METIS D7.9: Application to METIS study case (WP7)

METIS Research and Innovation Action (RIA) This project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 945121 Start date : 2020-09-01 Duration : 57 Months Application to METIS study case (WP7) Authors : Mr. Oleksandr SEVBO (Energorisk), Oleksandr SEVBO (Energorisk), Maksym SHUMILIN (Energorisk), Sviatoslav KIRDEY (Energorisk) METIS - D7.9 - Issued on 2025-04-16 15:06:18 by Energorisk METIS - D7.9 - Issued on 2025-04-16 15:06:18 by Energorisk METIS - Contract Number: 945121 Project officer: Katerina PTACKOVA Document title Application to METIS study case (WP7) Author(s) Mr. Oleksandr SEVBO, Oleksandr SEVBO (Energorisk), Maksym SHUMILIN (Energorisk), Sviatoslav KIRDEY (Energorisk) Number of pages 107 Document type Deliverable Work Package WP7 Document number D7.9 Issued by Energorisk Date of completion 2025-04-16 15:06:18 Dissemination level Public Summary The deliverable D7.9 is prepared to document activities performed under Task 7.6, dealing with application of new assessment methods to METIS study case. The Task is dedicated for resulting application of the METIS tool validated for the METIS study case. Integrative PSA modelling and quantification of risk metrics for study case is performed in order to demonstrate capabilities of the METIS tool, to formulate the tool advantages as well as areas for further improvements and developments. The METIS study case is hybrid case that for the project purposes integrates seismic hazards data from Italian site with real NPP located in Ukraine. The results of activities from several work packages of the METIS project were used as input data for the development of the probabilistic model for the NPP: development of hazard curves for selected intensity measures; detailed fragility computations for selected structures and components; software for PSA computations and quantification risk metrics Approval Date By 2025-04-16 15:07:28 Mr. Oleksandr SEVBO (Energorisk) 2025-04-16 15:29:14 Dr. Irmela ZENTNER (EDF) METIS - D7.9 - Issued on 2025-04-16 15:06:18 by Energorisk Research & Innovation Action NFRP-2019-2020 Application to METIS study case (WP7) Deliverable D7.9 Version N°2 Authors: Oleksandr SEVBO (Energorisk), Maksym SHUMILIN (Energorisk), Sviatoslav KIRDEY (Energorisk) This project has received funding from the Horizon 2020 programme under grant agreement n°945121. The content of this presentation reflects only the author’s view. The European Commission is not responsible for any use that may be made of the information it contains. Disclaimer The content of this deliverable reflects only the author’s view. The European Commission is not responsible for any use that may be made of the information it contains. Document Information Grant agreement 945121 Project title Methods And Tools Innovations For Seismic Risk Assessment Project acronym METIS Project coordinator Dr. Irmela Zentner, EDF Project duration 1 st September 2020 – 31 May 2025 (57 months) Related work package WP7 - PSA Tools and Methodology Related task(s) Task 7.6: Application of new assessment methods to METIS study case Lead organisation Energorisk Contributing partner(s) Due date 31 August 2024 Submission date 06 February 2025 Dissemination level Public History Date Version Submitted by Reviewed by Comments 05 February 2025 N°1 O. SEVBO EAB 26 February 2025 N°2 O. SEVBO Table of Contents Abbreviations and Acronyms ................................................................................................................. 7 Introduction ......................................................................................................................................... 9 1. ZNPP Unit 1 General description ..................................................................................................11 1.1. Zaporizhzhia NPP Description .................................................................................................11 1.2. ZNPP Unit 1 Description .........................................................................................................12 1.3. ZNPP Unit 1 Seismic PSA Description ......................................................................................14 2. Input data description ................................................................................................................16 2.1. ZNPP Unit-1 Systems description ............................................................................................16 2.2. Seismic event frequencies ......................................................................................................29 2.3. Fragility curves .....................................................................................................................31 3. Probabilistic model description ....................................................................................................37 3.1. Accident sequence analysis (event trees) ................................................................................37 3.2. System analysis (functional fault trees, system fault trees) .......................................................40 4. Quantification and interpretation .................................................................................................50 4.1. Base case .............................................................................................................................50 4.2. Study case ...........................................................................................................................65 4.3. Sensitivity studies .................................................................................................................73 5. Conclusion .................................................................................................................................78 6. Bibliography ..............................................................................................................................79 Annex I. Reliability data .......................................................................................................................80 List of figures Figure 1: Flow chart of the METIS work package 7 .................................................................................. 9 Figure 2: Map of the location of the METIS case study site in central Italy. ...............................................10 Figure 3: Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, Ukraine .............................................................................. 11 Figure 4: ZNPP Unit 1 location ..............................................................................................................12 Figure 5: Diagram of main equipment of WWER-1000/320. ....................................................................13 Figure 6: The results of ZNPP Unit-1 Seismic PSA ...................................................................................16 Figure 7: General Layout of RCS ...........................................................................................................17 Figure 8: Emergency Primary Gas Removal System – YR ........................................................................18 Figure 9: Low Pressure Injection – TQ12 ................................................................................................19 Figure 10: Low Pressure Injection – TQ22 (TQ32 Similar) .......................................................................20 Figure 11: Shutdown Cooling Suction – TQ40 .......................................................................................21 Figure 12: High Pressure Injection – TQ13 .............................................................................................21 Figure 13: Full Pressure Injection (FPI) – TQ14 .......................................................................................22 Figure 14: Emergency Core Flooding System – Accumulators (ECFS) - YT ................................................23 Figure 15 Essential Service Water – QF/VF10 .........................................................................................24 Figure 16: Essential Service Water – QF/VF20 ......................................................................................24 Figure 17: Essential Service Water – QF/VF30 ......................................................................................25 Figure 18: Non-Safety Grade Electric Power Supply System ...................................................................26 Figure 19: Safety Grade Electric Power Supply - Division 1 .....................................................................27 Figure 20: Common Unit Electric Power Supply System .........................................................................28 Figure 21: Hazard curves for PGA at the case study site. ........................................................................29 Figure 22: Approaches for quantification frequencies for seismic intervals ................................................30 Figure 23: Fragility Curves for the Diesel Generator Building. (a) from /METIS 2025/, (b) from /ZNPP 2019/ ................................................................................................................................................. 33 Figure 24: Fragility Curves for the Transformer located in Reactor Building. (a) from /METIS 2025/, (b) from /ZNPP 2019/ ............................................................................................................................... 34 Figure 25: Fragility Curves for the Control Monitor Cabinet. (a) from /METIS 2025/, (b) from /ZNPP 2019/ 35 Figure 26: Fragility Curves for the Essential Service Water pump. (a) from /METIS 2025/, (b) from /ZNPP 2019/ ......................................................................................................................................... 36 Figure 27: ET for IE “Large LOCA caused by seismic events” (screen from the METIS tool) ........................38 Figure 28: ET for all levels of seismic impact ..........................................................................................39 Figure 29: Fault Tree Modeling Frequencies for all seismic levels .............................................................39 Figure 30: FFT QS1-1-D3 «Primary inventory control» ............................................................................41 Figure 31: FFT QS1-F2F3D4D2 «Primary inventory control and heat removal» ..........................................41 Figure 32: FT YT00-000 «Failure of hydroaccumulator system» ...............................................................42 Figure 33: FT TQ12-001 «Failure of LPIS train» .....................................................................................43 Figure 34: Modeling Basic Events for Seismic Impacts ............................................................................48 Figure 35: Modeling recovery rules for minimal cut sets (boundary conditions sets) ......................................50 Figure 36: The MCS calculated using the METIS tool ..............................................................................51 Figure 37: Base case CCDP ..................................................................................................................52 Figure 38: CCF data treatment in SAPHIRE and the METIS tool. ..............................................................56 Figure 39: SAPHIRE calculation type G ..................................................................................................57 Figure 40: SSC seismic failure probability in the METIS tool.....................................................................58 Figure 41: METIS study case CDF .........................................................................................................66 Figure 42: METIS study case CCDP .......................................................................................................66 Figure 43: METIS study case results (logarithmic scale) ..........................................................................67 Figure 45: Contribution of Dominant Failures to CDF for EQ 0,085g .........................................................72 Figure 46: Contribution of Dominant Failures to CDF for the EQ 0,17g .....................................................72 Figure 47: Contribution of Dominant Failures to CDF for EQ 0,2g .............................................................72 Figure 48: Contribution of Dominant Failures to CDF for EQ 0,3g .............................................................73 Figure 49: Sensitivity of CDF to Am ESW pump .....................................................................................73 Figure 50: Sensitivity of CDF to Am Control Monitor Cabinet ...................................................................74 Figure 51: Sensitivity of CDF to correlations for risk-significant components .............................................76 Figure 50: Sensitivity of CDF to seismic frequencies ...............................................................................78 Figure 52: Modeling Common-Cause Failures (CCF) .............................................................................. 