World War II for Young Russians: the Production and Reception of History

ZOiS REPORT No. 1 / 2020 · April 2020 WORLD WAR II FOR YOUNG RUSSIANS: THE PRODUCTION AND RECEPTION OF HISTORY Félix Krawatzek and Nina Frieß ZOiS Report 1 / 2020 World War II for young Russians 2 Content 02 ___ Executive summary 04 ___ Victory Day in Russia and its implications abroad 06 ___ Surveys, focus groups, and cultural manifestations 07 ___ What history young people remember 08 ___ Young people as targets of historical politics 08 ______ Patriotic education: Military and spiritual training 10 ______ History textbooks: Eradicating critical assessments 11 ______ Literature: Competing perspectives 12 ______ Film: In the footsteps of the young heroes 13 ___ The uneasy heritage of a great victory 14 ___ United against the external threat 16 ___ Remembering violence: Views on Stalin 18 ___ Present-day relevance and how to celebrate the end of the war 21 ___ Conclusions 21 ___ Imprint Executive summary Under Russian president Vladimir Putin, historical narratives have become a central component of the Kremlin’s attempts to shape the identities of Russians at home and abroad. These narratives provide a set of identity markers and aim to compensate for limitations in other spheres of life, such as a lack of economic growth, insufficient infrastructure, and restrictions on personal freedom. Yet political actors have only a limited capacity to control how historical politics reaches into society. Some of the prevailing historical narratives diverge substantively from the elite’s intentions. A one-sided interpretation of World War II is central for Russian patriotic education and is reiterated in authorised history textbooks. More critical historical narratives are encountered in literature. Recent state-subsidised films tend to repeat Soviet ideas about the war and provide strong emotional links to young people of the time of the conflict. ZOiS Report 1 / 2020 World War II for young Russians 3 This report analyses what World War II means for young Russians and how the conflict is represented for them, notably in literature and film. Four themes are particularly important: – First, victory in World War II provides a generally shared foundation for young Russians to identify with their society and state. Victimhood and violence motivate narratives about the victory in cultural artefacts, while the historical perceptions of young respondents tend to downplay the violence and centre on the heroic victory itself. – Second, national and social unity is a central theme in how young people perceive the war. Likewise, literature, film, and political discourse emphasise that unity against an external enemy was critical for the Soviet victory. – Third, views on Stalin and violence against civilians during World War II are diverse, although young people’s opinions of Stalin are on average more positive than negative. Young Russians are generally aware of Stalin’s excessive violence, but their evaluations of that violence differ sharply. The young seem to receive only part of the culturally available information about violence. – Fourth, present-day victory celebrations are mostly seen as inappropriate and disproportionate. Many young people oppose the official festivities. They agree on the need to transmit the memory of the war to the young generation but prefer a more intimate remembering. Other historical events remain crucial for how young Russians think about their historical identity. Among them are the humiliation of the breakup of the Soviet Union, the ambivalent rupture of 1917, and — with decreasing popularity — the historical ‘return’ to Russia of Crimea, which Moscow annexed from Ukraine in 2014. ZOiS Report 1 / 2020 World War II for young Russians 4 Victory Day in Russia and its implications abroad For many countries and people across the globe, the seventy-fifth anniversary of the end of World War II in 2020 has unparalleled symbolic importance.1 It is probably the last commemoration to include sizeable numbers of veterans and survivors of the Holocaust, and the anniversary takes place amid increasing divergence between countries’ historical viewpoints. In July 2019, Russian president Vladimir Putin declared 2020 the ‘year of memory and glory’ and invited leaders from across the world to celebrate the end of the war in Moscow on 9 May.2 From the West, French president Emmanuel Macron was the first to accept — a move that created some irritation among other Western leaders, who have tried to coordinate a common position. Polish representatives have not been invited, whereas Ukraine and Lithuania have stated that they have no interest in attending, even if they are invited. International hostilities have been building up as the commemoration approaches. Across Eastern Europe, history has become a battle for truth. In the run-up to Victory Day, Putin has repeatedly declared the importance of ‘preserving the historical truth about this greatest event of the twentieth century’. He has emphasised the key to Russian historical perspectives: ‘We remember at what a high price the victory was achieved and we consider it necessary to remember and not forget the lessons of that terrible war.’3 This attitude of perceiving history