Demographic Transformation and Economic Resilience: International Experience and Public Policy Strategies

Available online at www.rajournals.in International Journal of Management and Economics Invention ISSN: 2395-7220 DOI: 10.47191/ijmei/v11i11.05 Volume: 11 Issue: 11 November 2025 International Open Access Impact Factor: 8.518 (SJIF) Page no. 4817-4826 4817 Bibigul Omirbayeva, IJMEI Volume 11 Issue 11 November 2025 Demographic Transformation and Economic Resilience: International Experience and Public Policy Strategies Bibigul Omirbayeva PhD Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies, under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Astana, Kazakhstan ORCID ID: 0000-0002-5154-4943 ARTICLE INFO ABSTRACT Published Online: 17 November 2025 Corresponding Author: Bibigul Omirbayeva The article analyzes the global demographic transformation, such as a decrease in the birth rate, an increase in life expectancy, urbanization and mobility, highlighting population aging as a key phenomenon. The approach combines an inter-regional review with comparative cases. Descriptive demographic indicators and an overview of policies in the areas of family support, labor market institutions, pension provision, healthcare and long-term care are used. The results show that cash payments and tax benefits alone have a limited impact on fertility without parallel expansion of flexible forms of employment, affordable childcare and housing, as well as real gender equality in career paths. Immigration can mitigate labor shortages, but requires effective integration and recognition of qualifications. Healthcare and long-term care systems show the best results when universal coverage is combined with geographically oriented forms of care and "active longevity" measures that prolong work activity. The crosscountry differences are largely explained by the quality of institutional design and managerial ability: in Korea, generous monetary, vacation and housing packages do not compensate for the effects of long working hours and employment dualism; Japan has achieved significant success in healthy longevity and integrated care with limited fertility dynamics; Europe is facing a decline in the share of employed and pressure on pensions, while in Italy fragmented family policy undermines the feasibility of childbearing intentions, and the fall in the birth rate in Finland highlights the role of norms and uncertainty even in a developed welfare state. The policy conclusions suggest intersectoral demographic strategies that simultaneously encompass family policy, labor market institutions, housing measures, migration, and sustainable financing of long-term care, based on clear assessment frameworks and time consistency. KEYWORDS: demographic transformation, population aging, birth rate, family policy, long-term care, migration, labor market. INTRODUCTION The global demographic transformation is characterized by a decrease in the birth rate, an increase in life expectancy, urbanization and high mobility of the population. The key manifestation of these processes is the aging of the population, which poses serious challenges to governments: a reduction in the working-age population, an increase in the burden on social systems, an increase in healthcare and care costs, as well as increased intergenerational tensions. In developed countries, the proportion of the population aged 65 and over already exceeds 20%, while in developing countries it is about 9%. (UNDESA, 2023) Forecasts indicate that by 2050, the proportion of the elderly population in developed countries will reach 28%, in developing countries – 17%, and in least developed countries – more than 6% (UNDESA, 2023). At the same time, in Japan and South Korea, the population over 65 is expected to exceed a third (World Economic Forum, 2023), while in Western Europe it is 33% (EuroStat, 2023) “Demographic Transformation and Economic Resilience: International Experience and Public Policy Strategies” 4818 Bibigul Omirbayeva, IJMEI Volume 11 Issue 11 November 2025 Table 1. Number (in thousands) and proportion of people aged 65 and over by development group, 2023 and 2050 Region/Year 2023 2050 Number, thousand people Share, % Number, thousand people Share, % Developed countries 258 311 20,2% 351 500 27,8% Developing countries 506 841 9,0% 1 132 877 17,4% Least developed countries 42 637 3,7% 118 566 6,1% Source – UNDESA, 2023 Changes in the age structure have implications for the entire economy. Fewer able-bodied people have a negative impact on the labor market, investment, and GDP growth. A decrease in the ratio of employees to retirees and an increase in retirement life expectancy place a strain on state budgets, pension and medical systems. Without largescale government intervention, these negative trends will intensify as the population ages faster. The UN report on the