107 List of tables Table 1. Seismic event frequencies .......................................................................................................31 Table 2: Base case calculations were performed (see METIS deliverable 6.8 /METIS 2025/) and included in the METIS case study probabilistic model: ..................................................................................... 31 Table 3: List of the required safety functions for large LOCA ...................................................................38 Table 4: Description of the Accident Sequences for IE S1........................................................................40 Table 5: List of Operators for Inter-System Interfaces ............................................................................48 Table 6: Base case calculations ............................................................................................................52 Table 7: Base case MCS for the seismic impact level of 0,085 g ...............................................................55 Table 8: Minimal cut sets for the seismic impact level of 0,17 g ...............................................................60 Table 9: Minimal cut sets for the seismic impact level of 0,2 g .................................................................63 Table 10: Minimal cut sets for the seismic impact level of 0,3 g ...............................................................64 Table 11: METIS study case results .......................................................................................................65 Table 12: Comparison of the METIS tool results for seismic level 0,085g ..................................................71 Table 13: Correlations for the sensitivity study .......................................................................................76 Abbreviations and Acronyms Acronym Description AC Alternate Current AS Accident Sequence BE Basic Event CCF Common Cause Failures CCDP Conditional Core Damage Probability CDF Core Damage Frequency DC Direct Current DG Diesel generator ECCS Emergency Core Cooling System ECFS Engineering Core Flooding System ET Event Tree EQ Earthquake FDF Fuel Damage Frequency FT Fault Tree HCLPF High Confidence of Low Probability Failure HPIS High Pressure Injection System HDS HRA Damage States HEP Human Error Probability HRA Human Reliability Analysis IE Initiating event LOCA Loss of coolant accident LRF, LERF Large Release Frequency, Large Early Release Frequency LPIS Low Pressure Injection System MCR Main control room MCS Minimal cutset PGA Peak Ground Acceleration POS Operational States PSA Probabilistic Safety Assessment PMSM Code for essential service water pump (pump motor stand model) RCS Reactor Coolant System RHR Residual Heat Removal System RPS Reactor Protection System SPSA Seismic Probabilistic Safety Assessment o Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS): Comprises hydroaccumulators and high-/lowpressure pumps that can quickly compensate for coolant loss in the event of a pipe rupture, maintaining core cooling and preventing fuel overheating. o Emergency Cooldown System: Provides additional coolant circulation or heat exchangers to remove residual heat if the normal cooling systems fail. ► Confinement of Radioactive Products Within Barriers o Containment: A hermetically sealed structure surrounding the reactor and the primary circuit. In the event of an accident, it prevents radioactive substances from escaping the reactor building. o Containment Depressurization and Isolation Systems: Control pressure and temperature inside the containment, supply inert gas if needed, and use filtration-ventilation units to remove radioactive aerosols. o Leakage and Integrity Monitoring Systems: Detect and isolate potential leaks and ensure sealing of rooms and process pathways. ► Power Supply to Equipment During Emergencies o Diesel Generators (DGs): Backup power sources capable of automatic startup in the event of a loss of offsite power, supplying electricity to critical equipment (pumps, valves, safety systems). o Uninterruptible Power Supplies and Batteries: Maintain control and monitoring functions during short-term power losses, ensuring continuity of essential monitoring and safety functions. In summary, Unit 1 of ZNPP is a complex of interconnected technological systems whose primary goal is the safe and reliable generation of electricity through a controlled nuclear reaction in the reactor core. A series of safety barriers, including containment, emergency core cooling systems, and radioactive release control measures, safeguards both plant personnel and the public, as well as the environment, from potential accident consequences. Multiple layers of defense and redundancy enable a high level of operational safety, aligning with international requirements and standards. 1.3. ZNPP Unit 1 Seismic PSA Description The seismic PSA of Level 1 and Level 2 for Unit 1 of Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant includes the full spectrum of initiating events for all operational states of the reactor unit. As part of the seismic PSA, the following tasks were completed: ► The levels and frequencies of potential seismic impacts on the ZNPP were established. ► The boundary seismic resistance values of the systems and components of ZNPP Unit 1 were determined for use in the probabilistic safety analysis. ► Scenarios were analyzed for seismic impact levels in the range of 0.085–0.3g, inclusive. ► Using a probabilistic safety model of ZNPP Unit 1, quantitative assessments were conducted for: o CDF (Core Damage Frequency), o LERF (Large Early Release Frequency), o FDF (Spent Fuel Pool Damage Frequency), taking into account potential seismic impacts. The seismic PSA consists of 8 stages: ► Stage 1: The recurrence parameters of earthquakes at the Design Basis Earthquake and Safe Shutdown Earthquake levels were determined, and the frequencies of seismic events for the ZNPP site were calculated. For this purpose, documents containing seismic data for the ZNPP site were collected and analyzed, including results of previously performed deterministic and probabilistic seismic hazard analyses. The frequencies of earthquakes for the ZNPP site were calculated for the following ranges of peak ground accelerations (PGA) o 0,085g≥a<0,15g; o 0,15g≥a<0,2g; o 0,2g≥a≤0,3g; o a>0,3g. ► Stage 2: An analysis of equipment qualification for seismic impacts was performed. Based on this analysis, a list of equipment for ZNPP Unit 1 was compiled, significant in terms of seismic PSA: o Thermal-mechanical equipment: 432 items. o Electrical equipment: 107 items. o I&C (Instrumentation and Control) equipment: 239 items. o Electrical equipment of diesel generators: 152 items. o TME (thermal-mechanical equipment) not included in the PSA integral model but required for consideration in the seismic PSA: 10 items. o Electrical and I&C equipment not included in the PSA integral model but potentially required for the seismic PSA: 156 items. ► Stage 3: For the equipment identified in Stage 2, its seismic margin (HCLPF – High Confidence of Low Probability of Failure) was determined. ► Stage 4: A database of seismic margins for Unit 1 equipment was developed. Damage fragility curves were constructed, and the conditional probability of equipment failure was calculated for each HCLPF parameter. ► Stage 5: Accident scenarios and sequences for selected seismic impact levels were analyzed, considering the following: o Scenarios for each seismic level were analyzed separately o The PSA full-scope model for Unit 1 was used as the basis for seismic PSA scenario analysis, o Possible initiating events (IEs) were accounted for during seismic scenario analysis, o The effects of earthquakes on plant elements were analyzed in detail based on intensity, and initiating events were identified, o The plant's response to identified IEs was evaluated, and safety functions and systems required for transitioning the plant to a safe state were identified, o Accident sequences for identified IEs were analyzed. ► Stage 6: Reliability analysis of NPP components, including human error, was performed to account for these factors in the probabilistic model for seismic impacts of 0.15g, 0.2g, 0.3g, and 1.45g. ► Stage 7: Accident scenarios (event tree modeling) and system response (fault tree modeling) were analyzed for selected seismic impact levels. The seismic PSA models for Level 1 and Level 2 were integrated. ► Stage 8: A quantitative assessment of the probabilistic seismic PSA models for Level 1 and Level 2 was performed, including significance, uncertainty, and sensitivity analyses. CDF, LERF, and FDF values were calculated for all seismic impact levels. The obtained values meet probabilistic safety criteria. The results are shown on Figure 6. Figure 6: The results of ZNPP Unit-1 Seismic PSA 2. Input data description 2.1. ZNPP Unit-1 Systems description Maintenance of Operation Following Partial Failures There are two mechanisms on ZNPP Units which are designed to prevent reactor trip in the event of partial balance of plant failure or other failures which do not immediately lead to exceedance of the operating envelop. The first of these systems is the Limitation System (RCLS). In the event of a mismatch between secondary power and reactor power, as the result of a balance of plant failure, the system will drive in the control rods to reduce the reactor power to match steam power. The maximum transient that this system is designed to handle is a turbine trip followed by successful operation of turbine bypass to give a stable power consumption below 40% at nominal power. This will enable restoration of the turbine if the cause of failure can be easily rectified. The second is the fitting of a breakers between unit output transformer and 750 kV switchyard, Thus, if there are any problems with the off-site power or switchyard, the switchyard breaker opens and the generator will continue to supply power to the auxiliary transformers and the unit. This is sometimes known as "Island Operation". As an alternative to off-site power, if a successful runback to island operation is achieved at any of Zaporizhzhya NPP Units 1 through 4, Zaporizhzhya NPP Unit 