Does the Terrorism Prevention Branch prevent terrorism? Does the Terrorism Prevention Branch prevent terrorism? Assessing the role and impact of the UNODC's Terrorism Prevention Branch

Does the Terrorism Prevention Branch prevent terrorism? Assessing the role and impact of the UNODC’s Terrorism Prevention Branch June 2024 June 2024 Does the Terrorism Prevention Branch prevent terrorism? Assessing the role and impact of the UNODC’s Terrorism Prevention Branch Jordan Street and Ali Altiok Acknowledgements This discussion paper was written by Jordan Street and Ali Altiok. Invaluable advice and suggestions were provided by Tamara Duffey-Janser and Gabrielle Aron. Generous input was also provided by a number of United Nations staff from a range of different offices and postings, government representatives and independent experts. The paper was copyedited by Scott Yearsley and Martha Crowley, and designed by Jane Stevenson. Errors that remain are the authors’ own. Cover photo: A view of the sun rising behind Long Island City and the sculpture, ‘Good Defeats Evil’, by Zurab Tsereteli, in the north garden area of UN Headquarters. © UN Photo/Manuel Elías Abbreviations C/PVE Countering or preventing violent extremism CT Travel United Nations Countering Terrorist Travel CTC Counter-Terrorism Committee GCTS Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy GPML Global Program against Money Laundering, Proceeds of Crime, and the Financing of Terrorism HRC UN Human Rights Council HRDDP Human Rights Due Diligence Policy INTERPOL International Criminal Police Organization OHCHR Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights PTA Prevention of Terrorism Act (of Sri Lanka) PVE Preventing violent extremism TPB Terrorism Prevention Branch of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime UN United Nations UNCTED United Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate UNOCT United Nations Office of CounterTerrorism UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime UNSC United Nations Security Council UNSCR United Nations Security Council Resolution © Saferworld, June 2024. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without full attribution. Saferworld welcomes and encourages the utilisation and dissemination of the material included in this publication. Contents Executive summary ii 1 Introduction 1 1.1 Methodology 2 2 The Terrorism Prevention Branch 5 2.1 An Introduction to the TPB 5 2.2 Understanding the TPB’s mandate 5 BOX 1: Mandates of counter-terrorism6 related entities of the UN 2.3 The TPB’s portfolio 7 BOX 2: Serious potential human rights risks 8 with the CT Travel Programme? BOX 3: The rise of UNOCT 9 2.4 The TPB’s resources 9 BOX 4: Strength or weakness? Reliance on 10 voluntary funding 3 Good practices 13 3.1 Presence in the field 13 3.2 Expertise in criminal justice and the rule of law 14 3.3 Robust training and capacity-building 14 programming BOX 5: Gender and the new Global Programme 15 3.4 Application of UN Human Rights Due Diligence 15 Policy 3.5 Independent evaluations within UNODC 16 3.6 Transparency with donors 16 4 Shortcomings 19 4.1 Inconsistent engagement with civil society 19 and the wider community 4.2 Stretching expertise? 20 BOX 6: Civil society and the wider UN counter21 terrorism architecture 4.3 Is the ‘engage to change’ strategy apolitical 22 or not? 4.4 Lack of human rights monitoring and risks 23 of ‘blue-washing’ BOX 7: TPB support to Sri Lanka on counter24 terrorism 4.5 Measuring management success, not whether 26 terrorism is being prevented BOX 8: ‘Learn Better, Together’– Meta27 synthesis of UN counter-terrorism impacts 4.6 Insufficient external transparency 27 5 Dilemmas 31 5.1 Sticking to expertise vs staying relevant 31 5.2 Committing to an inclusive approach vs 32 staying close to authorities 5.3 Human rights as a calling card vs human 32 rights as compliance 6 Emerging conclusions 35 6.1 Recommendations 36 ii Executive summary The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime’s (UNODC) Terrorism Prevention Branch (TPB), based in Vienna, is responsible for an important mandate within the United Nations (UN) counterterrorism architecture, yet it receives less attention than other entities such as the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT) and the United Nations CounterTerrorism Executive Directorate (UNCTED). Its critical contributions, strengths, weaknesses and dilemmas in the evolving counter-terrorism landscape are mostly not known by the community working on UN counter-terrorism issues in New York and Geneva. By analysing the work of the TPB through the review of 64 documents and 31 interviews with UN staff, Member State representatives and independent experts on UN counter-terrorism issues, this discussion paper aims to bridge the gap between Vienna and New York and spark a conversation for knowledge exchange. There are many aspects that distinguish the TPB from more well-covered UN counter-terrorism entities. The TPB has an extensive field presence through UNODC’s global network, which enhances its capacity for contextually specific programming at the national and subnational level. It also benefits from UNODC’s expertise in criminal justice and the rule of law, which enables it to provide specialised legal assistance to Member States. For over two decades it has been offering robust training programmes and practical guides, which have been instrumental in developing national counterterrorism capabilities in line with the international conventions on terrorism and the obligations under UN Security Council Resolution 1373. The TPB’s work demonstrates a clear expertise in providing tailored capacity-building assistance and guidance to states on how to bring their counter-terrorism policies into line with the rule of law. What’s more, the fact that the TPB has independent experts evaluate its work is both rare and welcome within UN counter-terrorism architecture. The TPB has also shown solid application of the UN Human Rights Due Diligence Policy throughout much of its field presence. executive summary iii While we acknowledge the strengths of the work of the TPB, there appears to be significant room for improvement. The TPB’s engagement with civil society is inconsistent and lacks a clear strategy. While a new global programme expands the TPB’s programmatic footprint into the realms of countering and preventing violent extremism (C/PVE), there appears to be an uneasy fit with the expertise the TPB has cultivated over the years. Broadening its scope of engagement takes the Branch away from its core strengths in criminal justice and legal frameworks. The TPB clearly can do better to avoid the risk of misuse of the UN brand. The TPB pursues an ‘engage to change’ strategy even in cases where there is clearly no will on the part of authorities to respect human rights. This pushes the TPB to risk complicity in human rights abuses in the name of counter-terrorism, and potentially has a negative impact on the UN’s reputation. In addition, access to information by stakeholders and the public is limited by a lack of external transparency about the TPB’s activities and funding. Finally, evaluations of the TPB focus much more on management success rather than assessing whether it is contributing to outcomes that relate to the prevention of terrorism. Over the coming years, the TPB will face several critical dilemmas as it navigates its role within an increasingly competitive UN counter-terrorism architecture. One major dilemma for the TPB is to find the balance between its core expertise in criminal justice and the perceived need to remain relevant by expanding into C/PVE. To expand its donor base beyond its normal funders, the TPB risks diluting its strengths. Another dilemma for the TPB is its commitment to inclusive programming. The TPB credits much of its ability to implement successful projects to its close ties with state authorities. Engaging meaningfully with civil society will likely strain these relationships, as many civil society representatives in countries the TPB is operating in are critical of their governments’ counter-terrorism approaches. Lastly, the TPB will have to grapple with how to promote human rights as opposed to simply ensuring compliance. Its ‘engage to change’ strategy of working with governments regardless of their human rights records risks complicity in abuses and undermines the UN’s credibility. The TPB must decide whether to prioritise human rights advocacy– which could strain relations with some Member States– or to continue to occupy a neutral, ‘technical assistance’ role that, in many challenging contexts, will likely result in the obfuscation of human rights issues. Based on the findings, the discussion paper makes seven recommendations for the TPB to capitalise on its good practices, address its shortcomings and navigate the dilemmas it faces: 1. Move beyond human rights compliance 2. Develop a go/no-go framework to protect against blue-washing 3. Invest in dedicated senior capacity on human rights, gender and youth 4. Develop a civil society strategy 5. Produce a collaborative community engagement policy 6. Commit to inclusive programme evaluations 7. Embrace improved transparency The Vienna International Centre, where the United Nations Office in Vienna is located. © Jordan Street 1 In 2020, Saferworld published a discussion paper entitled A fourth pillar for the United Nations? The rise of counterterrorism.1 This research analysed the impact and potential risks of the growing counter-terrorism architecture at the United Nations (UN). ‘A fourth pillar’ focused primarily on the two institutions that are best known within the UN counter-terrorism architecture: the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT) and the United Nations CounterTerrorism Executive Directorate (UNCTED). It argued that the recent reforms by the UN Secretary-General and the subsequent rise of counter-terrorism within the UN was leading to a series of compromises that would begin to threaten the institution’s ability to uphold its Charter– potentially putting the effectiveness of its work for peace, rights and development on the line.2 Yet, throughout this discussion paper very little focus was reserved for another important part of the UN’s counterterrorism footprint, the Terrorism Prevention Branch (TPB) of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). There was good reason for this relative omission. The TPB, unlike other parts of the UN counterterrorism architecture, is not based in New York, nor had its role been particularly debated in recent counter-terrorism policy discussions at the General Assembly or Security Council. Unlike the rest of the counter-terrorism-focused UN entities, the TPB’s work primarily takes place in country, with programming at the national and subnational level. Despite this role as the entity with the primary capacity-building mandate in the UN counterterrorism architecture, a surprisingly limited amount of commentary or analysis exists on the TPB in comparison to the role of UNCTED and UNOCT. Indeed, the last comprehensive analysis on the role of the TPB, The UN Office on Drugs and Crime’s Terrorism Prevention Branch: Strengths and Challenges