RELIGION A MULTIDISCIPLINARY STUDY

Editor: Assoc. Prof. Yılmaz ARI RELIGION A Multidisciplinary Study Published by BZT TURAN PUBLISHING HOUSE Certificate Number: 202401 Delaware, United States www.bztturanpublishinghouse.com [email protected] Editor: Assoc. Prof. Yılmaz ARI RELIGION A MULTIDISCIPLINARY STUDY OPEN ACCESS Suggested Citation: Arı, Y. (2025). RELIGION A MULTIDISCIPLINARY STUDY. BZT TURAN PUBLISHING HOUSE. DOI: https://doi. org/10.30546/19023.978-9952-610-03-1.2025.5095 Language: English Publication Date: December 2025 Language Editor: Dr. Mustafa TURAN Layout: Dr. Erşahin Ahmet AYHÜN Cover Design By Mehmet ÇAKIR Print and digital versions typeset by BZT TURAN Media Co. Ltd. E-ISBN: 9 7 8 - 9 9 5 2 - 6 1 0 - 0 3 – 1 DOI: https://doi.org/10.30546/19023.978-9952-610-03-1.2025.5095 iii From the Editor Dear Readers, Religion has occupied a central place in human history, encompassing social, cultural, ethical, aesthetic, and psychological dimensions. Therefore, a multidisciplinary approach is essential to fully understand and interpret contemporary discussions on religion. This volume examines the multifaceted nature of religion through contributions from diverse fields, including art, music, technology, politics, philosophy, psychology, Sufism, and ethics. Prof. Dr. Hasan Ocak explores the inseparable relationship between religion and art within the context of rituals and metaphysical beliefs, while Assoc. Prof. Hakan Emre Ziyagil analyzes the transformation of religious music in the modern world and the impact of digitalization. Prof. Dr. Muhammet Özdemir discusses the interplay between religion and technology in philosophical and social terms, and Dr. Mustafa Turan and Assoc. Prof. Sevim Yılmaz examine the relationships among science, religion, and Sufism in historical and conceptual contexts. Assoc. Prof. Bekir Emiroğlu investigates the mutual legitimization between religion and politics and the transformations shaped by modernization and globalization, while Assist. Prof. Şahin Baykal analyzes how the historiography of al-Andalus is constructed in terms of identity, memory, and ideology. The moral and linguistic dimensions of religion are addressed by Assoc. Prof. Emel Karaşahin and PhD candidate Neslişah Başbuğ, who examine how religious language, with its ethical and moral dimensions, responds to the contemporary search for meaning. Finally, Assist. Prof. Durali Karacan explores the reciprocal relationship between psychology and religion, and Assist. Prof. Seyfettin İliter evaluates Nietzsche’s critique of Christianity, collectively strengthening the interdisciplinary perspective of the volume. Together, these contributions reveal the complexity of religion, which cannot be explained from a single disciplinary standpoint, and demonstrate the necessity of a multidisciplinary approach. This volume offers a valuable resource for scholars and readers seeking a deeper understanding of the role of religion in contemporary iv society and contributes meaningfully to both academic literature and public awareness. I would like to express my sincere gratitude to all the authors for their invaluable contributions, rigorous scholarship, and dedication, without which this volume would not have been possible. This volume offers a valuable resource for scholars and readers seeking a deeper understanding of the role of religion in contemporary society and contributes meaningfully to both academic literature and public awareness. Sincerely, Assoc. Prof. Yılmaz ARI Editor Eskişehir / TÜRKİYE, 2025 v CONTENTS From the Editor ........................................................................................................ iii CHAPTER 1 RELIGION AND ART .................................................................................................. 1 Prof. Dr. Hasan OCAK CHAPTER 2 RELIGIOUS MUSIC IN THE MODERN WORLD ...............................................25 Assoc. Prof. Hakan Emre ZİYAGİL CHAPTER 3 RELIGION AND TECHNOLOGY ............................................................................41 Prof. Dr. Muhammet ÖZDEMİR CHAPTER 4 TILLICH’S RELATION TO RELIGION AND OTHER FIELDS .........................59 Dr. Mustafa TURAN CHAPTER 5 TASAWWUF AND RELIGION ................................................................................ 73 Assoc. Prof. Sevim YILMAZ CHAPTER 6 RELIGION AND POLITICS.....................................................................................99 Assoc. Prof. Bekir EMİROĞLU vi CHAPTER 7 AL-ANDALUS: HISTORIOGRAPHY, IDENTITY, AND THE POLITICS OF MEMORY .................................................................................................................. 129 Assist. Prof. Şahin BAYKAL CHAPTER 8 THE IMPORTANCE OF MORAL CONCEPTS IN THE LANGUAGE OF RELIGION ................................................................................................................. 151 Assoc. Prof. Emel KARAŞAHİN PhD Candidate Neslişah BAŞBUĞ CHAPTER 9 PSYCHOLOGY AND RELIGION .........................................................................169 Assist. Prof. Durali KARACAN CHAPTER 10 FREDERIC WILHELM NIETZSCHE’S CRITIQUE OF CHRISTIANITY ......185 Assist. Prof. Seyfettin İLİTER 1 CHAPTER 1 RELIGION AND ART Prof. Dr. Hasan OCAK1 Abstract The aim of this study is to examine the relationship between religion and art in general and the influence of art on religious rituals as a concrete reflection of this relationship. The study first addresses the relationship between religion and art and examines the importance of symbolic elements for art and religion. It then draws attention to the religious culture of life that worship brings about and what situations arise in the expression of this culture through art. Finally, it focuses on the practical elements found in religious rituals and examines their underlying meanings in the context of art philosophy. Throughout human history, the phenomenon of religion and art has been one of the most thought-about and analyzed topics. The similarities in the theories put forward about the origins of religion and art reveal the existence of a serious relationship between religion and art. From this perspective, one of the aims of this text is to offer an art-centered interpretation of theories about the nature of religion, attempting to express that art is at the center of religion and religious life. The religious sphere and the artistic sphere share many similarities, and this inevitable relationship between them has been felt throughout human history, from ancient times to the modern era. Art and religion are both ways of making the imaginary 1 ORCID: 0000-0003-2895-8176 | E-Mail: [email protected] Iğdır University, Faculty of Theology, Department of Philosophy of Religion, Iğdır, TÜRKİYE. RELIGION AND ART 8 morality, and ritual (worship). Since the following chapters analyze how the relationship between the understanding of divinity and morality and aesthetics is established or attempted to be established, the preference for the concept of “ritual” here is only because the concept of “ritual” is more inclusive. In general, issues such as belief and faith constitute the mental/cognitive side of religions, while worship or rituals, in whatever form they take, are the tangible manifestations of this thought or worldview. Of course, a believer or a religious person is aware that the being he or she believes to be sacred has a transcendent reality outside/above him or herself and recognizes that the sacred transcends what the person has created. It is seen that the “sacred” is associated with a being and, above all, with an emotional experience; this experience is then expressed in the form of visions, images, intellectual categories, religious practices—in short, religious institutions. Such a general understanding gives us the impression that every act of faith is a form of worship. Indeed, the sacred and experiences of the sacred are often externalized or expressed in some way through concepts, myths, and symbols. The externalization of the lived experience, which is perhaps the first goal of rituals—and we often make our evaluations and analyses through external phenomena—makes us feel that the perception and realization of the sacred presence contain elements that are both useful and dangerous. Because rituals are often performed in order to achieve some gains or to eliminate some dangers (Zuesse, 1987, pp. 406). In order to lead a balanced life, the human soul cannot be nourished only by theoretical truths. Apart from its need to know and believe, it needs to be grounded in a practical principle that will constantly regulate its actions, whether in its personal behavior or in its relations with God or with human beings. As Whitehead points out, in this practical aspect, religion, compared to its other elements, is the most important force that cleanses the spiritual parts of man. This is because the actions, objects, and practices that have value in terms of rituals are also a source of excitement. One of the two basic functions of rituals is “protection,” and the other is “enthusiasm.” Religion manages and tries to balance the relationship between the sacred and profane/ worldly spheres through rituals. Therefore, it can be said that rituals provide the transition and balance between two states, two eras, two systems, two identical societies, etc. (Whitehead, 1993, pp. 92). The above-mentioned basic features of rituals—i.e., purifying and strengthening our spiritual structure—are also indispensable requirements of aesthetics and art. It is clear that the great arts offer brilliant values to the HASAN OCAK 9 soul and pave the way for the reorganization of our environment. From such a point of view, it does not seem easy to exhaust the importance of rituals with an accepted work of art (Read, 1981, pp. 67). Although the intellectual dimension is necessary in art and rituals, emotion always has a more important place than intellect in both. Because most of the time, art and rituals are made in the name of the emotion they will elicit. Seeing that ritual and art have a structure with similar functions, Whitehead claims that people become artistic in rituals and reflect their rituals with their art. According to him, our human adventure, which begins with curiosity, wonder, and sensation, is externalized in ritual and art as play or as stimuli for our emotions. In this context, we see that Whitehead states that religion is an art; that the true authenticity of ritual and art must be sought in solitude; and that you can never be a good religious person or a good artist if you have never been alone with yourself (Whitehead, 1993, pp. 93). It is clear that in some societies and in some segments of society, art and aesthetics have replaced religious belief and worship and tried to fill their void. There are many examples in history to confirm this. For example, during the heyday of Roman and Greek civilization (and even today), many people sought solace by filling the void left by religion with art. It is no coincidence that some philosophers and psychologists today argue that the behavioral symptoms of the religious individual are surprisingly similar to those of lovers or those united in aesthetic passion. According to these arguments, music, art, and scripture are rhythmic symbols of religious beliefs reflected outwardly. Religions, probably just like art style and fashion, are structures that have been cleverly designed with the aesthetic characteristics of human nature in mind—or that God has not ignored the aesthetic nature of human beings (Dawkins, 2006, pp. 253). The fact that aesthetics is based partly on the realm of freedom and partly on sensation, and that religions try to maintain a balance between the sacred and the profane, especially through rituals, has led them to be sometimes synonymous and sometimes interchangeable. Of course, considering that society, language, and art do not develop or change on their own but in interaction with each other, it is impossible for religion and rituals, which are an inseparable element of it, not to share in these mutual relations. Therefore, the most important point in both religion and aesthetics is to explain the relationship of religion and aesthetics with external existence “in terms of whether they have an organic connection”; in other words, to show how the religious manifests itself in the sensible. RELIGION AND ART 10 However, the idea that art is a substitute for religion and religion for art, or that the two are identical, and that religion and art can be fully externalized, becomes an approach that requires careful attention—especially when it comes to Islamic art and religion. For, according to Muslim theologians and artists, art has always been conscious of the fact that it is art; it has never attempted to replace religion or to stand against it as an “element of opposition.” In our opinion, of course, religion is not art, but no one can say that living by hearing, thinking, and enjoying is not related to art or aesthetics. Therefore, when the Ihsan (spiritual excellence) dimension of Islam is considered—i.e., “the believer behaves as if he sees Allah and Allah’s Jamal” is taken into account—it is inconceivable for believers to stay away from beauty, subtlety, deep perception—in short, aesthetic enjoyment. Because the Muslim has the goal of being one of the good ones by choosing the beauties of the universe and life. To summarize, Islamic aesthetics never ceases to be interested in metaphysics, even if its intensity changes. From monotonous, simple gymnastic movements to dance, song, and poetry, the common element in all of them that creates aesthetic excitement is actually rhythm and meter. Although music and dance in primitive societies are thought to involve simple rhythmic movements, it is also widely believed that they functioned as an integral part of primitive rituals. Perhaps Plato is actually referring to this aesthetic nature of human beings (modern and primitive society) rather than the human condition on a temporal plane when he claims that the rhythmic and harmonious movements we make in the singing of a song (also while listening) or in a dance create rhythm and harmony in the mind. In a way, such a claim also implies that movements that are far from rhythm and meter will be insufficient in creating aesthetic sensitivity. For example, we do not find any aesthetic value in the general view of a man who leaps with joy and shouts at the top of his lungs. Nor can we attribute any elegance to the behavior of people who fight. But when we connect these movements of theirs to a sequence or order with constant repetitions over time—that is, these rhythmic movements—they create an aesthetic excitement in us. Therefore, it is always possible for a fight to turn into a war dance. In short, even in primitive societies, it seems difficult to imagine an art devoid of meter and rhythm (Read, 1981, pp. 78). The use of artistic manifestations and instruments in the rituals of primitive societies is due to their ability to better express collective excitement. They are more effective in provoking excitement than highly refined works of art whose scale becomes invisible in the gestalt/integrity of melodic beauty. HASAN OCAK 11 Among the primitive arts, the first striking element is the gymnastic-like dances that accompany various religious rituals and battles. Although it is difficult to distinguish between religion and magic (sorcery) in primitive manifestations—because magic, like religion, can have certain beliefs and rituals. According to some anthropologists, it too has superstitions, ceremonies, sacrifices, prayers, songs, rites, and even gods. For this reason, in primitive societies, some of the ceremonies and purposes of magic and religion can be confused. When we analyze the issue in the center of Hegel’s idea that art is one of the most sublime things that came to us from the past, the understanding of art and aesthetics of primitive societies can also contribute to the life experience of today’s people—provided that our evaluations are not from a single or reductionist perspective. In this context, in order to understand the art of primitive societies, it is not necessary to look at their works of art only from an objective and evolutionary perspective. Therefore, it is quite possible to see a high metaphysics in the artworks of primitive societies, which can evaluate art in its entirety but also transcend objective interpretations—whether in the wood carvings of the Maori or the Assyrian reliefs. In a Hegelian interpretation, such a metaphysical understanding can also be considered a continuous recording of the great process of reckoning (thesis–antithesis–synthesis) in which man and the external world have been engaged since the day of creation and will continue to engage in the future (Farazer, 1927, pp. 253). Music is one of the most important means that religions use to express themselves and gain a social dimension while not neglecting the position of the individual. As an integrative element of social life, music is among the indispensable elements of religion and religious life, especially with its qualities such as dramatization or emotional intensification in the context of rituals. Despite the fact that some theologians and clergymen viewed music with suspicion due to its association with entertainment and worldly pleasures, and even banned it altogether—and despite the fact that many people today consider it as a leisure activity—it is seen that religions definitely include music, albeit in certain forms, and that music is of central importance especially for some religions. Music, with all its individual and social texture, is both a carrier of human values and thoughts and an aesthetic bridge between the beliefs of the individual and society. Music, with its melody and meaningful linguistic structure, is also used to express metaphysical experience in a manner similar to rituals with its character in the externalization and transportation of human experience. This is because music, with its aspect that gains meaning in or through rituals, and with some of the common features it shares with rituals, RELIGION AND ART 12 gives the impression that it itself has a ritualistic power. Even from our own lives, we can say that people who listen to music or participate in rituals go beyond the constraints and obligations of the current daily life and step into a different world with their experience. In this respect, to agree with Schopenhauer, music is the truest, most expressive, and most real language. Music is not the image, imitation, composition, and indirect depiction of existence, but directly the existence itself and the essence of existence. The world can be called the embodied will as well as the embodied music (İkbal, 1908, pp. 27). Schopenhauer, who considers music as a metaphysical force, is not alone in this assumption, for music has always been believed to have a metaphysical power since the dawn of humanity. In ancient Egyptian religion, for example, we see the Sun God singing and making the realm emerge from the cries of light, and at the beginning of the Brahma creation myth, music and harmony accompany creation. Within rituals, the event of death itself and some post-mortem practices are a state of “aesthetic sublimity,” and it is in the ritualistic dramas of funeral rites that we encounter manifestations of aesthetics or art. In these ceremonies, we see the development of the branches of art involved in speech, singing, architecture, and ornamentation. Funeral ceremonies, which were originally a dramatic scene, gradually took on a purely lyrical character; in many cultures, they gave birth to elegies, prayers, laments, and were the source of the formation of an enormous oral literature. The dramatic element in funeral ceremonies and the attitudes taken towards the idea of death cause us to revive certain religious legends or myths. These enrich the imagination on the one hand and influence aesthetic modes of expression on the other. In short, funeral ceremonies play an important role in both the birth and development of a musical genre. Attitudes taken in the face of death and immortality or funeral ceremonies, with their aesthetic excitement, can lead people to a new field of thought and contribute to the evaluation of life in an existential dimension. 4. Aesthetic Experience and God Aesthetic experience, like religious experience, is multifaceted. In the first stage, the subject’s contact with the object arouses a kind of emotional appetite in the subject’s perception and focuses attention on the object. Therefore, aesthetic perception emerges as a result of an emotional state and involves a series of voluntary-emotional conditions. The element that makes aesthetic experience different from other experiences is a cognitive state HASAN OCAK 13 arising from satisfaction in the first stage. The cognitive state in aesthetic experience is aesthetic judgment (Zdybicka, 1991, pp. 153). This judgment varies from person to person. On the other hand, since aesthetic experience is available to all people, it would be appropriate to ask whether it implies the ultimate beauty. In order to claim this, it is essential to make some assumptions. First of all, it is assumed that the object of aesthetic experience is beautiful. The value discovered in aesthetic experience is beauty. That is to say, it is to break away from everyday concerns, preoccupations, and objects and move to a new dimension that is practically irrelevant. This aesthetic attitude is sometimes identified with religious experience because it does not provide a measurable material benefit and opens the subject’s existence to new dimensions. Yet there is a big difference between the object and purpose of religious and aesthetic experience. Religious experience is ultimately a search for unity with a transcendent being. It is, therefore, an act that aims to achieve a true union with God. In contrast, aesthetic experience may not always have an existential aspect. Moreover, while aesthetic experience takes us away from practical reality and leads us to live in the moment, religious experience, on the contrary, leads the subject to action. Although religious experience in a sense distances the subject from daily practical concerns, it aims to include their actions in the awareness resulting from religious experience. Sometimes there is no apparent difference between religious experience and aesthetic experience. Natural beauty reveals the uniqueness of particular objects (Dadosky, 2010, pp. 3). Theistic natural signs involve the indirect perception of God. These signs are thought to be grounded in human nature and lead to belief in God. For example, the splendor of nature can remind us of God. The sunset over a mountain landscape can be considered a theistic natural sign. This perception leads to certain beliefs about God’s existence and attributes. In fact, perceiving beauty as a theistic natural sign is related to the epistemology of aesthetic feelings. One should not be reluctant to trust aesthetic experiences as well. First, the value of an emotion, object, or situation is appreciated. To believe that the world is as it appears in sensory experience is to tend to trust emotions as well as sensory perceptions. Emotions enable us to perceive and value the beauty in objects. This perception is, in a way, an evaluation arising from a combination of physical characteristics. Therefore, beauty is not entirely in the eye of the beholder. The subject only needs to be “ready to perceive the value of splendor” to experience beauty (Alston, 1991, pp. 28). RELIGION AND ART 14 Nature, taken as a theistic sign, represents a kind of image of the divine creator. With the analogy that lightning is invisible but its effect is visible, Socrates says that we can observe the order that God has given to the universe only in its effect. If nature is, in reality, an image or mirror of the divine, then nature, like human beings, has an integrity in itself and a value for itself. Thus, nature ceases to be merely an object for man and becomes an end for God. In this context, the visible is the sign of the divine. The visible part of nature, then, emerges as the beauty bestowed upon it by God. In a similar sense, human life is thought to be the image of God insofar as it reveals creativity, intelligence, will, freedom, and love—or better. “Wherever we look at beauty, we eventually reach the level of divinity: every beauty that you unfold in nature is nothing but the appearance of the Idea of the Beautiful.” The changing manifestations in the visible world lead man to his unchanging Being. On the other hand, when we take unity as the ontological distinction between creator and created, nothing can be like God. Thus, God’s beauty can be seen in His actions, and the perfection of His actions is the measure of all other beauty (Evans, 2010, pp. 12-17). Beauty in nature is not the divine beauty itself, but its image—its reflection. Today, aesthetic value is thought to be found in nature and in works of art. In the Middle Ages, many thinkers believed that there was a transcendent aspect of beauty, goodness, and unity. The theological tradition, influenced by Plato’s Feast, embraces the idea that God is the source of beauty and that beauty is even defined by God. Post-medieval thinkers emphasize the connection between God and beauty. “The apprehension of nature as a sign leads to a process of