Athletes for Good Governance and Rights in Europe - CBA REPORT

0 Athletes for Good Governance and Rights in Europe Deliverable D2.1 CBA REPORT August 2025 1 Funded by the European Union. Views and opinions expressed are however those of the author(s) only and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union or the European Education and Culture Executive Agency (EACEA). Neither the European Union nor EACEA can be held responsible for them. CBA REPORT August 2025 REPORT AUTHORS Dr Andrea Cattaneo Edge Hill University Assisted by Nicole Fischhaber and Dr Cristina Silvestri Project Partners 2 Contents EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................ 4 1. Introduction and Project Context......................................................................... 4 2. EU Law and Policy Context ................................................................................ 5 3. Key Findings ....................................................................................................... 6 1. Legal recognition varies — but the principle is universal ................................. 6 2. Sport-specific frameworks are uneven ............................................................ 6 3. CBAs bring tangible benefits for athletes and more ........................................ 6 4. Decentralisation trends require careful management ...................................... 6 5. Barriers to collective bargaining in sport remain significant ............................. 7 6. Alignment with EU law strengthens the case for CBAs ................................... 7 4. Recommendations .............................................................................................. 7 1. Recognise and engage with athlete unions ..................................................... 7 2. Promote sectoral or coordinated bargaining in sport ....................................... 7 3. Use CBAs to address priority issues for athlete welfare .................................. 7 4. Align sports regulations with EU law through CBAs ........................................ 8 5. Leverage EU funding to build capacity for bargaining ..................................... 8 6. Strengthen enforcement and monitoring ......................................................... 8 7. Encourage transnational dialoge…………………………………………………. 8 1. Introduction and Methodology ................................................................................ 9 1.1 Purpose and Scope of the Report................................................................... 10 1.2 Background Context ....................................................................................... 10 1.3 Objectives ....................................................................................................... 11 1.4 Methodology ................................................................................................... 12 2. Literature Review ................................................................................................. 12 2.1 Collective Bargaining Agreements: Concepts and Types ............................... 12 2.2 Employment Relations in Sport....................................................................... 13 2.3 CBAs in sport: the landscape and trends ........................................................ 14 2.4 Transnational Efforts in Collective Bargaining ................................................ 16 3. The Legal Framework .......................................................................................... 17 3.1 Participation, Recognition and Worker Status................................................. 17 3.2 Effects and Enforcement of CBAs .................................................................. 19 3.3 The International Legal Framework ................................................................ 20 3 4. The European Union and CBAs in Sport .............................................................. 21 4.1 EU Competence ............................................................................................. 21 4.2 Collective Agreements and the Internal Market .............................................. 22 4.2 The European Sectoral Social Dialogue ......................................................... 25 4.3 CJEU and Sport .............................................................................................. 26 5. Mapping and Analysis of Existing Collective Bargaining Agreements .................. 28 5.2 Classification by Sport, Jurisdiction, and Characteristics ................................ 28 5.3 Common Provisions and Variations ................................................................ 29 5.4 Gaps, Trends, and Emerging Issues .............................................................. 30 5.5 Key Themes from CBA Analysis ..................................................................... 30 6. National Legal Frameworks .................................................................................. 31 6.1 Spain .............................................................................................................. 31 6.2 Italy ................................................................................................................. 33 6.3 United Kingdom .............................................................................................. 35 6.4 Ireland ............................................................................................................. 37 6.5 Finland ............................................................................................................ 39 6.6 Comparative Observations on Collective Bargaining Frameworks ................. 41 7. Transnational Agreements: Case Studies and Implications ................................. 42 7.1.1 Content ........................................................................................................ 44 8. Findings and Recommendations………………………………………………………43 8.2 Challenges, Good Practices, and Replication Models .................................... 49 8.3 Recommendations for Stakeholders ............................................................... 50 4 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1. Introduction and Project Context The AGREE (Athletes for Good Governance and Rights in Europe) project is a threeyear EU-funded initiative coordinated by the EAPA, with player associations and an academic partner across multiple Member States. Its purpose is clear: to strengthen the protection of athletes’ rights and working conditions through collective bargaining agreements (CBAs), underpinned by evidence-based research and structured social dialogue. The project recognises that while sport has unique features, athletes are workers under EU law when performing under an employment relationship. Collective bargaining is therefore not just a labour relations tool — it is a legal mechanism that delivers certainty for governing bodies, protects athlete welfare, and reduces the risk of litigation under EU competition law, as demonstrated in high-profile cases such as Diarra (C-650/22) and ISU (C-124/21 P). AGREE is structured in stages to ensure practical impact: 1. Initial Research and Report – Mapping existing collective bargaining arrangements in European sport, analysing legal frameworks, and identifying gaps. This report is the product of that stage. 2. Job Shadowing Exchanges – Players’ associations will learn from best practices in Europe and beyond, observing how established unions negotiate and implement agreements. 3. European Minimum Standard Contract and CBA Framework – The project team will identify and consolidate minimum standards to ensure good governance and respect for athletes’ rights, creating a template for use across sports and countries. 4. Practical Guide on CBAs – A user-friendly booklet compiling relevant information, practical advice, and examples of good practices to assist both athletes and sports organisations in initiating and improving collective bargaining. This structured approach ensures that the project will not only provide evidence and recommendations but also deliver tools, capacity-building, and tangible outcomes for the sports sector. Sport in Europe has a distinctive legal and institutional framework. It is recognised in Article 165 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which calls for the promotion of fairness and openness in sporting competitions and the protection of the physical and moral integrity of sportspeople. At the same time, athletes’ employment conditions fall within the – limited – EU’s social policy and labour law competences, with important implications for how employment rights and CBAs operate in the sporting sector. The AGREE project builds on these legal foundations and EU priorities. It responds to growing concerns that while professional athletes in some sports enjoy comprehensive 5 CBAs — covering wages, working time, health protection, image rights, and career transition — many others, particularly women, athletes in smaller markets, or those in non-traditional disciplines, have little or no collective protection. This gap undermines the EU’s broader policy goals on equality, inclusion, and good governance. Through comparative legal analysis, country case studies, and direct engagement with stakeholders, the project has documented the current landscape of CBAs in sport across different Member States, identified structural barriers to their development, and formulated recommendations to address them. These findings are intended not only to inform athlete organisations, but to engage governing bodies, federations, and public authorities in constructive dialogue — recognising that effective collective bargaining benefits the integrity, sustainability, and credibility of sport itself. 2. EU Law and Policy Context Collective bargaining in sport is supported not only by national labour laws but also by the EU’s legal framework and case law, which confirm that social dialogue is both lawful and necessary to balance economic and social objectives. Under Articles 151–155 TFEU, the EU is committed to improving working conditions and promoting social dialogue. The Treaties explicitly allow social partners to conclude agreements that can be implemented through EU law, highlighting the legitimacy and importance of CBAs. The Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) has repeatedly confirmed that collective agreements serving social policy goals enjoy protection from EU competition rules. In Albany (C-67/96) and FNV Kunsten (C-413/13), the Court ruled that CBAs are exempt from antitrust restrictions where they improve employment conditions. This principle is especially relevant for sports, where governing bodies may fear that CBAs could conflict with competition law. Recent sports-related cases reinforce this message: • In ISU (C-124/21 P) the CJEU established that overly restrictive eligibility rules can breach competition law where they lack proportionality. The case underlines that sports regulations must be compatible with EU law and that social dialogue — including CBAs — can help design proportionate rules that protect both competition and athletes’ rights. • In Diarra (C-650/22), the CJEU found that certain transfer rules imposed excessive restrictions on a player’s freedom to work. The judgment demonstrates that where sports regulations have significant effects on athletes’ livelihoods, they must be balanced with fundamental labour rights. CBAs offer a structured way to achieve that balance, ensuring that rules serve legitimate sporting objectives without undermining workers’ freedoms. EU labour directives also provide a floor of rights that CBAs in sport can build upon. For example, the Working Time Directive (2003/88/EC) and the Transparent and Predictable Working Conditions Directive (2019/1152) address working hours, rest 6 periods, and contractual clarity — all issues that can be tailored to the specific realities of athletic careers through collective bargaining. The EU’s Work Plan for Sport and the European Sectoral Social Dialogue further encourage structured dialogue between employers and athletes’ representatives. The AGREE project’s findings demonstrate that CBAs are a practical mechanism to translate these high-level policy commitments into concrete protections for athletes, aligning sport with the EU’s broader social and economic objectives. 3. Key Findings The AGREE project’s comparative research across the European Union and the UK reveals wide variation in how collective bargaining operates in sport, but also clear opportunities for alignment with EU legal and policy goals. 1. Legal recognition varies — but the principle is universal All five countries legally recognise collective bargaining, either through constitutional provisions (e.g. Spain, Italy) or statutory frameworks (e.g. UK, Ireland, Finland). In practice, however, the scope and enforceability of CBAs differ sharply. Civil law systems (Spain, Italy, Finland) tend to give CBAs normative effect across entire sectors, while common law systems (UK, Ireland) rely more on voluntary agreements that lack automatic extension. 2. Sport-specific frameworks are uneven Spain and Italy have specific legislation for professional athletes — such as Spain’s Royal Decree 1006/1985 — and well-established CBAs in sports like football, basketball, and futsal. In Finland, a sport-specific CBA exists in ice hockey, but coverage is partial. The UK and Ireland have fewer formal CBAs in sport, and where they exist, they are often confined to certain clubs or leagues (e.g. professional rugby in the UK). 3. CBAs bring tangible benefits for athletes and more Where CBAs exist and are implemented, they regulate a broad range of matters: wages, contractual stability, training conditions, leave, health and welfare, social protection, image rights, and dispute resolution. In some cases, such as Spanish women’s football, CBAs have been instrumental in advancing gender equality, securing minimum salaries, and formalising maternity protections. CBAs can also be instrumental to promote the objectives of Governing Bodies: in Italy, the Serie A football CBA includes a relegation clause that automatically reduces salaries by 25% when clubs drop to Serie B. This shows that CBAs can be designed not only to protect athletes, but also to promote sustainability and competitive balance in sport. 