state of the world's population in 2023 notes that if the population decline continues, «entire countries or even humanity as a whole may face collapse» (World Bank Blogs, 2024). LITERATURE REVIEW Modern literature interprets demographic transition as an important, but not an automatic driver of growth: a positive effect occurs only when a young age structure is combined with investments in human capital, an adaptive employment system and effective institutions. There are a number of studies that confirm the existence of a stable link between demographic dynamics and economic development: if earlier population growth was considered as a factor stimulating growth due to the expansion of the labor force and domestic demand, today the nature of demographic changes has changed radically. Population growth is increasingly occurring not at the expense of fertility, but due to aging, which is becoming a new challenge – increasing the burden on pension systems, healthcare and public finances. In its report «Golden Aging: Prospects for Healthy, Active, and Prosperous Aging in Europe and Central Asia» the World Bank showed that demographic aging is already determining growth and employment trajectories. At the same time, golden aging is possible with the adaptation of policies to the new age profile of the population through the prolongation of economic activity, prevention of chronic diseases, retraining and shifting incentives in healthcare from treating complications to maintaining the physical health of the elderly. Updated UN estimates show a global slowdown in the birth rate and an increase in life expectancy, which are changing the age pyramid of almost all countries. In the current context, the policy focus should shift from «population growth» to managing the age structure and spatial distribution of the population. For Central Asia, this means the simultaneous coexistence of a young profile in a number of countries and increasing aging in the horizon up to 2050. The UNFPA Regional Survey (2025) estimates that the working-age population in Central Asia will increase by about 20 million people by 2050. This opens a window for a demographic dividend, but it will be limited in time. The share of young people in the total population will decrease from 34% in 2023 to 26% in 2050, while the share of older people, on the contrary, will grow. To use this window, a flexible and balanced policy is needed that simultaneously meets the needs of a rapidly growing younger generation and a slowly growing older population. Investments in education and health care for children and youth, active labor market policies and increased employment opportunities should be a priority. Of particular importance is the involvement of women in the economy and the reduction of barriers to education and vocational training, as this will increase the participation of the population in the workforce and ensure more sustainable growth. A recent World Bank report (Accelerating Growth through Entrepreneurship, Technology Adoption, and Innovation) highlights that in order to convert quantitative demographic opportunity into productivity growth, countries need accelerated technology diffusion, entrepreneurship, and rapid retraining. In Europe, the increase in the proportion of elderly dependents is already associated with a slowdown in production in Italy and Spain, while France shows milder effects due to active migration and social policies. These examples confirm that demography is becoming a key macroeconomic factor, and its consequences depend on the quality of adaptation policies. METHODS This study is based on a comparative analysis of country cases – Japan, the Republic of Korea, Italy, and Finland. It draws on statistical data from the United Nations, Eurostat, and national statistical agencies, as well as policy and analytical reports, including European Commission publications and national demographic development strategies. “Demographic Transformation and Economic Resilience: International Experience and Public Policy Strategies” 4819 Bibigul Omirbayeva, IJMEI Volume 11 Issue 11 November 2025 The methodological approach combines: − Analysis of statistical indicators such as fertility, mortality, median age, and dependency ratios; − Examination of institutional measures in the areas of family policy, healthcare, labor markets, and longterm care; − Comparative assessment of policy effectiveness to identify the key success factors and limitations of demographic strategies. DISCUSSION Japan: Aging and Gender Constraints Japan is one of the world leaders in terms of aging, which is seen as a key challenge for the country's socioeconomic development (European Parliamentary Research Service, 2020). The share of people over 65 in 2024 was about 30% (World Bank Group Data, 2024). By 2036, one third of Japan's population is projected to be over 65 