6, or from the fossil fuel power stations at the site, Zaporizhzhya NPP Unit 5 can be cross connected to any of these other sources. Reactor Coolant System Unit 1 has a four loop primary system (loops 10, 20, 30, 40). Each loop has a horizontal steam generator (YB) and one reactor coolant pump (YD). There is one pressurizer (YP10B01) connected to loop 40. There is one spray line connected to the cold leg of loop 10. The nominal pressure is 15.7 MPa. The total primary side water volume is equal to 346.6 m3 (including the water in pressurizer) and 370.6 m3 for the total geometrical volume (Figure 7). This figure also shows the connection points for the emergency core cooling systems. Figure 7: General Layout of RCS The layout of the primary loops is similar to that of Westinghouse plants (flat hot legs, loop seal in the cold leg at the suction of the main coolant pump). Some differences, however, exist: ► The hot and cold leg nozzles to the vessel are not at the same elevation (hot leg nozzles located above cold leg nozzles). ► There is a water seal in the pressurizer surge line. ► Low pressurizer level is about at the elevation of the hot legs, and the surge line nozzle into the pressurizer is about at the elevation of the top of the core. There is an RCS Vent System (called steam-gas mixture emergency removal system - YR), which allows venting of the reactor vessel head, the pressurizer and also the collectors of the steam generators either to the pressurizer relief tank or to the TY (organized leakage collection system) depending upon the RCS pressure (Figure 8). The system is manually operated by the operator. Figure 8: Emergency Primary Gas Removal System – YR Emergency Core Cooling System The ECCS consists of three pump trains and four accumulators. Each pump train consists of four pumps: a low head pump (the low head pumps are also the residual heat removal pumps), (Figure 9, Figure 10); a containment spray pump; a high head pump (Figure 12); and a high head positive displacement pump (Figure 13). The capacity of each ECCS train is designed for a double-ended break of the primary piping (850 mm). The high head pumps are, in fact, "Intermediate Head" as the discharge pressure at rated flow is 9.81 MPa, which is 5.89 MPa below normal operating pressure. Figure 9: Low Pressure Injection – TQ12 Figure 10: Low Pressure Injection – TQ22 (TQ32 Similar) Figure 11: Shutdown Cooling Suction – TQ40 Figure 12: High Pressure Injection – TQ13 Figure 13: Full Pressure Injection (FPI) – TQ14 Each high head and low head (as well as containment spray) pump has a suction line from a common sump (TQ10,20,30B01). That sump contains 500 m3 of 16 g/Kg (1.6 wt % or 2,800 ppm) borated water. It is similar to the Westinghouse Advanced PWR Emergency Water Storage Tank. The water temperature in the sump is 20 to 60℃. There is a heat exchanger in each sump suction line, cooled by the essential service water (VF) system. When actuated, the high head pumps first take suction from separate boric acid tanks, and on depletion, the high head pumps only take suction from the sump. The low head and containment spray pumps take suction directly from the sump. The low head pumps inject into the hot leg/upper plenum and cold leg/downcomer simultaneously. The high head pumps inject into the cold legs (through a common line). The pump trains are 3 x 100 % capacity. Two accumulators (Figure 14) inject into the upper plenum and two into the downcomer. On low level in each accumulator, the discharge valves will automatically close to prevent injection of nitrogen into the primary system. Figure 14: Emergency Core Flooding System – Accumulators (ECFS) - YT Residual Heat Removal System (RHR) This system (Figure 9, Figure 10) consists of three (3) RHR/low head pumps, three (3) heat exchangers, and isolation and control valves. All trains can take suction from one loop 40 (normally from the hot leg, but the possibility exists to take suction from the cold leg for midloop operation) with two motor-operated isolation valves. The power supply to the loop 40 valves (on the suction line) is from the emergency diesel generators. The RHR TQ12 return line is connected to cold or hot leg of loop YA10, TQ22 and TQ32 return lines are connected respectively to the accumulator YT13 and YT14, and YT11 and YT12 discharge lines, and therefore inject into the upper or lower plenum. The heat exchangers are cooled by the VF essential service water system. The heat exchangers are located on the suction side of the RHR pumps. A bypass line around the heat exchanger with a control valve makes it possible to automatically control the cooldown rate. The RHR system is placed in service when primary temperature is less than 150 ℃ and must be operated at a pressure less than 1.8 MPa. During normal cooldown operation, one train is sufficient; the preferred train is that which takes suction from loop 40 and returns to loop 10 (Figure 11). Essential Service Water System (VF) This system ensures the cooling of the safeguards systems in case of accident (Figure 15, Figure 16, Figure 17). It has 3 x 100% trains. Each train consists of 2 pumps (one in operation and one in standby), one 80 m3 buffer tank located outside containment (in the reactor building) and two cooling ponds (also called spray pools). The heat absorbed in the loads is removed by spraying the service water into the cooling pond (heat is going to the atmosphere). The buffer tank ensures the cooling function for the time period (approximately 2 minutes) during which the pumps might be without electric supply (in case of loss of electrical grid, while waiting for the diesel generators to pickup). Seismic event frequencies for selected seismic intervals were calculated using three approaches, as illustrated on Figure 22. The representative frequency can be calculated as follows: ► Option 1. Use frequency for most conservative value of PGA, λjm,b; ► Option 2. Use frequency for median PGA within the seismic interval, λjmedian; ► Option 3. Calculate average frequency for the seismic interval by equation, λj. Where: λjm occurrence frequency from seismic hazard curve m (curve for a confidence level) for the acceleration interval j; pm weighting factor related to seismic hazard curve m; M number of confidence levels for which seismic hazard curve is available; N number of acceleration interval bins. 𝝀𝝀𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 = 𝝀𝝀𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗,𝑎𝑎– 𝒉𝒉𝝀𝝀𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗,𝑏𝑏 Where: λjm,a frequency value at the lower limit of acceleration range j on seismic hazard curve m; λjm,b frequency value at the upper limit of acceleration range j on seismic hazard curve m. Figure 22: Approaches for quantification frequencies for seismic intervals Frequencies are shown in Table 1. 𝜆𝜆𝑗𝑗=� 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗⋅𝜆𝜆𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 𝑀𝑀 𝑗𝑗=1 , j = 1, 2, …, N λjm,a λjmedian λjm,b Seismic interval Frequency for high PGA Frequency for median PGA Frequency for the whole interval 0-0.085g 1.84E-05 4.42E-05 2.87E-05 0.085g-0.17g 5.37E-06 1.19E-05 1.05E-05 0.17g-0.2g 4.00E-06 4.69E-06 4.64E-06 0.2g-0.3g 3.36E-06 3.68E-06 3.59E-06 0.3g-0.4g 2.23E-06 2.79E-06 2.75E-06 0.4g-0.5g 1.62E-06 1.92E-06 1.90E-06 0.5g-0.6g 1.25E-06 1.43E-06 1.42E-06 0.6g-0.7g 1.00E-06 1.12E-06 1.10E-06 0.7g-0.8g 8.26E-07 9.13E-07 9.10E-07 0.8g-1.45g 3.53E-07 5.89E-07 5.52E-07 Table 1. Seismic event frequencies 2.3. Fragility curves The methods and detailed information on definition and classification scheme of systems, structures and components for specific and generic seismic fragility evaluation are presented in the METIS deliverable 6.1, /METIS 2021b/. Regarding SSC required to prevent fuel damage at spent fuel pool, the following SSCs ranked as high significance can be recommended for specific fragility analysis: ► Diesel-generators 1, 2, 3; ► Essential power supply components o busbars 6 kV (plant designation BV, BW, BX) and associated section breakers; o DC buses (plant designation EE01,02,03) and batteries; o busbars 0.4 kV (plant designation CV, CW, CX); o transformers (plant designation BVF01 02; BWF01 02; BXF01 02). ► Essential service water components o filters, o pumps (plant designation QF) o check valves on QF pumps discharge; ► Essential service water spray ponds. Other SSCs should be considered as part of Tier 2 group (generic fragility data). Specific fragility calculations were performed (see METIS deliverable 6.8 /METIS 2025/) and included in the METIS case study probabilistic model for the following SSC: ► Diesel Generator Building, Figure 23; ► Transformers 6kV-380V, Figure 24; ► Control Monitor Cabinets, Figure 25; ► Essential service water pumps, Figure 26. Fragilities for all other equipment in the probabilistic model are the same from the original ZNPP Seismic PSA (a) (b) Figure 23: Fragility Curves for the Diesel Generator Building. (a) from /METIS 2025/, (b) from /ZNPP 2019/ (a) (b) Figure 24: Fragility Curves for the Transformer located in Reactor Building. (a) from /METIS 2025/, (b) from /ZNPP 2019/ (a) (b) Figure 25: Fragility Curves for the Control Monitor Cabinet. (a) from /METIS 2025/, (b) from /ZNPP 2019/ Figure 26: Fragility Curves for the Essential Service Water pump. (a) from /METIS 2025/, (b) from /ZNPP 2019/ This project has received funding from the Euratom research and training programme 2014-2018 under grant agreement No 945121. 3. Probabilistic model description This section provides a description of the seismic probabilistic model of the PSA developed using the METIS tool. A seismic probabilistic model previously developed for ZNPP Unit 1 was used as the baseline model. A description of this model is presented in Section 1.3. For modeling the impact of earthquakes on ZNPP Unit 1, as an example, the initiating event S1 “Large LOCA” was selected under conditions when the unit is operating at nominal power. The following peak ground acceleration intervals were selected: ► 0-0.085g, it corresponds to safe shutdown earthquake; ► 0.085-0.17g; it corresponds to maximum design earthquake; ► 0.17-0.2g; ► 0.2-0.3g; ► 0.3-0.4g; ► 0.4g-0.5g; ► 0.5g-0.6g; ► 0.6g-0.7g; ► 0.7g-0.8g; ► 0.8g-1.45g. The subsequent sections describe the process and results of development of the Event Trees (ET) and Fault Trees (FT). 