State of electoral disinformation in Spain and Portugal

State of Electoral Disinformation in Spain and Portugal November 2025 1 CC BY 4.0 Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ This license requires that reusers give credit to the creator. It allows reusers to distribute, remix, adapt, and build upon the material in any medium or format, even for commercial purposes. BY: SmartVote / https://mysmartvote.org/ Dissemination level Public Title State of electoral disinformation in Spain and Portugal Date November 2025 Work Package WP2 - Analysis and refinement of existing AI tools to prevent misinformation in the scope of elections Scientific Coordination OberCom – Observatório da Comunicação Miguel Paisana, António Vasconcelos, Paulo Couraceiro, Pedro Pais, Gustavo Cardoso and Vania Baldi Contributing Authors by organisation / institution OberCom – António Vasconcelos, Gustavo Cardoso, Miguel Paisana, Paulo Couraceiro, Pedro Caldeira Pais and Vania Baldi. Fundación Cibervoluntarios – Octavio Barriuso Varela, Ernestina Álvarez Corona, Óscar Espiritusanto and Inès Dinant. Universidad Carlos III de Madrid – Raúl Magallon Rosa, Carolina Fernández Castrillo, Eva Herrero Curiel and Juan Pedro Molina. Universidade Politécnica de Madrid – David Camacho, Sergio D’Antonio, Javier Huertas Tato, Adrián Girón and Alejandro Martin. CENJOR – Miguel Crespo. CLABE – Juan Zafra, Lola Bonilla and Marisol Sales Recommended citation Paisana, M., et al. (2025). State of Electoral Disinformation. SmartVote, Cibervoluntarios. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.17630444 2 Table of Contents Executive Summary ................................................................................................................................................................................. 5 1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................................................................................... 9 1.1. Regarding SmartVote.................................................................................................................................................................. 9 1.2. Considering the Iberian context .........................................................................................................................................10 2. State of electoral disinformation in Spain and Portugal ..............................................................................................18 2.1. Gauging the relationship to news, political mobilization and disinformation .........................................18 2.1.1. Sources of news and political information ...........................................................................................................18 2.1.2. Trust, interest and avoidance.....................................................................................................................................23 2.1.3. Perceptions and attitudes towards disinformation ....................................................................................... 31 2.1.4. Activism and mobilisation ...........................................................................................................................................33 2.2. Disinformation narratives in Portuguese and Spanish elections ................................................................. 35 2.2.1. Spain ......................................................................................................................................................................................... 37 2.2.2. Portugal ...................................................................................................................................................................................41 2.2.3. Iberian outlook on disinformation trends .......................................................................................................... 43 References.................................................................................................................................................................................................. 49 3 List of Figures and Tables Table 1. Main aspects of political and territorial organisation in Spain and Portugal ....................................... 11 Table 2. List of elections in Spain and Portugal, 2019 to 2027 .......................................................................................... 13 Figure 1. Political polarisation in the European Union, Spain and Portugal, 2000 to 2024 ..............................15 Figure 2. Main sources for news, Spain and Portugal, 2024 .............................................................................................18 Figure 3. Main gateway to online news, Spain and Portugal, 2024 ........................................................................... 20 Figure 4. Use of algorithmic tools as the main gateway to news, Spain and Portugal, 2024 ...................... 21 Figure 5. Social Media usage for news, 18-24's, Spain and Portugal, 2024 ............................................................ 22 Figure 6. Trust in news in general, Spain and Portugal, 2015 to 2024 ........................................................................23 Figure 7. Net trust, Global (48 country comparison), 2024............................................................................................. 24 Figure 8. Trust in news in general - 18 to 24, Spain and Portugal, 2015 to 2024 .................................................. 26 Figura 9. Trust by age group, Spain and Portugal, 2024 ................................................................................................... 27 Figure 10. Interest in news, Spain and Portugal, 2015 to 2024 ........................................................................................ 28 Figure 11. Interest in news - 18 to 24, Spain and Portugal, 2015 to 2024.................................................................... 29 Figure 12. News avoiders, Spain and Portugal, 2024 ........................................................................................................... 30 Figure 13. Concern about what is real or fake online, Portugal and Spain, 2020 to 2024 ............................... 31 Figure 14. Concern about what is real or fake online , 18-24, Portugal and Spain, 2020 to 2024 ...............32 Figure 15. Interest in politics, Spain and Portugal, 2015 to 2024 ................................................................................... 34 Table 3. Main frameworks and narratives linked to electoral disinformation during general elections in Spain between 2019 and 2024 ................................................................................................................................................... 40 Table 4. Disinformation topics: "Have you seen false or misleading information about any of the following topics, in the last week?" (Multiple choice), Global, Portugal and Spain, 2024 ............................. 