Between Choice and Constraint: Go-and-See Visits and Syrian Return from Türkiye

1 EC POLICY REPORT – NOVEMBER 2025 HORIZON EUROPE PROJECT Decentring the Study of Migrant Returns and Readmission Policies in Europe and Beyond (GAPs) Between Choice and Constraint: Go-and-See Visits and Syrian Return from Türkiye1 N. Ela Gökalp Aras2 and Umutcan Yüksel3 Swedish Research Institute in Istanbul (SRII) This policy report analyses Türkiye’s “Go-and-See Visits” as a distinctive mechanism within the country’s evolving return-migration governance for Syrians under Temporary Protection. It relies on rounds of desk research and interviews conducted in Gaziantep and Hatay between January and June 2025. The fieldwork combined site-level observations with consultations involving NGOs, UN agencies, and other humanitarian stakeholders. The aim was to understand the changing humanitarian landscape, new implementations (such as “go-and-see visits” and assistance for voluntary return), the needs and future intentions of Syrians, and the policy adjustments and challenges surrounding voluntary return to Syria. The policy report, a culmination of this thorough analysis, presents critical policy-related insights and provides recommendations. Executive Summary This policy report examines Türkiye’s “Goand-See Visits” (GSVs) as a distinctive mechanism within the country’s evolving return-migration governance for Syrians under temporary protection (SuTP). Originally designed to enable informed decision-making, GSVs were re-launched in 2025 following the fall of the Assad regime at the end of 2024, allowing selected refugees to temporarily travel to designated areas in Northern Syria to assess safety, housing, and 1 Please cite as: Gökalp Aras, N. E., & Yüksel, U. (2025). Between Choice and Constraint: Go-and-see Visits and Syrian Return from Türkiye, WP10 Policy Report in GAPs: Decentring the Study of Migrant Returns and Readmission Policies in Europe and Beyond, DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17668808 2 Senior Researcher, Swedish Research Institute in Istanbul (SRII), ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-00029844-3955 , E-mail: ela.gokal[email protected] 3 Researcher, Swedish Research Institute in Istanbul (SRII), ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-35653568 , E-mail: [email protected] livelihood conditions before deciding whether to return. Drawing on desk research, field observations, and consultations with humanitarian actors conducted between January and June 2025 (with the support of previous fieldwork conducted between January and June 2024), this report situates GSVs within the broader shift from a reception-to-return policy framework. It analyses their implications for voluntariness, agency, and policy legitimacy. 2 EC POLICY REPORT – NOVEMBER 2025 The findings highlight that while GSVs are framed as a best-practice model for operationalising informed choice, they simultaneously expose the contradictions of voluntary return governance. Although many Syrians express emotional attachment to their homeland, structural constraints such as insecurity, destroyed infrastructure, poor access to services, and economic deprivation continue to impede sustainable return. In Türkiye, policy-induced pressures, such as the closure of Temporary Accommodation Centres (TACs) and rising socio-economic vulnerability, have created subtle coercive environments that may compromise voluntariness. The visits themselves are often limited to male family representatives, restricting women’s and children’s participation and reinforcing gendered asymmetries in decision-making. Moreover, the reduced presence of the UN agencies and NGOs, caused by severe funding shortages, undermines independent protection monitoring and increases the risk that GSVs evolve into symbolic showcases rather than genuine voluntary-choice mechanisms. Field data confirm that while Syrians consider GSVs helpful in decisionmaking, the majority still refrain from permanent return due to ongoing insecurity and livelihood challenges in Syria. The implementation of pilot cash-assistance programmes (up to €1,000 per household) by the Presidency of Migration Management (PMM) and UNHCR demonstrates that economic support remains crucial for ensuring genuine voluntariness and sustainability of return. The policy report concludes that Türkiye’s GSV model reflects both innovation and ambiguity. It provides a platform for informed decision-making, yet it operates in a policy context in which voluntariness is structurally constrained by push factors in Türkiye and by limited pull factors in post-Assad Syria. For GSVs to function as a credible instrument of voluntary return, three policy priorities are essential: (1) coupling GSVs with targeted financial and reintegration support; (2) restoring independent monitoring capacity through adequate international funding; and (3) integrating genderand child-sensitive approaches into visit design. Without these safeguards, GSVs risk serving as administrative formalities rather than pathways to safe, dignified, and sustainable return. Introduction In the field of return migration policy, Türkiye’s approach toward the return of Syrians has increasingly drawn attention as both a regional and international case study. Among the various instruments employed, the so-called “go-and-see visits (GSVs)” constitute a particularly significant example of how states seek to