Physicalism's Self-Refutation Is as Implicit as Its Agent-Causation Denial (PSIAD)

PSIAD 1 † Formatting note: All quoted emphases are editorial. Where practical, the full PDF version links each appendix citation to its title page, while each appendix title links back to its initial citation. Working Paper - Version 4 (Dec 08, 2025) © 2025 Arseniy Vodopyanov. Licensed under CC BY 4.0 (Creative Commons Attribution). Physicalism’s Self-Refutation Is as Implicit as Its Agent-Causation Denial (PSIAD) Author: Arseniy Vodopyanov 1 Pre-print archived at SSRN Electronic Journal: https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5401163 Pre-print indexed on PhilPapers: https://philpapers.org/rec/VODPSI Abstract PSIAD is a two-part proof centered on the concept of genuine personal control (GPC). A concept often referred to as agent-causation and volition . Lemma 1 shows that GPC denialism is self-refuting, while Lemma 2 shows that physicalism/materialism necessitates GPC denialism. Therefore, this overall proof shows physicalism to be selfrefuting. I.e., PSIAD shows that accepting any corresponding counter (by way of compatibilism, epiphenomenalism, quantum indeterminacy, emergentist/nonreductive physicalism, property dualism, arguments from incredulity , etc.)—provably entails abandoning fundamental principles of logic and physics. Keywords: Philosophy of Mind, Mind–Body Problem, Libertarian Free Will, Compatibilism, Determinism, Materialism, Emergentism, Substance Dualism, Panpsychism, Mysterianism 1 Center for Studies in Foundational Dualism ORCID: 0009-0007-1900-6073 Email: [email protected] PSIAD 2 No. I regard consciousness as fundamental. … We cannot get behind consciousness. —Max Plank, The Observer (Sullivan 1931b), in response to whether “consciousness can be explained in terms of matter and its laws” \ Consciousness cannot be accounted for in physical terms. For consciousness is absolutely fundamental. It cannot be accounted for in terms of anything else. —Erwin Schrödinger, The Observer (Sullivan 1931a) 2 2 The two Nobel laureates—renowned for originating (Plank) and formulating the central equation of ( Schrödinger ) what is widely regarded as humanity’s most successful scientific theory (see Appendix O ) —stated this conclusion nearly a century ago. A growing number of academics have since come to concur (see Appendix A ). PSIAD 3 Introduction, Methods And Context Despite some slow transformation in this regard, 3 to target physicalism (as promised in abstract) still ultimately entails targeting a foundational premise of modern scientific discourse. Little can be taken for granted when navigating such deeply contentious territory. Hence, PSIAD 4 is structured in somewhat unusual, multilayer fashion; intended for scrutiny by both experts and avid non-experts. While its central contribution (Lemma 1) is only 77 words long and its self-sufficient core proof is only ~1700 words overall, said core is backed by three layers of auxiliary support: a. Several elaborative subsections provide additional specificity. b. A 10,000-word appendix section provides extensive supplementary citations and several ancillary arguments. c. While the forthcoming companion book ( Djin in the Machine ; title inspired by Thomas Huxley and Stephen Hawking) delves deeper yet into various adjacent proofs, potential counters thereto and suchlike. It should also be noted that a later volume of the overall corresponding Two Natures book - series—helps elucidate how the scientific approach to belief formation is nevertheless objectively superior to the religious one 5 and why none of this work elevates religious explanations above genuinely scientific ones. 3 As exemplified in Appendix A . 4 Appendix B provides some additional context via its elaboration on this acronym choice. 5 As also briefly covered in Appendix C . PSIAD 4 Further Disambiguation of “Genuine Personal Control” (GPC) • As meant here, GPC is synonymous with primary definitions of terms like volition , agent-causation , self-causal determination and [libertarian] free will . E.g., OED aptly defines the latter as: “The power of an individual to make free choices, not determined by… the laws of physical causality, fate, etc.” As distinct from: - I mmaculat e “free choice” that is never influenc ed by preceding physical causes. - [Physicalist] Compatibilism . Where reconciliation of pure physics with free will is sought through the following redefinition/claim: all our motivations and behaviors are ultimately preselected for us by preceding physical causes, but while those preselected behaviors conform to those preselected motivations—we qualify as possessing genuine free will. 6 Instead, GPC would allow subjects who are regularly influenced by preceding physical causes, to substantively transcend being mere vetoless extensions/marionettes thereof. 7 • GPC can be further formalized/disambiguated via the following short alternative definition: the minimum requirement of reasonably resolving the transcendental , a priori paradox established in Lemma 1 (L1). Which is what ultimately keeps this term from being arbitrary. 6 Appendix D corroborates. 7 On top of the key second definition above, Appendix E supplementarily expands further yet—on what sort of criteria would help distinguish “substantive” from illusory in this case. PSIAD 5 Lemma 1. The Marionette-Scientist Paradox: GPC Denialism (i.e., the position that humans hold zero GPC) Is Self-Refuting S1. If humans indeed hold zero GPC, then we [are mere conscious marionettes who] possess zero capacity to personally verify the validity of any possibility whatsoever. S2. Which would imply there being zero genuine human capacity to thus verify the zeroGPC possibility itself. S3. Any claim of any such human zero-GPC verification, therefore proving unavoidably self-refuting. S4. And when any verifiable reason for us to accept a possibility, proves unavoidably self-refuting—so, effectively, does that possibility itself. Elaboration and Implications of Lemma 1 Elaboration The above conclusion is so inescapable, because when a possibility inherently refutes any verifiable reason for us to believe therein—we are objectively left with zero verifiable reason to believe therein. The smallest possible amount thereof. This constitutes outright refutation by any humanly-verifiable measure; and as such, by any scientific measure. I.e., GPC proves a brute, transcendental scientific fact—in the same sense that “brute facts of experience… do not need further justification” (Norton 2003, 668)—because: a. GPC is the only coherent foundation (sine qua non) of genuine human verification and therefore of