years old (European Parliamentary Research Service, 2020). Special attention should be paid to the phenomenon of longevity: the number of Japanese citizens who surpassed the age of 100 reached a record 95 119 in 2024 (The Nippon Communications Foundation, 2024). Since 2008, the country's population has been declining from 128 million to 125 million in 2022. Japan's population is expected to decrease to 63 million by 2100 (East Asia Forum, 2024). Japan's demographic crisis is caused by a combination of two factors: high life expectancy - 84,5 years (The Global health observatory, 2024) and low fertility – the total fertility rate is consistently below 1,57 (European Parliamentary Research Service, 2020). Among the possible reasons are the peculiarities of the work culture, the deterioration of employment for young men and the traditional gender division of roles. The Government has taken a number of measures to stimulate the birth rate, but the remaining barriers related to gender inequality and corporate culture significantly limit their effectiveness. The Angel Plan program (1994) was implemented to support families with children, which expanded preschool education services, introduced new forms of parental leave, and increased benefits. The program has been reviewed several times, and in 2009 it included measures to retain women in the labor market and ensure a better balance between family and work responsibilities. In 2015, the government set a goal to raise the fertility rate to 1,8 by 2025. However, no significant progress has been achieved so far. The key constraint remains a work culture with long working hours and high competition, which hinders the achievement of a balance between work and family life. In 2019, Japan introduced free preschool education and daytime childcare services for children aged three to five, and in 2020, a new policy package was launched – expanding free higher education programs, increasing payments for paternity leave, and prioritizing infertility treatment within the national health insurance system. Another government-led initiative, known as «womenomics», was designed to increase women’s participation in the economy, however, it fell short of its stated goals. Institutional and cultural barriers persist – including limited career opportunities, a rigid labor market, and strong social expectations that place the primary responsibility for childcare and household duties on women. The consequences of population aging and decline include economic challenges, rising public expenditures, pressure on the labor market, and depopulation of rural areas. At the same time, Japan is actively developing the so-called «silver economy» and has become a global leader in robotics, aimed at compensating for labor shortages and providing care for the elderly. Since 1961, Japan has maintained a system of universal health insurance, and since 1973, medical services have been provided free of charge for older citizens. In 2000, the country introduced a long-term care insurance system covering a wide range of social and rehabilitative services, including institutional care, home assistance, and community support. The Healthy Japan 21 program, launched in 2000, aims to extend healthy life expectancy and reduce regional disparities in health outcomes. In 2012, Japan introduced a community-based integrated care system built on four pillars: self-help, mutual assistance, social solidarity, and government support. By 2025, local authorities are expected to complete the implementation of this system, promoting decentralization and tailoring measures to regional conditions. Thus, Japan’s health and social welfare policy in an aging society is grounded in the integration of medical and social support, decentralization, and civic engagement. This model reflects a shift from dominant state paternalism toward a more flexible, multi-level framework of cooperation between the government, society, and families. Japan’s experience shows that even with a high level of material support for families and a well-developed social infrastructure, increasing fertility is impossible without institutional and cultural transformation. The key issues remain gender equality and labor market flexibility. Immigration still plays only a minor role in offsetting Japan’s demographic deficit, which exacerbates the problem of a shrinking workforce. At the same time, the country has achieved remarkable success in health care and active aging, becoming a global leader in life expectancy and quality of medical services. An important element of this progress has been the integration of community-based care systems and the engagement of civil society initiatives. Internationally, Japan actively promotes the concept of Universal Health Coverage “Demographic Transformation and Economic Resilience: International Experience and Public Policy