities. The lack of integrated data and coordinated policies between Colombia and Brazil highlights the urgent need for empirical research and cross-border analysis. This study suggests viewing rivers and their networks as socio-environmental corridors — critical not only for the movement and exploitation linked to illegal economies but also for developing strategies to enhance environmental governance and climate security across this transnational basin.1 1. Introduction: The need to Ensure Climate Security in the Face of Illicit Economies and State Fragility AMAZON CLIMATE SECURITY: CHALLENGES AMID THE EXPANSION OF ILLICIT ECONOMIES AND STATE WEAKNESS IN THE CAQUETÁ–JAPURÁ AND PURÉ–PURUÊ CORRIDOR 2Table of Contents Endnotes IGARAPÉ INSTITUTE – FCDS | NOVEMBER 2025 Produced jointly by the The Foundation for Conservation and Sustainable Development (FCDS) and the Igarapé Institute, this report shows how illegal gold mining and drug trafficking affect ecosystems, local communities, and climate resilience in one of the most remote cross-border regions of the Amazon, between Colombia and Brazil. Over the past decade, research on the Amazon — and its severe forms of violence and complex insecurity — has grown considerably.2 Studies agree that informality, fragmented transport networks, high impunity levels, and limited government presence create ideal conditions for illicit economies, including illegal mining and logging, which worsen environmental damage and insecurity.3 Although there is consensus that the Amazon region and its resources are subject to constant dispute, there is still a lack of studies adopting a transboundary perspective and offering equally integrated solutions to tackle both the legal and illegal economies fueling deforestation and violence in the area. The proposed study addresses two major gaps. First, it examines a specific border area managed by a river-basin system and a patchwork of distinct territorial structures, where the transboundary riverine axis becomes essential to understanding social, environmental, and criminal dynamics. Second, it offers new evidence on the convergence of illicit economies, environmental crimes, and governance challenges. Border regions are known hotspots for the growth of organized crime, yet most research has concentrated on the borders of Central and North America.4 Civil society organizations working in the Amazon have explored the links between deforestation and violence. However, there is still a lack of studies offering actionable evidence to inform public policies and interventions aimed at reducing violence, strengthening governance, and curbing organized crime. To bridge these two gaps — of information and of responses regarding which solutions to adopt — this study offers an innovative perspective centered on the Caquetá–Japurá and Puré–Puruê circuit. It incorporates new data on the dynamics of illegal mining and drug trafficking, as well as their impacts, such as mercury pollution, deforestation, and various forms of victimization and violence, in one of the least studied Amazonian border areas. It also proposes concrete strategies to strengthen regional cooperation and climate security. The approach combines spatial analysis, field data, and institutional mapping within the circuit. “The study’s approach combines spatial analysis, field data, and institutional mapping in the Caquetá–Japurá and Puré–Puruê circuit” AMAZON CLIMATE SECURITY: CHALLENGES AMID THE EXPANSION OF ILLICIT ECONOMIES AND STATE WEAKNESS IN THE CAQUETÁ–JAPURÁ AND PURÉ–PURUÊ CORRIDOR 3 Table of ContentsEndnotes IGARAPÉ INSTITUTE – FCDS | NOVEMBER 2025 The territorial focus of this study lies along the Amazonian border between Colombia and Brazil, centered around the basins of the Caquetá–Japurá and Puré–Puruê rivers. (Figure 1).5 It is one of the planet’s most isolated, biodiverse, and best-conserved regions, dominated by continuous rainforests, Indigenous territories, and protected natural areas. With limited roads and mobility based on rivers and seasonal floodplains, daily life depends on these waterways and is organized around 2. Socio-environmental and Institutional Context of the Caquetá–Japurá and Puré–Puruê Circuit Figure 1. Area of study and influence Source: Boundaries of Protected Areas and Indigenous Lands: Amazonian Network of Georeferenced Socio-Environmental Information (RAISG) platform, as of May 2025. Mining refers to the locations where mining dredges were identified, based on data available from RAISG (downloaded in May 2025) and updated with field data and secondary sources by FCDS in September 2025. small, scattered settlements. Within this context of inaccessibility and weak state presence, with limited access to public services and education, the territory becomes especially vulnerable to the expansion of organized crime, illegal mining, and drug trafficking, which exploit its mineral availability, institutional fragility, and porous borders. Despite its protected status, this transboundary corridor is increasingly affected by extractive and exchange dynamics that exert growing pressure on its ecosystems and communities. AMAZON CLIMATE SECURITY: CHALLENGES AMID THE EXPANSION OF ILLICIT ECONOMIES AND STATE WEAKNESS IN THE CAQUETÁ–JAPURÁ AND PURÉ–PURUÊ CORRIDOR 4Table of Contents Endnotes The area of influence is not defined by a fixed boundary but as a dynamic river system that extends both upstream and downstream. It integrates the Caquetá–Japurá and Puré– Puruê circuits through a network of streams and igarapés6 that connect key settlements and support the ecological and cultural life of the territory. These waterways link broader areas such as Taraira in the north and Tarapacá in the south, forming routes for river and air transport. From the Andean headwaters of the Caquetá, the rivers connect regions of cattle ranching, smuggling, and drug trafficking in the Colombian departments of Caquetá and Putumayo to their middle and lower courses in Brazil, where they flow toward the Solimões River, passing through Maraã and Tefé.7 2.1. Protected Areas The Caquetá–Japurá and Puré–Puruê circuit forms a transboundary conservation corridor that integrates natural parks and Indigenous territories of high ecological and cultural value. On the Colombian side, the Río Puré National Natural Park, created to protect the Yurí– Passé peoples living in voluntary isolation,8 stands out, together with the Cahuinarí and Yaigojé–Apaporis National Parks. Several Indigenous reserves near the border, such as Curare–Los Ingleses, Camaritagua, Puerto Córdoba, Comeyafú, and Mirití–Paraná, are part of a broader Indigenous territorial framework represented by the Bajo Río Caquetá– Amazonas Indigenous Territorial Entities, CIMTAR, Mirití–Paraná, and PANI, which bring together communities and traditional authorities. On the Brazilian side, the Juami–Japurá Ecological Station (Estação Ecológica Juami– Japurá, ESEC) serves as the main protected area, complemented by the Indigenous Lands (TIs) surrounding the town of Japurá and its tributaries: TI Paraná do Boá–Boá, TI Uneiuxi, TI Mapará, and TI Rio Apaporis — the latter adjoining the Comeyafú Indigenous Reserve in Colombia. Other TIs extend farther north and west of the municipality.9 Among these areas, a wide protection gap persists in the intermediate stretch of the Japurá River and in the Puré River basin, where the coverage of conservation areas is discontinuous or nonexistent. This zone corresponds to a large block of pubic forestlands without formal designation — that is, Undesignated Public Lands (UPL), according to the typology established by the Brazilian Forest Service (SFB). This gap facilitates the expansion of irregular mining, extractive, and logistical activities that exploit geographic isolation, river routes, and rudimentary airstrips across the transboundary corridor.10 2.2. Environmental Wealth and Hydrography Covering approximately 289,000 km² (80% within Colombia), the Caquetá–Japurá basin forms a key hydrographic axis.11 Its predominant ecosystem is tropical rainforest, hosting rich biodiversity that serves as a refuge for species such as large felines, including the jaguar (Panthera onca), whose wide distribution attests to the region’s healthy conservation status.12 Originating in the Andes, the Caquetá River flows west to east through the Colombian departments of Cauca, Caquetá, Putumayo, and Amazonas, gathering waters from both the mountains and the forest before entering Brazil, where it becomes the Japurá River. There, it forms a navigable whitewater corridor connecting binational communities and ecosystems. In contrast, the smaller, meandering Puré–Puruê River runs through protected forests from the Río Puré National Natural Park to its confluence with the Japurá in Brazil. Beyond these main axes, the basin is woven with a dense network of tributaries, such as the Juami, Maiuará, and Iuauí rivers in Brazil, and the Agua Negra, Agua Blanca, and Zumaeta streams, along with the Bernardo and Pupuña rivers in Colombia, as well as a complex web of caños (Colombia) and igarapés (Brazil). Together, these create a continuous hydrological system that provides binational ecological and river connectivity. The sustained forest cover, low fragmentation, and presence of 5 Table of ContentsEndnotes IGARAPÉ INSTITUTE – FCDS | NOVEMBER 2025 alluvial gold deposits in the middle and lower rivers explain both the area’s high ecological importance and its vulnerability to illegal mining and mercury contamination.