Ahead, was written by Eric Rosand for the Global Center on Cooperative Security in July 2009.3 Since then, there have been a few policy reports and papers that have referred to the TPB and noted its contribution to the implementation of the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy.4 Yet none of these reports have provided any sort of detailed analysis of the Branch’s work.5 Scholarship on the TPB’s effectiveness in its implementation of Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy has been similarly limited, with a scattering of references to the role and contribution of the TPB in a number of scholarly books.6 None of this commentary, however, has thoroughly looked at the strengths and weaknesses of the TPB, nor has it engaged in primary research activities to assess the effectiveness of the Branch’s activities at the national and sub-national level. The most informative research article on the TPB was published in the volume Research Handbook on International Law and Terrorism,7 edited by Professor Ben Saul– the current Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism. 1 Introduction 2 does the terrorism prevention branch prevent terrorism? The chapter in question was written by UNODC’s own staff describing the work of the TPB, and mainly summarised activities and outputs, without offering a deep critique or reflection on its shortcomings.8 Aside from this, the considerable lack of external assessment has created an air of opacity surrounding the TPB. Even donor governments have found themselves puzzled by the intricacies of its connections and coordination mechanisms with other UN counter-terrorism bodies, particularly the UNOCT.9 This lack of transparency permeates not only its relationships with donors and some parts of the UN system but also its engagement with civil society, where the culture of inclusion and partnership remains ad hoc at best, and absent at worst. The minimal attention across the policy community to the role and impact of the TPB within the wider UN counter-terrorism architecture raises questions, considering the importance of the TPB’s work in global counter-terrorism efforts. To address this gap in the policy and scholarly literature, this discussion paper offers a critical assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the TPB. It maps out several current dilemmas for the TPB before offering recommendations to address observed shortcomings. It is intended to start a wider conversation about the efficacy of different parts of the wider UN counter-terrorism architecture and is by no means to be treated as an exhaustive study. 1.1 Methodology This paper is based on two main strands: n A review of available literature covering more than 64 documents, including past UN resolutions, Secretary-General reports, evaluations, audits, guidelines, statements by interested parties, independent studies and articles. n Semi-structured interviews and consultations with people and organisations working on UN counterterrorism policy and practice or related fields. There were 31 interviews/consultations in total, including with Member State representatives, UN officials working across a range of relevant institutions, and the remainder with independent experts. Interviews were a mixture of in-person and virtual. The authors accurately cite interviewees’ feedback on the issues covered, representing the spectrum of opinion encountered in a balanced and fair way. The study preserves interviewees’ anonymity in all cases, in order to allow for frank sharing of opinions. Interviewees’ views are not necessarily to be taken as indicative of wider thinking across the UN or among Member States. This research had limitations based on the original scope of inquiry. Due to limited resources, we were not able to speak with representatives from recipient or host governments. The discussion paper mentions some practices observed at the country level, but does not represent a comprehensive overview of all the contributions and challenges of the TPB across its field presence. Further and more comprehensive country-level research is needed to shed light on the critical roles that the TPB and its field officers play in programme implementation. the terrorism prevention branch 9 2.4 The TPB’s resources The budget of the TPB from the UN’s regular funds has remained steady for over two decades, having received only a minor budget increase from the UN’s assessed regular budget for its headquarters staff in 2002, when the mandate of the Branch was expanded to provide capacity-building and technical assistance to Member States. Since then, there has been no substantial increase in its funding for its regular staff– the UN’s regular budget only covers a team of eight staff members.57 As of January 2023, the wider UNODC field office network comprised over 2,500 staff operating in 98 countries, some of whom work for the TPB.58 The proposed programme budget for 2025 indicates that the TPB currently employs a further 21 staff positions from extra-budgetary resources.59 The larger portion of the TPB’s extrabudgetary resources primarily comes from voluntary contributions by Member States. The US, Japan, Germany, Canada and other (mostly European Union) countries are among the major contributors to the TPB’s funding.60 Gulf States such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar, who have been the major contributors to UNOCT, are not recorded as funding the TPB.61 In the seven short years since the birth of UNOCT, there have been significant changes to the UN counter-terrorism architecture. Outside observers– these authors included– have noted the extraordinary growth of UNOCT in its short existence.49 Assessed budgetary contributions to UNOCT have shot up from $1.52 million to $9.46 million in the space of those years.50 While it was once assumed that the creation of UNOCT would be primarily for a coordination mandate, recent years have shown that assumption to be porous.51 Instead, UNOCT has expanded its counter-terrorism programming, often in a way which goes beyond a coordinating role and instead slides towards a lead implementation role. Major extrabudgetary contributions from the State of Qatar and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia52 have enabled UNOCT to hire a large workforce, host major conferences and events, and begin new flagship projects. This has combined to contribute to a dynamic whereby UNOCT has a high degree of influence over the UN counter-terrorism architecture. Meanwhile, the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Compact now boasts of being the largest coordinating platform across the entire UN system– symbolising the wider growth of the agenda across the institution.53 Vladimir Voronkov, United Nations Under-SecretaryGeneral for Counter-Terrorism, speaks at a Security Council meeting on threats to international peace and security, February 2024. © UN Photo/Eskinder Debebe In the space of a few years, UNOCT has gone from a small staff in New York to 197 staff members54 and seven new project and programme offices in Baghdad, Budapest, Doha, Madrid, Nairobi and Rabat.55 At times, the competition for funding has been direct with the TPB. Moreover, interviewees also told us that UNOCT has sidelined UN Resident Coordinators on occasion, by inserting counter-terrorism-focused coordinators at the country level in mission settings, when the UN Resident Coordinators do not want to engage in counter-terrorism.56 BOX 3 The rise of UNOCT 10 does the terrorism prevention branch prevent terrorism? In 2009, the policy brief ‘The UN Office on Drugs and Crime’s Terrorism Prevention Branch: Strengths and Challenges Ahead’,62 argued that the reliance on voluntary funding was both a strength and a weakness of the TPB. Fifteen years later in 2024, and the TPB still functions as a field-based capacity-building entity almost entirely through short-term projects. Funding from the UN regular budget contributes to the branch’s staff in Vienna, whereas extra-budgetary funding is responsible for all other functions. This does not make the TPB unique, as many UN entities exist in this manner. However, given the growth of UNOCT, this situation creates a dilemma for the TPB as it seeks to re-establish its offering to UN Member States. The TPB’s regular budget draw remains steady at $1.376 million with eight staff posts.63 The reliance on external funding grants the TPB very little flexibility in terms of operational focus and also leaves it extremely vulnerable to fluctuations in donor priorities. Furthermore, while regular budget funding for UNOCT has increased in recent years, UNOCT still has a significant extrabudgetary funding base to support its large staff.64 This financial dichotomy reflects the differing resource landscapes within which the TPB and UNOCT operate, shaping their respective capacities and priorities. The vast majority of funders65 to the TPB since 2016 are ostensibly champions of international norms of human rights and the rule of law.66 In UN negotiations around counter-terrorism strategy, almost all major funders of the TPB have been the main proponents of human rights, civil society participation, transparency, accountability and the rule of law. For these states, being able to shape the work of the TPB through extrabudgetary contributions is appealing. But, if democratic states make pay-to-play the norm for counter-terrorism programmes, then illiberal states may see this as an opportunity to influence and shape the norms and institutions of multilateral counter-terrorism. This has already been somewhat evident in the way illiberal Gulf states have used this same approach to shape the counter-terrorism architecture in New York.67 The result of huge funds from Saudi Arabia and Qatar has been the sudden growth of UNOCT, which has enabled a considerable mandate expansion on issues that once were solely the TPB’s domain. BOX 4 Strength or weakness? Reliance on voluntary funding Notes 10 UN General Assembly (1997), ‘Renewing the United Nations: A Programme for Reform. Report of the Secretary-General’ (https://undocs.org/A/51/950) 11 Ibid. 12 UN Economic and Social Council (2001), ‘Revised draft plans of action for the implementation of the Vienna Declaration on Crime and Justice: Meeting the Challenges of the Twenty-first Century’, June (https://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/10_commission/resumed_ session/14e.pdf) 13 Ibid. 14 The international conventions on terrorism are as follows: 1. Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed On Board Aircraft (1963) 2. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation (1971) 3. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (1970) 4. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents (1973) 5. International Convention against the Taking of Hostages (1979) 6. Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (1980) 7. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (1988) 8. Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf (1988) 9. Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation (1988) 10. Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection (1991) 11. International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (1997) 12. International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (1999) 13. International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT) (2005) 14. Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (2005) 15. Protocol to the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf (2005) 16. Protocol to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (2005) 17. Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Relating to International Civil Aviation (2010) 18. Protocol Supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (2010) 19. Protocol to the Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft (2014) 15 Information received from staff member of UNODC TPB, May 2024. 16 UN General Assembly (2003), ‘Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly – Questions Relating to the Programme Budget for the Biennium 2002–2003’, February (https://undocs.org/A/RES/57/292) 17 Stigter E, Hollister A, Calabuig I (2021), ‘Independent In-Depth Evaluation Strengthening The Legal Regime Against Terrorism,’ UNODC, September (https://www.unodc.org/documents/evaluation/ indepth-evaluations/2021/GLOR35_Final_Evaluation_Report.pdf) 18 The expansion of the mandate of the TPB was requested only a few weeks before the adoption of UNSCR 1373 at the tenth session of the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice on 6–7 September. See ECOSOC (2001), ‘Revised draft plans of action for the implementation of the Vienna Declaration on Crime and Justice: Meeting the Challenges of the Twenty-first Century’, June (www.undocs.org/E/CN.15/2001/14) 19 United Nations Security Council (2001), ‘Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001), S/RES/1373 (2001)’, 28 September (https://www.unodc. org/pdf/crime/terrorism/res_1373_english.pdf) 20 United Nations Security Council (2004), ‘Security Council Resolution 1535 (2004), S/RES/1535 (2004)’, 26 March (https://documents. un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n04/286/41/pdf/n0428641.pdf?token=QlA3 wQU2AMN4mCnaoa&fe=true) 21 Saferworld interview with UN representative, March–April 2024. the terrorism prevention branch 11 22 UNODC (2022), ‘Global Programme on Preventing and Countering Terrorism 2022–2027 – Abridged’, October (https://www.unodc.org/ res/terrorism/aboutus/UNODC_TPB_New_Global_Programme_ abridged_online.pdf) 23 United Nations General Assembly (2015), ‘Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism. Report of the Secretary-General, A/70/674’, 24 December 24 United Nations, ‘Counterterrorism’ (https://www.un.org/ counterterrorism/) 25 United Nations Security Council (2021), ‘United Nations Security Council Resolution 2617’, 30 December (https://documents.un.org/ api/symbol/access?j=N2142408&t=pdf) 26 UNODC (2022), op. cit. 27 UNODC (2021), ‘Independent In-Depth Evaluation: Strengthening the Legal Regime against Terrorism’, September (https://www.unodc.org/ documents/evaluation/indepth-evaluations/2021/GLOR35_Final_ Evaluation_Report.pdf) 28 Ibid. 29 Ibid. 30 Ibid. 31 Ibid. 32 UNODC (2009), ‘Model Provisions on Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing, Preventive Measures and Proceeds of Crime’, April (https://www.unodc.org/documents/money-laundering/Model_ Provisions_Final.pdf) 33 UNODC (2019), ‘Nigeria Training Module on Gender Dimensions of Criminal Justice Responses to Terrorism’, August (https://www.unodc. org/pdf/terrorism/Web_stories/UNODC_Nigeria_Gender_Training_ Module.pdf) 34 UNODC, ‘Sharing Electronic Resources and Laws on Crime Portal’ (https://sherloc.unodc.org/cld/en/st/about-us/about-us.html) 35 Ibid. 36 UNODC (2022), op. cit. 37 This figure is included in the internal project document for the Global Programme. In private communication with the authors, the Branch noted that they spend ‘a bit less than 50% overall on staffing’. UNODC (2022), ‘Programme/Project Document – Preventing and Countering Terrorism GLOTP1’, (internal document). 38 The authors were able to view an internal project document of the Global Programme on Preventing and Countering Terrorism (from 2022). This document shares significantly more contextual framing than the abridged public version, with useful information on proposed activities and target results. 39 Ibid. However, in private communication with the authors, the Branch indicated that the Global Programme currently has annual expenditure of between $14–15 million. 40 Ibid. 41 UNODC, ‘Global Programme against Money Laundering’ (https://www.unodc.org/unodc/sl/money-laundering/globalprogramme-against-money-laundering/.html) 42 UNODC, ‘Sharing Electronic Resources and Laws on Crime Portal’ (https://sherloc.unodc.org/cld/en/st/about-us/about-us.html) 43 UNODC, ‘Expertise’ (https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/terrorism/ expertise/expertise.html) 44 UNOCT (2023), ‘Mid-Term Independent Joint Evaluation United Nations Countering Terrorist Travel Programme,’ March (https://www.unodc.org/documents/evaluation/indepthevaluations/2023/Midterm_Joint_Evaluation_Report_UN_ Countering_Terrrorist_Travel_Programme.pdf) 45 United Nations Security Council (2014), ‘Resolution 2178, S/RES/2178’, 24 September (https://www.undocs.org/S/ RES/2178%20(2014); United Nations Security Council (2017), ‘Resolution 2396, S/RES/2396’, 21 December (http://undocs.org/S/ RES/2396(2017); United Nations Security Council (2019), ‘Resolution 2482, S/RES/2482’, 19 July (http://undocs.org/S/RES/2482(2019) 46 Ní Aoláin F (2023), ‘Position Paper of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism on the United Nations Countering Terrorist Travel (‘CT Travel’) Programme and the goTravel Software Solution’, United Nations Human Rights Special Procedures, October (https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/ issues/terrorism/sr/statements/2023-10-30-a-ct-travel-gotravelposition-paper.pdf) 47 Ní Aoláin F (2023), op. cit., p 31. 48 Website of UN Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact: https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/global-ct-compact 49 Rosand E, Miller A (2020), ‘The Odd Couple at the Center of the U.N.’s Counterterrorism Growth’, Just Security, 8 July (https://www. justsecurity.org/71273/the-odd-couple-at-the-center-of-the-u-n-scounterterrorism-growth/) 50 United Nations General Assembly (2024), ‘Proposed programme budget for 2025 Part IV – A/79/6 (Sect. 16)’, 11 April (https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?j=N2408732&t=pdf) 51 Attree L (2022), ‘Function before Form – Optimising the UN’s CounterTerrorism Architecture’, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, July (https://www. saferworld-global.org/resources/publications/1396-function-beforeform-optimising-the-unas-counter-terrorism-architecture) 52 Ibid. 53 ‘The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact is the largest coordination framework across the three pillars of work of the United Nations: peace and security, sustainable development, human rights and humanitarian affairs’ – see the website of UN Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact: https://www.un.org/ counterterrorism/global-ct-compact 54 United Nations General Assembly (2024), ‘Proposed programme budget for 2025 Part IV – A/79/6 (Sect. 3)’, 11 April, pp 101–105 (https://undocs.org/A/79/6(Sect.3) 55 UNOCT, ‘Office Structure’ (https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/ office-structure) 56 Saferworld interview with UN official, March–April 2024. 57 These eight posts are for one D1 position, one P5, three P4, one P3, and two general administrative assistants: United Nations General Assembly (2024), ‘Proposed programme budget for 2025 Part IV – A/79/6 (Sect. 16)’, May (https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/ access?j=N2408732&t=pdf) 58 UNODC confirmed they have counter-terrorism staff in around 25 countries, with many of those staff based in regional offices that have responsibility for a number of countries. 59 United Nations General Assembly (2024), ‘Proposed programme budget for 2025 Part IV – A/79/6 (Sect. 16)’, 11 April (https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?j=N2408732&t=pdf) 60 UNODC, ‘Partners’ (https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/terrorism/ partners.html) 61 Although Qatar and Saudi Arabia are not listed as donors, UNOCT is, which might indicate Qatar and Saudi Arabia funding making its way to the TPB. 62 Rosand (2009), op. cit. 63 Compared with UNOCT's regular budget contribution of $9.462 million, supporting 57 staff posts up from just eight two years ago. United Nations General Assembly (2024), ‘Proposed programme budget for 2025 Part IV – A/79/6 (Sect. 16)’, 11 April (https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?j=N2408732&t=pdf) 64 United Nations General Assembly (2024), ‘Proposed programme budget for 2025 Part IV – A/79/6 (Sect. 3)’, 11 April, pp 101–105 (https://undocs.org/A/79/6(Sect.3)) 65 Given the poor transparency from the TPB around its funding, we are unable to give accurate accounts of top donors. However, on its donor page, it indicates that Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, the EU, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Monaco, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the UK, the US, UNPDF (China) and UNOCT have funded the TPB’s work since 2016. See: UNODC, ‘Partners’ (https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/terrorism/partners. html) 66 This statement is qualified with the term ‘ostensibly’ – given that the authors are well aware that many Member States are prone to support the international rules-based order, yet ignore it or bend the rules when it suits them. 67 Rosand E (2020), ‘Counterterrorism and the UN: The rise and hapless fall of American leadership’, Brookings Institute, July (https://www.brookings.edu/articles/counterterrorism-and-the-unthe-rise-and-hapless-fall-of-american-leadership/) Training for prison officers to provide knowledge on how to adequately plan for both the sentences and the specific interventions that violent extremist offenders require while in custody. © UNODC/GMCP – Pareet Shah 13 Within the UN counter-terrorism architecture, there appear to be areas where the TPB exhibits good practices: 3.1 Presence in the field While not the only entities that engage in counterterrorism programming for the UN, the TPB and UNOCT are the only institutions within the UN system with formal counter-terrorism programming mandates. However, the size and scope of the TPB and UNOCT offer a striking contrast. Only a small portion of the TPB’s budget is allocated towards coordination of its activities at the Secretariat level, while a larger portion of its budget is spent on projects that take place at the country level, following its mandate to provide capacity-building support to Member States. The TPB’s main offer to UN Member States is its extensive presence in the field through the existence of UNODC field offices. As previously noted, the TPB has eight staff members on the UN regular budget, with 21 additional as the result of extra-budgetary funding.68 At the time of writing, UNODC has 115 field offices in 89 countries, with counter-terrorism-focused staff in approximately 25 countries. However, many of these staff are based