genuine human science (making it as empirically grounded as human science itself). b. Any human claim of having scientifically verified the reverse—proves necessarily self-refuting. Implication 1: ‘Compatibilist Free Will’ Insufficient to Resolve Paradox If all our motivations and behaviors are ultimately preselected for us by preceding causes8, then we still lack any “capacity to personally verify the validity of any possibility whatsoever.” At most, we are mere verification instruments; with corresponding accuracy hinging entirely on calibrations that we can never personally 8 A definition corroborated in Appendix D corroborates. PSIAD 6 control. I.e., Our assessment will never be accurate, unless those preceding causes happen to calibrate us accordingly. Only genuine personal control offers any possibility of genuinely personal such ‘calibration’/verification; and hence, of genuinely resolving the Marionette-Scientist Paradox (L1). Implication 2: Criterial Control L1 moreover implies9 that we possess genuine personal ‘administrative’/‘building block’ type control over even the core selection criteria upon which our choices are based. Otherwise, ‘our choices’ would still be fully reliant upon those external precalibrations and L1 would remain unresolved. Implication 3: Incredulity Overruled As with Descartes’s Cogito, L1’s aforementioned transcendental, a priori nature— also overruling any incredulity-based counters (e.g., ‘how could this possibly work?’). Such counters were moreover likewise applied against quantum non-locality/superposition when it was first substantiated; stifling vital scientific progress had they been [illogically10] accepted. Segue Though it (of course) echoes previous work 11 , the proof contained in Lemma 1 above is apparently quite novel. The main contribution of Lemma 2 below however, is its synthesis of largely well-established arguments into a single unified proof. Its overall conclusion especially, certainly being nothing new. 12 9 As elaborated upon in L2.S1.1.1–2 below. 10 Appendix J.1.3 expands on said illogic. 11 F rom Epicurus’s clinamen to Kant's conditions for the possibility of knowledge to the argument from reason—all of which concern the tension between determinism and genuine deliberation. 12 See Appendix F . PSIAD 7 Lemma 2. Physicalism Necessitates GPC Denialism S1. GPC/ Agent-Causation Is Fundamentally Incompatible with Ele mental Physics Not only is this particular conclusion deeply uncontroversial 13 , but it can be substantiated on several key fronts. S1.1. Foundational/Ontological (Most Important) A cornerstone postulation of elemental physics (both classical and quantum) is: No elemental physical entity can change its own dynamics (e.g., momentum, energy, path). In place of such agent-causation , all said dynamics are decided instead through event-causation 14 . I.e., Through preceding physical causes which boil down to interactions from other such entities and the preset fundamental laws/parameters that dictate all 15 corresponding outcomes (including quantum randomness , uncertainty principle , etc.). Not only is said postulation/preclusion a stark logical implication, but it has proven so ironclad over centuries of study as to itself have been buttressed into many of the most fundamental corresponding principles; all of which would be unprecedentedly 16 violated if pure elemental physics featured GPC. E.g., Conservation of energy and the first law of thermodynamics (energy cannot be created, only transferred), conservation of momentum and Newton’s laws of motion (momentum cannot be created, only transferred), Urconservation law at large ( ex nihilo nihil fit ; from nothing, nothing comes ), physical causal completeness and causal closure of the physical ( physical[ist] causality ; all physical events are owed to fully-sufficient preceding physical causes). More precisely, the multiple levels on which GPC in pure elemental physics would unprecedentedly 17 violate each abovementioned principle, include: S1.1.1. Initial Self-Causal (Causa Sui) Thrust a. Physical energy/momentum is required to initiate any change in a purely-physical elemental entity’s [physical] dynamics. 13 Appendix G expands. 14 Ibid. 15 See Appendix H . 16 Appendix I corroborates . 17 Ibid. PSIAD 8 b. If all energy/momentum indeed long predates all current elemental dynamical changes and indeed only follows strict fixed rules, then (per ‘a’ above) all said changes must be entirely attributable to preexisting physical causes; not said entity’s own GPC. I.e., To event-causation, not [genuine] agent-causation. c. As such, the very initiation of any purely-physical GPC change in any such entity’s dynamics, must entail said entity self-generating nonzero new physical energy– momentum 18 from literal nothingness. (As, again, there is no other source/foundation it can come from in a purely-physical system.) Which would already clearly violate each 19 aforementioned fundamental principle. S1.1.2. Self-Determination Exacerbations If only done in a blind/uncontrolled way however, the self-generation of those initial volition thrusts alone—cannot constitute GPC. Said purely-physical elemental entity must also be capable: a. Of exercising GPC over how said thrusts are directed; i.e., over which path it subsequently takes. (Otherwise—instead of GPC—it is merely self-generating ‘random dice rolls’.) b. Of moreover exercising such personal control over the selection criteria upon which said choices are based. c. And even of [re]assessing, modifying and creating new such criteria; down to the corresponding building block level; in a truly personal, meaningful way. Otherwise said entity’s behavior remains fully preselected by whatever prior causes determined said selection criteria; ultimately allowing said entity no more GPC than possessed by a complex Rube Goldberg contraption (i.e., none). This compounds each violation established in S1.1.1 above, because these additional layers of control would—in turn—require those purely-physical elemental entities to selfgenerate far more energy–momentum yet. S1.1.3. GPC ‘Actualization Mechanism’ Cannot Ultimately Be Physical Though this may already be clear from s1.1.1–2 above, listed below are two additional reasons why this conclusion is so particularly inescapable. 18 The most straightforward confirmation of corresponding coupling is simply that GPC actualization requires momentum creation, which is impossible without energy creation ( Appendix J.4 confirms ). 