³ 2.3. Geographic Isolation and Indigenous Settlement Patterns The region is characterized by low population density and scattered isolated settlements built along rivers, which serve as the main routes for transportation and supply (Figure 2). On the Colombian side, Taraira (Vaupés), La Pedrera, Tarapacá, and Araracuara (Amazonas) are non-municipalized areas under departmental administration, accessible only by river or air. Together, they have small populations and record some of the lowest densities in the country, well below the national average of 46.5 inhabitants per km². These population centers have fluvial and aerial mobility to Leticia, Mitú, and Puerto Leguízamo, which act as regional exchange hubs. In Brazil, the municipality of Japurá has similar characteristics: it has the smallest population in the state of Amazonas and one of the lowest population densities in the country (25 inhabitants per km²).13 Along the Japurá River lie small communities such as Serrinha, Itaboca, Mangueira, and Tamandaré, while the Puré River lacks permanent settlements, preserving its character as a continuous, scarcely accessible forest.14 Figure 2. Location of populated centers Colombia Brazil National (Hab/km2) National (Hab/km2) Source: Population projections for 2025. National Administrative Department of Statistics (DANE), Colombia (2025). Proyecciones de población con la actualización post COVID-19 calculadas con base en los resultados del Censo Nacional de Población y Vivienda - CNPV2018; Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics - IBGE (2025). Cities and States AMAZON CLIMATE SECURITY: CHALLENGES AMID THE EXPANSION OF ILLICIT ECONOMIES AND STATE WEAKNESS IN THE CAQUETÁ–JAPURÁ AND PURÉ–PURUÊ CORRIDOR 6Table of Contents Endnotes Across Colombia’s main population centers, various riverine Indigenous communities are distributed, shaping the region’s dispersed settlement pattern. Along the Caquetá River, notable communities include Camaritagua, Tanimuka, Yucuna, Mamuaya, and Bacurí, located near La Pedrera. On both sides of the border, these communities share languages, lifestyles, and subsistence strategies—fishing, hunting, gathering, and artisanal mining—and move along the rivers as if the territory were a continuous unit. On the Brazilian side, the villages are concentrated within the Paraná do Boá–Boá, Uneiuxi, and Mapará Indigenous Lands, farther from the border, while the village of São José do Apaporis lies in the border section. Despite the presence of indigenous people, no isolated villages are reported along the Puré River, which retains its character as a dense primary rainforest. 2.4. Socioeconomic Vulnerabilities Demographically, the region is characterized by a high percentage of Indigenous people, which in Colombian areas greatly exceeds the national average, unlike the smaller Indigenous presence in the Brazilian municipality of Japurá. The population is mainly young, with many children and teenagers, and a slight male majority — traits that indicate natural population growth but also highlight important challenges in accessing education and social services. Socioeconomically, the analyzed territories exhibit high illiteracy rates, limited access to education, health and public services, and elevated levels of unmet basic needs and extreme poverty— far surpassing national averages. Taken together, these indicators reveal persistent structural vulnerability and a wide gap in living conditions between the two countries. Internet connectivity, however, has been boosted by the installation of Starlink antennas in some parts of the region (Table 1).15 “Taken together, the indicators reveal a persistent structural vulnerability and a significant gap in living conditions compared to both countries” 7 Table of ContentsEndnotes IGARAPÉ INSTITUTE – FCDS | NOVEMBER 2025 Table 1. Demographic and socioeconomic indicators Tarapacá La Pedrera Araracuara (Puerto Santander) Taraira Japurá Colombia Brazil Proportion Indigenous Population 91% 89% 86% 74% 29% 4.7% 0.83% Proportion Male 53% 51% 52% 51% 53% 49% 48% Population Under 14 Years of Age 38% 35% 38% 40% 37% 22% 19% Illiteracy 12.1% 12.5% 7.8% 15.2% 12.4% 5.2% 7.0% Unmet Basic Needs (UBN) - Colombia 50.8% 78.8% 49.5% 78.9% - 14.3% - Extreme Poverty (UBN) - Colombia16 15.9% 42.7% 11.5% 50.1% - 3.8% - Poverty (CadÚnico) - Brazil - - - - 63.0% - 20.0% Source: Data retrieved in May 2025. National Administrative Department of Statistics (DANE), Colombia (2025). Proyecciones de Población (for sex, age, and ethnic composition); DANE (2018). Visor de Analfabetismo; DANE (2018). Censo Nacional de Población y Vivienda for NBI and poverty by unmet basic needs. For Brazil: Instituto Brasileiro de Geografía e Estatística (IBGE) (2022). Censo Demográfico 2022 (for sex, age, ethnic composition, and illiteracy); Unified Registry for Social Programs (CadÚnico) (2025). Painel de Monitoramento do Bolsa Família e Cadastro Único for poverty data. AMAZON CLIMATE SECURITY: CHALLENGES AMID THE EXPANSION OF ILLICIT ECONOMIES AND STATE WEAKNESS IN THE CAQUETÁ–JAPURÁ AND PURÉ–PURUÊ CORRIDOR 14 Table of Contents Endnotes 3.3. Actors Associated with Illegal Markets Although there are various forms of decisionmaking over these territories and river basins, predominant control lies in the hands of illegal armed groups and criminal organizations. At times, this armed governance is imposed on local communities through subordination; in others, communities actively participate as actors within illicit economies.56 In these regions, what is at stake is the legitimacy of official government, whose presence in the Amazon is nearly innocuous. Armed actors, as seen in the Colombian case, challenge this authority and take on state-like roles, building social bases loyal to their control systems. In doing so, they secure their long-term presence in the territory while extracting resources from it — and its inhabitants — to support their armed operations, financed through environmental exploitation. Following the signing of the 2016 Peace Agreement with the FARC-EP in Colombia, the internal conflict and the armed actors who persist in violent confrontation have largely reconfigured themselves in the Colombian transboundary Amazon. The slow reaction of the Colombian State in reaching the territories vacated by the former FARC-EP created a window of opportunity for dissident factions of the guerrilla to rebuild armed orders and controls in regions of strategic interest for their renewed operations.57 On the other side of the border, Brazil’s Comando Vermelho (CV) withdrew northward into the Amazon starting in 2016, expanding along the Solimões, Japurá, and Negro rivers58 and consolidating its hegemony by formalizing ties with the Frente Carolina Ramírez.59 The main groups present in the area include: •FARC dissidences: Before 2016, the FARC-EP controlled vast areas of the Amazon, regulating activities such as gold mining along the Caquetá and Puré rivers and expelling Brazilian miners.60 After the Peace Agreement, several dissident factions emerged that now dispute territorial control: the Estado Mayor Central (EMC) led by Iván Mordisco; the Estado Mayor de Bloques y Frentes (EMBF) led by Calarcá Córdoba;61 the Segunda Marquetalia (SM) under Iván Márquez; and the Coordinadora Nacional Ejército Bolivariano (CNEB) under Walter Mendoza, which brings together the Comandos de Frontera. In the Amazon, the Frente Carolina Ramírez of the Bloque Amazonas Manuel Marulanda (EMC) dominates gold mining and drug trafficking along the Caquetá–Japurá and Puré–Puruê axis, while the Bloque Jorge Suárez Briceño and the Columna Miller Perdomo (EMBF) extend their influence southward into Caquetá and the Brazilian border. •Comando Vermelho (CV): Controls drug-trafficking corridors from Peru and Colombia and combines coercion with food, medicine, and money distribution, maintaining significant influence across the Amazon62 and forging agreements with Colombian groups. •Riverine communities and river pirates: Operate along the Solimões, Negro, and Japurá rivers, engaging in assaults on vessels, toll collection, and transport of illicit cargo. Their tactical role alternates between collaboration and competition with major factions, and they are responsible for river violence recorded in Japurá and Maraã.63 •Other cross-border suppliers (Colombia–Peru): The Comandos de la Frontera64 and Peruvian clans act as logistical intermediaries along the Içá/ Putumayo, Solimões, and Japurá corridors, providing crews, fuel, and boats for binational trafficking. 15 Table of ContentsEndnotes IGARAPÉ INSTITUTE – FCDS | NOVEMBER 2025 The armed regulations built around illicit economies in the Caquetá–Japurá and Puré– Puruê circuit mirror the dynamics of enclave economies, such as cocaine trafficking, characterized by violence and exploitative labor practices that primarily benefit those who control invested capital. These economies are defined by the appropriation of most of the wealth by actors external to the territory — those controlling inputs, machinery, or logistics — while excluding local communities from the bulk of the benefits generated. On the Colombian side, dissident factions of the former FARC-EP guerrilla have taken advantage of weak state presence to control mining, organize labor, and expel Brazilian miners, who originally introduced gold mining into the Colombian Amazon.65 These factions have inherited territorial governance structures and actively participate in gold extraction, concentrating capital. At the same time, miners face poverty, environmental degradation, and health damage due to mercury exposure, a topic that will be discussed further below.66 “Illicit economies are characterized by the appropriation of most of the wealth by actors external to the territory, who control inputs, machinery, or logistics, thereby excluding local communities from much of the benefits generated” AMAZON CLIMATE SECURITY: CHALLENGES AMID THE EXPANSION OF ILLICIT ECONOMIES AND STATE WEAKNESS IN THE CAQUETÁ–JAPURÁ AND