44 Table 5. Disinformation topics: "Have you seen false or misleading information about any of the following topics, in the last week? (Multiple choice) - Country samples and 18-24, Portugal and Spain, 2024 ................................................................................................................................................................................................. 45 Figure 16. Instagram posts by Portugal's Chega party and Spain's VOX party on the Islamisation of Europe, 2024 ...............................................................................................................................................................................................47 Executive Summary 5 Executive Summary This report provides a comparative state-of-the-art analysis of disinformation in Spain and Portugal, examining its systemic manifestations, underlying dynamics, and institutional responses, as well as its electoral implications. Both countries, while sharing a common Iberian context, present distinct patterns in terms of intensity, actors involved, and societal impact. The findings underline structural vulnerabilities that make both democracies susceptible to manipulation, while also pointing to differences in scale, political salience, and regulatory development. Upon analysis, we identified a specific overarching feature, common to both countries -18-24’s display remarkably different behaviors and perceptions compared to the rest of the population and this is especially true regarding younger men. Below we list the key-take aways from this report, observing the Iberian landscape in terms of consistent patterns, country specific trends and, finally, a detailed look at the 18-24 demographic, where we list key data points which better illustrate the needs and expectations of this group. Common Patterns at the Iberian scale o European Context and Exposure: both Spain and Portugal are embedded in the wider European information environment, which exposes them to cross-border disinformation campaigns and narratives circulating through social media platforms. The porous nature of the online space means that narratives originating in other European countries or globally (e.g., Russian propaganda, pandemic-related conspiracy theories) circulate seamlessly across Iberia. o Platform Dependency: citizens in both countries rely heavily on platforms such as Facebook, WhatsApp, YouTube, and increasingly TikTok for news consumption. This dependency amplifies vulnerabilities to algorithmic amplification of misleading or polarising content. Messaging apps in particular represent a closed ecosystem where fact-checking and monitoring are limited. o Challenges of Media Literacy: limited levels of digital literacy remain a structural challenge in both Spain and Portugal. Citizens often lack the tools to critically assess online information, increasing susceptibility to false or misleading claims. Public investment in media literacy initiatives has been modest, and fragmented across institutions. o Fact-Checking Ecosystem: both countries have developed active fact-checking organisations (e.g., Maldita and Newtral in Spain, Polígrafo in Portugal), often integrated into wider European networks. They play a central role in debunking viral falsehoods, yet face resource limitations and difficulty countering the speed and scale of disinformation flows. o Weak Signals of Foreign Interference: while no systematic large-scale campaigns directly targeting Spain or Portugal have been confirmed, there are weak signals of interference and opportunistic use of Iberian audiences by foreign actors. Both countries are therefore not insulated from global disinformation strategies. 6 Country specific trends and dynamics o Scale and Political Centrality: Spain experiences a higher volume and political salience of disinformation. Polarisation, particularly around Catalonia, immigration, and electoral competition, fuels a fertile ground for disinformation actors. Portugal, by contrast, records lower levels of political polarisation, and disinformation remains a less central feature of political life. o Actors and Narratives: In Spain, partisan actors and far-right movements actively produce and disseminate disinformation, exploiting identity-based and territorial fault lines. Narratives often focus on delegitimising institutions and fostering distrust. In Portugal, disinformation is less tied to mainstream political actors, and tends to revolve around global issues (e.g., health, climate, conspiracies) rather than domestic political conflicts. o Institutional Responses: Spain has taken more visible steps in aligning with European Union initiatives on disinformation, including regulatory debates and parliamentary inquiries. Portugal’s institutional response has been more reactive and less centralised, relying mainly on independent organisations and limited state engagement. o Media System Dynamics: Spain’s larger, more fragmented media landscape creates a fertile environment for competing narratives and polarised debates, amplifying the visibility of disinformation. Portugal’s smaller and more concentrated media system provides some insulation, though economic fragility in the sector may pose risks in the medium term. Younger Iberians and their relationship to news and disinformation Spain o Main news source: 18–24s lean much more toward social media than TV as their primary source (≈41% social vs. 26% TV), while the overall adult population is more balanced across sources. o Trust in news: Sharp generation gap. Only 19% of 18–24s say they trust “most news most of the time,” vs. roughly one-third in the full sample. o Interest in news: Lower among youth (≈34% interested) compared with about 52% in the overall population. o News avoidance: Youth avoid more often (≈43% among 18–24s) while overall avoidance is ≈37%. Male–female differences among youth are small. o Concern about online falsehoods: Lower for 18–24s (≈63% concerned) than for the overall public (≈70%). o Topics where youth see more disinformation (self-reported, last week): 18–24s—especially young men—report higher exposure than the national average, notably on politics and COVID-19. 