4. Decentralisation trends require careful management Collective bargaining in sport can take diverse forms – from sectoral agreements to club-level arrangements. In the Netherlands, a single ice hockey club concluded a binding CBA with a union, showing that effective bargaining can be scaled to different contexts. Research from Finland shows that moving from centralised, sectoral bargaining to more decentralised models (“local pots” or firm-level bargaining) can 7 fragment protections and lead to uneven benefits, particularly for blue-collar or lowerpaid workers. While wage effects may be modest in the short term, decentralisation without strong coordination risks creating gaps in athlete protection — especially in sports with weaker union presence. 5. Barriers to collective bargaining in sport remain significant Even in countries with strong legal frameworks, athletes face challenges: • Representation gaps — fragmented unions or low membership in certain sports, particularly women’s and semi-professional disciplines. • Employer resistance — reluctance by federations or clubs to recognise athlete unions or engage in binding negotiations. • Lack of enforcement — even binding CBAs can be undermined by poor monitoring or insufficient legal remedies. • Transnational gaps — no country studied formally recognises transnational CBAs, despite the cross-border nature of many sports. 6. Alignment with EU law strengthens the case for CBAs The ISU and Diarra cases show that poorly balanced sports regulations can breach EU competition or labour law, creating legal uncertainty for governing bodies. CBAs offer a structured, lawful way to design proportionate rules that protect both the sport’s integrity and athletes’ rights — reducing litigation risk and aligning with EU principles under Articles 151–155 TFEU. 4. Recommendations The AGREE project findings point to a clear conclusion: collective bargaining in sport is not only a matter of fairness — it is a tool for legal certainty and alignment with EU policy goals. To unlock its full potential, we recommend the following actions: 1. Recognise and engage with athlete unions Sports governing bodies and federations should formally recognise representative athlete unions and enter into structured negotiations. Where legal thresholds for recognition are unclear (as in the UK and Ireland), voluntary recognition can still deliver stability, trust, and compliance with international good practice. 2. Promote sectoral or coordinated bargaining in sport Fragmented, club-level agreements risk leaving many athletes without protection — particularly in women’s and semi-professional sports. Sectoral or coordinated CBAs, as seen in Spain, Italy, and to some extent Finland, ensure consistent standards across leagues and divisions. 3. Use CBAs to address priority issues for athlete welfare CBAs should be designed to cover: • Minimum pay; • Training and workload management; 8 • Health, safety, and insurance; • Maternity, paternity, and parental leave; • Post-career transition and pension rights; • Image rights and commercial opportunities. 4. Align sports regulations with EU law through CBAs The ISU and Diarra cases demonstrate the legal risk of imposing rules without adequate consultation or consideration of their proportionality. Negotiated agreements between athlete unions and governing bodies offer a defensible, EU-compliant route to regulating competition formats, transfer systems, or disciplinary frameworks. 5. Leverage EU funding to build capacity for bargaining EU programmes, including Erasmus+ and the European Social Fund, can support training for athlete representatives, legal advice for negotiations, and pilot CBAs in under-represented sports. Federations and public authorities should actively support such funding applications in partnership with athlete unions. 6. Strengthen enforcement and monitoring Even the best CBAs are ineffective without enforcement. Federations and public authorities should work with unions to establish joint monitoring committees, transparent compliance reporting, and accessible dispute resolution mechanisms. 7. Encourage transnational dialogue While national law governs CBA enforceability, many sports operate across borders. National federations should collaborate through European or international bodies (e.g., FIFPRO, EAPA) to align minimum standards and explore frameworks for recognising transnational agreements 15 World Players Association (2023) reported that 83% of basketball players, 80% of cricket players, and 73% of rugby players are covered by CBAs, indicating strong union presence in team sports. However, CBAs are less common in women’s sports, lower leagues, and individual disciplines due to weaker union representation and financial constraints. 19 The brief overview presented above describes a complex system of relations and statuses, resulting in disjointed forms and levels of representation, which makes it more challenging for athletes to engage in coordinated negotiation efforts. National Olympic Committees (NOCs) generally hold consultative roles and lack the authority to negotiate binding agreements for athletes. 20 The presence of trade unions specifically for Olympic athletes is uncommon, with notable exceptions found in France and Slovenia. In this system, athletes have traditionally enjoyed very limited direct representation. 21 In countries such as Norway, Finland, and Belgium, individual athletes may join general—rather than sport-specific—trade unions, while in others, including Germany, the Netherlands, the UK, and Portugal, independent athlete associations exist. Their role varies according to the legal framework: some focus primarily on advocacy, with occasional engagement in litigation to protect athletes’ rights, 22 whereas others, like NL Sporter in the Netherlands, play a prominent role in representing all Olympic and other high-performance athletes. Finally, a general fragmentation of employment relations in sport can be observed, where the prevalence of non-standard contracts poses structural challenges to effective bargaining. Within this multi-level relationship, effective athletes’ representation might be impaired if SGBs impose the creation of athletes’ commissions, over independent unions. 23 For example, the IOC Athletes’ Commission is composed of athletes, nominated by their NOC or appointed by the IOC President. Athletes’ commissions might be useful in informing the SGB of issues relevant to athletes’ working conditions, but they do not equate to athletes’ unions: they are not independent bodies, and their role is merely advisory. They are also not representative bodies for the purpose of collective bargaining. Athletes’ commissions are significantly less likely to raise contentious issues in their relations with governing bodies, and cannot exert pressure through industrial action. Additionally, some federations have simply resisted unionisation efforts, maintaining control over athlete contracts and sponsorship deals. 24 ILO Conventions (No. 87; No. 98) offer protection against discriminatory practices and the right to unionisation; however, instances of anti-union behaviour are prevalent in sports. 25 Frictions and obstacles in the relationship between employers and employees can lead to industrial actions. While the sporting industry presents specific characteristics 19 Graham, Garton and Yellin (n 10), 34. 20 Mittag et al (n 1) 16. 21 JL Chappelet, ‘The unstoppable rise of athlete power in the Olympic system’ (2020) 23(5) Sport in Society 795, 795–809. 22 Mittag et al (n 1) 25. 23 Mittag et al (n 8) 15. 24 Pannett (n 6) 189. 25 Graham, Garton and Yellin (n 10) 4. 16 that can morph into constraints on both sides of this relationship, such as unique skills of the workforce that cannot be easily replaced outside the industry and short careers for players that need quick resolution of disputes, industrial actions are not unprecedented. 26 2.4 Transnational Efforts in Collective Bargaining In recent years, the landscape of professional sports labour relations has seen increasing efforts to develop transnational CBAs that operate beyond national jurisdictions. With the globalisation of elite sport and the mobility of athletes across borders, there is growing momentum for regulatory frameworks that can harmonise standards internationally. 27 In contrast to North America, where major leagues operate under a centralised structure where the league functions as the formal employer of athletes, creating a relatively straightforward framework, professional leagues in Europe function primarily as governing or coordinating bodies, while individual clubs are the employers. This decentralised employment structure complicates the collective bargaining process, especially when attempting to introduce league-wide or crossborder agreements. A relevant framework for institutional dialogue between Social Partners is Social Dialogue. This instrument has the potential to suit the sporting industry, due to its voluntary and flexible nature. In this context, the experience in professional football represents the forefront of the gradual ‘Europeanisation’ of the sports sector, which may lead to significant procedural and substantive changes compared to other major sports. 28 However, it is noted how, although SD is becoming increasingly recognised, it remains uncommon in professional sports across Europe, varying by country, type of sport, and gender. 29 The literature suggests that Social Dialogue constitutes an ideal platform for various stakeholders and advocacy groups within the EU's sports policy framework to reach agreements, thereby reducing the reciprocal challenges they present to each other. 30 The focus on the notion of dialogue here is particularly relevant: encouraging communication (between sports organisations and players' unions) and creating strategies for enhanced Social Dialogue is seen as essential for creating solutions and improving workplace safety, protecting young athletes, and promoting initiatives related to discrimination, gender equality, and tackling gender-based violence. 31 The 26 O'Leary (n 11) 12. 27 De Spiegelaere (n 9) and Mittag et al (n 8) 28 B Keller, ‘Sectoral Social Dialogue in Professional Football: Social Partners, Outcomes and Problems of Implementation’ [2018] SSRN Electronic Journal 5, 5-43. 29 L Fiege and M Seltmann, ‘Social dialogue in professional sports in Europe: towards democratic governance between the European Sport Model and national industrial relations?’ [2024] Journal of European Public Policy 1, 1-33. 30 R Parrish, ‘Social dialogue in European professional football’ [2011] 17(2) European Law Journal 213, 213– 229. 31 International Labour Organization, Professional Athletes and the Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work: ILO Brief (ILO Technical Brief, ILO 2024) https://doi.org/10.54394/UPJT5382. 17 European Commission has also stressed the importance of engaging with Social Dialogue to build sustainable communities, as it can help reconcile economic progress with the well-being of workers, encourage innovation while narrowing income disparities, support social fairness, and improve workplace conditions. 32 3. The Legal Framework The legal framework governing collective bargaining operates at both international and national levels, with European Union (EU) regulations, International Labour Organisation (ILO) conventions, and country-specific labour laws influencing how CBAs function. In particular, across the EU, different national legal systems provide different frameworks for the recognition, legal effect and enforcement of CBAs. The legal framework might be established through labour codes in civil law countries (e.g., France or Germany) or legal precedents in common law countries (e.g., the United Kingdom). 33 In many EU countries, CBAs are not mandated by law but are recognised as a legitimate outcome of negotiations between employers (or their associations) and workers’ representatives (typically trade unions). Their legal validity depends on meeting statutory requirements concerning representativeness, registration, and scope. 3.1 Participation, Recognition and Worker Status Employment relationships are commonly understood to involve structural inequalities, with employers generally holding greater bargaining power over their counterparty. This imbalance has been acknowledged by the UK courts: in Braganza, 34 the Supreme Court highlighted the “significant imbalance of power” in employment contracts. With specific reference to football, in Eastham v Newcastle United Football Club, 35 the High Court noted the disparity in negotiating power between a professional footballer and their club. Statutory employment protections aim to address these inequalities, but Collective Bargaining Agreements can further promote balance by enabling workers to negotiate collectively. 36 The right to strike or take industrial action is also a fundamental means by which workers may assert their interests. Although the right to 32 European Commission, Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion, ‘Sustainability and governance: the role of social dialogue’ in Publications Office (ed), Employment and social developments in Europe 2019: sustainable growth for all: choices for the future of Social Europe (Publications Office 2019) 210226. 33 Eurodev, ‘Collective Bargaining Agreement in EU: Explained’ (Eurodev, 2025) <https://www.eurodev.com/blog/collective-bargaining-agreementseurope#:~:text=The%20most%20fundamental%20aspects%20of,with%2015%20years%20of%20tenure.> accessed 3 June 2025. 34 Braganza v BP Shipping Ltd [2015] UKSC 17, para 18. 35 Eastham v Newcastle United Football Club [1964] Ch 413 (ChD), para. 14. 36 O'Leary (n 11) 4. 18 strike is guaranteed under the European Court of Human Rights’ (ECtHR) interpretation of Article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), national law may impose requirements that must be necessarily satisfied in order to exercise this right lawfully. The ability to enter into collective agreements may depend on the status of the person – whether they are employed, workers, or self-employed. The nature of the relationship between the athlete and the organisation for which they perform their services determines the respective rights and obligations of each party. It must be noted, however, that the amateur or professional label attributed to an athlete by their federation may not necessarily dictate the nature of the service provided, and hence their status under labour law. 37 Employee status offers the benefit of access to minimum statutory employment rights and trade union rights that may not necessarily be available to independent contractors or other non-employee workers. In general terms, the relationship between an employee and an employer is characterised by three main elements: control, remuneration and continuity. The employer can exercise control over the time and mode of performing the services; employees do not bear financial risks but they are remunerated by the employer; the service is provided continuously for a period of time. In recent years, this distinction has started to blur, with the emergence of disguised employment, where individuals supply services through intermediaries but would be considered employees if contracted directly, and false self-employed, where individuals are labelled as selfemployed but work under conditions akin to employment. In team sports, it is generally accepted that an athlete who has entered into a contract with a professional team is a worker. 