PURÉ–PURUÊ CORRIDOR 16 Table of Contents Endnotes 4.1. Environmental Impacts: Deforestation and Pressure on Biodiversity As illegal economies expand in the region, their environmental impacts become evident through rising deforestation, water basin pollution, and biodiversity loss. In the area analyzed, deforestation is closely linked to the expansion of illegal gold mining and the supporting infrastructure.67 In addition to clearing forest cover in extraction zones to expose mineral deposits, this activity requires roads, airstrips, and worker accommodations, which significantly broaden the affected area beyond the mining site itself. Since 2020, deforestation in the municipality of Japurá, on the Brazilian side of the border, has increased sharply due to the advance of illegal mining. While only 0.21 km² of forest loss was recorded in 2019, the figure rose to 6.99 km² in 2020 and 9.88 km² in 2021, peaking at 36.37 km² in 2022. Reductions were observed in 2023 and 2024.68 Data on deforestation specifically attributed to illegal mining show that Japurá was the most affected municipality in the state of Amazonas in 2024, with 6.4 km² deforested for this reason, — a 66% decrease compared to 18.8 km² in 2023.69 In the first half of 2025, Japurá ranked second among all municipalities in Brazil’s Legal Amazon for the largest deforested area caused by illegal mining, with 1.4 km² between January and February and 2.8 km² between March and April, second only to Itaituba (Pará).70 In Colombian territory, deforestation increased significantly in 2016, reaching approximately 0.2 km², with 0.03 km² of forest lost in the municipality of La Pedrera. However, from 2016 to 2024, a total of 898 km² were deforested, including 168 km² in Mirití Paraná and 147 km² in Araracuara. Reports and analyses by FCDS and the Amazon Conservation Association, monitoring mining activity in Río Puré National Natural Park (PNN Río Puré), used satellite imagery and low-altitude aerial photography to identify ongoing deforestation linked to mining along the Puré River. By the first half of 2025, active deforestation areas associated with mining along the Puré River had resulted in the loss of 0.65 km² of forest along the riverbank. Figure 5 shows that forest loss in the region follows the course of several main rivers affected by illegal mining, particularly along the Puruê River (on the Brazilian side), the main hotspot of illegal mining in the study area, and along the Juami River, a tributary of the Japurá River located within the Juami–Japurá Ecological Station. In both cases, the critical deforestation points are recent, indicating that deforestation trends have effectively mirrored the expansion of illegal mining across the region. 4. Traces of Gold and Drug Trafficking: Contamination, Threats, and Violence in Communities 17 Table of ContentsEndnotes IGARAPÉ INSTITUTE – FCDS | NOVEMBER 2025 Figure 5. Deforestation 2001–2024 Source: FCDS and Igarapé Institute. Deforestation visualization based on Global Forest Watch data (2025) Tree cover loss Since 2003, records already indicated illegal alluvial gold mining along the Puré River and threats to Indigenous peoples living in voluntary isolation.71 However, it was only from 2020 onward that the river was massively invaded by dredges. With the advance of illegal mining, estimates suggest that approximately 10 km² of forest72 were destroyed along the river, with more than half occurring in 2022 alone.73 Within the Juami–Japurá Ecological Station, and specifically along the Juami River, satellite images reveal an increase in illegal gold mining starting in 2019, with numerous dredges and boats associated with this activity.74 Between 2019 and 2022, mineral extraction along the Juami River caused the loss of more than 5.3 km² of forest75 in this protected area of the Brazilian state of Amazonas. The Amazon Deforestation Calculation Program (PRODES)76 system of Brazil’s National Institute for Space Research (INPE) reported that deforestation within the ESEC Juami–Japurá peaked in 2023 at 6.8 km², preceded by 5.6 km² in 2022 and about 3 km² in 2021. In 2024, the figure dropped sharply to 0.5 km². Beyond deforestation, mining activities also have severe impacts on the Amazonian environment. The region’s ecological conditions favor the transformation of mercury used in mining into methylmercury—a highly toxic compound that bioaccumulates in organisms AMAZON CLIMATE SECURITY: CHALLENGES AMID THE EXPANSION OF ILLICIT ECONOMIES AND STATE WEAKNESS IN THE CAQUETÁ–JAPURÁ AND PURÉ–PURUÊ CORRIDOR 18 Table of Contents Endnotes and moves up the food chain. Mercury released by mining travels through the air, settles on vegetation and soil, and adheres to particles that are washed into rivers and streams, where it accumulates in bottom sediments and in fish that move through the basins and are later consumed by local communities.77 In this way, mercury travels long distances, affecting not only communities near mining areas but also populations in distant towns and territories.78 Environmental damage is not confined to the areas where dredges operate; it spreads silently and invisibly throughout the Amazon region. In the Caquetá, Apaporis, Cotuhé, and Puré rivers,79 studies have found that 37% of fish samples contained mercury concentrations above the Codex Alimentarius reference threshold established by the World Health Organization (WHO) for safe human consumption.80 One of the sampled species, tucunaré (peacock bass), showed concentrations of 1.6 ppm in the Puré River and 4.7 ppm in the Caquetá River,81 levels approximately 60% and 370% above the recommended limit, respectively.82 In summary, illegal wildcat mining is causing a dual environmental impact in the Amazon: accelerating deforestation and forest fragmentation, and contaminating rivers with mercury that disperses over long distances and bioaccumulates in aquatic fauna. This combination destroys habitats, disrupts the ecological balance of the basins, and increases pressure on biodiversity, weakening the resilience of the Amazon forest and compromising its capacity to sustain life and the environmental services on which communities and the region depend. 4.2. Public Health Impacts: Mercury Contamination among Local Populations Methylmercury, the most toxic organic form of mercury, bioaccumulates in aquatic organisms and biomagnifies as it moves up the food chain,83 reaching its highest concentrations in large carnivorous fish. This is particularly critical in the Amazon, where fish constitute the main source of protein in the diet of Indigenous communities. In recent years, contamination by mercury has been documented not only in fish but also among people living in this region,84 posing serious health risks to affected communities. For example, in the Caquetá, Cotuhé, and Apaporis river basins, a study85 conducted with members of the PANI, CIMTAR, and ACIYA-ACITAVA communities found that the average levels of mercury detected in human hair samples exceeded the World Health Organization (WHO) reference threshold86 in 94%, 93%, and 84% of cases, respectively, indicating high mercury exposure. Studies also point out that these communities already exhibit signs and symptoms consistent with chronic mercury poisoning, whose mediumand long-term effects on health can be devastating. The most frequent consequences include neurological disorders, progressive damage to the central nervous system, loss of peripheral vision, motor, speech, and hearing difficulties, as well as muscle weakness, with a risk of death in the most severe cases.87 The situation is even more critical among pregnant women, as mercury can cross the placental barrier, potentially causing severe neurological damage, fetal development disorders, and even DNA mutations.88 A study conducted in the Yaigojé Apaporis National Natural Park found that 50% of women of reproductive age are at risk of giving birth to children with a reduction of up to four points in their IQ.89 19 Table of ContentsEndnotes IGARAPÉ INSTITUTE – FCDS | NOVEMBER 2025 Recent interviews with local communities90 confirm that mercury contamination is an urgent concern, as there appear to be increasing cases of children born with physical malformations and intellectual disabilities. Added to this is the growing food insecurity resulting from mercury bioaccumulation in fish, which not only affects the diet of Amazonian populations but is also causing shifts in their cultural practices. Several studies have recommended restricting the consumption of carnivorous fish and even considering a reduction in breastfeeding as a preventive measure to protect children’s health.91 These recommendations illustrate how deeply the risks associated with contaminated fish consumption are transforming the livelihoods and ancestral subsistence practices of these communities. 