7 Portugal o Main news source: Among 18–24s, TV and social media are neck-and-neck as the main source (≈30% TV vs. 31% social), unlike older groups where TV leads more clearly. o Trust in news: No major youth gap—about 53% of 18–24s trust the news, close to the overall level (~56%). o Interest in news: Lower among youth (≈32%) vs. ≈51% overall. o News avoidance: Youth avoid less than the overall public (≈35% vs. ≈38% overall). There is a gender gap among youth: men avoid more (38%) than women (31%). o Concern about online falsehoods: Lower among 18–24s (≈60%) than the overall public (≈72%). o Topics where youth see more disinformation (self-reported, last week): 18–24s—especially young men—report relatively higher exposure on immigration, COVID-19, and cost of living than the national average. Cross-cutting youth specifics (both countries) o Algorithmic gateways & social feeds: 18–24s rely more on algorithmic gateways (social, search, video/podcasts) than older adults; within youth, young women are especially likely to cite social media as the main gateway (pattern seen in both countries). o Interest vs. trust: Youth show lower interest than the overall population in both countries, but the trust gap is much larger in Spain than in Portugal (where youth trust remains relatively high). o Self-reported exposure to disinformation: 18–24s—particularly men—more often say they’ve seen false or misleading content in the last week, with topic patterns differing by country (Spain: politics/COVID-19; Portugal: immigration/COVID-19/cost of living). o Political interest by gender: Among 18–24s, men report notably higher interest in politics than women in both countries (Spain: 33% vs. 16%; Portugal: 28% vs. 15%). Disinformation constitutes a shared democratic vulnerability in both Spain and Portugal, sustained by structural factors such as platform dependency, weak media literacy, and limited institutional capacity. Yet, the phenomenon is more acute in Spain, where disinformation intersects with high political polarisation and partisan mobilisation. Portugal faces fewer immediate risks, but the persistence of global conspiracy theories and limited investment in systemic countermeasures leave it vulnerable to future shocks. A comparative view highlights the need for both countries to strengthen media literacy, invest in sustainable fact-checking infrastructures, and enhance coordination with European frameworks. Spain’s experience demonstrates the destabilising effects of disinformation in a polarised environment, while Portugal illustrates the risks of underestimating structural vulnerabilities in a less polarised society. 1. Introduction 15 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 Figure 1. Political polarisation in the European Union, Spain and Portugal, 2000 to 2024 Source: Coppedge et al. (2025). Varieties of Democracy Project (V-Dem). Edition: OberCom / SmartVote. In Portugal, political polarisation levels remained stable and low ever since the beginning of the millenium, starting to rise around 2019 / 2020 and almost matching polarisation levels in the EU and Spain in 2024. The creation of farright populist party Chega in 2019, the saturation with the saturation with the long standing rule of Partido Socialista (center / center left) and the pandemic which started in 2020 may play a considerable role in this new stage of the country’s evolution in terms of political polarisation. Negative behaviors towards politics, elections, and participation are also common among young people in both countries, with voter turnout being lower in this demographic. In the 2009 European elections in Spain, approximately 65% of young people abstained from voting (Bouza, 2014) although in other instances spaniards below 25 have been known to mobilise in particularly sensitive moments - in the 2019 European elections voter turnout increased by 14 pp. compared to previous elections (European Parliament, 2022). 16 In Portugal, researchers highlight that absenteeism is becoming a habit among young people below 35, in particular in the 18-24 demographic (Durães, 2024), and that extremist parties on the left and right are the only ones able to mobilise young or inactive voters. While this trend may be identified in both countries, in Spain there have been significant shifts among the Spanish youth, with rising antifeminism speech and nostalgia for authoritarianism (Jones, 2025). In both countries, and despite above and aforementioned differences, factors influencing youth electoral participation can be summed in: the feeling that politics does not represent their interests, decreased interest in politics at all, economic insecurity, unemployment and low job security than previous generations, and differences in territorial perceived identity (much more pronounced in Spain, where regional identity often shadows national and European identity). Both countries have gone and are going through drastic digitalisation via platformisation in recent years. Portuguese people consecutively display high levels of trust in news but trust in news rates drop considerably in digital environments, and Spanish media operate in a more polarised environment, with growing presence of partisan digital ecosystems. Albeit less polarised, and with more moderate political discourse, there is increased concern regarding echo-chambers associated with the rise of far-right political relevance. Considering the response to disinformation at a governmental and political level, Spain has developed a more solid response structure, like the Forum Against Disinformation Campaigns, an interministerial working group in alignment with European security strategies (Vicente, 2023). 2 Portugal, on the other hand, has taken a softer approach based on the guarantee of rights and freedoms with a strong emphasis on freedom of expression with less centralised actions against disinformation (Assembleia da República, 2021, Pardal & Narciso, 2023). These ongoing dynamics happen in a very specific context in 2025, with heightened political shifts at a global level and the development of AI at a rapid pace, with fears of it being used as a disinformation amplifier, with higher potential for microtargeting voters, a regulatory framework that is still lacking, and a media ecosystem still learning to maximise the opportunities of AI in fact-checking and content moderation. 2 See: https://www.dsn.gob.es/foro-desinfo 2. State of electoral disinformation in Spain and Portugal 18 38% 26% 30% 21% 53% 30% 34% 27% 24% 22% 22% 21% 22% 27% 24% 30% 23% 41% 36% 47% 16% 31% 29% 32% 6% 6% 4% 8% 4% 5% 5% 6% 9% 6% 8% 3% 7% 7% 9% 5% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% Spain ES 18-24 ES Men 1824's ES Women 18-24's Portugal PT 18-24 PT Men 1824's PT Women 18-24's TV Online (Exc. Social media) Social Media Printed Radio 2. State of electoral disinformation in Spain and Portugal 2.1. Gauging the relationship to news, political mobilization and disinformation 2.1.1. Sources of news and political information In Spain, social media is the top source for information on political and social issues (42%) with TV running a close second (39%). About one in four respondents access news via online media and / or news platforms (26%), friends, family or colleagues (25%) and video platforms (European Parliament, 2025). While data for Spain follows a closer pattern to the one displayed by other Europeans, prioritizing social media over TV (49% over 44%). Flash Eurobarometer data for Portugal points in the same direction as other sources, such as the Digital News Report, with TV prevailing over social media by 13 pp. —53% against 40% (European Parliament, 2025). Figure 2. Main sources for news, Spain and Portugal, 2024 Source: Digital News Report España 2024, Digital News Report Portugal 2024 Edition: OberCom / SmartVote. n≃2000 in both countries. 