as a realm for fighting over the truth is unique neither to Putin nor to Russia. Confrontations over history have escalated particularly between Poland and Russia. Since late December 2019, the Russian president has claimed on several occasions that Józef Lipski, the Polish ambassador to Berlin from 1933 to 1939, was an ‘anti-Semitic pig’. Putin has made Poland partly responsible for the outbreak of the war, pointing to its annexation of a small part of Czechoslovak territory after the 1938 Munich Agreement.4 Speaking in early 2020, the current Russian ambassador to Warsaw emphasised that Poland downplays the fact that Soviet soldiers ‘saved Poland from complete destruction by the Nazis’.5 Polish prime minister Mateusz Morawiecki’s response was furious. He accused the Russian president of ‘repeated lies’ and argued that Putin’s statements were similar to ‘propaganda from the time of Stalinist totalitarianism’. Morawiecki underlined, ‘Without Stalin’s complicity in the partition of Poland, and 1 The authors gratefully acknowledge research assistance provided by Kseniia Cherniak, Maria Kireenko, and Simon Muschick. 2 ‘UkazPrezidentaRossiiskoiFederatsiiot08.07.2019№327“OprovedeniivRossiiskoi FederatsiiGodapamyatiislavy”’,Ofitsial’nyjinternet-portalpravovoiinformatsii,8July 2019, http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001201907080031. All quotes are translated by the authors. 3 ‘PutinrasskazalopodgotovkekyubileyuPobedyv2020godu’,TASS,3July2019,https:// tass.ru/obschestvo/6625880. 4 ‘Putin’sBigLie’,Atlantic,5January2020,https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/01/putin-blames-poland-world-war-ii/604426/. 5 ‘«Fakt spaseniya Pol’shi Krasnoi armiei starayutsya zatushevat’» Posol RF v Pol’she Sergei Andreev o tom, kak Varshava pytaetsya zabyt’ ob osvoboditel’yakh Osventsima’, Izvestiya, 27January2020,https://iz.ru/968040/elnar-bainazarov/fakt-spaseniia-polshi-krasnoiarmiei-staraiutsia-zatushevat. Across Eastern Europe, history has become a battle for truth. ZOiS Report 1 / 2020 World War II for young Russians 5 without the natural resources that Stalin supplied to Hitler, the Nazi German crime machine would not have taken control of Europe.’6 Incompatible perspectives on the war are a source of tension not only between Poland and Russia. When Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky accused the Soviet Union during a visit to Poland in December 2019 of sharing responsibility for the outbreak of the war, the Kremlin denounced his statements as ‘erroneous’ and ‘offensive’.7 And the open hostility is not limited to former Warsaw Pact countries. In September 2019, the European Parliament renewed a resolution that equated the Nazi and Soviet totalitarian regimes and proposed 25 May as a day of remembrance for the struggle against totalitarianism.8 Putin considered this resolution ‘absolutely unacceptable and incorrect’ and added, ‘To put the Soviet Union and fascist Germany on the same level is the height of cynicism’.9 In Russia, political elites use the memory of the war as a central resource to strengthen a sense of belonging. As Putin regularly underlines, ‘Our memory serves our future, inspires us and strengthens our unity. We must protect the truth about the victory.’10 Highlighting this centrality of World War II, Russia made significant efforts well ahead of this year’s anniversary to determine what the war should mean at home and abroad. The framing of the war occurs in a myriad of ways, from speeches by political elites to editorials, museum exhibitions, and history teaching in schools. Besides state-funded initiatives, numerous cultural objects such as literary texts and films deal with the conflict. Key targets of many such initiatives are Russia’s young people, who are folded into a larger cultural web of interpretations with the aim of shaping their historical consciousness. At the same time, since May 2014 the Russian penal code has included an article on the rehabilitation of Nazism. This sets out severe punishments for anyone who questions the official depiction of the Soviet Union’s role in the outbreak of the war, the Red Army’s behaviour during the conflict, and the post-war regimes put in place in Eastern Europe. 6 ‘Statement by the Prime minister of Poland Mateusz Morawiecki’, website of the Republic of Poland, 29 December 2019, https://www.gov.pl/web/diplomacy/statement-by-the-primeminister-of-poland-mateusz-morawiecki. 7 ‘‘Ze’ predal deda. Prezident Ukrainy obvinil SSSR, naravne s fashistskoi Germaniei, v razvyazyvaniiVtoroiMirovoi’,Rossiiskayagazeta,28January2020,https://rg.ru/2020/01/28/ zachem-zelenskij-obvinil-sssr-v-razviazyvanii-vtoroj-mirovoj-vojny.html. 8 ‘European Parliament resolution on the importance of European remembrance for the future of Europe’, European Parliament, 18 September 2019, https://www.europarl.europa. eu/doceo/document/RC-9-2019-0097_EN.html. 9 ‘Za vklad v pobedu. Vladimir Putin nagradil veteranov i obeshchal yubileinye vyplaty’, RossiiskayaGazeta,19January2020,https://rg.ru/2020/01/19/vladimir-putin-nagradilveteranov-i-obeshchal-iubilejnye-vyplaty.html. 10 ‘Putin prizval zashchishchat’ pravdu o Pobede v Velikoi otechestvennoi voine’, Ren.tv, 15 