Report on Conspiracy Theories in the Online Environment and the Counter-Disinformation Ecosystem in Poland

Report on Conspiracy Theories in the Online Environment and the Counter-Disinformation Ecosystem in Poland Elżbieta Drążkiewicz Researching Europe, Digitalisation and Conspiracy Theories (REDACT) ISBN: 978-91-8104-786-8 REDACT is supported by the CHANSE ERA-NET Co-fund programme, which has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Programme, under Grant Agreement no. 101004509. The research on Poland and Slovakia is funded by the Slovak Academy of Sciences. Imprint Published by REDACT November 2025 © REDACT. Some rights reserved. www.redactproject.sites.er.kcl.ac.uk Licensing Information Open Access. Some rights reserved. As the publisher of this work, REDACT wants to encourage the circulation of our work as widely as possible while retaining the copyright. We therefore have an open access policy which enables anyone to access our content online without charge. Anyone can download, save, perform or distribute this work in any format, including translation, without written permission. This is subject to the terms of the Creative Commons By Share Alike licence. The main conditions are: • REDACT and the author(s) are credited including our web address www.redactproject.sites.er.kcl.ac.uk • If you use our work, you share the results under a similar licence A full copy of the licence can be found at https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/ All data methods and data visualisations by Ben Pelling. Designed by Julius Haferkorn. Contents Executive Summary 1. History and Context of Conspiracy Theories in Poland 2. Polish Online Environment and Online Conspiracist Environment 3. Case Study: Great Replacement Conspiracy Theories in Poland 4. Case Study: Anti-Gender Ideology Conspiracy Theories 5. The Counter-Disinformation Sector in Poland 6. Expanded Key Findings 7. Expanded Recommendations References 4 6 8 9 11 13 15 17 18 3 Executive Summary REDACT Project Summary The REDACT project analysed how digitalisation shapes the form, content and consequences of conspiracy theories, including online sociality and offline actions and effects. Rather than seeing digitalisation as a process that has universal outcomes, or conspiracy theories as the same over space and time, REDACT considered online conspiracy theories and counter-disinformation organisations in a selection of European countries. The project involved a team of 14 researchers analysing data from Western Europe, Central Europe, the Baltics and the Balkans. Methodology Using keywords from a range of conspiracy theory topics, the project gathered 6 million posts from Twitter/X, Facebook, Instagram and Telegram between 2019–2024. The researchers used a mixture of digital methods and close reading strategies to analyse the datasets. Each regional team also conducted ethnographic interviews with key members of counter-disinformation organisations across Europe. Political, social and economic contexts were brought to bear on all of these methods and findings. About the Author Elzbieta Drazkiewicz (Associate Professor, Lund University) has been researching conspiracy theories and conflicts over truth for almost a decade. She also has extensive experience in studying state and non-state organisations, NGOs and civic movements. Currently, she is leading several international projects on countering disinformation and crisis preparedness. Key Findings • Conspiracismhasdeephistoricalroots:Conspiracy theories are evolving but they remain tied to longstanding concerns about external and internal enemies and national identity and sovereignty. • Conspiracythinkingoftenreflectscomplexsocio-economicchangesattheglobalandlocal levelaswellasthehighlydiverseexperiencesofthosechanges. • Conspiratorialnarrativesoftenrecycleoldtropeswhileadaptingtonewissues. • Conspiracismamplifiesnationalismandpolarisation:This makes public debate more emotionally charged and intractable. • Conspiratorialnarrativesbecomepartofthepoliticalmainstream: Once these narratives are mainstream, interventions are almost impossible. • Greyzonescomplicateintervention: Conspiracy theories are not always expressed explicitly, making them hard to identify, regulate or counter. • ForeignInformationManipulationandInterference(FIMI)andhomegrownconspiracy theoriesarecloselylinked:Often exploiting pre-existing fears and using local actors for scaremongering, they must be considered jointly. 4 • Thecounter-disinformationsectorreliespredominantlyoncivilsocietyorganisations,which areunderfundedandunderpressure. • Everydayusersplayanimportantroleincounteringconspiracism:The Polish education system (both formal and informal) is an untapped resource for supporting the fight against disinformation and conspiracy theories. Key Recommendations 1. Understand conspiracy theories as a unique form of disinformation: Consider what makes conspiracy theories ‘stickier’ than other forms of disinformation. 