Challenging Dollar Dominance? The Geopolitical Dimensions of Renminbi (RMB) Internationalisation

This is the Version of record of the research article titled Challenging Dollar Dominance? The Geopolitical Dimensions of Renminbi (RMB) Internationalisation, published by SAGE in the Journal of Current Chinese Affairs (Online ISSN: 1868-4874) in December 2025, available online at https://doi.org/10.1177/18681026251342258. License: Challenging Dollar Dominance? The Geopolitical Dimensions of Renminbi (RMB) Internationalisation © 2025 by Monique Taylor is licensed under CC BY 4.0. To view a copy of this license, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/. This work has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon Europe coordination and support action 101079069 — EUVIP — HORIZON-WIDERA-2021ACCESS-03. Funded by the European Union. Views and opinions expressed are however those of the author(s) only and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union or the European Research Executive Agency (REA). Neither the European Union nor the granting authority can be held responsible for them. Challenging Dollar Dominance? The Geopolitical Dimensions of Renminbi (RMB) Internationalisation Monique Taylor 1 Abstract This paper examines the geopolitical dimensions of China’s strategy to internationalise the renminbi (RMB) and reduce reliance on the U.S. dollar. Far from a purely financial initiative, RMB internationalisation is a strategic response to the geopolitical and economic risks of a dollar-centric order. Through instruments such as the petroyuan, bilateral currency swaps, the CrossBorder Interbank Payment System, and the digital yuan, China seeks to embed the RMB within global trade, investment, and payment infrastructures. Anchored in geopolitical frameworks such as the Belt and Road Initiative and BRICS+cooperation, these efforts form part of a wider strategy to extend China’seconomicinfluence and reduce exposure to dollar weaponisation. While the RMB’s role in global reserves remains limited, China’s selective and incremental approach prioritises trade-based internationalisation over capital account liberalisation. Set against accelerating de-dollarisation and deepening multipolarity, the paper analyses how China’sRMBstrategy is reshaping global systems of exchange, across finance, trade, and payments. Manuscript received 30 January 2025; accepted 28 April 2025 Keywords Renminbi internationalisation, de-dollarisation, belt and road initiative, global reserve currencies 1 Faculty of Social Sciences, Political Science, University Lecturer in World Politics, University of Helsinki, Helsinki, Finland Corresponding Author: Monique Taylor, Faculty of Social Sciences, Political Science, University Lecturer in World Politics, University of Helsinki, PL 54 (Unioninkatu 37), 00014 Helsinki, Finland. Email: monique.taylor@helsinki.fi Creative Commons CC BY: This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/) which permits any use, reproduction and distribution of the work without further permission provided the original work is attributed as specified on the SAGE and Open Access page (https://us.sagepub.com/en-us/nam/open-access-at-sage). Analysis Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 2025, Vol. 54(3) 430–447 © The Author(s) 2025 Article reuse guidelines: sagepub.com/journals-permissions DOI: 10.1177/18681026251342258 journals.sagepub.com/home/cca Introduction Mounting frustration with the dominance of the U.S. dollar has driven BRICS+(an intergovernmental group now comprising Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, United Arab Emirates [UAE] and Indonesia) members, among others, to pursue de-dollarisation efforts, as highlighted at the 2023 and 2024 BRICS summits. Geopolitical concerns over the dollar’s weaponisation through Western sanctions, combined with economic vulnerabilities caused by dollar shortages, have fuelled interest in alternatives, notably the Chinese renminbi (RMB) (Wade, 2024). These moves aim to reduce reliance on the greenback, foster local currency usage, and advance a multipolar financial order. China has been proactive in pursuing de-dollarisation through the RMB, employing mechanisms such as the petroyuan, bilateral currency swap agreements, the Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS), and the digital yuan. The RMB’s role has grown significantly in the BRICS and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) trade, as well as in sanctioned countries such as Russia and Iran, where it provides a viable alternative to the dollar. While financial challenges persist, most notably limited convertibility, which constrains the RMB’s share in global reserves, China’s strategic initiatives nonetheless position the RMB as a significant contender in the de-dollarisation agenda. This paper examines the geopolitical dimensions of China’s RMB internationalisation strategy. It argues that China is pursuing a cautious and incremental approach to RMB internationalisation, balancing a seemingly contradictory policy agenda: promoting internationalisation while maintaining control over its capital account to limit financial volatility. At present, Beijing is prioritising trade-based rather than financial internationalisation, expanding the RMB’s use in bilateral trade settlements –particularly with sanctioned states such as Russia and Iran, as well as with BRICS partners –as a way to internationalise the currency without liberalising domestic financial markets. China’s selective approach to RMB internationalisation reflects not only economic pragmatism but also a deliberate effort to hedge against potential U.S.