38 Conversely, in individual sports, athletes may be considered self-employed, as they bear financial risks for their activity, and they stand to make a profit from it. For example, Olympic athletes frequently receive minimal to no compensation directly associated with their involvement or achievements. 39 Where athletes in individual sports are able to challenge their classification as independent contractors, and are instead recognised as workers, they will be able to engage in collective bargaining processes. This would also fall in line with the ILO Recommendation 206 (No 198) on the Employment Relationship, which stipulates that the nature of the relationship should be determined with reference to the performance of work and remuneration received, rather than the classification stipulated by the parties. 40 A fundamental requirement for the collective bargaining process is the recognition of representative employers’ and workers’ organizations. Such a recognition might be difficult in circumstances, where employers refuse to negotiate with the representative unions or where there are disputes over the true representative nature of the unions. National law may establish criteria and statutory provisions for recognition. When recognition is lacking or other requirements are not met, alternative arrangements may 37 Ibid. and as an example of case law confirming this in the UK, see Ferguson v John Dawson and Partners (Contractors) Ltd [1976] IRLR 346 (CA) and Autoclenz Ltd v Belcher and Others [2011] UKSC 41 (SC). 38 O’Leary, Seltmann and Smokvina (n 13) 4 39 Ibid., 27. 40 ILO Employment Relationship Recommendation No 198 (2006), art. 9 19 emerge — such as club-level agreements, individual contracts, or soft law instruments — but these often lack the enforceability and stability of CBAs formally recognised by labour law. 3.2 Effects and Enforcement of CBAs When collective bargaining leads to an agreement, this binds the signatories and those on whose behalf it is concluded, but in some legal framework can also be extended to cover the entire sector under specific circumstances. These agreements take precedence over individual contracts of employment, unless such contracts are more favourable to workers. 41 In many Member States, CBAs have normative force and are considered a source of law within the hierarchy of labour regulation. They may supplement statutory standards, and in some jurisdictions, they may even replace or derogate from certain legal provisions, provided they comply with principles of favourability and minimum protection: the terms of a CBA can deviate from statutory norms only if they are more beneficial to the workers. 42 For example, if a CBA provides for better pay conditions for workers than the minimum salary established by law, the superior level of protection will apply. This has allowed, for instance, the French professional rugby CBA to establish longer paid leave entitlements, improved job security provisions, and stronger health and safety rules than those contained in the general sports agreement or national law. Similarly, in the Netherlands, CBAs in football include provisions that are more favourable than general labour law, while in Ireland Rugby, players benefit from holiday entitlements and pension rights that exceed statutory requirements. However, such binding effect might be subject to specific requirements. In many EU countries a collective agreement must be filed or registered with labour authorities to take effect. Some legal frameworks (e.g. the Netherlands, Italy, Spain) allow for CBAs to be declared generally binding by ministerial decree, extending their effect to all workers and employers in a sector, even those not party to the agreement. In contrast, in Ireland’s amateur Gaelic sports context, no formal employment relationship exists, meaning CBAs fall outside the scope of national labour law and are instead governed by informal arrangements and tax-related compliance rules, while in the UK CBAs are not legally binding unless explicitly incorporated into individual employment contracts. 43 CBAs often provide for means to resolve disputes related to their enforcement. If a CBA is formally binding (as it is in Italy or Spain), its violation can be litigated in labour or civil courts, or resolved through joint arbitration panels. Italy typically resolves sports labour disputes via arbitration (e.g. the Italian Olympic Committee’s tribunals) rather 41 ILO, Collective bargaining: a policy guide (2015) https://researchrepository.ilo.org/esploro/outputs/encyclopediaEntry/Collectivebargaining/995218593702676#file-0 Accessed 3 June 2025 42 See for example Art. 84 Royal Decree 1006/1985 in Spain and Art. 2077 of the Italian Civil Code. 43 Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992, s 179. 20 than ordinary courts. By contrast, in the UK a CBA generally lacks independent legal status, so enforcement usually arises through individual employment contracts. 3.3 The International Legal Framework Collective Bargaining Agreements (CBAs) are a central instrument in labour relations across Europe, recognised both in national legal systems and in international human rights frameworks. While some international organisations engage with employmentrelated matters, their involvement in the regulation of collective bargaining is often limited, incidental, or secondary to their primary mandates. 44 At international level, the role of the International Labour Organization (ILO) must be acknowledged. The ILO is an agency of the United Nations which aims to promote workers’ rights and social protection, through international conventions that require implementation from the signatory states and other policy measures designed to support governments and social partners in improving industrial relations and use of collective bargaining. With reference to Collective Bargaining, the ILO has adopted a number of instruments: Convention No. 154 Article 2 (ILO, 1981) defines Collective Bargaining as: “extend[ing] to all negotiations which take place between an employer, a group of employers or one or more employers' organisations, on the one hand, and one or more workers' organisations, on the other, for (a) determining working conditions and terms of employment; and/or (b) regulating relations between employers and workers; and/or (c) regulating relations between employers or their organisations and a workers' organisation or workers' organisations”. Convention No. 87 on Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise (1948) and Convention No. 98 on the Right to Organise and to Bargain Collectively (1949). While these Conventions do not expressly guarantee the right to strike, ILO supervisory bodies — the Committee on Freedom of Association and the Committee of Experts — recognise strike action as a fundamental right to protect workers’ economic and social interests. While these instruments are important policy tools, they do not constitute an international legal system that directly regulates collective bargaining. The effects of such Conventions at the national level depend on the characteristics of the legal system. For example, while the UK is a member of the ILO, it also has a dualist legal system, meaning international treaties only take effect domestically if ratified through legislation. As the UK has not ratified Conventions 87 or 98, these instruments currently have no legal effect in UK law. 45 44 R Pedersini, ‘International organisations and the role of collective bargaining’ (2019) 25(2) Transfer: European Review of Labour and Research 181, 181-203. 45 O'Leary (n 11) 9. 21 The International Labour Organization (ILO) also contributes to the policy debate through reports such as Work for a Brighter Future, 46 in which it affirms that collective bargaining is both a fundamental right and a powerful mechanism for achieving economic growth and social justice. The report calls for stronger engagement with collective representation of workers and employers through social dialogue, and emphasises that States must ensure that all workers and employers are guaranteed the right to collective bargaining. The ILO has also considered issues pertaining to employment relations in the world of sport. In its 2012 International Standard Classification of Occupations, the ILO identified the main tasks of athletes and sports players, which are to train and compete in sporting events, either individually or as part of a team, for financial gains. In the 2020 Decent Work in the World of Sport, the ILO further defines professional athletes as all athletes and sports persons, regardless of their employment status, who gain income through competitive sport and offer an activity that is controlled by a sports organisation, whether a club or a federation. The International Labour Organization (ILO) has also addressed issues related to employment relations in the world of sport. In its International Standard Classification of Occupations, 47 the ILO identifies the main tasks of athletes and sports players as training and competing in sporting events—either individually or as part of a team— for financial gain. In its 2020 report Decent Work in the World of Sport, 48 the ILO further defines professional athletes as all individuals who derive income from competitive sport, regardless of employment status, and whose activity is controlled by a sports organisation, whether a club or a federation. 49 4. The European Union and CBAs in Sport 4.1 EU Competence At European Union level, the right to collective bargaining is protected under Article 28 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union: “Workers and employers, or their respective organisations, have, in accordance with Union law and national laws and practices, the right to negotiate and conclude collective agreements at the appropriate levels and, in cases of conflicts of interest, to take collective action to defend their interests, including strike action.” The impact of European Union Law on the area discussed in this Report must be carefully scrutinised. The EU has become a global market and normative power, capable of setting standards that become the norm beyond the boundaries of its territory. 50 Furthermore, the EU can exercise a pivotal role in the area of sport as it is 46 Global Commission on the Future of Work, Work for a brighter future (ILO 2019). 47 International Labour Office, International Standard Classifications of Occupations: ISCO-08 (ILO 2012). 48 Ibid. 210. 49 Issues paper for discussion at the Global Dialogue Forum on Decent Work in the World of Sport (Geneva, 20– 22 January 2020) 1. 50 C Damro, ‘Market power Europe’ (2012) 19(5) Journal of European Public Policy 682, 690. 22 less vulnerable to political pressures than Member States. In particular, Member States may be reluctant to act against the interests of SGBs as they can often exercise political leverage better than other stakeholders. The intervention of the European Union, however, is to some extent limited by its competence. Both in the area of Sport, and in the field of employment, the legislative competence of the Union is limited. In sport, Article 165 TFEU establishes that the EU cannot adopt any binding legislative measure aiming to harmonise the legislation of Member States, but its role is just to support, coordinate and supplement the action of Member States. Similarly, in the field of employment the EU can facilitate and support the action of Member States, and adopt Directives for the setting of minimum requirements in specific fields (e.g. working conditions, social protection, equality between men and women…). 51 However, under Article 153 TFEU, the Union is expressly prohibited from legislating on matters related to salary, right of association, right to strike and to impose lock-outs. This has not prevented the EU from adopting harmonising measures, attempting to ensure greater and more uniform protection for the workforce throughout the European Union. 52 It must also be noted that, while the legislative competence in a specific field might be limited, such as the competence in Sport, the European Union can always adopt binding legislation when the objective is to ensure the functioning of the internal market. Under Article 114 TFEU, the EU would be able to act when necessary to protect or enhance the functioning of the internal market, even when the action has a direct impact in a different policy field. 53 4.2 Collective Agreements and the Internal Market Despite the limited competence, European Union Law provisions apply to CBAs. In particular, industrial actions that can arise in the context of Collective Bargaining might constitute restrictions on freedom of movement principles. Furthermore, there is an inherent tension between Article 101 TFEU, which prohibits agreements between undertakings that restrict or distort competition, and CBAs, where associations (of undertakings) come together to regulate the conditions of employment in a certain market. With regard to the right to take industrial action, the CJEU has considered that the economic rights of the employer may be legitimately restricted through an industrial action taken by a trade union, provided that such restriction does not go beyond what is required to protect the rights of workers. 54 Therefore, the right to strike is not 51 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, art 151. 52 See, for example, Directive 2003/88/EC (Working Time Directive) [2003] OJ L 299; Directive (EU) 2019/1152 (Transparent and Predictable Working Conditions Directive) [2019] OJ L 186. 53 S Weatherill, ‘The limits of legislative harmonisation ten years after Tobacco Advertising: how the Court’s case law has become a ‘drafting guide’’ (2011) 12 German Law Journal 827. 