3.1. Accident sequence analysis (event trees) For the METIS study case, loss of coolant accident was selected for the modeling. This group includes non-isolable loss of coolant accident (LOCA) within the containment caused by seismic events. A distinguishing feature of this initiating event is the potential for multiple primary circuit leaks, which, in turn, can lead to a bypass of the main coolant flow through more than one ECCS channel and hydroaccumulators (ECFS). As a representative accident for this group of IEs, large LOCA (D > 90 mm) have been selected. It should be noted that frequency of large LOCA due to seismic impact is lesser than for other leaks from the primary circuit. Higher frequencies for small LOCAs are explained by high quantity of pipelines of small/medium diameter connected to the primary circuit, and increased possibility to rupture of small pipes comparing to the larger one. However, the conditional core damage probability (CCDP) for large LOCA is the highest within the entire spectrum of LOCAs. The higher CCDP can be explained by possible bypass of the main coolant flow (in case if the rupture occurs at ECCS pipelines); lesser number of safety injection systems capable to withstand with large LOCA. The safe end state for this type of leak is a “cold shutdown”. The primary safety functions required for this class of accidents are: D7.7 Assessment of new or improved PSA approaches GA N°945121 38 ► Maintaining the primary circuit coolant inventory, ► Ensuring long-term removal of residual heat via the primary circuit. Table 3 presents a list of the required safety functions and the systems responsible for performing these functions. System Name Safety Functions Success Criterias Control Method System Operating Time ECFS Inventory control 1\2 ECFS into the Upper Mixing Chamber 1\2 ECFS into the Lower Mixing Chamber Automatic Until Depletion of the Operating Volume LPIS Inventory control. Primary heat removal 1/3 LPIS into the nonaffected Loop Automatic 24 h HPIS Inventory control. Primary heat removal 2/3 HPIS into the nonaffected Loop Automatic 24 h Table 2: List of the required safety functions for large LOCA Figure 27 presents Event Tree for IE QS1 “Large LOCA in containment caused by seismic events”. This figure also illustrates scope of the METIS model – seven hundred basic events, dozens families of common cause failures, and 1,5 hundred fault trees, etc. Figure 27: ET for IE “Large LOCA caused by seismic events” (screen from the METIS tool) For each level of seismic impact, an ET was developed. This tree includes: ► A set of top events that model the frequencies of the Initiating Events depending on the plant state and the specified seismic impact level. ► A set of transfer event trees that represent the logic of accident progression scenarios for a specific initiating event. Figure 28 illustrates the ET for all levels of seismic impact. D7.7 Assessment of new or improved PSA approaches GA N°945121 39 Figure 28: ET for all levels of seismic impact Figure 29 shows the FT with frequencies for all seismic levels. Figure 29: Fault Tree Modeling Frequencies for all seismic levels For transitioning the reactor to a stable safe state, two emergency core flooding system (ECFS) hydroaccumulators are sufficient (one connected to the upper mixing chamber and one to the lower mixing chamber), along with either one of the three Low pressure injection system (LPIS) channels operating from tank GA–201 or two out of three High pressure injection system (HPIS) channels. The operation of the TQ14 HPIS pumps and the reactor trip system is not critical for this group of leaks. Whether these systems successfully fulfill their assigned safety functions does not affect the progression of the accident under consideration. This process leads to core uncovery followed by core reflooding via ECFS YT11-14V01 and pumps TQ12,22,32D01, TQ13,23,33D01, and TQ14,24,34D01. As a result of the release of hot coolant, the pressure and radioactivity inside the containment rise sharply. The drop in primary circuit parameters triggers ECCS actuation and initiates the activation of safety system mechanisms. A cold shutdown is considered a safe end-state for this type of leak. As shown on Figure 28, the event tree for large LOCA consists of three accident sequences, two of which lead to core damage. A description of these accident sequences is provided in Table 4. D7.7 Assessment of new or improved PSA approaches GA N°945121 46 HEP2-EQ3-T1ARZ00-D Operator error during implementation of the ARZ-0.0 procedure (blackout) (earthquake 0.2g) MCR 2 30 YES Multipl er 90 1.00E-04 2.00E-03 HEP2-EQ4-T11open switchyard-C Mechanical action "Restoration of the open switchyard in 5 hours" (earthquake 0.3g) Outcide MCR 3 270 YES Multipl er 30 2.17E-04 6.51E-03 HEP2-EQ4-T11OTHER-C Mechanical action "Restoration from sections of other power units in 5 hours" (earthquake 0.3g) Outcide MCR 3 270 YES Multipl er 30 2.17E-04 6.51E-03 HEP2-EQ4-T11RTSN-C Mechanical action "Restoration of the RTSN in 5 hours" (earthquake 0.3g) Outcide MCR 3 270 YES Multipl er 30 2.17E-04 6.51E-03 HEP2-EQ4-T12open switchyard-C Mechanical action "Restoration of the open switchyard before opening the pressurizer relief valve (40 minutes)" (earthquake 0.3g) Outcide MCR 3 10 YES HEP=1 8.40E-03 1.00E+00 HEP2-EQ4-T12OTHER-C Mechanical action "Restoration from sections of other power units before opening the pressurizer relief valve (40 minutes)" (earthquake 0.3g) Outcide MCR 3 10 YES HEP=1 8.40E-03 1.00E+00 HEP2-EQ4-T12RTSN-C Mechanical action "Restoration of the RTSN before opening the pressurizer relief valve (40 minutes)" (earthquake 0.3g) Outcide MCR 3 10 YES HEP=1 8.40E-03 1.00E+00 HEP2-EQ4-T13open switchyard-C Mechanical action "Restoration of the open switchyard before discharging the batteries (52 minutes)" (earthquake 0.3g) Outcide MCR 3 22 YES HEP=1 2.66E-03 1.00E+00 HEP2-EQ4-T13OTHER-C Mechanical action "Restoration from sections of other power units before discharging the batteries (52 minutes)" (earthquake 0.3g) Outcide MCR 3 22 YES HEP=1 2.66E-03 1.00E+00 HEP2-EQ4-T13RTSN-C Mechanical action "Restoration of the RTSN before discharging the batteries (52 minutes)" (earthquake 0.3g) Outcide MCR 3 22 YES HEP=1 2.66E-03 1.00E+00 HEP2-EQ4-T1ARZ00-D Operator error during implementation of the ARZ-0.0 procedure (blackout) (earthquake 0.3g) MCR 3 30 YES Multipl er 90 1.00E-04 9.00E-03 HEP2-EQ5-T11open switchyard-C Mechanical action "Restoration of the open switchyard in 5 hours" (earthquake 1.45g) Outcide MCR 4 270 YES HEP=1 2.17E-04 1.00E+00 HEP2-EQ5-T11OTHER-C Mechanical action "Restoration from sections of other power units in 5 hours" (earthquake 1.45g) Outcide MCR 4 270 YES HEP=1 2.17E-04 1.00E+00 HEP2-EQ5-T11RTSN-C Mechanical action "Restoration of the RTSN in 5 hours" (earthquake 1.45g) Outcide MCR 4 270 YES HEP=1 2.17E-04 1.00E+00 D7.7 Assessment of new or improved PSA approaches GA N°945121 47 Fault Trees for NPP Unit Components, Interfaces, and Buildings/Structures under Seismic Impacts Basic events modeling failures of thermal-mechanical equipment, electrical and technical equipment, instrumentation and control systems, building/structure failures, and pipeline ruptures/leaks are included in the fault trees. These fault trees account for the level of seismic impact by using a corresponding logical switch. As an example, Figure 34 illustrates the principle used for modeling NPP unit components, interfaces, and buildings/structures under seismic impacts. HEP2-EQ5-T12open switchyard-C Mechanical action "Restoration of the open switchyard before opening the pressurizer relief valve (40 minutes)" (earthquake 1.45g) Outcide MCR 4 10 YES HEP=1 8.40E-03 1.00E+00 HEP2-EQ5-T12OTHER-C Mechanical action "Restoration from sections of other power units before opening the pressurizer relief valve (40 minutes)" (earthquake 1.45g) Outcide MCR 4 10 YES HEP=1 8.40E-03 1.00E+00 HEP2-EQ5-T12RTSN-C Mechanical action "Restoration of the RTSN before opening the pressurizer relief valve (40 minutes)" (earthquake 1.45g) Outcide MCR 4 10 YES HEP=1 8.40E-03 1.00E+00 HEP2-EQ5-T13open switchyard-C Mechanical action "Restoration of the open switchyard before discharging the batteries (52 minutes)" (earthquake 1.45g) Outcide MCR 4 22 YES HEP=1 2.66E-03 1.00E+00 HEP2-EQ5-T13OTHER-C Mechanical action "Restoration from sections of other power units before discharging the batteries (52 minutes)" (earthquake 1.45g) Outcide MCR 4 22 YES HEP=1 2.66E-03 1.00E+00 HEP2-EQ5-T13RTSN-C Mechanical action "Restoration of the RTSN before discharging the batteries (52 minutes)" (earthquake 1.45g) Outcide MCR 4 22 YES HEP=1 2.66E-03 1.00E+00 HEP2-EQ5-T1ARZ00-D Operator error during implementation of the ARZ-0.0 procedure (blackout) (earthquake 1.45g) MCR 4 30 YES HEP=1 1.00E-04 1.00E+00 D7.7 Assessment of new or improved PSA approaches GA N°945121 48 Figure 34: Modeling Basic Events for Seismic Impacts Inter-System Interfaces Table 5 presents the logical connections of the system with other systems within the probabilistic model. System System FT ID FD Title Essential Power Supply System BV00-000 Loss of power supple from BV Essential Power Supply System BW00-00 Loss of power supple from BW Essential Power Supply System BX00-000 Loss of power supple from BX Essential Power Supply System HG11-000 Loss of power supple from HG11 Essential Power Supply System HG21-000 Loss of power supple from HG21 Essential Power Supply System HG31-000 Loss of power supple from HG31 Essential Power Supply System LV00-000 Loss of power supple from LV Essential Power Supply System LW00-000 Loss of power supple from LW Essential Power Supply System LX00-000 Loss of power supple from LX Essential Service Water System VF10-000 System channel failure QF\VF10 Essential Service Water System VF20-000 System channel failure QF\VF20 Essential Service Water System VF30-000 System channel failure QF\VF30 Table 4: List of Operators for Inter-System Interfaces System success criteria Preliminary success criterion is supply of boric acid solution into the primary circuit is assured by at least one train pump which flow rate corresponds to the primary circuit pressure and hydraulic characteristic. D7.7 Assessment of new or improved PSA approaches GA N°945121 49 System Faul Trees FT ID FT Name RHR-100 Failure of LPIS in RHR mode RHR-000 failure of LPIS in RHR mode TQ10-001 Failure of suction line from sump train 1 TQ10-002 Failures of heat exchanger train 1 TQ12-001 Failure of LPIS train 1 TQ12-003 Failure of headline train 1 TQ20-001 Failure of suction line from sump train 2 TQ20-002 Failures of heat exchanger train 2 TQ22-001 Failure of LPIS train 2 TQ22-003 Failure of headline train 2 TQ30-001 Failure of suction line from sump train 3 TQ30-002 Failures of heat exchanger train 3 TQ32-001 Failure of LPIS train 3 TQ32-003 Failure of headline train 3 TQ40-110 Failure of TQ40 input line TQ40-111 Failure of TQ40 channel 1 TQ40-112 Failure of TQ40 channel 2 TQ40-113 Failure of TQ40 channel 1 TQN0-003 Dependent failures of sump Recovery Rules In modeling failures of the emergency and planned cooldown system, recovery rules were applied. By applying these recovery rules, minimal cut sets containing more than one mutually exclusive basic event were removed, see Figure 35. D7.7 Assessment of new or improved PSA approaches GA N°945121 50 Figure 35: Modeling recovery rules for minimal cut sets (boundary conditions sets) 4. Quantification and interpretation 4.1. Base case Existent Seismic PSA for ZNPP is the base case. The base case model (fault trees, event trees, SSCs reliability, fragility data as well full correlations) was replicated using the METIS tool, taking into account differences between SAPHIRE and the METIS tool features. In order to evaluate whether the METIS study case model correctly represents the nuclear power plant, the results obtained by the METIS tool were compared with /ZNPP 2019/. Figure 36 present screenshot from the METIS tool with minimal cutsets (MCS) that are contributors to conditional core damage probability, calculated for the base case for particular seismic interval. The results are presented in Consequence PGA CDF (ZNPP 2019),1/year CCDP (ZNPP 2019) CDF (METIS study case),1/year CCDP (METIS study case) EQ1-CD 0.085g 3.36E-11 7.21E-08 6.60E-11 1.58E-07 EQ2-CD 0.17g 5.84E-09 7.27E-05 6.07E-09 7.24E-05 D7.7 Assessment of new or improved PSA approaches GA N°945121 51 EQ3-CD 0.2g 2.84E-08 5.24E-04 2.70E-08 5.36E-04 EQ4-CD 0.3g 7.53E-07 3.77E-02 6.90E-07 3.45E-02 Total 7,87E-07 7,23E-07 Table 6 and Figure 37. There are differences in the results obtained by SAPHIRE and the METIS tool, which are explained in this Section below. Figure 36: The MCS calculated using the METIS tool Consequence PGA CDF (ZNPP 2019),1/year CCDP (ZNPP 2019) CDF (METIS study case),1/year CCDP (METIS study case) EQ1-CD 0.085g 3.36E-11 7.21E-08 6.60E-11 1.58E-07 EQ2-CD 0.17g 5.84E-09 7.27E-05 6.07E-09 7.24E-05 EQ3-CD 0.2g 2.84E-08 5.24E-04 2.70E-08 5.36E-04 D7.7 Assessment of new or improved PSA approaches GA N°945121 52 EQ4-CD 0.3g 7.53E-07 3.77E-02 6.90E-07 3.45E-02 Total 7,87E-07 7,23E-07 Table 5: Base case calculations Figure 37: Base case CCDP