January2020,https://ren.tv/news/v-rossii/648272-putin-prizval-zashchishchat-pravdu-opobede-v-velikoi-otechestvennoi-voine. Political elites use the memory of the war to strengthen a sense of belonging. ZOiS Report 1 / 2020 World War II for young Russians 6 Surveys, focus groups, and cultural manifestations This report explores what World War II means to young Russians and how it is represented for them. We assessed the reach of top-down initiatives in contemporary Russia and the degree to which societal and elite-driven narratives of memory converge in the context of a crucial historical anniversary. Two sets of sources inform our analysis. The first is a series of online surveys among young people living in Russia’s major urban areas, alongside focus group interviews. The second is a canon of popular historical literature and films aimed also at young people. In April 2018 and 2019, ZOiS conducted cross-sectional online surveys among young people aged 16 – 34.11 The surveys included questions about how the respondents interpreted historical events. The focus groups took place in Yekaterinburg and St Petersburg in June 2019 and included an extensive discussion of historical interpretations of various aspects of World War II. There were twelve groups, each with around eight participants, who were divided according to the following three criteria: – city: Yekaterinburg or St Petersburg; – age range: 18 – 24 or 25 – 34; and – self-ascribed political orientation: regime supporter, politically indifferent, or regime critical. 11 See Félix Krawatzek and Gwendolyn Sasse, ‘Youth in Russia: Outlook on Life and Political Attitudes’, Centre for East European and International Studies (ZOiS), accessed 5 March 2020, https://www.zois-berlin.de/publikationen/zois-report/zois-report-12018/. Year Variable Var2 Army2018(n=1,911) Army2019(n=1,849) MassMedia2018(n=1,907) (2018) President Donottrustatall 165 217 481 (2018) President Ratherdonottrust 353 359 766 (2018) President Rathertrust 877 895 576 (2018) President Fullytrust 516 378 84 Total 1911 1849 1907 (2018) MassMedia Donottrustatall 481 (2018) MassMedia Ratherdonottrust 766 (2018) MassMedia Rathertrust 576 (2018) MassMedia Fullytrust 84 (2018) Army Donottrustatall 165 (2018) Army Ratherdonottrust 353 (2018) Army Rathertrust 877 (2018) Army Fullytrust 516 (2018) OrthodoxChurch Donottrustatall 574 (2018) OrthodoxChurch Ratherdonottrust 484 (2018) OrthodoxChurch Rathertrust 567 (2018) OrthodoxChurch Fullytrust 234 (2019) President Donottrustatall 387 (2019) President Ratherdonottrust 435 (2019) President Rathertrust 654 (2019) President Fullytrust 344 (2019) MassMedia Donottrustatall 521 (2019) MassMedia Ratherdonottrust 795 (2019) MassMedia Rathertrust 457 (2019) MassMedia Fullytrust 76 (2019) Army Donottrustatall 217 (2019) Army Ratherdonottrust 359 (2019) Army Rathertrust 895 (2019) Army Fullytrust 378 (2019) OrthodoxChurch Donottrustatall 626 (2019) OrthodoxChurch Ratherdonottrust 435 (2019) OrthodoxChurch Rathertrust 512 (2019) OrthodoxChurch Fullytrust 211 proInstitution? proInstitution? 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% Army 2018 (n=1,911) Army 2019 (n=1,849) Mass Media 2018 (n=1,907) Mass Media 2019 (n=1,849) Orthodox Church 2018 (n=1,859) Orthodox Church 2019 (n=1,784) President 2018 (n=1,897) President 2019 (n=1,820) Trust in major Russian institutions Do not trust at all Rather do not trust Rather trust Fully trust FIGURE 1 Trust in major Russian institutions Source: ZOiS Do not trust at all Rather do not trust Rather trust Fully trust ZOiS Report 1 / 2020 World War II for young Russians 7 The surveys aimed at understanding the broader reference population — urban youth — whereas the focus groups sought to gain a deeper knowledge of specific arguments. To position the focus group participants in the wider population of young Russians, a question about institutional trust asked in the online surveys is instructive. FIGURE 1 shows respondents’ trust in major Russian institutions, in particular their declining confidence in the president, between 2018 and 2019, which gives a sense of how prominent the different political orientations are among Russian youth. The literature corpus included canonical texts on World War II. We also analysed more recent publications and films that specifically target young people. What history young people remember The historical consciousness of young Russians today is not limited to World War II. Our surveys asked respondents what were the most important and second most important historical events for them. FIGURE 2 In both 2018 and 2019, World War II was the most frequently mentioned most important event. The share of respondents who gave this answer increased over the two years to more than one-quarter in 2019. Terms used for the war varied, with most people mentioning either the official Russian label — Great Patriotic War — or, more specifically, the end of the war, known as Victory Day. Only a small share used the more neutral term World War II.12 12 Thisreportuses‘WorldWarII’torefertotheentireperiodofconflictfrom1939to1945, rather than the term ‘Great Patriotic War’, which is the standard in Russia and refers to the period from 1941 to 1945. n = 1,960 FIGURE 2 Important historical events for young Russians 2019 2019 2018 2018 Important