contemplation and perception in man.” Whatever the object of beauty, it leads to God. Not only nature but also works of art can bear a divine signature. A song that stirs the emotions, an inspiring story, or a work of art that evokes aesthetic pleasure bears God’s imprint. It can be said that God only gives the world a shadow of His perfection. Order, harmony, and appropriateness in things correspond to divine unity. Even if the love of beauty in human beings is not satisfied with things, it will tell us about divine beauty as if it reminds us of a dream. The artist is the one who tries to see the divine beauty more than anyone else. Because the main goal in art is to pass from the visible to the ideas. Existence is beautiful in terms of the trace of the most beautiful, and the effort to understand the beautiful is a kind of effort to understand God. Because the artist creates his art in pursuit of the beautiful (Karadeniz, 2020, pp. 14). We should note that theistic signs are not obvious to every observer who thinks only about nature or human beings. One can very well look at nature or humans and find no trace of the divine there. If God exists and created HASAN OCAK 15 the world, is there any reason to believe that natural beauty points to this? Conversely, there is no reason to think that God does not reveal Himself through natural beauty. Suppose that God’s self-revealing through natural beauty is grounded in human nature. If God exists, there is no obstacle to His creating beauty to point to Himself. The relativity and subjectivity of beauty are counterexamples. Nevertheless, it is clear in one way or another that nature evokes emotions such as awe, wonder, gratitude, and respect. Some may say that these feelings or beauty are entirely in the mind, imagination, or evolutionary outcomes, but we cannot say that such arguments exclude the perception of beauty (Şimşek, 2014, pp. 78). As is well known, the beauty of objects in the external world causes a kind of satisfaction in the perceiver. Human tastes do not preclude this. The diversity of tastes can be explained in several ways. Some people may have better senses than others. Although all this beauty points to God, not all access may be equal. Sensitivity to beauty and the mind/God behind it can vary from person to person. Indeed, “They speak to everyone, but their beauty is understood only by those who compare their outward voices with the truth within.” Seeing the splendor in theistic signs can lead to a love of God, but in the absence of this love, it would not be difficult to explain beauty in different ways. Perceptual sensitivity and divine concerns provide a perspective for perceiving theistic natural signs. Seeing aesthetic experiences as revelations of God or as the means by which the divine reveals itself requires the subject to respond with assent and obedience. This is a kind of act of faith. In aesthetic experience, then, the traces of God’s activity and presence in nature become more clearly visible. Therefore, the experience of beauty can provide a rational justification for God’s existence, even if it is not necessary (Augustinus & Pusey, 1949, pp. 37). Aesthetic experience, as is known, includes all human beings. As Aquinas says, “Everyone loves the beautiful.” Therefore, it can be said that the aesthetic evidence used to prove God’s existence is inclusive/universal. In order to talk about aesthetic proof, it is necessary to talk with the concepts of aesthetics. First of all, we must specify what we mean by the term God. Otherwise, the question “Which God?” will come up, which will lead to some semantic and epistemological ambiguities. The term God can be understood in the light of qualities such as omniscience, omnipotence, and absolute goodness. It is one thing to prove the existence of such a God; it is another to find the fulfillment of the existential longing for a transcendent being. Proving God’s existence does not require the existence of a personal relationship with God, as emphasized in theistic religions. As a matter of fact, arguments and their conclusions lack the personal relationship that would RELIGION AND ART 16 offer an I–Thou interaction. In other words, believing that the conclusion of an argument is true does not directly lead to faith in God. A theology that appeals only to abstract reason can foster the sense that religious belief lacks existential depth. Whereas the ontological argument is a priori and does not refer to the nature of experience, the cosmological argument relies on concepts such as succession, causality, and contingency without value content. Among traditional arguments, the aesthetic argument provides a value-based understanding and appreciation of beauty. Indeed, axiological arguments focus on value. The supreme being must exist; therefore, God must exist. Everything that must exist probably exists, so God probably exists. In the same way, aesthetic arguments provide a strong argument for theism. In contrast, the beauty argument has received relatively little attention. The aesthetic argument is not included in anthologies of natural theological arguments; it is sometimes found among arguments for design. However, the evidence can be traced back to antiquity. Ecology is certainly the science that deserves to be a theoretical framework for making sense of our place in the world. When the design argument or aesthetic evidence is developed in the field of value, it can encompass all this. A posteriori arguments have been neglected in recent philosophy of religion, and a re-examination of design arguments could open up this area (De Cruz & De Smedt, 2015, pp. 133). More succinctly, the aesthetic argument does not have a traditional argumentative structure, but it is argued that aesthetic experience depends on the existence of God. For a theist, God’s desire to create beauty is a reason— but this is not the case for a non-theist. Aesthetic evidence must therefore show how aesthetic experience is explained by theism. This can be done in two ways: by appealing to the idea of design and by seeing beauty as an element of religious experience. The views of philosophers of religion who deal with the existential dimension of the aesthetic argument are experiential in nature. R. Swinburne, who appeals to beauty to strengthen his argument for design, and F. Tennant, who presents one of the most comprehensive views of beauty, are examples of the idea of design. Both forms of the aesthetic argument infer the existence of a creator from the beauty of the present realm. To see beauty as a form of religious experience is to see aesthetic experience as including the experience of God. On this interpretation, beauty somehow reflects the nature of God. Thus, people experience God through beauty. Although aesthetic experience is also related to religious experience, the connection with God in aesthetic experience is relatively indirect compared to religious experience (Swinburne, 2019, pp. 2). HASAN OCAK 17 Proving God’s existence may not be very difficult, but finding meaning and fulfillment is sometimes difficult. To expect proofs of God’s existence to satisfy a restless heart is to ask too much of them. Divine religions, on the other hand, offer such hope. Theological proofs support those who want to believe. Aesthetic evidence can be thought to be based on existential longing in this context. The justification provided by experience may not always be an argument. Although divine experiences can make a claim, they will not be considered a direct argument. Aesthetic desire is tried to be satisfied with experiences based on aesthetic pleasure. The sense of sublimity revealed in works of art or experiences of nature is a kind of remembrance. In this respect, the desire for aesthetic experience is quite different from other desires. For example, one can satisfy one’s desire to eat cake by eating cake, but the desire in the face of a striking work of art increases in intensity. The first premise of such a universality argument is that people perceive nature as full of beauty. Lewis claimed that humans seek to fulfill their longing for God through aesthetic experiences. The existence of artistic activity in all known human cultures empirically supports the universality of aesthetics (Lewis, 2001, pp. 136-137). Aesthetic evidence shaped in this way is based on a sense of longing, and for it to work, the reader is expected to have the same feeling. Feelings of restlessness and incompleteness are thought to stem from longing for God. As a response to existential longing, Augustine was one of those who could only soothe his restless heart with the beauty of God. According to him, the most perfect harmony is unity. By “one” is meant God. He has placed beauty and appropriateness in everything. All of these beauties come from the divine source and are justified by it. If the beginning and end of beauty is wahdat, God is the principle and cause of all beauty. In short, beauty points to the divine. Creation wants to communicate the nature of the divine. The saturation of forms radiates from the object through beauty. All creation is a reflection of divine beauty. Thus, a person can be beautiful in spirit and body to the extent that he or she approaches the perfection of God. Augustine says that beauty reminds us of divine beauty, but this remembrance does not imply an innate knowledge in Plantinga’s terminology. According to this understanding of remembrance, “we remember God from the moment we recognize Him.” So what does this mean? Calvin, as A. Plantinga suggests, speaks of the existence of conditions that remind us of God. The aesthetic argument establishes a connection with beauty and the divine. 25 CHAPTER 2 RELIGIOUS MUSIC IN THE MODERN WORLD Assoc. Prof. Hakan Emre ZİYAGİL1 Abstract Music, as one of humanity’s most ancient and universal languages establishes a profound connection between the material world and spiritual beliefs. However, in the contemporary era, this tradition faces a complex dance of change. The primary objective of this study is to analyze how the forces of secularization, modernization, and digitalization are reshaping religious music, aiming to elucidate the paradox between the declining auditory presence in traditional institutions and the proliferation of new musical forms. Employing a qualitative research design based on descriptive analysis and a comprehensive literature review this chapter investigates the sociological transformation of sacred music within a phenomenological framework. Rather than focusing on technical or structural analysis of specific liturgies, the study explores the broader “transformation thesis” of religious expression in the modern world. The research addresses the central question of how religious music negotiates its existence under secular pressure and evolves into innovative forms to maintain its function. Key findings reveal a significant spatial shift: religious music is moving from the communal sphere of churches and mosques to the individualized, private sphere of smartphones and digital platforms. While traditional performance practices 1 ORCID: 0000-0002-2981-2497 | E-Mail: [email protected] Niğde Ömer Halisdemir University, State Conservatory of Turkish Music, Department of Turkish Music / Niğde, TÜRKİYE RELIGIOUS MUSIC IN THE MODERN WORLD 26 are weakening, the study identifies a surge in hybrid genres, where religious messages are blended with secular forms such as electronic music, rock, and jazz. This digital democratization expands global access but simultaneously raises critical discussions regarding the potential loss of spiritual sincerity and depth. Ultimately, contradicting the notion that religious music is facing extinction, this work asserts its unique value by demonstrating how it is reconstructed as a vital tool for identity formation and belonging in modern society. Keywords: Ethnomusicology, modernity, spirituality, sacred music, secularization 1. Introduction The melodies echoing under the sky are intertwined with music, one of the most ancient and universal languages of humanity. It also establishes a deep connection with religious beliefs and rituals, adding a dimension that adds meaning and spirituality to our existence. In the modern world, this ancient tradition is being swept away in a complex dance of change and continuity. On the one hand, the waves of secularization and modernization are leading to the decline of traditional religious music practices and the change of their role in society. Classical hymns and prayers echoing in religious institutions such as churches, mosques and synagogues are being replaced by silence, religious music education and performance are weakening, and the number of religious musicians is decreasing. This situation is creating a gap between a generation yearning for the past with a wind of nostalgia and a generation setting sail for new pursuits. On the other hand, the dynamism of the modern world is also paving the way for religious music to sprout in new and innovative forms. Different musical genres such as electronic music, hip hop, rock and jazz are blended with religious feelings and messages, creating a brand new musical universe. In this way, religious music reaches a wider audience, is adopted by different generations and keeps pace with the pulse of the modern world. With the influence of digital technologies, the production, distribution and consumption of religious music are gaining a completely different dimension. Religious music works, which can now be easily accessed over the internet, reach millions of people through smartphones, tablets and computers. This contributes to religious music transcending its borders and becoming a global phenomenon. Will the opportunities offered by the digital age help religious music become widespread or will they cause it to drift away from spirituality and sincerity? These and similar questions pave the way for intriguing and HAKAN EMRE ZİYAGİL 27 important discussions about the future of religious music in the modern world. Issues such as the challenges faced by traditional religious music practices, the changes in the role of religious music in the modern world, the emergence of new and innovative forms of religious music and the use of religious music in the digital age are of great importance. In addition, the impact of religious music on individual and social identity, spirituality and sense of belonging in modern society is undeniable. Throughout this journey, we will explore the story of religious music from the past to the present, analyze the challenges and opportunities presented by the modern world, and examine different perspectives on the future of religious music. Our goal is to better understand the place and importance of this ancient tradition in the modern world and to create a meaningful framework for the future of religious music. 2. The Emergence of the Concept of Religion and Music Religious music encompasses musical genres that are associated with and performed by religious beliefs, rituals, and emotions. These musical genres are generally used in religious contexts, such as reading sacred texts, singing hymns, praying, and playing in religious ceremonies. The relationship between religion and music is a strong bond that has existed throughout human history. It is known that religion affects people’s spiritual and spiritual worlds and provides them with peace and happiness, and that music also has a similar effect. People have expressed their feelings and met their spiritual needs by using music both in religious rituals and in daily life for thousands of years. Religious music is not limited to a specific religion; it is encountered in almost all world religions in different forms and traditions. The concept of “religious music”, which generally reveals the power of selfexpression as a reflection of people’s spiritual integrity, still maintains itself with this strong structure. For example; when the call to prayer in Islam, puja in Buddhism, and the rituals that emerged in Hindus are considered, the concept of religious music is seen as a combination of divine words and music and its use (Ellingson, 2005). At the same time, according to Hindu belief, Brahma (god) is depicted with Saravasti playing a cymbal in his hands, while Vaishnava (god) is shown playing a flute by blowing into a conch shell (Beck, 2006, p.114). When we look at the life before Islam when we say religious music, we come across many facts. Among these facts, it is possible to talk about the combination of the concept of fine arts with religion among societies and RELIGIOUS MUSIC IN THE MODERN WORLD 28 the oldest Turkish communities. It is observed that the clergymen in these societies expressed beautiful words to mobilize the society and the connection with music (Özkan, 1987). At the same time, people called shamans used this religious music concept (harmony, lyrics and dance) in the emergence of the Turks. Later, these people were also called by names such as Kam, Ozan, Baksı, Bahşi and Kam (Banarlı, 1971). Based on this, it is seen that the connection between religion and music emerged together and formed the main theme of religious rituals through different people. On the other hand, the Turks included music in the ceremonies and celebrations related to religion that they put forward in the period before Islam. Later, with the acceptance of Islam by the Turks, the interest in music reached higher levels. Over time, forms called religious music will emerge and continue to this day as the richness of a deep-rooted culture (Özalp, 2000, p.106). If we go back further in the relationship between religion and music, it is possible to talk about the ancient periods. Here, we come across the ancient period and the rituals belonging to them. One of the most important building blocks used in these rituals is music. Therefore, although the concept of religion came to the fore in the emergence of civilizations, it would not be wrong to say that music gained a real identity with its combination and use. This situation will provide a transfer until today as a part of both cultural and cultural transfer that has lasted for years. The music used in these ancient periods was presented by the musicians who performed it in a very devoted manner, and it continued as an important element that could not leave room for error. Thus, the combination of divine words with music and the resulting devoted work revealed how important the connection between religion and music was even in that period. In fact, one of the main reasons for the creation of religious words and music was not to anger the gods (Elbaş, 2010, p. 247). This situation, which was frequently encountered in religious rituals in those periods, was examined meticulously and in a very sensitive order. The connection between music and religion can also be seen in tribal cultures, going back to ancient times. In tribes, there are musical concepts that generally emerge with the subject of magic. Although these concepts were not performed through melodic structures, they were performed with instruments similar to drums today. It can also be said that musical structures have the characteristics of a religious ceremony in which tribal people present their own voices together with rhythms. Therefore, it is observed that religion and music, as well as the magic plot, are presented together. It is also useful to note that dance figures are used in the shows performed in these rituals. The photo below shows the dances and figures performed by New Zealand tribal people together with music. HAKAN EMRE ZİYAGİL 29 1.War Dance, New Zelland (SOFREP, 2022). The ancient civilizations that formed the basis of the concept of religion and music exhibited quite holistic behaviors with the understanding of fate. Among these behaviors, they adopted the belief that all the good and bad situations that happened to them in their lives were given by the gods due to the belief in fate. In addition, they organized religious ceremonies to win the favor of the gods and to make themselves closer to them. These religious ceremonies are again connected to music and are performed within a ritual. In these rituals, some religious ceremonies are performed by considering what the gods want from them or whether any anger is presented to them. Ceremonies were held within some facts about the diseases that will be presented to them from the beginning to the end of their lives and how the cures for these diseases will be. These ceremonies are also thought to reveal the relationship of music with religion (Yiğit, 2023, p.132). RELIGIOUS MUSIC IN THE MODERN WORLD 30 2. Ancient Roman Period Religious Ceremony (Alamy, n.d) Another community where music and religion have the most important place among the tribes are the Aborigines. Aborigines are known as Australian natives. The concept that best expresses the connection between religion and music in these communities is Yijan. Yijan is generally defined as a dream (Batuk, 2013). According to this belief system, it is said that the ancestors of the Aborigines walked and moved in the sky. 3. Aborigines and Religious Music Show (Alamy, n.d.) HAKAN EMRE ZİYAGİL 31 In the archaeological excavations carried out in the Anatolian region, some evidence of importance for the history of music was found. Some materials and symbols used to produce sound were found among this evidence. In the light of this information, it can be said that the concept of musical culture was born in the Neolithic period (Karaagaç, 2018, p.287). Thus, it would not be wrong to say that the foundations of the religious-based musical approach also manifested themselves in the Anatolian region. At the same time, Judaism is among the religions that emphasize music. The word “singing” is repeated 309 times in the verbal expressions used in the Jewish religion. This situation also shows us the connection of the Jewish religion with music (Friedmann, 2009, p.25). 3. Types of Religious Music Religious music covers a wide range and appears in different forms in different religions and cultures. Some of the most common types of religious music are as follows: 3.1. Hymns These are melodies that express religious beliefs and feelings, usually adapted from sacred texts. They usually consist of lyrics that are appropriate to the structure of each religion, and their melodic structures show their existence within the musical system of that period. Hymns also show the structure of a certain system formed within the structure of religion. They present the rules that exist within any religion within a certain structure and with melodic patterns. Hymns, which constitute the most basic structure of music and the concept of religion, are among the most important building blocks of the belief system. 3.2. Prayer Music It is expressed as the music used during the reading or singing of prayers. Again, prayers are read with melodic patterns according to the own prayer and discourse style of each religion. Although it is a single human voice, it can include collective prayer rituals. At the same time, prayers can be read with the accompaniment of different instruments, as in the old and ancient periods. The own structure of each religion is taken as a basis here. RELIGIOUS MUSIC IN THE MODERN WORLD 32 3.3. Ritual Music Music played during religious ceremonies, usually accompanying the reading or performance of sacred texts. Rituals are performed with their structure specific to different religions. The most important of these and the best examples of the Mevlevi rituals that are well-known all over the world are one of the best examples. Mevlevi rituals can also be called Sufi music. 3.4. Meditation Music Music used during religious meditation and contemplation, usually creating a calm and peaceful atmosphere. It consists of melodic patterns that people generally do alone and that a certain music repeats frequently. Today, there are music made especially with the culture of Buddhism and meditations related to it. These meditations are performed by associating them with certain movements and keeping up with the calm structure of the music. At the same time, meditation music is also a type of music used during mental exercises such as meditation and mindfulness, creating a calm and peaceful atmosphere. These musics are designed to help deepen meditation by calming the mind and reducing stress and anxiety. These musics, which are generally listened to in a calm mood, are designed to make people focus on a certain task and reach the highest peak of concentration related to that task. It is a type of music that is frequently preferred in the modern world for the soul to calm down and take a peaceful state. 