in regional offices which are responsible for a number of countries, resulting in TPB staff covering the majority of countries where UNODC has a presence.69 In contrast to the other parts of the UN counterterrorism architecture– specifically UNOCT and UNCTED– this field presence offers a clear calling card. The offer to donors is an appealing one– long-standing in-country expertise and connections through UNODC field offices indicates direct capacity to collaborate with host states. While the TPB is primarily focused on in-country programming, UNOCT invests a significant amount of its capacity on events and conferences, in both New York and around the world. The difference in geographic focus of the TPB and UNOCT’s work reflects their distinct operational focuses: one rooted in practical implementation, the other in policy formulation and strategic coordination. A clear contribution of the TPB’s local presence can be seen in Borno State, Nigeria. The TPB field office in Nigeria leveraged its established, long-term relationship with state officials at the federal level, and worked to facilitate the safe release of 3,000 people from prison who had been falsely accused of terrorism and arbitrarily detained.70 The TPB assisted the authorities in this process, advising them on how to release, rehabilitate and reintegrate the individuals deemed to be wrongfully accused. This success story was made possible due to a strong trust-based relationship with authorities, formed through a longterm presence and a prolonged stay in the country. This case shows the added value of the TPB: competent field-based staff with in-depth expertise of the country and strong relationships with state representatives.71 3 Good practices The difference in geographic focus of the TPB and UNOCT’s work reflects their distinct operational focuses: one rooted in practical implementation, the other in policy formulation and strategic coordination. 14 does the terrorism prevention branch prevent terrorism? 3.2 Expertise in criminal justice and the rule of law The TPB offers unique expertise within the UN system on counter-terrorism, drawing on its deep experience in criminal justice. This makes sense given the broader mandate of the UNODC. As an organisation specialised in the prevention of crime and illicit drug trafficking alongside terrorism prevention, UNODC brings expertise in how terrorism prevention interacts with criminal justice, policing, the rule of law and intelligence gathering. The TPB also brings specific expertise on how states can ensure that their domestic counter-terrorism laws meet their international legal obligations. The TPB’s legal expertise is thus crucial for many states with institutions in need of capacity support. As UNODC is already involved in a wide range of crime prevention and illicit drug trafficking activities in most of the countries where the TPB operates, TPB staff would be expected to have already acquired knowledge of the context and the security and legal environment. This, according to TPB staff’s selfassessment of their work, leads to better counterterrorism programme results and outcomes informed by expertise in criminal justice and the rule of law.72 A similar observation was documented by Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, the previous Special Rapporteur on the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism. In her report to the UN General Assembly in 2022, she commended the ‘UNODC’s long experience of criminal justice and legal reform, both generally and on terrorism through the Terrorism Prevention Branch, which predated 9/11, as an asset that ensures its work is grounded in rule of law principles and rigorous application of international law standards across cross-cutting primary and other sources of international law’.73 This supportive assessment of the role of the TPB on counter-terrorism issues related to criminal justice and legal reform is consistent with what many interviewees noted. Those we spoke to also noted that the composition of staff within the TPB and UNOCT illustrates their differing approaches. The TPB’s workforce are predominantly practitioners with expertise on criminal justice issues and field experience in implementing counter-terrorism measures. For some, this is a critical factor in their assertion that the main place that expertise on counter-terrorism can be found within the UN is in the TPB. 3.3 Robust training and capacity-building programming Complex counter-terrorism compliance frameworks require a deep understanding of international law, normative frameworks, and cooperation with other UN entities such as UNCTED. The TPB’s work in this area has been instrumental in providing the training and knowledge necessary to navigate these complexities. Legislative guidelines break down and explain the provisions of international counterterrorism frameworks, international treaties and conventions, and provide practical guidance on how to implement them effectively at the national level. The TPB has also produced and disseminated a number of high-quality training manuals. The manuals cover fundamental aspects of upholding the rule of law in counter-terrorism and anti-money laundering, and incorporate expertise on human rights, gender justice, child protection and other related areas. These comprehensive manuals provide detailed analysis of complex issues in a manner that is accessible to counter-terrorism practitioners around the world. The TPB also assists countries in adapting these modules to their specific needs and contexts within their counter-terrorism frameworks, while ensuring legal compliance with international human rights standards. The 2019 Nigeria training module on the Gender Dimensions of Criminal Justice Responses to Terrorism is a good example of this.74 It is also notable that the TPB consulted a wide cross-section of civil society and non-state voices in the production of this training module. The TPB’s training modules carefully navigate conceptual ambiguities and provide important guidance and lessons for counter-terrorism practitioners, drawing on the expertise and competence of TPB staff. This sets the Branch apart from some other parts of the UN counter-terrorism system, which do not always produce such highquality outputs. good practices 15 3.4 Application of UN Human Rights Due Diligence Policy Among UN staff interviewed, there was a general sense that the TPB, by and large, understands and applies the UN’s Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP).79 While it is hard to fully assess application on a case-by-case basis, it is a policy that has been institutionalised within UNODC, given the agency’s core engagement with security services. There is a clear contrast with other UN agencies and programmes engaging in counter-terrorism or C/PVE. HRDDP– which first entered the UN system in 2009 and became system-wide in 2011– was designed to guide all parts of the UN system’s engagement with security forces and services and has long been used by UN Resident Coordinators’ offices where the UN system has programming with police, military or external peace operations.80 In the report of the Special Rapporteur on the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism to the UN General Assembly in 2021, the work of the TPB was covered in terms of its contributions to UN capacity-building assistance. Under the new Preventing and Countering Terrorism Global Programme, a new objective has been included that will see the TPB support capacity building for counter-terrorism programmes that take ‘measures to prevent terrorism that are partnership-based, genderresponsive or youth-empowering’.75 The new programme includes a detailed and comprehensive understanding of gender and terrorism, and integrates the principle that an ‘effective criminal justice response to terrorism must include a gender perspective, adopt an approach based on gender mainstreaming and human rights, and take account of the multifaceted and distinct ways that women and men are involved in, and impacted by, terrorist acts’.76 Among the criteria for monitoring the new programme’s results are a number of specific indicators to assess the impact on women and girls and the number and strength of genderresponsive outcomes. This builds on the TPB’s previous gender-focused work, including the production of a number of detailed handbooks (including the ‘Handbook on Gender Dimensions of Criminal Justice and Response to Terrorism’)77 and training modules (with gender-specific modules for Bangladesh, the Maldives and Nigeria).78 While the comprehensive integration of gender in the new Global Programme is encouraging, the TPB does not have a dedicated post for a gender expert and the overall expertise within the branch is unclear. Instead, with the staffing structure at the TPB, gender is just one of many thematic expertise areas integrated into one post. To achieve the ambitious gender-related objectives and outcomes of the new Global Programme, the TPB might have to reconsider its staffing structure to achieve satisfactory implementation and increase coordination with UN Women across its field and headquarters presence. Gender expertise within the TPB must be at the appropriate level of seniority– as is consistent with other gender mainstreaming reforms within the wider UN system. Without senior-level gender advisory capacity, there is the potential that the issue of gender becomes a tickbox exercise or is outsourced to entry-level staff, limiting the impact of their work and the chance of their recommendations being taken up and meaningfully integrated across the organisation. In the worst-case scenario, there is also the risk that staff without gender expertise inadvertently instrumentalise the issue of gender or enable gender-insensitive policies, programming or practices. BOX 5 Gender and the new Global Programme Without senior-level gender advisory capacity, there is the potential that the issue of gender becomes a tick-box exercise or is outsourced to entry-level staff, limiting the impact of their work and the chance of their recommendations being taken up and meaningfully integrated across the organisation. 16 does the terrorism prevention branch prevent terrorism? She viewed UNODC ‘model assistance positively, with consistent examples of good practice evidenced by a strong consultative ethic, not only across UN agencies but also with independent civil society’.81 Yet there is a significant portion of counter-terrorismrelated work which does not specifically engage with security forces, especially work labelled as C/PVE. In these instances, UN entities were not mandated to apply HRDDP and– even if they had used it– the tool was not necessarily appropriate, given its focus on security forces. This created a gap in the UN system’s human rights due diligence, given many C/PVE programmes still generate considerable human rights risks.82 As of June 2024 there is an internal UN process ongoing to revise this policy to cover all counter-terrorism and C/PVE engagements, but this gap has been present for almost a decade since the Secretary-General released his C/PVE plan of action. The TPB’s institutional application of HRDDP throughout its programming is a strength– one not necessarily shared by other UN entities engaged in counter-terrorism. The TPB’s legal expertise clearly plays a critical role here, as staff are able to identify human rights risks and actively seek to prevent them. Nonetheless, the authors were told of a few anecdotal cases where the TPB has been challenged by its host states in its implementation of HRDDP (see Box 7: TPB support to Sri Lanka on counterterrorism). Despite the obvious importance of HRDDP, it is important to note that the human rights responsibilities of UN agencies (including the TPB) do not end there. 