-led “financial war”scenarios (Freymann and Heng, 2025). Unsurprisingly, some observers have dismissed the possibility of the RMB becoming a leading global currency (Kirchner, 2019; Steil and Della Rocca, 2018). However, such analyses often overlook both China’s historically gradualist approach to economic reform and the intensifying geopolitical drivers behind both de-dollarisation and RMB internationalisation. Challenging dollar dominance is not merely an economic proposition but a politically symbolic and motivated effort. China, along with the BRICS, does not seek to establish currency hegemony for itself but instead envisions a multipolar financial system (Flores, 2024). The U.S. dollar’s dominance, entrenched over decades, has created deep path dependencies and institutional frameworks that support its continuing use. However, cracks are emerging in some of the geopolitical alliances that sustain it. For example, recent tensions in the U.S.–Saudi Arabia relationship –the cornerstone of the petrodollar system –raise questions about the long-term stability of their relationship. The push for de-dollarisation is also intended to counter the U.S. and other Western governments’ Taylor 431 weaponisation of the dollar-centric financial system to sanction their geopolitical opponents (Wade, 2024). These shifts coincide with growing ideological challenges to the liberal international order, as well as rising anti-Western sentiment among countries in the Global South. While outright displacement of the dollar remains unlikely, the combined pressures of geopolitical realignments and ideological shifts are beginning to erode its foundations. With Trump’s return to the White House, the drive for de-dollarisation is gaining further momentum. His aggressive neo-mercantilist agenda –marked by a preference for tariffs, unilateralism, and sanctions –combined with attacks on democratic institutions and the rule of law at home, reinforces the perception of the dollar as a weaponised tool of U.S. foreign policy and undermines global trust in the U.S. financial system. The renewed use of financial sanctions, including secondary sanctions, has heightened concerns about overexposure to the dollar among both adversaries and neutral states. The chaotic and punitive tariff regime unveiled on “Liberation Day”on 2 April 2025 – marked by sweeping tariffs on imports from both adversaries and allies –has disrupted global trade flows and sharpened concerns about the risk of over-reliance on the dollarcentric system. At the same time, strained alliances and mounting global economic uncertainty may create openings for alternatives, such as the RMB, to gain wider adoption. In this context, de-dollarisation emerges not merely as an economic strategy but as a geopolitical response to the volatility, assertiveness and unpredictability of U.S. policies, reflecting a broader rejection of dollar-centric hegemony. This paper explores the geopolitics and policy instruments of the RMB’s internationalisation and its potential to challenge dollar dominance. It begins by outlining and evaluating the geopolitical dimensions of RMB internationalisation, focusing on the petroyuan, digital yuan, and BRICS+and BRI trade and currency strategies. Next, it discusses the global geopolitical context and growing de-dollarisation momentum. Finally, the limits and opportunities for the RMB to become a significant international currency are addressed, along with the broader potential costs and benefits associated with the emergence of a multipolar currency order. Policy Instruments and Mechanisms of RMB Internationalisation China’s plan to internationalise the RMB began in the first decade of the twenty-first century, particularly after the 2008 global financial crisis exposed vulnerabilities in the dollar-dominated global financial system. Key milestones in Beijing’s incremental approach include the 2009 launch of the RMB Cross-Border Trade Settlement Pilot Program, which enabled selected Chinese companies to settle international trade in RMB, and the subsequent development of offshore RMB markets in financial hubs such as Hong Kong, London, and Singapore (PBC, 2009). To support these efforts, China introduced the CIPS in 2015, providing critical infrastructure to facilitate international RMB payments and reducing reliance on the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT), enabling China and others to bypass U.S.