facilitate and legitimise voluntary return. These visits typically allow potential returnees to travel temporarily to their areas of origin in Syria to assess the security situation, access to services, and general living conditions before making a final decision to return. This policy report examines Türkiye’s “Go-and-See Visits” (GSVs) as a distinctive mechanism within the country’s evolving return-migration governance for Syrians under temporary protection (TP). Originally designed to enable informed decision-making, GSVs were re-launched in 2025 following the fall of the Assad regime at the end of 2024, allowing selected refugees to temporarily travel to designated areas in northern Syria to assess safety, housing, and livelihood conditions before deciding whether to return. Drawing on desk research, field observations, and consultations with humanitarian actors conducted between January and June 2025 (with the support of previous fieldwork conducted between January and June 2024), this report situates GSVs within the broader shift from a reception-to-return policy framework. It analyses their implications for voluntariness, agency, and policy legitimacy. The importance of the GSV model can be classified into two main functions. First, it provides migrants with the opportunity to make an informed decision based on firsthand observation rather than hearsay, which is a significant principle of voluntariness in international protection and return frameworks (Black & Koser, 1999; IOM, 2019). Second, it serves as a policy instrument for the host state to encourage return by reducing uncertainty, mitigating fears, and demonstrating that return is both possible and supported institutionally (Hugo, 2013; Long, 2013). 3 EC POLICY REPORT – NOVEMBER 2025 There are different cases and similar implementations in various regions and countries, such as the Uganda–Rwanda experience, exemplified by the “Go-and-See, Come-and-Tell” (GSCAT) visits for Rwandan refugees residing in the Nakivale settlement. Initiated after 2015 by the Ugandan and Rwandan governments, along with the UNHCR. The programme aimed to allow selected refugees to observe conditions in Rwanda and return to Uganda to inform others about repatriation prospects (Karooma, 2024, p. 2). The visits, however, were highly securitised: participants were hosted in military and police training facilities, underwent patriotism training, and were interrogated about family ties and alleged links to rebel groups (Ibid., pp. 2–3). The program was embedded in state-led repatriation campaigns and perceived as politicised; however, neither case has led to large-scale voluntary return. This case demonstrates that while GSVs are promoted as tools of refugee agencies, they risk becoming instruments of state migration diplomacy and pressure for return. On the other hand, regarding the region and the focused refugee population, reflections from Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon are more relevant to Türkiye’s case and the specific GSVs related to Syrians. Based on the recent UNHCR (2025a, p. 4) report, across Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon, over 60% of surveyed refugees emphasised the importance of conducting GSVs before making a final decision on return. Interest in such visits was particularly high in Jordan (70%) and Lebanon (61%), while lower in Iraq (37%) (Ibid., p. 7). Refugees noted that these visits would provide critical first-hand information on safety, housing, livelihoods, and services. 42% of Syrian refugees in Egypt intended to return within the next 12 months, whereas this figure is only 12% in Iraq (Ibid., p. 6). The UNHCR’s report shows that regionally, GSVs are framed as essential for informed choice; however, their effectiveness depends on addressing structural barriers, such as housing destruction, insecurity, and a lack of services. Among those countries, particularly with almost 1.5 million Syrians, Lebanon stands out as a significant case study, similar to Türkiye. As of 30 June 2025, it is estimated that 1.4 million displaced Syrians are in Lebanon, of whom 722,000 are registered with the UNHCR, in addition to 11,200 asylum seekers and refugees from other nationalities (UNHCR, 2025b). Following the shifting political and humanitarian dynamics in Syria after December 2024, the UNHCR and its partners-initiated community consultations in Lebanon to explore refugees’ perceptions of return and the potential use of GSVs. By midMay 2025, approximately 156,000 Syrians had returned to or transited through Lebanon (UNHCR, 2025c, p. 1). The Lebanon case resembles that of Uganda-Rwanda and Türkiye-Syria in highlighting how GSVs are framed as tools for informed decision-making, yet structural barriers, such as security perceptions, housing, and services, heavily constrain their impact. The GSVs Implementation in Türkiye In Türkiye, this practice is embedded in a broader return policy that has shifted from an initial reception-and-integration paradigm toward a return-and-repatriation framework, particularly after 2019 (Şahin Mencütek et al., 2023; Gökalp Aras et al., 2025; Rottmann et al., 2025; Şahin Mencütek, 2025). Thus, the GSVs represent an important case for analysing how the boundaries between voluntary and coerced return are negotiated in practice, especially in contexts where return is politically promoted as a durable solution. The country case illustrates how voluntary return