Table 7 provides the most risk-significant minimal cut sets for the seismic impact level of 0.085g. The same frequencies of seismic events were used in the SAPHIRE and the METIS tool. ZNPP 2019 for large LOCA METIS base case № CDF 1/year % MCS № CDF 1/year % MCS 1 9.76E12 29 Q1POS00 C-GN01DGN-R-ALL CCF of DG to run Q1S1 1 2.71E11 41.1 Q1POS00 C-GN01DGN-R-ALL Q1S1 2 4.62E12 13.7 Q1POS00 C-BN02ACBA-E-ABC CCF of essential power supply Q1S1 2 7.15E12 10.8 Q1POS00 C-GN01-5DGN-R-ALL Q1S1 D7.7 Assessment of new or improved PSA approaches GA N°945121 53 ZNPP 2019 for large LOCA METIS base case № CDF 1/year % MCS № CDF 1/year % MCS section breakers BV(WX)02A 3 4.55E12 13.5 Q1POS00 CQFN1S0NCKV-O-ABC CCF of essential service water check valves to open Q1S1 3 6.77E12 10.3 Q1POS00 C-GN01DGN-R-ALL Q1S3 4 2.56E12 7.61 Q1POS00 C-GN01-5DGN-R CCF of DG to run during 5 hours Q1S1 4 4.76E12 7.21 Q1POS00 C-GN01DGN-R-ALL Q1S2 5 2.44E12 7.25 Q1POS00 C-GN01DGN-R CCF of DG to run Q1S3 5 4.62E12 6.99 Q1POS00 CBN(BV)2ACBA-E-ALL Q1S1 6 1.81E12 5.39 Q1POS00 CQFN1D0NMDP-S-ABC CCF to start of essential service water pumps Q1S1 6 4.55E12 6.89 Q1POS00 CQFN1S0NCKV-O-ALL Q1S1 7 1.71E12 5.09 Q1POS00 C-GN01DGN-R CCF of DG to run Q1S2 7 1.81E12 2.75 Q1POS00 CQFN1D0NMDP-S-ALL Q1S1 8 1.66E12 4.94 Q1POS00 C-EE0NDCP-F-ABC CCF of essential power supply DC buses Q1S1 8 1.79E12 2.7 Q1POS00 C-GN01-5DGN-R-ALL Q1S3 D7.7 Assessment of new or improved PSA approaches GA N°945121 54 ZNPP 2019 for large LOCA METIS base case № CDF 1/year % MCS № CDF 1/year % MCS 9 1.15E12 3.43 Q1POS00 C-BN02ACBA-E-ABC CCF of essential power supply circuit breakers Q1S3 9 1.66E12 2.52 Q1POS00 C-EE0NDCP-F-ALL Q1S1 10 1.13E12 3.38 Q1POS00 CQFN1S0NCKV-O-ABC CCF of essential service water check valves Q1S3 10 1.25E12 1.9 Q1POS00 C-GN01-5DGN-R-ALL Q1S2 11 1.11E12 3.3 Q1POS00 CYT1NS04CKV-OABCD CCF of ECFS check valves S04 to open Q1S1 11 1.15E12 1.75 Q1POS00 CBN(BV)2ACBA-E-ALL Q1S3 12 1.11E12 3.3 Q1POS00 CYT1NS03CKV-OABCD CCF of ECFS check valves S03 to open Q1S1 12 1.13E12 1.72 Q1POS00 CQFN1S0NCKV-O-ALL Q1S3 13 1.11E12 1.68 Q1POS00 C-YT1NS03CKV-O-ALL Q1S1 14 1.11E12 1.68 Q1POS00 C-YT1NS04CKV-O-ALL Q1S1 D7.7 Assessment of new or improved PSA approaches GA N°945121 55 ZNPP 2019 for large LOCA METIS base case № CDF 1/year % MCS № CDF 1/year % MCS total 3,36E-11 6,60E-11 Table 6: Base case MCS for the seismic impact level of 0,085 g Basic event Q1-POS-00 represents plant operational state 0 – nominal power operation; Q1-S1, Q1-S2, Q1-S3 are basic events with probability of large LOCA due to seismically-induced rupture of the primary circuit pipelines of large size, of medium size and small size, respectively. The comparison of minimal cut sets in Table 7 shows that MCS №1-12 in SAPHIRE correspond to MCS №1-14 (except of MCS8 and 10) in the METIS tool. At the same time, MCS containing common-cause failures to run of diesel generators (BE C-GN01-DGN-R-ALL and C-GN01-5-DGN-R-ALL for the METIS tool, and BE C-GN01-DGN-R and C-GN01-5-DGN-R for SAPHIRE) have different frequencies. The differences in the results can be explained by different algorithms used for calculation CCF probabilities based on the alpha-factor model in the SAPHIRE and the METIS tool. It should be noted, that quantification algorithm for CCF probabilities in the METIS tool gives the same results, as another commercial software RiskSpectrum. Figure 38 illustrates the differences in the calculation of CCF probabilities based on the alpha-factor model. D7.7 Assessment of new or improved PSA approaches GA N°945121 62 ZNPP 2019 for large LOCA METIS base case № CDF 1/ye ar % MCS № CDF 1/yea r % MCS 11 3.02E -10 1.0 6 Q3POS -00 C-GN01DGN-R Q3S1 11 3.62E10 1.3 4 Q3POS -00 EQ-3YT12006 EQ3YT14 -008 Q3-S1 12 2.93E -10 1.0 3 Q3POS -00 EQ-3BAT1P1320 Q3S3 12 2.93E10 1.0 9 Q3POS -00 EQ-3TRF1P2040 Q3S3 13 2.93E -10 1.0 3 Q3POS -00 EQ-3TRF1P2040 Q3S3 13 2.92E10 1.0 8 Q3POS -00 EQ-3BAT1P1320 Q3S3 14 2.51E -10 0.8 8 Q3POS -00 EQ-3DGB-C2C3-D Q3S1 YA 10 Z0 1C - PI PT 14 2.35E10 0.8 7 Q3POS -00 EQ-3CKV2P1920 Q3S1 15 2.35E -10 0.8 3 Q3POS -00 EQ-3CKV2P2300 Q3S1 15 2.35E10 0.8 7 Q3POS -00 EQ-3CKV2P2300 Q3S1 16 2.35E -10 0.8 3 Q3POS -00 EQ-3CKV2P1920 Q3S1 16 2.33E10 0.8 6 Q3POS -00 EQ-3SDSP1320 Q3S1 17 2.35E -10 0.8 3 Q3POS -00 EQ-3SDSP1320 Q3S1 17 2.33E10 0.8 6 Q3POS -00 EQ-3-LRO-DGD Q3S1 18 2.35E -10 0.8 3 Q3POS -00 EQ-3SUK1P1320 Q3S1 19 2.35E -10 0.8 3 Q3POS -00 EQ-3MSK1P1320 Q3S1 D7.7 Assessment of new or improved PSA approaches GA N°945121 63 ZNPP 2019 for large LOCA METIS base case № CDF 1/ye ar % MCS № CDF 1/yea r % MCS 20 2.35E -10 0.8 3 Q3POS -00 EQ-3-LRO-DGD Q3S1 Table 8: Minimal cut sets for the seismic impact level of 0,2 g ZNPP 2019 for large LOCA № Freq., 1/year % MCS 1 2,14E-07 28,4 Q4-POS-00 EQ-4-SP-D Q4-S1 2 6,17E-08 8,2 Q4-POS-00 EQ-4-SP-D Q4-S3 3 3,69E-08 4,9 Q4-POS-00 EQ-4-BAT1P1320 Q4-S1 4 3,69E-08 4,9 Q4-POS-00 EQ-4-TRF1P2040 Q4-S1 5 2,86E-08 3,8 Q4-POS-00 EQ-4-SP-D Q4-S2 6 2,17E-08 2,88 Q4-POS-00 EQ-4-DCPP2040 Q4-S1 7 2,17E-08 2,88 Q4-POS-00 EQ-4-ACB2P2040 Q4-S1 8 2,17E-08 2,88 Q4-POS-00 EQ-4-CBA2P2040 Q4-S1 9 1,72E-08 2,29 Q4-POS-00 EQ-4-YT11005 EQ-4-YT13007 Q4-S1 10 1,72E-08 2,29 Q4-POS-00 EQ-4-YT12006 EQ-4-YT14008 Q4-S1 11 1,07E-08 1,42 Q4-POS-00 EQ-4-BAT1P1320 Q4-S3 12 1,07E-08 1,42 Q4-POS-00 EQ-4-TRF1P2040 Q4-S3 13 1,04E-08 1,38 Q4-POS-00 EQ-4-SUK1P1320 Q4-S1 14 1,04E-08 1,38 Q4-POS-00 EQ-4-SDSP1320 Q4-S1 15 1,04E-08 1,38 Q4-POS-00 EQ-4-RTZP1320 Q4-S1 16 1,04E-08 1,38 Q4-POS-00 EQ-4-MSK1P1320 Q4-S1 17 1,04E-08 1,38 Q4-POS-00 EQ-4-L-RODG-D Q4-S1 Total 5,51E-07 METIS base case D7.7 Assessment of new or improved PSA approaches GA N°945121 64 Freq = P*2.0e05 CCDP % MCS 1 2,15E-07 0,01073 31,6 EQ-4-SP-D Q4-POS-00 Q4-S1 2 6,20E-08 0,003101 9,1 EQ-4-SP-D Q4-POS-00 Q4-S3 3 3,69E-08 0,001845 5,4 EQ-4-TRF1P2040 Q4-POS-00 Q4-S1 4 3,69E-08 0,001845 5,4 EQ-4-BAT1P1320 Q4-POS-00 Q4-S1 5 2,87E-08 0,001437 4,2 EQ-4-SP-D Q4-POS-00 Q4-S2 6 2,12E-08 0,001059 3,1 EQ-4-CBA2P2040 Q4-POS-00 Q4-S1 7 2,12E-08 0,001059 3,1 EQ-4-ACB2P2040 Q4-POS-00 Q4-S1 8 2,12E-08 0,001059 3,1 EQ-4-DCPP2040 Q4-POS-00 Q4-S1 9 1,72E-08 0,0008617 2,5 EQ-4-YT12006 EQ-4-YT14-008 Q4-POS-00 Q4S1 10 1,72E-08 0,0008617 2,5 EQ-4-YT11005 EQ-4-YT13-007 Q4-POS-00 Q4S1 11 1,07E-08 0,0005333 1,6 EQ-4-TRF1P2040 Q4-POS-00 Q4-S3 12 1,07E-08 0,0005333 1,6 EQ-4-BAT1P1320 Q4-POS-00 Q4-S3 13 1,04E-08 0,0005181 1,5 EQ-4-SDSP1320 Q4-POS-00 Q4-S1 14 1,04E-08 0,0005181 1,5 EQ-4-L-RODG-D Q4-POS-00 Q4-S1 15 9,02E-09 0,0004511 1,3 EQ-4DGN13-P0 EQ-4-VF20-212 Q4-POS-00 Q4S1 16 9,02E-09 0,0004511 1,3 EQ-4DGN13-P0 EQ-4-VF20-215 Q4-POS-00 Q4S1 17 9,02E-09 0,0004511 1,3 EQ-4DGN13-P0 EQ-4-VF20-224 Q4-POS-00 Q4S1 Total 5,46E-07 Table 9: Minimal cut sets for the seismic impact level of 0,3 g For the seismic impact level of 1.45g, a comparison of minimal cut sets is not provided. This is because, in /ZNPP 2019/, only one initiating event was modeled for this seismic level — destruction of the Reactor Building, with a probability close to 1.00. The destruction of the Reactor Building leads to the failure of all systems required to bring the reactor to a safe end state. . D7.7 Assessment of new or improved PSA approaches GA N°945121 65 4.2. Study case After base case calculations, and definition of reasons for differences in the results, the METIS study case model was updated to fully account the approaches and results developed at the METIS project: ► new fragility parameters for risk-significant components. New input data is described in Section 2.3; ► new levels of correlation for risk-significant redundant components, instead of full correlations. Additional seismic levels (0.3=1,47g) were modeled to account risk omitted in /ZNPP 2019/. The results are presented in Table 11, Figure 41-Figure 43. Seismic event PGA CDF CCDP EQ-1 0.085g 1.07E-12 5.83E-08 EQ-2 0.17g 1.32E-08 2.46E-03 EQ-3 0.2g 5.98E-08 1.50E-02 EQ-4 0.3g 1.06E-06 3.15E-01 EQ-5 0.4g 1.87E-06 8.40E-01 EQ-6 0.5g 1.61E-06 9.95E-01 EQ-7 0.6g 1.25E-06 1.00E+00 EQ-8 0.7g 1.00E-06 1.00E+00 EQ-9 0.8g 8.26E-07 1.00E+00 EQ-10 1.45g 3.53E-07 1.00E+00 Total CD 8.04E-06 Table 10: METIS study case results D7.7 Assessment of new or improved PSA approaches GA N°945121 66 Figure 41: METIS study case CDF Figure 42: METIS study case CCDP 0,00E+00 2,00E-07 4,00E-07 6,00E-07 8,00E-07 1,00E-06 1,20E-06 1,40E-06 1,60E-06 1,80E-06 2,00E-06 012345678910 CDF 0,00E+00 2,00E-01 4,00E-01 6,00E-01 8,00E-01 1,00E+00 1,20E+00 012345678910 CCDP CCDP D7.7 Assessment of new or improved PSA approaches GA N°945121 67 Figure 43: METIS study case results (logarithmic scale) Re-evaluation of seismic failure probabilities for selected components has led to: ► producing new MCS, ► re-ordering dominant contributors, ► increasing CDF (see Table 12 for example with 25% increase for EQ1). METIS base case METIS study case № CDF 1/year % MCS № CDF 1/year % MCS 1 2.71E11 41,09 Q1POS00 C-GN01DGN-R-ALL CCF of DG to run Q1S1 1 9.89E11 37.4 Q1POS00 EQ-1-QF-PMSM Loss of essential service water pumps Q1-S1 2 7.15E12 10,84 Q1POS00 C-GN01-5DGN-R-ALL CCF of DG to run during 5 hours Q1S1 2 4.04E11 15.3 Q1POS00 EQ-1-YZ Loss of control cabinets YZ Q1-S1 3 6.77E12 10,26 Q1POS00 C-GN01DGN-R-ALL CCF of DG to run Q1S3 3 2.71E11 10.3 Q1POS00 C-GN01-DGN-RALL CCF of DG to run Q1-S1 1,00E-12 1,00E-11 1,00E-10 1,00E-09 1,00E-08 1,00E-07 1,00E-06 1,00E-05 1,00E-04 1,00E-03 1,00E-02 1,00E-01 1,00E+00 1,00E+01 012345678910 CDF (METIS study case) CCDP (METIS study case) D7.7 Assessment of new or improved PSA approaches GA N°945121 68 METIS base case METIS study case № CDF 1/year % MCS № CDF 1/year % MCS 4 4.76E12 7,22 Q1POS00 C-GN01DGN-R-ALL CCF of DG to run Q1S2 4 2.47E11 9.33 Q1POS00 EQ-1-QF-PMSM Loss of essential service water pumps Q1-S3 5 4.62E12 7,00 Q1POS00 CBN(BV)2ACBA-E-ALL CCF of essential power supply section breakers BV(WX)02A Q1S1 5 1.73E11 6.56 Q1POS00 EQ-1-QF-PMSM Loss of essential service water pumps Q1-S2 6 4.55E12 6,9 Q1POS00 CQFN1S0NCKV-O-ALL CCF of essential service water check valves Q1S1 6 1.01E11 3.82 Q1POS00 EQ-1-YZ Loss of control cabinets YZ Q1-S3 7 1.81E12 2,74 Q1POS00 CQFN1D0NMDP-S-ALL CCF of essential service water pumps to start Q1S1 7 7.15E12 2.7 Q1POS00 C-GN01-5-DGN-RALL CCF of DG to run during 5 hours Q1-S1 8 1.79E12 2,71 Q1POS00 C-GN01-5DGN-R-ALL CCF of DG to run during 5 hours Q1S3 8 7.09E12 2.68 Q1POS00 EQ-1-YZ Loss of control cabinets YZ Q1-S2 D7.7 Assessment of new or improved PSA approaches GA N°945121 69 METIS base case METIS study case № CDF 1/year % MCS № CDF 1/year % MCS 9 1.66E12 2,52 Q1POS00 C-EE0NDCP-F-ALL CCF of essential power supply DC buses Q1S1 9 6.77E12 2.56 Q1POS00 C-GN01-DGN-RALL CCF of DG to run Q1-S3 10 1.25E12 1,9 Q1POS00 C-GN01-5DGN-R-ALL CCF of DG to run during 5 hours Q1S2 10 4.76E12 1.8 Q1POS00 C-GN01-DGN-RALL CCF of DG to run Q1-S2 11 1.15E12 1,74 Q1POS00 CBN(BV)2ACBA-E-ALL CCF of essential power supply section breakers BV(WX)02A Q1S3 11 4.62E12 1.75 Q1POS00 C-BN(BV)2A-CBAE-ALL CCF of essential power supply section breakers BV(WX)02A Q1-S1 12 1.13E12 1,71 Q1POS00 CQFN1S0NCKV-O-ALL CCF of essential service water check valves Q1S3 12 4.55E12 1.72 Q1POS00 C-QFN1S0N-CKVO-ALL CCF of essential service water check valves Q1-S1 13 1.11E12 1,68 Q1POS00 CYT1NS03CKV-O-ALL CCF of ECFS check valves S03 to open Q1S1 13 1.81E12 0.69 Q1POS00 C-QFN1D0N-MDPS-ALL CCF of essential service water pumps to start Q1-S1 D7.7 Assessment of new or improved PSA approaches GA N°945121 70 METIS base case METIS study case № CDF 1/year % MCS № CDF 1/year % MCS 14 1.11E12 1,68 Q1POS00 CYT1NS04CKV-O-ALL CCF of ECFS check valves S03 to open Q1S1 14 1.79E12 0.68 Q1POS00 C-GN01-5-DGN-RALL CCF of DG to run during 5 hours Q1-S3 15 1.66E12 0.63 Q1POS00 C-EE0N-DCP-FALL CCF of essential power supply DC buses Q1-S1 16 1.25E12 0.47 Q1POS00 C-GN01-5-DGN-RALL CCF of DG to run during 5 hours Q1-S2 17 1.15E12 0.44 