54 See Cases C-438/05 International Transport Workers’ Federation v Viking Line ABP [2008] All ER (EC) 127, and C-341/05 Laval un Partneri Ltd v Svenska Byggnadsarbetareforbundet [2008] All ER (EC) 166. 23 absolute, but its exercise is subject to an assessment of its proportionality to a legitimate objective pursued: such assessment has been criticized as essentially requiring trade unions to demonstrate that the industrial action is a measure of last resort against a serious threat. 55 The CJEU has also recognised that certain restrictions of competition are inherent in collective agreements between organisations representing employers and workers, and they are justified by social policy objectives when they are necessary for the improvement of working conditions. 56 Under this approach, agreements that are entered into as part of collective bargaining between employers and employees, and which directly improve working conditions (e.g., wages, job security), fall outside the application of Article 101 TFEU. 57 This approach, as originally developed, presents two limits: first, the exception ceases to apply if it affects third parties, such as commercial rights holders. Second, the exception applies only to employees, excluding many atypical workers who may be classified as independent contractors or ‘undertakings’. The approach of the Court was further refined in FNV Kunsten, 58 a case in which the CJEU assessed a Dutch collective agreement setting minimum fees for freelance musicians. Self-employed individuals, such as musicians, offer their services on a given market in return for remuneration and perform their activities as independent economic operators; 59 as such, they are normally treated as independent undertakings, rendering the agreement discussed in the case an anti-competitive agreement between an association of undertakings, rather than social partners. Conversely, in cases where self-employed individuals do not determine independently [their] conduct on the market” and “operate as an auxiliary within the principal’s undertaking”, because they do not bear financial or commercial risks of the activity, they will lose the status of independent trader. 60 Essentially, if the individuals are formally treated as self-employed, but they are in fact financially reliant on a single entity, which can dictate working conditions, they will not be considered independent trader, but ‘false self-employed persons’ and collective agreements they enter into may benefit from the Albany exception. 61 In this context, the categorisation of self-employed status of an individual under national law does not necessarily affect the assessment under European Union Law. 62 Such an assessment is based on the criteria illustrated above and is independent of the approach taken at national level. This case law has the potential to significantly strengthen arguments for extending labour protections to those self-employed athletes 55 O'Leary (n 11) 152. 56 G Monti, ‘Collective labour agreements and EU competition law: Five reconfigurations’ [2021] 17(3) European Competition Journal 714, 714-744. 57 C-67/79, Albany International v Stichting [1999] ECR I-5751, at para. 59 58 C-413/13, FNV Kunsten Informatie en Media v Staat der Nederlanden [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:2411. 59 Ibid. para. 27. 60 See also C-217/05, Confederación Española de Empresarios de Estaciones de Servicio [2006] EU:C:2006:784, paras. 43 and 44 61 Monti (n 57) 714 and A Jurkowska-Gomulka, A Piszcz and SO Pais, ‘Collective Agreements on Working Conditions of Solo Self-Employed Persons: Perspective of EU Competition Law’ (2024) 29 Bialostockie Studia Prawnicze 65. 62 O'Leary (n 11) 144. 24 who operate under the control of the SGBs, which would not be able to justify the decision not to engage in collective bargaining. To clarify the approach with regard to collective agreements and self-employed individuals, the EU Commission adopted a set of Guidelines in 2022. 63 The Guidelines acknowledge that certain self-employed persons face significant hurdles in influencing their working conditions. When these individuals are not entirely independent from the principal, and they are in situations comparable to workers, collective agreements regulating their working conditions will fall outside the scope of Article 101 TFEU; furthermore, the Commission has pledged not to intervene against collective agreements of self-employed persons, when there is a significant imbalance of power in their relationship with their counterparty. However, it must also be noted that neither the case law of the CJEU, nor the Guidelines of the Commission redefine the notion of “worker”; such a status can only be recognised by national Courts or other public authorities. The Guidelines essentially inform the authorities how to treat collective agreements involving certain categories of self-employed individuals under competition law. Pending the recognition of the status of self-employed as workers, the individuals and their representatives do not have the legal certainty that they will be covered by the Albany exception when they engage in collective bargaining. 64 Further, the fact that a collective agreement would not be exempted from the application of Article 101 TFEU does not mean that this would be immediately unlawful, but that its effects in terms of inherency, proportionality and efficiency would have to be considered to assess its legality. In conclusion, while the intervention of the EU is constrained by its limited legislative competence, as reflected in the measures adopted and their content, the CJEU and the institutions have signalled an approach that aims to offer labour protection based on the nature of the working relationship rather than the label used to define it. At its core, the position of the EU demonstrates an intention to strike a balance between the market and the need to strengthen the protection of workers, whether employed or self-employed. Where the CJEU and the institutions can expand the protection is by using references to economic factors to extend the notion of ‘worker’ to include individuals who may not work under ‘personal subordination’ (i.e. classic employeremployee control), but instead work in a relationship of economic dependency, such as freelancers or independent contractors who work mostly for one or two clients. Realistically, these individuals are not performing independently on the market, but they are working for a small number of contractual partners. 65 This – extended – notion fits very well the situation of many athletes, individuals who provide a service of economic value in return for some form of remuneration. 63 Communication from the Commission, Guidelines on the application of Union competition law to collective agreements regarding the working conditions of solo self-employed persons (2022/C 374/02). The primary objective of the Guidelines was to regulate the status of gig-workers, broadly defined as freelance workers performing on-demand services for customers via an online platform. 64 In an attempt to further clarify the issue, the EU has recently adopted Directive 2024/2831, which requires Member States to promote the role of the social partners and to encourage the collective bargaining rights for platform workers. Directive (EU) 2024/2831 (Platform Work Directive) [2024] OJ L, 2024/2831. 65 M Risak and T Dullinger, The concept of ‘worker’ in EU law: status quo and potential for change (ETUI, The European Trade Union Institute, 2020) https://www.etui.org/publications/reports/the-concept-of-worker-in-eulaw-status-quo-and-potential-for-change accessed 23 June 2025. 31 Finally, the coexistence of bipartite and tripartite agreements highlights a flexible and pragmatic approach to collective bargaining, adapting to the specific industrial relations contexts and governance structures prevalent within different sports and national jurisdictions. 6. National Legal Frameworks While the EU provides a broad framework for labour rights, individual countries implement CBAs differently based on their industrial relations traditions and the national legal frameworks. In this section, the Report will provide a brief overview of the framework applied in Spain, Italy, Republic of Ireland, the United Kingdom, and Finland, followed by a comparative discussion. 6.1 Spain The right to collective bargaining is recognised in the Spanish Constitution of 1978. 88 Collective Agreements in Spain are legally binding, 89 enforceable by the parties, and labour authorities can take action to ensure their implementation. 90 The legal framework for the operation of trade unions in Spain is established by the Organic Law of Trade Union Freedom 1985, 91 which includes rules pertaining to the recognition of unions for the purpose of engaging in collective bargaining and industrial actions. When recognised as 'most representative organizations,' employers' associations and trade unions gain specific privileges. These include the authority to negotiate multiemployer collective agreements, secure institutional representation (such as involvement in tripartite bodies, government consultations, and social pacts), and engage in out-of-court labour dispute resolution systems. Furthermore, attaining legal representativeness is crucial for eligibility to receive public funding. 92 Spanish Law recognises athletes' employment relationships as a distinct category governed by Royal Decree 1006/1985, 93 which regulates the special employment relationship of professional athletes. This framework is supplemented by the Workers' Statute (Estatuto de los Trabajadores), 94 which incorporates the favourability principle—collective agreements and individual contracts cannot undercut statutory minimum standards, 95 and the possibility for the Public Authority to extend the 88 Art. 37.1 89 Art. 37, Spanish Constitution. 90 Art. 152 Real Decreto Legislativo 2/1995, de 7 de abril, por el que se aprueba el texto refundido de la Ley de Procedimiento Laboral. 91 Ley Orgánica 11/1985, de 2 de agosto, de Libertad Sindical. 92 Ibid. Art. 6. 93 Real Decreto 1006/1985, de 26 de junio, por el que se regula la relación laboral especial de los deportistas profesionales. 94 Decreto Legislativo 2/2015, de 23 de octubre, por el que se aprueba el texto refundido de la Ley del Estatuto de los Trabajadores 95 Ibid. Art. 84. 32 application of the Agreement to cover all workers in the industry, regardless of whether they were members of the union negotiating the agreement. 96 Where not otherwise regulated, general labour law applies to athletes, provided it does not contradict the special regime. 97 In the national legal framework, Law 3/2007 98 on gender equality acts as a fundamental constraint on sport-specific CBAs, ensuring they do not deviate from the minimum rights it establishes. Collective bargaining in Spain is highly structured and operates on multiple levels (national, regional, company). 99 Sectoral CBAs specific to sports—such as those in football, basketball, and futsal—are negotiated by recognised players’ unions and league or club associations. These CBAs typically regulate core employment terms such as wages, buyout clauses, working hours, health protection, insurance, maternity rights, and post-career planning. In Spain, the landscape of Collective Bargaining Agreements (CBAs) in sport is notably developed, particularly within football and basketball, covering both male and female athletes. In football, two distinct CBAs for female players highlight progressive advancements in the sport. One is a bipartite "Agreement between Spanish Women’s National Football Team and the Spanish Football Federation (RFEF)" that is binding and fully implemented, covering economic conditions and image rights for national team players. The other is a tripartite "Collective Bargaining Agreement for Female Football Players who provide their services in Clubs of the First Division of Women’s Football," which is also binding and fully implemented, covering remunerated professional players of top-tier clubs, including those from affiliated teams. For male football, there is a bipartite "Collective Bargaining Agreement for Professional Football Activities" between the National Professional Football League (LFP) and the Spanish Football Players’ Association, which is equally binding and fully implemented, covering professional players of LFP clubs. Across all these football agreements, the scope of coverage is comprehensive, encompassing wages, contractual requirements, working time, training conditions, leave, vocational training, health and welfare, social protection, image and commercial rights, and enforcement/dispute resolution. Similarly, in male basketball, the "Collective Bargaining Agreement ACB – ABP for the Activity of Professional Basketball ACB" is a bipartite, binding, and fully implemented agreement between basketball clubs affiliated with the ACB and their male professional players, with an equally broad scope of coverage. However, not all sports disciplines benefit from a CBA. One futsal organisation reported that while there is no formal CBA in place, an agreement exists with the football association to require professional contracts and introduce economic controls 96 Ibid. Art. 92. The Agreement will be extended if it is in writing and includes certain clauses specified in Art. 92 (.e.g details of the parties, scope of application…). 97 Art. 21, Real Decreto 1006/1985. 98 Ley Orgánica 3/2007, de 22 de marzo, para la igualdad efectiva de mujeres y hombres. 99 Comisión Consultiva Nacional de Convenios Colectivos, ‘Collective Bargaining in Europe’ (Comisión Consultiva Nacional de Convenios Colectivos, 2004) https://www.mites.gob.es/ficheros/ministerio/sec_trabajo/ccncc/B_Actuaciones/Estudios/CollectiveBargainingI nEurope.pdf accessed 16 February 2025. 33 for contracts and salaries. This agreement involves the players' union (comprising only three members), the league, and broader stakeholders such as the government, CSD (Consejo Superior de Deportes), and sport federations. Despite the absence of a formal CBA, athlete employment and welfare are governed by the national legal framework articulated above, with particular reference to: 1. Royal Decree 1006/1985 2. Law 39/2022 on Sport 100 3. General labour law provisions via Article 21 of Royal Decree 1006/1985 National law requires formal recognition of athlete unions or associations for collective bargaining purposes in Spain, and the criteria or requirements for recognition are in place if they are constituted as unions. However, additional issues arise from the pluralist representation model in Spain. Multiple unions may claim to represent athletes, leading to internal divisions and complicating the election of a single bargaining representative. Players must participate in union elections to determine who represents them in CBA negotiations but are not required to join a union. Significant structural challenges were identified in women’s futsal. Respondents highlighted limited federation cooperation, underperforming club structures, and financial instability. One organisation stated that only a single private agreement exists: the club-level CBA signed by Pescados Rubén Burela Fútbol Sala and its women’s first team. No national or sector-wide CBA exists for women’s futsal. 