Strategies” 4820 Bibigul Omirbayeva, IJMEI Volume 11 Issue 11 November 2025 and contributes to shaping global approaches to managing population aging. For other nations, Japan’s experience offers valuable lessons: effective demographic policy requires not only financial incentives but also profound social reforms aimed at empowering women, balancing work and family life, engaging communities in elderly care, and fostering international cooperation. South Korea: Ultra-Low Fertility and Institutional Reforms South Korea is facing one of the deepest demographic crises in the world. The combination of an extremely low fertility rate (0,73 in 2024) and rapid population aging poses serious threats to economic growth, social stability and national security. Following the post-war baby boom, Korea implemented deliberate fertility control policies – promoting small families, expanding access to contraception, and discouraging large households. By 1983, the total fertility rate had already fallen below the replacement level of 2,1. The 1997 financial crisis further intensified labor market instability, leading to delayed marriages and later childbearing. A highly competitive education system and labor market made career advancement a top priority, while family formation became a postponed choice. Many women became unwilling to sacrifice professional opportunities for family life, considering childbirth only feasible if men shared childcare and domestic responsibilities equally. At the same time, high housing prices and the intense «education race» (private tutoring and after-school programs) have made raising children increasingly costly. As a result, since 2018 Korea has become the first country where the expected number of births per woman dropped below one (TFR 0,95), falling further to 0,73 in 2024 – the lowest rate among OECD countries (Kyung Ae Cho, 2021). Meanwhile, the share of the elderly (aged 65 and over) reached 19,3% in 2024 and is projected to rise to 40% by mid-century. Over the next 50 years, Korea’s working-age population will shrink from 70,2% to 45,8%, the elderly population will grow from 19,2% to 47,7%, and the youth share will decline from 10,6% to 6,6%. Table 2. Population forecast 2022-2072 2024 2040 2050 2072 Total population (10 thousand people) 5 175 5 006 4 711 3 622 Population aged 15-64 years (10 thousand people) 3 633 2 903 2 445 1 658 Working-Age Population Ratio 70,2 58 51,9 45,8 Youth Population (0-14 years) (10 thousand population) 549 388 375 238 School-Age Population (6-21 years) (10 thousand population) 715 412 425 278 Youth Population (19-34 years) (10 thousand people) 1 044 722 511 450 Elderly Population (65+ years) (10 thousand people) 994 1 715 1 891 1 727 Median age 46,1 54,6 58,1 63,4 Total Dependency Ratio (working-age population per 100 people) 42,5 72,4 92,7 118,5 Aging Index (youth population per 100 people) 181,2 442,2 504 726,8 Data Source – Population Projections for Korea (2022-2072), Statistics Korea. Thus, the country is entering the category of a «super-aged society», with inevitable socio-economic consequences. The causes of South Korea’s ultra-low fertility are commonly may be attributed to the following factors: 1. Long and inflexible working hours that limit time for rest and caregiving. Despite the legal cap on the workweek being reduced to 52 hours in 2018, actual working hours remain well above the OECD average, constraining work-family balance (Lee Jaeeun, 2024). 2. Labor market dualism and employment instability, particularly affecting young workers and mothers. After childbirth, many women lose stable, well-paid contracts and return to low-wage, secondary employment, reducing the likelihood of having a second child (OECD, 2025). 3. High costs of childrearing – housing, education, and care. Korean families traditionally invest heavily in private tutoring and supplementary education, according to the Ministry of Education (2023), around 78,5% of students receive private tutoring, with average monthly spending reaching about 434 thousand won (roughly 10% of household disposable income). Studies also show a negative correlation between rising housing prices and the probability of having a first or second child (OECD, 2025). 4. Persistent gender norms and «motherhood penalties». The gender pay gap is one of the largest among OECD countries, sending a strong signal about the economic disadvantages of motherhood and reinforcing women’s tendency to delay childbirth (Susan Kreimer, 2024). 