2. Don’t use conspiracism to fuel political wars: Stand up against the normalisation of conspiracy theories in public discourse. 3. Don’t allow populist conspiracism to set the terms of national debates: Media neutrality does not mean that we have to tolerate forms of denialism, veiled racism, homophobia and radicalisation. Resist clickbait. 4. Create society-centred solutions: Don’t overestimate solutions focusing on technology. 5. Disincentivise online disinformation: This requires regulators and platforms to work together for the public good. 6. Look beyond social media: Conspiracy theories do not exist only in the online world and should be considered as part of the larger ecosystem. 7. Acknowledge that just as the problem of conspiracy theories is political, so is the countering of disinformation, which deserves support: Run nationwide programmes for all ages that link critical literacy skills to real local and global issues (corruption, health, history) and mobilise trusted local actors (teachers, doctors, community leaders). 8. Regulate platforms with transparency and sensitivity to local needs: Push platforms for fine-grained moderation data, stronger Polish-language moderation teams, cooperation with regulators and measures that disincentivise disinformation. 9. Avoid heavy-handed censorship; insist on due process: Any legal measures must have clear criteria, judicial oversight and swift, proportionate implementation — transparency over secret takedowns. 10. Design tailored, evidence-based responses: Different conspiracy types (anti-gender ideology, anti-migrant, anti-Ukraine, etc.) need different approaches. 11. Protect and strengthen independent institutions and journalism: Fund and legally safeguard public service media, investigative outlets, regulators and public broadcasters to rebuild trust and prevent capture. 12. Invest in civic capacity and rapid response: Provide stable, multi-year funding for NGOs and create cross-sector, non-partisan rapid-response units for coordinated communications, factchecking and evidence-based explanations. 5 1. History and Context of Conspiracy Theories in Poland Central and Eastern European spaces are often described as the archetypes of strong conspiratorial cultures. This is understandable given the number of real conspiracies experienced by countries in the region.1 In the case of Poland, this includes external conspiracies, such as the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, or the postwar efforts of Stalin and his allies to install a communist, pro-Moscow regime in Poland. But while the fear of the external enemy is strong, the fear of the internal traitor is perhaps the most significant difference between Eastern and Western European conspiracism.2 This trope is particularly strong in Poland. The Targowica Confederation of 1792 played a pivotal role in generating fears of internal treachery, making it an indispensable part of Polish political life. This perception was consolidated and complicated during the 20th century, particularly during World War II. This historical context is important because many conspiracy theories in Poland today utilise this fear of betrayal, for instance, in narratives in which prominent politicians are accused of betraying the nation and of being puppets in the hands of foreign elites. The Polish context is also different from the West in the lack of overt stigmatisation of conspiracy theories. In Western Europe, the 1950s were pivotal for the delegitimisation of conspiracy theories.3 In Central Europe, on the other hand, that was a time when conspiracy theories were integrated into official Communist Party discourse. Communist propaganda not only included lies about the state of the economy and society, but also was heavily dependent on anti-capitalist, anti-West conspiracy theories. Scaremongering was an important part of communist ideology; citizens were encouraged to stay vigilant and to watch out for traitors of the state. Communist authorities frequently used conspiracy theories to influence the atmosphere in their countries or justify their own actions. The events of March 1968 are an example of this, when, to justify the brutal crackdown on student protests and to push for a shift in politics, the Communist Party utilised well-rehearsed antisemitic conspiracy theories. When the Solidarity movement finally succeeded in 1989, suspicion towards the state, elites, foreign powers and one another was so engrained it was hard to overcome. The politics of the 1990s were influenced by the weaponisation of the lustration process and an urge to reveal the truth about the end of communism. The question of who among politicians and high-level civil servants had collaborated with communist interior police and served as internal or external agents – and lied about it – was a driving force in the politics of the era, generating suspicion and conspiracy theories. This atmosphere led to the collapse of several governments, most notably Jan Olszewski’s government in 1992. Conspiratorial investigations concerning communism and its dissolution