3.5. Spiritual Musics It is called musics related to religious beliefs and spiritual concepts, but not limited to a specific religion. This type of music is generally listened to to increase focus and maximize concentration. It also includes positive affirmations such as purifying one’s own soul and nourishing oneself with spiritual feelings. This form of music, which stands out in our modern world, offers us the different tone of religion and music. Spiritual musics, which are presented using many different instruments, are also listened to by people from different religions today. When this style of music is considered, it is seen that it shows itself in the modern world as a different reflection of religious music. There are many different artists who reflect and perform this form of music today. HAKAN EMRE ZİYAGİL 33 4. The Modernization Process of Traditional Religious Music Practices Modernization and secularization have led to the decline of religious institutions such as churches, mosques, synagogues and the traditional religious music practices performed in these institutions in many societies. This has led to a decline in religious music education and performance, a decrease in the number of religious musicians and a decrease in the audience of religious music. At the same time, the decrease in some cultural accumulations with modernization is revealed by the music produced. It can be said that the concept of traditional religious music has also been pushed to the background due to the increase in societies that accept the concept of religion only as a ritual and cannot fully implement this feeling in their lives. A society that consumes fast and individuals who cannot fully comprehend the belief system within themselves have gradually accelerated this process. It would not be wrong to say that the concept of traditionality has also entered a weakening process due to the acceleration of these processes. The negative effects of modernization processes on the concepts of traditionality and religious music are also evident today. On the other hand, modernization is a process in which societies undergo radical changes in social, cultural and economic areas, so it also has a significant impact on traditional practices. Traditional religious music practices also tend to decline with the modernization process, taking their share of these changes. There are many reasons behind this decline. Some of these reasons include: 4.1. Secularization It is the process of decreasing the influence of the sacred in society and individuals and the prominence of worldly values. This process includes not only the decrease in religious beliefs and practices, but also the decline of the influence of religion in all areas of society. From another perspective, it can also be expressed as the modern societies that exist today moving away from traditional religious beliefs and values and becoming more secular. This situation also reduces the importance and function of religious music in society. When looked at from the religious dimension, this tension (secular structure) is calculated by looking at the interest in religious ceremonies, loyalty to the Orthodox belief system, the number of people attending holidays and other religious-based collective actions (Ekinci, 2018, p.321). Although the secular structure seems to have negatively affected the concept of religion, according to Luckman; research has also revealed that there is no 41 CHAPTER 3 RELIGION AND TECHNOLOGY Prof. Dr. Muhammet ÖZDEMİR1 Abstract This study attempts to interpret the relationships between the concepts of religion and technology, focusing on social life and the key concepts of the second half of the 21st century. The concept of religion corresponds to one of the phenomena concretely experienced in the knowledge, law, and economy of an individualized social life. The concept of technology corresponds to a power center that intensely influences social life, communication, division of labor, solidarity, and values. Humanity, economy, and culture cannot be understood while disregarding the realities of technology and individualized life. Within this framework, religion is characterized as one of the valueproviding actors in established communication, division of labor, and solidarity, rather than merely an emotion or spiritual state. The relationship between religion and technology must be addressed by examining individualization, economy, artificial intelligence (AI), and the new format of social life. In this study, religion is treated as a concept that is as dynamic, variable, and dependent on power relations as technology. Thus, religion, having evolved from a passive actor role in the 19th and early 20th centuries to an active actor role in the second half of the 20th century, has become a central component in the first quarter of the 21st century. Currently, religion 1 ORCID: 0000-0001-8465-1924 | E-Mail: [email protected] Duzce University, Faculty of Arts and Science, Department of Philosophy/ Duzce, TÜRKİYE RELIGION AND TECHNOLOGY 42 is as much a part of the economy, knowledge, and law as technology, and it acts as a guiding force for the state and society. Furthermore, it must be acknowledged that technology is increasingly replacing science, and science operates with a characteristic that is more passive and determined, even when compared to religion. The study focuses on constructing a philosophical context that simultaneously observes and develops these shifts. Key Words: Religion, technology, ındividualization, economy, artificial ıntelligence 1. Introduction This section aims to critically examine the role and status of religion within the evolving global culture shaped by technological advancements –an idea that is anticipated to become a defining theme of the 21st century. In any relationship between technology and religion—just as in the classic Eurocentric association between “religion and science”—the immediate notion is typically that technology, with its own materiality, paves the way for humanity and empowers it, whereas religion, being founded on faith, demands submission from humanity and imposes limitations on it. In this comparative framework, technology is understood to represent labor and innovation, while religion is seen as embodying entrenched popular social life and resistance (Alonso, 2023: 277-278). This conceptualization is, however, flawed because it continually reduces our understanding of history to a dichotomy between the negatively perceived Catholic Church (or the Inquisition courts) of Medieval Europe and civil society. History is not solely constituted by the experiences of the people of Medieval Europe. Moreover, the social experience in which the Catholic Church was dominant pertains to one historical context, while the experience characterized by the strength of civil society belongs to another. Consequently, whether one focuses on the possibility that technology might one day assume the role of religion when discussing religion, or on the possibility that religion may invariably serve as the resistance of inexperienced masses when discussing technology, such approaches are unproductive. Instead, when the potential outcomes of these ostensibly opposing arguments are taken into consideration, it is more beneficial to problematize each concept by translating it into the experiential demands of human life. Rationality can only truly safeguard itself from mere hypothetical constructs and sentimental intentions when it is tested through an evaluation grounded in potential outcomes (James, 1922: 3–19; 1966: 3–5). Thus, it is imperative to ascertain from the outset that neither emotional disposition nor MUHAMMET ÖZDEMİR 43 systematic resistance constitutes an intrinsic component of religion. Rather, both characteristics, which are often regarded as deficiencies, serve to delineate individuals who lack experiential engagement and the capacity for their cultivation. If such individuals are religious and devout, these attributes may be subject to adverse influence. Conversely, if the same individuals are irreligious and non-believers, it becomes equally necessary to examine whether these attributes might undergo a similar form of negative alteration. In this section, while examining the potential new relationships between religion and technology, it is beneficial to first conceptualize the religion from the perspective of an individualized society and, subsequently, the technology from the standpoint of an individualized economy. As a second framework, it is necessary to address the relationship between artificial intelligence and the religion. A third analytical perspective involves transhumanism and the religion. Undoubtedly, the ultimate aim of these analyzes is to anticipate and effectively manage the emerging interactions between machines and religious individuals. 2. Individualized Social Religion The contemporary era began with the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the United Nations General Assembly on December 10, 1948. The hallmark of this period is the recognition of every individual as equally dignified and entitled to rights from birth. While Article 1 of the Declaration proclaims and guarantees this principle, the document’s content redefines concepts such as religion, women, children, and slavery in a manner that challenges the legacy of Enlightenment modernity. Thus, the Declaration rejects all assumed roles of religion as posited by 19th-century Western European philosophers and social scientists, establishing a new framework in this regard. According to this framework, religion, insofar as it constitutes an individual right, regained the opportunity to participate in social spheres such as knowledge, law, and economics. In other words, while religious individuals in the 19th century were divided between their personal religious lives and public existence, this division was reconciled in the second half of the 20th century (OHCHR, 1-8; Marks, 2016: 1-24). In the contemporary era, the existence and legitimacy of “institutional religions” have been accepted within an individualized social format and the dynamics of consumer society. While some criticize this development under the concept of secularity as the corruption of religion and religiosity, there are optimistic scholars who argue that this secularity represents a rediscovery of religion in the public sphere by ordinary people (Smith, RELIGION AND TECHNOLOGY 44 2008). Meanwhile, from the perspective of Western European theorists, it must be acknowledged that modernity, popular American culture, secularity, democracy, consumer society, and ultimately technology are not positively regarded. These theorists seem, in a sense, to view the conditions of the 19th century more favorably. Among these theorists are Martin Heidegger, Jean Paul Sartre, Jacques Ellul, Michel Foucault, and Jean Baudrillard (Ellul, 1964; Sartre, 1966; Heidegger, 1977; Baudrillard, 1998; Foucault, 2008). Regarding religion and the religious, it is important to recognize that the contemporary individualized social format of religion is preferable when compared to the conditions of the 19th century. This new development— whether termed modernization, democracy, multiculturalism, secularity, or individualization—has enabled religious individuals to reengage in life with their religious characteristics and to become dynamic actors. Today, religious individuals contribute labor in environments that create, develop, and market technology, and in turn, technology bears influences from their religiosity. It is nearly impossible to consider religion as static and technology as dynamic within this form of social experience. Although conservative and pessimistic religious individuals exist, it can be said that they are fewer in number and have yet to fully shed the passive roles assigned to them by Enlightenment modernity in the 19th century. In this context, Andoni Alonso highlights distinct differences between Christianity and other religions such as Buddhism, Islam, and Judaism. According to his interpretation, examples where religion is perceived as static and technology as dynamic—thereby positioning them in opposition—can only be found within Christianity. Alonso’s observations are entirely rooted in the framework of individualized societal systems seen worldwide, and even if he does not explicitly acknowledge it, it should be added that Christianity, too, is compatible with technology (Alonso, 2023: 288, 291). As a reflection and requirement of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, religious individuals participate in the market as recipients of education, seekers of employment, taxpayers, and consumer entities. In the individualized societal model, the economic market defines and legitimizes the society, and the religion, through the religious individual, becomes one of the fundamental components of the market. The agency and activity of the individual result in religion also becoming active and dynamic. Although the economic market defines the macro-social framework and identity, the religions can also establish micro-social frameworks and identities proportional to their economic reach. Therefore, it can be argued that individualized societal religion has become one of the key factors reshaping life within the realms of knowledge, law, and economy. In the contemporary MUHAMMET ÖZDEMİR 45 relationship between technology and capital, the influence of the religious individuals and the religions cannot be overlooked. This framework can be stated to have transformed medieval and Enlightenment Christian thought, which traditionally distinguished between worldly and spiritual existence. In the first half of the 20th century, many American religious writers, such as Alonso T. Jones, viewed the sacred and the secular as antithetical for Christians, while simultaneously appealing to the individual side of humanity and imagining a harmonious union of the world and the spirit (Jones, 2024: 1–5, 19, 48–53). The individualized form of social religion they aspired to but failed to actualize was, in fact, realized within the framework of the free market system through the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the rise of popular American democracy. Accordingly, as Graeme Smith astutely observed, secularism has conferred upon religion the role of a vital component in shaping the new shared ethic of the public sphere. It can no longer be claimed that any religion—including Christianity—is static or absent from a technologically centered social reality (Smith, 2008: 183–206). This development has profoundly influenced the economic, political, institutional, bureaucratic, historiographical, and communicative structures previously shaped by Enlightenment modernity across much of the globe. The ongoing discursive tensions between religion and technology exemplify a continued resistance to this interaction. Prior to the widespread internalization of the essentialist dichotomy between Enlightenment rationalism and pre-modern local traditions, a countervailing, individualistic modernity had already begun to redefine conceptions of the world and life itself. Digital modernity—emerging as a third phase of modernity—at times aligns with Enlightenment ideals, yet it does not relinquish its commitment to individualization. Indeed, without an individualistic free-market system, the development and advancement of digital technologies, including artificial intelligence, would likely be unattainable. At this juncture, conceptual frameworks around the world acquire new layers of complexity, informed by diverse historical trajectories and temporalities. Moreover, just as contemporary technology remains indebted to religion in various ways, religion, in turn, finds itself increasingly intertwined with and reliant upon contemporary technological developments (Drees, 2009). 3. Individualized Economic Technology Both the religion and the technology are reflections of two fundamental concepts and phenomena: the society and the economy. Today, the society has become more inclusive due to the increased participation of religious RELIGION AND TECHNOLOGY 46 and devout individuals in production and consumption. Undoubtedly, there are societies where religion is less prominent—such as the Czech Republic and Scandinavian countries—but these are relatively few in number. The economy has become so closely intertwined with technology that it encourages and enables individuals to act as both producers and consumers. While agricultural activities and non-digital economic processes still exist and are significant, technology is increasingly being applied in these areas as well. In this context, technology emerges as a unifying concept bridging society and the economy, or as a shared outcome of their interplay. In this context, technology emerges as a unifying concept bridging the society and the economy, or as a shared outcome of their interplay. Religion, too, has evolved into a connective framework between society and the economy. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights institutionalized equality by mediating the relationship among religion, the individual, and pre-modern history. Only an economy oriented toward individual agency could sustain this new paradigm—and indeed, it has succeeded. The fourth industrial revolution brings new superpowers to the forefront through the management of the massive economy produced by individualized technology. The role of artificial intelligence (AI) should not be ignored here (Ding, 2024: 184-185; 210-212). The most serious mistake that could be made in addressing the challenges faced by global societies, religions, technology, and artificial intelligence in the 21st century is to interpret these phenomena through the lens of alienation theory. While the considerable costs, side effects, and disadvantages of individualized economic technologies are already evident, this should not lead us to conclude that everything associated with modernity, contemporary life, or neoliberalism is fundamentally flawed, nor should it prompt a regressive return to the origins of capitalism. Opposing individualization and the technological economy on the basis of alienation theory—which plays no constitutive role in the currently dominant global paradigm—offers little in terms of philosophical or scientific advancement. Like other Platonic frameworks, alienation theory tends to produce a pessimistic, negative, and romanticized perspective, ultimately fostering a sense of perpetual nostalgia (Holmes, 1976, p. 213). Instead, it is more productive to adopt approaches that generate meaningful thought from within the sphere of lived experience. Nevertheless, it is essential to maintain a sense of measure and balance, and to remain vigilant against the seductions of economic ambition. This system represents an evolved iteration of the free-market model, one that sustains security and societal stability by addressing collective needs and expenditures within an individualized, technology-driven economy. MUHAMMET ÖZDEMİR 47 It operates by allocating costs to each participant individually, thereby fostering a cyclical economic mechanism propelled by the continuous purchase and consumption of technological goods and services. However, during the transitional phase preceding the full establishment of this system and its integration into the broader economy, disruptions and conflicts of interest among individuals or groups are inevitable. This instability arises from two key factors: first, the emergence of a new socioeconomic divide between the technologically affluent and the digitally disadvantaged; and second, the absence of universally adopted ethical standards governing international digital platforms. Consequently, phenomena such as cyber theft, disinformation, and fraudulent activities proliferate. Moreover, a substantial proportion of those who have accrued wealth through technological means lack the commensurate development of intellectual and cultural maturity. As a result, their influence may undermine the cultivation of shared moral and spiritual values within society. At this developmental stage of the system, religious individuals, like all other participants, function as both producers and consumers. While they are capable of contributing positively to societal progress, they remain equally susceptible to the same ethical lapses and misjudgments as the broader population. A rigorous examination of this issue is imperative, ensuring an equitable analysis of both religion and technology in the context of their interrelation. Furthermore, both the concepts of religion and technology require updating in terms of meaning, with consideration given to new experiences (Alexander, 2020: 170-176). Evaluating technology without its individualized economic nature hinders our understanding of it. Similarly, the concept of religion, whose role in information, law, and the economy has been sanctioned within the public sphere by the individualized economic framework, cannot be properly understood when evaluated separately from these components. In this context, it is crucial to recognize that both technology and religion are two dynamic concepts of an individualized economic society. When individualized economics is used to understand humanity and society as a whole, it can be argued that the relationship between technology and religion is one that almost necessitates each other. Therefore, religion and technology are two indispensable elements of democracies where individualized people and societies thrive. 4. Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Religion In an era where artificial intelligence (AI) is performing almost all human tasks with increasing efficiency, it’s more effective to analyze religion not as RELIGION AND TECHNOLOGY 48 a static concept, but as a dynamic human activity. This approach mirrors how we perceive AI itself—as a human-driven activity. Our understanding of the world—including people, objects, and tools—is shaped by our personal experiences. Therefore, for any scientific inquiry to genuinely meet human needs, it must reference the real world of experience. This view sees humans as a collaborative element in society, working to fulfill their own needs while simultaneously contributing to the needs of others. This process is often called social solidarity or the life process. Within this framework of social solidarity, religion is a powerful and enduring area of human experience. It’s a space where AI can cooperate and develop itself, much like it does in other fields of human activity. The most compelling perspective on this relationship in existing literature is a realistic and functional one, which views both religion and AI as integral parts of the complex, collaborative process of human life (Dorobantu, 2022: 985-987; Vestrucci, 2022: 10001001; Tsuria, Tsuria, 2024: 1-2). The relationship between artificial intelligence (AI) and religion can be understood through the roles these two concepts play in the production and consumption activities of humans and societies. Any perspective that disregards empirical experience may, in certain cases, view both AI and religion in a static and negative light. While broad generalizations are challenging, it is evident that classical German and French phenomenology, for example, often adopts a negative, pessimistic, and romantic approach to technology, AI, and religion. This stance fundamentally stems from a static view of these concepts, coupled with Continental European philosophy’s underlying resistance to popular American culture. A similar negative approach, though directed solely at religion, is also present in transhumanist philosophy. However, transhumanism opposes religion because it associates it with certain immigrant groups often stereotyped by popular American culture. These two examples illustrate that the motivation for a static approach to religion is, paradoxically, rooted in an experiential critique, which ultimately serves to undermine a more realistic and nuanced position. Rather than internalizing these two negative perspectives and approaching technology and AI with them, religious individuals should prioritize their own realistic experiences in the marketplace. When approached realistically and empirically, religion demonstrates a positive and reciprocal relationship with AI to the extent that it engages in production and consumption activities (Özdemir, Başaran, 2021: 44-45; Özdemir, Aşık Birlik, 2025: 122-123). Individuals who produce and consume artificial intelligence (AI) may be religious believers or non-believers, or even anti-religion. This truly global and international experience can render AI either a passive and neutral MUHAMMET ÖZDEMİR 49 entity in its relationship with religion or an influencing factor that directs religiosity or anti-religion. We are, in essence, discussing a multifaceted and continuously operating interaction. It’s challenging to grasp this interaction as a fixed and universal relationship at any given moment. Therefore, the most accurate and valid statement regarding all possible relationships between AI and religion is simply that they exist, are related, and interact. The existence, unity, and effectiveness of God can be understood through the personal experiences of believers. Likewise, AI can form an opinion about these concepts based on the experiences of its human producers or consumers, and the demands of governments and corporations within the free market. Given this framework, it would be unrealistic to argue for or against a universal stance on the matter. AI might approach the concepts of God, religion, and human belief in the same way it processes any other term, such as Marxism or the word “moon.” (Özdemir, 2024: 104-129). The attitudes of religious people toward artificial intelligence (AI) are shaped by their personal experiences, much like how AI’s stance on religion is a reflection of their own interactions. Just as certain philosophical theories, such as classical phenomenology and transhumanism, may hold a negative view of technology and religion, conservative religious individuals with limited personal experience may also object to AI. This perspective is rooted in a fundamental misconception. Similar to how classical phenomenology can mistakenly apply a specific, limited experience as a universal truth, some religious figures may incorrectly elevate their own modern religious experiences—which may be limited in the public sphere—to a universal and binding standard for the concept of religion itself. However, because this narrow interpretation will inevitably need to be updated by real-life and practical experiences, using it as a universal basis for understanding religion is both misleading and incorrect. Therefore, when we discuss religious and devout individuals, we should focus on those who actively participate in the collective production and consumption activities of societies. For these people, technology and artificial intelligence (AI) will be perceived as at least as legitimate and valid as their own religion and beliefs (Zhao, 2019: 2024-2027). 