historical events for young Russians WorldWarII (including Great Patriotic War and Victory Day) Breakdown USSR 23.20% 19.03% 18.81% 12.26% Revolution (1917) 10.91% 5.35% 7.99% 4.58% Crimea (including accession, return, annexation, and referendum) Total responses 1237 804 1127 742 26.19% 14.68% 22.45%  7.44% 7.09% 12.87% 9.70% 26.2% 23.2% 10.9% 7.4% 22.5% 18.8% 8.0% 12.9% World War II Breakdown USSR Revolution (1917) Crimea Most important event 2019 2018 Quelle : ZOiS  Sourc e: fist choice, second choice, Quelle Quelle: ZOiS  Quelle: ZOiS  Quelle Quelle: ZOiS  Quelle: ZOiS  Sourc e: fist choice, second choice, Quelle Quelle: ZOiS  Quelle: ZOiS  Quelle Quelle: ZOiS  Quelle: ZOiS  14.7% 19.0% 5.4% 7.1% 10.2% 12.3% 4.6% 9.7% World War II Breakdown USSR Revolution (1917) Crimea Second most important event 2019 2018 Quell e: ZOiS Sourc e: fist choice, second choice, Quell Quelle: ZOiS  Quelle: ZOiS  Quell Quelle: ZOiS  Quelle: ZOiS  2019 2019 2018 2018 Important historical events for young Russians WorldWarII (including Great Patriotic War and Victory Day) Breakdown USSR 23.20% 19.03% 18.81% 12.26% Revolution (1917) 10.91% 5.35% 7.99% 4.58% Crimea (including accession, return, annexation, and referendum) Total responses 1237 804 1127 742 26.19% 14.68% 22.45%  7.44% 7.09% 12.87% 9.70% 26.2% 23.2% 10.9% 7.4% 22.5% 18.8% 8.0% 12.9% World War II Breakdown USSR Revolution (1917) Crimea Most important event 2019 2018 Quelle : ZOiS  Sourc e: fist choice, second choice, Quelle Quelle: ZOiS  Quelle: ZOiS  Quelle Quelle: ZOiS  Quelle: ZOiS  Sourc e: fist choice, second choice, Quelle Quelle: ZOiS  Quelle: ZOiS  Quelle Quelle: ZOiS  Quelle: ZOiS  14.7% 19.0% 5.4% 7.1% 10.2% 12.3% 4.6% 9.7% World War II Breakdown USSR Revolution (1917) Crimea Second most important event 2019 2018 Quell e: ZOiS Sourc e: fist choice, second choice, Quell Quelle: ZOiS  Quelle: ZOiS  Quell Quelle: ZOiS  Quelle: ZOiS  Source: ZOiS Most important event Second most important event Difference to 100% are other events. Difference to 100% are other events. 2019(n = 1,237) 2018(n = 1,127) 2019(n = 804) 2018(n = 742) ZOiS Report 1 / 2020 World War II for young Russians 8 The breakup of the Soviet Union was also frequently cited as an important historical milestone. Its number of mentions increased from 2018 to 2019, when this event was suggested nearly as often as World War II. Putin regularly underlines that he regrets the Soviet Union’s disappearance. For many young people, the chaos of the 1990s remains a highly salient background to their political socialisation. Interpretations of the Soviet breakup are overwhelmingly negative, not only emphasising economic chaos but also suggesting that democracy might not be suitable for Russia. References to Russia’s 1917 revolutions also increased between 2018 and 2019, when 11 per cent of young people saw it as the most important historical event. This increase suggests that the revolution’s centenary in 2017 continues to influence historical awareness. It is, however, an ambiguous heritage, and young people’s interpretations are double edged: they point not only to the potential for political breakdown and the chaos and civil war that ensued, but also to the gulf the revolution created between Russia and Europe. Lastly, the number of respondents who view Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea — referred to in various ways — as the most important or second most important historical event has decreased remarkably, dropping to 7 per cent in 2019. This decrease shows the weakened salience of the topic in wider public and political discourse. It also suggests an awareness of the economic costs of owning Crimea, a realisation which has replaced the euphoric nationalism that followed the annexation. Young people as targets of historical politics Interpretations of World War II in today’s Russia come not only from the Kremlin but also from broader society and intellectuals. Below we review four sets of contributions to framing the war — patriotic education, history textbooks, literature, and film — and reveal what their respective interpretations emphasise. Patriotic education: Military and spiritual training During Putin’s time in power, patriotism has become Russia’s state ideology to strengthen regime support.13 Moscow introduced state programmes of patriotic upbringing back in 2001. But it was during Putin’s third term as president, beginning in 2012, that the focus shifted to the military dimension of patriotism. The open conflict with the West as a result of the annexation of Crimea and the war in Ukraine’s eastern Donbas region accelerated this development and increased demands to militarise patriotic education. One component of Russian military and spiritual training is the youth movement Yunarmiya, officially one of the main priorities of patriotic education. Initiated by Russian defence minister Sergei Shoigu in 2016, the movement counts eighty-five regional branches, whose members participate in 13 ‘Putin vyskazalsya za patrioticheskoye vospitaniye molodezhi bez ideologizatsii takoy raboty’, TASS, 18 March 2019, https://tass.ru/politika/6230692. For many young people, the chaos of the 1990s remains a salient background to their political socialisation. Beginning in 2012, the