19 Appendices J.2–J.4 expand. PSIAD 9 S1.1.3.1. Physics: No Components, No Mechanism a. Purely physical GPC actualization, would require some purely physical GPCactualization mechanism. b. No mechanism [and certainly no such mechanism] can consist of a singular physical component. c. Yet an elemental physical entity must itself [by definition] consist of a singular component. d. Ergo, an elemental physical entity cannot possess a purely-physical GPC-actualization mechanism. And if it does possess GPC nonetheless, the corresponding actualization must be nonphysical 20 in nature. S1.1.3.2. Physics: No Criteria, No Meaning Let us ignore the previous argument here and moreover (generously 21 ) grant that both physical meaning and physical selection criteria are feasible corresponding concepts to begin with. It is established via L1.ii/L 2.S1.1.2 above, that meaningful building-blocklevel (re)calibration of core personal selection criteria—is a requisite GPC capacity. This however, is logically impossible under pure physics: a. Much as buildings cannot disassemble/reassemble their own foundations, purely physical entities cannot in principle perform meaningful/personal building-block-level reconfiguration of their own core physical selection criteria; because without core physical selection criteria, physical meaning has no basis. I.e., Such [meaningful] purely-physical disassembly/reassembly of core selection criteria—requires said criteria. This infinite-regress/homunculus fallacy precludes purely physical such entities from possessing said capacity and thus, from possessing GPC. b. The only hope of this criterial paradox being outmaneuvered, hinges on some innermost nonphysical/‘ x-factor ’ type component(s) providing additional corresponding degrees of freedom. I.e., On said entity possessing some nonphysical mind/consciousness which can manipulate nonphysical selection criteria—along with their building blocks—in ways that physical components/processes cannot in principle permit (again, per ‘a’ directly above). 20 Nonphysical need not be of entirely different composition, just radically/fundamentally so (Appendix J.1.3 expands). 21 See Appendix K . PSIAD 16 Carroll, Sean M. 2021. “Why Something Rather Than Nothing?” In The Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Physics, edited by Eleanor Knox and Alastair Wilson. Routledge. 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PSIAD 22 Wigner, E.P. 1960. “The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics in the Natural Sciences.” Communications in Pure and Applied Mathematics 13: 1–14. https://web.archive.org/web/20240514035743/https://bpb-us-e1.wpmucdn.com/ blogs.uoregon.edu/dist/c/11942/files/2016/02/Wigner-math-in-naturalsciences-1960-J-pure-appplied-math-2dk4spx.pdf . Wolfson, Richard. 2016. Essential University Physics. Pearson. PSIAD 23 Appendices This appendix section contains apropos citations and some supplementary arguments. Said arguments are mostly light elaboration on what is already implied in the main text. Whereas—aside from corroborating less-than-obvious basics—said citations serve supplementary reference and reinforcement purposes only. As mentioned earlier, PSIAD’s core strength is intended to be self-contained (rather than reliant on either such secondary arguments or appeals to authority 1 ). 1 Appendix C elaborates. PSIAD 24 Appendix A. Schrödinger and Plank Certainly Not Alone a. The current point—along with various corresponding nuances—is covered at more length in Appendices J and K . E.g., J.2.4.1.e.ii (Churchland 2011, 17; Churchland 2014, 37): “We have here a gathering consensus that the… conscious… is something that the physical sciences… will never explain.” b. Or per the Royal Institute of Philosophy (McHenry 2010, 16): “We have come a long way in that the number of philosophers who no longer regard [the view that ‘consciousness [i]s something not explicable in physical terms’] as incredible has increased significantly. Given the stalemate in explaining consciousness in contemporary philosophy of mind, even panpsychism has been re-introduced into mainstream by the likes of David Chalmers, Galen Strawson, David Skrbina, and William Seager.” c. And further echoed in Psychology Today , by the cognitive scientist best known for discovering the Subliminal Sensory Buffer Store (Pang, 2024): “[Enough] scholars have suggested that [consciousness] is a fundamental aspect of the universe[ that] this view, [sometimes referred to as conscious] fundamentalism is no longer just a fringe theory but has some respected supporters (Hoffman et al., 2022; Schurger & Graziano, 2022).” PSIAD 25 Appendix B. PSIAD Acronym Elaboration The acronym of this proof’s title—PSIAD—is pronounced “psy add” or just “sad.” Which is apropos because: a. This proof addresses the question of whether or not certain irrefutable facets of our psyches necessitate lifting the longstanding ban on open, large-scale scientific inquiry into an entire additional foundation. b. And if such a straightforward proof cannot be reasonably refuted, is it not indeed ‘an objectively sad thing’ that an entire domain—with its untold scientific potential— remains so thoroughly 1 overlooked (merely to prolong physicalism’s illogical, unscientific reign)? After all, per Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (SEP): “Philosophy, in particular philosophy of mind, is part of cognitive science” (Thagard 2003 ) . 1 Appendix D elaborates. PSIAD 32 “The state of the universe and its contents, like ourselves, are completely determined by the laws of physics... So much for free will” (Hawking 2007, 63). “Though we feel that we can choose what we do, our… biological processes are governed by the laws of physics and chemistry and therefore are as determined as the orbits of the planets. … Our physical brain, following the known laws of science, determines our actions, and not some agency that exists outside those laws …We are no more than biological machines[,] free will is just an illusion” Hawking 2010, 31– 32). e. As later echoed by yet another famed physicist, physicalist and atheist Lawrence Krauss (2012, 1:59:06): “Everything I know about the world tells me there’s no such thing as free will. [Humans are] just like… particles[ — ]they behave as if they can do things that they’re not being forced to do…and we behave as if we have free will, because we live in a very complex world” whose complexity sires said free will illusion. f. And as likewise echoed by the other participant of that same presentation—famed biologist, physicalist and atheist Richard Dawkins (2012, 1:58:12): “I have a materialist view of the world. I think that things are determined in a rational way by antecedent events. And so that commits me to the view that, when I think I have free will, when I think that I’m exercising