4.3. Social, Economic and Cultural Impacts The expansion of gold mining has transformed livelihoods along the Colombian–Brazilian Amazon border, displacing traditional activities with illicit economies dependent on gold and criminal networks. Beyond its environmental impacts, illegal mining disrupts community and spiritual order, eroding social cohesion.92 In the absence of viable options, young people, mostly men, often turn to mining or trafficking as their only source of income. The local saying “in La Pedrera there’s no money, but never food shortage; in Taraira there’s always money, but no food” captures the extractive paradox: where gold flows, prices increase, food becomes scarce, and agroforestry systems adapted to the characteristics of the Amazon region (chagras) vanish, creating a false sense of prosperity that sustains dependency and economic vulnerability.93 The predominantly male composition and the lack of job and educational opportunities make the wildcat mines a quick route to gain capital and status, though at the cost of greater exposure to recruitment and exploitation. In Colombia, Early Warning 022-2194 denounces the use of Indigenous youth in mining-related work and drug transport in the territory. In Brazil, although there is no official evidence of forced recruitment in Japurá, an Amazon Underworld report recounts how, along the Caquetá–Japurá river border, Indigenous men have become involved in cross-border trafficking, many acknowledging that “the only way out here is to carry drugs and marijuana.” This phrase summarizes how the same economic precarity that drives people toward gold also sustains their dependence on criminal economies.95 Women also play active roles in illegal mining fronts as cooks, assistants, or vendors, but they also provide sexual services within the extractive circuit. In this specific territory, “floating brothels, locally known as love boats,” have been identified along the Puré River,96 where payments are made in gold, which is later converted to cash in Japurá or Tefé.97 These dynamics place women in highly vulnerable situations of sexual and genderbased violence in a context devoid of any state protection. This commodification of women’s bodies within the extractive economy coexists with widespread rates of youth sexual violence, making Japurá one of the municipalities with the highest number of reported cases of sexual assault against children and adolescents in the state of Amazonas.98 In Colombia, although documentation is more limited, Early Warning 002-2199 warns of sexual exploitation cases linked to illegal mining along the Caquetá and Apaporis rivers, showing patterns similar to those observed on the Brazilian side. AMAZON CLIMATE SECURITY: CHALLENGES AMID THE EXPANSION OF ILLICIT ECONOMIES AND STATE WEAKNESS IN THE CAQUETÁ–JAPURÁ AND PURÉ–PURUÊ CORRIDOR 20 Table of Contents Endnotes Beyond their shared logistical control, the link between drug trafficking and the wildcat mines (garimpo) is evident in the demand for drugs inside mining camps100 and in local micro-trafficking markets in extraction sites and populated centers. In Colombia, Early Warnings 022-21 and 017-23 from the Defensoría del Pueblo (Office of the Ombudsman of Colombia)101 document that in areas such as La Pedrera, Taraira, and Puerto Santander (Araracuara), the dissident Frente Primero Carolina Ramírez has exercised violent social control over drug consumption — carrying out exemplary punishments against Indigenous youth accused of using psychoactive substances. In Japurá and neighboring municipalities, reports show that the lack of anti-trafficking measures has led to a rise in the availability and consumption of drugs and alcohol in local communities,102 resulting in substance abuse, increased cases of child prostitution, pedophilia, alcoholism, suicide, rape, teenage pregnancy, and domestic violence.103 Interviews104 also reveal that this dynamic has become part of miners’ daily lives in Japurá, who, upon returning home after periods in mining sites, spend much of their earnings on alcohol and drugs. Suicide has also been identified among Indigenous populations in the Amazon, reflecting deep emotional and social deterioration affecting communities in both Colombia and Brazil.105 On the Colombian side, records reveal a critical situation: in Tarapacá, nine suicides were recorded compared to four homicides between 2020 and 2024, while in La Pedrera the ratio was two suicides for every homicide in 2023, showing that suicide has become a severe concern in these territories.106 In contrast, Japurá, where about 29% of the population is Indigenous, with a more urban, mestizo profile, has suicide rates close to the national average (10 per 100,000 in 2023 compared to 8 nationwide). Further north, São Gabriel da Cachoeira, a border municipality with one of Brazil’s highest proportions of Indigenous people, reports rates above 30 suicides per 100,000 inhabitants, four times the national average, indicating a shared pattern of vulnerability across Amazonian areas with strong Indigenous populations.107 Meanwhile, socio-environmental conflicts reflect the tensions between conservation, mining, and territorial rights. In the Mapari Indigenous Land, home to the Kaixana people (municipality of Japurá), illegal garimpo, logging, and predatory fishing have intensified since 2022, with threats to communities and the destruction of around 30 mining rafts by the Federal Police along the Puré and Joami rivers.108 Although not directly linked to the Japurá–Puré circuit, the case of Yaigojé Apaporis National Park in Colombia, where a company sought to overturn its protected status to exploit gold,109 and the 60 active mining processes in Indigenous territories of the Upper Rio Negro (Brazil)110 reflect similar pressures on Indigenous lands in neighboring areas. 4.4. Escalation of Violence and Territorial Threats The convergence of illicit gold and drug economies, combined with a weak state presence, results in threats, homicides, and violence against communities and environmental defenders. These dynamics vary on each side of the border: in Colombia, the main patterns involve persecution, displacement, and confinement linked to armed dissident groups, while in Brazil, violence is more widespread, related to garimpo, river piracy, and interpersonal conflict. The patterns of violence identified in Japurá reflect the worsening security situation in the Brazilian Amazon.111 Between 2020 and 2024, Japurá, with about 10,000 inhabitants, recorded 12 homicides and two deaths from police intervention,112 reaching a rate of 66 per 100,000 inhabitants in 2021, one of the highest in the state and the country, according to the Brazilian Yearbook of Public Security, published by the Brazilian Forum on Public Security (FBSP).113 Press reports that shed light on these homicides 21 Table of ContentsEndnotes IGARAPÉ INSTITUTE – FCDS | NOVEMBER 2025 reinforce the localized and brutal nature of violence along the Japurá River. Between 2020 and June 2025, of the 12 homicides recorded in Japurá, at least nine were directly related to dynamics of river piracy and garimpo, including the murder of three garimpeiros (wildcat miners) in 2021,114 the lynching and burning of a suspected pirate in a case of vigilante justice in 2022,115 as well as the discovery of two dismembered bodies in shallow graves;116 a river robbery in 2023; the death of an alleged pirate in a confrontation with police in 2024,117 and the killing of a merchant on the Puré River, who supplied garimpeiros, in 2025.118 Cases linked to river piracy and garimpo also continue downstream, with additional incidents reported in the municipality of Maraã, 170 km below Japurá.119 These episodes illustrate the violence carried out by local gangs and allied factions, alternating between piracy, armed protection of dredges used in illegal gold extraction, and microtrafficking. Table 2. Intentional Lethal Violent Crime Rate, 2020–24. Japurá and Maraã 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Japurá 0.0 66.6 43.7 21.6 0.0 Maraã 12.1 0.0 18.6 6.3 6.3 Amazonas 27.2 40.2 36.5 33.2 27.4 Brazil 24.9 23.6 23.1 22.3 21.0 Source: Amazonas State Department of Public Security. National Public Security Information System (SINESP) https://www.gov.br/mj/pt-br/ assuntos/sua-seguranca/seguranca-publica/estatistica. Population: CGI Demográfico/RIPSA and CGIAE/SVSA/Ministry of Health. In Colombia, there has been a sustained increase in risks in this territory since 2018, evolving from early warnings about postpeace-agreement circumstances to scenarios of structural territorial control.120 Since 2021, violence patterns have shown a consolidation of illegal economic networks, greater armed presence, and increasing threats to communities (see table 3). This pattern is also reflected in the steady rise of homicide rates in the department of Amazonas since 2020, increasing from seven cases in 2019 to 24 in 2021, remaining above 20 through 2024 (rising from a rate of 15 to 30 per 100,000 inhabitants).121 22 Table of Contents AMAZON CLIMATE SECURITY: CHALLENGES AMID THE EXPANSION OF ILLICIT ECONOMIES AND STATE WEAKNESS IN THE CAQUETÁ–JAPURÁ AND PURÉ–PURUÊ CORRIDOR Table 3. Summary of Early Warning Alerts from the Office of the Ombudsman: La Pedrera, Tarapacá, Araracuara, Taraira Variable Evolution 2018–2020 Evolution 2021–2025 Frequency of alerts 3 regional alerts including La Pedrera; initial post-agreement risks. Sustained increase (≥6 alerts), focused on La Pedrera and Tarapacá. Armed actors Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia, ELN, and early FARC dissidents. Consolidation of Front 1 and expansion of cross-border gold– drug networks. Types of violence Threats, displacement, electoral coercion. Recruitment, confinement, extortion, and armed social control. Illegal economies Drug trafficking and river smuggling. Illegal mining, gold–drug nexus, and local economic coercion. Affected populations Afro and Indigenous communities; local authorities. Indigenous peoples (Yaigojé Apaporis), women, youth, and community leaders. Source: author’s systematization based on Early Warning Alerts from the Office of the Ombudsman. An analysis of disaggregated homicide records documents at least 21 cases between 2013 and 2024, with peaks in 2013–2016 and a resurgence between 2022 and 2024 — a trend consistent with the Early Warning Alerts issued since 2021, which already signaled increased risks in the region. Although the number of homicides is limited and does not allow precise differentiation among types of violence, Alerts 022-21, 017-23, and 001-25122 indicate the coexistence of overlapping forms of everyday violence associated