continue to shape contemporary politics. In particular, the conservative camp, continues to fuel conspiracy theories concerning the Magdalenka talks and Round Table Negotiations, as well as speculation surrounding Lech Wałęsa and his alleged conspiring against the Solidarity movement. According to Franciszek Czech and some of the experts we interviewed for this project, the most prominent conspiracy theories in Poland concern the end of communism.4 While the Central and Eastern European conspiratorial milieu is unique to an extent, the differences between Western and Eastern Europe should not be overestimated. As in other parts of Europe, since the 19th century there has been a tendency to attribute societal problems to a clandestine plot by Jews. The predominantly Christian, Catholic environment of Poland fostered anti-Judaic beliefs that portrayed Jews as satanic conspirators, poisoning wells and kidnapping Christian children for ritual purposes.5 In the interwar period, antisemitic conspiracy theories were widely spread by national-radical movements such as Falanga and its leader Bolesław Piasecki6 as well as the National Democracy movement and its leader Roman Dmowski.7 6 At this time, the notion of Judeo-Bolshevism (‘Żydokomuna’) gained momentum, spreading the idea that communism was invented by Jewish conspirators to take over Poland and the world. In the postwar and later post-communist periods, other variants of antisemitic conspiracy theories were propagated, associating Jews with capitalism and imperialism. In both variants Jews were dehumanised, representing an almost metaphysical evil, a foreign power plotting against the Polish community in order to exploit it. These antisemitic conspiratorial tropes connect strongly in Central Europe, where victimhood plays a large part in social identity. Research shows that antisemitic conspiracy theories correlate with competition for the status of victim and destroy intergroup relations, as victimised groups deny or minimise the status of historical victims of others.8 An example is the case of Polish conservative groups distorting the memory of World War II crimes in general and the Holocaust in particular. Antisemitic tropes and the fears of external and internal enemies accumulate in several popular conspiracy theories, particularly concerning the EU and ‘the West’. Here, the EU is presented as the external enemy, with ‘Brussels Elites’ plotting to endanger Poland through economic exploitation, the loss of national sovereignty and the imposition of values that are not compatible with the traditional Polish Catholic–Conservative variant. Another version of this conspiracy theory identifies the ‘gender and gay lobby’ as the main threat, plotting to destroy the family and eradicate the Polish nation by corrupting its values. Theories utilising the fear of the loss of sovereignty are frequently weaponised in politics, with politicians accusing each other of acts of treachery and of serving as puppets of Brussels, Germany or Russia. Their echoes can also be found in climate change denialism, which is frequently interpreted as a plot to end the Polish coal industry, reverse the last thirty years of modernising efforts (which included a strong emphasis on supporting the automobile and aviation industries through large investments in motorways and airports) or counter Catholic doctrine, which sees the environment as subservient to humans. In Poland, conspiracy theories are not just on the fringes of politics. Antoni Macierewicz and some other politicians are responsible for sharing conspiratorial speculation concerning the Smoleńsk plane crash. Grzegorz Braun has been accused of antisemitism, in 2019 Sławomir Mentzen ‘jokingly’ summarised the programme of his party as: ‘We do not want Jews, homosexuals, abortions, taxation and the European Union’. Some members of the Konfederacja party also support ending Poland’s ban on promoting fascism and hate speech. Current President Nawrocki propagates views that Germany is using the EU to subordinate Poland and actively fuels theories that Lech Wałęsa was a traitor of Solidarity and secretly plotted with the Secret Service. Some Catholic bishops and priests spread conspiratorial narratives, particularly with regard to gender ideology and feminism. Conspiracy theories are not just a characteristic of new media or a problem limited to digital media. They have been spread by right-wing news outlets such as Gazeta Polska (founded in 1993), Sieci (founded 2012), Do Rzeczy (founded 2013) or Radio Maryja (established in 1991). During the PiS government, the national TV broadcaster, Telewizja Polska, produced pseudo-documentaries such as Reset, which was strongly conspiratorial in tone. Since 2022, TV Republika – a right-wing television station linked to Gazeta Polska – has frequently served as a platform for conspiratorial views. The spread of conspiracy theories is made easier not only due to their normalisation in the political sphere, but also because of increasing distrust in science. Even