is operationalised through institutional mechanisms and why it remains a crucial, yet contested, component of return governance in Türkiye. These visits enable Syrians to temporarily travel to designated areas in northern Syria, allowing them to directly observe the conditions of safety, housing, and livelihood opportunities before making a final decision about their return. In principle, this mechanism is widely regarded as a bestpractice example, since it reduces uncertainty, strengthens agency, and enhances the credibility of voluntary return processes by grounding them in first-hand experience. At the same time, the Türkiye case highlights the inherent ambiguities of such practices from a critical perspective. While framed as a 4 EC POLICY REPORT – NOVEMBER 2025 confidence-building measure, GSVs also serve as a state-led instrument to encourage return, especially in a political climate where the repatriation of Syrians has become a central policy objective, as is the case in Türkiye since 2019. The practice, therefore, occupies critical space between voluntariness and subtle forms of coercion. It also demonstrates why voluntariness must be critically assessed not merely as a legal category but as a practice. Between 2017 and 2022, especially following Türkiye’s military interventions in Northwest Syria, Türkiye has been allowing Syrians to make GVSs to Syria for a period of up to 3 months during the two major religious holidays, i.e. Eid Al-Fitr and Eid Al-Adha. Eid (bayram) visits also provided Syrian migrants with an opportunity to check on their land or properties and the security situation firsthand. However, since 2022, Turkish authorities have effectively prevented Syrians who travel home from returning to Türkiye after visiting their homeland during religious holidays due to the intensifying anti-refugee sentiment in Türkiye (Al-Monitor, 2025). However, the fall of the Assad regime in Syria in December 2024 started a new phase, and more than 509,387 Syrians have returned from Türkiye since then (Yerlikaya, 2025). Accordingly, the number of Syrians under temporary protection has decreased from 3.53 million in 2022 to 2.43 million as of September 2025 (Ibid.) Despite the increased trend in numbers, many Syrians are critical of the option of return due to a lack of information/awareness, security concerns in Syria, financial/economic barriers, lack of housing/place to stay in Syria, and legal/administrative restrictions and personal circumstances (Upinion, 2025). In light of recent developments in Syria, Türkiye re-launched the GSVs for Syrians as of 1 January 2025. During this period, a designated head of the family was permitted to enter/leave the country three times within six months (UNHCR, 2025d). The UNHCR Türkiye welcomed the new measure authorising GSVs to Syria with the possibility of re-entry, acknowledging its importance in allowing Syrians to make informed decisions about whether to return to their country (AlMonitor, 2025). The Minister of Interior announced the measure as a pilot immigrant model, indicating a structured approach in which one family member travels first to lay the groundwork for the rest of the family’s return (PMM, 2025a). To facilitate GSVs and permanent voluntary returns, the processing capacity at border crossings was increased from 3,000 to 15,000-20,000 persons per day (DW, 2024). In May 2025, the Minister of Interior announced approximately 27,000 “pioneer immigrants” (PMM, 2025b). A recent report of Upinion (2025) reflects the implications and drawing important lessons from GSVs of Syrian refugees in Türkiye, developed based on interviews with more than 200 Syrians, reveals that only a small proportion of Syrian migrants participated in the GSVs to Syria, 12% did so themselves and 14% knew someone who did, mainly due to lack of awareness, security risks, financial constraints, housing issues, and legal or administrative barriers (Ibid.). Those who made the journey largely encountered devastating conditions: destroyed infrastructure and homes, dire economic and humanitarian circumstances, and widespread insecurity; while the visits had a decidedly mixed effect on refugees’ return intentions: roughly 46% were encouraged to consider returning, spurred by nostalgia, family ties, or hope for stability, while another 46% were deterred, discouraged by harsh living conditions, lack of services, and safety concerns with just 9% reporting no change in intent (Ibid.). Overall, more than half (57%) of survey respondents deemed the visits helpful in making informed decisions, 40% describing them as essential and 17% as useful (Ibid.) Considering GSVs, another study on Turkey (Zeynep Şahin-Mencütek and O. Bahadır Dinçer, forthcoming/2025), which also confirms that, after Assad’s fall, enthusiasm surged, but the actual return remained limited and uneven across governorates. Returns are constrained by insecurity, destroyed housing, poor services, lack of livelihoods, and social divisions (Ibid., p. 1). The research emphasises the contradiction between the official Turkish data and the UNHCR records regarding voluntary returns (Ibid., p. 3). In particular, regarding the GSVs, the study states that the related procedure is framed as “orderly and voluntary,” involving online appointments, interviews, voluntary return forms, UNHCR presence, and designated border crossings, which are without cash or logistical support, 5 EC POLICY REPORT – NOVEMBER 