3.5 Independent evaluations within UNODC UNODC has an Independent Evaluation Section which operates across the wider UNODC, including the TPB.83 This Section evaluates global programmes– such as the ‘Strengthening the Legal Regime Against Terrorism’– as well as countryspecific projects, such as with Sri Lanka and the Maldives. UNODC’s policy on evaluation states: ‘The Executive Director ensures that the evaluation function at UNODC is functionally and operationally independent and adequately resourced.’84 During interviews, all stakeholders (donors, UN staff and external experts) reported that this unit has a high level of rigour and integrity. As one donor put it, “the head of this unit is not exactly being put up for any promotions because the unit is very tough on UNODC’s work”.85 This praise of the internal evaluation unit was also echoed by TPB staff, who felt that their evaluations helped guide their programming and future strategies. This good practice separates the TPB from other parts of the UN counter-terrorism architecture, such as the UNOCT, which have been criticised in the past for a lack of robust monitoring and evaluation practices. The evaluation reports are by no means perfect and have some considerable shortcomings (see chapter 5.5). However, the practice is commendable, and represents a strength for the TPB in juxtaposition to the rest of the UN counter-terrorism architecture. UNODC’s willingness to publish these evaluation reports clearly demonstrates some level of commitment to transparency and accountability. It also establishes a good starting point for all entities within UN counter-terrorism architecture to replicate. 3.6 Transparency with donors All major donors interviewed for this research expressed a solid level of satisfaction with the programming and the reporting they received from the TPB.86 The TPB staff we spoke with noted that the Evaluation Unit within UNODC briefs Member States on the content of recent evaluations, adding another level of transparency to their work.87 UNODC also has an online portal showing how donors’ contributions are spent on different projects of the TPB– although a few noted that the information is not always that up to date.88 This portal is not a public webpage, unfortunately, and only UN entities and donor states have access to the information. good practices 17 Notes 68 United Nations General Assembly (2024), ‘Proposed programme budget for 2025 Part IV – A/79/6 (Sect. 16)’, 11 April (https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?j=N2408732&t=pdf) 69 Response to written questions to UNODC-TPB staff, May 2024. 70 Premium Times (2021), ‘Borno leaders agree to forgive, accept 3,000 repentant terrorists’, 29 August (https://www.premiumtimesng.com/ news/headlines/481954-borno-leaders-agree-to-forgive-accept3000-repentant-terrorists.html?tztc=1) 71 Saferworld interviews with UN officials, March–April 2024. 72 Saferworld interviews with UN officials, March–April 2024. 73 Ní Aoláin F (2021), ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, Fionnuala Ní Aoláin Advancing Human Rights through the Mainstreaming of Human Rights in Counter-Terrorism Capacity-Building and Technical Assistance at the National, Regional and Global Levels’, September, p 20 (https://undocs.org/A/76/261) 74 UNODC (2019), ‘Nigeria Training Module on Gender Dimensions of Criminal Justice Responses to Terrorism’, August (https://www.unodc. org/pdf/terrorism/Web_stories/UNODC_Nigeria_Gender_Training_ Module.pdf) 75 UNODC (2022), ‘Global Programme on Preventing and Countering Terrorism 2022–2027 – Abridged’, October (https://www.unodc.org/ res/terrorism/aboutus/UNODC_TPB_New_Global_Programme_ abridged_online.pdf) 76 UNODC (2022), ‘Programme/Project Document – Preventing and Countering Terrorism GLOTP1’, (internal document). 77 Garms U, Wilkinson L, Kapur A (2019), ‘Handbook on Gender Dimensions of Criminal Justice Responses to Terrorism’, UNODC (https://www.unodc.org/documents/terrorism/ Publications/17-08887_HB_Gender_Criminal_Justice_E_ebook.pdf) 78 See: UNODC (2021), ‘Bangladesh Training Module on Gender Dimensions of Criminal Justice Responses to Terrorism’, March (https://www.unodc.org/res/terrorism/resources/capacity-building_ html/GENDER_DIMENSIONS_Book_FINAL.pdf); UNODC (2019), ‘Gender Dimensions of Criminal Justice Responses to Terrorism – Training Module’, May (https://www.unodc.org/res/terrorism/ resources/capacity-building_html/UNODC_Gender_Tool_x_ Maldives_FINAL_-_English.pdf); UNODC (2019), ‘Nigeria Training Module on Gender Dimensions of Criminal Justice Responses to Terrorism’, August (https://www.unodc.org/pdf/terrorism/Web_ stories/UNODC_Nigeria_Gender_Training_Module.pdf) 79 United Nations (2015), ‘Human Rights Due Diligence Policy on United Nations Support to Non-United Nations Security Forces’, June (https://unsdg.un.org/sites/default/files/Inter-Agency-HRDDPGuidance-Note-2015.pdf) 80 United Nations General Assembly (2013), ‘Identical letters dated 25 February 2013 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the General Assembly and to the President of the Security Council’, March (https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/ Documents/HRBodies/SP/AMeetings/20thsession/ IdenticalLetterSG25Feb2013_en.pdf) 81 Ní Aoláin F (2021), op. cit., p 20. 82 Ní Aoláin F (2020), ‘Human rights impact of policies and practices aimed at preventing and countering violent extremism. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism’, February (https://undocs.org/A/HRC/43/46) 83 UNODC, ‘Independent Evaluation Section’ (https://www.unodc.org/ unodc/es/evaluation/the-independent-evaluation-section.html) 84 UNODC (2022), ‘UNODC Evaluation Policy’, p 9 (https://www.unodc.org/documents/evaluation/Guidelines/ UNODC_Evaluation_Policy.pdf) 85 Saferworld interview with donor representative, March–April 2024. 86 Saferworld interview with donor representative, March–April 2024. 87 Saferworld interview with UN representative, March–April 2024. 88 Saferworld interview with donor representative, March–April 2024. A view of the Human Rights Council Chamber as a screen displays the vote tally on a resolution promoting accountability and reconciliation in Sri Lanka. The resolution was adopted by 25 votes in favour, 13 votes against and 8 abstentions. © UN Photo/Jean Marc Ferré BOX 7 TPB support to Sri Lanka on counter-terrorism shortcomings 25 Many of these groups had been listed during the government of Mahinda Rajapaksa (2005–2015), before being de-listed during the Yahapalana/ Good Governance government of Maithripala Sirisena. This re-listing included several hundred individuals within those groups as alleged ‘terrorists’, as well as many others who are rights activists or opposition politicians. The organisations included on that list are widely understood to be mainstream, non-violent groups that at the time of their listing were engaged in advocacy with Member States to promote accountability for past violations at the UN Human Rights Council (UN HRC).133 Just a month later, on 9 March 2021, President Rajapaksa issued new regulations pertaining to the PTA that enable up to two years of detention without trial for individuals accused of promoting ‘religious, racial, or communal disharmony’.134 On the basis of past practice, these regulations risked being used to target activists, including human rights defenders, as well as members of ethnic and religious minority groups that are already subject to discrimination and abuses by the security forces. This led to the HRC adopting Resolution 46/1, which calls on Sri Lanka to revise the PTA and affirms that ‘all measures taken to combat terrorism must fully comply with States’ obligations under international law, in particular international human rights law’.135 The resolution also created dedicated capacity within the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) to collect and preserve evidence to enable it to hold the government of Sri Lanka to account for international crimes committed in the country– something which the government continues to block. The government routinely tries to justify alleged abuses that will be the subject of these investigations on the grounds that they were counter-terrorism operations. All the while, the TPB project remained in operation, collaborating with the same government that was weaponising counterterrorism to target civil society groups. Compliance of the Sri Lankan counter-terrorism framework with international legal standards has declined since the EU-funded project began in January 2020. By continuing to support Sri Lankan security forces in this manner, the TPB undermined the One United Nations approach, putting its project funding ahead of important human rights considerations and the implementation of Resolution 46/1, rewarding unlawful actions and enabling abuses in the name of security.136 What’s more, during the course of the project, there was clear evidence that Sri Lanka’s counter-terrorism apparatus was used against activists and groups working to promote accountability, engaging with UN agencies, and participating in the UN HRC– as noted by the report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the human rights situation in Sri Lanka in October 2022.137 The lessons learnt from such examples should be of great value to the UN counter-terrorism architecture. The TPB suggests that it made attempts to bring Sri Lankan legislation in line with human rights standards, but inevitably got tangled in domestic political dynamics and an unhealthy donor-host relationship.138 The TPB’s internal evaluation report on the project in Sri Lanka curiously excludes this case from its learning.139 Yet, as the Fourth Pillar report argues, the UN counter-terrorism architecture must learn from its failure if it wants to improve its practice.140 In this instance, the ‘engage to change’ model from the TPB might very well have been ill-conceived. It is unclear whether the TPB’s engagement had any positive impact or contributed to the prevention of terrorism. At a minimum, this appears to be a poorly designed engagement based on an unrealistic risk evaluation, but– at worst– this was a clear case of blue-washing human rights abuses, one which undermined the UN’s image and impartiality. 26 does the terrorism prevention branch prevent terrorism? 