with alcohol and drug use, armed coercion, and social control,123 leading to both lethal outcome, such as the murder of an Indigenous defender,124 and non-lethal aggression, threats,125 and forced displacement. While it is not possible to determine which type of violence predominates, sources agree that both coexist and reinforce each other, creating a scenario in which both internal conflict and the coercive presence of armed groups shape community life. Table 4. Homicides identified in La Pedrera, Tarapacá, Araracuara, Taraira Municipality / Departmental District 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2022 2023 2024 Total Araracuara 32121 9 La Pedrera 2 1 2 5 Tarapacá 1 1 1 1 4 Taraira (Vaupés) 1 1 1 3 Total 3 4 3 3 1 1 1 2 3 21 Source: disaggregated data requested from the Colombian National Police.126 23 Table of Contents IGARAPÉ INSTITUTE – FCDS | NOVEMBER 2025 5. Conclusions and Strategies to Guarantee Climate Security and Basin Conservation in the Face of Illicit Economies Illegal mining and drug trafficking have already left far-reaching consequences on the region. The recent expansion of these illicit economies demonstrates how quickly both human and climate security can be severely undermined. The proposals outlined below align with COP30’s principles of inclusive climate action, sustainable financing, and nature-based solutions. They seek to enhance coordination, cooperation, and territorial control to counter non-state actors — often armed — who operate within illegal markets linked to mining, drug trafficking, and river smuggling, supported by local networks of pirates, miners, and corrupt law enforcement officials. It is essential to reverse this trajectory before the damage becomes irreversible. Taking into account the region’s environmental assets, the expansion of illicit economies, growing environmental degradation, and escalating violence, a set of recommendations is proposed for both public and private sectors. These recommendations aim to prevent and combat environmental crimes, foster ethical and sustainable supply chains that uphold human rights, and strengthen nature-based solutions — all while mitigating the impacts of climate change on peace and climate security in the region. Enhance state surveillance and territorial control: 1. Increase the number of police operations in the region, both at the national level and through coordinated, multinational efforts. - Given the Amazon’s ecological, social, and cultural importance, and considering the expansion of illegal mining, its associated impacts, and the consequences of drug trafficking routes on local populations, countries must prioritize the region in their operational plans, strengthening control and expanding their territorial presence. - Control and disruption of criminal activities can also be achieved through measures that weaken the operational capacity of criminal networks. Examples include the Conduct Adjustment Terms (TAC) promoted by Brazil’s Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office (MPF) in partnership with e-commerce companies to block illegal advertisements related to the sale of mercury, and the TAC signed with Starlink, which provides for the sharing of user data with the competent authorities (MPF or Federal Police) and the suspension of services for individuals involved in illegal mining activities.127 IGARAPÉ INSTITUTE – FCDS | NOVEMBER 2025 23 Table of ContentsEndnotes 30 Table of Contents AMAZON CLIMATE SECURITY: CHALLENGES AMID THE EXPANSION OF ILLICIT ECONOMIES AND STATE WEAKNESS IN THE CAQUETÁ–JAPURÁ AND PURÉ–PURUÊ CORRIDOR 17. The Vásquez Cobo–Martins Treaty of Boundary and Inland Navigation (1907) stipulates free navigation on the Amazon and other Colombian– Brazilian rivers, complemented by the Tratado García Ortiz–Mangabeira (1928). See Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Colombia (1982). Arreglo de Límites entre la República de Colombia y la República de los Estados Unidos de Brasil 18. Data from the Brazilian Federal Prosecution Office (Ministério Público Federal) indicate that in 2024, 749 irregular airstrips were identified in the state of Amazonas, 175 of which were on Indigenous lands (including the TI Rio Negro). See Amazonas Atual (2025). MPF pede fiscalização sobre pistas clandestinas no Amazonas 19. Despite the absence of traditional banks, Brazil’s northern region records the country’s highest per capita frequency of use for the PIX payment system, with an average of R$141 per transaction, according to FGV (2025), Geografia do Pix. In Colombia, banking correspondents and digital apps, including Movii, facilitate electronic payments in regions lacking physical infrastructure. 20. For an overview of regulatory differences among Amazon Basin countries, including Brazil and Colombia, see Igarapé Institute (2025), Markets and Forest: Comparative Analysis of the Economic Sectors that Pressure the Amazon Basin 21. Amazonian Institute of Scientific Research – SINCHI (2024). Conflictos: Minería de oro en el río Puré 22. The information in this section is based on fieldwork, expert interviews, conversations with local authorities, and official sources. 23. Data for Brazil are sourced from the Portal da Transparencia do Ouro - PTO 24. In the Traíra mountain range, mining has taken place since 1980, in crystalline rocks of Precambrian origin that form the foundation of the Guiana Shield in both Colombia and Brazil. See FOIRN (2020), Recomendações para Gestão Territorial e Ambiental da Terra Indígena Rio Apapóris e Entorno – Região do Rio Traíra 25. The first cases of illegality recorded in the Portal da Transparência do Ouro database date back to 1993 in São Gabriel da Cachoeira, although irregular artisanal mining in this municipality has existed since 1983. Over time, mining moved downstream toward Japurá, following the river’s course, with recurring cycles of widespread illegal activity. Data on the extent of illegal mining in Brazil come from MapBiomas (2025), Mining statistics - MapBiomas Brasil Collection 9 26. Annual Series of Land Cover and Land Use Maps of Colombia, consulted on October 23, 2025. MapBiomas (2025), Colección 3 27. The mercury content in humans (Hg) represents a quantitative approximation based on the data presented in section 4.2 of this document. 28. After consulting local authorities and informants in the field, no use of cyanide in alluvial mining within this circuit was identified. However, this does not rule out the possibility of its presence. 29. Record-high global gold prices have expanded illegal mining and deforestation across South American tropical forests. This surge has driven mercury prices up to as much as USD 330 per kilogram, according to the Environmental Investigation Agency - EIA) (2025), Traffickers Leave No Stone Unturned: What the largest exposed mercury smuggling operation tells us about gold, the shortcomings of the Minamata Convention on Mercury, and the convergence of crimes in Latin America. According to Mongabay (2025), Tráfico de mercurio: hablan los investigadores que descubrieron el nexo del narcotráfico mexicano con la minería ilegal en la Amazonía 30. Cambio & Unidos por los Bosques (2024). Adiós al Agua, bienvenida la minería 31. María Elena Crespo-López et al. (2023). Mercury in the Amazon: The danger of a single story. See also Última Hora (2011), Mineros usan cinco kilos de mercurio por cada kilo de oro 32. Defensoría del Pueblo (2018). Economías ilegales, actores armados y conflictos territoriales 33. It is estimated that around 10% of the gold extracted through alluvial mining is paid as quotas or “vaccines” (protection payments) to illegal armed groups operating along the Caquetá, Puré, and Cotuhé Rivers. See Vorágine (2024), Oro y coca: la maldición de la guerra en las selvas de Putumayo 34. In cases of illegal mining in Brazil, when “owners of dredges” are identified, judicial investigations usually point to local entrepreneurs with the financial means to fund machinery, inputs, and logistics, reflecting the business-oriented nature of this illicit economy in the Amazônia Legal. See Igarapé Institute (2024), Dynamics of the Ecosystem of Environmental Crimes in the Brazilian Legal Amazon (p. 9); and Garimpeiros no Amazonas são soltos após pagamento de fiança de R$ 48 mil 35. An example of settlements that temporarily serve mining operations is the community of Purezinho, a tiny miners’ village made up of simple wooden houses and two floating brothels locally known as “love boats.” See InfoAmazonia (2023), Garimpeiros retiram equipamentos e escapam de megaoperação no Amazonas 36. On major rivers such as the Solimões, where navigation is more open and easier for authorities to monitor, the risks associated with dredge circulation are higher. A recent joint operation involving the Fundação Nacional dos Povos Indígenas (FUNAI), Instituto Brasileiro do Meio Ambiente e dos Recursos Naturais Renováveis (IBAMA), the Brazilian Army, and the Federal Police demonstrates the strategy of dispersing equipment to hinder enforcement. See Funai (2025), Operação articulada pela Funai, Ibama, Exército e Polícia Federal desmonta rede de garimpo ilegal no Amazonas 37. These groups ensure mobility — of both money and gold — along the rivers in their areas of control, providing security services to buyers and drug traffickers in exchange for payments, thus preventing law enforcement from carrying out operations that might seize or destroy their equipment. 