before Covid-19, low vaccination rates have been a serious issue, with organisations such as STOP-NOP gaining popularity.9 Covid-19 only exacerbated this situation, but it also (again) linked science with politics. While pandemic denialism was popular, there were also many conspiratorial voices circulating among liberal audiences accusing the conservative PiS-led government of deliberately hiding the real infection and mortality rates to push its own political agenda.10 7 2. Polish Online Environment and Online Conspiracist Environment Internet usage in Poland is high (89.8%). In 2025 there were approximately 29 million active social-media user identities, which is equivalent to 75.6% of the population. Google, YouTube and Facebook are the three most visited websites in Poland. The most popular platforms (by share of population) are Facebook (86.5%), Messenger (80%), Instagram (63.2%), Whatsapp (58.7%) and TikTok (51.8%). Compared to Western Europe, the number of X users in Poland is low (28.7%). When measured by time spent on platforms, the most popular sites by far are TikTok, YouTube and then Facebook. However, Facebook still leads in web traffic referrals (58.78%) followed by Instagram (18.75%), Pinterest (8.9%) and X (6.11%).11 Poland has a diverse media landscape, including its public service TV and radio broadcasters. During the eight years of rule by PiS, these were used as propaganda tools, and private media was under strong pressure, often subjected to SLAPP cases. Trust in private media companies is also frequently undermined by smear campaigns (often led by politicians and conservative pundits) accusing them of ‘representing foreign interests’. According to the Reuters Institute Digital News Report of 2024, since 2015 trust in information media has dropped by 17 percentage points (from 56% in 2015 to 39% in 2024).12 Across all media, the rankings of the most trustworthy is led by private radio stations (RMF FM and Radio Zet). The right-wing newspaper Gazeta Polska, known for scaremongering and spreading conspiracy theories, scores almost the same as the left-leaning online magazine OKO Press, known for its investigative journalism and fact-checking services (31% and 32%). At the bottom of the ranking are the tabloid magazine Super Express and national TV broadcaster TVP. According to the study undertaken by the Digital Poland Foundation in 2024, as many as 16% of respondents claimed they do not have any reliable sources of information.13 The three most reliable sources are television (chosen by 64%, considered reliable by 27%), internet portals (chosen by 58%, considered reliable by 25%) and radio. Social media is consolidating its position as a source of information, moving ahead of print media. As Covid-19 restrictions eased, a new crisis began – the full-scale invasion by Russia of Ukraine. This triggered new conspiracy theories, but also escalated hybrid war attacks from Russia, which frequently included the spread of disinformation and conspiracy theories. In sum, the world of conspiracy theories in Poland is highly diverse and strong. It taps into centuries-old concerns about independence and power, as well as historical interethnic conflicts, such as those between Catholic and Jewish populations, or Polish and Ukrainian ones. While conspiratorial rhetoric has never been fully delegitimised in the Polish political sphere, currently it seems to be escalating, with Foreign Information Manipulation Interference (FIMI) only making the issue worse. Figure 1. Post on X, 2025: “#PiSRussianAgents: The truth comes out in the end.” 8 The last decade has witnessed the rise of the highly conservative Telewizja Republika. Since 2023 it has become one of the fastest growing broadcasters in the country, often topping popularity rankings (of both digital and traditional legacy media), despite being accused of spreading disinformation and tapping into conspiratorial narratives. Increasingly, Polish conservative commentators (such as Łukasz Warzecha, Rafał Ziemkiewicz and many others) have successfully expanded their journalistic activities to social media, in particular YouTube. One of the most successful channels is Kanal Zero, run by controversial journalist/politician Krzysztof Stanowski. The second fastest growing channel is the Sejm’s official YouTube channel, which currently has 702k subscribers, five times more than Germany’s Bundestag channel. This already complex landscape is further complicated by the economy. Polish media consumers are very reluctant to pay for content and subscriptions. At the same time, there are no subsidies for national or local print media. As a result, print media faces increased financial pressure, competing with digital media in the clickbait race by opting for sensationalised content or cutting back on in-house factchecking. As a result, such services are pushed on to other organisations or become the responsibility of media consumers. The study undertaken by the Digital Poland Foundation indicates that only one in five Poles knows