6.2 Italy In Italy, employment relationships in sport are primarily regulated through general labour law, the Italian Constitution, and civil law principles. The Italian Constitution (Article 36) guarantees fair pay and dignified working conditions for all workers, while Article 39 recognises trade union freedom and the right to collective bargaining. On the basis of Article 39, unions that are “registered” are able to negotiate collective bargaining agreements that apply erga omnes – industry-wide. 101 The Italian Civil Code regulates collective agreements as all types of contractual relationships. The Workers’ Statute protects the rights of workers to join and be represented by a union, as well as prohibiting anti-union conducts, and anti-discrimination practices. 102 In the absence of statutory provisions, agreements between social partners have defined the key framework: the Tripartite Protocol of 23 July 1993 — revised in 2009 and 2018 and adapted for various sectors establishes core principles on wage policy, cost-of-living adjustments, the structure and timing of collective bargaining, and workplace representation. 100 Ley 39/2022, de 30 de diciembre, del Deporte. 101 It must however be noted that this provision needed implementation in ordinary law to have effect. See S Leonardi, Collective bargaining and minimum wage regime in Italy (European Trade Union Institute, 2025). 102 Legge 20 maggio 1970, n 300, Norme sulla tutela della libertà e dignità dei lavoratori, della libertà sindacale e dell'attività sindacale, nei luoghi di lavoro e norme sul collocamento. 34 Italy has a distinctive two-tier bargaining system. National CBAs are negotiated at sectoral level between recognised trade unions and employer associations. They set out general minimum standards, while decentralised or company-level agreements may supplement or derogate from them under certain conditions. While this flexibility can allow adaptation to local contexts, it also poses risks of undercutting protections. The principle of favourability (principio di favore) establishes that in the event of a conflict between the provisions of national law and collective bargaining, the most favourable to the worker will apply. Similarly, Article 2077 of the Italian Civil Code establishes that Collective Agreements prevail against individual employment contracts, unless the latter is more favourable to the worker. Collective bargaining agreements are not directly enforceable unless incorporated into individual contracts, 103 but in practice, they are widely applied and function as normative standards in many sectors—including sport. With specific reference to sport, Law 91/1981 establishes a framework for professional sportspersons in Italy, with specific reference to their employment status. 104 The recent reform introduced with Legislative Decrees 36/2021 105 aimed to create symmetry between the treatment of professional and amateur sportspersons, by creating the notion of sports work. 106 The latter includes professional sportsperson, as well as any registered worker. This regulatory framework has created a distinction between the self-employed sport worker, the professional employed worker and the amateur sports worker. Accordingly, the professional sports worker is presumed to be employed, while the amateur is presumed to be an independent contractor, self-employed. 107 Since January 2024, a Collective Agreement for sports workers has been in force, aiming at including all activities that may be considered “sporting” and all individuals or entities for whom such activities may be performed. The CBA regulates a series of aspects, including minimum (and maximum) salary and rules on dispute resolution. At sport-specific level, other examples of CBAs can be observed. Collective bargaining agreements are prominent in both Italian football and basketball, covering male and female professional athletes. In football, two key CBAs are identified. For male football, there is a tripartite "Collective Agreement for Sports Performance Relationships between Professional Players and Professional Serie A Clubs," which is binding and fully implemented, covering professional players within Serie A clubs. The CBA was renewed in 2025, including provisions aiming at protecting the sustainability of the system: under clause 5.2.7.1, according to which, Serie A clubs are allowed to reduce players’ fixed salaries by 25% in the event of relegation to Serie B, provided the salary does not fall below the minimum set by the agreement (depending on the player’s age group). The reduction applies from the 103 S Leonardi, M Concetta Ambra and A Ciarini, ‘Italian collective bargaining at a turning point’ in Leonardi and Pedersini (eds) Multi-employer bargaining under pressure: decentralisation trends in five European countries (ETUI 2018)188. 104 Legge 23 marzo 1981, n 91, Norme in materia di rapporti tra società e sportivi professionisti. 105 Decreto legislativo del 28/02/2021 n. 36, Attuazione dell'articolo 5 della legge 8 agosto 2019, n. 86, recante riordino e riforma delle disposizioni in materia di enti sportivi professionistici e dilettantistici, nonche' di lavoro sportivo. 106 The label of professional as opposed to amateur sportsperson does not affect the employment status of the athlete concerned. 107 Decreto legislativo del 28/02/2021 n. 36, Art. 26 and 28. 35 season following relegation and continues until any promotion back to Serie A, which restores the original salary. This rule applies to contracts signed from 2 September 2025, although individual agreements may stipulate otherwise. For female football, a specific "Collective Bargaining Agreement for Clubs and Players of the Serie A Femminile" is in place, also binding and fully implemented, covering professional players in Serie A Femminile clubs. In male basketball, a tripartite "Collective Bargaining Agreement on Professional Basketball Players" exists, which is binding but currently has its "implementation pending," indicating it is in the process of full adoption. This agreement covers professional basketball clubs in Serie A and their players, including temporarily registered individuals. Across all these Italian CBAs, the scope of coverage is extensive, encompassing wages, contractual requirements, working time, training conditions, leave, vocational training, health and welfare, social protection, image and commercial rights, and provisions for enforcement and dispute resolution. Challenges include ensuring compliance with CBAs in lower leagues and amateur tiers, where enforcement is weaker and union membership less widespread. Furthermore, while CBAs are influential, their normative effect often depends on enforcement through sports-specific arbitration bodies rather than ordinary labour courts. For instance, disputes in football are frequently resolved within the FIGC's National Arbitration Panel, limiting recourse to general legal protections. There is currently no formal recognition or incorporation of transnational CBAs in Italy, though AIC and GIBA are affiliated with international organisations (e.g., FIFPRO) and may align their advocacy and contractual principles with transnational frameworks. 6.3 United Kingdom The United Kingdom regulates employment through a common law framework supported by statutory provisions. UK labour relations are broadly characterised by voluntary, private contractual relations between employers and trade unions, with limited legal intervention in disputes. Minimum rights (minimum wage, unfair dismissal, leave, discrimination) are guaranteed through a series of legislative instruments, such as the Employment Rights Act 1996, the National Minimum Wage Act 1998 and the Equality Act 2010. The core legislation governing collective bargaining is the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 (TULRCA). It provides both collective rights for recognised independent trade unions (e.g., to bargain collectively, receive information) and individual rights for union members (e.g., protection from detriment for union membership). A trade union that is independent (not controlled by the employer) must be recognised by the employer in order for it to engage in collective bargaining. 108 While the legislation provides a structure for trade union recognition and collective bargaining, it does not create a legal obligation on employers to enter into or conclude 108 Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 Schedule A1, s. 6. 36 collective agreements. Collective agreements are ordinarily not legally enforceable unless explicitly made so in writing. 109 However, under the Employment Rights Act 1996, if the terms of a collective agreement are incorporated into individual employment contracts, they can become enforceable between an employer and employee. 110 The determination of whether the collective agreement has been effectively incorporated into a contract is left to the court's decision. Industrial action in the UK typically constitutes a breach of contract, and is lawful only if it meets specific legal requirements regarding its purpose, the balloting of union members, and notice given to the employer. 111 The overview shows how the legal framework regulating industrial relations in the UK is not particularly apt to encourage the signing of collective bargaining agreements. This explains why, compared to other countries analysed in this section, the UK presents a lower incidence of collective bargaining agreements, with figures indicating that only 29% of the workforce is covered by CBAs in the UK, with even lower coverage in the private sector at 20.7%, and only 12% of workers in unions. 112 The UK has a decentralised and voluntary collective bargaining system, with company-level negotiations being the norm, while national CBAs are uncommon. 113 In sport, this leads to a fragmented bargaining landscape, with negotiations primarily taking place at the club or league level. This decentralisation diminishes the bargaining power of athletes, restricting unions' ability to negotiate standardised terms across the industry. 114 In UK professional sport, collective bargaining operates on a voluntary basis. Players’ unions such as the Professional Footballers' Association (PFA), Rugby Players Association (RPA), and Professional Cricketers' Association (PCA) negotiate agreements with leagues and governing bodies. These agreements cover matters such as minimum salaries, pensions, injury insurance, player wellbeing, and postretirement support, and are aligned with national legislation. While these CBAs are not legally binding per se, they are commonly incorporated by reference into player contracts, giving them contractual force for individual enforcement. A Collective Agreement is in place in Rugby Union in Wales and England. In Wales, the agreement is between the Players Association and the National Governing Body, while in England it is signed by the Player Union, League, and Game Union. Importantly, the legal status of athletes in the UK sporting system has been discussed in the seminal case of Jess Varnish. In Varnish v British Cycling and UK Sport [2020] (EAT), an elite cyclist attempted to argue that she had been unfairly dismissed and 109 Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992, S. 179. O’Leary notices that the explicit inclusion of a statement that the parties agree to make the contract legally enforceable is a rare occurrence. See O'Leary (n 11) 98. 110 Employment Rights Act 1996 S 1(4)(j). Case law has identified terms that are not ordinarily apt for incorporation in an employment contract, such as the mechanism for dispute resolution between an employer and a trade union. See Kaur v MG Rover Group Ltd [2005] ICR 625. 111 Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992, s. 219, ss. 226-234 and 234A. 112 De Spiegelaere (n 9). 113 Pannett (n 6) 189. 114 Comisión Consultiva Nacional de Convenios Colectivos (n 16). 37 discriminated against after her funding agreement was not renewed. To succeed, she needed to prove she was a worker or employee. Despite strict obligations in the agreement, the tribunal held she was not employed because there was no mutual obligation or wage-work bargain. The Employment Appeal Tribunal upheld the decision, confirming that funded elite athletes are not automatically workers under UK law. 115 While UK sport benefits from well-developed support structures, the lack of statutory support for collective bargaining means that the representation of workers depends heavily on the goodwill and cooperation of employers. The result is a pragmatic system based on consensus and long-term relationships, although this can leave gaps where employers refuse to recognise unions, particularly in women’s or semi-professional sports, and a lack of direct enforceability. 6.4 Ireland Article 40.6.1 of the Constitution of Ireland protects the right to form a trade union. However, this neither includes an automatic right to join a union, nor provides constitutional protection for collective bargaining. 116 Since 1946, Ireland has had statutory mechanisms in place to promote and regulate collective bargaining. Under Part III of the Industrial Relations Act 1946, parties to a collective agreement could apply to the Labour Court to have it registered as a Registered Employment Agreement (REA). Once registered, such agreements became binding on all employers and workers in the sector, enforceable both through incorporation into individual employment contracts and by criminal penalties for noncompliant employers. However, a series of constitutional challenges significantly weakened these protections. 