38. The city of Japurá has an operational airport (identified on the Mining Map, coordinates: 1°53’45”S 67°1’9”W). According to Flapper, an official charter flight to Manaus costs around BRL 40,000 (about USD 7,500), and to Porto Velho about BRL 53,000 (about USD 8,400). A large national scheme documented by Repórter Brasil during Aerogold Operation (2022) Esquema que prendeu ‘rei do ouro’ envolve balsas de garimpo ilegal no Amazonas 31 Table of Contents IGARAPÉ INSTITUTE – FCDS | NOVEMBER 2025 39. Five military police officers were arrested in 2022 for direct involvement in piracy cases downstream from the Japurá River, in the city of Maraã. See G1 (2022), PMs são detidos no interior do AM por suspeita de pirataria; defesa diz que não há provas. Another report indicates that Federal Police investigations revealed the involvement of an Army lieutenant colonel accused of leaking operational data to illegal mining groups in Japurá. See Terra (2023), PF diz que militar recebeu R$ 930 mil para vazar dados de operação a garimpo na Amazônia 40. Data for Colombia were collected through fieldwork, while those for Brazil were adjusted based on InfoAmazonia (2023), Dragas: ouro estimula crime e corrupção na fronteira Brasil-Colômbia, which reported a value of BRL 270 in August 2023. The figure was adjusted to May 2025 according to real exchange rate calculations (considering inflation in both the United States and Brazil, along with the nominal exchange rate), resulting in an estimated range of BRL 510–570. 41. For studies addressing law enforcement challenges, see AARIMO (2024), Addressing Illegal Gold Mining in the Amazon Region: From Recognition of the Problems and Challenges to Collective Action; and Igarapé Institute (2021), Lessons from fighting illegal gold mining in the Amazon Basin 42. Data sourced from the commodities base of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 43. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime - UNODC (2025). Global Analysis on Crimes that Affect the Environment – Part 2b: Minerals Crime: Illegal Gold Mining; Organization of American States - OAS (2022). Typologies and Red Flags Associated to Money Laundering from Illegal Mining in Latin America and the Caribbean 44. This reality is consistent with other river basins in tropical forest regions around the world. For example, Bazilier and Girard (2020), The gold digger and the machine. Evidence on the distributive effect of the artisanal and industrial gold rushes in Burkina Faso, find that the increase in international gold prices leads to higher household consumption among communities located near artisanal mines in the Black Volta Basin, Burkina Faso. According to Girard, Molina–Millán, and Vic (2024), Artisanal mining in Africa. Green for Gold?, the historic rise in gold prices accounts for 8% of deforestation in Africa and 28% in areas with gold deposits or suitable for artisanal mining. However, it has also raised local incomes and offered an alternative to communities affected by agricultural decline due to climate change and desertification. 45. Since the 1970s, the region has been linked to drug trafficking, including the “Cartel de Leticia,” associated with the Medellín Cartel and the use of clandestine airstrips, now overgrown by forest within the Puré National Natural Park (PNN Rio Puré). See El Tiempo (2021), Evaristo Porras, el triste final de un capo. Likewise, Fernandinho Beira-Mar was captured in Barrancominas (Guainía) in 2001 for his involvement in drug-trafficking networks and logistical supply operations — including arms trafficking — to armed groups in the jungle. See Semana (2001), La confesión de Fernandinho. The Taraira River has also been the site of several incidents involving arms trafficking and theft throughout the region’s history. See El Tiempo (2021), La incursión militar brasileña que hace 30 años dejó seis desaparecidos 46. Although cocaine remains a central element of the illicit trade in the Amazon, this section focuses on the marijuana route along the Caquetá– Japurá axis, due to its growing relevance in recent seizures and press reports. This does not imply overlooking the role of the Caquetá River in cocaine trafficking. 47. A Crítica (2017). Nova rota do tráfico de drogas é disputada por organizações criminosas 48. In this research, both in Brazil and Colombia, the press, regulatory agencies, and individuals interviewed during fieldwork mentioned creepy and skunk marijuana, known for their high THC levels. 49. El Espectador (2022). El pesebre de Marihuana que crece en el norte del Cauca. Institute for Development and Peace Studies (INDEPAZ) (2024). La economía de la marihuana en el enclave productivo del norte del cauca – punto de encuentro 81 50. Multiple reports on this route include: Armada de Colombia (2022), Estudio de caso de narcotráfico marino # 34-2022; El Tiempo (2024), Caquetá en época de paz total: refugio de disidentes y ruta de marihuana; Revista Raya (2023), ¡Es la marihuana, estúpido!: violencia y mercado en la paz total; and El Espectador (2023), El corredor de marihuana entre Brasil y Colombia que financia el conflicto 51. El Tiempo (2025). Las rutas de la marihuana en el sur de Colombia: lo que reveló la incautación de tres toneladas en menos de cinco días 52. Field research conducted by the The Foundation for Conservation and Sustainable Development (FCDS) team in the Caquetá–Japurá region in May 2025. 53. The riverine route along the Río Marie has also been highlighted in El Tiempo (2022), Así las disidencias mueven la marihuana creepy desde Cauca para narcos en Brasil, and in the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CDESC), United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), and United Nations Development Programme - UNDP (2023), Tráfico de drogas en la Amazonía. Resultados Preliminares 54. Amazonas State Department of Public Security (2023). Hórus/Fronteira Mais Segura: Dupla é presa com 32 quilos de droga no aeroporto de Japurá; Portal do Amazonas (2025). Operação Queda do Céu: PC-AM prende três militares da FAB e outros dois indivíduos por esquema de envio de drogas em voos da Força Aérea e lavagem de dinheiro 55. Colombia (2025). Policía Nacional de Colombia. Resultados operativos; and Brazil, information requests to the Amazonas State Department of Public Security (SSP-AM). 56. Along both the Caquetá River and the Japurá in Brazil, there have been various cases of Indigenous communities reacting differently to garimpo activity: some opposing it, while others reached agreements to extract or receive payments from gold mining on their territories. See Cassette, A. (1989), Reinvenção do garimpo no Brasil 57. The Foundation for Conservation and Sustainable Development (FCDS) and Igarapé Institute (2025). Amazonia en Disputa: Seguridad climática y conflictos socioambientales en la Amazonía Noroccidental 58. Brazilian Forum on Public Security - FBSP (2022). Cartografias das violências na região amazônica: relatório final 59. International Crisis Group (2024). Un problema de tres fronteras: detener la criminalidad en la Amazonía 60. El País (2025). La fragmentación de las disidencias de las FARC activa las alertas para la Amazonia colombiana (2022). “Un pueblo flotando”: la minería ilegal crece en el río Puré y afecta a los pueblos aislados 32 Table of Contents AMAZON CLIMATE SECURITY: CHALLENGES AMID THE EXPANSION OF ILLICIT ECONOMIES AND STATE WEAKNESS IN THE CAQUETÁ–JAPURÁ AND PURÉ–PURUÊ CORRIDOR 61. Since 2024, the EMC faction led by Mordisco broke off dialogue with the government, while the EMBF faction led by Calarcá continues to negotiate under the “Total Peace” policy. The Frente Carolina Ramírez remains divided between both factions: one under Mordisco and another, the Frente Raúl Reyes, aligned with Calarcá. See Institute for Development and Peace Studies (INDEPAZ) (2025), Las dinámicas del conflicto en zonas con y sin cese al fuego: estudio comparativo de Arauca, Cauca, Caquetá y Meta; and El País (2025), Diálogos con las disidencias de las FARC: ofensiva militar contra el Estado Mayor Central y negociación con el Estado Mayor de los Bloques y Frente 62. Brazilian Forum on Public Security (FBSP) (2024). Cartografias da Violência na Amazônia 2024 63. A Crítica (2020). Chacina: piratas do rio matam sete ribeirinhos no rio Japurá 64. AlaOrilladelRío (2022). Las guerras del posacuerdo: ¿Quiénes son los Comandos de Frontera? 65. In the 1980s, mining in the Colombian Amazon began with the arrival of miners from Brazil and from traditional gold-mining hubs. See Constitutional Court of the Republic of Colombia, Judicial Branch (2025). Sentencia T-106/25 66. Truth Commission (2022). Corredores estratégicos del conflicto armado en los territorios étnicos 67. The Foundation for Conservation and Sustainable Development (FCDS) (2025). Análisis Territorial en Fronteras Amazónicas Recorrido Pedrera-Taraira-Pedrera (Amazonas y Vaupés). Equipo Paz y Ambiente. 68. MapBiomas bases its data on the annual land-use classification derived from Landsat and Sentinel imagery, allowing the identification of territorial pressure zones and trends with high precision. For a detailed visualization of Japurá, see MapBiomas – Brasil (2025). Município: Japurá 69. Data from the bulletins of the Management and Operational Center of the Amazon Protection System (Censipam) (2024). Boletim de Desmatamento e ilicitos ambientais - Nº4 Anual 2024. The bulletins combine data from the DETER-INPE deforestation alert system, Brasil MAIS (Ministry of Justice and Public Security), LOGAR (illegal mining site locator), and LOPIS (airstrip locator) systems. They are published bimonthly and constitute one of the main up-to-date sources on environmental crimes in the Amazônia Legal. 70. Management and Operational Center of the Amazon Protection System (Censipam) (2025). Boletim de Desmatamento e ilicitos ambientais - Nº 5 Jan/Fev 2025 and Boletim de Desmatamento e ilicitos ambientais - Nº 6 Mar/Abr 2025 71. Civil Circuit Court Specialized in Land Restitution of the Judicial District of Cundinamarca (2023). Interlocutory Order No. 214, Case File No. 2023-00063. 