19 Digital News Report data also points towards these trends although with added nuance (Figure 1). In the case of Portugal, the proportion of 18-24’s who rely primarily on TV for news is about the same as those who prefer social media (30% and 31%, respectively) while in the case of Spain the differences are considerable, of 41% against 26%, as seen in Figure 1 (Cardoso, et al., 2024, Novoa-Jaso et al., 2024). In line with the general trends regarding news sources, the majority of young people (56%) use social media to stay informed about the European Union, specifically, although about half the sample of the Youth and Democracy report also use TV to stay on top of EU related news (European Commission, 2024). Interestingly, there is also a significant proportion of people (33%) using either online media, podcasts and / or news platforms, which suggests that this particular demographic resorts to multiple sources to stay up-to-date in regards to Europe related news. Although there are methodological aspects to consider, such as the difference in age of analyzed respondents (Flash Eurobarometer reports covers 16-30’s and DNR 18-24’s) or the difference in questioning (first asks about what sources people use, the second one asks respondents to point out the main one), the Digital News Report data allows for a slightly more detailed view of the 18-24 age bracket. Spanish young women are much more likely to use social media over TV than the general sample or than men – 47% use mainly social media against 21% who prefer TV. In the Portuguese case, it is the male 18-24 bracket that stands out, as seen in the general sample, young men prefer TV over social media. In Portugal’s case, despite the higher adoption rates of social media in general and for news by younger people, the preference for TV is the same as that identified among older individuals (Cardoso et al., 2024). Access to digital news in both countries is different in some aspects (Figure 2, next page). Direct access to news websites is at an all-time low, with only 15% and 16% of access to online news in Spain and Portugal happening directly. The importance of search also appears to be similar, with about one third of accesses in Spain, and slightly less in Portugal, happening via search engines (either by searching for a brand or a keyword associated with the news) (Cardoso et al., 2024, Novoa-Jaso et al., 2024). However, we do find some differences when it comes to social media, which is more prevalent in Spain (28% of accesses) than in Portugal (20%). The Portuguese have more fragmented habits in this instance, opting in larger proportion to other forms of access to digital news content such as e-mail newsletters (9% vs. 5% in Spain) or mobile alerts (17% against 8%, respectively). 20 15% 12% 13% 10% 16% 9% 10% 7% 31% 29% 35% 22% 29% 29% 28% 30% 10% 9% 9% 10% 7% 11% 12% 10% 28% 36% 29% 44% 20% 30% 24% 35% 5% 1% 3% 9% 7% 10% 4% 8% 11% 11% 11% 17% 12% 14% 9% 3% 2% 3% 3% 2% 2% 5% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% Spain ES 18-24 ES Men 1824's ES Women 18-24's Portugal PT 18-24 PT Men 1824's PT Women 18-24's Direct access to a website or app Search engine (searched a brand name or a keyword) News aggregator website or app Social Media Email newsletter / alert Mobile alert Other / DK Figure 3. Main gateway to online news, Spain and Portugal, 2024 Source: Digital News Report España 2024, Digital News Report Portugal 2024. Edition: OberCom / SmartVote. n≃2000 in both countries. Looking at the habits of 18-24’s in both countries, it is visible that younger women are much keener on social media for news (44%) than men (29%), the latter preferring either search entries or direct access (35% and 13%, against 22% and 10% in women). Differences in the proportion between young women and men using social media as the main gateway for news are as pronounced in Portugal as in Spain (35% and 44%, respectively). As for the fragmentation among lateral forms of access, we find that this is truer in younger men than women, as male 18-24’s are more likely to access news using e-mail newsletters or mobile alerts (10% and 14% against 4% and 9%). (Cardoso et al., 2024, Novoa-Jaso et al., 2024). 21 66% 71% 71% 79% 56% 65% 60% 71% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% Spain ES 18-24 ES Men 1824's ES Women 18-24's Portugal PT 18-24 PT Men 1824's PT Women 18-24's Figure 4. Use of algorithmic tools as the main gateway to news, Spain and Portugal, 2024 Source: Digital News Report España 2024, Digital News Report Portugal 2024. Edition: OberCom / SmartVote. n≃2000 in both countries. Looking at an aggregation of all algorithmic tools which may be used to access online news, it is visible that these tools are more common in Spain than in Portugal and, also, that 18-24’s are more likely to rely on these than the overall population. However, this is particularly true when it comes to young women, who rely more on gateways such as social media for news gathering than men —44% against 29% in Spain and 35% against 24% in Portugal. The composition of social media diets is also distinct in both countries, notwithstanding the fact that both the Spanish and Portuguese societies are pronouncedly multi-network when it comes to using social media as a way of accessing news. 22 10% 17% 31% 21% 31% 33% 20% 21% 19% 14% 30% 17% 3% 6% 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 45% 50% Spain Portugal Facebook X Instagram Youtube Whatsapp TikTok Facebook Messenger Figure 5. Social Media usage for news, 18-24's, Spain and Portugal, 2024 Source: Digital News Report España 2024, Digital News Report Portugal 2024. Edition: OberCom / SmartVote. n≃2000 in both countries. Instagram is now the most common source of news regarding political and social issues (47%) followed by TikTok (39%) and YouTube (37%) in Europe. X and WhatsApp are used by lower proportions of young people – 21% and 16% (European Parliament, 2024). Other research covering Portugal suggests a higher prevalence of Instagram as well, but of YouTube and X ranking considerably lower. Data for Spain shows a much more fragmented social media landscape among young people, with Instagram, X, and YouTube having similar weight in news consumption. 