focus shifted to the military dimen sion of patriotism. ZOiS Report 1 / 2020 World War II for young Russians 9 numerous public events ( FIGURE 3), notably the annual Victory Day marches. According to official numbers, Yunarmiya had about 670,000 members as of February 2020 — well below the target of 1 million — aged 8 to 18, with activities reaching into other post-Soviet countries.14 Our surveys show that young people are increasingly aware of the movement. In 2018, only 10 per cent of respondents recognised Yunarmiya, a number that had nearly doubled by 2019. Patriotic education also targets a younger constituency. A script exists for Victory Day celebrations in kindergartens, with an emphasis on expanding children’s vocabulary and building an emotional bond between them and their ancestors. The goal is to transmit knowledge of the Red Army, and battles are restaged in kindergarten sandpits. Many manuals on patriotic education target children aged 3 to 7, a noteworthy shift from the patriotic education of Soviet times. In late 2017, a music video featuring member of the State Duma Anna Kuvychko alongside uniformed schoolchildren and university students expressed this sense of uber-loyalty. Shot in Volgograd, Uncle Vova, we are with you! caused significant controversy, in Russia and elsewhere, as to whether children should be involved in these kinds of activities.15 In the video, images 14 ‘‘Yunarmiya’ ne budet zanimat’sya prinuditel’nym perevospitaniem’, TASS, 15 May 2019, https://tass.ru/obschestvo/6220061.‘Detstvo – podruzh’e.Militarizatsiyarusskoizhiznina marshe. «Yunarmiya» prikhodit v detdoma’, Novaya Gazeta, 13 March 2019, https://novayagazeta.ru/articles/2019/03/13/79863-detstvo-pod-ruzhie. 15 VovaisshortforVladimirandreferstoRussia’sbest-knownVladimir,presidentPutin. FIGURE 3 Yunarmiya members attend Defender of the Fatherland Day celebrations in Heroes Square, Krasnodar Source: imago images / ITAR-TASSStudio Young people are increasingly aware of the Yunarmiya movement. ZOiS Report 1 / 2020 World War II for young Russians 16 Remembering violence: Views on Stalin In our online surveys, hardly any respondents mentioned Stalin or the violence of Stalinism when referring to World War II as important historical event. This view matches Russia’s teaching practices, emphasis on military heroism, and political discourse with its focus on economic development after the war. Brutal industrialisation is seen as the key to enabling victory over Nazi Germany, and the terror becomes depersonalised and devoid of perpetrators. In 2019, survey participants were asked to assess Stalin’s role from six possible answers. FIGURE 5 The most popular statement was a broadly positive one: Stalin may have made some mistakes but has more merits than disadvantages. Around one-quarter of respondents agreed with outright critical assessments of Stalin, and 10 per cent opted for a positive assessment.22 This diversity of responses reflects the fact that the elite does not agree on one storyline about the memory of Stalin in today’s Russia. The focus groups revealed more about these diverging assessments. Young people agreed that Stalin played a crucial role in the war and that the victory would not have been possible without him. However, assessments varied 22 YoungpeoplearethereforesignificantlymorecriticalofStalinthangeneralpopulationsurveys suggest. See, for instance, ‘Uroven’ odobreniya Stalina rossiyanami pobil istoricheskiy rekord’, Levada Center, 16 April 2019, https://www.levada.ru/2019/04/16/uroven-odobreniya-stalina-rossiyanami-pobil-istoricheskij-rekord/. FIGURE 5 Young Russians’ views of Stalin WhichassessmentaboutStalindoyouagreemostwith? 219 11.12% Stalinisawiseleader 53 2.69% StalindoesnotdeserveapositiveassessmentinourvictoryoverfascismintheGreatPatrioticWar 103 5.23% Stalinisacrueltyrantwhodeservesnothingbutcondemnation 797 40.48% Stalinmayhavemadesomemistakes,buthehasmoremeritsthandisadvantages 372 18.89% Stalinwasdirectlyresponsibleforimprisonment,tortureanddeathofmillionsofinnocentpeople 135 6.86% NowsomepeopleexaggeratetheroleofStalinintherepressions 290 14.73% Difficulttoanswer 1969 total fromZOiSYouthSurvey2019 Stalinwasawiseleader 11.12% Nowsomepeople exaggerate theroleofStalininthe repressions 6.86% Stalinmayhavemade some mistakes,buthehas moremerits thandisadvantages 40.48% Stalinwasdirectly responsible forimprisonment,torture anddeath ofmillionsofinnocent people 18.89% Stalinwasacrueltyrant whodeserves nothingbut condemnation 5.23% Stalindoesnotdeservea positive assessmentinourvictory over fascismintheGreat PatrioticWar 2.69% Difficulttoanswer 14.73% 11.1% 6.9% 40.5% 18.9% 5.2% 2.7% 14.7% Stalin was a wise leader Now some people exaggerate the role of Stalin in the repressions Stalin may have made some mistakes, but he has more merits than disadvantages Stalin was directly responsible for imprisonment, torture and death of millions of innocent people Stalin was a cruel tyrant who deserves nothing but condemnation Stalin does not deserve a positive assessment in our victory over fascism in the Great Patriotic War Difficult to answer Young Russians’ views of Stalin Datenreihe1 n=1,969 Source: ZOiS  n=2,006 Quelle: ZOiS  Quelle: ZOiS  Source: ZOiS n = 1,969 ZOiS Report 1 / 2020 