5. Late marriages and low out-of-wedlock fertility. In Korea, childbearing remains closely tied to formal “Demographic Transformation and Economic Resilience: International Experience and Public Policy Strategies” 4821 Bibigul Omirbayeva, IJMEI Volume 11 Issue 11 November 2025 marriage. Out-of-wedlock births accounted for only 2,3% in 2019. Combined with later marriage ages, this significantly narrows the fertility window, especially for second births (Kyung Ae Cho, 2021). To address the problem of low fertility, South Korea established the Aging and Future Society Committee in 2004 and, in 2005, adopted the Basic Plan for Low Fertility and Aging Society, along with the creation of the Low Birth Rate and Aging Society Committee. Every five years, new Basic Plans are introduced, progressively expanding the range of policy measures – from subsidies for pregnant women and parents, and the development of nurseries and childcare centers, to youth employment initiatives and housing support for young families. Over the past two decades, the Korean government has consistently expanded cash benefits, childcare infrastructure, parental leave schemes, and housing programs for young families. However, without a parallel transformation of employment practices, working hours, income security, and gender norms, the impact of these measures has remained limited. Families continue to face an “impossible arithmetic” of time, finances, and career prospects (Kyung Ae Cho, 2021). The Fourth Basic Plan (2021-2025) aims to raise the total fertility rate to 1,0 by 2030. It outlines a vision for building a sustainable society through three strategic directions, comprising fifteen specific policy tasks designed to promote childbirth and support families: Direction 1. Work-Family Balance − Introduction of short-term parental leave; − Increase in the maximum allowance for parental leave; − Extension of paternity leave duration; − Creation of a unified application system for maternity and parental leave; − Promotion of flexible work arrangements. Direction 2. Education Reform and Reduction of Educational Costs − Free education and childcare for children aged 0-5; − Gradual expansion of free after-school programs; − Development of individualized childcare services; − Increased support for childcare services; − Establishment of on-site childcare facilities in workplaces. Direction 3. Housing and Marriage Support, Childbirth, and Child-Rearing Assistance − Removal of income limits for special loans for newborns; − Expansion of housing supply for families with infants; − Simplification of housing purchase policies for young families; − Introduction of special tax incentives for married couples; − Support for infertility treatment programs. The next step in South Korea’s demographic policy is the establishment of the Ministry of Population Strategy and Planning, which will assume responsibility for demographic policy and national development strategies – functions previously divided between the Ministry of Health and Welfare and the Ministry of Strategy and Finance. The new ministry will oversee demographic policymaking, develop mediumand long-term strategies, manage budget allocations to address low fertility, and coordinate key population issues such as workforce planning, migration, and aging. It will operate at the vice-prime ministerial level. In this way, South Korea is institutionally strengthening its demographic governance by creating a dedicated ministry with expanded powers and resources. However, while these measures have mitigated some consequences, they have not reversed the overall trend. Financial incentives alone, without changes in work culture and gender norms, remain insufficiently effective. The Korean experience demonstrates that overcoming the demographic crisis requires deep institutional and cultural transformation, not merely fiscal interventions. Europe’s Demographic Crisis While some countries focus on the potential risks of artificial intelligence and the automation of jobs, for many European nations the primary threat is not technological transformation but the sharp decline of the labor force driven by demographic factors. According to the European Commission’s 2024 Ageing Report, the population of the European Union is projected to decrease from 449 million in 2022 to 432 million by 2070 (GRINS Foundation, 2024). Many countries in the region are facing a deep demographic crisis characterized by falling fertility rates and rising life expectancy. The average total fertility rate declined from 2,8 children per woman in 1960 to 2.0 in 1990, and further to 1,6 today, which is well below the replacement level of 2,1 (World Bank Blogs, 2024). The region is also aging rapidly. Between 2001 and 2024, the share of people aged 65 and older increased from 15,8% to 21,6%. Projections indicate that this proportion will continue to rise, reaching 32,5% (136 million people) by the year 2100 (Eurostat, 2023). “Demographic Transformation and Economic Resilience: International Experience and Public Policy Strategies” 4822 Bibigul Omirbayeva, IJMEI Volume 11 Issue 11 November 2025 Figure 1. Population Structure of Europe (Eurostat, 2024) At the same time, the number of young people is declining: the share of