23 34% 43% 51% 44% 43% 36% 36% 32% 33% 33% 66% 60% 58% 62% 58% 57% 61% 61% 58% 56% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2.1.2. Trust, interest and avoidance Analyzed in parallel, data on trust, interest in news, and news avoidance for Spain and Portugal highlight both similarities and differences. When it comes to the objective evaluation of the state of the information and journalistic ecosystem, Portugal ranks historically high in the Press Freedom Index (6th out of 180 countries), whereas Spain is ranked 30th, due to the contamination of media environments by political polarisation and lower trust in journalism. Portugal, on the other hand, is less polarized, but journalists and media brands face economic, legal, and security challenges (Reporters Without Borders, 2024). Figure 6. Trust in news in general, Spain and Portugal, 2015 to 2024 Source: Digital News Report España 2024, Digital News Report Portugal 2024. Edition: OberCom / SmartVote. n≃2000 in both countries. Note: % values represent people who agree or totally agree with the statement "I think you can trust most news most of the time". Digital News Report data underlines the stark difference between both countries, trust-wise. 56% of Portuguese people say they trust the news, compared to a third of the Spanish respondents in the same report (Cardoso et al., 2024, Novoa-Jaso et al., 2024). The trust rate for Spain fell considerably from the 51% reported in 2017. As for Portugal, over the past ten years they have witnessed a 10 pp. decline from the 66% in 2015. 24 Figure 7. Net trust, Global (48 country comparison), 2024 Source: Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2024, Digital News Report España 2024, Digital News Report Portugal 2024. Edition: OberCom / SmartVote. Country samples n=2000. Note: Net trust is the difference between the % of people who claim to trust the news in general and the % of people who claim to distrust the news. This difference is presented in percentage points. In the global outlook, the iberian contrast in terms of trust in news is even more evident. Considering net trust, i.e., the proportion of citizens who say they trust the news in relation to the ones who do not, the portuguese situation is remarkably positive by comparison with Spain. 53 47 44 43 40 38 37 35 35 34 33 26 25 22 20 19 17 15 14 14 14 13 12 12 11 8 7 6 5 3 2 Finland Denmark Thailand Nigeria South Africa Singapore Sweden Ireland Germany Malaysia Brazil GLOBAL Philippines Australia Republic of Korea UK 0 0 -1 -4 -5 -6 -6 -7 -7 -7 -7 -8 -8 -10 -13 -17 -17 Mexico Czech Republic Colombia Morocco Turkey Argentina U.S.A. Slovakia Greece 31 69% 68% 65% 67% 62% 64% 70% 71% 75% 76% 76% 71% 71% 72% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2.1.3. Perceptions and attitudes towards disinformation Perceptions and attitudes towards disinformation are particularly complex to gauge, as they are highly volatile and permeable to subjective interpretations and the differences between knowledge systems, beliefs, and perceptions of wider social and political phenomena. As such, country comparisons based on perceived disinformation, its volume, range, and topics must always be equated with the specific national context. As mentioned in the introduction, in the Iberian case, there are stark differences in terms of politics, territorial organization, and administration, and also at a cultural, social and historical level. Figure 13. Concern about what is real or fake online, Portugal and Spain, 2020 to 2024 Source: Digital News Report España 2024, Digital News Report Portugal 2024. Edition: OberCom / SmartVote. n≃2000 in both countries. Note: % values represent people who strongly agree or tend to agree that they are concerned about what is real and what is fake on the internet. 32 56% 55% 56% 63% 66% 54% 65% 60% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 2021 2022 2023 2024 Despite these differences, a similar trend is observed on the perception of disinformation measured by the concern about online disinformation, with the wider national samples revealing higher concern compared to their younger subsets of respondents: about 7 out of 10 people in Spain and Portugal (70% and 72%) are concerned about what is real and fake online whereas concern rates for 18-24’s is at 63% and 60%, respectively. European Commission data (2018) mentions that about 80% of Spaniards often find news that distorts reality or is false, and the same proportion says that disinformation is a problem in Spain, and 83% believe disinformation is a problem for democracy. As for Portugal, 75% claim to encounter disinformation frequently, a proportion similar to the one in Digital News Report data. Figure 14. Concern about what is real or fake online, 18-24, Portugal and Spain, 2020 to 2024 Source: Digital News Report España 2024, Digital News Report Portugal 2024. Edition: OberCom / SmartVote. n≃2000 in both countries. Note: % values represent people who strongly agree or tend to agree that they are concerned about what is real and what is fake on the internet. 33 Concern about disinformation is lower among younger individuals in both countries, and younger people also tend to state, in a higher proportion, to not be worried about online disinformation. Concern also tends to be higher among those with higher education and wages. Despite the weight of sociodemographic factors in explaining concern about disinformation, a set of other factors appears to be determinant: high interest and high trust in news, especially when combined, are among the stronger predictors of awareness regarding disinformation (Novoa-Jaso et al., 2024, Cardoso et al., 2024). 2.1.4. Activism and mobilisation Unlike most EU countries, Spanish and Portuguese young people value freedom of speech and thought higher than the protection of human rights, democracy, and peace – EU 41% vs. 45%, Spain 46% vs. 44%, and Portugal 49% vs. 51%. European young women are more likely than their male counterparts to value the protection of human rights, democracy and peace, gender equality, tolerance and respect for diversity in society, the fight against discrimination, and the protection of minorities (European Parliament, 2025). Although young people are very active in participating in a wide range of organizations, participation in societal change actions is slightly lower – 64% have engaged in activities in at least one organization, whereas 48% have mobilized in actions to change society. These include signing petitions, participating in rallies, or contacting politicians (European Commission, 2024). European Parliament data (2025) also highlights the importance of human rights and climate change as triggers for activism among younger Europeans. Although these rank close to issues such as health/well-being or rights equality in gender, race or sexuality highlighting the fragmented concerns across different topics, complementary European Commission data (2024) suggests that young people are also concerned about topics such as inflation, the economy (namely employment) and social protection, even if these particular issues are not sufficient to trigger effective action and social or political participation. In Spain and Portugal, data on young activism follows EU trends closely, both in terms of the size of said participation and the causes which motivate it. However, there are slight differences between both: while Portugal stands closer to the EU averages, in Spain the issues related to equality, either of gender, race or sexuality, are at the top of mind among the Spanish youth, outranking themes such as human rights or climate change – close to one in every four young people in Spain claim to be motivated to action by equalitarian causes (38%), about the same proportion in Portugal are mobilized by human rights (39%). It should be noticed that despite having their social and political interests divided among several issues, some topics may be more influential in shaping youth activism and/or political participation such as mental health, an issue that has personally impacted more than 46% of young people in the recent past (European Commission, 2024), and public debate and attention is also growing. 