5. Transhumanism and Religion Transhumanism and posthumanism, two cyborg philosophies that emerged in the late 20th and early 21st centuries, have a complex and varied relationship with religion. Similarly, religious communities hold diverse views on these philosophies. It’s helpful to distinguish between RELIGION AND TECHNOLOGY 56 References Alexander, J. K. (2020). Introduction: the entanglement of technology and religion. History and Technology An International Journal. Vol. 36, No. 2, 165-186. Alonso, A. (2023). Whar Religion, What Technology? A Wittgensteinian Approach. Thinking Through Science and Technology: Philosophy, Religion, and Politics in an Engineered World. (Ed.: Glen Miller, Helena Mateus Jerónimo, Qin Zhu). Rowman & Littfield, 277-296. Baudrillard, J. (1998). 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The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays. (Çev.: William Lovitt). New York, London: Garland Publishing, Inc. Holmes, W. (1976). The Theory of Alienation as Sociological Explanation: Its Advantages and Limitations. Sociology, May 1976, Vol. 10, No. 2, 207-224. James, W. (1922). Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking. Longmans, Green and Co. 11. Edition. James, W. (1966). Essays in Pragmatism. Hafner Publishing Company, Inc. 14. Printing. Jones, A. T. (2024). Individuality in Religion. Sabbath Rest Adventh Church. https://www. practicaprophetica.com/files/books/atj/Individuality-in-Religion.pdf (Access Date: 20.07.2025) Marks, S. P. (2016). Human Rights: A Brief Introduction. Harvard University School of Public Health. Harvard University. More, M., Vita-More, N. (Ed., 2013). The Transhumanist Reader: Classical and Contemporary Essays on the Science, Technology, and Philosophy of the Human Future. Malden, Oxford, West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell. OHCHR, Universal Declaration of Human Rights. https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/ UDHR/Documents/UDHR_Translations/eng.pdf (Access Date: 18.07.2025) MUHAMMET ÖZDEMİR 57 Özdemir, M. (2021). Posthumanın Yeni Etkinlik Alanı ve Dijital Çağ İnsanında Yaşamın Anlamı. Transhümanizm ve Posthümanizm: Disiplinlerarası Bir Çalışma. (Ed.: Mustafa Tekin, Muhammet Özdemir). Ankara: Eskiyeni Yayınları, 48-76. Özdemir, M. (2024). Yapay Zekâ, Transhümanizm ve Din. Yapay Zekâ ve İslâm. (Ed.: Mehmet Bulgen). İstanbul: Timaş Akademi, 104-129. Özdemir, M., Aşık Birlik, B. (2025). Teknoloji Felsefesi ve Yapay Zekâ Kuşakları Bakımından Dünya Toplumları. International Journal of New Approaches in Social Studies, 9(1), 114-132. Özdemir, M., Başaran, N. (2021). Transhümanizm, Posthümanizm ve İnsan Bilincinin Yeni Kapsamı. Journal of Islamic Research, 32(1), 30-51. Özdemir, M., Başaran, Nevin (2021). Transhümanizm, Posthümanizm ve İnsan Bilincinin Yeni Kapsamı. Journal of Islamic Research, 32(1): 30-51. Sartre, J. P. (1966). Being and Nothingness: A Phenomenological Essay on Ontology. (Çev.: Hazel A. Barnes). New York: Washington Square Press. Smith, G. (2008). A Short History of Secularism. London, New York: I. B. Tauris. Tsuria, R., Tsuria, Y. (2024). Artificial Intelligence’s Understanding of Religion: Investigating the Moralistic Approaches Presented by Generative Artificial Intelligence Tools. Religions 15 (375), 1-15. Vestrucci, A. (2022). Artificial Intelligence and Religion: Recent Advances and Future Directions. Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science, vol. 57, no. 4 (December), 1000-1018. Zhao, F. (2019). The Impact of Communication Technology on Religion. Advances in Social Science, Education and Humanities Research, volume 329. 4th International Conference on Contemporary Education, Social Sciences and Humanities. Atlantis Press, 2024-2027. 59 CHAPTER 4 TILLICH’S RELATION TO RELIGION AND OTHER FIELDS Dr. Mustafa TURAN1 Abstract Throughout history the relations between the religion and science didn’t follow a straight way. Sometimes and somewheres science became in the realm of religion whereas religion at the same sime excluded from sphere of science and chosen as a matter not having value to deal with. There are too many researchs on history of science and religion. But the researchs focusing on specific scientists and their relation with the religion is a few except a well-known example of Russell. In this study, we focused on the specificly on Tillich’s concept of science and its relation to religion and to what extent. We used historical comparation and genealogy methods to make research at the same time draw conclusions. Conclusions have shown that the relation isn’t easy to draw because the real life is interwivened with each other although they are seen as different sectors. This is because of today’s non-holistic science view. Furthermore, science isn’t fully in the control of religion. Each of sciences are doing their job. If they meet with each other, the problematic is so dynamic that the philosopher and scienctist must use creative aspects to cope with the situation. If you put religion in the center of science when a change or drawback occurs, the effects of it will be much more destructive in the humans’ conception of religion. So, we need some dialogue between 1 ORCID: 0000-0002-1792-5494 | E-Mail: [email protected] Philosophy of Religion, PhD., Ministry of National Education, Adıyaman, TÜRKİYE. TILLICH’S RELATION TO RELIGION AND OTHER FIELDS 60 different fields and to see in an even-handed way a philosopher with allinclusive inclinatios. I hope, this chapter will make some contrubitons. Keywords: Philosophy of religion, religion, philosophy, science, Tillich 1. Introduction While Tillich explains whether the fields are related to each other, other thinkers are sometimes used to support Tillich’s thoughts. While explaining his views on religion, Tillich begins by comparing concepts such as religion, revelation and salvation. According to Tilich, while revelation is an absolute event that is self-sufficient, religion is not self-sufficient and expresses relative situations (Tillich, 2000, p. 37). Revelation speaks of the introduction of a new truth into life and the soul; religion always speaks of a given, vital truth and a spiritual, necessary function; revelation speaks of something beyond culture. For this reason, religion feels that it has reached its true essence when we call it religion (Tillich, 2000, p. 38). Science, philosophy, religion and history exist in their own autonomous spheres, but they do not present a closed structure like Leibniz’s monads, nor do they violate each other’s boundaries. Things and the world do not exist side by side. They penetrate each other, but this closeness is not a fusion. Tillich also addresses the issue of the essence and truth of religion as a problem. The essence of religion is first revealed experimentally, then the truth of religion is organized theoretically. This means the separation of the act and the object of the act, and this is a mistake that makes the philosophy of religion impossible. According to Tillich, the problem of essence and the problem of truth are identical. According to Tilich, the method beyond logic is superior in terms of grasping the truth together with the essence and not having to prove this truth (Tillich, 2000, pp. 79-80). The answer to the question, “What is the truth of religion?” can be given when the essence of religion is grasped by a method beyond logic. The basis of the meaningful field of truth, like all fields of meaning, is the unconditional meaning sought by religion. The problem of truth first gains meaning in the religious field. The problem of essence and the problem of truth are problems that are addressed on the same base.” (Tillich, 2000, p. 81). Tilich argues that there are different types of knowledge. He distinguishes them as “philosophical, scientific, historical and religious.” On the other hand, in addition to expressing these types of knowledge, he states that the MUSTAFA TURAN 61 mind that works in mathematics and the mind that works in music are the same minds, but the mathematical mind is thought of as if it were a single mind (Tillich, 1951, pp. 73-74). With the decline of German Idealism and the rise of British Empiricism, technical reason became dominant (Tillich, 1951, p. 72). It is important because it is an apparatus that enables experimental verification and enables coherent and logical thinking (Tillich, 1951, p. 73). He calls the use of this reason in theology “semantic rationality.” (Tillich, 1951, p. 54). Technical reason is useful as long as it accompanies and complements ontological reason. Apart from this, to separate technical reason from ontological reason and also to set it against it is to fragment the human being (Tillich, 1951, p. 73). Ontological reason, although identical with the content of revelation, remains reason as long as it is realized in the person and the world, and is subject to the destructive effects of existence. It is finite and separate. It has fallen apart from the essence to which it is attached and is afflicted with errors and deficiencies. Although it never breaks away from God, it is “blind” and incomplete under the conditions of existence. Another distinction Tillich makes in the concept of reason is between subjective and objective reason. While subjective reason expresses the rational structure of the mind, objective reason expresses the rational structure of reality (Tillich, 1951, pp. 74-75). 2. Religion and Science In this section, we will focus on the understanding of religion and science, which Russel calls the forms of human endeavor or the two aspects of social life (Russell, 1994, p. 7,11). There is no contradiction between the cognitive function and nature of faith and reason. It is not appropriate to explain faith with science, which is the expression of mathematical reason that presents a fragmented vision of the world rather than a holistic one. Beyond this, it is necessary to show the concrete relationship of faith with several forms of cognitive reason, namely, scientific, historical, and philosophical. The truth of faith is different from the meaning of truth in each of these forms of knowledge, but what they seek to reach is truth. Wherever there is an attempt to know, there is one of the many transitional stages between truth and error. In faith, the cognitive function of man is at work (Tillich, 2014, p. 82). Truth in science is the adequacy of describing the structural laws that determine reality and the demonstration of this description by experimental repetition. Every scientific truth is preliminary and subject to change both TILLICH’S RELATION TO RELIGION AND OTHER FIELDS 62 in the grasp of reality and in the adequate expression of it. The element of uncertainty does not diminish the truth value of a tested and proven scientific claim. It merely prevents scientific dogmatism and absolutism (Tillich, 2014, p. 83). If theologians point to the transitory nature of every scientific element, this is a very weak method of defending the truth of faith against the truth of science. If tomorrow scientific development narrows its uncertain area, faith will continue this retreat. Because scientific truth and the truth of faith do not belong to the same dimension of meaning. One dimension of meaning is not capable of intervening in another dimension. The conflict is not between faith and science, but between a faith and a science, each of which has not realized its true dimension. Science can only conflict with science, and faith can only conflict with faith. The conflict over the theory of evolution is not a conflict between science and faith; it is a conflict between a science whose faith has deprived man of his humanity and a faith whose expression has been distorted by biblical literalism. Modern psychology is afraid of the concept of the soul. Because the soul seems to establish a reality that cannot be approached by scientific methods and can conflict with their results. If scientific psychology attacks other forms of faith, it confuses those dimensions. Microphysics has undermined some scientific hypotheses concerning the computability of the universe. Quantum theory and the Uncertainty Principle have been influential in this. Religious writers have readily used these ideas to confirm their own ideas about human freedom, God’s creation, and miracles. There is no justification for such a procedure. The truth of faith cannot be denied or confirmed by the latest physical, biological, and psychological discoveries (Tillich, 2014, pp. 84-86). Tillich has tried to prevent the conflict between science and religion that has lasted for years. Tillich distinguishes between scientific and technical reason and existential reason here. He thinks that a person who looks existentially will not examine nature insensibly and by dividing it into pieces, as a requirement of Systematic Theology, like someone who looks from a scientific-technical perspective. What he means here is to give a new perspective-paradigm to modern man. He states that in the ongoing situation, the experience of disassociation has also spread to the sciences, that the sciences have deepened within themselves, but that there is no relational situation with other sciences, and as required by Systematic Theology, he develops a dialogue between these sciences that prevents ghettoization and living in a vacuum without violating each other’s fields. In addition, the scientific perspective abstracts the one from the environment and freezes it for a moment. It pulls it into a situation that seems safer, but this situation is not the world seen in the MUSTAFA TURAN 63 environment. Although this situation is sufficient for knowing, it cannot be applied to the situation we call understanding. When we look at it from a Heideggerian perspective, what science does in particular is to replace the soul with intelligence and have the final say. Existence, on the other hand, is a holistic and ongoing process. Tillich goes beyond Pascal’s “critique of academic reason”, which reduces everything to science (Bourdieu, 2016, p.132). Knowledge of reality never has the certainty of complete evidence. The process of knowing is endless. Theoretically, the imperfect certainty of belief remains and can be weakened at any moment by criticism and new experience. The certainty of faith does not have this feature. Faith has two elements: certainty, that is, the certainty of being related to something ultimate or absolute. The other is risk, involving doubt and courage, that is, surrender to an anxiety that is not really ultimate but may be harmful if taken as ultimate. Faith is neither belief nor knowledge that carries a low degree of probability (Tillich, 2014, pp. 42-43). Science exhibits an object-oriented stance within the I-it relationship. Emotional and sensual aspects are not taken into account. Just as we oppose David Hume’s reduction of religion to history, Kant’s to morality, Freud’s to psychology, and Durkheim’s to sociology, we argue that it should not be reduced to science and mathematics. This attitude should also be used to overcome the positivist understanding of knowledge. Tillich did not exhibit such a reductionist attitude. According to Kierkegaard, science is knowledge of the universal; it is objective, ignores the level of existence; it is impersonal, does not care about the person as a person, and is not of a nature to establish an emotional relationship with the knower (Açıkgenç, 2011, p. 21). Tillich, on the other hand, states that there are situations that transcend the paths of knowledge, which he calls “mystery.” The way to reach this mystery is revelation, which allows for transcending the subject-object relationship (Tillich, 1951, p. 108). Revelation is the concrete world manifestation of the foundation of existence or Being-in-Itself (Tillich, 2014, pp. 110-116). For this reason, the concept of revelation is expressed in Western languages with the word “revelation,” which means disclosure. Even if revelation is communicated, it always retains a mysterious aspect (mister). When we approach science phenomenologically, the job of science is to introduce species, not individuals. This is not about knowing a canary, not about Ahmet or Mehmet, but about a human being. Moreover, science tries to introduce general genera that include many species, rather than TILLICH’S RELATION TO RELIGION AND OTHER FIELDS 64 specific species. The aim of science is to introduce birds rather than canaries, vertebrates rather than birds, and life rather than vertebrates. However, in the world of experience, there are canaries and daisies that have characteristics that distinguish them from other individuals of the species. Therefore, unless the general essence is recognized, general science will not really have a subject. Because it introduces species, while in the natural world, individuals live (Topçu, 2011, p.23). In fact, due to the paradigm shift in recent times, even the general structure of science is like this. Human consciousness uses two modes of conceiving the world: one is direct, and objects appear to be present in the mind, as in perception or simple sense. The other is indirect, and can be spoken of when objects do not appear “lively” to the senses. In indirect states of consciousness, the nonexistent object is re-presented to consciousness by means of an image. We must therefore state that scientific and imaginative modes of thought are different from each other. Science pursues direct objective perception rather than the misleading twists of imagination. According to the scientific view, consciousness is in a confused blur in the image. Symbolic imagination aims to awaken the soul rather than to convey literal knowledge (Çınar, 2006, pp. 325-326). When we look at phenomena, how can we impose a reductionist explanation that is dependent on positivist and rationalist norms on religion, even when phenomena are irreducible to religious knowledge? (Kuşçu, 2011, p. 16). Heidegger argues that science will not really be interested in being. Because it is only interested in things in order to dominate them, operate them and consume them. As a result of such an attitude of understanding, it is the modern technique that is about to create and destroy the world (Verneaux, 1994, p. 42). As Jaspers stated, the direct examination of the world is the job of the sciences. This is why Kant rejected science but defended its worldliness (Verneaux, 1994, p. 47). There are certainly different levels of reality, and they demand different approaches and different languages. Not everything in reality can be grasped in the language most suitable for the mathematical sciences (Tillich, 2002, p. 228). The difference between faith and knowledge can be seen in the type of certainty each provides. There are two types of knowledge based on absolute evidence. The first is direct evidence of sensory perception (such as the color green). One cannot be absolutely certain, but one cannot doubt that one sees green. The other is absolute evidence, which is the mathematical and logical rules that are assumed beforehand. No one can argue logically without MUSTAFA TURAN 65 assuming the rules that make the argument meaningful. We have absolute certainty, but we do not have reality, which has led to the confusion of faith with belief (Tillich, 2014, p. 41). No science nor any system of sciences can perceive the world in its entirety. There is always a “remaining” to be discovered. Therefore, it is necessary to know that the possibility of unlimited progress for science is undeniable and that science is limited. A “total synthesis” of phenomena is not possible. It is not possible to unite all phenomena in terms of the object, because the objective world shows disunity. It shines and breaks under the gaze of the scientist. Another reason is that it breaks according to the different desires of the soul: art, morality, politics, religion, etc. Knowledge, no matter how abstract it is, remains attached to a particular view. And again, undoubtedly, every mind can invent “a world understanding.” There is no Weltanschauung (world view, perspective), no system that can be the truth for every thinker. Each expresses a view about the world. Each describes the world, not the world iself (Verneaux, 1994, p. 47). Tillich is a philosopher who is well versed in the philosophical tradition. His view of science is similar to Jaspers’ view of science. According to Jaspers, no science can completely solve human problems without establishing a relationship between the encompasser (God) and man. The “encompasser”, which is one of the central concepts of Jaspers’ philosophy, is thought of as a “transcendent reality” that surrounds us, above us limited beings, and is a religious concept in nature. According to his philosophy of science, science constantly draws attention to the concrete situations of the individual and cannot understand man holistically (Akgün, 2015, p. 461). Unlike Unamuno, who defended irrationalism, Tillich, like Jaspers, defended reason at every opportunity (Akgün, 2015, p. 462) but did not deify it. The identification of a thought reached with a certain method with the truth itself is an absolutization, that is, an imposition. Absolutization also gains real reality with the establishment of scientific disciplines, the establishment of their theoretical foundations and the consensus reached by scholars as a result of their efforts to approach the truth (Hanefi, 2004, p. 264). In other words, a part of the reality reached at a certain time is reached through abstraction and agreement. Therefore, considering its subjective aspect and temporal conditions, generalizing this situation is dogmatism. Science has a dynamic structure that progresses with continuous collapses. Sometimes, what he called white yesterday can be called black today. The concepts of science are mental and functional formations that are detached from life and created a priori by the scientist. These categories do not have 73 CHAPTER 5 TASAWWUF AND RELIGION Assoc. Prof. Sevim YILMAZ1 Abstract This article addresses a frequently raised modern question-“Did tasawwuf emerge from within Islam, or is it the product of extra-Islamic mystical influences?”