World War II for young Russians 17 hugely according to each participant’s political outlook. Regime supporters in both cities emphasised Stalin’s overall positive role for the country and regretted that today’s society tends to forget his contribution. One young man underlined that ‘he [Stalin] raised the country and restored cities that were destroyed’. Other young people in the pro-regime group even agreed that Stalin provides a role model for today. Older participants in St Petersburg believed that he was a strong leader with great foresight: one spoke positively about his ‘tough decisions’, while another argued that we, as Russians, should look up to him. There were very different historical narratives about Stalin in the indifferent and regime-critical groups. As one would expect, the latter expressed the most negative attitudes towards Stalin. These participants brought up the Gulag, and one young woman argued: [Stalin] was a tyrant. There was a genocide of the people, which also concerned my family. My great-great-grandfather fought [in World War II], then he once said that German tanks are better than ours. How dare he? He was sentenced for ten years. Another young man even claimed that there were similarities between Stalin and the current Russian president. However, despite criticising Stalin’s violence, regime-critical young people also agreed on his importance for the Soviet victory. The focus groups revealed conflicting assessments, which are similarly expressed in literature. Traditionally, literature in Russia has functioned as a corrective to state positions by criticising rulers and providing alternatives to dominant narratives. Literature on World War II has long addressed topics that go against official discourse, and it was nearly impossible to publish such texts officially in Soviet times. Vasily Grossman’s magnum opus Life and Fate, written in the 1950s, depicts Stalinist repression in World War II and, more importantly, compares Stalin with Hitler, was first published abroad. It was only in 1988, during perestroika, that the book was released in Russia. Today, cultural artefacts dealing with Stalinist repression are available in Russia. Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn’s One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich, whose main character is a former Red Army soldier serving a ten-year sentence in a Soviet labour camp for escaping from German war captivity, is even required reading in Russian schools. There are also more recent publications for young readers, which depict the repression in the Soviet Union in the 1940s. Wormwood Tree, written by Olga Kolpakova and published in 2017, focuses on repression against ethnic minorities. It tells the story of 5-year-old Soviet-German Marikhen, whose family is deported with many others to Siberia, because Soviet officials are afraid they might collaborate with Nazi Germany. Referring to her father, Marikhen explains the political situation as follows: [The Soviet Union] is the largest country in the world. And many, many different peoples live in it. Most of them are Russians. There are many Germans, too. And the main person in the country is the Georgian Stalin. We are Germans. The Germans also attacked us. And all because every nation has good and bad people, evil and good, Despite criticising Stalin’s violence, regime-critical young people also agreed on his importance for the Soviet victory. ZOiS Report 1 / 2020 World War II for young Russians 18 greedy and generous. And all people started to call the bad Germans ‘fascists’. That’s what dad explained. Wormwood Tree is based on a true story; but unlike the flood of memoirs that deal with the time of the repression, it is told not by a grown-up retrospectively but by a first-person child narrator and for children. As an innocent and highly vulnerable character, Marikhen demonstrates the excesses of Stalinist repression that targeted the entire Soviet population. The crimes committed by Red Army soldiers against the civilian population remain probably the most difficult topic. Especially rape continues to be a taboo even in literature. Yet, a few texts do mention it, perhaps the best known being Solzhenitsyn’s long poem Prussian Nights, which was composed in 1950 while the author was still in prison. In 1,500 lines, the poem recalls the pillages, rapes, and murders the Red Army committed in Prussia. At first, the narrator seems to be more of a chronicler than a participant, but in the last verse, he confesses that he also raped a woman. When the German weekly Die Zeit first published some verses from the poem in 1969, Solzhenitsyn was highly afraid of the consequences from Soviet authorities and protested against the unauthorised publication. In 1974, when an authorised Russian version of the poem was finally published in Paris, Solzhenitsyn was already in exile. However, this seems to be the only version that has ever been printed in Russian. When young people were asked whether Russians ought to criticise the Red Army or what to make of violence against the civilian population, some intuitively took a protective stance and relativised such violence: ‘If you remember what the Germans did in our country, it was much worse.’ Similarly, some dismissed the violence as one-off cases or even propaganda. Others, generally more critical of today’s Russian regime, were more willing to acknowledge the violence against the civilian populations of Eastern and Central Europe. But some critics of the regime asserted that they rejected any criticism of the Red Army. In other words, the Red Army’s heroism has emerged as a largely consensual historical view that seems to affect a significant part of the population and provide a shared sense of belonging. Present-day relevance and how to celebrate the end of the war Memory requires repetition and media. Especially when witnesses to an event have died, the media transmit interpretations about what to remember and how. Young Russians today face a rigid framework that prescribes how World War II is to be remembered, but they have also developed their own expectations. World War II first became iconised in cultural artefacts during the war itself. Combatants wrote the first texts, and their descendants updated interpretations of the war over time. Most contemporary updates occur via popular, previously published texts and therefore help perpetuate Soviet perspectives. Young people in the focus groups reiterated how important it was for them to watch Soviet films. The crimes committed by Red Army soldiers against the civilian population remain probably the most difficult topic. ZOiS Report 1 / 2020 World War II for young Russians 19 The Dawns Here Are Quiet illustrates this particularly well. The novella, first published in 1969, was turned into a film in 1972 ( FIGURE 6), which became even more popular than the original text. On 30 April 2015, shortly before the seventieth anniversary of the end of World War II, to guarantee maximum media attention, a Russian remake of the film was released. FIGURE7 It was first broadcast on 9 May 2016 on Channel One Russia, the country’s most-watched television channel. This Soviet text still frames the way Russians are to think about World War II. Young people echoed the relevance of the war that the media and political discourse suggest. There is a consensus that the war contains lessons for today’s Russia that ought to be transmitted to the next generation. Proregime youth argued that Russians should be considered ‘the heirs of the generation of winners’, and others agreed on the importance of knowing one’s ancestry. But regime critics, too, tended to agree that the war should be commemorated as an example of ‘courage’. For example, young people in the focus groups agreed in principle with the Immortal Regiment marches, in which people carry portraits of their relatives who fought during the war. But at the same time, many criticised the fact that the authorities increasingly use these marches for their own purposes. There was a broadly shared view that today’s celebrations are inappropriate: they were described as ‘for show’, too dramatised, and detached from the population. One young woman argued that the victory celebrations had become a kind of empty shell to show that Russia could win a war again, implicitly referring to the huge number of suggested continuities from 1945 to the present. Young people criticised the fact that those in power simply want to ‘prove something’, without having a clear historical meaning associated to the events. Frustration with today’s commemorations cut across political views. Young people — and not only those critical of the regime — complained about the ‘fuss’ the government makes of every 9 May. One young man from FIGURE 6 Poster for the film The Dawns Here Are Quiet (1972) FIGURE 7 Poster for the film The Dawns Here Are Quiet (2015) Source: SPUTNIK Alamy Stock FotoStudio Source: Zori Film There was a broadly shared view that today’s victory celebrations are inap propriate. ZOiS Report 1 / 2020 World War II for young Russians 20 Yekaterinburg argued that Victory Day had become a ‘nightmare’, as it had turned into an occasion for ‘hurray patriotism’ and was completely dissociated from the original event. Among the politically indifferent in St Petersburg, criticism of the presentday celebrations was particularly virulent. One young woman maintained that millions of roubles were spent just ‘to disperse the clouds [during large festivals]’ and that ‘veterans are dying of hunger in monstrous conditions in the villages’. She added, ‘It is just the same as going out and shooting them.’ A male participant took that argument further and said that in his eyes, it is a ‘celebration of hypocrisy’: We take a little old man out from the top shelf of the closet once a year. We say, ‘Well done to you’, eat buckwheat, soup, and then on May 10, we hide him back in the closet. All this goes along with drinking alcohol and the phrase ‘We can repeat it’. You can’t repeat it, and it’s not necessary to repeat it, because it was a dishonest, senseless war, and we drowned the Nazi knife with the blood of our people. And I think this is inadequate. Even most regime critics agreed on the need to remember Victory Day, but many underlined that it was not worth celebrating it. One young man criticised public displays of heroism and argued that this should be a private day of remembrance for family members. Adding nuance to the question of how to