72. Equivalent to 1,000 official soccer fields. 73. InfoAmazonia (2023). Dragas: ouro estimula crime e corrupção na fronteira Brasil-Colômbia 74. Instituto Socioambiental (2022). Garimpo ilegal cresce há 3 anos dentro de estação ecológica da Amazônia na fronteira com a Colômbia 75. Instituto Socioambiental (2022). Garimpo ilegal cresce há 3 anos dentro de estação ecológica da Amazônia na fronteira com a Colômbia 76. The Monitoring Deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon by Satellite (PRODES) project employs a specific methodology to estimate deforestation in Amazon rainforest areas using high-resolution satellite imagery (Landsat). 77. Sousa-Domingues et al. (2024). Mercury Dynamics and Bioaccumulation Risk Assessment in Three Gold Mining-Impacted Amazon River Basins 78. Amazon Cooperation Treaty Organization (ACTO) (2024). Study will provide a regional overview of the mercury contamination situation in the Amazon Basin 79. National Natural Parks of Colombia (2018). Contenido de Mercurio en comunidades étnicas de la subregión planicie en la Amazonia Colombiana 80. The reference limit for methylmercury concentration in fish established by the World Health Organization (WHO) is 0.5 mg/kg for nonpredatory fish and 1 mg/kg for predatory or piscivorous species. See World Health Organization (2017). Documento de debate sobre niveles máximos de metilmercurio en el pescado 81. National Natural Parks of Colombia (2018). Contenido de Mercurio en comunidades étnicas de la subregión planicie en la Amazonia Colombiana 82. The tucunaré (peacock bass) is a predatory and piscivorous fish; therefore, the reference values established by the WHO would be 1 mg/kg, equivalent to 1 ppm. 83. Amazon Cooperation Treaty Organization - ACTO (2024). Study will provide a regional overview of the mercury contamination situation in the Amazon Basin 84. Eight studies were identified and analyzed for the Colombian side of the border region, and only one for the Brazilian side. See Amazonian Institute of Scientific Research – SINCHI (2014), Un análisis descriptivo de la presencia de mercurio en agua, sedimento y peces de interés socio-económico en la amazonia colombiana; Olivero-Verbel, J. et al. (2016), Human exposure and risk assessment associated with mercury pollution in the Caqueta River, Colombian Amazon; Ministry of Health and Social Protection, National Institute of Health, and University of Córdoba (2016), valuación epidemiológica de los efectos en salud por exposición ocupacional y ambiental a mercurio en los departamentos de Chocó, Nariño y Vaupés, Colombia; National Natural Parks of Colombia (2018), Contenido de Mercurio en comunidades étnicas de la Subregión Planicie en la Amazonia Colombiana; Poveda Castillo, L. (2018), Contenido de mercurio total en sedimentos, agua, vegetacion y flora acuática en la cuenca media del Río Caquetá, Amazonas – Colombia; Alcala-Orozco, M. et al. (2019), Mercury exposure assessment in indigenous communities from Tarapaca village, Cotuhe and Putumayo Rivers, Colombian Amazon; Valdelamar-Villegas, J. and Olivero-Verbel, J. (2019), High Mercury Levels in the Indigenous Population of the Yaigojé Apaporis National Natural Park, Colombian Amazon; Amazonian Institute of Scientific Research – SINCHI (2019), La calidad de los ecosistemas acuáticos amazónicos y sus recursos; Basta, P. C. et al. (2023), Risk Assessment of Mercury-Contaminated Fish Consumption in the Brazilian Amazon: An Ecological Study 33 Table of Contents IGARAPÉ INSTITUTE – FCDS | NOVEMBER 2025 85. Olivero-Verbel, J. et al. (2016). Human exposure and risk assessment associated with mercury pollution in the Caqueta River, Colombian Amazon 86. The threshold established by the World Health Organization (WHO) is 5 µg/g. 87. Ministry of Health, Brazil (2021). Orientações para a notificação de intoxicações por mercúrio 88. Ministry of Health, Brazil (2021). Orientações para a notificação de intoxicações por mercúrio 89. Valdelamar-Villegas, J. and Olivero-Verbel, J. (2019). High Mercury Levels in the Indigenous Population of the Yaigojé Apaporis National Natural Park, Colombian Amazon 90. Interviews conducted by the Igarapé Institute team and field research by The Foundation for Conservation and Sustainable Development (FCDS) team in the Caquetá–Japurá region in May 2025. 91. Olivero-Verbel, J. et al. (2016). Human exposure and risk assessment associated with mercury pollution in the Caqueta River, Colombian Amazon 92. For example, the advance of mining toward the intangible zone of the Puré National Natural Park threatens the Yurí communities living in voluntary isolation, violating their decision to remain uncontacted and exposing them to disease and resource loss. The imminent risk of contact with Indigenous groups such as the Yurí–Passe has been repeatedly flagged by the Defensoría del Pueblo since 2021. See Defensoría del Pueblo de Colombia (Office of the Ombudsman of Colombia) (2021), Ficha de Alerta Temprana Inminencia 002-21; and Botero, R (2025). ¿Inminente contacto con pueblos indígenas aislados? The Foundation for Conservation and Sustainable Development (FCDS). 93. The Foundation for Conservation and Sustainable Development (FCDS) (2025). Análisis Territorial en Fronteras Amazónicas Recorrido Pedrera-Taraira-Pedrera (Amazonas y Vaupés). Equipo Paz y Ambiente. 94. Defensoría del Pueblo de Colombia (Office of the Ombudsman of Colombia) (2021). Alerta Temprana de Inminencia 022-21 para La Pedrera, en Amazonas; El Heraldo (2021). Defensoría alerta por reclutamiento de menores en Amazonas 95. Amazon Watch, InfoAmazonia, and Amazon Underworld (2023). Amazon Underworld: Economías criminales en la mayor selva tropical del mundo 96. InfoAmazonia (2023). Garimpeiros retiram equipamentos e escapam de megaoperação no Amazonas 97. InfoAmazonia (2023). Dragas: ouro estimula crime e corrupção na fronteira Brasil-Colômbia 98. Fundação de Vigilância em Saúde do Amazonas – Dra. Rosemary Costa Pinto (FVS–RCP) (2025). Panorama epidemiológico da violência sexual contra crianças e adolescentes no estado do Amazonas, entre 2020 e 2024 99. Defensoría del Pueblo (Office of the Ombudsman of Colombia)(2021). Alerta Temprana 002-21 100. Brazilian Forum on Public Security (FBSP) (2024). A nova corrida do ouro na Amazônia: garimpo ilegal e violência na floresta 101. Defensoría del Pueblo (Office of the Ombudsman of Colombia) (2021). Alerta Temprana de Inminencia 022-21 para La Pedrera, en Amazonas; Defensoría del Pueblo (Office of the Ombudsman of Colombia)(2023). Ficha de Alerta Temprana Inminencia 017-23 102. Instituto Socioambiental (ISA) (2008). Funai de Tabatinga pede ajuda para tirar índios das drogas e do álcool; Mapa de Conflitos (2009). AM – Intromissão do tráfico de cocaína na vida dos povos indígenas do Sudoeste Amazonense – inoperância dos governos federal e estadual facilita a atividade dos narcotraficantes e deixa os jovens indígenas em situação de enorme vulnerabilidade 103. Mapa de Conflitos (2009). AM – Intromissão do tráfico de cocaína na vida dos povos indígenas do Sudoeste Amazonense – inoperância dos governos federal e estadual facilita a atividade dos narcotraficantes e deixa os jovens indígenas em situação de enorme vulnerabilidade 104. Interviews conducted by the Igarapé Institute team in October 2025. 105. La Silla Vacía (2023), Suicidio Indígena: una herida abierta en la Amazonía Colombiana, and Barcelos, P. et al. (2022), O suicídio em indígenas da Amazônia Brasileira: revisão sistemática da literatura 106. National Administrative Department of Statistics (DANE) (2025). Sistema de información y consulta de estadísticas vitales 107. Department of Informatics of the Unified Health System (DATASUS) (2025). Mortalidade – desde 1996 pela CID-10: Óbitos por causas externas 108. Indigenist Missionary Council (CIMI) (2023). Relatório Violência contra os Povos Indígenas no Brasil. Dados 2023. The Comissão Pastoral da Terra - CPT also identified additional conflicts over land and water affecting Japurá, including in Aldeia Nova São Joaquim (T.I. Uneuxi), Aldeias Jutaí, Nova Canaã, and Jeremias (T.I. Paraná do Boá–Boá) between 2018 and 2019. 109. The Yaigojé Apaporis National Natural Park was created by Resolución 2079 del 27 de octubre de 2009, issued by the Ministry of Environment, Housing, and Territorial Development, shortly after the granting of mining titles IH3-16001X and IGH-15001X to the company Cosigo Frontier Mining Corporation, one of them approved just one day after the park’s creation. 