those under the age of 20 has decreased from 23,2% to 19,9%. The share of the working-age population (15-64 years) in the EU is also projected to shrink. In 2022, it accounted for 63,9% (285,5 million people), but by 2100 it is expected to fall to 54,4% (228,1 million), a decline of 57,4 million. The sharpest drop is projected around 2038, when the share will reach 60,0%, followed by a more gradual decline. An analysis of population aging in the EU by median age shows a steady increase – from 38,4 years in 2001 to 44,7 years in 2024, a rise of more than six years over two decades. In 2024, the highest median ages were recorded in Italy (48,7 years), Bulgaria and Portugal (47,1 years each), and Greece (46,9 years), while the lowest were observed in Armenia (33,7 years) and Turkey (34 years). The median age in Europe is projected to reach 50,2 years by 2100 (Eurostat, 2023). Figure 2. Median Age in European Countries (Eurostat, 2023) Italy: Demographic Winter and the Search for Solutions Italy is one of the oldest countries in Europe (Reuters, 2024). More than 24% of its population is aged 65 and older, and the median age has reached 48.7 years. The reason for Italy’s population aging is straightforward: the number of deaths linked to an aging population significantly exceeds the number of births. Over the past 25 years, the country’s total fertility rate has remained below the replacement level, standing at less than 1,5 in 2024. Figure 3. Total Fertility Rate in Italy (United Nations Data Portal Population Division, 20205) 15.8 21.6 23.2 19.9 15.0 16.0 17.0 18.0 19.0 20.0 21.0 22.0 23.0 24.0 The share of the population aged 65 and older The share of the population aged 0-20 years 32 34 36 38 40 42 44 46 48 50 1.25 1.21 1.15 1.2 1.25 1.3 1.35 1.4 1.45 2001 2010 2020 2024 “Demographic Transformation and Economic Resilience: International Experience and Public Policy Strategies” 4823 Bibigul Omirbayeva, IJMEI Volume 11 Issue 11 November 2025 The decline in birth rates in Italy is driven by a combination of socioeconomic and institutional factors. Experts note that the state has not invested in the younger generation over recent decades to the same extent as in previous ones, leading to a weakening of family support (Euronews, 2024). Although the desire to have children in Italy is as strong as in other countries, weak public policy remains a major barrier. The average age of parents at the birth of their first child (31,6 years) is among the highest in Europe, reflecting challenges related to employment, housing, and financial independence. Having a child often worsens a family’s material situation, while weak infrastructure and limited support measures make balancing work and family life extremely difficult. As a result, families receive a negative signal that childbearing is economically and socially disadvantageous reinforcing demographic stagnation. Government policy aimed at increasing fertility has evolved gradually. In the 2000s and 2010s, the focus was on tax incentives and regional programs, but their reach remained limited. In 2021, the government reduced the VAT on children’s goods to 5%, although the rate was raised again to 10% at the beginning of 2024 (the standard VAT rate in Italy is 22%) (Eurasia Review, 2024). Since 2022, Italy has introduced a universal child allowance (Assegno unico universale) available to all families with children. Opportunities for paid maternity and paternity leave have been expanded, measures have been adopted to help parents reconcile work and family life, and loans and tax benefits for young couples have been introduced. The network of nurseries and kindergartens is growing, although coverage remains below the EU average. So far, the results of these measures have been modest. Overall fertility remains low, and while social support has somewhat mitigated negative trends, no structural turnaround has occurred. Population aging continues, and the natural decline in population is only partially offset by immigration. According to UN projections, by the end of the 21st century, Italy’s population could shrink by nearly half, falling to around 35 million people. Figure 4. Projected Population of Italy (United Nations Data Portal Population Division, 2025) Italy’s policies to address low fertility have largely focused on supporting large families rather than encouraging the formation of new ones or increasing births outside of marriage. The 2024 Budget Law, approved by the Council of Ministers on October 16, 2023, allocated €1 billion for familyand fertility-related measures, including (The European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies, 2024): 1. Exemption from social security contributions (up to €3,000 per year) for mothers in permanent employment with three or more children. Starting in 2024, this measure has been extended to mothers with at least two children. 