117 Irish courts have found key aspects of the framework—including elements of the REA —to be unconstitutional, thereby undermining the legal foundation for sector-wide collective bargaining in certain industries. To address this gap, the government introduced the Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act 2015. The Act introduced a revised definition of collective bargaining, and enhanced protections against victimisation of workers. However, this legislation offers very limited protection for collective bargaining, as it does not include any obligations on employers to recognise trade unions for the purpose of bargaining, and Registered Employment Agreements are held to be binding only on the parties to the agreement. 118 Further changes were enacted through the Employment (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2018, which provided a series of protective measures for workers, including banning zero-hour contracts, and introducing two weeks of paid parental leave. 115 O’Leary, Seltmann and Smokvina (n 13) 17. 116 EI Co Ltd v Kennedy [1968] IR 69; Dublin Colleges Academic Staff Association v City of Dublin Vocational Education Committee [1981] 7 JIC 3101. 117 See among others John Grace Fried Chicken v Catering JLC [2011] IEHC 277 and McGowan v Labour Court [2013] IESC 21. 118 Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act 2015, s. 6. 38 Under the Trade Union Acts, 119 if a trade union respects certain requirements of membership and constitution, it can be registered. If registered, the union will be able to apply for a licence to engage in collective bargaining. Traditionally, industrial relations in Ireland were based on a voluntarist model, advocating for minimal legal intervention and judicial oversight. Instead, disputes and employment terms were addressed through direct negotiation, with each side relying on its bargaining power to reach an agreement. 120 The absence of state intervention has however consequences on the recognition of unions and the ability to reach agreements, which depend more on industrial action, rather than legal obligations. 121 In turn, this might help explaining the low level of Collective Bargaining coverage in Ireland, about 34%, and one of the lowest in Western Europe. Relatedly, union density has been dropping, estimated at 22% overall and 16% in the private sector. 122 In practice, Ireland operates a mixed model with sectoral bargaining, with some sectors using industry-wide CBAs, while others relying on company-level bargaining. The Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) landscape in sport in Ireland is generally underdeveloped. The Gaelic Athletic Association (GAA) governs amateur sports and does not engage in formal collective bargaining, although the Gaelic Players Association (GPA) operates as a representative body. General labour laws and collective bargaining agreements are not applicable as athletes are amateur. Dialogue between the GPA and GAA has produced outcomes on player welfare, taxation, and expenses, but no legally binding CBA exists. Conversely, promising developments can be seen in both rugby and football. For rugby, a bipartite "Collective Agreement between the Irish Rugby Football Union and Rugby Players Ireland" is in place, which is binding and fully implemented. This agreement covers professional rugby players contracted to the IRFU, whether they are based in Ireland or abroad. In football, a notable bipartite agreement titled "Equal Pay (Male/Female National Team Appearances)" exists, which is also binding and fully implemented. This agreement involves the Football Association of Ireland (FAI), an independent advisor, captains of both male and female national teams, and the Professional Footballers' Association of Ireland (PFAI). Both Irish agreements demonstrate a comprehensive scope, covering essential aspects such as wages, contractual requirements, working time, training conditions, leave, vocational training, health and welfare, social protection, image and commercial rights, and provisions for enforcement and dispute resolution. The structure of sports employment in Ireland further complicates collective bargaining. Many athletes, particularly in team sports, are classified as self-employed or receive irregular income, making formal employment relationships—and therefore 119 Including, Trade Union Act 1871, Trade Union Act 1941, Trade Union Act 1975 and Trade Union Act 1990. 120 T Dobbins, ‘Irish industrial relations system no longer voluntarist’ (Eurofound, 21 April 2005) <https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/en/resources/article/2005/irish-industrial-relations-system-no-longervoluntarist> accessed 20 June 2025. 121 A Eustace, Collective Benefit: Harnessing the power of representation for economic and social progress (Report for Fórsa, 2021) 20. 122 De Spiegelaere (n 9). 39 CBAs—more difficult to establish. Specific employment-related issues affecting athletes and governing bodies in Ireland relate to the treatment of athletes who cross jurisdictions (Ireland and UK). There is currently no evidence of transnational CBAs being recognised or applied in Ireland. Nevertheless, Irish players’ associations may adopt principles from European or global bodies such as EAPA, FIFPRO, and the World Players Association in their advocacy work. 6.5 Finland The right to collective bargaining in Finland is rooted in a long tradition of tripartite cooperation. It dates back to 1940 when labour market organisations first recognised each other as negotiating partners, and further formalised in 1968. 123 For decades, Finland’s industrial relations were characterised by a highly centralised model, with national incomes policy agreements and close coordination between the peak organisations of trade unions, employers, and the government. 124 This model embedded consensus as a core value and extended into areas beyond employment, such as pensions policy. The legal framework for collective bargaining and labour relations is anchored in the Collective Agreements Act, 125 which defines the rights and obligations of the parties to collective agreements, and establishes the procedure for confirming sectoral agreements as generally binding. Under the principle of general applicability—in place since the 1970s and confirmed through legislation in 2001—employers who are not party to a collective agreement must still comply with the terms of a sectoral agreement deemed representative of their industry. 126 This ensures a level playing field and prevents competitive advantage through avoidance of collective bargaining. National legislation such as the Employment Contracts Act, Annual Holidays Act, Working Hours Act, and Co-operation Act regulate core contractual terms, working time, and workplace cooperation. Formal dispute resolution mechanisms are provided for in the Act on Mediation in Labour Disputes and the Act on the Labour Court. The Finnish system has undergone significant structural change since the mid-2010s. In 2017, centralised national pay bargaining formally ended, marking a shift towards sectoral and company-level bargaining. 127 While this trend reflects broader OECD patterns of decentralisation, in Finland it has taken the form of coordinated 123 P Jonker-Hoffrén, ‘Goodbye centralised bargaining? The emergence of a new industrial bargaining regime’ in T Müller, K Vandaele and J Waddington (eds), Collective bargaining in Europe: towards an endgame (ETUI 2019) 197, 199. 124 P Jonker-Hoffrén, ‘Goodbye centralised bargaining? The emergence of a new industrial bargaining regime’ (n 1) 197. 125 Työehtosopimuslaki - Collective Agreements Act (436/1946) 126 Laki työehtosopimuksen yleissitovuuden vahvistamisesta - Act on confirmation of the general applicability of collective agreements (56/2001) 127 J Visser, ‘Did employers abandon collective bargaining? A comparative analysis of the weakening of collective bargaining in the OECD’ (2024) 55 Industrial Relations Journal 350, 354. 40 decentralisation, with employers’ organisations continuing to exercise strong influence over sectoral wage-setting. 128 Recent research highlights a structural shift in Finland from a long-standing tradition of highly centralised, sector-level collective bargaining towards more decentralised arrangements. In some cases, bargaining has moved entirely to the level of individual organisations; in others, hybrid models combining sectoral frameworks with locally negotiated supplements have emerged. 129 This decentralisation has not occurred uniformly across the economy: it is more prevalent in certain sectors and less common in others, reflecting differences in workforce composition, economic conditions, and bargaining traditions. The observed impacts of decentralisation on wages and working conditions have generally been modest. Some groups, particularly those in stronger bargaining positions, may achieve higher wage growth under decentralised arrangements, while others see little change. However, decentralisation can also increase disparities between different segments of the workforce, with outcomes varying by industry, employer resources, and the strength of worker representation. Moreover, shifts towards local-level bargaining have, in some instances, proved short-lived, with sector-wide agreements remaining important for maintaining stability and a level playing field. 130 These trends are relevant to the sport sector because they highlight the potential consequences of replacing or weakening sectoral or league-wide collective agreements. Where bargaining is left entirely to the club or team level, disparities in resources and bargaining power between organisations could lead to uneven employment conditions for athletes. Conversely, retaining a coordinated framework at the sectoral or league level can help ensure minimum standards, promote equality, and provide stability across the sport. In January 2025, a significative reform entered into force, expanding the scope for local bargaining, allowing employers outside employers’ associations to conclude local agreements—something previously prohibited where provisions deviated from statutory norms. The reform applies regardless of the type of employee representation in the company, including company-specific CBAs, and is overseen by the Occupational Safety and Health Authority. 131 In Finnish sport, professional athletes are covered by the general labour law framework and any relevant sectoral or generally binding collective agreements. The 128 M Wuokko, E Kuorelahti and N Jensen-Eriksen, ‘More than meets the eye: Finnish employers and the centralised labour market model, 1960s– 2020s’ (24 March 2025) Scandinavian Economic History Review, and J Visser, ‘Did employers abandon collective bargaining? A comparative analysis of the weakening of collective bargaining in the OECD’ (2024) 55 Industrial Relations Journal 350. 129 A Kauhanen, ‘The effects of the decentralization of collective bargaining on wages and wage dispersion: Evidence from the Finnish forest and IT industries’ (2024) 62 British Journal of Industrial Relations 319. 130 A Kauhanen, T Maczulskij and K Riukula, ‘The incidence and effects of decentralized wage bargaining in Finland’ (2024) 45 J Labor Res 232. 131 ‘Opportunities for local collective bargaining to expand’ (Valtioneuvosto, 22 April 2024) https://valtioneuvosto.fi/en/-/1410877/opportunities-for-local-collective-bargaining-to-expand accessed 12 August 2025. 47 7.3 Strengths, Weaknesses, and Legal Implications. The agreements analysed demonstrate a willingness of European sports stakeholders to engage in structured transnational bargaining and address issues pertaining to the working conditions of athletes at supra-national level. In particular, the FIFPRO-UEFAECAEPFL ‘Minimum Requirements’ Agreement is an autonomous agreement under EU law and is officially recognised by the European Commission, enhancing its legal legitimacy within the EU legal and policy dimension. 137 With this in mind, FIFPRO has emphasised its commitment to protecting players' rights, continuing dialogue with stakeholders into 2024, also highlighting how the European Sectoral Social Dialogue for Professional Football has fostered collaboration among stakeholders to enhance working conditions and strengthen football competitions. 138 Furthermore, as mentioned above, there appears to be momentum for greater use of social dialogue, potentially beyond the football sector. However, to ensure that Social Partners can benefit from such momentum, it is appropriate to highlight the inherent limits of transnational collective bargaining. The Minimum Requirements Agreement in football effectively constitutes a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) rather than a formal Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). The issues of divergent labour laws present a significant obstacle to its full implementation and in general, the realisation of transnational CBAs in Europe. For example, in a number of European countries, many footballers are not classified as employees, which deprives them of standard labour protections and complicates efforts to impose uniform standards. 139 In this context, however, it is particularly significant that the Cycling Joint Agreements provide for remuneration standards applicable to both employed and self-employed riders, thereby signalling the potential for CBAs to apply to athletes who would be classified as self-employed in certain jurisdictions. While in countries where athletes are recognised as employees, integration of transnational provisions into domestic law is more feasible, this is nevertheless rarely automatic and often depends on the willingness of national federations to align with international standards. 140 Transnational agreements, therefore, tend to lack enforceable mechanisms and instead rely on the goodwill of clubs, reducing their effectiveness in countries with weak labour protections. 137 UEFA (n 128). 138 FIFPRO, ‘FIFPRO Europe and continent’s stakeholders to expand and strengthen support of national social dialogue’ (FIFPRO, 2023b) https://fifpro.org/en/who-we-are/fifpro-members/fifpro-europe/fifpro-europe-andcontinent-s-stakeholders-to-expand-and-strengthen-support-of-national-socialdialogue#:~:text=The%20European%20Sectoral%20Social%20Dialogue,sustainability%20of%20clubs%20and %20competitions accessed 02 June 2025. 139 FIFPRO, ‘Normal’ Employment Rights for Players in Eastern Europe’ (FIFPRO, 2020) https://fifpro.org/en/supporting-players/conditions-of-employment/standard-player-contracts/properemployment-contracts-for-eastern-european-players accessed 29 May 2025. 140 OM Yaroshenko et al, ‘Harmonization of Labor Rights of Athletes in the EU: Challenges and Prospects in the Context of Integration of National Legislation’ (2024) European Politics and Society 1–15. 