-dominated financial payment systems (PBC, 2015). The inclusion of the RMB in 432 Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 54(3) the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF’s) Special Drawing Rights basket in 2016 marked its acceptance as a global reserve currency, while the 2018 introduction of yuandenominated crude oil futures, or petroyuan, expanded RMB usage in energy markets (PBC, 2016a; The Economist, 2018). These efforts gained renewed urgency during the U.S.–China trade war, beginning in 2018, which drew further attention to the strategic risks of dollar dependence for Beijing (Amighini and Garcia-Herrero, 2023: 7). RMB internationalisation is largely shaped by concerns over national security and financial vulnerability. Faced with growing U.S. economic coercion, Chinese elites increasingly regard dollar dependence as a strategic risk, viewing partial RMB internationalisation as a hedge against the threat of “financial war” (Freymann and Heng, 2025). Although numerous policy instruments and mechanisms contribute to RMB internationalisation –including financial market reforms and the development of offshore RMB markets –this paper focuses specifically on its geopolitical dimensions, examining three principal mechanisms where geopolitics plays a central role: the petroyuan, the digital yuan, and BRICS and BRI trade and currency strategies. Petroyuan. The introduction of yuan-denominated crude oil futures (petroyuan) via the Shanghai International Energy Exchange (INE) in 2018 marked a pivotal step in China’s efforts to internationalise the RMB and embed it within global energy markets. The petroyuan establishes a yuan-based benchmark for oil pricing alongside entrenched dollar-denominated benchmarks such as Brent Crude and West Texas Intermediate. Leveraging its position as the world’s largest oil importer, China aims to use the petroyuan to facilitate trade in its own currency, reducing the need for dollar conversions and lowering transaction costs for its trading partners. Yuan-based oil trade is expanding but remains modest in terms of its scale and share in the global oil market. However, deepening institutional and financial ties suggest that a much broader adoption of the petroyuan could unfold over the coming decades. President Xi Jinping’s December 2022 visit to Riyadh contributed to this trajectory, establishing cooperation on initiatives such as Saudi Arabia’sVision 2030, which seeks to leverage oil revenues to drive economic diversification and may lay the groundwork for expanded RMB use in energy and infrastructure projects (Ma, 2025). Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states are likely to expand yuan settlements cautiously, balancing relationships with the U.S. and China to pragmatically advance their interests. China’s strategic motivations for the petroyuan extend beyond trade efficiency to reducing vulnerabilities imposed by the dollar–oil nexus (Taylor, 2024a: 136). The petrodollar’s role as the dominant currency for oil invoicing, established in the 1970s through agreements between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia, has underpinned the dollar’s hegemonic position in the global financial system (Spiro, 1999). For China, this arrangement exposes its energy security to fluctuations in American monetary policy, which can lead to increased costs and economic instability. Mindful of these vulnerabilities, China’s RMB-denominated oil futures contract provides an alternative that reduces exposure to a financialised and dollarised global commodities market. Taylor 433 The petroyuan has gained traction among global traders and market participants, with swift acceptance from major commodities firms such as Glencore PLC and the Trafigura Group (Bloomberg News, 2018). Within its first year, the contract became the third most actively traded crude oil future worldwide, with trading volumes equivalent to 14% of the global activity in similar futures (Jordan, Knauff and Company, 2019). The contract’s adoption has been bolstered by the INE’s delivery to overseas clients, including South Korea, India, Singapore, Malaysia, and Japan, and the introduction of oil options for risk management (Al Shareef, 2024). In addition, the petroyuan’s closer reflection of regional supply and demand dynamics enhances its relevance as a benchmark for Asian markets. This alignment has the potential to address the “Asian premium”–the higher prices Asian importers have traditionally paid compared to their Western counterparts (Katsomitros, 2018). Countries seeking to diversify their trade settlement currencies for strategic or economic reasons have embraced the petroyuan as a practical alternative. Bilateral agreements with oil exporters such as Russia and Iran have incorporated yuan-denominated settlements, largely