ROLE OF THE ORTHODOX CHURCH IN CENTRAL ASIAN POLITICS

SCIENCE AND INNOVATION INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC JOURNAL VOLUME 4 ISSUE 11 NOVEMBER 2025 ISSN: 2181-3337 | SCIENTISTS.UZ 38 ROLE OF THE ORTHODOX CHURCH IN CENTRAL ASIAN POLITICS S.E. Atadjanova Acting Associate Professor of Tashkent Architecture and Construction University https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.17852363 Abstract. The article discusses territorial expansion not only as a military invasion, but also as a process of spreading Orthodox spirituality. It examines the formation of a political concept expressed by the slogan “Orthodoxy – the soul of civilization.” The Russian government, integrating Central Asia into its sphere for strategic, economic, military, and ideological reasons, chose a path of “moral justification” of this process through Orthodox missionary methods. The establishment of the Turkestan Governor-Generalship (1867) and the development of religious policy. Keywords: politics, religion, Orthodoxy, church, education, enlightenment, expansion, religious policy, “Orthodox civilization,” Turkestan diocese, Jadidism. Introduction The second half of the 19th century entered the history of the Russian Empire as the “Era of Cultural Expansion.” From the 1860s, the empire began to interpret its territorial expansion not only as a military invasion but also as the spread of Orthodox spirituality. The political concept that emerged during this period was expressed by the slogan “Orthodoxy — the soul of civilization.” The Russian government, incorporating Central Asia into its orbit from strategic, economic, military, and ideological perspectives, chose the path of “moral justification” using Orthodox missionary tools (Rittikh, 1898; Werth, 2014). The Orthodox Church, in turn, functioned as the “spiritual mechanism” of this policy. Simultaneously with the establishment of the Turkestan Governor-Generalship (1867), a religious policy also began to take form. In an 1870 letter, Governor-General K. P. Kaufman wrote: “Wherever a flag rises, the dome of a church must rise as well.” This expressed the idea of morally reinforcing political expansion. In 1871, the Turkestan diocese was established in Tashkent. It became not only a religious center but also an institution supporting imperial policy at the local level. The diocese was headed by Archbishop Innokentiy (Smirnov). He founded a diocesan printing house in 1873 and began publishing the “Turkestan Diocesan News.” Between 1871 and 1914 the structure of the diocese included: – 14 churches (Tashkent, Samarkand, Andijan, Kokand, Margilan); – 3 monasteries (Holy Dormition in Tashkent, Pokrovsky in Samarkand, Nikolayevsky in Ferghana); – 18 church schools, including 4 for women; – A missionary bureau and a department for military clergy; – A diocesan charitable society operating printing and publishing activities. SCIENCE AND INNOVATION INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC JOURNAL VOLUME 4 ISSUE 11 NOVEMBER 2025 ISSN: 2181-3337 | SCIENTISTS.UZ 39 This system carried out not only religious governance but also social control. The Russian Empire viewed missionary work as a form of spreading “Orthodox civilization.” This was an early form of “soft power” in the 19th century. Russian statesman A. F. Rittikh wrote in his 1898 work «The Eastern Question»: “The Church is Russia’s invisible border. It advances with faith, not with weapons.” [1] There were two main directions of missionary work in Central Asia: 1. Confessional — promotion of Orthodoxy and construction of churches; 2. Educational — teaching Russian language, literature, and history in religious schools. Thus, Orthodoxy was spread as “imperial morality.” At first, Muslims of Central Asia paid little attention to Orthodox policy. But from the 1890s, the expansion of missionary activity, the increase in Russian schools, and church penetration into the administrative system created concern among the Jadids. Mahmudkhodja Behbudi wrote in the journal «Мirror» in 1913: “It is unnecessary to close our madrasas. They simply lose competition to the church schools where our children do not study.” Missionary policy became a catalyst for local spiritual revival — i.e., the jadid movement. Table (Graph 1) is based on official reports on the activities of the Turkestan diocese (RIA, collection 821, file 53; Turkestan collection, 1890 -1915) Graph 1. The growth of Orthodox churches and educational centers between 1871 and 1914 Year Number of parishes Number of schools Priests learner (local) 1871 4 2 15 30 1885 12 7 34 180 1895 26 11 52 420 1905 37 15 64 680 1914 42 18 73 850 Source: RIA, collection 821; Turkestan Diocesan Gazette, No. 24 (1914). Analysis: – Over 43 years the number of churches increased tenfold, schools ninefold. – Over 70% of the clergy were sent from central Russian dioceses. – Local children (Uzbeks, Tajiks, Kazakhs) made up 12% of students by 1914. These figures indicate that missionary policy left a deep social imprint. The boundary between state administration and church activity was practically erased. The “Missionary Department” under the Turkestan Governor-General acted more as a political body than a religious one. In 1902, Archbishop Innokentiy wrote in a confidential letter to General N. I. Grodekov: “Our schools are protected by the government, not the Church. Therefore, they teach not