34 30% 25% 33% 16% 27% 22% 28% 15% 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 45% 50% Spain Spain 1824 Spain Men 18-24 Spain Women 1824 Portugal Portugal 18-24 Portugal Men 18-24 Portugal Women 1824 The dynamics surrounding overall interest in politics point towards considerably higher interest in young 18 to 24 men compared to the overall age group and women: in Spain, 33% of young men claim to be interested in politics, against 16% of women, and in Portugal we find a similar situation, in proportions of 28% and 15%, respectively. Figure 15. Interest in politics, Spain and Portugal, 2015 to 2024 Source: Digital News Report España 2024, Digital News Report Portugal 2024. Edition: OberCom / SmartVote. n≃2000 in both countries. Note: % values represent people who say they are extremely and very interested in politics. Historical analysis of voter turnout suggests that in most countries women have lower voter turnout compared to men (Portugal is a particularly representative case for this), even though in some specific cases, such as Sweden in particular, and Scandinavia in general, women tend to largely outperform men in electoral turnout (Rapp & Schweizer, 2024). As the influence of identity and belonging becomes more complex, so does the ability to identify the motivations for mobilization and voting, as these depend not only on personal characteristics but also on social, cultural, historical, and economic factors that influence context and are changed by it. 35 For instance, despite being recognizably favorable towards the European Union (64% say they are), 32% of young people argue that despite being favorable, they do not agree with the way Europe works presently, and evidence suggests that national and country identity remains the key factor for personal attachment (32%), and European identity are less strong in these terms (15% say they are attached to Europe). Geographical and political aspects also matter. Despite having joined the European Union at the same time, in 1986, and having about the same proportion of young people declaring to feel attached to Europe – 14% in Spain and 15% in Portugal – the feeling of belonging to the local and regional community is much higher in Spain (26% against 18%) and the attachment to national identity stronger in Portugal (37% compared to 28%). Regardless of whatever aspects lead to mobilization, the most common forms of participation are voting in any election (39%), followed by creating or signing petitions (on paper or online) (26%). Actions such as volunteering for a charity or campaign, sharing your opinion online, or boycotting certain products are less common, mentioned by about 1 in every 5 individuals. A percentage of 15% are total absentees, claiming to not engage in any way with any of the activities, and specific data on absenteeism during the June 2024 European election shows that having other commitments is the most common reason to have skipped the vote (16%), followed by the lack of information to support a choice (16%) and the absence of a candidate that reflects their views (15%). Also, 15% display general distrust or dissatisfaction with politicians and politics (European Parliament, 2024). 2.2. Disinformation narratives in Portuguese and Spanish elections The topic of disinformation in election campaigns has become increasingly important, especially after the 2016 presidential election in the United States (Faris et al., 2017), where it was suspected that foreign disinformation may have influenced the election result (Bovet & Makse, 2019). Since 2016, disinformation in elections has been described as a recurring phenomenon (Bader, 2018), with studies pointing to incidents in the Brexit referendum (Cervi & CarrilloAndrade, 2019), during the Covid-19 pandemic (European Commission, 2020), but also in various elections in several European countries, including the UK (Vaccari et al., 2023), Italy (Pierri et al., 2020) France (Ferrara, 2017), Germany (Zimmermann & Kohring, 2020) and also Spain (Paniagua-Rojano et al., 2020; Cano-Óron et al., 2021; Maldita,, 2023) and Portugal (Cardoso et al., 2020; Baptista & Gradim, 2022; Casquinho et al., 2024a; Casquinho et al., 2024b). In an electoral context, disinformation campaigns usually involve the repetition of false information, the manipulation of news, studies, and polls, as well as the general discrediting of political opponents (Bader, 2018; Bendiek & Schulze, 2019). When disinformation directly targets political candidates, it often involves fabricated statements, personal relationships, and policies, while stories about parties tend to revolve around proposals, secret alliances, and supposed beneficiaries of policies (Magallón-Rosa et al., 2019). As Paniagua-Rojano et al. (2020) note, stories about electoral disinformation are sometimes reproduced across multiple elections and in different countries. 36 Contextually, as Zimmermann & Kohring (2020) have shown, the less people trust the news media and politics in election campaigns, the more they tend to believe in disinformative content. It has also been observed that receiving campaign news from professional news organizations correlates with the ability to distinguish true from false information (Vaccari et al., 2023). Overall, it is important to emphasize the danger that disinformation can have in elections by influencing results, but also by inflicting several structural effects, such as “(…) the polarisation of society or distrust in and delegitimization of democratic processes and institutions.” (Departamento de Seguridad Nacional, 2022, pp.5-6.) From a conceptual point of view, the study of disinformation in election campaigns requires a clear definition of disinformation. In this report, we follow the definition proposed by the European Union’s High-Level Group of Experts (HLEG), which defines disinformation as “the creation, presentation and dissemination of verifiably false or misleading information for the purposes of economic gain or intentionally deceiving the public, and which may cause public harm”. Despite the general adaptability of the definition proposed by the HLEG, we believe it is important to also consider the categorization proposed by Wardle and Derakhshan (2017), which specifies that misinformation is shared without the intention to cause