free choice—I’m deluding myself. That my brain states are determined by physical events.” I.e., By event-causation, not agentcausation. PSIAD 33 Appendix H. All Physics Controlled by Laws/Rules Excerpts from the first four citations pertaining to Appendix G above, should amply suffice here: Per G.a: “The laws of physics… completely describe… the entire future of the universe[.] There is no room for human choice, so there is no such thing as free will.” Per G.b: “All any object ever does is obey… the laws of physics. …The ‘reason’ [anything] happens is because it was the inevitable outcome of the state of the universe at an earlier time.” Per G.c: “Fundamental laws of nature… govern the behaviour of all physical objects in the universe.” Per G.d: “The state of the universe and its contents, like ourselves, are completely determined by the laws of physics”… “as determined as the orbits of the planets.” Caveat: Singlehandedly Substantiating Lemma 2 While even this point alone, is sufficient to substantiate Lemma 2 (per ex nihilo nihil fit) . I.e., If such immutable lawfulness were indeed the sole foundation of all existence— GPC’s quintessential law-transcendence would have to arise from literal nothingness (i.e., ex nihilo ; from the utter absence thereof). Thus violating all 1 the fundamental principles in question. 1 See Appendix J at large and and J.4 in particular. PSIAD 34 Appendix I. Has Quantum Mechanics (QM) or Any Other Aspect of Elemental Physics Been Proven to Violate Any of These Laws/Principles? (No.) Caveat: Not a PSIAD Must, but Happens to Be So Must this be the case for PSIAD to work? Not unless there is a reasonable, purelyphysicalist delineation of the corresponding mechanism which can also account for GPC. In lieu thereof, other such violations would only grow the list of phenomena that physicalism cannot explain. Constituting only more corresponding problems; rather than reasonable solutions with which to counter PSIAD. That said, the fact that these principles have no other proven exceptions [much less purely physicalist ones]—does strengthen PSIAD further yet. I.1. Energy–Momentum Conservation a. Per the college physics textbook by Dallas University Physics Department chair, R. Olenick and Caltech’s F. Gilloon Distinguished Professor of Physics, D. Goodstein et al.: “The law of conservation of energy is one of the most fundamental laws of physics. No matter what you do, energy is always conserved” (2008, 219). “The law of conservation of momentum [is] like that of conservation of energy[—]a vast and powerful principle. It makes an overall statement about nature without fussing over the details of the force involved. …The word interact in physics means that some force is applied between the objects. We may not know the details of the force, and we may not know whether the objects have touched or [per ‘quantum nonlocality’] interacted at a distance without direct contact, but we can conclude that for a brief time the particles have exerted forces on each other from the fact that the motion of each object is changed. By using the laws of conservation of energy and momentum, we can predict much about the subsequent motion of particles in this type of encounter” (2008, 275). b. “Physics does not allow any exceptions. The principle of energy conservation has been tested again and again and always comes out a winner” (Koch 2009, 41). PSIAD 35 c. “The law of conservation of energy states that energy can not be created or destroyed... The law of conservation of energy applies always, everywhere, in any situation” (Duffy, 1998). d. “If a system is isolated (NOT influenced by external forces) Conservation of Momentum is always valid" (Velissaris and Efthimiou 2015). e. See also J.2.4.2.c below (Churchland 2011, 45; Churchland 2014, 55): ”momentum in any closed system is always conserved.” In sum of I.1: No proven physicalist exceptions to energy or momentum conservation exist. I.2. Something from Nothing The closest that modern elemental/fundamental physics comes to a genuine ex nihilo nihil fit violation—i.e., to something arising from truly nothing—is what’s known as the quantum vacuum fluctuation phenomenon. Said vacuum having sometimes been misleadingly equated with ‘nothingness’ in popular science books such as Lawrence Krauss’s A Universe from Nothing: Why There Is Something Rather than Nothing (2012). a. Among his famed critiques of this Krauss book/claim, Director of the MA Program in The Philosophical Foundations of Physics at Columbia University, David Albert (2012), wrote: “Krauss… apparently means to announce… that the laws of quantum mechanics have in them the makings of a thoroughly scientific… explanation of why there is something rather than nothing. …I kid you not. Look at the subtitle. Look at how Richard Dawkins sums it up in his afterword… [But] where, for starters, are the laws of quantum mechanics themselves supposed to have come from? Krauss is more or less upfront.. about not having a clue[. Moreover] the fundamental physical laws that Krauss is talking about[—]the laws of relativistic quantum field theories[—]have nothing whatsoever to say on the subject of where [their] fields came from… [Yet those] relativistic-quantum-field-theoretical vacuum states—no less than giraffes or refrigerators or solar systems—are particular arrangements of elementary physical stuff. The true relativistic-quantum-field- PSIAD 36 theoretical equivalent to there not being any physical stuff at all isn’t this [as Krauss defines it, but] the simple absence of… fields.” b. Even over a decade earlier, physicist John D. Barrow (Dirac Prize and the Gold Medal of the Royal Astronomical Society) made it clear that the quantum vacuum has by then long been established as far from true nothingness: “The quantum revolution showed us why the old picture of a vacuum as an empty box was untenable. [Its] state was by no means empty. …A vacuum energy… permeated every fibre of the Universe. [Said energy] was detected and shown to have a tangible physical presence” (2000, 10). c. The above conclusions were then only further reinforced via multiple studies (Choi 2013; Lähteenmäki et al. 2013): “The scientists detailed their findings online… in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. ‘This work and a number of other recent works demonstrate that the vacuum is not empty but full of virtual photons,’ says theoretical physicist Steven Girvin at Yale.” d. Sean Carroll, in his own direct response to Krauss’s book/claim, likewise wrote (2012): “Do advances in modern physics and cosmology help us address these underlying questions, of why there is something called the universe at all, and why there are things called ‘the laws of physics,’ and why those laws seem to take the form of quantum mechanics…? In a word: no. I don’t see how they could. Sometimes physicists pretend that they are addressing these questions, which is too bad, because they are just being lazy and not thinking carefully about the problem.” e. A decade later, Carroll’s disbelief in the very corresponding possibility was formalized via The Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Physics (2021, 703): “Every attempt to answer the question ‘Why is there something rather than nothing?’ ultimately grounds in a brute fact [with] no further explanation.” See also part I.3 below. In sum of I.2: There exist no proven physicalist violations of ex nihilo nihil fit . PSIAD 37 I.3. Physical[ist]: Causal Closure, Completeness, Causality Given how closely these principles are related, the information below also further confirms I.2 above. I.e., If ex nihilo nihil fit is violated in pure elemental physics, then something physical must have come from literal nothingness, which would in turn mean that said new physical phenomenon was causeless and thus violates physical[ist] closure/completeness/causality. And therefore, conversely, the confirmations below as to the lack of any proven such violations in elemental physics—also reaffirm the (I.2 corroborated) lack of any ex nihilo nihil fit violations. a. Bradford Emeritus Philosophy of Science Professor, Friedel Weinert (1998), not only confirms that QM does not violate physical causality, but emphasizes the importance of careful corresponding distinction: “Despite popular impressions that quantum mechanics has spelt the end of causality, quantum mechanics does not abandon causality. [Instead, q]uantum mechanical evidence led to a careful distinction between determinism and causality.” b. Vilasini and Renner (2024) established that, as phrased by Searle (2025): “Quantum processes are constrained by classical causality.” c. Given the above, it is also unsurprising that the following two citations confirm QM’s central equation to be describing causal processes: i. “The central equation of quantum mechanics [is] the Schrödinger equation” (Schomerus, n.d.). ii. “The Schrödinger equation has all the features of a causal connection” (London and Bauer 1983, 232). d. Nor is this surprising given that even in his seminal work on QM, physicist John von Neumann (1956 Enrico Fermi Award and National Medal of Freedom) wrote: “[The Schrödinger equation] describes how the system changes continuously and causally” (1955, 229). e. SEP also bluntly states (O’Connor and Wong 2025): PSIAD 38 “Physicalism[’s] thesis is standardly understood to entail ‘the causal closure of the physical’… accounts [that violate causal closure] are inconsistent with physicalism.” f. In the seminal collaboration between Nobel laureate neurophysiologist (Eccles) and preeminent philosopher of science best known for his all-important falsifiability principle (Popper), the authors likewise state: “The physicalist principle of the closedness of the physical world… is of decisive importance [i.e.,] the characteristic principle of physicalism or materialism” (1977, 51). In sum of I.3: There exist no proven physicalist violations of physical[ist]: causal closure, completeness, causality. In sum of Appendix I: Any physicalist violation of the fundamental physical principles listed in L2.S.1.1, would indeed be scientifically “unprecedented”. PSIAD 39 Appendix J. Can ‘Physicalist GPC’ Avoid Violating Any of These OtherwiseImmutable 1 Principles? (No.) Is Foundational Dualism Really a Significant Improvement? (Yes.) The two main points mentioned in the title above, are elaborated upon via parts J.1 and J.2 (in reverse order). Part J.3 confirms that strong emergence is purely speculative 2 . While part J.4 is a light elaboration on why Lemma 2’s “In Sum of S1.1” correctly states that all of those fundamental principles are violated in each of those three cases (described in L2 S1.1.1–3). J.1. Is Foundational Dualism Really a Significant Improvement? J.1.1. Are These Principles Not Equally Violated Under Foundational Dualism? (No.) It merits reemphasis that attempting to fit GPC into physicalism is what makes corresponding violations so inescapable and extreme. Something changed dramatically under a dualist scenario where GPC stems instead from a separate, nonphysical foundation. For starters: ex nihilo nihil fit and physical[ist] completeness/closure/causality violations—would all no longer apply in the latter case. As GPC would then have a distinct ( non nothing ) source and physics could no longer be considered a closed/isolated system ; where all causes are strictly internal/physical. Said dualism could well also prove key to resolving the remaining two violations, because (i) energy and momentum conservation laws were likewise conceived under those closed/isolated physicalist system assumptions and (ii) said laws state that while energy–momentum cannot be created, it can be converted from other corresponding forms. Something perfectly allowable under the dualist GPC scenario (unlike its purely physicalist counterpart). a. Per World Almanac and Book of Facts 2023 : “Conservation of Momentum: All moving objects have momentum, and in a closed system, total momentum is always conserved. …Conservation of Energy: The total amount of energy in a closed system will not change except when converted” (Janssen 2022, p. 2027). 1 As established in Appendix I . 2 As must therefore be all corresponding below-established corollaries like nonreductive/emergentist physicalism, its downward causation, any ensuing property dualism, etc. PSIAD 40 b. See also: • J.2.4.2.c below: “momentum in any closed system is always conserved” (Churchland 2011, 45; Churchland 2014, 55). • I.1.d above: “The principle of conservation of momentum… is valid only if the net external force acting on the system is zero… [I.e.,] If a system is isolated (not influenced by external forces) Conservation of Momentum is always valid” (Velissaris 2015). I.e., Foundational dualism would: • Entirely remove those various, otherwise-inescapable violations of fundamental logic. • Entirely remove the most severe corresponding violations of fundamental physics. • Supply a distinct (and otherwise distinctly-absent) possibility of those two remaining fundamental physics violations being resolved. • And even if some form of those latter two violations ultimately remains, [under foundational dualism] this would not only cease to be logic-breaking, but even unexpected. In sum of J.1.1: Recasting GPC in said dualist terms deescalates an otherwiseunavoidable breakdown of fundamental logic and physics alike, down to the sort of anomalies expected if an entire foundation—so extensively dismissed and excluded in mainstream academia—indeed exists and interacts with the physical. Via some unsurprisingly still-undiscovered nexus. J.1.2. “Dismissed And Excluded” a. As observed by Library of Congress Distinguished Scholar Chair (Schneider 2012, 62): “Substance dualism is all too often dismissed as ‘fringe’ by mainstream philosophy of mind. [I.e., By mainstream cognitive science 3 . Due to a] presumption in favor of substance physicalism . ” b. As echoed by SEP (Robinson 2024): “Although dualism has been out of fashion… the argument is by no means over. Some distinguished neurologists, such as… Eccles (Popper and Eccles 1977) have continued to defend dualism as the only theory that can preserve the data of consciousness.” 