48 Some countries have attempted to integrate transnational CBAs into their domestic legal frameworks, with varying degrees of success. In Spain, national CBAs are often aligned with UEFA/FIFPRO agreements, ensuring that international labour standards are reflected in domestic contracts. 141 In Italy, some transnational agreements have been incorporated into national CBAs, particularly in football and rugby, helping to standardise employment conditions across clubs. However, in the UK, due to its fragmented labour relations, transnational CBAs have had limited influence, with leagues and clubs retaining significant autonomy over labour relations. 142 Nevertheless, as labour rights advocacy continues to grow, there is an increasing pressure on international sports governing bodies to strengthen global collective bargaining mechanisms and recent agreements, such as the EuroLeague Agreement, show promising advances in this field. It must be noted that basketball and other sports have engaged in similar initiatives, but their agreements lack the legal force of CBAs, instead functioning as recommendations rather than enforceable contracts. 143 For example, in the context of the EuroLeague, a privately governed basketball competition formed by a collection of elite European clubs, the EuroLeague Basketball Players Association has entered into a transnational collective agreement with EuroLeague that establishes minimum employment standards across the participating clubs. 144 Euroleague itself does not employ the players, but has appointed player representatives to its decision-making bodies, offering a degree of institutional balance. 145 8. Findings and Recommendations This report highlights the complex and fragmented landscape of collective bargaining in the European sport sector. While several well-established Collective Bargaining Agreements (CBAs) exist — particularly in football, basketball, and rugby — coverage remains uneven, especially in women’s sports, Olympic disciplines, and among selfemployed or individual athletes. National frameworks vary considerably: countries such as Spain, Italy and Finland provide a stronger legal basis for sectoral CBAs, while systems in the UK and Ireland rely heavily on voluntarism and lack legal enforceability. The classification of athletes as workers or independent contractors significantly 141 Comisión Consultiva Nacional de Convenios Colectivos (n 16). 142 De Spiegelaere (n 11) and Pannett (n 6). 143 International Labour Organisation, ‘Issues paper for discussion at the Global Dialogue Forum on Decent Work in the World of Sport’ (ILO, 2020) https://www.ilo.org/resource/other/global-dialogue-forum-decent-workworld-sport-issues-paper accessed 26 February 2025. 144 ELPA, ‘EuroLeague Basketball and EuroLeague Players Association Announce Renewal of EuroLeague Framework Agreement’ (Euroleague Basketball, 2024) https://www.euroleaguebasketball.net/en/news/euroleague-basketball-and-euroleague-players-associationannounce-renewal-of-euroleague-framework-agreement/ accessed 29 May 2025. 145 UNI Global Union, ‘World Player Health and Safety Summit Highlights Need for Player Centered Change’ (UNI Global Union, 2025) https://uniglobalunion.org/news/world-player-health-and-safety-summit-highlightsneed-for-player-centred-change/ accessed 29 May 2025. 49 affects their access to collective rights, with employment status remaining a contested and inconsistent category. At EU level, the legal framework recognises the right to collective bargaining under Article 28 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and through the ILO Conventions (Nos. 87 and 98). However, obstacles remain, particularly concerning competition law and the position of solo self-employed athletes. The CJEU has affirmed that collective bargaining can fall outside Article 101 TFEU when it aims to improve working conditions, and that such exemption can apply to non-standard workers. There are promising developments: transnational initiatives demonstrate the potential of social dialogue structures. However, implementation at the national level is inconsistent, and athletes’ representation is frequently undermined by governance practices that rely on athletes' commissions with no collective bargaining function. In summary, the key findings are: (a) EU and national laws generally legitimize sport CBAs and social dialogue; (b) multiple binding CBAs already exist in European football, rugby and other sports (as mapped in Secs. 4–7), though coverage is uneven (e.g. weaker in women’s and lower-tier sports); and (c) collective bargaining can bring significant benefits (balanced pay structures, worker protections, stable relations), provided it is adapted to sports’ special context. 8.2 Challenges, Good Practices, and Replication Models Structural and legal challenges: Sport’s fragmented governance (clubs, leagues, federations, international bodies and multiple jurisdictions) complicates bargaining. For example, global bodies (e.g. FIFA) sometimes impose rules (calendars, transfer windows) without player consultation. In many countries or sports, players’ unions are weak or new, so collective bargaining is not well-established. Competition law uncertainty also deters agreements: although EU law tolerates labour CBAs for worker welfare, national interpretations vary. Coverage gaps are another challenge – women’s leagues and smaller sports often lack any formal CBA. Finally, enforcement can be difficult. Good practices / successful agreements: Several models stand out. At the national level, examples from France, Spain, and Italy highlight an increasing practice to include minimum standard provisions in binding collective agreements. In other countries (UK and Ireland) the application of agreements is left to voluntary actions of the parties. At the international level, joint negotiations have produced promising results both in Football and Cycling. These examples show how broad participation (bipartite or tripartite) and comprehensive coverage (pay, safety, welfare) yield durable agreements. Replication models: Many of the above approaches can be adapted elsewhere. For instance, the tripartite bargaining model of French rugby – involving clubs, players’ union and federation – could be applied to other sports. Federations and unions might develop model contracts or minimum standards (as Italian women’s soccer did) that smaller clubs can adopt. The European football social dialogue model suggests that 50 sectoral committees (for rugby, basketball, etc.) could address cross-border issues jointly. Finally, Europe can draw on the North American sports model: in the US, leagues negotiate salary caps and revenue-sharing via CBAs, which ensures financial stability. European stakeholders could emulate this by agreeing collective salary rules under agreed terms. Overall, combining these good practices and innovations would help other sports and countries build effective collective bargaining frameworks. 8.3 Recommendations for Stakeholders Based on these findings (Secs. 2–7), each stakeholder group should consider the following actions: EU and national policymakers: Legislate and facilitate collective bargaining in sport. For example, explicitly recognize players’ unions as social partners, and ensure greater clarity about the application of competition law to collective agreements in sports. At the EU level, continue to back sectoral dialogue, and consider extending it to other sports. National governments should require that sport CBAs, once negotiated, are binding and enforceable (as in Spain, Finland and France) and offer resources (funding, training) to support negotiations. In practice, this means including sport CBAs in labour laws or sports policies and promoting dialogue platforms. Athlete unions and player associations: to ensure effective collective negotiation, it is paramount that athletes’ unions and players associations present themselves as a united front, guaranteeing representativeness and strengthening their claim. Greater sharing of best practices amongst unions can help during negotiations, by allowing parties to emphasize the documented benefits of collective bargaining. Sport governing bodies and federations: Embrace structured dialogue with players. Crucially, Sports Governing Bodies must recognise and engage with representative social partners. Players’ and athletes’ representatives must be effectively involved in the decision-making process, to ensure it produces rules that are fairer, stronger and enforceable. By treating players as legitimate stakeholders, federations will improve compliance and shared commitment to sport policies. Clubs and leagues: View players as partners in ensuring a sustainable model of governance. Engage in collective bargaining to create stable salary and workingcondition frameworks, but also explore welfare standards found in model agreements: for example, implement insurance, health care and pension provisions negotiated in successful CBAs. Recognition of the right to unionise and bargain collectively, as well as the inclusion of players’ representatives in the decision-making process will build trust between the social partners. In short, clubs and leagues will benefit from the enhanced stability and goodwill that well-negotiated CBAs bring. 51 Annex I Mapping of the existing CBAs in the UK and Europe Country Sport Title Characteristics Actors Covered Scope/Coverage Europe Football (Male) Agreement Regarding the Minimum Requirements for Standard Football Player Contracts Tripartite, nonbinding, partially implemented EPFL, ECA, UEFA, FIFPRO Division Europe (Coverage: Signatories and their members at national level) Wage, Contractual requirements, Working time, Training conditions, Leave, Vocational training, Health and welfare, Social protection, Image and commercial rights, Enforcement and dispute resolution Europe Basketball (Male) EuroLeague Framework Agreement Bipartite, binding, fully implemented EuroLeague clubs; players employed/contracted by them Wage, Contractual requirements, Working time, Training conditions, Leave, Vocational training, Health and welfare, Social protection, Image and commercial rights, Enforcement and dispute resolution Europe Cycling (Male) Joint Agreements on the working conditions of riders hired by UCI ProTeams and UCI WorldTeams (version on 01.01.2024) Bipartite, binding, fully implemented Cyclistes Professionnels Associés (CPA); Association Internationale des Groupes Cyclistes Professionnels (AIGCP); riders employed by UCI WorldTeams or UCI ProTeams Hiring and Contractual Terms, Remuneration, Bonuses and Prizes, Conditions of Work and of Rest, Compensation of Salary, Insurance and Social Benefits, Data Protection, Dispute Resolution 52 Austria Football (Male) Collective Agreement for Football Players in the Austrian Football League Bipartite, binding, fully implemented All clubs active in the competitions of the ÖFBL; all players employed by these clubs in competitions of the ÖFBL Wage, Contractual requirements, Working time, Training conditions, Leave, Vocational training, Health and welfare, Social protection, Image and commercial rights, Enforcement and dispute resolution Belgium Football (Both) Standard Model Contract for Remunerated Football Players Bipartite, nonbinding, fully implemented Belgian football clubs; players employed/contracted by them Wage, Contractual requirements, Working time, Training conditions, Leave, Vocational training, Health and welfare, Social protection, Image and commercial rights, Enforcement and dispute resolution Belgium Volleyball (Both) Collective Bargaining Agreement on Remuneration Conditions of Remunerated Volleyball Players and Coaches Bipartite, binding, fully implemented Volleyball clubs of the Belgian Volleyball League (la Ligue belge du volley-ball); fully or partially employed players and coaches according to the law of 24 February 1978 on "contrat de travail des sportifs rémunérés" Wage, Contractual requirements, Working time, Training conditions, Leave, Vocational training, Health and welfare, Social protection, Image and commercial rights, Enforcement and dispute resolution Belgium Football (Both) Collective Bargaining Agreement on Working Conditions and Wages of Remunerated Football Players Bipartite, binding, fully implemented Belgian football clubs; players according to the law of 24 February 1978 on "contrat de travail des sportifs rémunérés" Wage, Contractual requirements, Working time, Training conditions, Leave, Vocational training, Health and welfare, Social protection, Image and commercial rights, Enforcement and dispute resolution 53 Belgium Multisport (Both) Collective Employment Agreement on Minimum Income Bipartite, binding, fully implemented All athletes under the Commission Nationale Paritaire du Sport (CP 223) Wage, Contractual requirements, Working time, Training conditions, Leave, Vocational training, Health and welfare, Social protection, Image and commercial rights, Enforcement and dispute resolution Denmark Football (Female) Female Players Contract Bipartite, binding, fully implemented Divisionsforeningens Arbejdsgiverforening (DBU) (divisional association); Spillerforeningen (Danish football players' union, SPF) Wage, Contractual requirements, Working time, Training conditions, Leave, Vocational training, Health and welfare, Social protection, Image and commercial rights, Enforcement and dispute resolution Denmark Football (Male) Football Agreement 20252030 Bipartite, binding, fully implemented Professional football clubs; players employed by them Wage, Contractual requirements, Working time, Training conditions, Leave, Vocational training, Health and welfare, Social protection, Image and commercial rights, Enforcement and dispute resolution Denmark Football (Female) Collective Agreement for the Female’s National Team Bipartite, binding, fully implemented DBU; female national team players Wage, Contractual requirements, Working time, Training conditions, Leave, Vocational training, Health and welfare, Social protection, Image and commercial rights, Enforcement and dispute resolution 54 Denmark Football (Male) Collective Agreement for the Men’s National Team Bipartite, binding, fully implemented DBU; male national team players Wage, Contractual requirements, Working time, Training conditions, Leave, Vocational training, Health and welfare, Social protection, Image and commercial rights, Enforcement and dispute resolution Denmark Football (Male) Player Contract Tripartite, binding, fully implemented Professional Danish football Clubs; players employed/contract by them, including amateurs and trainees Wage, Contractual requirements, Working time, Training conditions, Leave, Vocational training, Health