to bypass Western sanctions. Discussions with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states underscore the petroyuan’s potential to shift energy trade dynamics, although challenges persist due to Gulf currencies’dollar pegs and concerns over yuan liquidity. The BRI has also been instrumental in expanding the petroyuan’s reach, facilitating yuan-based trade relationships with a wider range of partners and reinforcing China’s broader strategy to elevate the RMB’s role in global trade. This growing adoption reflects not only the yuan’s utility in energy trade but also the geopolitical and economic drivers motivating China’s partners to reduce financial dependencies and diversify trade systems. Agreements made during President Xi’s visit to Riyadh include a local currency swap agreement between the People’s Bank of China (PBC) and the Saudi Central Bank, valued at 50 billion yuan (approximately $6.93 billion), to facilitate trade and investment in local currencies (Cash, 2023). Furthermore, the Shanghai Stock Exchange and Saudi Tadawul Group (the parent company of Saudi Exchange) signed a memorandum of understanding to explore crosslisting opportunities and data sharing between their capital markets (Reuters, 2023; Zhang and Ren, 2023). These developments highlight the growing financial architecture that could underpin yuan-based trade in the region. While the petroyuan’s role continues to expand, its significance lies in providing an alternative pathway for trade rather than fundamentally transforming the global energy market’s reliance on the petrodollar. At the same time, China’s evolving relationships with key energy exporters in the Middle East and elsewhere that foster broader economic partnerships align with Beijing’s ambitions to secure energy supplies, deepen trade ties, and support the internationalisation of the RMB. Digital Yuan. Even though its primary purpose remains domestic, the digital yuan (e-CNY), launched as a pilot project in 2020, is another component of China’s efforts to internationalise the RMB (PBC, 2021). As one of the first central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) introduced by a major economy, the e-CNY aims to enhance payment 434 Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 54(3) efficiency, reduce transaction costs, and provide a secure alternative to existing global financial infrastructures, including those dependent on Western bank messaging networks such as SWIFT. Designed to modernise payment systems and strengthen monetary control, the e-CNY also offers capabilities for cross-border transactions, making it a potential tool for expanding RMB adoption in international trade (Kshetri, 2023; Taylor, 2024b). By integrating advanced digital technologies and providing an alternative to dollar-dominated financial systems, the e-CNY aligns with China’s broader strategy to expand the global role of the RMB. The geopolitical utility of the digital yuan has become increasingly apparent in contexts where countries seek to bypass the constraints of U.S.-dominated financial networks. The e-CNY provides an alternative for sanctioned states, again notably Russia and Iran, allowing them to conduct trade without relying on dollar-linked systems vulnerable to U.S. restrictions. Moreover, China’s strategic partnerships with BRI participants and other Global South countries have created a conducive environment for the e-CNY’s adoption in cross-border trade and investment. Pilot programs for cross-border e-CNY payments with nations such as Thailand and the UAE further indicate its potential to integrate into regional financial ecosystems, facilitating transactions outside traditional dollar-dominated systems (The Economist, 2022). Although often discussed as a sanctions workaround, the international use of the digital yuan carries far broader strategic implications. Slawotsky (2022: 253) argues that if the digital yuan is successfully embedded in international payment systems, it could grant China structural power by shifting financial and technological infrastructures away from U.S.-dominated networks, thereby accelerating the erosion of dollar dominance by creating alternative digital infrastructure and reconfiguring global monetary governance to support RMB usage. However, as Chaisse (2023) shows the global regulatory landscape for cross-border digital transactions remains highly fragmented. Legal uncertainty surrounding data flows, digital foreign direct investment, and investment protections may present serious institutional constraints to any effort, such as China’s, to internationalise digital currencies through globally integrated financial systems. Despite its promise, the digital yuan faces hurdles to becoming a widely adopted international currency. Its primary usage remains domestic, and the limited international convertibility of the RMB, coupled with concerns about transparency and political control (as the PBC is a non-independent