3 See Appendix B . PSIAD 41 c. And by Research Associate at Oxford’s Ian Ramsey Centre (Weir 2024, 21): “According to a widely held view in the philosophy of mind… substance dualism need not be taken seriously.” J.1.3. Does Some Other Drawback Override The Merits Covered in J.1.1? (No.) “The reason standardly offered for the supposed incoherence of Cartesian interactionist dualism is that it is difficult to ‘conceive’ how two substances with such radically diverse natures… could exercise causal influence on each other. …Anthony Kenny, a philosopher well known for his philosophical acuity as well as historical erudition, writes: ‘On Descartes’[s] principles it is difficult to see how an unextended thinking substance can cause motion in an extended unthinking substance and how the extended unthinking substance can cause sensations in the unextended thinking substance. The properties of the two kinds of substance seem to place them in such diverse categories that it is impossible for them to interact.’ 7 The trouble is that this is all that Kenny has to say about Descartes’s difficulties with mind–body causation—and, as far as I know, that is pretty much all we get from Descartes’s critics and commentators. But as an argument this is incomplete… As it stands, it is not much of an argument; rather, it only expresses a vague, inchoate dissatisfaction… Why is it incoherent to think that there can be causal interaction between things in ‘diverse categories’? Why is it ‘impossible’ for things with diverse natures to enter into causal relations with one another?” (Kim 2005, 73-74). Some of the more obvious corresponding refutations include: a. Non Sequitur As mentioned briefly in footnote 18, just because there are two separate foundations— does not mean that the phenomena they sire must lack any common properties; either of which can serve as a nexus of their interaction. b. Sailed Ship The non sequitur nature of said “vague… dissatisfaction,” is only further highlighted by the reality that the most dominant/mainstream corresponding positions (compatibilism and nonreductive/emergentist physicalism) already accept that irreducibly/inexplicably distinct mental properties interact with their physical counterparts. As covered in Appendix D above and note J.2 below. PSIAD 48 b. As echoed via the expanded version of the SEP excerpt cited in I.3.e above: “ Physicalism , understood as the thesis that all natural phenomena are wholly constituted and completely metaphysically determined by fundamental physical phenomena[,] is standardly understood to entail ‘the causal closure of the physical’, according to which (roughly) any fundamental-level physical effect has a purely fundamental physical cause. ‘Strong’ emergence accounts are inconsistent with physicalism and causal closure” (O’Connor 2025). c. And—long before then—by renowned President of American Philosophical Association Jaegwon Kim (1989, 43; 1993, 280); via his tellingly-titled “The Myth of Nonreductive Materialism,” published as part of Cambridge Studies in Philosophy : “ ‘The causal closure of the physical domain’ [roughly states] that if we trace the causal ancestry of a physical event, we need never go outside the physical domain. To deny this [as, per above, mainstream ‘nonreductive materialism’ does] is to accept the Cartesian idea that some physical events have only nonphysical causes, and if this is true there can in principle be no complete and self-sufficient physical theory of the physical domain. [I.e., Again, no physicalism, even ‘in principle’.] If the causal closure failed, our physics would need to refer in an essential way to nonphysical causal agents [like] Cartesian souls.” I.e., To Cartesian/foundational dualism. d. “Non-reductive physicalists deny that there is any explanation of mentality in purely physical terms, but do not deny that the mental is entirely determined by and constituted out of underlying physical structures. There are important issues about the stability of such a view which teeters on the edge of explanatory reductionism on the one side and dualism on the other (see Kim 1998)” (Seager 2010; 2022). e. Caveat: Irreducible yet Explainable? (No.) Some occasionally propose that ontological irreducibility may be compatible with explanatory reducibility (Crane 2001; 2010). However, as well established (e.g., via what is known as explanatory gap of qualia ) if a property’s emergence from its constituents can be adequately explained, then it is in fact reducible/reductive and cannot serve as a basis for nonreductive physicalism; whereas nonreductive physicalism’s acceptance of consciousness’ “ontologically irreducible” nature—necessarily likewise implies its explanatory irreducibility. PSIAD 49 i. SEP’s “Qualia and the Explanatory Gap” segment of its “Qualia” entry elaborates (Tye 2021): “For no matter how deeply we probe into the physical structure of neurons and the chemical transactions which occur when they fire, no matter how much objective information we come to acquire, we still seem to be left with something that we cannot explain, namely, why and how such-and-such objective, physical changes, whatever they might be, generate so-and-so subjective feeling, or any subjective feeling at all. This is the famous ‘explanatory gap’ for qualia (Levine 1983, 2000).” ii. Even Paul Churchland (Endowed Chair of California University’s Philosophy Department and fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences), after his long career as a leading proponent of eliminative materialism, had to acknowledge by 2011: “Altogether, we have here a gathering consensus that the qualitative dimension of our conscious experience is something that the physical sciences, such as modern neuroscience, will never explain.” (Churchland 2011, 17; Churchland 2014, 37) iii. Which, in turn, further corroborates statements like (Stephan 1997, 310): “To the emergentist ‘irreducible’ always means ‘explanatorily irreducible’. 