2025 and are seen as creating barriers for vulnerable groups (Ibid.). While severe funding shortages have forced many NGOs to close or scale back, the IOM has had a limited role, and the UNHCR only monitors voluntariness, as it does not promote return, since Syria is not deemed safe (Ibid., p. 4). Those studies show that many Syrians express emotional attachment to Syria but delay return due to safety risks, housing shortages, poor services, and economic deprivation. Thus, regarding the GSVs, they highlight the need for assistance, monitoring, and safeguards. The hesitation and cost barriers faced by refugees indicate that GSVs alone cannot generate a sustainable return. The following two figures provide trend analysis of Syrian refugee returns and explain the procedure for voluntary return and GSVs. Figure 1: Syrian Refugees Voluntarily Returned to Syria from Turkey Source: Developed by authors, based on available information on UNHCR Regional Flash Update on Syria. Figure 2: Voluntary Return and Go-and-See Visit Procedure for Syrians in Türkiye Source: Developed by authors, based on available information on UNHCR. (2025d). “Movement procedures”, https://help.unhcr.org/turkiye/volrep/movement-procedures/ 6 EC POLICY REPORT – NOVEMBER 2025 Geopolitical and Internal Dynamics in Return Decisions of Syrians The collapse of the Assad regime in December 2024 has fundamentally transformed the landscape of Syrian return migration from Türkiye, introducing both unprecedented opportunities and complex challenges. While this political transition has generated cautious optimism among Syrian migrants who have endured fourteen years of protracted displacement, the sustainability of return remains contingent upon multiple intersecting geopolitical and internal dynamics that continue to shape Syria’s postconflict trajectory. The contemporary Syrian context is characterised by five principal dynamics that directly impact the viability and safety of refugee return: First, Israel’s military engagement in Syria has intensified significantly, with nearly 100 documented attacks in 2025 alone. These operations systematically target Syrian military infrastructure and areas perceived as threats to Israeli security interests, creating persistent insecurity zones that complicate return planning and territorial stability assessments (SOHR, 2025). Second, the eruption of sectarian violence on 12 July 2025, between Druze and Bedouin communities, exemplifies the fragility of intercommunal relations in post-Assad Syria. The United Nations reported that since 12 July, at least 93,400 people have been displaced, most within Sweida governorate (OCHA, 2025). The fighting between local Druze-led and Bedouin armed groups, exacerbated by the manner of the Syrian government’s intervention and Israeli airstrikes, has caused widespread disruptions to electricity, water, and health care, and ignited sectarian hate speech and the risk of reprisals against Druze communities across the country (HRW, 2025). Third, the integration of Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces presents both opportunities and challenges for national reconciliation. On 10 March 2025, the Syrian government reached an agreement with the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to integrate their military and civilian institutions into the state’s structures. This deal aimed to consolidate control over northeastern regions and address longstanding ethnic tensions. The integration is expected to be completed by December 2025 (Financial Times, 2025). Despite being signed by al-Sharaa and SDF commander Mazloum Abdi, implementation has stalled over Damascus’s demands for complete SDF disbandment and the rejection of Kurdish units. Fourth, the sanctions regime continues to impede Syria’s economic reconstruction. While the European Union and the United Kingdom have lifted most sanctions, the United States has issued only limited instruments, such as General License 25 and temporary suspensions of the Caesar Act. Consequently, Syria’s banking sector remains largely isolated from the global financial system, severely constraining economic recovery and reconstruction efforts essential for sustainable return (KAS, 2025). Fifth, return decision-making patterns reveal complex push-pull dynamics. According to ETANA’s (2025) comprehensive study on “Refugee Returns & Migration Dynamics after Assad,” returnees identified push factors in host countries, including rising living costs and xenophobia, as significant considerations. However, the regime’s fall emerged as the primary pull factor influencing recent return decisions. Those choosing not to return cited fundamental issues, including a lack of trust in the new authorities, security uncertainties, and concerns about living conditions. Notably, the study found that no pull factors independent of push factors proved sufficiently compelling to encourage return, nor were economic considerations the primary determinants for returnees (Ibid.). 