2. Parental leave: in 2024, compensation for the second month of parental leave increased to 80% of the salary and is available until the child turns six. By comparison, other European countries such as Spain, Sweden, and Finland maintain stricter parental leave policies but often provide stronger incentives for fathers to take leave. 3. Kindergarten attendance bonus: raised to €3,600 for families with an ISEE (Equivalent Economic Situation Indicator) below €40,000 and children up to 10 years old. Despite some progress, doubts remain about whether these policies can effectively reverse Italy’s negative fertility trend. The country has already entered a phase of «demographic winter». Current political measures aim to strengthen family support and increase women’s participation in the labor market, but the central challenge remains finding a balance between social spending and long-term sustainability in an aging society. Finland: Demographic Decline and Future Challenges Finland’s population is aging rapidly, with the share of older age groups growing steadily. The recent decline in 60.2 35.4 32 37 42 47 52 57 62 2010 2013 2016 2019 2022 2025 2028 2031 2034 2037 2040 2043 2046 2049 2052 2055 2058 2061 2064 2067 2070 2073 2076 2079 2082 2085 2088 2091 2094 2097 2100 “Demographic Transformation and Economic Resilience: International Experience and Public Policy Strategies” 4824 Bibigul Omirbayeva, IJMEI Volume 11 Issue 11 November 2025 fertility has accelerated this process while simultaneously reducing the size of the working-age population. Today, Finland’s population stands at around 5.6 million, of which nearly a quarter (23,6%) are aged 65 and older, 14,6% are children under 14, and approximately 61,9% belong to the working-age group (15-64 years). (Statistics Finland, 2024). At the same time, the population is becoming more ethnically and culturally diverse, though overall population growth is driven entirely by immigration. Finland’s demographic trajectory differs from that of other Nordic countries: its dependency ratio the balance between older and working-age populations is deteriorating more rapidly. The country’s population is projected to decline by about one million by 2100, while Sweden’s population is expected to increase by around three million over the same period (Marika Jalovaara etc., 2023). A key challenge is the sharp and persistent decline in fertility. In 2010, Finland’s total fertility rate (TFR) stood at 1,87, but by 2024 it had fallen to 1,29 (United Nations Data Portal Population Division, 2024). According to UN projections, by 2100 the TFR will reach 1,5 – a slight improvement, yet still well below the replacement level. The combination of low fertility and rising life expectancy from 77,7 years in 2000, 80,1 in 2010, 82,1 in 2024, and a projected 85,7 in 2050 is creating growing pressure on the pension system and healthcare services. An additional challenge is regional disparity: peripheral areas of Finland are aging much faster than major cities, complicating infrastructure planning and the provision of social services across the country (Pekka Valkama. 2021). In response to the demographic crisis, the Finnish government has developed a comprehensive set of measures. As early as 2020, it adopted the Population Policy Programme (Väestöliitto, Family Federation of Finland, 2020). Finnish experts emphasize that there is no single cause behind the recent decline in fertility and, consequently, no simple solution to reverse it. Fertility rates are simultaneously influenced by cultural shifts, relationship instability, mental health issues, labor market conditions, income levels, and the difficulty of balancing parenthood with professional life. In 2024, the government’s Working Group on Demographic Policy introduced a package of 20 proposals focusing on family formation and family policy. These include fertility counseling, relationship support, and encouragement of earlier childbearing, all of which are expected to help raise fertility rates (Rotkirch, Anna, 2025). Thus, Finland faces the classic set of demographic challenges seen in advanced economies: declining fertility, population aging, and regional disparities. Despite active family support measures, no systemic changes have yet occurred. Achieving sustainable demographic development will require a long-term, integrated approach combining pronatalist policies, a strategic migration framework, and the adaptation of social protection systems to new demographic realities. To overcome Europe’s demographic crisis, experts propose four key strategic directions (World Bank Blogs, 2024): − Encouraging fertility through financial and social support for families. Examples from Armenia, Belarus, the Czech Republic, Georgia, and Latvia demonstrate that consistent pro-natalist policies can increase fertility rates, although the results