6 ” In sum of J.2.4.1: It is indeed already widely acknowledged in mainstream academia that (however deterministic) what remains of mainstream physicalism indeed violates explanatory reducibility, physical[ist] completeness/closure/causality, and hence— physicalism itself. J.2.4.2. Violating Energy–Momentum Conservation It is just as thoroughly established that mainstream physicalism’s mental causation (however deterministic) likewise violates energy/momentum conservation. a. Per SEP entry (Robinson 2024): “Interactionism is the view that mind and body—or mental events and physical events —causally influence each other. [Yet] there appears to be a conflict between interactionism and some basic principles of physical science. For example, if causal PSIAD 50 power was flowing in and out of the physical system, energy would not be conserved, and the conservation of energy is a fundamental scientific law.” b. Senior Cambridge University researcher and philosopher of physics J. Pitts, writes in his Foundations of science journal paper (2021, 562–3): “Newton in fact quite frequently affirmed strong views of mental causation (Dempsey 2006). He seems not to have been worried by the idea of conservation law failure due to mental force. 3 It is quite obvious that momentum conservation fails due to lack of the action-reaction otherwise guaranteed by Newton’s third law of motion. …momentum is not conserved.” c. “Any [physicalist] position that includes non-physical elements in the causal dynamics of the brain must violate both the law that energy is neither created nor destroyed, and the law that the total momentum in any closed system is always conserved” (Churchland 2011, 45; Churchland 2014, 55). d. “If immaterial mind could move matter, then it would create energy; and if matter were to act on immaterial mind, then energy would disappear. In either case energy… would fail to be conserved.” (Bunge 1980, 17). In sum of J.2.4.2: It is indeed likewise widely acknowledged that (however deterministic) the mental causation pertaining to the most mainstream physicalism forms—indeed also violates energy/momentum conservation. J.2.4.3. Something from Nothing a. The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Science acknowledges the following objection without offering rebuttals (Humphreys 2016, 15): “[One objection to such emergentism is the] general principle that the novel element required for emergence cannot come from a basis that lacks that feature, a variant of the ‘never something from nothing ’ principle .” b. Or as more bluntly stated by Editor-in-Chief of Artificial Life magazine and co-founder of the European Centre for Living Technology (Bedau 1997, 376–377): “These examples highlight two… useful hallmarks of emergent phenomena: PSIAD 51 (1) Emergent phenomena are somehow constituted by, and generated from, underlying processes. (2) Emergent phenomena are somehow autonomous from underlying processes. … At worst, the two hallmarks seem to make emergent phenomena flat-out inconsistent. At best, they still raise the specter of illegitimately getting something from nothing. ... Strong emergence [again, an essential component of mainstream physicalism] is uncomfortably like magic. How does an irreducible but supervenient downward causal power arise, since by definition it cannot be due to the aggregation of the micro-level potentialities? Such causal powers would be quite unlike anything within our scientific ken. This not only indicates how they will discomfort reasonable forms of materialism. Their mysteriousness will only heighten the traditional worry that [such] emergence entails illegitimately getting something from nothing.” c. And as most bluntly stated by renowned neuroscientist Christof Koch (president and chief scientific officer of the Allen Institute for Brain Science in Seattle and recipient of many honors like the American Academy of Neurology’s Public Leadership in Neurology Award and Time Magazine’s Top Ten Medical Breakthroughs recognition): “The mental is too radically different for it to arise gradually from the physical. This emergence [of the mental itself, let alone mental causation or GPC] is at odds with a basic precept of physical thinking, the Ur-conservation law— ex nihilo nihil fit .” A statement followed by Koch concluding that consciousness clearly “hails from a kingdom other than the physical and is subject to different laws” (2014). In sum of J.2.4.3: It is indeed likewise widely acknowledged that (however deterministic) the mental causation pertaining to the most mainstream physicalism forms—indeed also violates ex nihilo nihil fit . J.3. Utterly Speculative: Mainstream Physicalism “Starts Where Scientific Explanation Ends” The following should not be much of a surprise given Appendix I. a. Per IEP (Vintiadis, 2021): “We do not have actual empirical proof that [strongly] emergent properties exist.” PSIAD 52 b. SEP (O’Connor 2025) confirms: “There is at present a lack of clear empirical evidence for strong emergence.” c. As does The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Science (Humphreys 2016, 15): “The laws and other conditions that are present in our universe preclude, or just happen not to have produced, cases of [such] emergence.” d. Bedau’s Principia article (2002, 5) rephrases it thus : “All the evidence today suggests that strong emergence is scientifically irrelevant. … There is no evidence that strong emergence plays any role in contemporary science. … Strong emergence starts where scientific explanation ends.” In Sum of J.1–3 Appendix J should now have substantiated that all those unprecedented 6 PSIAD-listed violations have indeed long been found, even by mainstream scholars, to apply even to such mainstream-accepted/deterministic mental causation. Not only indeed reinforcing conclusions of Lemma 2 further yet, but also underscoring just how low that J.1-described “scientific cost” [of a mainstream shift from physicalism to foundational dualism] has long become. I.e. In effect, despite the longstanding “presumption in favor” thereof, mainstream physicalism has already had so much of its substance eaten away by contrary evidence—that what remains is a mere scientific equivalent of a shell corporation . A hollow facade. PSIAD only serving to help bring this already-dire situation to a head. 7 J.4. All Said Principles Violated On Each Said Level? (Yes.) Caveat: It should first be noted here that in order to corroborate L2.S1.1, one need prove only that elemental-physics-based GPC must violate just one said principle on but a single level. Ergo, proving such GPC to require all those various corresponding violations on each of those three levels—drives the corresponding point home in deeply overabundant, compounding fashion. 