Orthodox faith but Russian obedience.” (RIA, collection 821, op. 2, d. 61, l. 17) This circumstance turned the Orthodox Church into an ideological department of the empire’s sociopolitical apparatus. At the turn of the 20th century, the role of the Russian Orthodox Church in Central Asia became less religious and more ideological and sociocultural. It attempted to morally justify colonialism by “sanctifying” imperial policy. [2] Missionary activity in the Turkestan region expanded across five major zones: Tashkent, Samarkand, Ferghana, Semirechye, and the Caspian region. Graph 2 illustrates this expansion. SCIENCE AND INNOVATION INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC JOURNAL VOLUME 4 ISSUE 11 NOVEMBER 2025 ISSN: 2181-3337 | SCIENTISTS.UZ 40 Graph 2. Dynamics of territorial expansion of Orthodox missionary centers (1871-1914) Year Tashkent Samarkan d Ferghana Semirechy e Caspian region Total number of centers 1871 2 – – – – 2 1880 4 1 1 – – 6 1890 5 2 2 1 1 11 1900 7 3 3 2 1 16 1914 8 4 4 3 2 21 Source: RIA, collection 821, OP. 2, d. 46; Turkestan diocesan news (1905-1914). The data presented shows that between 1871 and 1914, the number of Orthodox missionary centers increased more than tenfold. This growth accelerated particularly between 1890 and 1905—the period when the Russian Empire's policy of cultural assimilation was most active. By 1914, 850 students were studying in Orthodox theological schools in the Turkestan region, 102 of whom were of indigenous origin (Turkestan Collection, No. 24, 1914). Although this figure initially seemed low, in a historical context it was interpreted as a strategic achievement for Russia: "the process of assimilating Orthodoxy had begun" (Ostroumov, 1902, p. 61). Subjects taught in Orthodox schools included: – History of the Qur’an and Islam (in comparative, apologetic form); – Scripture (Orthodox); – Russian language, history, mathematics, natural sciences; – Practical training in “Christian culture.” This curriculum reflected mechanisms of missionary “moral control.” Historical statistics on the number of Muslims who converted to Orthodoxy in the Turkestan region vary from source to source. According to the cited data in the RIA archives (fond 821, OP. 2, d. 71), between 1871 and 1914, a total of 410 people were registered as "converted to the Orthodox faith." But the veracity of these figures has been questioned by historians. Paul Werth (2014) argues that these reforms were "more administrative than legal". In most cases, people changed religion to avoid taxes or military obligations. In this regard, the following chart 3 provides an analytical representation of the conversion process: Graph 3. Dynamics of the number of converts to Orthodoxy in the Turkestan region (18711914) Year peoples Number of converts Of which indigenous (%) Who returned to Islam (%) 1875 22 100 60 1885 45 95 70 1895 73 89 55 1905 102 84 48 1914 168 79 52 Sources: RIA, collection 821, OP. 2, d. 71; Werth P. Tsarist Beliefs, 2014; Turkestan Collection, No. 42, 1914. Analysis: – 80–90% of converts were Muslims; SCIENCE AND INNOVATION INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC JOURNAL VOLUME 4 ISSUE 11 NOVEMBER 2025 ISSN: 2181-3337 | SCIENTISTS.UZ 41 – More than half later returned to Islam. By the late 19th century, local intellectuals reacted sharply to missionary activity. The Jadids interpreted the process as cultural colonialism. Abdurauf Fitrat, in his book “Rahbari Najat” (Guide to Salvation, 1915), called Orthodoxy spiritual violence: "They wanted to defeat us with words, not with weapons. But words became our weapon, not theirs." [3] Thus, missionary policy became a factor awakening local Islamic modernism (Jadidism). Michael Kemper (2017) calls this process a “paradox of mutual learning”: Orthodox missionaries wanted to change Muslims, but, conversely, Muslim intelligentsia adopted Russia’s scientific and cultural approach, creating ideas of national revival. [4] Historical analysis shows that the relationship between Orthodoxy and Islam in Central Asia was more of a spiritual rivalry than a conflict. The Orthodox Church emerged as the "disseminator of enlightenment", while Islam was the "guardian of traditions". The debate between these two models accelerated the process of national identity. For example, after the Andijan uprising in 1898, church activities were temporarily suspended, but resumed in 1901. During this period, the phrase “new strategy in missionary work – cultural convergence” appeared in diocesan reports (Garf, fond 1345, D. 101). With this strategy, the church attempts to create "moral, rather than religious, influence" among Muslims through charity, education, and medicine. For this reason, Orthodox medical aid societies were established in the 1910s (Tashkent, Samarkand, Kokand). Main conclusions: 1. The Russian Orthodox Church functioned in Central Asia as a spiritual extension of political authority. 2. Missionary activity served as a mechanism of cultural rather than religious control. 3. This process stimulated national and intellectual awakening among Muslims. 4. Conversion statistics show limited religious success but significant social influence. REFERENCES 1. «The Eastern Question» (St. Petersburg, 1898) 2. Adeeb Khalid. «Islam after Communism», 2008 3. Abdurauf Fitrat. «Guide to Salvation», 1915 4. Michael Kemper. «Russian Islam and Orthodoxy Beyond Institutions», 2017