7 EC POLICY REPORT – NOVEMBER 2025 Policy and Practice on the Return of Syrians Following the political transition in Syria in December 2024, our team conducted rounds of desk research (Yüksel and Gökalp Aras, 2024) and additional interviews in Gaziantep and Hatay between January and June 2025. The fieldwork combined site-level observations with consultations involving NGOs, UN agencies, and other humanitarian stakeholders. The aim was to understand the changing humanitarian landscape, new implementations (such as GSVs and assistance for voluntary return), the needs and future intentions of Syrians, and the policy adjustments and challenges surrounding voluntary return to Syria. After the fall of the Assad regime, Syrians perceive return as a viable option, though not in the near future. Safety and security concerns, lack of trust in new authorities, and infrastructure deficits are among the primary reasons for Syrians’ cautious stance toward permanent return. Meanwhile, the protective environment for Syrians has been severely affected by compounded vulnerabilities caused by the 2023 earthquakes, deteriorating socio-economic conditions, and stricter policy implementation. In this dynamic and evolving environment, we captured the following shifts in policy and practice. First, due to USAID budget cuts (reduced to $ 3.8 million USD in 2025 from $ 52.5 million USD in 2024) and the increasingly stretched humanitarian funding landscape, there has been a significant decrease in the presence of NGOs and UN institutions, with many having either substantially reduced their personnel capacity and programs or closed entirely. Considering the impact of the 2023 earthquakes, this limited humanitarian capacity has directly affected the support mechanisms provided to Syrians and reduced the independent protection monitoring capacity. Despite the premature nature of many return movements, demand for return assistance has increased significantly among Syrian refugees, especially those who see no other option due to socio-economic and documentation challenges. Many actively seek support for return and reintegration, particularly cash assistance for shelter reconstruction in Syria. The EU has committed 95 million EUR in funding to UNHCR for “Supporting Voluntary, Safe and Dignified Returns of Syrians to Safe Zones in Syria (Family Based Voluntary Return),” likely to be implemented in coordination with Turkey’s Presidency of Migration Management (European Commission, 2025). It was reported that cash assistance of up to 1,000 EUR is being provided to Syrian families in Adıyaman as a pilot, if they choose to return to Syria. PMM and UNHCR implement the program. Due to the camp’s closure, Syrian families were provided with three options: voluntary return, transfer to urban areas, or transfer to another province. The socio-economic impacts on Syrian families in Turkey reveal concerning intergenerational trends. There has been a marked increase in child labour and school dropout rates, as Syrian families increasingly prioritise accumulating savings for home reconstruction or rehabilitation in Syria over their children’s educational continuity. This trade-off between immediate return preparation and long-term human capital development poses significant risks for the next generation of Syrians. Particularly concerning is the potential reintegration challenge facing children born in Turkey who possess limited Arabic language skills in the event of permanent return to Syria. These educational and linguistic barriers compound the already complex challenges of postconflict reintegration. Housing policy changes have intensified structural pressures for return. The closure of temporary accommodation centres (TACs) in September 2025—including facilities that 8 EC POLICY REPORT – NOVEMBER 2025 housed Syrian migrants following the 2023 earthquakes—has forced vulnerable families into untenable choices between relocating to unaffordable urban settings or returning prematurely to Syria. The convergence of housing crises, elevated rental costs (particularly in earthquake-affected regions), and the absence of financial support or reintegration assistance for returnees has effectively created structural push factors that may compel premature and potentially unsustainable returns. A lack of information about procedures and rights further complicates informed decisionmaking about returning. Inadequate access to accurate information about voluntary return procedures, rights, and entitlements, compounded by the proliferation of misinformation, has led many Syrians to make return decisions without a complete understanding of the implications and options. Particularly complex cases involve unaccompanied minors or children with one deceased or Syria-based parent, where Turkish authorities’ requirement for parental consent creates unexpected procedural barriers that families often discover only after initiating return processes. In response, UNHCR, NGOs, and local authorities have intensified efforts to disseminate accurate information about rights, entitlements, and voluntary return processes, tailoring interventions to address individual needs. The updated field information confirms that GSVs may provide information, but cannot shift overall return dynamics. The closure of Temporary Accommodation Centres (TACs) in earthquake-affected regions forces households into premature return or unaffordable relocation. This demonstrates how policy-induced pressures can compromise the voluntary nature of returns and overshadow the function of GSVs. Also, without financial support, GSV participants may view returns as unfeasible even if visits confirm emotional attachment or family ties. The respondents stated that a joint PMM– UNHCR pilot in Adıyaman offers up to €1,000 per household, while international NGOs also plan a pilot cash-support programme that provides €700–1,000 per household, embedded in case management systems. These models directly address the cost barriers refugees face and could be integrated with GSVs to strengthen voluntariness. On the other hand, recent interviews also highlighted that funding shortages have forced NGOs and UN agencies to significantly reduce or close their operations. The shrinking humanitarian funding environment decreases independent monitoring capacity and increases the risk that GSVs become policy showcases rather than genuine voluntarychoice mechanisms. Finally, regarding the GSVs, it should be noted that despite its positive aspects, women face restrictions on mobility, loss of independence, and dresscode impositions; children born in Turkey lack Arabic literacy and face blocked educational pathways in Syria. Thus, when the GSV opportunity is provided to the household, it is generally the male family members; therefore, GSVs must be designed with genderand child-sensitive components. Our field observations underscore that while GSVs serve as an important mechanism for informed decision-making, the convergence of push factors in Turkey and pull factors in postAssad Syria creates a complex environment where the voluntariness of return remains a contested issue. The gap between refugees’ aspirations for return and the reality of Syria’s capacity to ensure sustainable, safe, and dignified reintegration continues to present fundamental challenges for all stakeholders involved in managing this unprecedented return movement. 9 EC POLICY REPORT – NOVEMBER 2025 Conclusion and Policy Recommendations While GSVs represent a crucial mechanism for enabling Syrian refugees to make informed decisions about return within this complex spectrum of considerations, the multitude of emerging challenges on the Syrian side, from ongoing security threats and sectarian violence to economic isolation and minority vulnerability, fundamentally undermine the sustainability of return and compromise the safety and dignity of returnees. The gap between the aspiration for voluntary, safe, and dignified return and the reality of Syria’s current conditions remains substantial, requiring continued international attention and carefully calibrated policy responses that prioritise refugee protection while acknowledging the legitimate desire of many to return home. Türkiye’s GSVs have often been framed as a pragmatic response to the complex dilemmas of return migration. By allowing Syrians under temporary protection to witness conditions in their country of origin before making lifechanging decisions, the approach appears to offer a balanced middle ground between the imperatives of host-country management and refugees’ right to informed choice. Yet a closer analysis reveals that this model, while innovative in principle, is far from unproblematic. First, the practice operates within a context where Syrians face persistent challenges in Türkiye, discrimination in the labour market, unequal access to education and health services, and exposure to xenophobia. Such experiences can create indirect pressures and push factors that undermine the perceived “voluntariness” of return, even when the decision is framed as informed. Second, the situation in Syria itself remains unstable, with fragile governance and the rule of law, insecurity, and limited access to basic services continuing to deter large-scale, sustainable returns. In this context, GSVs risk creating unrealistic expectations or functioning as symbolic gestures rather than pathways to durable solutions. However, sustainable returns require structural guarantees in Syria itself, such as safety, economic stability, and functioning public services, which are still absent. Until such conditions are met, return will remain a limited option for a small minority rather than a collective trajectory. In this sense, while Türkiye’s “go-and-see” approach illustrates an attempt to operationalise informed choice, it simultaneously exposes the contradictions of return governance: an emphasis on pragmatic management in the absence of genuine conditions for durable solutions. As such, the model should be read both as a best practice and as a reminder that voluntary return cannot substitute for the long-term political and socio-economic reconstruction of Syria. For GSVs to function as a credible instrument of voluntary return, three policy priorities are essential: 1. Coupling GSVs with targeted financial and reintegration support: The pilot cash-assistance programmes demonstrate the critical importance of economic support. Such programmes should be expanded and systematically linked to GSV participation to ensure that returnees can make genuinely informed decisions with adequate resources for reintegration. 2. Restoring independent monitoring capacity through adequate international funding: The diminished presence of UN agencies and NGOs due to funding shortages has created serious protection gaps. Robust, independent monitoring mechanisms must be restored to ensure that GSVs function as tools of the refugee agency rather than state-directed return pressure. 3. Integrating genderand childsensitive approaches into visit design: Current GSV practices often limit participation to male family representatives, excluding women and children from decision-making processes. Future implementations must ensure inclusive participation and address the specific protection concerns of women and children.