Madagascar 1984–2024: Forty Years of IMF/World Bank Policies and the Trajectory of the Water–Sanitation–Hygiene (WASH) Sector

1 Madagascar 1984–2024: Forty Years of IMF/World Bank Interventions and the Degradation of the Water–Sanitation–Hygiene (WASH) Sector Strategic Analysis Note – Synthetic Version Introduction This note provides a synthetic overview of forty years of macroeconomic and sectoral policies that have shaped the development of the Water–Sanitation–Hygiene (WASH) sector in Madagascar. It retraces the evolution of IMF/World Bank doctrines in a context marked by rapid population growth, accelerated urbanization, and recurrent climatic pressures. The objective is to identify the cumulative factors—institutional, financial, and operational— that have structured sector performance, and to clarify the strategic levers for a more stable and effective public planning approach. Methodology The analysis draws on the main public sources available (JMP 1990–2022, PER 2017–2021, JIRAMA reports, IMF Article IV, IEG evaluations), complemented by a documentary review of macroeconomic and sectoral conditionalities applied since the structural adjustment programs of the 1980s. Table 1. Causal Chain of IMF/World Bank Policies: Expected and Undesirable Effects (1984–2024) Axis IMF/World Bank Decision Expected Effect Undesirable Effect Public expenditure Expenditure ceilings Stabilize macroeconomic framework Slowdown of structural investments Wage bill Hiring freeze Control recurrent spending Chronic shortage of technical expertise Tariffs Gradual increases Improve financial viability Payment arrears and pressure on households Subsidies Reduction Reduce budget distortion Rising production costs for public services Sectorization Targeted projects Accelerate local implementation Fragmentation and weak coordination Governance Autonomous PMUs Increase operational efficiency Weakened institutional steering Limitations Data prior to 2000 are heterogeneous, and some impacts are difficult to isolate from demographic, economic, or climatic dynamics. This note prioritizes a cumulative reading of trends over strict causal attribution. Executive Summary Between 1984 and 2024, Madagascar experienced several cycles of economic and sectoral policies that shaped the trajectory of the WASH sector. In a context where population multiplied by 2.5, progress in access to essential services remained modest: +10 percentage points for drinking water and +8 points for sanitation. Accumulated budgetary and institutional constraints are reflected in JIRAMA’s deficit (–190 M USD in 2022) and high physical losses in urban networks (45%). Sector evolution results from the interaction of macroeconomic factors, national governance, and structural pressures. These dynamics increased external dependence and limited maintenance and infrastructure modernization. The analysis highlights the need for stronger coordination and stable recurrent funding to sustainably improve WASH performance. Madagascar 1984–2024: Forty Years of IMF/World Bank Interventions and the Degradation of the Water– Sanitation–Hygiene (WASH) Sector – (Rasoanaivo Z., 2025) 2 1. Findings (1990–2024) Table 2. Structural Indicators of the WASH Sector: Evolution 1990–2022 Indicator 1990 2022 Evolution Population 12M 30M +18M Drinking water access 26% 36% +10 points (32 years) Sanitation access 10% 18% +8 points JIRAMA water losses 28% (1998) 45% (2022) +17 points JIRAMA deficit — –190 M USD (2022) Deterioration Sources: WHO/UNICEF JMP (1990, 2022), WB PER (2017, 2021), JIRAMA Reports, FMI Article IV. Interpretation: Demand grows much faster than access; the sector remains fragile. 2. Evolution of IMF/World Bank doctrine and sectoral impacts (1984–2024) 2.1. 1984–1990 — IMF/World Bank Doctrine: Pure Structural Adjustment Objectives: macro stabilization, deficit reduction, State withdrawal, deregulation. Key Decisions: • Rapid devaluations: restore external competitiveness • Hiring freeze: reduce the wage bill • Removal of water/energy subsidies: balance public accounts • Sharp reduction of operational budgets: strict austerity • Maintenance shifted to communities: externalize recurrent costs WASH Impacts: • Reduction of maintenance activities: OPEX reduced to strict minimum • Advanced degradation of rural networks: infrastructure without maintenance • Beginning of long-term underinvestment in JIRAMA: CAPEX blocked • Reduction of public technical capacities: erosion of skills 2.2. 