4.5 Measuring management success, not whether terrorism is being prevented While the presence of an internal evaluation unit is welcome, there are some inherent shortcomings in UNODC-TPB’s evaluations. Firstly, UNODC’s evaluations appear to be centred upon a resultsbased management approach, measuring whether activities occurred as planned, documenting the number of individuals reached, achievement of project objectives, the expansion of the programmatic footprint and the ratification of international treaties by states. As such, evaluations do not ask larger questions about the achievement of the core objectives of the TPB’s engagement in counter-terrorism activities, nor the outcomes achieved. Secondly, while UNODC’s 2022 Evaluation Policy states that ‘Member States are invited to participate actively in evaluations, for example, as core learning partners, in order to widen the ownership and use of evaluation results,’141 there is not a single mention of civil society, communities or other non-state actors in its 24 pages. This is a state-centric evaluation model, which is a systemic problem of the UN counter-terrorism architecture (as diagnosed in the metasynthesis review, see Box 8). Global Compact entities, including the TPB, have prioritised the views of government representatives over the perceptions and representations of affected populations, whose sense of security does not necessarily coincide with Member States’ concerns, but is no less essential.142 While the independence of the evaluation section is laudable, if its guiding policy does not invite engagement with other project stakeholders beyond states and UN staff, then there could be serious shortcomings in terms of accurately assessing project impacts and outcomes. To exemplify this, in the two public country-specific evaluation reports– of the Maldives and Sri Lanka– on the Independent Evaluation Section’s website, there is no evidence that a single civil society organisation was consulted during the evaluation process; instead, each evaluation conducted interviews with UNODC staff, partners, recipient governments and the donor.143 Also, given the external context within Sri Lanka (see Box 7) on counter-terrorism-related issues, it seems an odd omission by the evaluators not to include a reflection of the role of the TPB’s engagement during a period of considerable backsliding on the misuse of the UN brand by Sri Lankan authorities.144 As is the case for the majority of evaluations, the scope is determined by the entity being evaluated, who can permit or withhold access. Taking the example of the Sri Lanka evaluation report, the responsibility to seek out civil society groups’ experiences– especially those who were publicly critical of the TPB’s approach– lay with the TPB. Excluding such context undermines the validity and independence of such evaluation reports. Thirdly, the expected outcome of the TPB’s work, and indeed the wider UN counter-terrorism architecture, is ‘prevention and reduction of global terrorism’, as framed by the ‘Learn Better, Together’ metasynthesis study (see Box 8). However, often the evaluation reports are not assessing whether terrorism was reduced during the programme lifecycle. While it is difficult, but not impossible, for the TPB to trace the link between its capacity-building and technical assistance to Member States and the expected outcome of preventing and reducing global terrorism, there is no evidence of data being collected that can help to make such an assertion. Publicly available evaluation reports tend to assume that attendance at a training equals an increased awareness and capacity, but fail to record behavioural and relationship changes or outcomes in any significant way.145 The TPB is not the only part of the UN counterterrorism architecture that is susceptible to these charges. The lack of metrics or evidence-based results to assess the programming of wider UN counter-terrorism has been a source of complaint for many UN Member States.146 Nonetheless, despite a professional internal evaluation unit, it remains unclear when the TPB is contributing to meaningful outcomes in its counter-terrorism work. There are many ways to do this. For instance, the TPB could follow the build upon existing examinations of the impact of national legislation on the effects of terrorism trends and use that to inform future engagement.147 There is also sufficient data on terror incidences, and sufficient intellectual expertise at the Branch to attempt to address this gap. With sound and reliable research methods, the TPB should demonstrate the actual ‘results’ of its contribution to terrorism prevention. ... despite a professional internal evaluation unit, it remains unclear when the TPB is contributing to meaningful outcomes in its counter-terrorism work. shortcomings 27 4.6 Insufficient external transparency External transparency is not the TPB’s forte. While donors are able to get information on the work of the TPB through an online portal, other stakeholders are not. Transparency to its donors is a strength, but lack of transparency to others is a shortcoming. If a civil society organisation wishes to understand what the TPB is doing in the country they are based in, they have no way of finding out unless they directly ask TPB staff in the field. There is no central database online that indicates what activities are occurring. This is in stark contrast to parts of the UN system such as the UN Peacebuilding Fund. The Peacebuilding Fund has an open online portal which clearly tracks every approved and completed project.152 It notes key objectives for each project, shows the implementing partner, and includes budget levels. This is a good practice for the UN system, and the TPB is falling well short of this. Moreover, the TPB does not provide sufficient information to the counter-terrorism community in New York or in Geneva. As the epicentre of decisionmaking and policy-making on terrorism prevention moved to New York when UNSC Member States adopted UNSCR 1373 in 2001, so too did the diplomatic focus. The UN General Assembly and Security Council have become forums for competition over the ownership of multilateral counter-terrorism. Most reasonably sized UN Member State delegations with diplomats assigned to counter-terrorism policy (usually along with a few other items in their portfolio) are for this reason based in New York; there is significantly less counter-terrorism expertise among UN Member State The 2021 ‘Learn Better, Together’ meta-synthesis of evaluations and other reports from UNOCT and the UNODC was commissioned to aggregate and synthesise the results of evaluation and other oversight reports produced under the aegis of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy.148 This study reviewed available evidence (over 200 documents) on how well the UN system has worked to: a) minimise the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism b) strengthen the infrastructure and systems to prevent and combat terrorism c) increase respect for human rights and rule of law as the fundamental basis of the fight against terrorism The conclusion was notable for its assessment of the ability of the UN to perform counter-terrorism, noting that the evidence the UN had was ‘inadequate to assess (not to mention quantify) the extent to which ... outcomes were being achieved’.149 The meta-synthesis noted that this shortcoming was present not only in analysing any outcomes related to behaviour change, but also in expected outcomes such as knowledge increases or better awareness of project issues. Furthermore, the study concluded: ‘Most evaluation reports used perceptual measures such as interview and survey data, often without incorporating statistical methodologies that establish their validity and reliability. As far as feasible, Compact [referring to Global CT Compact] agencies would do well to encourage increased triangulation by incorporating objective data and methodologies, including archival and big data as well as impact evaluation and experimental designs, to validate their findings.’150 Perhaps the most important lesson for the UN to draw from this study is hidden in Annex VII, which states that it is ‘necessary to deepen critical issues, lessons learned, open questions and gaps beyond and below the levels of managerial, programmatic and technical expertise’. The most recent UN Secretary-General report in February 2023 on activities of the UN system in implementing the UN GCTS includes an annex which presented the major findings of a selfassessment of the UN counter-terrorism architecture’s methodologies and tools for a results framework to implement the GCTS. This represents some initial steps to address some of the shortcomings found through the metasynthesis.151 BOX 8 ‘Learn Better, Together’– Meta-synthesis of UN counter-terrorism impacts 28 does the terrorism prevention branch prevent terrorism? Notes 89 UNODC (2022), ‘Programme/Project Document – Preventing and Countering Terrorism GLOTP1’, (internal document). 90 Saferworld interview with independent expert, March–April 2024. 91 UNOCT (2020), ‘Civil Society Engagement Strategy: Ensuring a Wholeof-Society Approach to Preventing and Countering Terrorism’, May (https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/sites/www.un.org. counterterrorism/files/civil_society_engagement_strategy_website_ mai_2020.pdf) 92 UNODC (2022), ‘Global Programme on Preventing and Countering Terrorism 2022–2027 – Abridged’, October (https://www.unodc.org/ res/terrorism/aboutus/UNODC_TPB_New_Global_Programme_ abridged_online.pdf) 93 UNODC, ‘Youth-Led Action to Prevent and Respond to Terrorism’ (https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/terrorism/unodc_youth_pve_ initiative.html) 94 Edelman Trust Institute (2024), ‘Trust Barometer: Global Report’ (https://www.edelman.com/sites/g/files/aatuss191/files/202402/2024%20Edelman%20Trust%20Barometer%20Global%20 Report_FINAL.pdf) 95 Pew Research (2023), ‘Public Trust in Government: 1958–2023’, September (https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2023/09/19/ public-trust-in-government-1958-2023/); Jamal A, Robbins M, Al-Shami S (2020), ‘Youth in MENA’, Arab Barometer; Sanny JAN, van Wyk-Khosa S, Asunka J (2023), ‘Africa’s youth: More educated, less employed, still unheard in policy and development’. 96 UNODC (2022), ‘Programme/Project Document – Preventing and Countering Terrorism GLOTP1’, (internal document). 97 Obama White House Archives (2015), ‘Fact Sheet: The White House Summit on Countering Violent Extremism’ (https:// obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/02/18/factsheet-white-house-summit-countering-violent-extremism) 98 Attree L (2017), ‘Shouldn’t You Be Countering Violent Extremism’, Saferworld, March (https://www.saferworld-global.org/long-reads/ shouldnat-you-be-countering-violent-extremism); Martini A (2021), The UN and counter-terrorism: Global hegemonies, power and identities (London: Routledge); Atwood R (2016), ‘The dangers lurking in the UN’s new plan to prevent violent extremism’, Crisis Group, 6 February (https://www.crisisgroup.org/global/dangers-lurking-u-ns-new-plan-prevent-violent-extremism); Karlsrud J (2017), ‘Towards UN counter-terrorism operations?’, Third World Quarterly 38 (6), pp 1215–1231. 99 Altiok A, Street J (2020), op. cit. 100 Ní Aoláin F (2020), op. cit. 101 Saferworld interview with independent expert, March–April 2024; Saferworld interview with UN representatives, March–April 2024. 