and welfare, Social protection, Image and commercial rights, Enforcement and dispute resolution Denmark Handball (Male and Female) Player Contract Bipartite, binding, fully implemented Professional Danish Handball Clubs; players employed/contract by them, Wage, Contractual requirements, Working time, Training conditions, Leave, Vocational training, Health and welfare, Social protection, Image and commercial rights, Enforcement and dispute resolution 55 Finland Ice Hockey (Male) Collective Agreement between Jääkiekon SMLiiga OY and the Finnish Ice Hockey Players’ Association regarding the Activity of the Finnish Elite League (incl. the Chl) and the Activity of the Elite League Teams Bipartite, binding, fully implemented Clubs (owners) of the league; players of these clubs Wage, Contractual requirements, Working time, Training conditions, Leave, Vocational training, Health and welfare, Social protection, Image and commercial rights, Enforcement and dispute resolution France Handball (Female) Collective Agreement for Professional Women’s Handball Tripartite, binding, partially implemented Clubs participating in 1st and 2nd division of the Female Handball League (LFH) organised and managed by the French Handball Federation; players employed by these clubs; coaches employed by these clubs Wage, Contractual requirements, Working time, Training conditions, Leave, Vocational training, Health and welfare, Social protection, Image and commercial rights, Enforcement and dispute resolution France Handball (Male) Collective Agreement on First Division Men’s Handball Tripartite, binding, fully implemented Handball clubs of the 1st and 2nd divisions; players under an exclusive professional contract or under a multi-active ("professionel pluriactif") professional contract with these clubs, incl. young players under a "trainee" contract with these clubs bound by a training agreement, head coach(s) and assistant coach(s) of these clubs Wage, Contractual requirements, Working time, Training conditions, Leave, Vocational training, Health and welfare, Social protection, Image and commercial rights, Enforcement and dispute resolution 56 France Multisport (Both) National Collective Convention on Sport Bipartite, binding, fully implemented All employers and employees of the French sport sector (incl. sport clubs) Wage, Contractual requirements, Working time, Training conditions, Leave, Vocational training, Health and welfare, Social protection, Image and commercial rights, Enforcement and dispute resolution France Rugby (Male) Collective Agreement on Professional Rugby Tripartite, binding, fully implemented Clubs (members) of the UCPR and possibly also non-members of UCPR who are members of the LNR); professional rugby players and coaches of these clubs Wage, Contractual requirements, Working time, Training conditions, Leave, Vocational training, Health and welfare, Social protection, Image and commercial rights, Enforcement and dispute resolution France Basketball (Male) Collective Agreement on Professional Basketball – Players’ Chapter Tripartite, binding, fully implemented Professional French basketball clubs (companies/associations) who are members of the LNB; players and coaches under contract with these clubs Wage, Contractual requirements, Working time, Training conditions, Leave, Vocational training, Health and welfare, Social protection, Image and commercial rights, Enforcement and dispute resolution France Football (Male) Professional Football Charter / National Collective Convention on the Football Sector Tripartite, binding, fully implemented Professional French football clubs (companies/associations); players and coaches employed by these clubs Wage, Contractual requirements, Working time, Training conditions, Leave, Vocational training, Health and welfare, Social protection, Image and commercial rights, Enforcement and dispute resolution 63 United Kingdom Football (Male) Professional Football Negotiating and Consultative Committee (PFNCC) Constitution Tripartite, forum for negotiation and consultation, includes dispute resolution mechanisms Professional Footballers’ Association (PFA), The Football League Limited (EFL), The FA Premier League Limited (PL), The Football Association Limited (FA); professional football players employed by clubs in membership of EFL and the PL Standard terms and conditions for contracts of employment (incl. contractual obligations, minimum pay, pension provision, treatment of benefits in kind, holidays); Health and safety of Players, and appropriate insurance arrangements; Code of practice for clubs and players; Minimum standards for the resolution of disputes; Effects of any applicable legislation; No major changes in regulations affecting Player’s terms and conditions without PFNCC agreement; Facilitate consultation on any matter relating to professional football 62 Annex II LIST OF SOURCES A. Table of Cases European Union Walrave v Union Cycliste Internationale (C-36/74) [1974] ECR 1405 Union Royale Belge Sociétés de Football Association and others v Bosman and others (C-415/93) [1995] ECR I-4921 Albany International v Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds Textielindustrie (C-67/79) [1999] ECR I-5751 Confederación Española de Empresarios de Estaciones de Servicio (C-217/05) [2006] EU:C:2006:784 David Meca-Medina and Igor Majcen v Commission of the European Communities (C-519/04 P) [2006] ECR I-6991 Laval un Partneri Ltd v Svenska Byggnadsarbetareforbundet (C-341/05) [2008] All ER (EC) 166 International Transport Workers’ Federation v Viking Line ABP (C-438/05) [2008] All ER (EC) 127 FNV Kunsten Informatie en Media v Staat der Nederlanden (C-413/13) [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:2411 European Superleague Company (ESL) v FIFA and UEFA (C-333/21) [2023] EU:C:2023:1011 UL and Royal Antwerp FC v Union royale belge des sociétés de football association ASBL (URBSFA) (C-680/21) [2023] EU:C:2023:188 International Skating Union v Commission (C-124/21 P) [2023] EU:C:2023:1012 Fédération internationale de football association (FIFA) v BZ (C-650/22) [2024] ECLI:EU:C:2024:824 Other Jurisdictions Eastham v Newcastle United Football Club [1964] Ch 413 (ChD) (England and Wales) Autoclenz Ltd v Belcher and Others [2011] UKSC 41 (England and Wales) Braganza v BP Shipping Ltd [2015] UKSC 17 (England and Wales Dublin Colleges Academic Staff Association v City of Dublin Vocational Education Committee [1981] 7 JIC 3101 (Republic of Ireland) EI Co Ltd v Kennedy [1968] IR 69 (Republic of Ireland) Ferguson v John Dawson and Partners (Contractors) Ltd [1976] IRLR 346 (CA) (Republic of Ireland) John Grace Fried Chicken v Catering JLC [2011] IEHC 277 (Republic of Ireland) Kaur v MG Rover Group Ltd [2005] ICR 625 (Republic of Ireland) McGowan v Labour Court [2013] IESC 21 (Republic of Ireland) 63 B. Legislation and Instruments International Instruments ILO Employment Relationship Recommendation No 198 (2006) ILO Convention No 87 on Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise (1948) ILO Convention No 98 on the Right to Organise and to Bargain Collectively (1949) ILO Convention No 154 concerning the Promotion of Collective Bargaining (1981) Global Commission on the Future of Work, Work for a brighter future (ILO 2019) International Labour Office, International Standard Classifications of Occupations: ISCO-08 (ILO 2012) International Labour Organisation, ‘Issues paper for discussion at the Global Dialogue Forum on Decent Work in the World of Sport’ (ILO, 2020) https://www.ilo.org/resource/other/global-dialogue-forum-decent-work-worldsport-issues-paper accessed 26 February 2025 International Labour Organization, Collective bargaining: a policy guide (2015) https://researchrepository.ilo.org/esploro/outputs/encyclopediaEntry/Collectivebargaining/995218593702676#file-0 accessed 3 June 2025 (No publisher provided in original) International Labour Organization, Professional Athletes and the Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work: ILO Brief (ILO Technical Brief, ILO 2024) https://doi.org/10.54394/UPJT5382 European Union Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union Directive 2003/88/EC (Working Time Directive) [2003] OJ L 299 Directive (EU) 2019/1152 (Transparent and Predictable Working Conditions Directive) [2019] OJ L 186 Directive (EU) 2024/2831 (Platform Work Directive) [2024] OJ L, 2024/2831 European Commission, Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion, ‘Sustainability and governance: the role of social dialogue’ in Publications Office (ed), Employment and social developments in Europe 2019: sustainable growth for all: choices for the future of Social Europe (Publications Office 2019) 210 European Commission, ‘Professional football - Sectoral social dialogue’ (European Commission, 2025) <https://employment-social-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies-andactivities/eu-employment-policies/social-dialogue/cross-industry-and-sectoralsocial-dialogue/professional-football-sectoral-socialdialogue_en#:~:text=In%202005%2C%20it%20was%20estimated,law%20contra cts%20is%20still%20widespread.> accessed 2 June 2025 64 European Commission, White Paper on Sport COM(2007) 391 final National Legislation Collective Agreements Act (436/1946) (Finland) Act on confirmation of the general applicability of collective agreements (56/2001) (Finland) Industrial Relations Act 1946 (Ireland) Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act 2015 (Ireland) Legge 20 maggio 1970, n 300, Norme sulla tutela della libertà e dignità dei lavoratori, della libertà sindacale e dell'attività sindacale, nei luoghi di lavoro e norme sul collocamento (Italy) Legge 23 marzo 1981, n 91, Norme in materia di rapporti tra società e sportivi professionisti (Italy) Decreto Legislativo 2/2015, de 23 de octubre, por el que se aprueba el texto refundido de la Ley del Estatuto de los Trabajadores (Spain) Decreto legislativo del 28/02/2021 n 36, Attuazione dell'articolo 5 della legge 8 agosto 2019, n. 86, recante riordino e riforma delle disposizioni in materia di enti sportivi professionistici e dilettantistici, nonche' di lavoro sportivo (Italy) Real Decreto 1006/1985, de 26 de junio, por el que se regula la relación laboral especial de los deportistas profesionales (Spain) Ley Orgánica 11/1985, de 2 de agosto, de Libertad Sindical (Spain) Real Decreto Legislativo 2/1995, de 7 de abril, por el que se aprueba el texto refundido de la Ley de Procedimiento Laboral (Spain) Ley Orgánica 3/2007, de 22 de marzo, para la igualdad efectiva de mujeres y hombres (Spain) Ley 39/2022, de 30 de diciembre, del Deporte (Spain) Employment Rights Act 1996 (United Kingdom) Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 (United Kingdom) C. Academic Literature Books and Chapters in Edited Collections Eustace, A, Collective Benefit: Harnessing the power of representation for economic and social progress (Report for Fórsa, 2021) Jonker-Hoffrén P, ‘Goodbye centralised bargaining? The emergence of a new industrial bargaining regime’ in T Müller, K Vandaele and J Waddington (eds), Collective bargaining in Europe: towards an endgame (ETUI 2019) 197 O'Leary, L, Employment and Labour Relations Law in the Premier League, NBA and International Rugby Union (TMC Asser Press 2017) 65 Palmer, W, ‘Brexit and Social Dialogue in Sport’ in J Kornbeck (ed) Sport and Brexit (Routledge 2022) Pannett, D, Collective Bargaining in Sport: Challenges and Benefits (UCL Press 2015) Leonardi, S, Ambra, MC and Ciarini, A, ‘Italian collective bargaining at a turning point’ in S Leonardi and R Pedersini (eds) Multi-employer bargaining under pressure: decentralisation trends in five European countries (ETUI 2018) Jagodzinski, R, ‘Transnational collective bargaining: a literature review’ in Schömann et al (eds) Transnational collective bargaining at company level. A new component of European industrial relations? (ETUI 2012) Journal Articles Bosold, A and Mayer, J, ‘Athlete participation in decision-making in elite sport: a scoping review’ (2025) Sport in Society Chappelet, JL, ‘The unstoppable rise of athlete power in the Olympic system’ (2020) 23(5) Sport in Society 795 Damro, C, ‘Market power Europe’ (2012) 19(5) Journal of European Public Policy 682 Farrag, S, ‘Olympians as Laborers: How Unionizing Can Help Athletes Bargain for Compensation and Better Structural Support’ [2021] 32 Fordham Intell Prop Media & Ent LJ 689 Fiege, L and Seltmann, M, ‘Social dialogue in professional sports in Europe: towards democratic governance between the European Sport Model and national industrial relations?’ [2024] Journal of European Public Policy Hayter, J and Visser, J, ‘Making collective bargaining more inclusive: The role of extension’ [2021] 160(2) International Labour Review 169 Jurkowska-Gomulka, A, Piszcz, A and Pais, SO, ‘Collective Agreements on Working Conditions of Solo Self-Employed Persons: Perspective of EU Competition Law’ (2024) 29 Bialostockie Studia Prawnicze 65 Kauhanen A, ‘The effects of the decentralization of collective bargaining on wages and wage dispersion: Evidence from the Finnish forest and IT industries’ (2024) 62 British Journal of Industrial Relations 319 Kauhanen A, Maczulskij T and Riukula K, ‘The incidence and effects of decentralized wage bargaining in Finland’ (2024) 45 J Labor Res 232 Keller, B, ‘Sectoral Social Dialogue in Professional Football: Social Partners, Outcomes and Problems of Implementation’ [2018] SSRN Electronic Journal Mittag, J et al, Good Governance in the Employment Relations of Athletes in Olympic Sports in Europe: Understanding–Evaluating–Improving (University of Rijeka, Faculty of Law 2022) Mittag, J et al, Understanding the Employment Relations of Athletes in Olympic Sports in Europe: Fact Report (University of Rijeka, Faculty of Law 2022) Monti, G, ‘Collective labour agreements and EU competition law: Five reconfigurations’ [2021] 17(3) European Competition Journal 714 66 O’Leary, L, Seltmann, M and Smokvina, V, ‘Elite Athletes and Worker Status’ [2024] Industrial Law Journal Parrish, R, ‘Social dialogue in European professional football’ [2011] 17(2) European Law Journal 213 Pedersini, R, ‘International organisations and the role of collective bargaining’ (2019) 25(2) Transfer: European Review of Labour and Research 181 Visser J, ‘Did employers abandon collective bargaining? 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Views and opinions expressed are however those of the author(s) only and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union or the European Education and Culture Executive Agency (EACEA). Neither the European Union nor EACEA can be held responsible for them.