Q1POS00 C-BN(BV)2A-CBAE-ALL CCF of essential power supply section breakers BV(WX)02A Q1-S3 18 1.13E12 0.43 Q1POS00 C-QFN1S0N-CKVO-ALL CCF of essential service water check valves Q1-S3 19 1.11E12 0.42 Q1POS00 C-YT1NS03-CKVO-ALL CCF of ECFS check valves S03 to open Q1-S1 20 1.11E12 0.42 Q1POS00 C-YT1NS04-CKVO-ALL CCF of ECFS check valves S03 to open Q1-S1 Total 6,59E-11 2,64E-10 D7.7 Assessment of new or improved PSA approaches GA N°945121 71 Table 11: Comparison of the METIS tool results for seismic level 0,085g The analysis of minimal cut sets shows that the top 10 dominant MCS for all seismic levels include failures of the Control Monitor Cabinet and Essential Service Water Pump (PMSM). This is due to the high conditional probability of failure of these components caused by earthquakes, as calculated in /METIS 2025/. The failure of the ESW pump leads to the failure of the consumers of the service water system and the dependent failure of the HPIS and LPIS, resulting in the inability to perform the safety function on maintaining coolant inventory and heat removal from the primary circuit. The failure of the Control Monitor Cabinet also results in the inability to perform the same safety function due to the lack of signal for starting the HPIS and LPIS. ► For the seismic level of 0.085g: o No additional seismic-related failures except of mentioned above. ► For the seismic level of 0.17g and 0,2g: o The top 10 MCS also include failures related to damage of spray ponds due to seismic impacts. The destruction of spray ponds causes the failure of the responsible consumers' service water system and dependent failures of HPIS and LPIS, leading to the inability to perform the SF of "Maintaining coolant inventory and removing heat from the primary circuit." ► For the seismic level of 0.3g-0.5g: o In addition to the failures of the Control Monitor Cabinet, PMSM, and spray ponds, the top 10 MCS also include the failure of EA01, EA02, and EA03 batteries caused by the earthquake. o In the event of a power loss at the 6 kV sections (BV, BW, BX) before the diesel generators are started, or during voltage dips on the 6 kV sections, power is supplied to the consumers from the EA01-03 batteries with a voltage of 220 V. Thus, the failure of batteries EA01, EA02, EA03 due to the earthquake before the DG startup during a 6 kV section power loss would lead to the loss of ECFS, Essential service water system, LPIS, HPIS, and, consequently, the failure of the SF of "Maintaining coolant inventory and removing heat from the primary circuit." ► For the seismic level more than 0.6g: seismic failure probabilities for spray ponds, control cabinets, PMSM are very, CCDP is equal to 1. o D7.7 Assessment of new or improved PSA approaches GA N°945121 78 Figure 51: Sensitivity of CDF to seismic frequencies Sensitivity analysis to the frequencies showed that the most conservative results were obtained using average frequencies. The least conservative results were obtained using frequencies for the upper PGA values of the corresponding acceleration ranges. Based on the obtained results, it can be recommended for real SPSA to use average frequencies for seismic interval, and quantify these frequencies using reasonable number of bins within the seismic interval. Increasing number of bins gives more precise, more accurate calculation of the frequencies. 5. Conclusions The obtained results showed that main contributors changed from original ZNPP PSA to the METIScase-study PSA. The reasons for changing conditional core damage probabilities are: ► Implementation of enhanced approaches for fragility analysis, that gives different results (both more optimistic and more pessimistic) regarding the seismic resistance of selected SSCs; ► Different, more precise quantification algorithms used in the METIS tools; ► Best estimate, more justifiable treatment of correlations for risk-significant components; ► Consideration of new seismic intervals that were omitted in the original PSA. Since the METIS study case is hybrid one, seismic event frequencies were also re-evaluated. Taking all these factors, final core damage frequency was increased by factor of about 10. Such impact can be considered as rather significant. It should be noted that fragility modeling uses lognormal distribution. While lognormal hypothesis holds for the body of the distribution, but it inaccurately represents the fragility tails (as it considers higher probabilities of failure at low accelerations, which is conservative). This may be considered for improvements on low seismicity regions, like Zaporizhzhia site. Another aspect that should be mentioned is that PSHA results should be produced taking into account real PSA purposes, e.g. the same intensity measure (and terminology) should be used both for seismic hazards, seismic fragilities and risk. D7.7 Assessment of new or improved PSA approaches GA N°945121 79 Further improvements may be considered regarding the METIS tool: ► Code debugging to ensure more stable operation of the solver at different platforms; ► Further integration and debugging of software within the METIS tool pack; ► Improvement of the solver to correctly treat initiating event frequencies. 6. Bibliography /ZNPP 2019/ Zaporizhzhie NPP. Probabilistic safety assessment of seismic impact on power unit 1. Final report (in Russian). АТ75/208-13.1000.ОД.4 (2019). /METIS 2021a/ G. SENFAUTE, “Case study for implementation and application of METIS results”, Horizon 2020 project METIS, Deliverable D3.1, 2021. /METIS 2021b/ O. Sevbo, “Definition and classification scheme of SSCs for specific and generic seismic fragility evaluation”, Horizon 2020 project METIS, Deliverable D6.1, 2021. /METIS 2022/ M. HIBTI, “TASK 7.1 Development of an open-source representation format for PSA models”, Horizon 2020 project METIS, Deliverable D7.1, 2022. /METIS 2023a/ M. PAGANI, T. Chartier, A. Rood, “D4.6 - Preparation of the METIS study case (WP4) and application”, Horizon 2020 project METIS, Deliverable D4.6, 2023. /METIS 2023b/ C. DROSZCZ, “Enhanced version of the PSA calculation engine SCRAM”, Horizon 2020 project METIS, Deliverable D7.3, 2023. /METIS 2024/ O. Sevbo, “Assessment of new or improved PSA approaches”, Horizon 2020 project METIS, Deliverable D7.7, 2024. /METIS 2024b/ D.Gumenyuk, O.Ponochovnyi, O. Sevbo, S. Boulley, “Benchmark of PSA models”, Horizon 2020 project METIS, Deliverable D7.6, 2024. /METIS 2025/ M.Zouatine, I. Zentner, H.Sadegh-Azar, “Fragility computations for METIS case study”, Horizon 2020 project METIS, Deliverable D6.8, 2025. D7.7 Assessment of new or improved PSA approaches GA N°945121 80 Annex I. Reliability data Reliability Parameters for Systems Components A list of system components and their parameters was used in accordance with the seismic PSA of ZNPP Unit 1 /ZNPP 2019/. Coding scheme for basic events as follows: SSC plant-specific designation – component type – failure mode. For the reliability parameters of Thermal-Mechanical Equipment, Electrical and Technical Equipment, and Instrumentation and Control systems, grouping was performed using the results of reliability assessments for different levels of seismic impact. The grouping of components in the reactor unit was carried out according to the following principles and assumptions: ► Equipment of the same type is grouped together for a given seismic impact level. ► Components assigned to the same group are located at the same elevation level. ► Components within the same group have the same HCLPF value, representing their seismic capacity threshold. Current BE ID Model Template Probability/ Failure Rate 0BT01-TRF-F Mission Time T-TRF5-F 3.73E-05 0BT02-TRF-F Mission Time T-TRF5-F 3.73E-05 ASP1-SUP Probability T-ASP 5.98E-04 ASP2-SUP Probability T-ASP 5.98E-04 ASP3-SUP Probability T-ASP 5.98E-04 BA-ACB-F Mission Time T-ACB2-F 2.41E-07 BA-BD-LOSS Probability BA-BD-LOSS 1.00E+00 BA01A-CBA-K Mission Time T-CBA1-K 6.66E-08 BA01A-CBA-O Probability T-CBA1-O 3.22E-05 BA01A-TM Probability T-BA01A-TM 2.16E-06 BA02A-CBA-E Probability T-CBA1-E 3.87E-04 BA02A-TM Probability T-BA02A-TM 1.39E-05 BA03A-CBA-K Mission Time T-CBA1-K 6.66E-08 BA03A-CBA-O Probability T-CBA1-O 3.22E-05 BB-ACB-F Mission Time T-ACB2-F 2.41E-07 BB01A-CBA-K Mission Time T-CBA1-K 6.66E-08 BB01A-CBA-O Probability T-CBA1-O 3.22E-05 BB01A-TM Probability T-BB01A-TM 5.41E-07 BB02A-CBA-E Probability T-CBA1-E 3.87E-04 BB02A-TM Probability T-BA02A-TM 1.39E-05 BB03A-CBA-K Mission Time T-CBA1-K 6.66E-08 BB03A-CBA-O Probability T-CBA1-O 3.22E-05 BC-ACB-F Mission Time T-ACB2-F 2.41E-07 D7.7 Assessment of new or improved PSA approaches GA N°945121 81 Current BE ID Model Template Probability/ Failure Rate BC01A-CBA-K Mission Time T-CBA1-K 6.66E-08 BC01A-CBA-O Probability T-CBA1-O 3.22E-05 BC01A-TM Probability T-BC01A-TM 3.61E-07 BC02A-CBA-E Probability T-CBA1-E 3.87E-04 BC02A-TM Probability T-BA02A-TM 1.39E-05 BC03A-CBA-K Mission Time T-CBA1-K 6.66E-08 BC03A-CBA-O Probability T-CBA1-O 3.22E-05 BD-ACB-F Mission Time T-ACB2-F 2.41E-07 BD01A-TM Probability T-BD01A-TM 3.61E-07 BD02A-TM Probability T-BA02A-TM 1.39E-05 BL-ACB-F Mission Time T-ACB2-F 2.41E-07 BL01A-CBA-K Mission Time T-CBA1-K 6.66E-08 BM-ACB-F Mission Time T-ACB2-F 2.41E-07 BM01A-CBA-K Mission Time T-CBA1-K 6.66E-08 BP-ACB-F Mission Time T-ACB2-F 2.41E-07 BP01A-CBA-K Mission Time T-CBA1-K 6.66E-08 BT01-TRF-F Mission Time T-TRF4-F 1.98E-05 BT02-TRF-F Mission Time T-TRF4-F 1.98E-05 BU01-TM Probability T-BU01-TM 1.48E-05 BU02-TM Probability T-BU01-TM 1.48E-05 BU03-TM Probability T-BU01-TM 1.48E-05 BU04-TM Probability T-BU01-TM 1.48E-05 BU05-TRF-F Mission Time T-TRF1-F 4.34E-07 BU06-TRF-F Mission Time T-TRF1-F 4.34E-07 BU07-TRF-F Mission Time T-TRF1-F 4.34E-07 BU10-TM Probability T-BU10-TM 6.13E-05 BU14-TRF-F Mission Time T-TRF2-F 7.28E-08 BU15-TRF-F Mission Time T-TRF2-F 7.28E-08 BU16-TRF-F Mission Time T-TRF2-F 7.28E-08 BU19_1-TM Probability T-BU19-TM 2.17E-04 BU19_2-TM Probability T-BU19-TM 2.17E-04 BU21_1-TM Probability T-BU19-TM 2.17E-04 BU21_2-TM Probability T-BU19-TM 2.17E-04 BU22_1-TM Probability T-BU19-TM 2.17E-04 BU22_2-TM Probability T-BU19-TM 2.17E-04 D7.7 Assessment of new or improved PSA approaches GA N°945121 82 Current BE ID Model Template Probability/ Failure Rate BU23-TRF-F Mission Time T-TRF2-F 7.28E-08 BU24-TRF-F Mission Time T-TRF2-F 7.28E-08 BU25-TRF-F Mission Time T-TRF2-F 7.28E-08 BU26-TRF-F Mission Time T-TRF1-F 4.34E-07 BU27-TRF-F Mission Time T-TRF1-F 4.34E-07 BU28-TRF-F Mission Time T-TRF1-F 4.34E-07 BV-5-ACB-F Mission Time T-ACB2-5-F 3.08E-07 BV-ACB-F Mission Time T-ACB2-F 2.41E-07 BV-LOSS Probability BV-LOSS 3.30E-01 BV-TM Probability T-BV-TM 6.85E-06 BV01A-CBA-K Mission Time T-CBA1-K 6.66E-08 BV01A-CBA-O Probability T-CBA1-O 3.22E-05 BV02A-CBA-E Probability T-CBA1-E 3.87E-04 BV07A-CBA-K Mission Time T-CBA1-K 6.66E-08 BV10A-CBA-K Mission Time T-CBA2-K 1.28E-06 BV11A-CBA-K Mission Time T-CBA2-K 1.28E-06 BV16A-CBA-K Mission Time T-CBA1-K 6.66E-08 BW-5-ACB-F Mission Time T-ACB2-5-F 3.08E-07 BW-ACB-F Mission Time T-ACB2-F 2.41E-07 BW-LOSS Probability BW-LOSS 3.33E-01 BW-TM Probability T-BV-TM 6.85E-06 BW01A-CBA-K Mission Time T-CBA1-K 6.66E-08 BW01A-CBA-O Probability T-CBA1-O 3.22E-05 BW02A-CBA-E Probability T-CBA1-E 3.87E-04 BW07A-CBA-K Mission Time T-CBA1-K 6.66E-08 BW10A-CBA-K Mission Time T-CBA2-K 1.28E-06 BW11A-CBA-K Mission Time T-CBA2-K 1.28E-06 BW16A-CBA-K Mission Time T-CBA1-K 6.66E-08 BX-5-ACB-F Mission Time T-ACB2-5-F 3.08E-07 BX-ACB-F Mission Time T-ACB2-F 2.41E-07 BX-LOSS Probability BX-LOSS 3.30E-01 BX-TM Probability T-BV-TM 6.85E-06 BX01A-CBA-K Mission Time T-CBA1-K 6.66E-08 BX01A-CBA-O Probability T-CBA1-O 3.22E-05 BX02A-CBA-E Probability T-CBA1-E 3.87E-04 D7.7 Assessment of new or improved PSA approaches GA N°945121 83 Current BE ID Model Template Probability/ Failure Rate BX07A-CBA-K