1991–2001 — World Bank Doctrine: Liberalization + “Minimal State” Period marked by an orientation toward reducing the role of the State. Key decisions: • Attempts to privatize JIRAMA/Air Madagascar: improve efficiency / management. • Proliferation of pilot projects: test / find viable models. • Decentralization without resource transfers: bring decision-making closer to citizens. • Substitution of State by NGOs/donors: accelerate implementation. • Institutional fragmentation: distribute sector responsibilities. WASH Impacts: • 30–40% of rural water points non-functional: high failure rate • Rapid urbanisation without accompaniment: demand far exceeds supply • Loss of public technical skills (exodus toward NGOs): erosion of national capacities • Insufficiently consolidated WASH strategy: absent sector leadership Madagascar 1984–2024: Forty Years of IMF/World Bank Interventions and the Degradation of the Water– Sanitation–Hygiene (WASH) Sector – (Rasoanaivo Z., 2025) 3 2.3. 2002–2009 — World Bank/IMF Doctrine: Poverty Reduction (PRSP) The discourse changes but the constraints persist. Key decisions: • Public expenditure ceilings maintained: aim for macro stability • Salary restrictions: control the wage bill • Limited WASH budgets: prioritize poverty reduction • Vertical projects centered on communities: strengthen local participation • Heavy infrastructure almost absent: favor targeted interventions WASH Impacts: • Limited progress in access (26% → 33%): minimal improvement • JIRAMA losses increased to 35–38%: severely degraded networks • Sanitation not prioritized: chronic and persistent underinvestment • Structural urban delay accentuated: cities increasingly overwhelmed 2.4. 2009–2014 — Aid Suspension: Amplified Degradation Direct consequence of political crisis: the State operated with limited resources. Effects: • Halt of water/sanitation projects: investments stopped • Halt of maintenance: OPEX budget almost eliminated • Increased vulnerability of JIRAMA: national utility in difficulty • Multiplication of failures in rural areas: nationwide breakdowns • Rise of epidemic episodes: Plague (119 cases, 40 deaths as of 16/11/2014) 2.5. 2014–2020 — IMF/World Bank: SDGs + Resilience, but Austerity Persists Aid resumed, but under strict conditionalities. IMF decisions: • Gradual tariff increases: align with real costs. • Reduction of JIRAMA subsidies: restore public finance health. • Limits on technical recruitment: contain the wage bill. • Strict budget discipline: stabilize the macroeconomic framework. World Bank decisions: • Multiplication of autonomous PMUs: accelerate implementation • WASH-nutrition, resilience, social safety nets programs: fight poverty • Low priority for heavy infrastructure: prioritize local interventions • CAPEX funded 80–90% by donors: mobilize external resources WASH Impacts: • Strong dependence on external financing: +2/3 of public investments • Ageing urban networks: Non-revenue water (44%) – Physical loss (45%) • Structural JIRAMA deficit: (low production + high losses) × social tariff = tariffs < costs • Stagnation of access: Antananarivo population +4.5%/year but network unchanged Madagascar 1984–2024: Forty Years of IMF/World Bank Interventions and the Degradation of the Water– Sanitation–Hygiene (WASH) Sector – (Rasoanaivo Z., 2025) 4 2.6. 2020–2024 — IMF/World Bank doctrine: “Stabilization in the face of shocks” Covid period, global inflation, climatic crises. Decisions: • IMF emergency loans → increased debt • World Bank aid centered on social resilience rather than infrastructure • Return to austerity in 2022 WASH Impacts: • Stagnation of water access (36%) • Urban failures + JIRAMA outages • Increased vulnerability to cyclones 3. Concrete mechanisms that weakened the WASH sector 3.1. On the IMF side (macroeconomic) • Expenditure ceilings → limited investment capacity in water supply/stations • Wage bill freeze → chronic shortage of engineers • Devaluations → imported equipment cost ×2 or ×3 • Ascending tariffs → non-payment → recurring JIRAMA deficit • Macroeconomic priority over social sectors 3.2. On the World Bank side (sectoral) • Uncoordinated interventions → national system still incomplete • Autonomous PMUs → implementation outside ministries • Approach less adapted to urban contexts • Insufficient OPEX financing → no sustainable maintenance • Priority for nutrition/resilience > heavy hydraulic infrastructure • Short cycles → impossible decade-long planning 4. Internal factors: shared institutional responsibility 4.1. National governance • Irregularities in procurement • Political instability (1991, 2002, 2009, 2018, 2025) • Low political