harm; disinformation is deliberately created and disseminated with the intention to deceive; and malinformation is based on reality but decontextualized to cause harm. Furthermore, in this report, we tend to avoid terms such as “fake news” as they are generally ambiguous and lack conceptual development. Many authors have approached this term (Tandoc et al., 2018; Coady, 2019 Dentith, 2017; Gelfert, 2018, Lilleker, 2017, Meinert et al., 2018) and generally conclude that it is somewhat convoluted, used as a “catch-all term” (Lilleker, 2017) and often employed by political actors and their supporters as a means to suppress opinions that contradict them and to degrade their opposition, as well as media organizations. As mentioned in the introduction to this report, this chapter will mainly focus on electoral disinformation studies conducted online. Overall, interest in social media, particularly Twitter/X, in the analysis of political campaigns increased after the Obama campaign in the 2008 presidential election in the United States, which was recognized for its success in mobilizing voters (Maarek, 2014). Despite the possibilities of social media, it is often observed that political representatives do not employ these platforms to interact directly with their supporters but rather pursue a general informational strategy (López-Garcia et al., 2016; Waisbord & Amado, 2017, Magallón-Rosa et al., 2019). Regardless of this, the online activities of politicians during political campaigns generally increase as the campaign draws to a close (Maarek, 2014, López-Garcia et al., 2016). Studies on disinformation on the Internet during elections have shown that identifying false narratives is not always an easy process. As Casquinho et al. (2024a) note, the distinction between what is disinformation and merely freedom of expression can be difficult to access and may be conditioned by an individual’s political preference. Additionally, Cano-Óron et al. (2021) conclude that distinguishing between advertising, propaganda, and disinformation on social media can be a difficult exercise. 37 Previously, it has been suggested that disinformation, especially in relation to politics, spreads more quickly on social media (Vosoughi et al., 2018) and that these platforms can contribute to the development of echo chambers and filter bubbles (Colleoni et al., 2014; Saurwein & Spencer-Smith, 2021). Furthermore, the use of social media platforms as a source of political campaign news seems to be related to the difficulty of distinguishing between true and false information (Vaccari et al., 2023). This conjecture makes social media platforms a fundamental object of study to understand and prevent the spread of disinformation, especially during elections. In the following subsections, we will present different studies that analyze disinformation in elections in the Portuguese context and then in the Spanish context. After these first separate analyses, we will offer a comparative perspective to understand the differences and similarities regarding electoral disinformation in both countries. 2.2.1. Spain In Spain, the number of studies on elections in social media has increased since the 2010’s, with Twitter in particular being a frequent object of study because of the former access to Twitter Api (Rivas-de-Roca et al., 2022). As far as political communication on social media during elections is concerned, we mainly find studies on general elections, but also some on regional elections and municipal elections. Overall, European elections tend to be a less prominent object of study (Rivas-de-Roca et al., 2022). In the 2019 elections, the main Spanish fact-checkers, Maldita and Newtral, established themselves as sources for verifying claims made by the candidates and as agents against rumors and hoaxes that spread on social media during the campaign. Otherwise, it is measurable that, in terms of verifications carried out by fact-checking organizations, the number of hoaxes and misinformation narratives circulating in the July 2023 general elections was much higher than in the 2019 elections. According to Maldita (2023), Spain has a history of disinformation during electoral seasons, particularly targeting the integrity of elections. Following a recommendation of the EU, in 2020, the Spanish Department of National Security set up a group of experts from civil society to work with representatives of public administration to combat and prevent disinformation, in order to ensure the protection and preservation of democratic values (Departamento de Seguridad Nacional, 2022). Overall, since around 2015, there has been an increase in studies that approached disinformation online (Rivas-de-Roca et al., 2022), especially during general elections (Paniagua-Rojano et al., 2020; Cano-Óron et al., 2021; Maldita, 2023). Studies on online political communication have shown that the volume of publications by both political and media agents tends to increase over the course of the election campaign, especially in the later stages. This applies to both general elections (López-Garcia et al., 2016; Maldita, 2023) and regional elections (Magallón-Rosa et al., 2019). 38 Television debates were also identified as a focus of discussion on Twitter in various elections (Paniagua-Rojano et al., 2020; Magallón-Rosa et al., 2019; Marcos-García, 2016; Rivas-de-Roca, 2021; Córdoba-Cabús et al., 2021). In fact, in the 2021 regional elections in Madrid, media coverage on Twitter focused mainly on campaign events and electoral debates (Córdoba-Cabús et al., 2021). As Marcos-García (2016) mentions, this reinforces the idea of convergence between media. However, in Rivas-deRoca's study on the regional elections in Galicia in 2020, the author highlights that the issues raised online by politicians do not always coincide with the issues raised in televised debates. Furthermore, despite the importance of televised debates, Magallón-Rosa et al. (2019) observed that discussions intensified even more on election day. Zamora-Medina & Zurutuza-Muñoz argued in 2014 that “(…) Spanish politicians have not yet understood that Twitter/X is a tool focused on the candidate as a person rather than as part of a political institution”. However, it is important to understand that, as mentioned by López-Garcia et al. (2016), there tends to be a difference between the way emerging and established parties use social media. As the authors pointed out during the 2015 general election, Podemos and its then leader Pablo Iglesias took a more conversational and interactive approach, in contrast to PP and PSOE, which used Twitter/X more institutionally. In this sense, it is also important to highlight that some studies have focused specifically on the way in which emerging parties use Twitter/X. Casero-Ripollés et al. (2017) also studied Podemos during the 2016 general elections and emphasized a complementary approach between the party and Pablo Iglesias. According to the authors, Iglesias focused mainly on relating to the people and building his image through personal topics, while the party's Twitter account addressed more ideological and political aspects. Aladro-Vico & RequeijoRey (2020) examined VOX’s online communication during the 2019 general elections and concluded that VOX uses “cult of law, nativism and closed group thinking” as its main strategies. Furthermore, the authors highlight how VOX's strategies encourage polarisation, at times adopting simplistic language and engaging in talks about a corrupt media ecosystem. Overall, online political communication in Spain during elections appears to be rapidly developing. As Calvo et al. (2019) point out, different campaign teams in Spain have confirmed that they are using new tools and strategies based on data extraction and automated messages during the elections. In this new ecosystem, it is fundamental to consistently study the patterns of political communication and keep up to date on potential problems, including disinformation practices. 