6 See Appendix I . 7 Dualism and physicalism are revisited in Appendix P. PSIAD 53 That said, further delineation of the main corresponding text should now be mostly redundant. I.e., It should by now be clear how/why ex nihilo energy and/or momentum creation (L1.S1.1.1–2) as well as ex nihilo creation of nonphysical mechanism(s) capable thereof (L1.S1.1.3) must violate: ex nihilo nihil fit, as well as physical completeness, causal closure and causality. The only point that could perhaps use more clarity is that, touched upon in footnote iv of the main text. I.e., Why the above would necessitate violation of both energy and momentum conservation. Again, in a purely physicalist system all momentum must follow fixed rules only 8 . If that does not change, all actions are owed to preceding physical causes (i.e., event-causation); while GPC (i.e., agent-causation) would never be actualized. Whereas if GPC is actualized, that law-bound momentum must have been changed somewhere in the system. Which in turn means that new momentum must have been created. While the creation of new momentum is indeed impossible without the creation of new energy: “Kinetic energy [is the] form of energy that an object or a particle has by reason of its motion” (Britannica, 2025). Whereas per Essential University Physics (Wolfson 2016, 62): “M omentum is the ‘quantity of motion’.” In sum of J.4: While GPC implies new physical momentum/motion, said new momentum indeed implies new physical (kinetic) energy. 9 8 See Appendix H . 9 Momentum–energy coupling in particular, is further codified via what’s known as the work–energy principle. While broader cross-coupling between energy and momentum is also corroborated by fundamental principles like energy–momentum relation, Lorentz covariance and Noether’s theorem. PSIAD 54 Appendix K. Why “Generously”? This side-point is sufficiently corroborated here simply by reiterating the well-established fact that nonreductive/emergentist physicalism and the underlying explanatory gap have become widely accepted in mainstream academia despite the longstanding overarching push toward the most reductive physicalism possible 1 . Ergo, this paper will not further scrutinize that particular aside, beyond briefly listing some famed corresponding arguments: • Levine’s Explanatory Gap (see J.2.4.1.e.i ). • Davidson’s Irreducibility of the Mental (mental concepts (i) cannot be subsumed under strict physical laws (ii) are not reducible to physical properties). • Nagel’s Subjectivity (first-person what it is like perspective cannot be captured by third-person physical accounts). • Chalmers’s Hard Problem (explaining all physical functions related to cognition does not resolve why these functions are accompanied by conscious experience). • Brentano’s Aboutness (mental phenomena possess intentionality —they are directed toward or are about something—making them distinct-from/irreducible-to purely physical phenomena). As Nagel put it in his seminal Philosophical Review article (1974, 435): “Consciousness is what makes the mind–body problem really intractable.” 1 As established in Appendix J . PSIAD 55 Appendix L. Determinism And Randomness Only This is an accurate corresponding binary given that in absence of true randomness—all such behavior in elemental physics (quantum probabilistic, stochastic, etc.) proves strictly deterministic. a. Routledge Philosophy Of Science encyclopedia confirms (Sarkar and Pfeifer 2006, 566): “Causal completeness of physics[ states]: Every physical effect that has a sufficient cause has a sufficient physical cause. (Physical events that are not causally determined may be said to have their objective chances of occurrence determined by physical causes.)” I.e., Events determined by quantum randomness (that are therefore not considered classically deterministic) are nevertheless still “determined by physical causes.” 1 b. “Physical events are either deterministic or probabilistic[, while] the hallmark of probabilistic or random systems is (1) unpredictability of individual outcomes, and more importantly, (2) ‘frequency stabilization’ 10,11,14–16 . The genuine probabilistic nature of an event can, in the end, only be verified by the fact that its relative frequency, as it is measured in a repeated experiment, stabilizes towards a fixed number when the number of trials increases. All probabilistic systems, stemming from the enormous variety of probabilistic disciplines and sub-fields, show this frequency stabilization and satisfy the simple rules of probability theory” (Vervoort 2019, 848). c. The following Frontiers in Physics excerpt confirms both that randomness is the closest known thing to nondeterministic elemental physics and that this is insufficient to account for GPC: “Deterministic theory implies that the outcome of any action or decision was in principle fixed at the beginning of the universe. [E]ven adding a random element (as in quantum mechanics) does not allow human beings to choose one of several future options, because in this case the only ambiguities about the future… are entirely unaffected by anything to do with human thought” (Hossenfelder and Palmer 2020, 139). 1 See Appendices N and O . PSIAD 56 d. Moreover (as alluded to in Appendix O) while QM is the most successful and predictive known theory—it is also among the most infamously ambiguous in what it reveals about the ultimate nature of physical reality. With several still-competing corresponding interpretations . One of which, though less favored, even challenges the idea that QM (and therefore empirically proven elemental physics) entails any genuine randomness to speak of. E.g., Per Entropy’ s above-cited article (Vervoort 2019, 848): “Probability theory points towards superdeterminism [over its] competitor, indeterminism[.] This suggests that [physicists] should… reject indeterminism.” PSIAD 57 Appendix M. “Language of Physics” a. Nobel laureate physicist Eugene Wigner (1960, 6), wrote in his seminal essay on the profound role of mathematics in physics: “The statement that the laws of nature are written in the language of mathematics was properly made three hundred years ago;( 8 It is attributed to Galileo) it is now more true than ever before.” b. Or as echoed in a Nuovo Cimento C article (Pospiech et al. 2016, 110) archived at Harvard University: “Mathematics is the ‘language of physics’.”