central bank subject to party–state interference), constrain its appeal among foreign users, particularly in the West (Taylor, 2024b). However, as China continues to expand bilateral agreements and refine its CBDC framework, the e-CNY could contribute significantly to RMB internationalisation. Although not initially intended as a vehicle for this purpose, the e-CNY serves as an example of how digital innovation can align with broader economic and geopolitical strategies. BRICS+and BRI Trade and Currency Strategies. The BRICS+grouping and the BRI are important frameworks for advancing RMB internationalisation. Through these platforms, China has sought to increase the RMB’s role in regional and global trade systems, drawing upon bilateral and multilateral agreements to encourage its use in settlements and Taylor 435 investments. The recent expansion of BRICS to include five new members –Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, UAE, and Indonesia –enhances the bloc’s economic and geopolitical influence and could further bolster RMB internationalisation efforts. The BRI, encompassing over 140 countries, complements these efforts by promoting RMB usage in infrastructure financing and trade settlements along key economic corridors. Within BRICS, China has promoted initiatives aimed at expanding RMB usage among member states. Bilateral currency swap agreements, such as those between the PBC and the central banks of Brazil and Russia, enable trade and financial transactions in local currencies (BBC, 2013; PBC, 2016b). These agreements serve as a key mechanism for providing offshore RMB liquidity without requiring capital account liberalisation, making them central to China’s strategy of controlled internationalisation. They become particularly significant for Russia, which has settled an increasing share of its bilateral trade with China in RMB since 2022, in response to Western sanctions. Discussions at the 2024 BRICS Summit in Kazan, Russia, about establishing a BRICS reserve currency further highlighted interest in reducing reliance on the dollar, though practical implementation remains uncertain (von Essen and Ingvarsson, 2024: 4). RMB adoption within BRICS countries varies widely, yet China’s status as the bloc’s largest economy positions the RMB as a strong candidate for regional currency usage and cooperation. The BRI provides additional avenues for promoting RMB adoption, particularly through infrastructure financing and trade relationships. In 2021, China’s RMB settlements with BRI countries reached 5.42 trillion yuan (approximately US$763.4 billion), marking a 19.6% year-on-year increase (State Council, 2021). This growth included a 14.7% rise in the trade of goods and a 43.4% increase in direct investment settlements (State Council, 2021). China had concluded bilateral currency swap agreements with twenty-two BRI countries and set up RMB clearing arrangements in eight of them in that same year (State Council, 2021). Furthermore, in 2023, the merchandise trade volume between China and approximately 150 BRI countries reached 14 trillion yuan (Chan, 2023). This substantial trade volume is promising for the growth of RMB usage in trade and investment activities. Chinese state-owned banks, notably the China Development Bank and the Export– Import Bank of China (Eximbank), play a pivotal role in financing BRI projects, often through RMB-denominated loans. For instance, both banks have established financing windows of 350 billion yuan each to support BRI endeavours (Xinhua, 2023). This strategy encourages recipient countries to engage in transactions using the RMB, thereby promoting its internationalisation. For example, Pakistan has increasingly adopted the RMB for several China–Pakistan Economic Corridor projects (Safdar and Zabin, 2020). By integrating the RMB into trade and investment activities across Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, the BRI facilitates the currency’s expanded international role. Although not all transactions are conducted in RMB, China’s Eximbank has financed over 4000 kilometres of railways, 23,000 kilometres of roads, forty airports, and thirty ports in BRI partner countries, underscoring the extensive reach of its financing activities (Wu, 2024). 