deal with the victory today, another male participant agreed that it was necessary in principle to remember this historical milestone, but with an emphasis on society: It is not necessary to clothe this in some kind of heroism of the Soviet Union itself. The heroism of the people should be clothed with this, because the victory was won by the people’s victims, not by the state. Critical young people agreed that it was necessary to remember the war and teach the young generation, to prevent such violence from recurring. History needs to be brought to young people, and today’s young Russians are concerned about history being rewritten. Most link this rewriting of history to the deaths of the last veterans, who are recognised as authentic witnesses to the war. It is noteworthy that even some regime supporters had a nuanced view of what kind of remembering is desirable. One young man underlined that ‘our country does not need to live only in memory’. For him, this might be a way to cover up the fact that nothing else happens in Russia today. He illustrated this argument with the example of his home city of Volgograd, where life only happens in memory, given that nothing else is available. Tropes of the Russian state discourse were clearest in the regime-supporting groups. Most prominent was an emphasis on the need to defend the memory of the victory against external threats. One young man was very outspoken in this regard and accused the ‘propaganda of Western media’ of trying to influence what people think about history and of reshuffling the facts. Most worrying for him was that even many Russians would come to believe that ‘the Soviet Union itself attacked Germany’. He went on, ‘It sounds crazy and utopian for us now. If we were sitting in a European country or in America, everyone would probably nod their heads.’ Even most regime critics agreed on the need to remember Victory Day. ZOiS Report 1 / 2020 World War II for young Russians 21 Conclusions Historical narratives are a central component of today’s identity narratives in Russia. These narratives were first promoted overtly around 2005 with the aim of formulating a sense of belonging for Russians in Russia and abroad. At that time, Russia felt threatened domestically by the unfolding colour revolutions in neighbouring countries. The narratives have been intensified during Putin’s third term as president. The use of history to strengthen national identity is not unique to Russia but can be encountered across Europe. In the current political context, history is increasingly used as an instrument by political and social actors in various political systems. But authoritarian countries seem particularly able to control historical narratives. The extent to which Russians internalise the top-down narratives is harder to assess, however. This report has found diversity in young people’s historical narratives, some of which contradict the official visions of history. Views on Stalin and the violence that civilians were exposed to are particularly contested. Although young people are generally aware of Stalinist repression, evaluations of that period of history differ sharply among young Russians today. Information in literature, exhibitions, and films about violence are publicly available but reach young people only to a limited extent. Young people also criticise today’s victory celebrations as excessive. There is widespread agreement on the need to transmit memory from one generation to another, but many prefer a more personalised way of remembering. The Soviet victory in World War II provides a shared historical foundation for young Russians. They broadly reiterate Russia’s official narratives of heroism and Soviet strength, while the victims and violence — usually central in literature or films — play only a minor role in young people’s perceptions of the war. The mythical unity of the people in wartime is a recurring theme among young Russians, who contrast this with a contemporary society that many perceive as atomised. The unity of the diverse people of the Soviet Union contrasts with today’s geopolitical situation and is a feature that recent films in particular reiterate. For those in power, the Soviet victory in World War II provides one of the most usable historical events to generate support for Russia. But narratives about a glorified past are bound to be contested in society. As this report has shown, the Russian elite can control the key in which young Russians talk about history, but it cannot determine the tune they sing. Imprint Authors Dr. Félix Krawatzek and Dr. Nina Frieß Published by © Centre for East European and International Studies (ZOiS) gGmbH Address Centre for East European and International Studies (ZOiS) gGmbH Mohrenstraße 60 10117 Berlin [email protected] www.zois-berlin.de Citation Félix Krawatzek and Nina Frieß: “World War II for young Russians: The production and reception of history”, ZOiS Report 1 / 2020, (https://www. zois-berlin.de/fileadmin/media/ Dateien/ZOiS_Reports/ZOiS_Report_1_2020.pdf) ISSN 2512-7233 Layout Yuko Stier Cover image Premium Stock Photography GmbH / Alamy Stock Foto Figure 4: Reproduced with the kind permission of Motor Film Studio ZOiS Report 1 / 2020 World War II for young Russians 22