-and seeks to reframe the relationship between tasawwuf and religion. The central claim is that tasawwuf is neither a separate religion nor a cultural add-on, but an authentically Islamic tradition and a discipline of religion grounded in the Qurʾan and Sunna. Methodologically, the study conducts a qualitative literature analysis, surveying foundational classical texts of tasawwuf alongside ḥadīth sources. The framework is historicaltheoretical and descriptive-analytic. Tracing the trajectory from the early zuhd movement to the institutionalization of ṭarīqas, the study undertakes conceptdriven readings of classical works ( Qushayrī, Hujvīrī, Ghazālī, Mawlānā) together with modern scholarship ( Kılıç, Demirli, Kara, Nasr, Chittick, Derin). The research design is text-centered and comparative rather than field-based. The guiding question is whether tasawwuf should be explained in terms of non-Islamic elements, or-within the horizon of the Ḥadīth of Jibrīl-understood as a discipline of religion oriented to iḥsān. Because the study does not employ ethnography and focuses primarily on Sunnī classical sources and selected Orientalist critiques, it is limited in geographical scope 1 ORCID: 0009-0004-7260-3123 | E-Mail: [email protected], Eskişehir Osmangazi University, Faculty of Theology, Department of Basic Islamic Sciences, Division of Sufism / Eskişehir, TÜRKİYE. TASAWWUF AND RELIGION 74 and does not represent every intra-Sufi school. The article’s contribution is twofold: it situates tasawwuf within a comprehensive schema that integrates both its historical development (zuhd-tasawwuf-ṭarīqa) and its place in the classification of the religious sciences; and it systematically grounds tasawwuf as an iḥsān-centered science of ethical-spiritual transformation. The core finding is that tasawwuf rests on the Qurʾan-Sunna foundation and unfolds through the stages of sharīʿa-ṭarīqa-maʿrifa-ḥaqīqa as a coherent sayr u sulūk; Orientalist and Salafī readings tend to overlook this inner continuity. These conclusions matter insofar as they provide a balanced scholarly ground that moves beyond both reduction of tasawwuf to “mystical therapy” and wholesale denunciations. Keywords: Tasawwuf, religious sciences, iḥsān, Sunnī tasawwuf, tawḥīd, Qurʾan and Sunna 1. Tasawwuf and Religion Throughout history, humanity has not been content with merely understanding the physical world; rather, it has sought the meaning of existence, the source of its sorrows and joys, and ultimately, the origin and destiny of its journey. This fundamental quest gave rise to religion, which stands as humanity’s most ancient and widespread answer. Religion has manifested not merely as a system of beliefs, but also as a comprehensive set of values that shapes the inner world of the individual, organizes the social order, and conveys moral principles. From the earliest communities to modern civilizations, this manifestation has endured in various dimensions. From a sociological perspective, Émile Durkheim’s emphasis on the unifying and regulating function of religion within society is particularly noteworthy. According to him, religion represents the invisible bonds that hold the social structure together (Durkheim, 2008). However, this perspective may lead to an understanding of religion merely as an external structure. In contrast, Mircea Eliade adopts a more inward approach, asserting that religion is the domain wherein the human being encounters the Sacred and transcends the boundaries of ordinary time (Eliade, 1978). This experience entails a striving of the heart toward the Real (al-Ḥaqq) by transcending worldly habits. Karen Armstrong, on the other hand, argues that religion should be regarded as a process of inner transformation. In her view, a genuine religious experience initiates an inner journey and nurtures the individual’s spiritual development (Armstrong, 1993). Although each of these perspectives highlights a different aspect of religion, in Islamic thought, it is Tasawwuf that brings all these elements into a harmonious unity. SEVIM YILMAZ 75 Indeed, Tasawwuf does not confine religion to doctrinal beliefs (‘aqāʾid) and outward practices (aʿmāl); rather, it perceives religion as a journey of the heart’s purification (taṣfiya al-qalb) and the soul’s refinement (tazkiyat alnafs) toward the unveiling of ultimate truth (al-Ḥaqq). In this understanding, religion is not merely the repetition of what is already known, but a continuous striving to encounter a truth that renews itself at every moment. The endeavor of the individual to transcend the self (nafs), to confront the veils of the ego, and to return to the origin of existence (al-aṣl) constitutes the very essence of Tasawwuf. Thus, Tasawwuf presents itself as a path of gnosis (maʿrifa) that actualizes religion both as an inner spiritual experience and as a process of ethical and spiritual perfection (taḥqīq al-akhlāq) (Kılıç, 2013). This aspect of Sufism is not unique to Islam but is a common feature of all religions. The underlying shared thought within the foundations of religions is the recognition that humans are not only material beings but also spiritual ones. This awareness not only prevents religions from being viewed solely as tools for maintaining social order but also directs individuals toward a deep quest for meaning by touching upon their inner worlds (Nasr, 1972). Every religion offers essential principles that guide humans on an inner journey, leading them to an encounter with the Creator. In this context, just as there is no society without religion, there is also no religion without spirituality. At the core of every religion lies a force that profoundly addresses the human spiritual and moral aspects, and the most prominent example of this is the mystical traditions (Kara, 2008). In the Abrahamic religions, this tradition takes shape through following the spirituality of the prophet and deepening through that spiritual heritage. In Islam, this mystical structure is known as Tasawwuf (Kılıç, 2013). Islam inherits the legacy of the earlier Abrahamic religions and integrates this heritage with the universal message brought by Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) (Chittick, 2000). The spiritual depth of Tasawwuf directly draws from the essence of the Prophet Muhammad’s (pbuh) truth. Because of the universal nature of Islam, its truth encompasses the truths of the previous prophets as well. In other words, one who follows the path of Prophet Muhammad is, in reality, embracing the essence of both the Christian and Jewish traditions. Therefore, it is impossible to separate the understanding of Tasawwuf in Islam from the truth of the Qur’an and Sunnah that Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) represents (Kılıç, 2014). The debates concerning the origins of tasawwuf, particularly among Western scholars, often point to the notion that it developed under the TASAWWUF AND RELIGION 76 influence of non-Islamic elements. Scholars like Goldziher argue that tasawwuf was shaped by traditions such as Indian philosophy, Neo-Platonism, and Christian mysticism (Derin, 2006). This perspective tends to view tasawwuf not as a product of Islam’s internal dynamics but as one influenced by external sources. However, contemporary Muslim thinkers such as Chittick (2000) and Nasr (1972) challenge this interpretation, asserting that tasawwuf is nourished by an internal source rooted directly in the Qur’an and the Sunnah. Similarly, Kara (2008) emphasizes that tasawwuf is a spiritual domain emanating from the example set by the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh). In this context, when seeking to understand tasawwuf, one must focus not on its historical interactions but rather on the pursuit of truth inherent in the essence of Islam. The central aim of this study is to demonstrate that tasawwuf, both in terms of its origin and structure, is not shaped by non-Islamic influences but rather forms an original Islamic tradition directly grounded in the Qur’an and the Sunnah. Specifically, this research seeks to address the intellectual background of this tradition and its reflections in individual and social life, from a revelation-centered perspective. The role of tasawwuf in not only the spiritual life of the individual but also in the construction of social ethics renders it an indispensable part of Islamic thought. In this regard, the study aims to reveal the connection tasawwuf establishes with Islamic references, drawing upon classical sources. The connection can be directly traced in the foundational classical texts of tasawwuf: works such as al-Qushayrī’s (d. 465/1072) Risāla, al-Hujwīrī’s (d. 465/1072 [?]) Kashf al-Mahjūb, alGhazālī’s (d. 505/1111) Ihyā’, and Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī’s (d. 672/1273) Masnawī lay the theoretical and practical foundations of a tasawwuf understanding rooted in revelation and the Sunnah. Should the emergence of tasawwuf be explained through the influence of non-Islamic thought and cultures, or through the internal sources and dynamics of Islam? Should tasawwuf be seen as a separate religion, or should it be understood as a form of interpretation that arises from within Islam? This study is structured in two main parts to address these questions: - The Historical and Theoretical Foundations of Tasawwuf - The Qur’ān and Sunnah-Based Tasawwuf SEVIM YILMAZ 77 1. The Historical and Theoretical Foundations of Tasawwuf In this section, the origins of tasawwuf are explored, emphasizing that they must be sought not in external, non-Islamic traditions, but within the very heart of Islam itself. The lives and practices of the earliest Sufis are examined through the lens of the ascetic spirit (zuhd) that characterized the Companions (Sahaba) and the generation that followed them (Tabi’un). The discussion further traces how these early spiritual inclinations gradually crystallized into the distinct tradition known as tasawwuf. 1.1. The Etymological and Terminological Definition of Tasawwuf The term tasawwuf has been a frequent subject of discussion in the history of Islamic thought. Various interpretations have been proposed regarding its origins, each highlighting different aspects of tasawwuf. The most widely accepted view suggests that tasawwuf is derived from the Arabic word sūf, meaning “wool.” Early Sufis are known for their preference for a simple and modest lifestyle, often expressed by wearing coarse woolen garments as a sign of humility and detachment from worldly excess (al-Qushayrī, 1993). More than just an outward appearance, the woolen garment symbolized a particular worldview and way of living. In this sense, tasawwuf represents not only a linguistic matter but also the visible expression of an inner spiritual tendency and an ascetic understanding that emerged in the earliest phases of Islamic spirituality. There exists no unanimity among scholars concerning the definition of tasawwuf, just as there is none regarding its origin. Indeed, some authorities have recorded that the definitions of tasawwuf number a thousand, and it has been said: “The definitions are as numerous as the Sufis themselves” (Haksever, 2021). This divergence arises from the profoundly personal and experiential nature of tasawwuf. Al-Hujwīrī reproaches those who would reduce tasawwuf to mere externalities, declaring: “Those who derive the name Sufi from the wearing of sūf concern themselves solely with the form; in truth, the Sufi is he whose heart has attained purification” (al-Hujwīrī, 2010). Likewise, Junayd al-Baghdādī (d. 297/909) defines tasawwuf as “the purification from all blameworthy traits and the adornment with all virtuous qualities” (al-Sarrāj, 1960). Throughout history, tasawwuf has been expressed using various concepts, each shaped by the social and cultural conditions of its time. However, at its TASAWWUF AND RELIGION 78 core, tasawwuf represents a moral understanding that is intimately tied to the individual’s lived spiritual experience. In this sense, tasawwuf is not merely an intellectual endeavor, but a journey in which the individual, driven by the desire to know God, turns inward toward his or her own inner truth (Wilcox, 2001). The methodology of tasawwuf, in turn, reveals its essential distinction from other Islamic sciences: tasawwuf is not only a field of knowledge, but also a “state” (ḥāl) and a process of “becoming.” This characteristic is as unique to Islamic tasawwuf as it is found, in similar forms, within other mystical traditions (Küçük, 2009). The term tasawwuf was not used as a technical term during the lifetime of the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him). However, the ascetic and Godconscious lifestyle of that period reflected the essence of tasawwuf. In other words, the people of that time lived the spirit of tasawwuf without being familiar with the term itself. Over time, this way of life evolved into a concept and began to be referred to as tasawwuf. Al-Qushayrī notes that those who were in the presence of the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) were called “the Companions” (ṣaḥābah), those who followed them were called “the Successors” (tābi‘ūn), and those who came after them were known as “the Followers of the Successors” (tabe‘ al-tābi‘īn). After these generations, individuals who strove to adhere to both the outward and inward aspects of the religion were referred to as “worshipers” (‘ābid) or “ascetics” (zāhid). Over time, in response to the spread of innovations and the weakening of religious sensitivities, some distinguished believers who remained on the Ahl al-Sunnah path embraced a lifestyle centered on devotion to God and inner spiritual awakening. This way of life eventually came to be known by the term tasawwuf. Those who followed this path were referred to as “Sufis,” “people of tasawwuf,” or “mutasawwif” (mutasawwifah). In this context, alQushayrī emphasizes that the terms tasawwuf and sufism played an essential role in restoring meaning to religious concepts that had become hollowed out over time (al-Qushayrī, 1993). 1.2. The Stages of the Tasawwuf Journey: Shari’ah, Tariqah, Ma‘rifah, and Haqiqah Tasawuf emerges as a path of spiritual journey that makes the spiritual depth intended by religion tangible. This journey is viewed as a spiritual process of discovery that leads the individual both inwardly toward the self and outwardly toward God. In this regard, tasawwuf is the name for the endeavor to grasp the essence of religion from a deeper, more intimate perspective. Therefore, there is no significant distinction between the goal of SEVIM YILMAZ 79 tasawwuf and the ultimate objective of religion; rather, tasawwuf is the path to internalizing this goal on a deeper level. This inner journey is expressed through specific stages in the tasawwuf tradition. The stages, often described as Shari’ah, Tariqah, Ma‘rifah, and Haqiqah, are not merely terms but also indicators of the transformations the servant undergoes in the process of drawing nearer to Allah. In this way, tasawwuf transforms into a spiritual map that outlines the search for meaning, leaving nothing to chance but rather explaining it within a specific order of knowledge. Each stage is aimed at constructing both the outward and inward aspects of the servant’s being. This journey, which unites the external (zahir) and the internal (batin), reveals that religion is not simply a set of rules but also a matter of deep inner states and consciousness. In this sense, tasawwuf is not merely a system of thought but a unique journey that leads the individual to the truth as a science of states (hal) (Küçük, 2009). 1.2.1. Shari’ah Shari’ah encompasses the rules of worship, ethics, and social regulations in Islam. However, in Sufi thought, Shari’ah is viewed not merely as a set of external obligations but as the first and indispensable step in the process of disciplining the soul (nafs) (Kara, 2008). In this context, Junayd alBaghdadi states that Shari’ah is the starting point of the tasawwuf journey, emphasizing that these rules must not only be applied but also internalized. According to him, while the rulings of Shari’ah are followed outwardly, they must also take root inwardly; otherwise, this journey remains limited to mere forms and cannot deepen (Kuşeyrî, 1993). Similarly, Mawlānā stresses the necessity of entering the tasawwuf path with a strong understanding of Shari’ah. According to him, without Shari’ah, turning toward Tariqah does not lead one to the truth; rather, such a pursuit could be misleading. In this approach, Shari’ah is not just a formal system but is regarded as the first station in the human effort to attain the truth (Küçük, 2009). Demirli (2016) also defines tasawwuf in this framework as the effort to deeply comprehend the external commands of Shari’ah and understand its internal dimension. 1.2.2. Tariqah Tariqah is the name given to the spiritual journey in which the Sufi turns from the outward to the inward, aiming for the purification of the heart. On this stage of the journey, the traveler not only restrains the desires of the nafs but also disciplines his inner world through practices such as muraqabah (spiritual watchfulness), dhikr (remembrance), and service. Tariqah forms the TASAWWUF AND RELIGION 80 central axis of this esoteric journey, which is undertaken under the guidance of the spiritual master (Murshid). In this context, the Sufi learns not only the knowledge itself but also the spirit of that knowledge through experience. Thus, Tariqah can be seen as the soul that gives life to the external structure shaped by Shari’ah (Kuşeyrî, 1993). 1.2.3. Maʿrifa Maʿrifa refers to the stage of directly perceiving God through the heart and intuitively grasping the divine reality. At this level, knowledge is not limited to data acquired by reason and intellect; rather, it is a truth profoundly felt within the depths of the heart. Junayd al-Baghdādī defines maʿrifa as the servant’s heartfelt intimacy with God, emphasizing that it is shaped not merely by external knowledge, but by divine manifestations within the heart (Qushayrī, 1993). Similarly, Ibn al-ʿArabī (2006) describes maʿrifa as the union of existence with the Real (al-Ḥaqq), the knowledge of the Real by the Real and within the Real, thus highlighting that maʿrifa transcends mere intellectual comprehension and represents a higher level of spiritual realization. 1.2.4. Ḥaqīqa (The Ultimate Truth) Ḥaqīqa represents the final stage in the Sufi spiritual journey — the inner and direct realization of the Absolute Truth through the heart and soul. At this level, the Sufi is freed from all veils of the self and reaches the station of fanāʾ fi’llāh (annihilation in God); he no longer beholds his own existence, but witnesses solely the existence of the Divine. In this state, the Sufi’s attention is no longer captivated by the outward forms of the world but is drawn to the Divine Reality underlying all appearances. Thus, it is not the visible forms but the absolute meaning behind them that becomes essential (Sülemî, 2018). In this context, Yunus Emre expresses the stages of the Sufi path in the following couplets: Sharīʿa and ṭarīqa are the paths for those who seek, From within them, the fruit of ḥaqīqa is attained. To abandon religion is an act of disbelief, Yet such disbelief lies hidden within true faith. (Toprak, 2006) Through these verses, Yunus Emre portrays sharīʿa (the religious law) and ṭarīqa (the spiritual path) as necessary stages in the seeker’s journey toward maʿrifa (gnosis) and ultimately ḥaqīqa (truth). SEVIM YILMAZ 81 Sharīʿa constitutes the foundation, guiding the external practices of worship and ethical conduct. Ṭarīqa deepens the journey through disciplined inner striving and spiritual purification. However, the true objective is to attain maʿrifa and, beyond it, to realize ḥaqīqa, the inner essence of existence. In Yunus Emre’s view, external adherence to religious practices alone is insufficient to attain ultimate truth. True religion demands the union of outward observance with inner realization. It is only through this integration that acts of worship acquire real meaning, enabling the seeker to experience the Divine Reality beyond mere forms. We can thus state that the fundamental stages of Tasawwuf, namely Shari’ah, Tariqah, Ma’rifah, and Haqiqah, are phases of a spiritual journey that progress within a holistic and complementary framework. While Shari’ah represents the external order and the first step, Tariqah ensures that this external order gives rise to an internal discipline. Ma’rifah is the name of the heart-based recognition that develops within this discipline. Haqiqah, on the other hand, represents the final point of this journey: the realization of the essence of existence in Allah. Each stage is both dependent on the previous one and opens the door to the subsequent one, thus the Tasawwuf journey gains both continuity and depth. These four stages reveal the strong connection between the outward (zahir) and inward (batin) aspects of Tasawwuf. In the Tasawwuf tradition, outward actions are not merely expressions, but also carry an inward meaning. Junayd of Baghdad asserts that outward acts of worship must acquire an inner depth to be meaningful, emphasizing that Shari’ah is a path leading to truth (Qushayrī, 1993). Qushayrī (1993) describes the relationship between the outward and inward as intertwined, stressing the importance of harmony between the two dimensions. Ibn ‘Arabī also suggests that the outward is merely a superficial reflection, and that the true reality is hidden within inward truths (Chittick, 2000). Furthermore, Demirli argues that inner knowledge must not only be understood internally but must also manifest in the outward world. He asserts that the inner depth of Tasawwuf should carry a broader meaning within society (Demirli, 2016). Kılıç, in the context of the modern world dominated by outward values, points out the vital importance of inward understanding and emphasizes the need to preserve this inner depth in a societal sense (Kılıç, 2013). Salafis and Wahhabis argue that outward acts of worship represent the true practice of Islam. In their view, inward experiences are seen as deviations from the essence of Islam. This perspective, however, contradicts the fundamental understanding of Tasawwuf, which holds that inner depth and spiritual transformation reinforce and give meaning to outward acts of TASAWWUF AND RELIGION 88 One day, Fatih Sultan Mehmed, disguised in plain clothes to avoid being recognized, went to a shop early in the morning. The shopkeeper, upon seeing this person wanting to make a purchase, directed him by saying, “I have already made my first sale, the shop across the street hasn’t opened yet. Go there.” This behavior demonstrates how the understanding of “The entire world is a unity” is manifested in daily life. The shopkeeper’s thought process is based on the belief that the opening of the shop across the street, as part of the whole, will also bring benefit to him. According to Kılıç, this approach represents a mode of thinking that contemporary people may find difficult to comprehend. This same perspective applies not only in relationships between people but also in the connection with the universe (Kılıç, 2013). As a result, we can say that tasawwuf is both a religious science and a way of life that deepens the individual’s relationship with nature, other beings, and their inner world. This tradition, which has continued from the Ottoman period to the present day, encourages balance, tolerance, and harmony with nature in both societal and individual life. Tasawwuf is not just a theoretical understanding; it is a principle that manifests itself in daily life and personal relationships. Although some individuals may oppose the more systematic aspects of the tariqahs and tasawwuf, living independently of these teachings on a societal level is quite difficult. This is because tasawwuf is a profound culture that deeply influences the thought processes, values, and lifestyles of individuals and societies (Kara, 2008). 2.2. Taṣawwuf as a Religious Science Historically, religious sciences (al-ʿulūm al-dīniyya) such as ḥadīth, fiqh, and kalām were shaped by the dialectics of conflicting interpretations, giving rise to distinct schools. Taṣawwuf, too, evolved under the influence of these intellectual tensions, emerging as a unique discipline. The term “religious science” (ʿilm dīnī) primarily denotes that the source of knowledge must be derived from revealed texts (nuṣūṣ—i.e., the Qur’an and Sunnah). For a discipline to qualify as a religious science, its epistemic foundations must be directly rooted in nuṣūṣ. Any field recognized as such must first establish its authority through reference to Allah and the Prophet (ṣallā Allāhu ʿalayhi wa-sallam). This criterion applies equally to Taṣawwuf. As Junayd al-Baghdādī asserted in his definition: “Our knowledge (ʿilm) is bound solely by the Qur’an and the Sunnah. Thus, Taṣawwuf’s subject matter, questions, and solutions are framed within this revelatory framework. Its central focus is human ethical refinement— termed ḥāl (a transformative “state”) in Taṣawwuf literature, implying SEVIM YILMAZ 89 metamorphosis or transmutation. Taṣawwuf presupposes that humans are morally perfectible beings, and ethical progression (tahdhīb al-akhlāq) is its axiomatic principle. Without this, Taṣawwuf ceases to be a viable science. It provides methodologies (manāhij) and practices (e.g., riyāḍa, mujāhada) to guide this transformation toward the Divine Ideal (Demirli, 2016). The mutability of human character parallels the principle of “transformation” (taghyīr) observed in the natural sciences. The transformation of substances symbolizes the spiritual and ethical metamorphosis of the human being. Tasawwuf, founded upon this principle, pursues a systematic method aimed at realizing the inner transformation (taḥawwul) of the individual. The concerns of tasawwuf consist in the manifold aspects of this ethical transformation, wherein the human being strives against moral deficiencies (naqā’iṣ), sins (dhunūb), and vices (radha’il) encountered along the path of spiritual maturation. In the classical literature of tasawwuf, these matters are predominantly treated under the categories of ḥāl (spiritual states) and maqām (spiritual stations). Moreover, these issues are elucidated through principles derived directly from the Qur’an and the Sunnah. (Demirli, 2016) As for the method of tasawwuf, it consists of the means employed for the discipline of the nafs (lower self) and the attainment of ethical perfection (kamāl al-akhlāq). Among these means are riyāḍah (spiritual exercise), mujāhadah (spiritual struggle), and supererogatory acts of worship (nawāfil). The practices of dhikr (remembrance of God), tafakkur (contemplation), and the increase of benevolent deeds (khayrāt) constitute essential elements of this method. The ultimate aim of tasawwuf is the moral and spiritual maturation of the human being, which is defined as “adorning oneself with the attributes of God” (al-takhalluq bi-akhlāq Allāh). (Demirli, 2016) . One of the most significant evidences affirming that tasawwuf is an integral branch of the religious sciences (ʿulūm al-dīn) is the Ḥadīth of Jibrīl. According to the narration of ʿUmar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb, he recounts: “One day, while we were sitting in the presence of the Messenger of Allah (ṣallā Allāhu ʿalayhi wa-sallam), there appeared before us a man whose clothes were exceedingly white and whose hair was exceedingly black. No signs of travel were visible upon him, and none of us knew him. He came and sat close to the Prophet, resting his knees against the Prophet’s knees and placing his hands upon his own thighs. He said: ‘O Muḥammad, inform me about Islām.’ The Messenger of Allah (ṣallā Allāhu ʿalayhi wa-sallam) replied: ‘Islām is that you testify that there is no deity but Allah and that TASAWWUF AND RELIGION 90 Muḥammad is the Messenger of Allah; that you establish the prayer (ṣalāh); that you pay the alms (zakāh); that you fast during the month of Ramaḍān; and that you perform the pilgrimage (ḥajj) to the House if you are able to find a way thereto.’ The man said: ‘You have spoken the truth.’ We were amazed that he would ask a question and then confirm the answer. Then he said: ‘Inform me about īmān (faith).’ The Prophet replied: ‘It is that you believe in Allah, His angels, His Books, His Messengers, the Last Day, and that you believe in the Divine Decree (qadar), both its good and its evil.’ The man again said: ‘You have spoken the truth.’ Then he said: ‘Inform me about iḥsān.’ The Prophet answered: ‘It is that you worship Allah as though you see Him; and if you do not see Him, then know that He sees you.’ Thereupon, the man departed. I (ʿUmar) remained for a while in a state of astonishment. Then the Messenger of Allah (ṣallā Allāhu ʿalayhi wa-sallam) asked: ‘O ʿUmar, do you know who the questioner was?’ I replied: ‘Allah and His Messenger know best.’ He said: ‘Indeed, it was Jibrīl; he came to teach you your religion (dīn) (Muslim, 1955). The Ḥadīth of Jibrīl systematically defines the foundational pillars of Islamīmān (faith), Islām (submission), and iḥsān (spiritual excellence) - in sequential order. At its conclusion, it is stated that this is the religion (dīn). Thus, this ḥadīth serves as a fundamental source in clarifying the interrelations among various religious sciences (ʿulūm al-dīn) that later emerged, such as tasawwuf, fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence), and kalām (theology). An essential point that must be emphasized here is that iḥsān should not be treated as an independent concept, isolated from Islām and īmān. Rather, iḥsān is not a separate phase completed after īmān and Islām, but a state that enhances and perfects the quality of these two dimensions. One of the principal reasons why tasawwuf is considered among the religious sciences (ʿulūm al-dīn) lies in the fact that the notion of iḥsān is positioned as a constitutive element representing the ultimate aim of the religious life. In this context, the expression mentioned in the Ḥadīth of Jibrīl — “to worship Allah as though you see Him” — should be understood not merely as a mystical state (ḥāl), but as an ideal criterion regarding the qualitative perfection of ʿibādah (worship). This criterion aims at a degree of certainty (yaqīn) that deepens and authenticates both the believer’s faith (īmān) and practice (ʿamal). In accordance with this understanding, tasawwuf emerges as a discipline that investigates the methods of inner cultivation and spiritual training (tarbiyah) necessary for the believer to attain the station (maqām) of iḥsān (Demirli, 2016). SEVIM YILMAZ 91 The fundamental concerns of tasawwuf are, to a large extent, related to the notion of intention (niyyah); for according to the Ṣūfīs, the depth of the religious life is contingent upon the authenticity (ṣiḥḥah) of one’s niyyah. In this context, the principal factor that corrupts the purity of niyyah is identified as the human desire to preserve one’s existence and to make oneself visible. The Ṣūfīs termed this desire as “the love of existence” (ḥubb al-wujūd) and connected all human actions to this primordial motive. This underlying motive also serves as the source of attitudes that obstruct the state of iḥsān, such as hypocrisy (riyāʾ). Indeed, when a person seeks to exhibit his acts before others, worship (ʿibādah) ceases to be for Allah alone and begins to derive its meaning from human approval. At this point, Islam regards such behavior as a form of shirk (associating partners with Allah) and treats it as a manifestation of a weakness in īmān (faith) Within the framework of the Ḥadīth of Jibrīl, the state of iḥsān is attainable only when one is purified from such weaknesses and directs all devotion exclusively toward Allah. The expression “to worship Allah as though you see Him” thus signifies the exclusive dedication of niyyah to Allah alone and the purification from riyāʾ (ostentation).Tasawwuf, in its essence, is the methodological endeavor aimed at realizing precisely this process of inner transformation. According to the Ṣūfīs, without sincerity (ikhlāṣ), true tawḥīd (affirmation of divine oneness) cannot be achieved; and without tawḥīd, genuine īmān and ʿibādah are impossible (Demirli, 2016). Tawḥīd, rather than merely denoting numerical oneness, is primarily a moral and existential concept. Drawing upon the verse, “We created everything in truth” (Q 15:85), Ibn al-ʿArabī asserts that al-Ḥaqq (the Real) constitutes the very essence of all things. According to this conception of tawḥīd, there is but one true agent (fāʿil) in existence: Allah. All beings, in their essential reality, are grounded in al-Ḥaqq. Consequently, according to the ʿārifūn (gnostics) such as Ibn al-ʿArabī, every individual has attained to a portion of the truth, and none are utterly bereft of it. What matters, however, is to guide each fragment back toward the wholeness of the truth. This wholeness is none other than the conception of tawḥīd as articulated by Islam through the Qurʾān. Indeed, the oft-cited phrase “Come, whoever you are” is a call to tawbah (repentance) that the ʿārifūn echo and that ultimately traces back to the Prophet’s guidance. It is, in essence, an endeavor to reunite the human being with the totality of the truth (Demirli, 2016). Thus, the notion of a so-called “moderate Islam” is untenable (Haksever, 2016). In accordance with the understanding of tawḥīd, in tasawwuf, fundamental human qualities such as birth, death, and love, which are intrinsic to the human essence, are considered essential. In contrast, accidental attributes TASAWWUF AND RELIGION 92 such as race, color, nationality, and religion, while necessary for the continuation of life, are regarded as secondary in the face of ultimate reality. At this point, tasawwuf emphasizes the need to avoid discrimination based on race, color, nationality, or religion. It rejects the philosophy of separation based on these attributes and refuses to engage in wars motivated by them (Kılıç, 2013). The gnostics (arifin) communicate with others through the essential qualities of humanity. Rumi’s metaphor of the compass (pergel) is a beautiful example of this. The fixed foot of the compass represents stability and steadfastness in living according to the Qur’an and Sunnah, while the movable foot allows communication with others based on a common point, within the limits permitted by the fixed foot. For this reason, Rumi defined his path by saying, “I am the slave of the Qur’an, and the dust of the path of Prophet Muhammad,” indicating his core principles. He established contact with everyone according to this stability and helped them gain awareness by communicating through shared qualities. For instance, Rumi did not tell the Christian priests in Konya to “become Muslims.” Instead, he said, “Resurrect the Jesus within you,” aiming to bring them closer to the Muhammadan Truth and thus facilitating their conversion to Islam (Cebecioğlu, 2010). When his funeral procession was being carried, people of different faiths, who intervened to ask for permission and help in carrying it, said, “Rumi is like bread to us; just as bread is to a hungry person, so is he to us” (Eflaki, 2011).” The most prominent distinction between Christian mysticism and Tasawwuf is asceticism (rūhbāniyya). According to Christian belief, in creation, Eve deceived Adam in collaboration with Satan, which led to their expulsion from Paradise. Over time, this understanding transformed into an asceticism that viewed women as the source of sin and emphasized avoiding them. Approaching God was seen as possible only by distancing oneself from worldly pleasures and particularly from women. In contrast, in Tasawwuf, nearness to Allah is not achieved by withdrawing from the world or people; on the contrary, it is realized through remaining in life and living among people. (Derin, 2006). In this context, celvet (solitude in the midst of society) is essential in Tasawwuf. It means being among the people, empathizing with their struggles, and walking the thorny paths of life. Solitude (uzlet) and retreat (khalwat) are not opposites of celvet, but rather its complements. Furthermore, celvet is a sign of the soul’s ascent. Men and women are not seen as obstacles on this path, but as complementary beings, both directed toward the same truth. (Öztürk, 1979). In Tasawwuf, when the term insan-ı kamil (the perfect human) is used, it refers to the Prophet Muhammad. Every SEVIM YILMAZ 93 person progresses on the path to perfection to the extent that they follow him. This is one of the fundamental features that distinguish Tasawwuf from other mystical traditions (Demirli, 2013). In this regard, mystics such as Ibn Arabi and Mevlana show the way to reach the truth not by fleeing from the world or completely renouncing desires, but by being involved in life, integrating with every being, and living with love and tolerance. They present Tasawwuf’s understanding of Tawhid (the oneness of God) as a way of life based on unity. There is no place for discrimination, hatred, or war here; every human being, every creature, is a part of the truth. Tasawwuf demonstrates that the path of living Tawhid is possible by being in life, living with people, and being in harmony with all beings. Conclusion Understanding the place of Tasawwuf in Islamic thought is not only a historical inquiry but also a profound answer to the question of how we should live our faith today. Tasawwuf is the name of the effort to preserve and sustain the moral essence of Islam. In this regard, it is neither limited to the practice of a particular period nor merely an individual story of inner retreat. In fact, it is the continuation of the deep Islamic experience that the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) personally lived and passed down to the generation of the Companions, carried forward in subsequent centuries through different languages and forms. The era of Zuhd is the first stage of this experience. In an environment where the material world rapidly expanded and surrounded humanity, it emerged as a new language of turning towards Allah. However, over time, this language of Zuhd evolved into a more comprehensive and profound process of spiritual construction, known as Tasawwuf. In this process, Tasawwuf has become a principle that revitalizes the inner world of the individual while also repairing the spiritual fabric of society. All these developments show that Tasawwuf is not an understanding borrowed from outside, but rather a quest for truth that arises from the very depth of Islam. To understand it is to understand a life built upon revelation and the Sunnah. However, throughout history, Tasawwuf has not remained solely a path for those seeking the truth. Over time, various accumulations have formed along the way, and at times the essence has been overshadowed. Particularly, some intellectual currents turning into a form-based religiosity have led Tasawwuf to deviate from the goals indicated by the Qur’an and Sunnah. In response to this, Tasawwuf has needed to redefine its boundaries in line with the Ahl al-Sunnah beliefs TASAWWUF AND RELIGION 94 and schools of thought. Thus, it is no longer the personal experiences of individuals that are central, but the scholarly and evidence-based references upon which these experiences are based. In the modern era, approaches to Tasawwuf generally focus on two extremes. The first reduces Tasawwuf to an individual search for peace shaped by a secular mindset, turning it into a psychological therapy embellished with mystical tones, devoid of its true content. The second approach completely disconnects Tasawwuf from the scholarly and spiritual content accumulated throughout history, transforming it into a rejection that equates it entirely with innovation (bid’ah). Both attitudes fail to fully grasp the essence of Tasawwuf and its place within Islamic thought. However, Tasawwuf is neither merely an emotional refuge opening the door to individual escape nor a nostalgic realm trapped in the past. Rather, it is a dynamic experience that emerged under the guidance of revelation, shaped by the Sunnah of the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him), and is based on the spiritual and moral education of the human heart. Considering the essential aspects of Tasawwuf in today’s conditions, its relevance at both the individual and societal levels can be reinterpreted in a way that suits the circumstances of the time. In this context, the following suggestions can be made: • Knowledge and wisdom should be considered together. Tasawwuf should be built on a scholarly foundation; the ancient balance between the madrasa and the Sufi lodge, between intellect and heart, should be revived. • Return to authentic sources should be increased. The texts of the early Sufis should be translated for today’s people; instead of dry explanations, a living language should be used. • Representation should be transparent. Sufi orders should make themselves open to scrutiny, both spiritually and administratively; the role of guidance should be seen not as a position of power, but as a responsibility. • Tasawwuf explained to society should be deepened. The works of figures such as Mevlâna and Yunus should not only be explored in terms of their poetry but also in terms of their connection with the Qur’an. • A new discourse should be established in academia. In opposition to the Orientalist thesis that explains Tasawwuf through non-Islamic SEVIM YILMAZ 95 influences, a scientific approach that speaks with our own sources should be developed. In conclusion, Tasawwuf is the path of those who seek the truth by following the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him); however, this path is only accessible to those who purify their intentions, cleanse their hearts, and seek the truth by refining their souls. TASAWWUF AND RELIGION 96 References Armstrong, K. (1993). A history of God. New York: Ballantine Books. Buhârî. (1993). es-Sahîh (M. Dîb el-Buğâ, Ed.). Dımaşk: Dâru İbn Kesîr. Cebecioğlu, E. (1997). Tasavvuf terimleri sözlüğü. Ankara: Rehber Yayınları. Cebecioğlu, E. (2010). Mevlânâ üzerine bazı notlar. Ankara: Sami Efendi Vakfı Yayınları. Chittick, W. C. (2000). The sufi path of knowledge: Ibn al-`Arabi’s metaphysics of imagination. Albany: State University of New York Press. Demirli, E. (2013). İbnü’l-Arabî metafiziği. İstanbul: Sûfî Kitap Yayınları. Demirli, E. (2016). İslam düşüncesi üzerine söyleşiler ve konuşmalar. İstanbul: Sufi Yayınları. Demirli, E. (2017). İslam metafiziğinde Tanrı ve insan. İstanbul: Alfa Yayınları. Derin, S. (2006). İngiliz oryantalizmi ve tasavvuf. İstanbul: Küre Yayınları. Durkheim, E. (2008). Dinsel yaşamın ilkel biçimleri (Ö. Akınhay, Çev.). İstanbul: Say Yayınları. Eflâkî, Ahmed. (2011). Menâkıbü’l-Ârifîn (T. Yazıcı, Çev.). İstanbul: Kabalcı Yayıncılık. Haksever, A. C. (2021). Günümüz tasavvuf meseleleri. İstanbul: Kitapyurdu Doğrudan Yayıncılık. Hücvîrî. (2010). Keşfü’l-Mahcûb (Hakikat bilgisi) (S. Uludağ, Çev.). İstanbul: Dergâh Yayınları. İbnü’l-Arabî, M. (2006). Fütûhât-ı Mekkiyye (Cilt 3, E. Demirli, Çev.). İstanbul: Litera Yayıncılık. Kara, M. (2008). Metinlerle Osmanlılarda tasavvuf ve tarikatlar. İstanbul: Sır Yayıncılık. Kılıç, M. E. (2013). Tasavvufa giriş. İstanbul: Sûfî Kitap. Kılıç, M. E. (2014). Tasavvuf düşüncesi. İstanbul: Sûfî Yayınları. Kuşeyrî, E. K. A. b. H. (1993). er-Risâletü’l-Kuşeyriyye fî ilmi’t-tasavvuf (M. Z. A. Baltacı, Tahk.). Beyrut: Dârü’l-Hayr. Küçük, O. N. (2009). Mevlânâ’ya göre manevi gelişim. İstanbul: İnsan Yayınları. Müslim b. Haccâc. (1955). Sahîh (M. F. Abdülbaki, Ed.). Kahire: Matbaatü Îsâ el-Bâbî el-Halebî. Nasr, S. H. (1972). Sufi essays. Albany: State University of New York Press. Öztürk, Y. N. (1998). Kur’an ve sünnete göre tasavvuf. İstanbul: Yeni Boyut. Serrâc, Ebû Nasr Abdullah et-Tusî. (1960). el-Lüma’ (A. Mahmûd & A. Surûr, Tahk.). Bağdat: Dâru’l-Kütübü’l-Hadis. Sülemî. (2018). Tabakātü’s-sûfiyye (İlk zâhid ve sûfîler) (A. Tek, Çev.). Bursa: Bursa Akademi. Tek, A. (2017). Tarihi süreçte tasavvuf ve tarîkatlar (2. baskı). Bursa: Bursa Akademi. SEVIM YILMAZ 97 Toprak, B. (2006). Yunus Emre Divanı. İstanbul: Odunpazarı Belediyesi Yayınları. Uludağ, S. (2014). Tasavvuf ve tenkit. İstanbul: Dergâh Yayınları. Uludağ, S. (2018). İslâm düşüncesinin yapısı: Selef, kelâm, tasavvuf, felsefe. İstanbul: Dergâh Yayınları. Wilcox, L. (2001). Sûfîzm ve psikoloji (O. Düz, Çev.). İstanbul: İnsan Yayınları. Yılmaz, H. K. (2019). Anahatlarıyla tasavvuf ve tarikatlar. İstanbul: Ensar Yayınları. RELIGION AND POLITICS 104 attitudes. Since each approach intensely contains many thinkers and a series of theoretical constructs and conceptual sets of these thinkers, this text will only touch upon the main thematic points of the theoretical perspectives in question, emphasizing the status and role of religion in different theoretical openings in the religion and politics relationship. Within this framework, the ontological and functional status of religion, the social role it assumes, and the form of interaction it establishes with the political sphere in the context of its relationship with politics will be discussed in a broad outline. All of these will allow for a comparative overview of the theoretical foundations used to understand and interpret the relationship religion and politics. 2.1. Religious Approach: The Supremacy of Religion Over Politics In medieval Christian thought, religion was viewed as an ontological principle positioned above the political sphere; political theories were constructed on the basis of the transcendence of the spiritual over the temporal. In this framework, political power was conceived not as an autonomous structure in itself but as a domain that the determining principles of religion should guide. It was believed that spiritual authority should hold a decisive and supervisory position over the political, both due to its epistemological privilege in attaining truth and its function of leading society to eternal salvation. Thus, politics became merely a tool limited to maintaining worldly order, while religion was positioned as the primary authority that gave it meaning, direction, and legitimacy. This understanding with its inclination to subordinate the political to the divine aimed to define not only power relations but also the normative structure of social order on a theological basis (Barbier, 2000, pp. 23-25). The supremacy of religion over politics and its positioning as the primary determining principle in the relationship religion and politics was theorized and articulated in writing on a theo-political ground through the contributions of canonical thinkers in Western intellectual history. This approach, characterized as religious in the context of the relationship religion and politics, first manifested itself in Martin Luther. Martin Luther, as the founding figure of the Reformation movement in Western intellectual history that paved the way for the reconstruction of not only theological but also political and social order, holds a central place in the relationship religion and politics by transforming the nature of religion’s institutional structure as well as its relationship with the individual and authority. While emphasis BEKIR EMIROĞLU 105 on Luther’s centrality is important, it should be noted that he was more a theologian and religious reformer than a political theorist (Yazoğlu, 2001). Martin Luther’s political thought, essentially theological in orientation, was shaped by an effort to purify religion. His opposition to the hierarchical structure of the medieval Church, which had permeated the political sphere, inevitably forced him to confront politics (Barbier, 2000, pp. 27-28). This confrontation led him to radically distinguish between faith and law, spirit and body, religion and politics. Luther’s main thesis is that humans are saved by faith alone—an understanding that forms the essence of the Reformation; this understanding positions the religious sphere as internal and transcendent and the political sphere as external and worldly. Thus, politics is defined as a divine tool to curb sinful human nature, but as a regulative function not essential for Christians, only necessary for unbelievers. In this context, Luther ontologically separates religion and politics with his theory of two kingdoms. However, it should be noted that Luther’s distinction is not one that implies the ineffectiveness of the religious in the worldly, such as one religious and one non-religious. Indeed, both kingdoms are divine and based on a divine foundation. The Kingdom of God refers to the internal realm governed by faith, while the Earthly Kingdom refers to the external realm ruled by law. Temporal power also originates from God, but it is defined by a limited and oppressive function, such as limiting evil and preserving peace. Luther divides humanity into believers belonging to God’s kingdom and unbelievers belonging to the world’s kingdom, seeing political authority as an order established by God, especially to limit the evil of unbelievers (Luther, 2011, p. 368). Therefore, even if political power is unjust, it necessitates obedience as both a divine command and a conscientious responsibility because it is based on God’s will (Has, 2014, p. 267). According to Luther, a true Christian is already internally free by faith and obeys worldly authority only for the sake of others’ salvation. Therefore, although politics is necessary for the order of Christian society, it should not interfere with the realm of faith; it should govern bodies, not souls. From this perspective, political power is subordinate to the sacred, serving it (Barbier, 2000, p. 30). However, Luther’s thought, by defining the political sphere not as an autonomous structure but in the shadow of religious truth, limited political power with the desire to put it at the service of faith. Politics is legitimized not according to its own internal norms but according to religious references. This situation, while consistent with Luther’s initial effort to involve temporal authority in the reformation of the Church, could not prevent this authority from interfering with the religious sphere over time (Barbier, 2000, p. 37). In this framework, it is possible to state that Luther’s political thought tends to RELIGION AND POLITICS 106 grant transcendence to religion while reducing politics to a subordinate and functional sphere. In this respect, it can be characterized not as a precursor to modern secular political theories, but as an expression of a theo-political order. Another canonical thinker of the religious approach, where politics is subordinated to religion and absolute sovereignty resides in religion is Jean Calvin. Calvin and Calvinism, highly renowned in sociological literature based on Weber’s connection between capitalism and Calvinism, left a theological legacy that forms a matrix for the religion and politics relationship. Jean Calvin’s theory of religion and politics is fundamentally a product of a theological orientation based on the ideal of a Christian society. Like Luther, Calvin was a religious reformer, but his legal background and observations of political reality enabled him to develop a more systematic and realistic thought on politics (Barbier, 2000). Unlike Luther’s distant stance towards the law, Calvin placed the law at the center of his thought, arguing that political power is both an anthropological necessity due to the corrupted nature of human beings and a theological necessity originating from God’s will. According to him, humans are beings inclined to evil under the influence of their passions, and the condition for ensuring social order is the existence of a civil authority. Calvin explicitly defends the divine origin of political power; authority comes directly from God, not from the people, and therefore rulers are seen as God’s representatives. Although the people’s election of rulers is accepted as a legitimate practice, this does not mean that the power source is the people. According to Calvin, rulers are obligated to establish justice and maintain public order, and they are also responsible for protecting religion as God’s representatives on earth. This also underpins Calvin’s political conservatism: he advocates absolute obedience to rulers, and disobedience is legitimized only when it conflicts with faith. Calvin develops a dual power concept similar to Luther’s two-kingdom theory when explaining the relationship between religion and politics. However, his approach distinguishes between the two dimensions within each human being—spiritual and temporal—rather than distinguishing between people. Each individual is subject to both spiritual power, which concerns their conscience, and civil power, which regulates social relations. This distinction allows Calvin to balance between Christian freedom and civil obedience. Christians’ consciences are free before God; however, this freedom does not exempt them from worldly laws. In this framework, the purpose of spiritual power is eternal salvation, while the purpose of civil power is social order and justice. While theoretically maintaining