436 Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 54(3) The petroyuan and digital yuan play complementary roles in advancing China’sfinancial and geopolitical objectives through BRICS+and the BRI. Saudi Arabia has not yet adopted the yuan for oil transactions but has expressed openness to exploring this possibility (Wong, 2024). Iran and Russia are already using the petroyuan in their energy trade with China in order to circumvent international sanctions (Gardner, 2024; Prokopenko, 2024). Meanwhile, the digital yuan supports the broader internationalisation of the Chinese currency by enabling secure cross-border payments, particularly in BRI economies with underdeveloped financial infrastructure. While these initiatives are not yet transformative for RMB adoption on a global scale, they constitute strategic steps towards increasing its international role. De-Dollarisation Trend China’s efforts to internationalise the RMB coincide with a growing global push to reduce reliance on the U.S. dollar, driven by a range of geopolitical, economic, and systemic factors. Calls for a more multipolar monetary order emerged in the first decade of the twenty-first century when China and Russia began advocating for a multipolar world, the details of which can be found in their 2005 “Joint Statement of the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation on the International Order of the twenty-first Century”(PRC and Russian Federation, 2005). The 2008 global financial crisis exposed vulnerabilities in the dollar-centric framework, prompting more systematic efforts to diversify away from the dollar throughout the 2010s (Amighini and Garcia-Herrero, 2023: 4). These efforts have been intensified by U.S. sanctions regimes, geopolitical rivalries, and the fragmentation of the global economy, creating greater openings for the RMB’s wider international acceptance. Countries such as Russia and Iran are clearly motivated by geopolitics in their move away from the dollar, yet economic considerations are no less significant. Emerging economies often face heightened exposure to U.S. monetary policy, particularly through the impact of interest rate volatility, dollar-denominated debt burdens, and the spillover effects of inflation or recession in the U.S. The Federal Reserve’s tightening cycles frequently trigger capital outflows, exchange rate depreciation, decline in equity prices, and rising bond yields, underscoring the risks of over-reliance on the dollar (Gupta et al., 2017: 3). Simultaneously, concerns about the long-term stability of the dollar, amid rising U.S. debt and inflationary pressure, have deepened scepticism. These dynamics coincide with China’s economic rise and its promotion of the RMB as a reserve currency, supported by the establishment of alternative institutions such as the New Development Bank and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, which challenge the dominance of Bretton Woods-era international financial institutions such as the World Bank and IMF. De-dollarisation is also driven by changes in the structure of global trade. Over the past twenty years, trade patterns have evolved to include a growing share of bilateral trade among emerging economies, alongside continued exchanges with advanced economies. For the latter, transactions are largely denominated in U.S. dollars, while the former are increasingly conducted in local currencies. Taylor 437 renminbi-internationalization-probing-gulf-china-relations/#wp–skip-link–target (accessed 26 April 2025). Amighini, Alessia, and Alicia Garcia-Herrero (2023) Third time lucky? China’s push to internationalise the renminbi. Policy Brief 20/2023, Bruegel. Arslanalp, Serkan, Barry Eichengreen, and Chima Simpson-Bell (2022). The stealth erosion of dollar dominance: Active diversifiers and the rise of nontraditional reserve currencies. IMF Working Paper No. WP/22/58. International Monetary Fund. BBC (2013) China and Brazil sign $30bn currency swap agreement. BBC News, 27 March. Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/business-21949615 (accessed 26 April 2025). BIS (2022) Turnover of OTC foreign exchange instruments, by currency. BIS 2022 triennial central bank survey of foreign exchange OTC derivatives markets. Basel: Bank for International Settlements. Available at: https://data.bis.org/topics/DER/tables-and-dashboards/BIS,DER_ D11_3,1.0?time_period=2013 (accessed 26 April 2025) Bloomberg News (2018) Global trading giants dip toes in China oil futures on debut day. Bloomberg, 26 March. Available at: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-03-26/ china-s-first-ever-yuan-oil-futures-begin-trading-in-shanghai (accessed 26 April 2025) Cash, Joe (2023) China, Saudi Arabia sign currency swap agreement. Reuters, 20 November. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/markets/currencies/china-saudi-arabia-central-bankssign-local-currency-swap-agreement-2023-11-20/ (accessed 26 April 2025). Chaisse, Julien (2023) ‘The black pit:’power and pitfalls of digital FDI and cross-border data flows. World Trade Review 22(1): 73–89. Chaisse, Julien (2024) Hong Kong as an Actor in International Economic Law: Multilateralism, Bilateralism and Unilateralism. Oxford: Hart Publishing. Chan, Darryl (2023) Keynote speech at the Bank of China: the Belt and Road Initiative and RMB internationalization forum. Hong Kong Monetary Authority, 06 June. Available at: https://www. hkma.gov.hk/eng/news-and-media/speeches/2023/06/20230606-1/ (accessed 26 April 2025) Eichengreen, Barry (2011) Exorbitant Privilege: The Rise and Fall of the Dollar and the Future of the International Monetary System. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Flores, Wilson (2024) BRICS expansion marks rise of a multipolar world. China Daily (HK edition), 22 October. Available at: https://www.chinadailyhk.com/hk/article/595934 (Accessed 26 April 2025) Freymann, Eric, and Calvin Heng (2025) The logic of partial RMB internationalization: PRC perspectives on “Financial War.”The China Quarterly:1–16. DOI: 10.1017/S0305741025000037. Gardner, Timothy (2024) Trump could harden Iran oil stance but struggle to stem flow to China, analysts say. Reuters, 6 November. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/ trump-could-harden-iran-oil-stand-raise-china-ire-analysts-say-2024-11-06/ (accessed 26 April 2025) GovHK (The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region) (2025) New measures to deepen financial co-operation between Hong Kong and the Mainland. GovHK, 13 January. Available at: https://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/202501/13/P2025011300240.htm (accessed 26 April 2025) Gupta, Poonam, Oliver Masetti, and David Rosenblatt (2017) Should emerging markets worry about U.S. monetary policy announcements? Policy Research Working Paper No. 8100. Development Economics Vice Presidency, Operations and Strategy Team, World Bank Group. IMF (2024a) Global FX reserves increased by 3.1 percent in 2024Q3. IMF Data, 20 December. Available at: https://betadata.imf.org/en/news/122024%20global%20fx%20reserves% 20increased%20by%2031%20percent%20in%202024q3 (accessed 15 December 2024) 444 Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 54(3) IMF (2024b) IMF currency composition of official foreign exchange reserves (COFER). IMF Data. Available at: https://data.imf.org/?sk=e6a5f467-c14b-4aa8-9f6d-5a09ec4e62a4 (accessed 26 April 2025) Jordan, Knauff & Company (2019) The success of China’s crude oil futures. Pumps & Systems,19 July. Available at: https://www.pumpsandsystems.com/success-china-s-crude-oil-futures (accessed 26 April 2025) Katsomitros, Alex (2018) The petro-yuan could usher in a new era for global energy. World Finance. Available at: https://www.worldfinance.com/markets/the-petro-yuan-could-usherin-a-new-era-for-global-energy (accessed 26 April 2025) Kindleberger, Charles (1973) The World in Depression, 1929–1939. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Kirchner, Stephen (2019) The ‘reserve currency’myth: The US dollar’s current and future role in the world economy. United States Studies Centre, 11 November. Available at: https://www.ussc.edu.au/thereserve-currency-myth-the-us-dollars-current-and-future-role-in-the-world-economy (accessed 26 April 2025) Kshetri, Nir (2023) China’s digital Yuan: motivations of the Chinese government and potential global effects. Journal of Contemporary China 32(139): 87–105. Ma, Sylvia (2025) China’s yuan on the rise in oil trade, but petrodollar here to stay: report. South China Morning Post, 16 January. Available at: https://www.scmp.com/economy/global-economy/article/ 3295048/chinas-yuan-rise-oil-trade-petrodollar-here-stay-report (accessed 26 April 2025) Naughton, Barry (2008) A political economy of China’s economic transition. In: Loren Brandt and Thomas G. Rawski (eds.) China’s Great Economic Transformation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 91–135. PBC (2009) Administrative rules on pilot program of renminbi settlement of cross-border trade transactions. The People’s Bank of China, 02 July. Available at: http://www.pbc.gov.cn/ english/130721/2884989/index.html (Accessed 26 April 2025) PBC (2015) Milestone of RMB internalization: RMB cross-border inter-bank payment system starts operation. (Press release.) The People’s Bank of China, 14 October. Available at: http://www.pbc.gov.cn/english/130721/2963649/index.html (accessed 26 April 2025) PBC (2016a) Chinese renminbi officially included in the SDR. (Press release). The People’s Bank of China, 1 October. Available at: http://www.pbc.gov.cn/english/130721/3154437/index.html (Accessed 26 April 2025) PBC (2016b) People’s Bank of China and Central Bank of the Russian Federation successfully launched bilateral currency swap arrangement. The People’s Bank of China, 02 March. Available at: http://www.pbc.gov.cn/english/130721/3024330/index.html (accessed 26 April 2025) PBC (2021) Progress of Research & Development of E-CNY in China. Working Group on E-CNY Research and Development of the People’sBankofChina, July. Beijing: PBC. Available at: www.pbc.gov.cn/en/3688110/3688172/4157443/4293696/2021071614584691871.pdf (accessed 26 April 2025) PRC and Russian Federation (2005) Joint statement of the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation on the international order in the twenty-first century (Moscow, 01 July). Prokopenko, Alexandra (2024) What are the limits to Russia’s“Yuanization”?Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 27 May. Available at: https://carnegieendowment.org/ russiaeurasia/politika/2024/05/china–russia–yuan?lang=en (accessed 07 May 2025). Reuters (2024) Shanghai Stock Exchange signs MOU with the Saudi Exchange. Reuters,04 September. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/markets/shanghai-stock-exchange-signsmou-with-saudiexchange-2023-09-04/ (accessed 07 May 2025). Taylor 445 Safdar, Muhammad Tayyab, and Joshua Zabin (2020) Pakistan and the Belt and Road: new horizons for a globalized RMB. The Diplomat, 04 September. Available at: https://thediplomat. com/2020/09/pakistan-and-the-belt-and-road-new-horizons-for-a-globalized-rmb/ (accessed 26 April 2025) Sandlund, William (2024) China’s international use of renminbi surges to record highs. Financial Times, 29 August. Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/ae08b6ed-d323-4a95-a6870172a98857f4 (accessed 26 April 2025) Slawotsky, Joel (2022) Digital currencies and great power rivalry: China as a disseminator in the digital age. Asia Pacific Law Review 30(2): 242–264. Spiro, David E. (1999) The Hidden Hand of American Hegemony: Petrodollar Recycling and International Markets. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. State Council (2021) China RMB settlements with Belt and Road countries up in 2021. State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 05 October. Available at: https://english.www. gov.cn/archive/statistics/202210/05/content_WS633d1a85c6d0a757729e0dfc.html (accessed 26 April 2025) Steil, Benn, and Benjamin Della Rocca (2018) China’s currency internationalization is failing; oil futures won’t rescue it. Council on Foreign Relations, 18 April. Available at: https://www.cfr. org/blog/chinas-currency-internationalization-failing-oil-futures-wont-rescue-it (accessed 26 April 2025) Taylor, Monique (2024a) The petroyuan’s challenge to dollar hegemony. Global China Pulse 3(1): 133–140. Taylor, Monique (2024b) The digital Yuan: purpose, progress, and politics. Made in China 9(1): 68–73. The Economist (2018) China Wants to Reshape the Global Oil Market. The Economist, 28 May. Available at: https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2018/03/28/china-wants-toreshape-the-global-oil-market (accessed 26 April 2025) The Economist (2022) The digital yuan offers China a way to dodge the dollar. The Economist, 05 September. Available at: https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2022/09/05/ the-digital-yuan-offers-china-a-way-to-dodge-the-dollar (accessed 26 April 2025) von Essen, Hugo, and Stefan Ingvarsson (2024) What is the significance for Russia of the 2024 BRICS Summit in Kazan? Stockholm Centre for Eastern European Studies, 25 October. Available at: https://sceeus.se/en/publications/what-is-the-significance-for-russia-of-the-2024brics-summit-in-kazan/ (accessed 26 April 2025) Wade, Robert H. (2024) Long Read: The Beginning of the End for the US Dollar’s Global Dominance. LSE Blogs, 29 February. London: The London School of Economics and Political Science. Available at: blogs.lse.ac.uk/internationaldevelopment/2024/02/29/longread-the-beginning-of-the-end-for-the-us-dollars-global-dominance (accessed 26 April 2025). Wong, Kandy (2024) Saudi Arabia ‘open’to petroyuan, closer China ties, minister says. South China Morning Post, 09 September. Available at: https://www.scmp.com/economy/ global-economy/article/3277788/saudi-arabia-open-petroyuan-closer-china-ties-minister-says (accessed 26 April 2025) Wu, Fulin (2024) China Eximbank backs BRI cooperation. China Daily, 12 November. Available at: https://global.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202411/12/WS673290c5a310f1265a1ccc1c.html (accessed 26 April 2025) Xinhua (2024) China EximBank issues financial bonds to support Belt and Road cooperation. Xinhua, 17 July. Available at: https://english.news.cn/20240717/b11cd9b3040f41e1b741fbd 4ac3c4783/c.html (accessed 07 May 2025). 446 Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 54(3) Zhang, Shidong, and Daniel Ren (2023) Shanghai Stock Exchange signs agreement with Saudi Arabian bourse to explore cross-listings, data sharing as ties between Beijing and Riyadh warm up. South China Morning Post, 05 September. Available at: https://www.scmp.com/business/ china-business/article/3233469/shanghai-stock-exchange-signs-agreement-saudi-arabian-bourseexplore-cross-listings-data-sharing (accessed 26 April 2025). Author Biography Monique Taylor is a University Lecturer in World Politics at the Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of Helsinki. She holds a doctorate in International Political Economy from the University of Queensland and has previously worked at several global top fifty universities in Singapore and Australia. She specialises in international political economy and international relations. Her ongoing research explores the development of CBDCs, the internationalisation of the RMB, the geopolitical implications of Sino–Russian alignment, and the dynamics of China’s authoritarian governance. Monique is a co-coordinator on a Horizon Europe Twinning Project called “The EU in the volatile Indo-Pacific region.” Taylor 447