39 In relation to online disinformation campaigns during the Spanish elections, Paniagua-Rojano et al. (2020) examined 37 hoaxes identified by fact-checkers Maldita and Newtral during the 2019 general elections and concluded that the electoral system was the main target of disinformation narratives. According to the authors, most of these hoaxes warned people about rigged ballots that would result in votes being declared invalid. The most common type of hoax was the false attribution of actions. However, there were also cases where images were misattributed, photos were manipulated and in one case a political candidate was impersonated. In the same election, Cano-Óron et al. (2021) examined disinformation in Facebook ads placed by political parties. The authors emphasize that while disinformation was unusual, it was not negligible. Moreover, it was mainly parties such as Ciudadanos and VOX that were behind the few ads that contained elements of disinformation. On the other hand, disinformation was only found to a small extent in the PP ads and not at all in the PSOE and IU ads. In this sense, the authors believe that, as already mentioned by Lopez-Garcia et al. (2016) in relation to political communication, there is also a difference in disinformation practices between established and new parties. With regard to the 2023 general elections, Maldita (2023) investigated the patterns of disinformation on social media platforms by analyzing 741 posts containing disinformation claims that were debunked in the course of the election. As in 2019 (Paniagua-Rojano et al., 2020), the electoral process was again a target of disinformation, with one in four posts (24%) relating to this topic. However, the authors highlight that this tendency increased to 40% in the week of the elections and 74% on the day of the elections, in a consolidated effort to discourage people from going to the polls. This time, postal voting was the main target of disinformation and not the ballot papers as in 2019. Maldita (2023) also conducted an analysis of hate speech in disinformation posts and found that 32% of these posts met the criteria for hate speech. As mentioned by the authors, 78% of the hate speech was related to racist content and mainly targeted racialized people and migrants, accusing them of taking advantage of government welfare, committing crimes, and imposing their views on others. Interestingly, Maldita (2023) also found that many of the disinformation narratives were amplified by political actors, which not only gave them greater reach but also enhanced their appearance of credibility. The authors conclude that PSOE, PP, VOX, and Sumar all contributed to the amplification of stories with disinformation elements. In Spanish electoral processes, we find three main axes on which disinformation circulates: axis candidates and proposals, axis electoral campaigns, and axis institutions linked to the State. 40 Table 3. Main frameworks and narratives linked to electoral disinformation during general elections in Spain between 2019 and 2024 Source: Magallon-Rosa (2024). Edition: OberCom / SmartVote. In the first case, we find fake images and videos, possible party agreements, measures in case of governing, etc. In the second axis, false statements and endorsements by international personalities, influencers, and celebrities, or false polls and information not published by the media. Finally, the third axis is linked to the role of the State and public companies regarding postal voting or disinformation related to the act of voting or the vote counting process. In any case, the most significant trend is the rise of misinformation related to postal voting. Axis Candidates and proposals Axis electoral campaign Axis: Institutions linked to the State Fake images and videos. Fake videos circulating on social media. Disinformation related to public companies like Correos, Renfe, etc. Deepfakes and slowed-down videos. False statements and endorsements by international personalities, influencers, and celebrities. Postal voting. Possible party agreements. False polls and information not published by the media. Disinformation related to the act of voting. Measures in case of governing. Trolls, bots, and WhatsApp chains. Disinformation about the vote counting process. False statements and fake post or tweets. False information related to rallies and/or demonstrations. Overseas voting. Candidates' links. Non-political actors participating in campaigns: billboards, NGOs, etc. Dissemination of false information about electoral legislation. False electoral program content. Consequences of the results (e.g., stock market crash). 47 Figure 16. Instagram posts by Portugal's Chega party and Spain's VOX party on the Islamisation of Europe, 2024 Source: Casquinho, M., Vasconcelos, A., Moreno, J., Cardoso, G., Palma, N., Paisana, M., Pinto-Martinho, A. (2024a). Europeias 2024 - Amplificação do discurso político online e desinformação em Portugal. Publicações OberCom. Previously, Belim (2020) had pointed out similarities between the online communication of VOX and Chega. Both parties present in-group favoritism to explore feelings of inclusion, with these types of posts receiving the most attention on social media (Belim, 2020). These publications by VOX and Chega appear to have similar objectives. Overall, this consensus suggests that narratives are increasingly shared between countries, leading to cohesion at a European and international level. 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Communication & Society, 27(1), 83-106. https://doi.org/10.15581/003.27.36005 DOI: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.17630444 CC BY 4.0 Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ This license requires that reusers give credit to the creator. It allows reusers to distribute, remix, adapt, and build upon the material in any medium or format, even for commercial purposes. BY: SmartVote / https://mysmartvote.org/