of such measures typically materialize only after several decades. − Attracting immigrants while addressing the risks of skill shortages. To maintain the current worker-to-retiree ratio by 2050, the EU would need to attract over 100 million migrants. Even if fertility in the EU were to rise from the current 1,46 to the replacement level of 2,1, the demographic gain would remain modest. − Expanding automation and extending the working life of older people. These measures can help alleviate labor shortages but have inherent limitations and cannot fully offset the decline in the working-age population. − Engaging NEET youth (neither in education, employment, nor training) in the economy. Their share remains particularly high in some countries, around 20% in Romania and 15% in Bulgaria and Croatia, compared to the EU and U.S. average of 12%. RESULTS Comparative analysis shows that the key condition for a successful demographic policy is the combination of financial incentives with institutional and cultural transformations. The experiences of Japan and South Korea highlight the limitations of purely monetary measures in societies marked by rigid work cultures and persistent gender barriers. The European experience further demonstrates that even well-developed social protection systems cannot always prevent fertility decline if comprehensive support for young families is lacking. An equally important factor is the mobilization of internal reserves – extending the working life of older adults and integrating NEET youth into the labor force. These measures can partially offset the decline in the working-age population. Global experience indicates that cash transfers and tax incentives alone cannot reverse negative demographic trends. Even in countries providing generous financial assistance, such as Japan or South Korea, fertility remains low. The core reason lies in the absence of broader social reforms – including the development of childcare infrastructure, flexible work arrangements, and reduced labor market insecurity – without which families lack confidence in the future. Thus, financial incentives are effective only when coupled with institutional change. “Demographic Transformation and Economic Resilience: International Experience and Public Policy Strategies” 4825 Bibigul Omirbayeva, IJMEI Volume 11 Issue 11 November 2025 A key determinant of people’s willingness to have children is gender equality and employment flexibility. Northern European countries demonstrate that combining high female labor force participation with access to childcare, flexible working hours, and active involvement of fathers in childrearing helps maintain a relatively stable fertility rate. Immigration has become an important tool to offset the labor shortages caused by population aging. However, migration inflows can only be effective when paired with thoughtful integration policies – ensuring access to education, recognition of qualifications, and prevention of social isolation. Without these, migration fails to solve demographic problems and can instead generate new challenges. Finally, two social groups remain untapped reserves for many economies: NEET youth (those not in education, employment, or training) and older adults willing to remain economically active. Engaging the first group helps reduce social risks and strengthen the tax base, while prolonging the working lives of older people can partially compensate for workforce decline. Many countries are now developing active aging programs, emphasizing the value of senior experience and intergenerational participation in the economy. In conclusion, the experiences of different nations show that effective demographic policy must be multifaceted – combining financial measures with social reforms, ensuring equal opportunities for men and women, and mobilizing internal societal resources alongside well-designed migration strategies. CONCLUSION The global demographic transformation is a longterm challenge that affects labor markets, social systems, and economic growth. International experience shows that: − Financial incentives are effective only when combined with institutional reforms; − Gender equality and labor market flexibility are key determinants of fertility and family well-being; − Migration can serve as a valuable resource, provided there is effective integration and recognition of qualifications; − Active aging programs and the inclusion of disengaged youth (NEET) can help reduce social risks. Thus, the demographic policy of the future must be multidimensional, tailored to the specifics of national institutions, and ensure a sustainable balance between supporting fertility, adapting to population aging, and managing migration strategically. REFERENCES 1. United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2023). 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