about fact-checking organisations, but 62% of respondents recognise the need for such services. In the same study, 79% indicated that at some point in their lives they encountered disinformation, and according to 81% of respondents, the scale of online disinformation has grown in the last decade. Similar responses were given to questions about fake news. Significantly, respondents encountered fake news equally frequently in social media (55%) and on television (53%), but 70% of respondents admitted that they received fake news from another person, either through word of mouth (57%) or through social media (49%). This shows that we have to pay equal attention to offline and online spaces when it comes to the spread of disinformation. Importantly, half of respondents (52%) pointed to politicians as responsible for spreading falsehoods. Research shows that the Polish population is strongly concerned with disinformation. In the survey conducted by the Pew Research Center in 2025, 85% of Polish respondents identified the spread of false information online as the primary threat, with the spread of infectious diseases, terrorism, climate change and the state of the economy ranked significantly lower.14 This is the highest result among 25 countries surveyed. Significantly, the percentage of adults who consider false information to be a serious threat has increased by more than 20 percentage points since 2022, when the spread of infectious diseases was considered the largest threat. This reflects the intensified weaponisation of conspiracy theories and disinformation during the most recent election campaigns in 2023 and 2025, as well as intensified FIMI attacks originating from Russia. Poland is at particularly high risk of FIMI. According to the Microsoft Digital Defense Report of 2024, Poland ranks third in Europe and nineth in the world in terms of exposure to attacks from cybercriminal organisations sponsored by foreign countries, mainly Russia.15 Disinformation spread by Russia strongly influences the political landscape as well as public moods, especially attitudes on such sensitive issues as migration.16 According to Polish government representatives, there is evidence that the GRU (Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation) and FSB (Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation) have been recruiting people through the dark web to influence the results of the 2025 presidential elections by spreading disinformation online.17 Figure 2: “Any history of mental conditions in the family?” - “My Brother-in-Law reads ‘Wyborcza’ and watches TVN.” Meme from Facebook, 2024. 9 • Greyzonescomplicateintervention: Conspiracy theories are not always expressed overtly. They are often communicated through innuendo, implication, speculation and memes rather than explicit claims, making them difficult to identify, regulate or counter. • FIMIalignscloselywithhomegrown conspiracytheories,oftenexploitingpreexistingfearsandusinglocalactorsfor scaremongering:They must be considered jointly. • Conspiratorialnarrativesoftenrecycle oldtropeswhileadaptingtonewissues: Topics shift with crises (gender → COVID → Ukraine), but actors reuse core repertoires (fear of the external enemy, treachery, victimhood) to fit new contexts. Counter-Disinformation Sector • WhilethePolishstateismakingsomeprogressinaddressingtheproblemofdisinformation,itsresponseisstillinsufficient: There is a lack of clarity on which institutions are responsible for addressing the problem of disinformation, what the state strategy is and what the priorities in that field are. • Thelabourofcounteringdisinformation andconspiracytheoriesreliespredominantlyoncivilsocietyorganisations,which areunderfundedandunderpressure: In the last decade there has been a significant growth of civic initiatives aimed at countering disinformation. However, funding is still precarious and vulnerable to geopolitical shifts, resources are minimal relative to the scope of disinformation and there are no consequences for spreading lies. • Technology-orientedsolutionslimit possibilitiesofdeepandmeaningful change: Debates concerning counterdisinformation frequently focus on seeking technology-based solutions, but the problem of conspiracy theories is neither exclusively nor predominantly digital. While digital platforms offer the infrastructure for conspiracy theories to travel, the popularity of conspiracy theories cannot be blamed on digitalisation alone, as they are deeply rooted in the regional political culture and national identity politics, as well as low trust in science and experts. Searching for a digital solution is a start, but a true change requires a shift in the political culture. • Everydayusersplayanimportantrolein counteringconspiracism: Grassroot, ad-hoc initiatives should not be underestimated. In Poland, their importance is reflected in the popularity of scientific and political blogs, podcasts and social media groups and channels where content creators and their audiences discuss current issues and engage in