Mission Time T-CBA1-K 6.66E-08 BX10A-CBA-K Mission Time T-CBA2-K 1.28E-06 BX11A-CBA-K Mission Time T-CBA2-K 1.28E-06 BX16A-CBA-K Mission Time T-CBA1-K 6.66E-08 CU01-ACB-F Mission Time T-ACB1-F 1.14E-06 CU02-ACB-F Mission Time T-ACB1-F 1.14E-06 CU03-ACB-F Mission Time T-ACB1-F 1.14E-06 CV01-ACB-F Mission Time T-ACB1-F 1.14E-06 CV02-ACB-F Mission Time T-ACB1-F 1.14E-06 CW01-ACB-F Mission Time T-ACB1-F 1.14E-06 CW02-ACB-F Mission Time T-ACB1-F 1.14E-06 CX01-ACB-F Mission Time T-ACB1-F 1.14E-06 CX02-ACB-F Mission Time T-ACB1-F 1.14E-06 DU01-RTZ-F Mission Time T-RTZ-F 2.72E-06 DU02-RTZ-F Mission Time T-RTZ-F 2.72E-06 DU03-RTZ-F Mission Time T-RTZ-F 2.72E-06 EA01-BAT-F Mission Time T-BAT1-F 2.11E-06 EA02-BAT-F Mission Time T-BAT1-F 2.11E-06 EA03-BAT-F Mission Time T-BAT1-F 2.11E-06 EA05-BAT-F Mission Time T-BAT2-F 7.03E-07 EE01-DCP-F Mission Time T-DCP-F 5.80E-06 EE02-DCP-F Mission Time T-DCP-F 5.80E-06 EE03-DCP-F Mission Time T-DCP-F 5.80E-06 EE05-DCP-F Mission Time T-DCP-F 5.80E-06 EG-LOSS Probability EG-LOSS 1.00E-06 EQ01-RTF-F Mission Time T-RTF1-F 3.40E-06 EQ05-RTF-F Mission Time T-RTF1-F 3.40E-06 EQ09-RTF-F Mission Time T-RTF1-F 3.40E-06 GV01-5-DGN-R Mission Time T-DGN-5-R 2.03E-04 GV01-DGN-R Mission Time T-DGN-R 2.03E-04 GV01-DGN-S Probability T-DGN-S 7.64E-05 GW01-5-DGN-R Mission Time T-DGN-5-R 2.03E-04 GW01-DGN-R Mission Time T-DGN-R 2.03E-04 GW01-DGN-S Probability T-DGN-S 7.64E-05 GX01-5-DGN-R Mission Time T-DGN-5-R 2.03E-04 D7.7 Assessment of new or improved PSA approaches GA N°945121 84 Current BE ID Model Template Probability/ Failure Rate GX01-DGN-R Mission Time T-DGN-R 2.03E-04 GX01-DGN-S Probability T-DGN-S 7.64E-05 HE-EQ1-T1-1open switchyard-C Probability HEP2-EQ1-T1-1open switchyard-C 2.17E-04 HE-EQ1-T1-1OTH-C Probability HEP2-EQ1-T1-1OTHER-C 2.17E-04 HE-EQ1-T1-1RTS-C Probability HEP2-EQ1-T1-1RTSN-C 2.17E-04 HE-EQ1-T1-2open switchyard-C Probability HEP2-EQ1-T1-2open switchyard-C 1.00E+00 HE-EQ1-T1-2OTH-C Probability HEP2-EQ1-T1-2OTHER-C 1.00E+00 HE-EQ1-T1-2RTS-C Probability HEP2-EQ1-T1-2RTSN-C 1.00E+00 HE-EQ1-T1-3open switchyard-C Probability HEP2-EQ1-T1-3open switchyard-C 5.32E-03 HE-EQ1-T1-3OTH-C Probability HEP2-EQ1-T1-3OTHER-C 5.32E-03 HE-EQ1-T1-3RTS-C Probability HEP2-EQ1-T1-3RTSN-C 5.32E-03 HE-EQ1-T1-ARZ-D Probability HEP2-EQ1-T1-ARZ00-D 2.00E-04 HE-EQ2-T1-1open switchyard-C Probability HEP2-EQ2-T1-1open switchyard-C 2.17E-04 HE-EQ2-T1-1OTH-C Probability HEP2-EQ2-T1-1OTHER-C 2.17E-04 HE-EQ2-T1-1RTS-C Probability HEP2-EQ2-T1-1RTSN-C 2.17E-04 HE-EQ2-T1-2open switchyard-C Probability HEP2-EQ2-T1-2open switchyard-C 1.00E+00 HE-EQ2-T1-2OTH-C Probability HEP2-EQ2-T1-2OTHER-C 1.00E+00 HE-EQ2-T1-2RTS-C Probability HEP2-EQ2-T1-2RTSN-C 1.00E+00 HE-EQ2-T1-3open switchyard-C Probability HEP2-EQ2-T1-3open switchyard-C 5.32E-02 HE-EQ2-T1-3OTH-C Probability HEP2-EQ2-T1-3OTHER-C 5.32E-02 HE-EQ2-T1-3RTS-C Probability HEP2-EQ2-T1-3RTSN-C 5.32E-02 HE-EQ2-T1-ARZ-D Probability HEP2-EQ2-T1-ARZ00-D 2.00E-03 HE-EQ3-T1-1open switchyard-C Probability HEP2-EQ3-T1-1open switchyard-C 2.17E-04 HE-EQ3-T1-1OTH-C Probability HEP2-EQ3-T1-1OTHER-C 2.17E-04 HE-EQ3-T1-1RTS-C Probability HEP2-EQ3-T1-1RTSN-C 2.17E-04 HE-EQ3-T1-2open switchyard-C Probability HEP2-EQ3-T1-2open switchyard-C 1.00E+00 HE-EQ3-T1-2OTH-C Probability HEP2-EQ3-T1-2OTHER-C 1.00E+00 HE-EQ3-T1-2RTS-C Probability HEP2-EQ3-T1-2RTSN-C 1.00E+00 HE-EQ3-T1-3open switchyard-C Probability HEP2-EQ3-T1-3open switchyard-C 5.32E-02 HE-EQ3-T1-3OTH-C Probability HEP2-EQ3-T1-3OTHER-C 5.32E-02 HE-EQ3-T1-3RTS-C Probability HEP2-EQ3-T1-3RTSN-C 5.32E-02 HE-EQ3-T1-ARZ-D Probability HEP2-EQ3-T1-ARZ00-D 2.00E-03 HE-EQ4-T1-1open switchyard-C Probability HEP2-EQ4-T1-1open switchyard-C 6.51E-03 D7.7 Assessment of new or improved PSA approaches GA N°945121 85 Current BE ID Model Template Probability/ Failure Rate HE-EQ4-T1-1OTH-C Probability HEP2-EQ4-T1-1OTHER-C 6.51E-03 HE-EQ4-T1-1RTS-C Probability HEP2-EQ4-T1-1RTSN-C 6.51E-03 HE-EQ4-T1-2open switchyard-C Probability HEP2-EQ4-T1-2open switchyard-C 1.00E+00 HE-EQ4-T1-2OTH-C Probability HEP2-EQ4-T1-2OTHER-C 1.00E+00 HE-EQ4-T1-2RTS-C Probability HEP2-EQ4-T1-2RTSN-C 1.00E+00 HE-EQ4-T1-3open switchyard-C Probability HEP2-EQ4-T1-3open switchyard-C 1.00E+00 HE-EQ4-T1-3OTH-C Probability HEP2-EQ4-T1-3OTHER-C 1.00E+00 HE-EQ4-T1-3RTS-C Probability HEP2-EQ4-T1-3RTSN-C 1.00E+00 HE-EQ4-T1-ARZ-D Probability HEP2-EQ4-T1-ARZ00-D 9.00E-03 HE-EQ5-T1-1open switchyard-C Probability HEP2-EQ5-T1-1open switchyard-C 1.00E+00 HE-EQ5-T1-1OTH-C Probability HEP2-EQ5-T1-1OTHER-C 1.00E+00 HE-EQ5-T1-1RTS-C Probability HEP2-EQ5-T1-1RTSN-C 1.00E+00 HE-EQ5-T1-2open switchyard-C Probability HEP2-EQ5-T1-2open switchyard-C 1.00E+00 HE-EQ5-T1-2OTH-C Probability HEP2-EQ5-T1-2OTHER-C 1.00E+00 HE-EQ5-T1-2RTS-C Probability HEP2-EQ5-T1-2RTSN-C 1.00E+00 HE-EQ5-T1-3open switchyard-C Probability HEP2-EQ5-T1-3open switchyard-C 1.00E+00 HE-EQ5-T1-3OTH-C Probability HEP2-EQ5-T1-3OTHER-C 1.00E+00 HE-EQ5-T1-3RTS-C Probability HEP2-EQ5-T1-3RTSN-C 1.00E+00 HE-EQ5-T1-ARZ-D Probability HEP2-EQ5-T1-ARZ00-D 1.00E+00 HEP2-T1-1open switchyard-C Probability HEP2-T1-1open switchyard-C 2.17E-04 HEP2-T1-1OTHER-C Probability HEP2-T1-1OTHER-C 2.17E-04 HEP2-T1-1RTSN-C Probability HEP2-T1-1RTSN-C 2.17E-04 HEP2-T1-2open switchyard-C Probability HEP2-T1-2open switchyard-C 8.48E-03 HEP2-T1-2OTHER-C Probability HEP2-T1-2OTHER-C 8.48E-03 HEP2-T1-2RTSN-C Probability HEP2-T1-2RTSN-C 8.48E-03 HEP2-T1-3open switchyard-C Probability HEP2-T1-3open switchyard-C 2.66E-03 HEP2-T1-3OTHER-C Probability HEP2-T1-3OTHER-C 2.66E-03 HEP2-T1-3RTSN-C Probability HEP2-T1-3RTSN-C 2.66E-03 HEP2-T1-ARZ00-D Probability HEP2-T1-ARZ00-D 1.00E-04 HG10-RTZ-F Mission Time T-RTZ-F 2.72E-06 HG11-RTZ-F Mission Time T-RTZ-F 2.72E-06 HG14-RTZ-F Mission Time T-RTZ-F 2.72E-06 HG20-RTZ-F Mission Time T-RTZ-F 2.72E-06 D7.7 Assessment of new or improved PSA approaches GA N°945121 86 Current BE ID Model Template Probability/ Failure Rate HG21-RTZ-F Mission Time T-RTZ-F 2.72E-06 HG24-RTZ-F Mission Time T-RTZ-F 2.72E-06 HG30-RTZ-F Mission Time T-RTZ-F 2.72E-06 HG31-RTZ-F Mission Time T-RTZ-F 2.72E-06 HG34-RTZ-F Mission Time T-RTZ-F 2.72E-06 KAG24-KAG-O Probability T-KAG-O 1.13E-02 LV-RTZ-F Mission Time T-RTZ-F 2.72E-06 LW-RTZ-F Mission Time T-RTZ-F 2.72E-06 LX-RTZ-F Mission Time T-RTZ-F 2.72E-06 NPS1-SUP Probability NPS1-SUP 1.00E-06 NPS2-SUP Probability NPS2-SUP 1.00E-06 NPS3-SUP Probability NPS3-SUP 1.00E-06 Q1-POS-00 Frequency Q1-POS-00 4.66E-04 Q1-S1 Probability Q1-S1 2.56E-04 Q1-S2 Probability Q1-S2 4.49E-05 Q1-S3 Probability Q1-S3 6.39E-05 Q2-POS-00 Frequency Q2-POS-00 8.03E-05 Q2-S1 Probability Q2-S1 2.90E-02 Q2-S2 Probability Q2-S2 3.46E-03 Q2-S3 Probability Q2-S3 7.26E-03 Q3-POS-00 Frequency Q3-POS-00 5.42E-05 Q3-S1 Probability Q3-S1 6.81E-02 Q3-S2 Probability Q3-S2 7.86E-03 Q3-S3 Probability Q3-S3 1.70E-02 Q4-POS-00 Frequency Q4-POS-00 2.00E-05 Q4-S1 Probability Q4-S1 3.30E-01 Q4-S2 Probability Q4-S2 4.42E-02 Q4-S3 Probability Q4-S3 9.54E-02 Q5-POS-00 Frequency Q5-POS-00 7.95E-08 Q5-S1 Probability Q5-S1 9.67E-01 Q5-S2 Probability Q5-S2 8.82E-01 Q5-S3 Probability Q5-S3 9.67E-01 QF11D01-MDP-R Mission Time T-MDP12-R 3.89E-07 QF11D01-MDP-S Probability T-MDP12-S 1.52E-04 QF11D01-SB Probability QF11D01-SB 5.00E-01 D7.7 Assessment of new or improved PSA approaches GA N°945121 87 Current BE ID Model Template Probability/ Failure Rate QF11D02-MDP-R Mission Time T-MDP12-R 3.89E-07 QF11D02-MDP-S Probability T-MDP12-S 1.52E-04 QF11D02-SB Probability QF11D02-SB 5.00E-01 QF11N01-BST-Q Mission Time T-BST1-Q 2.34E-07 QF11S04-MOV-D Mission Time T-MOV11-D 3.10E-08 QF11S05-MOV-D Mission Time T-MOV11-D 3.10E-08 QF11S06-CKV-E Probability T-CKV5-E 5.09E-04 QF11S06-CKV-O Probability T-CKV5-O 3.81E-04 QF11S07-MOV-D Mission Time T-MOV15-D 1.85E-08 QF11S07-MOV-O Probability T-MOV15-O 6.44E-04 QF11S08-CKV-E Probability T-CKV5-E 5.09E-04 QF11S08-CKV-O Probability T-CKV5-O 3.81E-04 QF11S09-MOV-D Mission Time T-MOV15-D 1.85E-08 QF11S09-MOV-O Probability T-MOV15-O 6.44E-04 QF21D01-MDP-R Mission Time T-MDP12-R 3.89E-07 QF21D01-MDP-S Probability T-MDP12-S 1.52E-04 QF21D01-SB Probability QF21D01-SB 5.00E-01 QF21D02-MDP-R Mission Time T-MDP12-R 3.89E-07 QF21D02-MDP-S Probability T-MDP12-S 1.52E-04 QF21D02-SB Probability QF21D02-SB 5.00E-01 QF21N01-BST-Q Mission Time T-BST1-Q 2.34E-07 QF21S04-MOV-D Mission Time T-MOV11-D 3.10E-08 QF21S05-MOV-D Mission Time T-MOV11-D 3.10E-08 QF21S06-CKV-E Probability T-CKV5-E 5.09E-04 QF21S06-CKV-O Probability T-CKV5-O 3.81E-04 QF21S07-MOV-D Mission Time T-MOV15-D 1.85E-08 QF21S07-MOV-O Probability T-MOV15-O 6.44E-04 QF21S08-CKV-E Probability T-CKV5-E 5.09E-04 QF21S08-CKV-O Probability T-CKV5-O 3.81E-04 QF21S09-MOV-D Mission Time T-MOV15-D 1.85E-08 QF21S09-MOV-O Probability T-MOV15-O 6.44E-04 QF31D01-MDP-R Mission Time T-MDP12-R 3.89E-07 QF31D01-MDP-S Probability T-MDP12-S 1.52E-04 QF31D01-SB Probability QF31D01-SB 5.00E-01 QF31D02-MDP-R Mission Time T-MDP12-R 3.89E-07 D7.7 Assessment of new or improved PSA approaches GA N°945121 94 Current BE ID Model Template Probability/ Failure Rate YT13S01-MOV-E Probability T-MOV1-E 2.06E-04 YT13S02-MOV-D Mission Time T-MOV1-D 5.97E-08 YT13S02-MOV-E Probability T-MOV1-E 2.06E-04 YT13S03-CKV-O Probability T-CKV2-O 9.30E-05 YT13S04-CKV-O Probability T-CKV2-O 9.30E-05 YT13Z01-PIP-T Probability YT13Z01-PIP-T 9.70E-05 YT14-TM Probability T-YT00-TM 2.06E-03 YT14S01-MOV-D Mission Time T-MOV1-D 5.97E-08 YT14S01-MOV-E Probability T-MOV1-E 2.06E-04 YT14S02-MOV-D Mission Time T-MOV1-D 5.97E-08 YT14S02-MOV-E Probability T-MOV1-E 2.06E-04 YT14S03-CKV-O Probability T-CKV2-O 9.30E-05 YT14S04-CKV-O Probability T-CKV2-O 9.30E-05 YT14Z01-PIP-T Probability YT14Z01-PIP-T 2.58E-02 YZ-100-SUP Probability T-YZ-000 1.71E-04 YZ-200-SUP Probability T-YZ-000 1.71E-04 YZ-300-SUP Probability T-YZ-000 1.71E-04 Reliability Parameters for Systems Interfaces failures A list of Systems Interfaces and their parameters was used in accordance with the seismic PSA of ZNPP Unit 1 /ZNPP 2019/. In this project, basic events (BEs) representing pipeline ruptures/leaks were incorporated, which, as a result of seismic impacts, influence the quantitative CDF calculation results. Current BE ID Model Template Probability/ Failure Rate EQ-1-ACB2-P2040 Probability EQ-1-ACB2-P2040 2.36E-08 EQ-1-BAT1-P1320 Probability EQ-1-BAT1-P1320 6.73E-08 EQ-1-BU26-TRF Probability EQ-1-TRF1-P2040 2.59E-08 EQ-1-BU27-TRF Probability EQ-1-TRF1-P2040 2.59E-08 EQ-1-BU28-TRF Probability EQ-1-TRF1-P2040 2.59E-08 EQ-1-CBA2-P2040 Probability EQ-1-CBA2-P2040 2.36E-08 EQ-1-CC1-D Probability EQ-1-CC1-D 6.36E-09 D7.7 Assessment of new or improved PSA approaches GA N°945121 95 Current BE ID Model Template Probability/ Failure Rate EQ-1-CC2-D Probability EQ-1-CC2-D 6.36E-09 EQ-1-CC3-D Probability EQ-1-CC3-D 6.36E-09 EQ-1-CHV6-P2460 Probability EQ-1-CHV6-P2460 6.36E-09 EQ-1-CKV2-P1320 Probability EQ-1-CKV2-P1320 8.33E-08 EQ-1-CKV2-P1920 Probability EQ-1-CKV2-P1920 8.33E-08 EQ-1-CKV2-P2300 Probability EQ-1-CKV2-P2300 8.33E-08 EQ-1-CKV3-P1320 Probability EQ-1-CKV3-P1320 8.33E-08 EQ-1-CV02-ACB Probability EQ-1-ACB2-P2040 2.36E-08 EQ-1-CW02-ACB Probability EQ-1-ACB2-P2040 2.36E-08 EQ-1-CX02-ACB Probability EQ-1-ACB2-P2040 2.36E-08 EQ-1-DCP-P2040 Probability EQ-1-DCP-P2040 2.36E-08 EQ-1-DGB-C1-D Probability EQ-1-DGB-C1-D 9.97E-15 EQ-1-DGB-C2-C3-D Probability EQ-1-DGB-C2-C3-D 9.97E-15 EQ-1-DGN1-P0 Probability EQ-1-DGN1-P0 1.42E-05 EQ-1-DGN2-P0 Probability EQ-1-DGN2-P0 6.36E-09 EQ-1-DGN3-P0 Probability EQ-1-DGN3-P0 1.42E-05 EQ-1-L-RO-DG-D Probability EQ-1-L-RO-DG-D 6.36E-09 EQ-1-MOV1-P1320 Probability EQ-1-MOV1-P1320 8.33E-08 EQ-1-MOV1-P1920 Probability EQ-1-MOV1-P1920 8.33E-08 EQ-1-MOV1-P2300 Probability EQ-1-MOV1-P2300 8.33E-08 EQ-1-MOV2-P1320 Probability EQ-1-MOV2-P1320 8.33E-08 EQ-1-PIPE-DG1 Probability EQ-1-PIPE-DG1 1.08E-05 EQ-1-PIPE-DG2 Probability EQ-1-PIPE-DG2 8.08E-06 EQ-1-PIPE-DG3 Probability