102 See the list of 47 UN entities participating in the UN Global CounterTerrorism Coordination Compact: https://www.un.org/ counterterrorism/global-ct-compact. See also Martini A, op. cit. 103 UNODC (2022), ‘Global Programme on Preventing and Countering Terrorism 2022–2027 – Abridged’, October (https://www.unodc.org/ res/terrorism/aboutus/UNODC_TPB_New_Global_Programme_ abridged_online.pdf) 104 ECOSOC (2023), ‘Report of the Secretary-General – Technical assistance in implementing the international conventions and protocols related to terrorism’, 16 March, p 14 (www.undocs.org/E/ CN.15/2023/5) 105 It remains unclear to the authors what the purpose of this youth-led network on PVE is, as it duplicates the work already being done by various international NGOs and UNOCT. 106 Ní Aoláin F (2023), ‘Independent Global Study on the Impact of Counter-Terrorism Measures on Civil Society’, October (https://defendcivicspace.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/ SRCT_GlobalStudy-1.pdf) 107 Hadzi-Miceva Evans K, Miller N (2021), ‘Time for a Course Correction on Counterterrorism and Civic Space’, Just Security, 15 June (https://www.justsecurity.org/76919/time-for-a-course-correctionon-counterterrorism-and-civic-space/) 108 Schwartz M (2024), ‘Independent Civil Society–UN Counterterrorism Engagement: A Scoping Report’, Global Center on Cooperative Security and Rights & Security International, May (https://globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/GCCS_ScopingReport_2024.pdf). One of the co-authors of this discussion paper, Ali Altiok, also served on an advisory committee of 15 experts for the Scoping Report. 109 Ibid. 110 Attree L, Street J (2022), ‘No Shortcuts to Security: Learning from Responses to Armed Conflicts Involving Proscribed Groups’, Saferworld, May (https://www.saferworld-global.org/resources/ publications/1389-no-shortcuts-to-security) 111 Ibid. 112 Schwartz M, op. cit. 113 Ní Aoláin F (2023), ‘Rethinking Counterterrorism’, Just Security, 2 November (https://www.justsecurity.org/89563/rethinkingcounterterrorism/) 114 Saferworld interview with UN representative, March–April 2024. 115 Saferworld interview with UN representative, March–April 2024. 116 Global Center on Cooperative Security (2021), ‘Situating UN CT and PVE efforts within the Organization’s Reforms and the Prevention Agenda’, video, YouTube, 29 April [posted date] (https://www. youtube.com/watch?v=kdq4XnUuSgw) 117 Ní Aoláin F (2023), ‘Independent Global Study on the Impact of Counter-Terrorism Measures on Civil Society’, October, p 11 (https://defendcivicspace.com/) 118 Saferworld interview with donor representative, March–April 2024. 119 ‘Blue-washing’, similar to ‘green-washing’, is a term that refers to an entity pursuing a partnership with the UN to paint a positive image of their conduct. Historically it has been used to refer to companies that use partnership with the UN to cover for negative labour practices. 120 The authors asked multiple interviewees if they were aware of such a process, standard or criterion, and no one was able to tell us that one existed. 121 Saferworld interview with independent expert, March–April 2024. 122 United Nations (2020), ‘The Highest Aspiration. A Call to Action for Human Rights’ (https://www.un.org/sg/sites/www.un.org.sg/files/ atoms/files/The_Highest_Asperation_A_Call_To_Action_For_Human_ Right_English.pdf) 123 Saferworld interview with UN official, March–April 2024. 124 Saferworld interview with UN official, March–April 2024. 125 Ní Aoláin F (2021), op. cit., p 20. 126 Global Affairs Canada (2023), ‘Evaluation of the Anti-Crime and Counter-Terrorism Capacity Building Programs 2015–16 to 2021–22’, 25 April (https://www.international.gc.ca/transparencytransparence/assets/pdfs/audit-evaluation-verification/2023/ acctcbp-report-en.pdf) 127 Amnesty International (2018), ‘Indonesia: Newly amended anti-terror law threatens to undermine human rights’, 25 May (https://www. amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/05/indonesia-newly-amendedanti-terror-law-threatens-to-undermine-human-rights/) 128 UNODC (2022), ‘Programme/Project Document – Preventing and Countering Terrorism GLOTP1’, (internal document). 129 UNODC (2022), ‘Final Independent Project Evaluation Support to Sri Lanka on Counter Terrorism’, (https://www.unodc.org/ documents/evaluation/Independent_Project_Evaluations/2022/ Final_Evaluation_Report_Support_to_Sri_Lanka_on_Counter_ Terrorism.pdf) 130 United Nations Special Procedures (2022), ‘Sri Lanka: UN experts call for swift suspension of Prevention of Terrorism Act and reform of counter-terrorism law’, March (https://www.ohchr.org/en/pressreleases/2022/03/sri-lanka-un-experts-call-swift-suspensionprevention-terrorism-act-and) 131 Panel of Experts on accountability in Sri Lanka (2011), ‘Report of the Secretary-General’s Panel of Experts on Accountability in Sri Lanka’, March (https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/POC%20Rep%20on%20 Account%20in%20Sri%20Lanka.pdf) delegations in Vienna. Some UN Member States do not even have a permanent delegation in Vienna in the first place. In practice, this means that very little attention is paid to the work of the TPB by delegations in Vienna. Those consulted for this research from the donor side acknowledged that their day-to-day job did not have the TPB anywhere near the top of priorities. For most, the TPB was not part of their policy-making portfolio, nor did they pay much attention to its services. At the same time, hiding in Vienna allows the TPB to avoid the international civil society organisations that follow the development of international counter-terrorism policy-making processes, which are largely based in New York or Geneva. This results in very few outside civil society observers being aware of the full extent of the TPB programming. shortcomings 29 132 Human Rights Watch (2023), ‘Sri Lanka: Reject New Counterterrorism Bill’, 7 April (https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/04/07/sri-lankareject-new-counterterrorism-bill) 133 Gazette of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka (2021), ‘Amendment to the List of Designated Persons under Regulation 4(7) of the United Nations Regulations No. 1 of 2012’, 25 February (http:// fiusrilanka.gov.lk/docs/UNSCR/List/2216_37/2216_37_E.pdf) 134 Gazette of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka (2021), ‘Regulations made by the President under Section 27 of the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, No. 48 of 1979 read with paragraph (b) of Article 4 of the Constitution’, 12 March (http://www.documents.gov.lk/files/egz/2021/3/2218-68_E.pdf) 135 United Nations Human Rights Council (2021), ‘Promoting reconciliation, accountability and human rights in Sri Lanka’, March (https://undocs.org/A/HRC/RES/46/1) 136 Ibid. 137 UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (2022), ‘Situation of human rights in Sri Lanka. Comprehensive report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights’, October (https://undocs.org/a/ hrc/51/5) 138 Global Center on Cooperative Security (2021), op. cit. 139 UNODC (2022), ‘Final Independent Project Evaluation Support to Sri Lanka on Counter Terrorism’ (https://www.unodc.org/documents/ evaluation/Independent_Project_Evaluations/2022/Final_ Evaluation_Report_Support_to_Sri_Lanka_on_Counter_Terrorism. pdf) 140 Altiok A, Street J (2020), op. cit. 141 UNODC (2022), ‘UNODC Evaluation Policy’ (https://www.unodc.org/ documents/evaluation/Guidelines/UNODC_Evaluation_Policy.pdf) 142 UNODC (2021), ‘“Learn Better, Together” – Independent MetaSynthesis under the Global Counterterrorism Strategy’, p 96 (https://www.unodc.org/documents/evaluation/Meta-Analysis/ Meta_Synthesis_United_Nations_Global_Counter_Terrorism_ Strategy_Report.pdf) 143 UNODC (2021), ‘Final Independent Project Evaluation – Support to Maldives on Counter-Terrorism’ (https://www.unodc.org/documents/ evaluation/Independent_Project_Evaluations/2021/Final_ Evaluation_Report_Support_to_Maldives_on_Counter_Terrorism. pdf); UNODC (2022), ‘Final Independent Project Evaluation Support to Sri Lanka on Counter Terrorism’ (https://www.unodc.org/documents/ evaluation/Independent_Project_Evaluations/2022/Final_ Evaluation_Report_Support_to_Sri_Lanka_on_Counter_Terrorism. pdf) 144 Ibid. 145 Ibid. 146 UNODC (2021), ‘“Learn Better, Together” – Independent MetaSynthesis under the Global Counterterrorism Strategy’ (https://www. unodc.org/documents/evaluation/Meta-Analysis/Meta_Synthesis_ United_Nations_Global_Counter_Terrorism_Strategy_Report.pdf) 147 See for example Shor E (2016), ‘Counterterrorist Legislation and Subsequent Terrorism: Does it Work?’ Social Forces 95 (2), pp 525–557. 148 UNODC (2021), ‘“Learn Better, Together” – Independent MetaSynthesis under the Global Counterterrorism Strategy’ (https://www. unodc.org/documents/evaluation/Meta-Analysis/Meta_Synthesis_ United_Nations_Global_Counter_Terrorism_Strategy_Report.pdf) 149 Ibid., p xvi. 150 Ibid., p 45. 151 UN General Assembly (2023), ‘Report of the Secretary-General – Activities of the United Nations system in implementing the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy’, 2 February (https://undocs.org/A/77/718) 152 Website of United Nations MPTF Office Partners Gateway – Peacebuilding Fund: https://mptf.undp.org/fund/pb000 A press briefing with Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, the former Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, October 2023. © UN Photo/Loey Felipe 31 The fast growth of the UN counterterrorism architecture, combined with an increasingly divisive and contested space around UN counter-terrorism policy, means that the TPB will have to wrestle with three dilemmas as it seeks to maintain its role in the wider UN counterterrorism system while remaining attractive to donors. 5.1 Sticking to expertise vs staying relevant The TPB’s unique contribution to UN counterterrorism architecture is rooted in its original goal of assisting countries in meeting their obligations under international treaties, conventions and Security Council resolutions, as well as assisting Member States and other UN entities implementing counter-terrorism programmes. Over the years, the TPB has played a crucial role in helping countries comply with UNSCR 1373 and has consistently been a key partner for UNCTED country visits under its mandate.153 No other UN entity besides the TPB has been capable of providing these types of terrorism prevention capacity-building services for Member States. However, with shrinking official development assistance budgets from major donors, combined with increased competition between UN entities for counter-terrorism funding, the TPB has broadened its portfolio.154 This expansion, codified through its new mandate and Global Programme, demands that the TPB engage in approaches and programming that 5 Dilemmas are not consistent with the type of expertise that it has cultivated over time. While the TPB could argue that it is simply following the UN Secretary-General Plan of Action on PVE from 2016, which– rather unhelpfully– provided over 70 extremely broad recommendations for Member States and the UN system, it may be a case of mandate expansion for reasons other than suitability. Pushing the TPB outside of the thematic expertise it has developed over two decades could potentially harm the positive contributions of the Branch. One individual told us that they can clearly see the TPB’s comparative advantage diminishing as UNOCT has grown to provide the type of capacitybuilding support the TPB traditionally delivers.155 There is an undeniable competition among UN entities and programmes in the field of counterterrorism, each trying to expand their portfolio and areas of expertise– all happening at a time when many donor states are beginning to favour their own national agencies instead of UN agencies like the TPB. During our research, we heard anecdotes that both UNOCT and the TPB applied– separately but with the same co-applicant UN entity– to a government donor funding call on counterterrorism.156 As UNOCT continues to expand beyond its coordination mandate, with projects that include capacity building to Member States, the development of training materials, and the opening of regional or country offices, the TPB might feel pressure to mirror this move and expand its mandate and presence to demonstrate its relevance and unique contribution. It is an understandable move for the TPB to seek to diversify its portfolio and adapt to donor preferences to try and ensure its survival in the wake of UNOCT’s extraordinary growth under the guise of coordination. Pushing the TPB outside of the thematic expertise it has developed over two decades could potentially harm the positive contributions of the Branch. 