this distinction, Calvin, especially with his experience in Geneva, designed an order that puts BEKIR EMIROĞLU 107 civil power at the service of religion. Although the separation of jurisdictions between spiritual and civil authority is emphasized (Barbier, 2000, p. 49), in Calvin’s envisioned Christian society model, civil government is obliged to protect true religion and prevent publicly committed religious deviations. Thus, the theoretical distinction between two powers is practically replaced by a system that establishes the supremacy of the religious over the political. In this respect, Calvin’s political understanding, while attempting to make religious authority independent of temporal power, ultimately results in a semi-theocratic model where civil authority is subject to religious commands. Following Luther and Calvin, Jean Bodin is another key figure in the approach where religion is the driver and determinant of politics in the religion-politics relationship. Bodin’s central aim is to create a correspondence between religion and politics by grounding the modern state on natural religion (Barbier, 2000, pp. 53-54). Bodin’s effort to establish a consensus between religion and politics through the concept of natural religion distinguishes him from other theorists in terms of the status he gives to religion. Indeed, the religion Bodin addresses and tries to establish a correspondence with politics is natural religion, not other specific religions/ sects. Bodin aimed to reconstruct the state based on unity and stability by purifying the political sphere from sectarian divisions. For this purpose, he sought to provide the state with a natural and rational basis of legitimacy. According to him, since religious differences fuel political divisions and threaten the state, sovereignty must be entrusted to the state as an absolute and indivisible power to overcome these conflicts. This sovereign power places the state above sects while also enabling the establishment of an order based on tolerance among different faiths. Although Bodin detaches the state from specific religions, he grounds it on a natural religion that can be shared by all citizens. This approach creates a basis for protecting the state from sectarian conflicts without denying the social function of religion (Barbier, 2000, p. 56). Bodin, by purifying the state from sectarian conflicts to establish a stable political unity, grounds the place of religion in the state independently of specific religions but within a natural and universal framework. In his understanding, religion is positioned as both the foundational basis and the ultimate goal of the state. In this context, God is not only the source of power but also the end towards which the state should strive. However, this understanding of God is based on a natural religion grounded in reason and nature, not on a specific sect (Barbier, 2000, p. 58). Bodin’s emphasis on religion is essentially related to his fundamental problem and trajectory, which is the establishment of political unity. For Bodin’s primary concern is RELIGION AND POLITICS 108 how political unity can be achieved (Ekiz, 2020). Bodin, while placing the state above sects, seeks a common religious ground that everyone can adopt through reason to ensure social order. According to Bodin, religion serves as a regulative function that determines not only individual morality but also the limits of political power. Bodin, in this manner, places religion at the foundation of political authority while arguing that the order on which this authority rests is also rational for both nature and human reason are the work of God. In this respect, the purpose of the state is to establish and maintain this order, which is in accordance with God’s will. In this context, the king, as God’s representative on earth, derives his power from a divine source; however, this does not lead him to interfere with different faiths. On the contrary, Bodin’s approach allows for a tolerant approach to different faiths based on respect for the order created by God. Bodin, by grounding absolute monarchy with theological legitimacy, ensured that this structure did not exclude religious pluralism and proposed an original political model that combines absolutism with tolerance (Akat, 1974, pp. 567-568). For Bodin’s compromise to be realized, the laws of the state must conform to God’s law, and the monarch must see God as both a witness to their actions and the ultimate judge. While not prioritizing any particular sect or granting it a superior status, Bodin attributes a special function to the Church in the social and political sphere. Beyond being a spiritual institution, the Church is the guardian of moral order, the supervisor of political power, and a historical counter-balance against tyranny (Barbier, 2000). 2.2. Instrumental Approach: The Subordination of Religion to Politics The instrumentalization of religion through its subordination to politics signifies the loss of religion’s central role in the political arena; religion’s existence is found solely in its being seen as a social cement in the formation and maintenance of social order and its undertaking of a mediating role in ensuring consensus between state and society, indicating that religion has been stripped of its autonomous and determining foundational principle in a political sense. In this context, religion is abstracted from its transcendent claims and becomes a functional tool that strengthens the legitimacy of political authority; thus, religion’s influence in the public sphere is reduced to an instrument limited to the preservation of order. This approach also serves as a source for the idea of separating religion and politics. The first rupture in the positively attributed ontological status of religion in political philosophy, concerning the relationship between religion and BEKIR EMIROĞLU 109 politics, manifested itself in Machiavelli. Although Machiavelli did not directly target the religious power of the state, he consciously disregarded it. He sought the source of political power not in God but in human will and historical reality, finding the sacred claims of kings to be imaginary and irrational. In this way, he is the first thinker to break entirely from the scholastic tradition (Cassirer, 2005, p. 140). Although he attributes an autonomous status to the state and rejects the state’s dependence on religion, Machiavelli does not exclude religion as a whole; instead, he grants it a functional status. Machiavelli, while emphasizing the functional role of religion in politics, sharply criticized the pacifying effect of Christianity in his time; instead, he preferred the constitutive role of pagan religion in Rome in producing social unity and political discipline. For example, in his work Discourses on Livy, Machiavelli expresses how religion was used instrumentally in Rome, how it played a mediating role in establishing and maintaining social order, and how unsuccessful Christianity of his time was in fulfilling this duty. According to Machiavelli, the greatness of Rome was based on Numa Pompilius’s establishment of religious institutions, thereby instilling the fear of God and social obedience in the people. For him, religion is an indispensable tool that ensures social order and reinforces the legitimacy of political power. Therefore, the permanence and stability of a state are possible not so much through the virtue of individuals but through institutionalized religious and moral structures (Machiavelli, 2025, pp. 67-71). Machiavelli argues that the institutional and social function of religion is vital for the continuity of a strong state. According to him, the success of pagan religion in keeping the people in harmony is possible through the influence of prophecies and rituals on the populace. When this religious foundation deteriorates, social order also collapses. The deviation of Christianity from its original principles and especially the corruption of the Roman Church led to the weakening of religious belief in Italy, the corruption of the people, and the hindrance of political unity. Therefore, he sees the papacy as the primary culprit for the fragmentation of Italy (Machiavelli, 2025, p. 74). Thus, he advocated for the re-functionalization of religion as a tool to strengthen political order (Barbier, 2000, p. 110). In this context, Machiavelli completely subordinates religion to politics: the ruler should appear pious, use religion, and even distort it if necessary; however, all this must be done faithfully in the public eye (Barbier, 2000). The state, which is autonomous and not bound by religion, will not accept any authority other than itself, and it has the power to use other authorities, such as religion, instrumentally within its own authority to establish the order of the state (Beriş, 2019, p. 15). From this perspective, the functional status Machiavelli accords to religion RELIGION AND POLITICS 110 makes him one of the first thinkers to implicitly accept the fundamental thesis of functional sociology, where religion finds its place in establishing and maintaining social order and exists insofar as it can fulfill a function. Indeed, the primary role given to religion by the structural-functionalist school, long considered the sole and fundamental theory in social theory (Ritzer, 2011, p. 94), manifests itself in terms of the function it fulfills in the social system. The functionalist approach, developed under the leadership of Talcott Parsons, revolves around the question of how order can be established in a balanced way. In this respect, it follows the trajectory of Thomas Hobbes, who centered the same problem in political philosophy, demonstrating that structural-functionalist sociology inherits Hobbes’s legacy in the theoretical continuity it establishes with the tradition of political thought. For both Hobbes’s theory of the state of nature and Parsons’s system theory explain the establishment of social order, the limitation of individual tendencies, and the legitimization of authority on common grounds. In this context, structural functionalism seeks answers to the questions of how society as a whole achieves and maintains stability, just as in Hobbes’s political theory, through normative and regulative structures. Therefore, the analysis of Hobbes’s theory of religion and politics is important in this regard. It can be stated that Thomas Hobbes’s positioning in the relationship between religion and politics, which can be described as one of the cornerstones of political philosophy, is shaped around by his understanding of the natural state of humanity and the resulting concept of the state. Hobbes’s political philosophy, by basing its description of the state of nature on human nature, derives the source of political being not from traditional virtue ethics but from individual fear, desires, and impulses. According to him, humans are not by nature political or social; on the contrary, they are equally dangerous and mutually distrustful (Berns, 2022, pp. 420-422). This situation gives rise to the state of nature, which he defines as a war of all against all. The way out of this dangerous environment is for people to mutually renounce their natural rights and unite in a common will, thereby entrusting authority to a sovereign through a contract (Hobbes, 2023, pp. 128-130). Hobbes states the necessity of a state authority as follows: “The purpose of the State is the security of individuals. Humans naturally desire freedom and domination over others; but when they agree to live in a state, they also undertake to limit these desires. The ultimate reason for this restriction is to live a safer and more peaceful life. For humans can only escape destructive conflicts and a state of constant danger in an order where a common authority compels them to keep their promises and obey natural laws through the threat of punishment” (Hobbes, 2023, p. 127). The will of the sovereign, to whom BEKIR EMIROĞLU 111 authority is entrusted, becomes the autonomous will of each individual, and the law he establishes transforms into the self-law of the subjects. In this respect, Hobbes conceives of the state as a juridical person: the authority of the sovereign represents the united will of all individuals, and the state is the sole guarantor of peace, order, and security. This construct prioritizes the state as the strongest structure to protect individual rights; but this prioritization is fueled by the individual’s consent, directly from their own instinct for selfpreservation and fear of death (Berns, 2022). Hobbes’s central trajectory in this regard is the necessity of establishing order and the existence of authority for its continuity. Religion also finds its place in the axis of the benefit it provides for establishing order. Indeed, his approach to religion and politics can be characterized as a product of the religious conflicts prevalent in 17th-century England. Religious conflicts, which had the potential to disrupt the contractual state that guaranteed peace, prosperity, and security, according to Hobbes, should be curbed by the state. This curbing can be achieved not through conflict with religion, but rather by not leaving religion to itself, and by subordinating religion to the state with the aim of preventing conflict and preserving peace (Barbier, 2000, p. 128). Hobbes attributes a functional status to religion for both the individual and society. The essence of religion holds no meaning for Hobbes; its position in his interest lies in fulfilling individual and social needs (Hobbes, 2023, p. 89). In Hobbes’s design of Leviathan, the state and the church are identified; their members are the same, and there are no distinctions. Thus, the civil sovereign is not only the possessor of political power but also of spiritual authority. The religion determined by the civil sovereign becomes the official and sole religion of the state; other religions are not tolerated because religious unity is a prerequisite for political unity. The state also has the authority to interpret sacred texts and to decide which texts are authentic. In this context, only the civil sovereign, not individuals, can determine the binding meaning of sacred texts (Barbier, 2000, p. 132). From this perspective, Hobbes, who places spiritual authority within the scope of civil authority, considers spiritual authority in the context of its function as a social cement for the continuation of order. In this respect, in Hobbes’s system, religion is an extension of political authority and a tool for establishing order. This thought pushes the truth claims of religion to the background, positioning religion as a kind of political instrument. Thus, Hobbes presents a model that dissolves religion within politics, removing it from the sphere of individual conscience and transforming it into a regulatory institution of the state. In this model, religion is a power that reinforces the state, not threatens it. RELIGION AND POLITICS 112 The instrumental status Hobbes accords to religion reaches its zenith in Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s theory of civil religion. Rousseau’s theory of civil religion found its place in sociological theory through Robert Bellah’s use of civil religion, inspired by Rousseau. Civil religion, originating in Rousseau and fully developed by Bellah, serves the function of integrating atomized individuals into a whole, primarily in the context of establishing and stabilizing social order, rather than focusing on the essence of religion itself. Rousseau, as in the approaches that subordinate religion to politics, placed the social function of religion, not its essence and nature, at the center of his interest (Akdemir, 2020, p. 286). In Rousseau, one of the main implications of the social contract idea, which originates from the collective will above the individual will, is the idea of religion that will keep the said collective will intact. However, he classifies religions to examine which form of religion can exist in a society governed by the collective will and which can benefit society, ultimately arriving at the conceptualization of civil religion (Rousseau, 2019, pp. 124-130). Rousseau seeks to establish a constitutive and complementary relationship between religion and the state, without reducing one to the other. According to him, religion serves to foster civic virtue by guaranteeing individual morality and social order; without religion, neither true morality nor sustainable political order can be established in a society. In this context, the function of religion is not to represent metaphysical truth but to sacralize the social contract, to ground the binding nature of laws, and to give a sacred foundation to state authority. The concept of civil religion comes into play precisely at this point: it is defined as a belief system where individuals believe not in God but in the social contract; however, this belief is internalized with a kind of transcendental feeling. Rousseau’s aim is to utilize religion as a moral foundation that will legitimize the political (Akdemir, 2020, p. 289). Rousseau’s vision of political unity rests on the inseparability principle the establishes between religion and the state. While sharing the generally distant stance towards religion prevalent in Enlightenment thought, Rousseau, unlike this line of thought, argues that religion holds an indispensable place in establishing social order and moral integrity. According to him, existing religions may have been inadequate in shaping the political sphere; however, religion itself is still can still play a constitutive role in building a common will and harmony in society (Ataman, 2014, pp. 24-25). In a general assessment, the social function of religion comes to the forefront in this aspect of the religion and politics relationship. The tension between the presupposition that religion is indispensable for social order and the limitation of religion’s autonomous intervention in politics has resulted BEKIR EMIROĞLU 113 in the subordination of religion to politics and its reduction to a functional tool. 2.3. Separation of Religion and Politics Approach The liberal approach, which aims to limit the influence of religion on politics and advocates the independence of both spheres, was systematically grounded, especially by Locke in modern intellectual history and achieved its main development with the rise of political liberalism after the French Revolution. From Locke onwards, this approach, emphasizing the intrinsic value of religion for the individual, aimed to liberate religion from state tutelage and defend its autonomy within the sphere of freedom. This line developed in different forms in the first half of the 19th century with thinkers such as Constant, Lamennais, and Tocqueville: Constant expressed the absolute separation of religion from political power most consistently; Lamennais, although initially leaning on Catholicism, gradually evolved into a libertarian position advocating for the separation of church and state. Tocqueville, synthesizing this intellectual heritage, integrated the religionpolitics separation, supported by his analyses of American society, with an effort to reconcile Christianity and democracy. Thus, the liberal approach constructed an original line that simultaneously grounded both the autonomy of religion based on freedom and the moral/social role it assumes in democratic societies (Barbier, 2000, pp. 183-184). John Locke’s approach, based on the absolute separation of religion and politics, which took shape in his political philosophy, emphasizes the implementation of the distinction between material and spiritual realms at the administrative level, in contrast to approaches that advocate the supremacy of religion over politics or the instrumentalization of religion by politics ; accordingly, it advocates for the existence of the state and religion as two independent autonomous institutions on the social plane. The impact of the religious and state conflicts that England was experiencing had a significant influence on Locke’s theory regarding the definite separation of religion and politics (Guétin, 2009). Indeed, since the religion and politics relationship is primarily a practical theo-political matter, the time period in which political philosophers find themselves influences their reflections. Locke argues that politics and religion are independent, autonomous institutions with different functions. According to him, the separation of religion and politics, which are inherently different in nature and function, is necessary (Barbier, 2000). He believes that political governance and religious affairs must be strictly separated, and clear boundaries set between them; otherwise, constant conflicts will inevitably arise between these two spheres, one claiming to RELIGION AND POLITICS 120 history. In periods when there was no distinction between religious, social, and political life, coming to power was possible by possessing a divine quality. The God-king is the most powerful legitimate power formation with divine origins. God-kings (pharaohs), especially associated with Ancient Egypt, claimed to be endowed with divine attributes themselves. What should be understood from this thought is that the power of kings was a right granted to them by God and an authority given by a sacred will. That is, power is sourced from God. It should be noted that rather than discourses about kings having divine qualities in pre-medieval periods, there was a belief that the source of power belonging to kings was God. Since God’s will is above all human will, political will now has an absolute, spiritualized character. Therefore, such authority requires unquestioning obedience. Every power relationship can gain religious legitimacy by being tied to God. It is also true that power was established in this way during certain periods. Moreover, it is a fact that even though the means of legitimizing political power have diversified, the situation where religion is instrumentalized for the easy governance of the masses still has living extensions in today’s political systems. However, the use of religion as a tool of governance is not a function that can be included in the definition of religion, but rather something done by humans in the name of religion (Macit, 2009, p. 351). Religion, by its very nature, is a phenomenon that makes itself felt in all layers of society and in all institutional structures formed by society. Therefore, it is hardly possible to view and evaluate the fields of politics and administration, and the activities and relationships that take place in these fields, as phenomena independent of religion (Okumuş, 2003, p. 130). Religion contributes to the individual’s development of unique abilities and to becoming a good person using rational filters and free will. The fact that politics is a structure that regulates, sets rules, and supervises people’s lives has made the mention of religion and politics together inevitable. The guidance and restrictions that both structures impose on people constantly push them into an obligatory cooperation. It is widely known that religion has been influential in the political approaches of states, such as the Crusades in Christianity, conflicts for the holy land in Judaism, and the concept of jihad in Islam. The political impact of religion can vary regionally. This relationship can manifest itself in a religious sense as well as in a sectarian sense. This occurs in Europe, specifically with the Vatican, while in Russia, it is experienced in the context of the Kremlin. Judaism in Israel, the Shiite sect in Iran, and Wahhabi movements in Saudi Arabia and some African countries are used by political parties. Furthermore, in these countries, religion is an important source of reference for providing solutions to BEKIR EMIROĞLU 121 international politics, regional problems, and domestic issues (Moyser, 1991, p. 2). Among religions, sects also hold an important place in national politics. Examples of sectarian superiority efforts include the Iran-Iraq-Syria, Shiite and Sunni wars (Bulut, 2015, p. 286) and the Catholic-Orthodox conflicts during the Conquest of Istanbul (Öztürk, 2003, p. 137). Thus, religion is not limited to the identity of political parties but also plays an active role in solving existing national problems or determining interstate policies. Indeed, this close relationship between religion and politics becomes even more pronounced in the context of legitimacy quests. When it comes to the state, power, sovereignty, and the politics to be carried out in their execution, the factor of religion frequently comes to the fore as an intermediary in ensuring their legitimacy. The prominence of religion stems from its relationship with the political system and its place in the beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors of the human actor of politics (Köktaş, 1997, p. 7). In this regard, religion can be used as a unifying instrument for society and politicians. Religion is an important factor that strengthens the economic and social order deemed appropriate by powers, and it is a means of legitimacy that commands absolute obedience to political power (Weber, 1997, p. 29). While powers sometimes instrumentalize religion instrumentalized by powers in the context of legitimacy and hegemony production, this instrumentalization can sometimes put religious people in a difficult position regarding decisions taken by powers to shape society (Polat, 2002, p. 126). Religion, being one of the biggest supporters of powers, politicians, and states, can also take on the role of the biggest opponent when necessary. Conflicts between the political principles of powers and religious principles, and the failure of political power and voters to offer each other a future, can be among the reasons for opposition. Throughout history, many rulers who claimed to rule in the name of religion have been witnessed to be overthrown by their opponents using the same reference (Fığlalı, 1997, pp. 23-26). 