conversations about ‘the truth’, offering their own analysis and interpretations of specific events or debunking (dis)information or popular misconceptions. • ThePolisheducationsystem(formaland informal)isanuntappedresourcethat canbebetterutilisedtofosterresilience againstconspiracytheories:Unlike in other countries – such as the Nordics, where source criticism has been part of the national curriculum for decades – in Poland, subjects that could support the fight against disinformation are not prioritised in national education. At present, such educational programmes are mostly promoted by civil society actors, rather than the state. • Whilefact-checkingandmedialiteracy areuseful,theyhavetheirlimitations: Such approaches push responsibility for addressing the problem of conspiracy theories and disinformation on consumers of digital content rather than those who produce content or provide platforms enabling conspiracy theories. Wider approaches to improve societal resilience and crisis preparedness as well as stronger regulatory solutions are needed. 16 7. Expanded Recommendations 1. Don’tuseconspiracismtofuelpoliticalwars: Conspiratorial narratives are frequently spread and popularised by political elites, so focusing only on addressing the problem at the societal level is not enough. Stand up against the normalisation of conspiracy theories in public discourse. 2. Createsociety-centredsolutions;don’t overestimatesolutionsfocusingon technology: Conspiracy theories do not exist only in the online world. Many spread in ‘traditional’ ways: at political rallies, through face-to-face communication, print media, TV and radio, etc. Thus, they should be considered as part of the larger ecosystem. 3. Don’tallowpopulistconspiracismtosetthe termsofnationaldebates: Media neutrality does not mean that we have to tolerate forms of denialism, veiled racism, homophobia and radicalisation. Resist clickbait. 4. Tacklerootgrievanceswithpolicyand institutionalstrengthening: Instead of lamenting falling levels of trust, institutions should become worthy of trust. The focus cannot only be on the ‘paranoia’ of citizens, but should examine the trustworthiness of institutions and political actors. Because conspiracy theories are better thought of as symptoms rather than causes of democratic disfunction, energy should be directed towards making democratic institutions and systems fair, robust and transparent. 5. Protectandstrengthenindependent institutionsandjournalism: Fund and legally safeguard public service media, investigative outlets, regulators and public broadcasters to rebuild trust and prevent capture. 6. Disincentiviseonlinedisinformation: To understand contemporary conspiracism, we need to examine how platform affordances and financial incentives shape online communication and, crucially, how they intersect with traditional media and the offline world. This requires platforms giving access to researchers and considering digital infrastructures as a public good. 7. Regulateplatformswithtransparencyand sensitivitytolocalneeds: Push platforms for algorithmic transparency, fine-grained moderation data and stronger moderation teams with necessary language and socio-cultural skills. Platforms must cooperate with regulators and measures must be taken to disincentivise disinformation, both for platform owners and users. 8. Addresscurrentfundingmodelsforcounterdisinformationwork:Funding models for counter-disinformation work should be reformulated in consultation with the sector to ensure swift and adequate responses to emerging issues. There is an urgent need for more sustainable planning, better state support and investment in the sector. 9. Avoidheavy-handedcensorship;insiston dueprocess: Any legal measures must have clear criteria, judicial oversight and swift, proportionate implementation. 10.Createalliances:Foster and support cooperation between civic and state actors, and national and international institutions countering disinformation. The exchange of ideas, learning best practices and joint initiatives can enhance capacity to tackle the problem of disinformation. Strong transnational alliances can also prove central for addressing problems related to FIMI. 11.Designtailored,evidence-basedresponses: Different conspiracy types need different approaches. 12.Acknowledgethat,justastheproblemofconspiracytheoriesispolitical,soiscountering disinformation: Instead of dividing society into those who defend ‘truth and democracy’ and those who have been ‘brainwashed by algorithms’ we should acknowledge that decisions about what counts as disinformation or conspiracy are never completely neutral — they always involve politics and values. Recognising this does not mean abandoning facts; rather, it allows us to argue more honestly that politics grounded in verified information and open debate offers citizens the fairest and most democratic way to make collective choices. 17 References 1 M. Carey, Mistrust: An Ethnographic Theory (HAU, 2017) and C. 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