32 does the terrorism prevention branch prevent terrorism? The TPB can either stick to its expertise and provide already established forms of counter-terrorism assistance based on expertise and experience in criminal justice-based approaches; or it will have to undergo a major transformation to demonstrate what it can offer beyond criminal justice expertise. While the first option requires the TPB to downsize its programming portfolio, the second option requires the TPB to reform its institutional identity, and potentially lose its distinctive expertise within the UN counter-terrorism architecture. Perhaps more importantly, though, such expansion risks doing harm as it implements programming in new areas without the necessary expertise. 5.2 Committing to an inclusive approach vs staying close to authorities As noted, the scope of the TPB’s main programmatic engagement has been expanded, notably with the new Global Programme on Preventing and Countering Terrorism (2022–2027). Through this new programme, the TPB seeks to develop partnershipbased, gender-responsive and youthempowering approaches alongside its ongoing support for legal and criminal justice capacity building. The TPB has many goals for the new programme. For example, it is in the process of revising its programme design and implementation in a consultative manner, taking into account gender and human rights concerns. It is developing platforms and networks led, established or supported by– and inclusive of young people, which support terrorism prevention with leaders and volunteers. The TPB aims to collaborate with women-led and youth-led organisations, bringing them into the centre of terrorism prevention programmes. The ultimate goal of inclusion for the TPB is to increase civic engagement to help bridge civil society and government institutions through meaningful dialogue and participation.157 However, while this shift is largely positive, there are risks that this could become negative unless the TPB invests in the necessary expertise to work with civil society organisations, including womenand youth-led organisations. And to do this, the TPB encounters a dilemma of committing to an inclusive approach or remaining close to the state authorities. For its civil society engagement and partnership approach to be meaningful, the TPB needs to build relationships with groups that represent wider society, with an interest in holding authorities to account for the repression and human rights abuses they commit under the guise of counter-terrorism. This will often mean working with marginalised groups and groups critical of the government.158 All of this puts the TPB in a difficult position. The TPB has been an attractive partner and service provider for government and state institutions. As we heard in interviews with donor and TPB representatives, it provides what it sees as non-political, technical capacity-building programmes for state institutions and representatives. Will the TPB seek to maintain this approach and, in doing so, will this mean that civil society engagement is simply a tick-box exercise with government-approved groups, or will the TPB seek to expand its portfolio and embrace civil society engagement in a meaningful fashion? It can no longer claim that its capacity-building programmes keep its hands clean from domestic political dynamics, including mistrust between marginalised communities and state institutions and representatives. 5.3 Human rights as a calling card vs human rights as compliance As noted, the TPB’s mantra for working in complex contexts is ‘engage to change’. This was the rationale provided for engaging with Sri Lankan authorities in 2020–2021, and was either an explicit or underlying sentiment across many of our interviews with UN staff during the course of this research. However, given the experience in Sri Lanka, it is worth considering whether this approach fits with the need to protect and promote human rights. The current climate for the protection and promotion of human rights under the peace and security pillar of the UN is bleak. The expulsion of the human rights lead for the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) The TPB can either stick to its expertise and provide already established forms of counter-terrorism assistance based on expertise and experience in criminal justice-based approaches; or it will have to undergo a major transformation to demonstrate what it can offer beyond criminal justice expertise. dilemmas 33 in 2023 for having the temerity to question the human rights practices of the military junta,159 the subsequent withdrawal of host consent for the UN peacekeeping mission by Congolese,160 Malian161 and Sudanese authorities162 later the same year, combined with a decade of rising authoritarianism and weakening democracies, are all part of a significant backsliding in the enjoyment and fulfilment of universal human rights. This trend will likely lead to more experiences for the TPB like Sri Lanka, not less. The TPB’s work may thus face an increasing risk of being part of a blue-washing process and its offerings on human rightsor rule of law-based approaches to counter-terrorism may be rejected by national authorities. Across the numerous UN Funds, Agencies, Programmes, Secretariat Offices, Special Political Missions and Peace Operations, each part of the UN family rightly adopts different postures with host authorities based on their primary mandates. Original mandates given to UNODC to undertake counter-terrorism-related work by the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice all referenced human rights. Indeed, the Vienna Declaration, a guiding document from 2000, elevates human rights and fundamental freedoms in a core operating paragraph.163 Some within UNODC, and specifically the TPB, might say that criticising national authorities on human rights is not their role within the UN system. Instead, as some shared with us during our research, they felt that this should be the role of OHCHR, and instead UNODC’s and the TPB’s role on human rights should be using an insider approach to try and change behaviour and policies. Perhaps it is unrealistic to expect UNODC and the TPB to replicate OHCHR’s approach to human rights, but it is worth evaluating whether this approach will lead to the deprioritisation of human rights when national authorities are openly hostile to the role of the UN on human rights issues. There is no evidence that the TPB’s capacity-building programming institutionally disregards human rights– but at the same time there is a similar lack of evidence that it institutionally advocates for human rights. Good practices, as we heard from staff working in the field, appear ad hoc, rather than systematic.164 Over the coming years, the TPB will have to decide whether it can continue to walk the tightrope of working on terrorism prevention with authorities who are openly attacking the human rights functions and roles of the UN. The TPB’s dilemma will be whether they look to amplify their expertise and offering on human rights-based terrorism prevention support to contrast with other parts of the UN counter-terrorism architecture, or whether they instead choose to deprioritise human rights issues and seek new funders who are not traditional supporters of human rights. ... the TPB will have to decide whether it can continue to walk the tightrope of working on terrorism prevention with authorities who are openly attacking the human rights functions and roles of the UN. Notes 153 Saferworld interview with UN official, March–April 2024. 154 While the TPB’s portfolio has technically been set by UN Member States through UN Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice resolutions, it is not accurate to say that the TPB is simply a passive observer in this process. As is the case for most UN entities, the TPB provides advice and input into this agenda-setting process. 155 Saferworld interview with independent expert, March–April 2024. 156 Saferworld interview with UN official, March–April 2024. 157 UNODC (2022), ‘Programme/Project Document – Preventing and Countering Terrorism GLOTP1’, (internal document). 158 Schwartz, op. cit. 159 Prentice A (2023), ‘Mali expels U.N. mission’s human rights chief’, Reuters, 6 February (https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/maliexpels-un-missions-human-rights-chief-2023-02-05/) 160 Al Jazeera (2024), ‘UN peacekeepers close base in preparation to leave DR Congo’, 26 April (https://www.aljazeera.com/ news/2024/4/26/un-peacekeepers-close-base-in-preparation-toleave-dr-congo) 161 Ahmed B (2023), ‘The UN peacekeeping mission in Mali ends after 10 years, following the junta’s pressure to go’, Associated Press, 11 December (https://apnews.com/article/mali-un-peacekeepingextremism-ffd9c0ebe51e8db820ddc41a101c8d98) 162 Al Jazeera (2023), ‘Security Council agrees to terminate UN mission in Sudan’, 2 December (https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/12/2/ security-council-agrees-to-terminate-un-mission-in-sudan) 163 ‘We reaffirm the goals of the United Nations in the field of crime prevention and criminal justice, specifically the reduction of criminality, more efficient and effective law enforcement and administration of justice, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and promotion of the highest standards of fairness, humanity and professional conduct.’ United Nations General Assembly (2001), ‘Vienna Declaration on Crime and Justice: Meeting the Challenges of the Twenty-first Century’, 17 January, p 2 (www.undocs.org/A/RES/55/59) 164 Saferworld interview with UN representative, March–April 2024. The Peace Bell at the Vienna International Centre, where the United Nations Office in Vienna is located. © Jordan Street