allocation for the WASH sector • Partial use of IMF directives to justify clientelist cuts • Limited administrative capacity (formats, procedures, control) 4.2. Examples of Malagasy resilience Despite the context, several positive local results show that failure was not total: • FIFAMANOR: strong agro-hydraulic management in the 1990s–2000 • Ambatondrazaka water utility: local performance improvement 2005–2010 • CRS/CARE hydraulic successes in the South: infrastructure >10 years • FID water supply systems: greater durability than several WB projects • Community approaches in Androy during droughts These cases prove that local governance ensuring operational continuity can partially compensate national weaknesses. Madagascar 1984–2024: Forty Years of IMF/World Bank Interventions and the Degradation of the Water– Sanitation–Hygiene (WASH) Sector – (Rasoanaivo Z., 2025) 5 5. External factors: pressures not attributable to donors • Very rapid urbanisation (Antananarivo: +2M inhabitants) • Very high demographic growth (+18M population) • Droughts (Androy 1991, 2016, 2021) • Major cyclones (Gafilo 2004, Enawo 2017, Batsirai 2022) • Covid-19 • Rapid rise in fuel and material prices 6. Internal divisions within IMF/World Bank and doctrinal evolutions 6.1. IMF • Austerity hawks: strict orthodoxy (mainly 1980–2014) • Humanitarian pragmatists: more flexible post-2015 Madagascar was mainly concerned by the first category. 6.2. World Bank • 1990s: deregulation + privatizations • 2000s: poverty + social safety nets • 2010s: climate + resilience + nutrition 6.3. Internal World Bank evaluations (IEG) Several internal criticisms documented: • High fragmentation • Insufficient institutional support • Focus on short projects • Absence of coherent tariff strategy 7. Historically possible (and realistic) alternatives 7.1. National alternatives not adopted • Strong WASH planning (Rwanda, Ethiopia) • Securing OPEX budget (maintenance) • Unified water/energy regulation • Anticipatory urban strategy for Tana/Toamasina 7.2. Relevant international models • Senegal: SONES/SDE (public utility + private management) • Ghana: PURC (social tariff + financial viability) • Burkina Faso/Niger: high-performing municipal utilities 7.3. Sectoral alternatives • SWAp (sector-wide approach) instead of 300 uncoordinated interventions • JIRAMA–State performance contracts • Heavy investments rather than scattered microprojects Madagascar 1984–2024: Forty Years of IMF/World Bank Interventions and the Degradation of the Water– Sanitation–Hygiene (WASH) Sector – (Rasoanaivo Z., 2025) 6 8. Regional positioning: Madagascar lagging behind Table 3. Regional comparison of WASH progress (1990–2022) Country Water (1990→2022) Sanitation (1990→2022) Mali 29% → 77% 17% → 40% Niger 21% → 50% 7% → 28% Chad 20% → 35% 5% → 20% Madagascar 26% → 36% 10% → 18% Sources: WHO/UNICEF JMP – Water, Sanitation and Hygiene Data (2023 Update) Madagascar progresses more slowly than comparable countries despite regular external support to the sector. 9. General causal synthesis The degradation of the WASH sector 1984–2024 results from a set of factors: 9.1. External factors (IMF/World Bank) • Prolonged austerity • Evolving and sometimes insufficiently adjusted doctrines • Underinvestment in heavy infrastructure • Fragmentation through projects • Absence of OPEX financing 9.2. Internal factors (State) • Weak governance • Political instability • Inability to absorb reforms • Limited budget allocation to WASH 9.3. Structural factors • Sustained demographic growth • Insufficiently managed urbanisation • Climatic vulnerability 9.4. Local resilience • Positive but insufficient to balance structural factors. 10. Conclusion Forty years after structural adjustment, Madagascar still does not have a consolidated public capacity able to guarantee access to water, sanitation, and hygiene. Demographic growth is strong, but progress remains modest; urban networks deteriorate; JIRAMA remains financially in deficit; and maintenance remains highly insufficient. Donor policies played a role, but the sectoral trajectory results from the interweaving of international conditionalities, national choices, and structural constraints. To this must be added the influence of other partners (European Union, AfDB, USAID, AFD, UNICEF, JICA, …), whose approaches—sometimes convergent, sometimes divergent—have also shaped the sector. The analysis of these combined interventions offers an essential perspective for understanding past trajectories and clarifying the margins for strategic autonomy in the future.