EQ-1-PIPE-DG3 8.08E-06 EQ-1-QF-PMSM Probability EQ-1-QF-PMSM 8.29E-04 EQ-1-RCL-P2460 Probability EQ-1-RCL-P2460 2.29E-07 EQ-1-RTF1-P2040 Probability EQ-1-RTF1-P2040 6.73E-08 D7.7 Assessment of new or improved PSA approaches GA N°945121 96 Current BE ID Model Template Probability/ Failure Rate EQ-1-RTZ-P1320 Probability EQ-1-RTZ-P1320 6.36E-09 EQ-1-SDS-P1320 Probability EQ-1-SDS-P1320 6.36E-09 EQ-1-SP-D Probability EQ-1-SP-D 2.31E-06 EQ-1-TQ11-168 Probability EQ-1-TQ11-168 3.73E-05 EQ-1-TQ13-061 Probability EQ-1-TQ13-061 7.72E-07 EQ-1-TQ13-064 Probability EQ-1-TQ13-064 7.72E-07 EQ-1-TQ13-067 Probability EQ-1-TQ13-067 7.72E-07 EQ-1-TQ13-079 Probability EQ-1-TQ13-079 7.72E-07 EQ-1-TQ23-062 Probability EQ-1-TQ23-062 1.08E-05 EQ-1-TQ23-065 Probability EQ-1-TQ23-065 1.08E-05 EQ-1-TQ23-068 Probability EQ-1-TQ23-068 1.08E-05 EQ-1-TQ23-080 Probability EQ-1-TQ23-080 1.08E-05 EQ-1-TQ33-063 Probability EQ-1-TQ33-063 5.83E-08 EQ-1-TQ33-066 Probability EQ-1-TQ33-066 5.83E-08 EQ-1-TQ33-069 Probability EQ-1-TQ33-069 5.83E-08 EQ-1-TQ33-081 Probability EQ-1-TQ33-081 5.83E-08 EQ-1-TRF1-P2040 Probability EQ-1-TRF1-P2040 2.59E-08 EQ-1-TRF2-P2040 Probability EQ-1-TRF2-P2040 2.59E-08 EQ-1-VF10-211 Probability EQ-1-VF10-211 1.08E-05 EQ-1-VF10-214 Probability EQ-1-VF10-214 1.08E-05 EQ-1-VF10-223 Probability EQ-1-VF10-223 1.08E-05 EQ-1-VF20-212 Probability EQ-1-VF20-212 1.08E-05 EQ-1-VF20-215 Probability EQ-1-VF20-215 1.08E-05 EQ-1-VF20-224 Probability EQ-1-VF20-224 1.08E-05 EQ-1-VF30-213 Probability EQ-1-VF30-213 1.08E-05 EQ-1-VF30-216 Probability EQ-1-VF30-216 1.08E-05 EQ-1-VF30-225 Probability EQ-1-VF30-225 1.08E-05 D7.7 Assessment of new or improved PSA approaches GA N°945121 97 Current BE ID Model Template Probability/ Failure Rate EQ-1-YT11-005 Probability EQ-1-YT11-005 7.31E-05 EQ-1-YT12-006 Probability EQ-1-YT12-006 7.31E-05 EQ-1-YT13-007 Probability EQ-1-YT13-007 7.31E-05 EQ-1-YT14-008 Probability EQ-1-YT14-008 7.31E-05 EQ-1-YZ Probability EQ-1-YZ 3.39E-04 EQ-2-ACB2-P2040 Probability EQ-2-ACB2-P2040 3.78E-05 EQ-2-BAT1-P1320 Probability EQ-2-BAT1-P1320 8.20E-05 EQ-2-BU26-TRF Probability EQ-2-TRF1-P2040 3.16E-05 EQ-2-BU27-TRF Probability EQ-2-TRF1-P2040 3.16E-05 EQ-2-BU28-TRF Probability EQ-2-TRF1-P2040 3.16E-05 EQ-2-CBA2-P2040 Probability EQ-2-CBA2-P2040 3.78E-05 EQ-2-CC1-D Probability EQ-2-CC1-D 1.42E-05 EQ-2-CC2-D Probability EQ-2-CC2-D 1.42E-05 EQ-2-CC3-D Probability EQ-2-CC3-D 1.42E-05 EQ-2-CHV6-P2460 Probability EQ-2-CHV6-P2460 1.42E-05 EQ-2-CKV2-P1320 Probability EQ-2-CKV2-P1320 2.09E-05 EQ-2-CKV2-P1920 Probability EQ-2-CKV2-P1920 2.09E-05 EQ-2-CKV2-P2300 Probability EQ-2-CKV2-P2300 2.09E-05 EQ-2-CKV3-P1320 Probability EQ-2-CKV3-P1320 2.09E-05 EQ-2-CV02-ACB Probability EQ-2-ACB2-P2040 3.78E-05 EQ-2-CW02-ACB Probability EQ-2-ACB2-P2040 3.78E-05 EQ-2-CX02-ACB Probability EQ-2-ACB2-P2040 3.78E-05 EQ-2-DCP-P2040 Probability EQ-2-DCP-P2040 3.78E-05 EQ-2-DGB-C1-D Probability EQ-2-DGB-C1-D 2.13E-09 EQ-2-DGB-C2-C3-D Probability EQ-2-DGB-C2-C3-D 2.13E-09 EQ-2-DGN1-P0 Probability EQ-2-DGN1-P0 3.65E-03 EQ-2-DGN2-P0 Probability EQ-2-DGN2-P0 1.42E-05 D7.7 Assessment of new or improved PSA approaches GA N°945121 98 Current BE ID Model Template Probability/ Failure Rate EQ-2-DGN3-P0 Probability EQ-2-DGN3-P0 3.65E-03 EQ-2-L-RO-DG-D Probability EQ-2-L-RO-DG-D 1.42E-05 EQ-2-MOV1-P1320 Probability EQ-2-MOV1-P1320 2.09E-05 EQ-2-MOV1-P1920 Probability EQ-2-MOV1-P1920 2.09E-05 EQ-2-MOV1-P2300 Probability EQ-2-MOV1-P2300 2.09E-05 EQ-2-MOV2-P1320 Probability EQ-2-MOV2-P1320 2.09E-05 EQ-2-PIPE-DG1 Probability EQ-2-PIPE-DG1 1.11E-03 EQ-2-PIPE-DG2 Probability EQ-2-PIPE-DG2 8.94E-04 EQ-2-PIPE-DG3 Probability EQ-2-PIPE-DG3 8.94E-04 EQ-2-QF-PMSM Probability EQ-2-QF-PMSM 1.48E-01 EQ-2-RCL-P2460 Probability EQ-2-RCL-P2460 1.28E-04 EQ-2-RTF1-P2040 Probability EQ-2-RTF1-P2040 8.20E-05 EQ-2-RTZ-P1320 Probability EQ-2-RTZ-P1320 1.42E-05 EQ-2-SDS-P1320 Probability EQ-2-SDS-P1320 1.42E-05 EQ-2-SP-D Probability EQ-2-SP-D 1.04E-03 EQ-2-TQ11-168 Probability EQ-2-TQ11-168 2.78E-03 EQ-2-TQ13-061 Probability EQ-2-TQ13-061 1.49E-04 EQ-2-TQ13-064 Probability EQ-2-TQ13-064 1.49E-04 EQ-2-TQ13-067 Probability EQ-2-TQ13-067 1.49E-04 EQ-2-TQ13-079 Probability EQ-2-TQ13-079 1.49E-04 EQ-2-TQ23-062 Probability EQ-2-TQ23-062 1.11E-03 EQ-2-TQ23-065 Probability EQ-2-TQ23-065 1.11E-03 EQ-2-TQ23-068 Probability EQ-2-TQ23-068 1.11E-03 EQ-2-TQ23-080 Probability EQ-2-TQ23-080 1.11E-03 EQ-2-TQ33-063 Probability EQ-2-TQ33-063 1.98E-05 EQ-2-TQ33-066 Probability EQ-2-TQ33-066 1.98E-05 EQ-2-TQ33-069 Probability EQ-2-TQ33-069 1.98E-05 D7.7 Assessment of new or improved PSA approaches GA N°945121 99 Current BE ID Model Template Probability/ Failure Rate EQ-2-TQ33-081 Probability EQ-2-TQ33-081 1.98E-05 EQ-2-TRF1-P2040 Probability EQ-2-TRF1-P2040 3.16E-05 EQ-2-TRF2-P2040 Probability EQ-2-TRF2-P2040 3.16E-05 EQ-2-VF10-211 Probability EQ-2-VF10-211 1.11E-03 EQ-2-VF10-214 Probability EQ-2-VF10-214 1.11E-03 EQ-2-VF10-223 Probability EQ-2-VF10-223 1.11E-03 EQ-2-VF20-212 Probability EQ-2-VF20-212 1.11E-03 EQ-2-VF20-215 Probability EQ-2-VF20-215 1.11E-03 EQ-2-VF20-224 Probability EQ-2-VF20-224 1.11E-03 EQ-2-VF30-213 Probability EQ-2-VF30-213 1.11E-03 EQ-2-VF30-216 Probability EQ-2-VF30-216 1.11E-03 EQ-2-VF30-225 Probability EQ-2-VF30-225 1.11E-03 EQ-2-YT11-005 Probability EQ-2-YT11-005 4.54E-03 EQ-2-YT12-006 Probability EQ-2-YT12-006 4.54E-03 EQ-2-YT13-007 Probability EQ-2-YT13-007 4.54E-03 EQ-2-YT14-008 Probability EQ-2-YT14-008 4.54E-03 EQ-2-YZ Probability EQ-2-YZ 1.54E-02 EQ-3-ACB2-P2040 Probability EQ-3-ACB2-P2040 1.56E-04 EQ-3-BAT1-P1320 Probability EQ-3-BAT1-P1320 3.17E-04 EQ-3-BU26-TRF Probability EQ-3-TRF1-P2040 1.25E-04 EQ-3-BU27-TRF Probability EQ-3-TRF1-P2040 1.25E-04 EQ-3-BU28-TRF Probability EQ-3-TRF1-P2040 1.25E-04 EQ-3-CBA2-P2040 Probability EQ-3-CBA2-P2040 1.56E-04 EQ-3-CC1-D Probability EQ-3-CC1-D 6.31E-05 EQ-3-CC2-D Probability EQ-3-CC2-D 6.31E-05 EQ-3-CC3-D Probability EQ-3-CC3-D 6.31E-05 EQ-3-CHV6-P2460 Probability EQ-3-CHV6-P2460 6.31E-05 D7.7 Assessment of new or improved PSA approaches GA N°945121 100 Current BE ID Model Template Probability/ Failure Rate EQ-3-CKV2-P1320 Probability EQ-3-CKV2-P1320 6.37E-05 EQ-3-CKV2-P1920 Probability EQ-3-CKV2-P1920 6.37E-05 EQ-3-CKV2-P2300 Probability EQ-3-CKV2-P2300 6.37E-05 EQ-3-CKV3-P1320 Probability EQ-3-CKV3-P1320 6.37E-05 EQ-3-CV02-ACB Probability EQ-3-ACB2-P2040 1.56E-04 EQ-3-CW02-ACB Probability EQ-3-ACB2-P2040 1.56E-04 EQ-3-CX02-ACB Probability EQ-3-ACB2-P2040 1.56E-04 EQ-3-DCP-P2040 Probability EQ-3-DCP-P2040 1.56E-04 EQ-3-DGB-C1-D Probability EQ-3-DGB-C1-D 2.42E-08 EQ-3-DGB-C2-C3-D Probability EQ-3-DGB-C2-C3-D 2.42E-08 EQ-3-DGN1-P0 Probability EQ-3-DGN1-P0 9.90E-03 EQ-3-DGN2-P0 Probability EQ-3-DGN2-P0 6.31E-05 EQ-3-DGN3-P0 Probability EQ-3-DGN3-P0 9.90E-03 EQ-3-L-RO-DG-D Probability EQ-3-L-RO-DG-D 6.31E-05 EQ-3-MOV1-P1320 Probability EQ-3-MOV1-P1320 6.37E-05 EQ-3-MOV1-P1920 Probability EQ-3-MOV1-P1920 6.37E-05 EQ-3-MOV1-P2300 Probability EQ-3-MOV1-P2300 6.37E-05 EQ-3-MOV2-P1320 Probability EQ-3-MOV2-P1320 6.37E-05 EQ-3-PIPE-DG1 Probability EQ-3-PIPE-DG1 2.72E-03 EQ-3-PIPE-DG2 Probability EQ-3-PIPE-DG2 2.22E-03 EQ-3-PIPE-DG3 Probability EQ-3-PIPE-DG3 2.22E-03 EQ-3-QF-PMSM Probability EQ-3-QF-PMSM 2.90E-01 EQ-3-RCL-P2460 Probability EQ-3-RCL-P2460 4.32E-04 EQ-3-RTF1-P2040 Probability EQ-3-RTF1-P2040 3.17E-04 EQ-3-RTZ-P1320 Probability EQ-3-RTZ-P1320 6.31E-05 EQ-3-SDS-P1320 Probability EQ-3-SDS-P1320 6.31E-05 EQ-3-SP-D Probability EQ-3-SP-D 3.21E-03 D7.7 Assessment of new or improved PSA approaches GA N°945121 101 Current BE ID Model Template Probability/ Failure Rate EQ-3-TQ11-168 Probability EQ-3-TQ11-168 6.33E-03 EQ-3-TQ13-061 Probability EQ-3-TQ13-061 4.22E-04 EQ-3-TQ13-064 Probability EQ-3-TQ13-064 4.22E-04 EQ-3-TQ13-067 Probability EQ-3-TQ13-067 4.22E-04 EQ-3-TQ13-079 Probability EQ-3-TQ13-079 4.22E-04 EQ-3-TQ23-062 Probability EQ-3-TQ23-062 2.72E-03 EQ-3-TQ23-065 Probability EQ-3-TQ23-065 2.72E-03 EQ-3-TQ23-068 Probability EQ-3-TQ23-068 2.72E-03 EQ-3-TQ23-080 Probability EQ-3-TQ23-080 2.72E-03 EQ-3-TQ33-063 Probability EQ-3-TQ33-063 6.37E-05 EQ-3-TQ33-066 Probability EQ-3-TQ33-066 6.37E-05 EQ-3-TQ33-069 Probability EQ-3-TQ33-069 6.37E-05 EQ-3-TQ33-081 Probability EQ-3-TQ33-081 6.37E-05 EQ-3-TRF1-P2040 Probability EQ-3-TRF1-P2040 1.25E-04 EQ-3-TRF2-P2040 Probability EQ-3-TRF2-P2040 1.25E-04 EQ-3-VF10-211 Probability EQ-3-VF10-211 2.72E-03 EQ-3-VF10-214 Probability EQ-3-VF10-214 2.72E-03 EQ-3-VF10-223 Probability EQ-3-VF10-223 2.72E-03 EQ-3-VF20-212 Probability EQ-3-VF20-212 2.72E-03 EQ-3-VF20-215 Probability EQ-3-VF20-215 2.72E-03 EQ-3-VF20-224 Probability EQ-3-VF20-224 2.72E-03 EQ-3-VF30-213 Probability EQ-3-VF30-213 2.72E-03 EQ-3-VF30-216 Probability EQ-3-VF30-216 2.72E-03 EQ-3-VF30-225 Probability EQ-3-VF30-225 2.72E-03 EQ-3-YT11-005 Probability EQ-3-YT11-005 9.90E-03 EQ-3-YT12-006 Probability EQ-3-YT12-006 9.90E-03 EQ-3-YT13-007 Probability EQ-3-YT13-007 9.90E-03 D7.7 Assessment of new or improved PSA approaches GA N°945121 102 Current BE ID Model Template Probability/ Failure Rate EQ-3-YT14-008 Probability EQ-3-YT14-008 9.90E-03 EQ-3-YZ Probability EQ-3-YZ 3.07E-02 EQ-4-ACB2-P2040 Probability EQ-4-ACB2-P2040 3.21E-03 EQ-4-BAT1-P1320 Probability EQ-4-BAT1-P1320 5.59E-03 EQ-4-BU26-TRF Probability EQ-4-TRF1-P2040 2.42E-03 EQ-4-BU27-TRF Probability EQ-4-TRF1-P2040 2.42E-03 EQ-4-BU28-TRF Probability EQ-4-TRF1-P2040 2.42E-03 EQ-4-CBA2-P2040 Probability EQ-4-CBA2-P2040 3.21E-03 EQ-4-CC1-D Probability EQ-4-CC1-D 1.57E-03 EQ-4-CC2-D Probability EQ-4-CC2-D 1.57E-03 EQ-4-CC3-D Probability EQ-4-CC3-D 1.57E-03 EQ-4-CHV6-P2460 Probability EQ-4-CHV6-P2460 1.57E-03 EQ-4-CKV2-P1320 Probability EQ-4-CKV2-P1320 7.70E-04 EQ-4-CKV2-P1920 Probability EQ-4-CKV2-P1920 7.70E-04 EQ-4-CKV2-P2300 Probability EQ-4-CKV2-P2300 7.70E-04 EQ-4-CKV3-P1320 Probability EQ-4-CKV3-P1320 7.70E-04 EQ-4-CV02-ACB Probability EQ-4-ACB2-P2040 3.21E-03 EQ-4-CW02-ACB Probability EQ-4-ACB2-P2040 3.21E-03 EQ-4-CX02-ACB Probability EQ-4-ACB2-P2040 3.21E-03 EQ-4-DCP-P2040 Probability EQ-4-DCP-P2040 3.21E-03 EQ-4-DGB-C1-D Probability EQ-4-DGB-C1-D 5.00E-06 EQ-4-DGB-C2-C3-D Probability EQ-4-DGB-C2-C3-D 5.00E-06 EQ-4-DGN1-P0 Probability EQ-4-DGN1-P0 7.35E-02 EQ-4-DGN2-P0 Probability EQ-4-DGN2-P0 1.57E-03 EQ-4-DGN3-P0 Probability EQ-4-DGN3-P0 7.35E-02 EQ-4-L-RO-DG-D Probability EQ-4-L-RO-DG-D 1.57E-03 EQ-4-MOV1-P1320 Probability EQ-4-MOV1-P1320 7.70E-04 D7.7 Assessment of new or improved PSA approaches GA N°945121 103 Current BE ID Model Template Probability/ Failure Rate EQ-4-MOV1-P1920 Probability EQ-4-MOV1-P1920 7.70E-04 EQ-4-MOV1-P2300 Probability EQ-4-MOV1-P2300 7.70E-04 EQ-4-MOV2-P1320 Probability EQ-4-MOV2-P1320 7.70E-04 EQ-4-PIPE-DG1 Probability EQ-4-PIPE-DG1 1.86E-02 EQ-4-PIPE-DG2 Probability EQ-4-PIPE-DG2 1.58E-02 EQ-4-PIPE-DG3 Probability EQ-4-PIPE-DG3 1.58E-02 EQ-4-QF-PMSM Probability EQ-4-QF-PMSM 7.51E-01 EQ-4-RCL-P2460 Probability EQ-4-RCL-P2460 5.86E-03 EQ-4-RTF1-P2040 Probability EQ-4-RTF1-P2040 5.59E-03 EQ-4-RTZ-P1320 Probability EQ-4-RTZ-P1320 1.57E-03 EQ-4-SDS-P1320 Probability EQ-4-SDS-P1320 1.57E-03 EQ-4-SP-D Probability EQ-4-SP-D 3.25E-02 EQ-4-TQ11-168 Probability EQ-4-TQ11-168 3.61E-02 EQ-4-TQ13-061 Probability EQ-4-TQ13-061 4.11E-03 EQ-4-TQ13-064 Probability EQ-4-TQ13-064 4.11E-03 EQ-4-TQ13-067 Probability EQ-4-TQ13-067 4.11E-03 EQ-4-TQ13-079 Probability EQ-4-TQ13-079 4.11E-03 EQ-4-TQ23-062 Probability EQ-4-TQ23-062 1.86E-02 EQ-4-TQ23-065 Probability EQ-4-TQ23-065 1.86E-02 EQ-4-TQ23-068 Probability EQ-4-TQ23-068 1.86E-02 EQ-4-TQ23-080 Probability EQ-4-TQ23-080 1.86E-02 EQ-4-TQ33-063 Probability EQ-4-TQ33-063 8.56E-04 EQ-4-TQ33-066 Probability EQ-4-TQ33-066 8.56E-04 EQ-4-TQ33-069 Probability EQ-4-TQ33-069 8.56E-04 EQ-4-TQ33-081 Probability EQ-4-TQ33-081 8.56E-04 EQ-4-TRF1-P2040 Probability EQ-4-TRF1-P2040 2.42E-03 EQ-4-TRF2-P2040 Probability EQ-4-TRF2-P2040 2.42E-03