110. Indigenist Missionary Council (CIMI) (2021). Recuo do governo sobre garimpo no AM foi justo e recomendável 111. In 2024, Brazil’s Amazônia Legal recorded a homicide rate of 24 per 100,000 inhabitants — higher than the national average (20.7) — maintaining a gap observed since 2019. The Foundation for Conservation and Sustainable Development (FCDS) and Igarapé Institute (2025). Amazonia en Disputa: Seguridad climática y conflictos socioambientales en la Amazonía Noroccidental 112. Data obtained under the Freedom of Information Act (Lei de Acesso à Informação, LAI) from the Public Security Secretariat of Amazonas (SSP-AM). Homicides are considered the key indicator in Brazil for Crimes Violentos Letais Intencionais (CVLI, or intentional lethal violent crimes), which include homicides, murders committed during robberies (latrocínios), and deaths resulting from bodily harm. 34 Table of Contents AMAZON CLIMATE SECURITY: CHALLENGES AMID THE EXPANSION OF ILLICIT ECONOMIES AND STATE WEAKNESS IN THE CAQUETÁ–JAPURÁ AND PURÉ–PURUÊ CORRIDOR 113. Brazilian Yearbook of Public Security, of the Brazilian Forum on Public Security (Fórum Brasileiro de Segurança Pública - FBSP); Portal Norte (2022). Japurá, no AM, está entre as 14 cidades mais violentas do país, diz Anuário de segurança pública 114. G1 (2021). Três homens são mortos a tiros em garimpo ilegal no Rio Japurá, no interior do AM 115. G1 (2022). Homem é morto e carbonizado durante tumulto em Japurá, no interior do AM 116. A Crítica (2022). Corpos esquartejados são encontrados em covas no município de Japurá; dois suspeitos foram presos 117. Portal do Holanda (2024). ‘Pirata’ morre durante ataque de fuzil contra policiais em Japurá 118. Onda Digital (2025). Corpo de comerciante é encontrado em rio, no interior do Amazonas 119. A Crítica (2017). Chacina: piratas do rio matam sete ribeirinhos no rio Japurá. BCAMAZONAS (2020). Piratas atacam barcos e matam em Maraã, no rio Japurá 120. Defensoría del Pueblo (Office of the Ombudsman of Colombia) (2025). Alertas Tempranas, La Pedrera, Tarapacá y Puerto Santander (Araracuara) y Taraira. In particular, the early warnings (002-21, 022-21, 017-23, 007-24, 001-25) were issued specifically for these territories. These forms of violence fall within a broader pattern of victimization carried out by armed groups across the Caquetá–Japurá basin. In 2023, the same front executed four Indigenous teenagers in Los Estrechos (Solano, Caquetá), upstream along the Caquetá River, as they attempted to flee forced recruitment. See Radio Nacional de Colombia (2023). Denuncian reclutamiento y asesinato de jóvenes indígenas en Caquetá 121. Data from the National Police of Colombia (2025). Estadística Delictiva 122. Defensoría del Pueblo (Office of the Ombudsman of Colombia)(2021). Alerta Temprana de Inminencia 022-21 para La Pedrera, en Amazonas; Defensoría del Pueblo (2023). Ficha de Alerta Temprana Inminencia 017-23; Defensoría del Pueblo (2025). Alerta Temprana 001-25 123. Casanare Noticias (2022). A la cárcel hombre que habría asesinado a machete a su hermano. The Defensoría del Pueblo referred to the killing of a drug user by the Frente Primero. See Defensoría del Pueblo (2023). Alerta Temprana de Inminencia Nº 017-23 124. Murder of Indigenous leader Custodio Yucuna Tanimuca in 2023, attributed to dissidents of the EMC-FARC in La Pedrera. 125. Agencia Prensa Rural (2018). Intento de homicidio, tortura y amenazas contra lideresa indígena del Amazonas 126. Detailed homicide data were obtained by the Igarapé Institute through annual information requests submitted to the National Police of Colombia since 2012. Departmental districts (corregimientos departamentales) are not explicitly listed in official records, revealing a structural gap in territorial reporting. However, a detailed review of rural records associated with Leticia (the departmental capital) made it possible to identify cases that occurred in these territories. 127. A través de solicitudes de acceso a información, el Instituto Igarapé tuvo acceso a los TACs firmados entre el Ministerio Público Federal (MPF) y algunas empresas, como Mercado Libre, OLX y B2Brazil. Estos acuerdos buscan ajustar las prácticas comerciales sin necesidad de acciones legales, mediante compromisos de monitoreo, transparencia y bloqueo de anuncios ilegales. Para más información, ver Ministerio Público Federal - MPF (2025). COP30: MPF mira plataformas digitais para frear garimpo ilegal de ouro na Amazônia. Ver también MPF (2025). MPF firma acordo inédito com Starlink para coibir uso de internet por garimpeiros ilegais na Amazônia 128. The Portal da Transparência do Ouro, developed by WWF-Brazil with support from NAP.Mineração (the Mining Research Support Center at the University of São Paulo) and the Igarapé Institute, compiles and cross-references relevant public data to assess the level of compliance of gold mining activities with the parameters established under Brazilian law. 129. Fairmined is an international certification that ensures gold is responsibly sourced and traceable, extracted under good mining practices that protect the environment and promote the social and economic development of artisanal and small-scale mining communities. For more information, see: What is Fairmined? In 2024, a miners’ association in Madre de Dios, Peru (AMATAF) became the first legal mining association in the Amazon to obtain Fairmined certification. See also: Historic Milestone for Miners in the Amazon: First Fairmined Gold Sale in Peru 130. For more information, see: Ministry of Mines and Energy of Brazil (2025). MME articula parceria com a ONU para projeto de mineração de ouro em pequena escala; Ministry of Mines and Energy of Colombia (2024). PAN: Un plan para combatir el uso de mercurio en la minería artesanal y de pequeña escala 131. Igarapé Institute (2025). Transforming the economy in the Amazon: Lessons from Community-Led Initiatives 132. See Oficina de Negocios Verdes y Sostenibles, Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development (in cooperation with Corpoamazonia), Negocios Amazónicos, SINCHI Institute. SEDECTI (2025). Plano de Bioeconomía do Amazonas and Ministry of Environment and Climate Change (2023). Plano de Ação para Prevenção e Controle do Desmatamento na Amazônia Legal (PPCDAm) – 5.1, Eixo I – Atividades produtivas sustentáveis 133. In coordination with structures such as Centros de Atenção Psicossocial (CAPs) in Brazil. In Colombia, coordination should involve municipal Health and Education Departments, together with the Territorial Health Directorates, in collaboration with the Ministries of Health and Justice, and with the Colombian Institute of Family Welfare (ICBF) for underage populations. For reference, see: Ministry of Health (2025). Directorio de Direcciones Territoriales. Colombian Institute of Family Welfare (ICBF) Herramientas para la Formulación y la Gestión de Planes de Desarrollo Territoriales para la Niñez. (AMAZONAS) 134. Socio-Environmental Institute (Instituto Socioambiental, 2024). São Gabriel da Cachoeira (AM) lança plano de prevenção ao suicídio 135. For more information, see: Ministry of Health – Brazil (2025). Consultório na Rua 136. Vice Presidency of Colombia (2024). MinIgualdad presenta los resultados del Sistema Nacional del Cuidado con el inicio de la ruta fluvial del cuidado en el Amazonas 137. Due to the low internet connectivity in the region, electronic reporting systems should be able to operate offline and automatically synchronize once connectivity is restored. 35 Table of Contents IGARAPÉ INSTITUTE – FCDS | NOVEMBER 2025 138. In Brazil, an example of coordination and dialogue between local leaders and public health systems is the Departmental Councils on Social Policy. These councils are deliberative bodies designed to address actions related to the health of Indigenous populations. The municipality of Japurá is part of the District Council on Indigenous Health (CONDISI) of the Upper Rio Negro. 139. For more information, see: World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF, 2024). Dinâmica do mercúrio e avaliação dos seus riscos: o impacto da contaminação nos rios da Amazônia brasileira; Oswaldo Cruz Foundation, Ministry of Health, and Ministry of Indigenous Peoples – Brazil (2025). Manual técnico para o atendimento de indígenas expostos ao mercúrio no Brasil 140. Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Brazil. Bilateral relations with the Republic of Colombia 141. Embassy of Colombia in Brazil. Instrumentos y acuerdos vigentes entre Colombia y Brasil 142. Ministry of Justice and Public Security – Brazil (2011). Acordo de Cooperação Policial entre a Polícia Federal do Brasil e a Polícia Nacional da Colômbia 143. Presidential Agency for International Cooperation of Colombia, APC (2021). Colombia y Brasil firman siete acuerdos de cooperación en la Visita Oficial del Presidente Duque and on the Binational Border Commission (Combifron); Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2015). Relaciones Bilaterales - República de Colombia Institutional Information Igarapé Institute Ilona Szabó de Carvalho Co-founder and President Robert Muggah Co-founder and Chief Innovation Officer Melina Risso Director of Research Leriana Figueiredo Program Director Maria Amélia L. Teixeira Operations Director Laura Trajber Waisbich Deputy Program Director Carolina Torres Graça Director, Green Bridge Facility Program Foundation for Conservation and Sustainable Development (FCDS) Rodrigo Botero García Director Érika Benítez Tapias Deputy Director Beatriz Josefina Niño Endera Advocacy and Institutional Strengthening Coordinator Harold Andrés Ospino Burgos Territorial Transformations Coordinator Maryi Adriana Serrano Garzón Territorial Monitoring and Analysis Coordinator Juliana Hurtado Rassi Coordinator of the Project “Security, Conflict, and Environment in the Amazon” Credits General Coordination Melina Risso, Maria Eugênia Trombini and Juliana Hurtado Rassi Research Katherine Aguirre, Marina Alkmim, Lucas Alves, João Gabriel Caetano Leite, Liliana Duica Amaya, Salomón Majbub Avendaño, Luz Alejandra Gómez Gallego and Yadi Cristina González Álvarez How to cite: IGARAPÉ INSTITUTE and FOUNDATION FOR CONSERVATION AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (FCDS). Amazon Climate Security: Challenges amid the Expansion of Illicit Economies and State Weakness in the Caquetá–Japurá and Puré–Puruê Corridor. Rio de Janeiro. Igarapé Institute, 2025. Available at: https://igarape.org.br/publicacoes DOI Number: 10.5281/zenodo.17555146 Support Wendell Fabrício, Antonella Di Ciano, Víctor Moreno, Megan García, Cesar Bautista and Silvia Pabón Editing Débora Chaves Graphic Design Raphael Durão and André Guttierrez *The content of this publication is the sole responsibility of the Foundation for Conservation and Sustainable Development (FCDS) and the Igarapé Institute, implementers of the project “Security, Conflict, and Environment in the Amazon”. 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