5. Secularization Theories as a Natural Extension of Modernization and the relationship religion and politics The four basic patterns we mentioned above both prepare and clearly accelerate modernization. As a result of modernization, while Catholic Christianity developed anti-modern reactions, it is also believed to have continuously receded in the face of the destructive power of modernization, and this is theorized through secularization and defended as a teleological necessity. However, the schematic teleological character of secularization RELIGION AND POLITICS 122 theories struggles to explain many asymmetrical societies from both the temporal perspective of modernization theories and the spatial perspective of world-systems theories and defines them with exceptionalism. Thomas Luckmann (1977, pp. 1-28), who objects to this process defined as the empirical starting point of secularization theories, argues that these patterns are a myth that helps to understand the modern world. Thomas Luckmann’s thought reveals that the empirical starting point of secularization theories is highly problematic. This problematic character of secularization theories, unfortunately, remains unquestioned under the shadow of the dominant view in sociology. The process of construction that modernism tried to achieve in human societies has been a universal civilization project valid not only for Western societies but for all human societies. According to Mehmet Aydın, secularization is seen as something that should happen rather than something that is happening, and as a result, secularization has been transformed into a political program imposed by force. According to some administrators who are in a hurry regarding modernization, religion should remain in the individual’s private life and completely withdraw from the public sphere. According to the secularization thesis expressed in moderate circles, religion should withdraw into its own sphere (Aydın, 2001, p. 14). Based on the fact that the phenomenon of religion, by its nature, cannot be removed from human conscience and human history, efforts to secularize religion have turned religion from a rival of the political sphere into a supportive element that can be used when needed, by reducing it from the “divine” realm to the secular realm to be controlled by politics. George Weigel states the world’s moving away from secularization towards the end of the 20th century as one of the social realities, while Gilles Kepel defines the resurgence of religion as “The Revenge of God” that unites civilizations (Huntington, 2006, p. 27). Therefore, religion, as a social marker, is still a valid element that continues to shape identities by drawing dark lines between “us” and “them,” even if its connection with organized (institutionalized) belief is very little (Nelsen and Guth, 2015, p. 203). In the relationship between the Church and the Russian state, which varies according to political and temporal conditions, the Church has been the most important partner supporting the traditional values of the state. Loyalty and trust in the Church have made the Church a key social institution with a certain influence in the public sphere (Curanović, 2015, p. 192). For obvious reasons (number of adherents, size of infrastructure, historical role, etc.), the Russian Orthodox Church holds a central place in Kremlin policy. The Greek Orthodox Church and the state cooperate in selected areas of the public sphere, and this cooperation is called “social partnership”. The BEKIR EMIROĞLU 123 close cooperation developed by the state and religious institutions outside the state borders constitutes “religious diplomacy”. The expectation that “traditional” religions will support state policies and strengthen the duties of ruling elites (Curanović, 2015, p. 194) brings religion and the state closer together and makes religion an important element in policymaking. With the declaration of the kings of England as the head of the Anglican Church, which separated from the Roman Catholic Church (Nieuwenhuis, 2012), the Anglican Church established its presence not only in the religious sphere but also in the political sphere. This organic link between the state and the Church in the political and religious spheres enabled the Church to obtain an official status. In England, the Anglican Church has been accepted as the Established Church. “Not every democracy is legally secular. In England, where representative parliamentary democracy has its deepest roots, there is — albeit only formally — an established church” (Lewis, 2017, p. 124). In France, which has been a cradle of secularism discussions, the situation has similarly undergone transformation. While secularism expresses the official separation of the church from the state and the exclusion of religion from the public sphere by the state, former French President Nicolas Sarkozy presented a new vision on the relationship between religion and the political regime in France. In his speech at Saint John Lateran Cathedral in Rome in 2007, he proposed a new understanding for the religion-political regime relationship around the concept of “positive secularism” [laïcité positive]. The statement that political regimes should not be anti-religious, and religions should not be anti-political regimes but rather can enrich each other through dialogue, understanding, and respect (Manuel, 2019) can be defined as a sign of the competition-consensus shift between the two concepts. Conclusion Although humanity’s conception of the universe has fundamentally transformed at least twice in the last 700 years, some things resist transformation. Humankind, which Voltaire heralded with the triumph of reason, or Nietzsche announced the death of God, has refused to distance itself from the sacred in a way that would mislead them, but has also refrained from accepting the sacred in its traditional forms. In other words, what has happened is “the displacement of the institutional position of religion” or, to put it differently, the world is not disenchanted (contrary to Weber’s assertion) but is re-enchanted. In short, the “sacred” has not disappeared, but has gained a different dimension. RELIGION AND POLITICS 124 Regarding the relationship between religion and politics, various interpretations are made based on the definitions of religion and politics, and whether such a relationship exists is debated. The relationship between religion and politics is one of the most difficult and complex issues that has existed throughout human history, and it will continue to exist, changing over time. According to some researchers, religion and politics are intertwined and cannot be separated; while according to others, religion and politics are separate entities and should not be mixed. Religion is concerned with the regulation of all aspects of individual and social life, while politics is concerned with the regulation of social life. In this sense, religion has a broader dimension. Because religion, by its nature, is a phenomenon that makes itself felt in all layers of society and in all institutional structures formed by society. Considering the holistic place of religion in social life, it is also seen that religion inevitably affects and will affect politics. The existence of fundamentally two different views on the relationship between religion and politics stems from the fact that those who comment focus on different aspects of religion and politics. The phenomenon of “sacralization of politics” which expresses a dimension of the relationship between religion and politics after the Enlightenment, has been a matter on which many social scientists have written since the French Revolution, and moreover, it has often been confused with the politicization of religion. However, the sacralization of politics is an entirely modern phenomenon. Attention should be paid to the emphasis on modernity in understanding what is meant by the concept. Looking at examples around the world and academic literature, it can be said that the theoretical framework within which sacralization can be examined fundamentally has a dual structure. Historically, from the end of the Middle Ages onwards, simultaneously with the opening of a secular sphere in society, the sacralization of secular concepts also manifested itself. During this process, which became increasingly noticeable after the Enlightenment, a mystical aura can be observed forming around many institutional structures, from science to reason, from nation to humanity, from nation to state. In addition to this conceptual analysis, on the political plane, the process by which the secular sphere, from which politics derives its legitimacy, creates its own sacred within itself to ensure loyalty and invites the public to respect this sacred, also allows sacralization to be used as a regime analysis. Analyses made through concepts such as civil religion, secular religion, political religion, and similar concepts come to the forefront at this point. As discussed in theories of religion and politics, concepts such as civil religion, secular religion, and political religion imply the sacralization of the secular, BEKIR EMIROĞLU 125 and the viewing of social duties and obligations as divine commands. All of this, contrary to the classical secularization thesis, reveals that religion is effective in all layers of social life in various new forms and planes. The relationship between religion and politics constitutes one of the most concrete examples of this situation. This study, conducted through the historical, theoretical, and social dimensions of the religion and politics relationship, reveals that this relationship is not merely a historical legacy or an ideological conflict zone, but a continuous and determining element in the political organization forms of modern societies and in the formation processes of individual political identity. Throughout history, religion has not only shaped the spiritual world of the individual; it has also gained continuity as a determining element in the construction of political authority, the preservation of social order, and the establishment of legitimacy. Modernization and secularization processes have transformed the form of this relationship, but the role of religion in social order and political legitimacy production has continued to exist in different forms. Therefore, the interaction between religion and politics maintains its importance as a dynamic relational area that has shaped both individual socialization processes and the formation of collective political structures from the past to the present. RELIGION AND POLITICS 126 References Akat, M. (1974). Machiavel-Bodin ve Hobbes’da monarşi anlayışı. Journal of Istanbul University Law Faculty, 40(1–4), 553–587. Akdemir, F. (2020). Jean Jacques Rousseau’da “sivil din” tasarımı bağlamında din-siyaset ilişkisi. 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Uluslararası Yönetim İktisat ve İşletme Dergisi, 9(19), 319–332. 129 CHAPTER 7 AL-ANDALUS: HISTORIOGRAPHY, IDENTITY, AND THE POLITICS OF MEMORY Assist. Prof. Şahin BAYKAL1 Abstract This study examines how the history of al-Andalus has been constructed within both Islamic and modern Western historiographical traditions. By analysing medieval Arabic chronicles alongside 19th – 21st century European scholarship, the chapter investigates the epistemological tensions and ideological frameworks that have shaped competing narratives of identity, civilisation, and memory. The research adopts a qualitative design grounded in comparative historiography and discourse analysis, treating historical narratives not as neutral representations but as products of knowledge making. The findings demonstrate that both Islamic and Western traditions place al Andalus at the centre of their respective civilisational claims, albeit through contrasting lenses. Islamic historiography frames al Andalus within paradigms of civilisational expansion and moral reflection, while modern Spanish nationalism constructs a teleological narrative through the ideological category of the “Reconquista.” Orientalist and romantic scholarship further aestheticize al Andalus as a “lost paradise,” whereas contemporary memory politics simultaneously idealise and marginalise this past. The study argues that the historiography of al-Andalus constitutes a site of epistemic contestation, revealing how modernity negotiates its identity 1 ORCID: 0009-0007-7383-1533 | E-Mail: [email protected] Boğaziçi University, Department of History. İstanbul, TÜRKİYE. AL-ANDALUS: HISTORIOGRAPHY, IDENTITY, AND THE POLITICS OF MEMORY 136 Mudejars were artisans and peasants who paid taxes to Christian authorities while maintaining their religious identity. Their architectural and artistic contributions, particularly the Mudéjar style (Arte Mudéjar), left a lasting mark on Spanish culture. In the 16th century, Muslims who were forcibly converted to Christianity were called ‘Moriscos’, this group lived among conflicts of identity and belief (Smith et al., 1993). The expulsion of the Moriscos between 1609 and 1614 symbolises the final dissolution of Andalusia’s multicultural structure, which had been shaped over centuries. However, Andalusian society was class-conscious not only according to religious and ethnic differences, but also according to economic and social status. At the top were the Arab aristocracy and the high-ranking civil servants, while Berber tribal chiefs and the Muwalladun elite occupied the second tier. Urban merchants, artisans, and scholars formed the middle class (Barton, 2004, pp. 154–189). Slaves, especially those of Slavic origin, held important positions in the palace or the army. This hierarchical order was based on a social balance that blended Islamic law and local traditions. The interaction between ethnic and religious groups in al-Andalus gave rise to a phenomenon that could be described as ‘cultural hybridity’. While Arabic became a common superordinate language, Latin, Hebrew and Romance languages continued to exist in local usage. Cities functioned as ‘civilisation laboratories’ with their multilingual, multi-religious and multiclass structures. This hybrid culture in Al-Andalus has been evaluated in different ways in modern historiography, romantic historians glorify it as ‘Convivencia,’ or tolerant coexistence, while critical historians argue that this picture is an exaggerated idealisation (Lapidus, 1988, pp. 298–314). 4. The Islamic Historiography on in al-Andalus This multi-layered structure of society is directly reflected in Andalusian historiography. Writers such as Ibn al-Qūṭiyya, Ibn Ḥayyān and Ibn Ḥazm (d. 1064) brought their own social positions and ideological tendencies into their works. Some emphasised Arab supremacy, while others highlighted local elements. This diversity turned historical writing itself into a ‘social practice’. Andalusian historians not only recorded the past but also reproduced their own identities. Modern historiography similarly attempted to compress this multi-layered society into national or religious categories. Yet, the Andalusian experience offers the most concrete example of history’s plural and permeable nature. Andalusian historiography was encouraged by the classical traditions of Islamic historiography on the one hand, while on the other hand it took on a unique form within the social, cultural and political ŞAHIN BAYKAL 137 conditions specific to the western Mediterranean (Adıgüzel, 2020). These historical narratives were based not only on the recording of events, but also on the interpretation of the past and the effort to legitimise the existence of civilisation in the West. Therefore, Andalusian historiography should be read both as an identity construction and as an intellectual defence. Early Islamic historiography is directly related to the Qur’an’s understanding of history, the past is a field of experience from which lessons (ʿibra) are to be learned. Classical historians, for example al-Ṭabarī (d. 923), do not merely chronicle events, they also seek the divine wisdom behind them (Fayda, “TABERÎ, Muhammed b. Cerîr”, TDV İslâm Ansiklopedisi). In this understanding, history is like a worldly repetition of a ‘sacred time.’ Andalusian historiography inherited this legacy but reinterpreted it within the different socio-political realities of the Western Islamic world. The earliest chronicles of al-Andalus, written in the 8th and 9th centuries, focused particularly on narratives of conquest (fatḥ) (Collins, 1995). In these texts, the conquest of Al-Andalus is presented not merely as a military achievement, but as part of Islam’s geographical and spiritual expansion. Narratives of conquest form the basis of the legitimacy of Muslim identity. Therefore, for historians, the past serves as a ‘founding narrative of power.’ Conquest epics are also intertwined with Arab tribal identities, and the historical narrative has become the ground for ethnic rivalry. Aḥmad al-Rāzī (d. 955), recognised as the founding figure of Andalusian historiography, established the fundamental framework of regional history with his work Aḥbār Mulūk al-Andalus (Reports on the Kings of al-Andalus) (Özdemir, “RÂZÎ, Ahmed b. Muhammed”, TDV İslâm Ansiklopedisi). AlRāzī displays a synthesising approach, combining historical data with both the Arab tradition of conquest and local Latin and Visigoth sources (LéviProvençal, “ar-Rāzī, Abū Bakr”, EI2). In his texts, history is presented as the evolution of an Islamic civilisation centred on Córdoba. Conquest signifies not merely a beginning, but the birth of civilisation. al-Rāzī’s son, ‘Isa alRāzī, continued this tradition, expanding the chronology and reinforcing the idea of ‘state continuity’ in Andalusian historiography. Their works show that in 10th century Andalusia, historical writing was no longer merely a record of events but had become a tool for constructing political memory. In this respect, the al-Rāzī family were among the earliest writers in the Islamic world to approach the idea of ‘national history’ (Kennedy, 2014). Ibn al-Qūṭiyya (d. 977), a Muslim historian represents the pluralistic structure of Andalusian identity. His work Tārīkh Iftitāḥ al-Andalus (History of the Conquest of al-Andalus) is one of the earliest and most original AL-ANDALUS: HISTORIOGRAPHY, IDENTITY, AND THE POLITICS OF MEMORY 138 sources on the conquest process. Ibn al-Qūṭiyya interprets the narratives of the conquest in the context of the participation of local Christian elements in Islam, thus adding a dimension of local belonging to Andalusian history (Lévi-Provençal, “ar-Rāzī, Abū Bakr”, EI2). In his historical narrative, ‘Islamisation’ is conceived not merely as an external conquest but as an internal process of transformation. This approach reflects a socio-cultural perspective of internalisation rarely seen in Islamic historiography (J. Bosch-Vilá, “Ibn al-Ḳūṭiyya”, EI2). Ibn al-Qūṭiyya’s text can be considered an early expression of the idea of an ‘Andalusian community’ beyond Arab and Berber identities. Thus, the writing of history here becomes a narrative of coexistence rather than ethnic rivalry. In this respect, Ibn al-Qūṭiyya’s narrative offers an alternative interpretation to the ‘centralised’ emphasis of the al-Rāzī tradition in terms of both history and identity construction. Ibn Ḥayyān al-Qurṭubī (d. 1076), who lived in the 11th century, is the most comprehensive and methodologically advanced representative of Andalusian historiography (Özdemir, “İBN HAYYÂN”, TDV İslâm Ansiklopedisi). His work, al-Muqtabis fi Tarikh al-Andalus, is unique in terms of both archival material and critical observation. While providing a chronology of events, Ibn Ḥayyān also draws moral lessons, linking historical collapses to the tyranny of rulers and moral decay in society (Huici Miranda, “Ibn Ḥayyān”, EI2). This perspective is the Andalusian version of the ‘parable paradigm’ prevalent in Islamic historiography. In Ibn Ḥayyān’s texts, history is interpreted as ‘the earthly manifestation of divine justice.’ According to him, the political instability of Andalusia is the result of violating God’s Sunna. However, Ibn Ḥayyān also analyses historical events in a critical manner, thereby taking historical writing beyond moralism. Modern historians have found early examples of an empirical approach to history in the Islamic world in his works. In al-Andalus, historical narrative was not limited to chronicles and official records. Literary texts, particularly “qasida”, served as carriers of historical consciousness. Poems written about the fall of Andalusian cities reveal the emotional and social dimensions of historical writing. In these texts, history is no longer merely ‘what has happened’ but ‘what has been lost’. The memory gives way to longing and mourning. These literary historical narratives combine with the rational tradition of Islamic historiography to form a layer of emotional history. Thus, Andalusian historiography records not only events but also the aesthetics of loss (Toprak, 1988, pp. 157–175). However, Andalusian historians saw themselves not only as mere ‘transmitters’ of information, but also as authorities on knowledge. The writing of history was closely intertwined with religious sciences, particularly hadith, fiqh, and ŞAHIN BAYKAL 139 literature. For a historian, the social meaning of an event was as important as the chain of transmission. Therefore, in Andalusian historical narratives, both narration and observation, sacred time and everyday reality are intertwined. Most historians belonged to the ulema class, scholars and wrote their works as an intellectual responsibility rather than to present them to the ruling circles. This situation gave Andalusian historiography a relatively autonomous character (Fierro, 2020). However, it should not be forgotten that historical narratives also reproduced the ‘language of legitimacy’ of society. Andalusian historiography has been rooted in a specific ideological context in every period. The chronicles of the Umayyad period emphasised legitimacy, the texts of the Taifa period nostalgia, and the texts of the Almoravid and Almohad periods moral reform. History thus became a mirror of the social concerns of each era. In this context, the historical narrative is not merely a record of the past but also serves as a ‘warning for the future.’ With this feature, Andalusian historiography contains the precursors of the historical theory that Ibn Khaldun (d. 1406) would later systematise (Görgün, “İBN HALDÛN”, TDV İslâm Ansiklopedisi). History is an attempt to understand the laws of the rise and fall of a civilisation. Al-Andalus historians intuitively identified these laws and conceptualised historical cyclicality (ʿibra and ʿādātullah). 5. How Was the History of Al-Andalus Written in the Modern Era? In modern historiography, al-Andalus has become not only a medieval civilisation but also a mirror of modernity. Al-Andalus’s place in the construction of cultural boundaries, identities, and ideological narratives between Europe and the Islamic world has been shaped more as a narrative strategy than as a historical event. For this reason, the history of al-Andalus has been at the centre of debates on nationalism, Orientalism, and modernity since the 19th century. When we speak of ‘modern Andalusian historiography,’ we are actually referring to two major discourses that often contradict each other but share the same past: Spanish national historiography and IslamicOrientalist studies. Both have reimagined Al-Andalus in the mirror of their own identity-building processes (Manuela Marín, 2009, pp. 67–81). From the mid-19th century, as the idea of a ‘shared history’ came to the fore as the ideological basis for nation-state building in Europe, Spain also found itself in a position where it had to redefine its own past. However, during this process, al-Andalus was positioned as a past that could not be included AL-ANDALUS: HISTORIOGRAPHY, IDENTITY, AND THE POLITICS OF MEMORY 140 in modern Spanish identity and even had to be excluded (McSweeney & Hopkins, 2017, pp. 2–6). This exclusion led to the production of a ‘national myth’ centred on the concept of the Reconquista. The term ‘Reconquista’ (reconquest) was used in a limited and technical manner in sources prior to the 19th century, but in the modern era it became the founding narrative of Spanish national identity (O’Callaghan, 2011, pp. 5–22). According to this narrative, the Iberian Peninsula, ‘invaded’ by Muslims in 711, was reclaimed by its ‘rightful owners,’ the Christians, after eight centuries of struggle. Thus, the Reconquista was glorified as the re-establishment of Spain’s ‘natural’ Catholic identity. This reading of history turned Al-Andalus into a foreign body in the national memory. Historians such as Menéndez Pelayo linked the ‘soul’ of Spain to Catholicism, characterising Islam as a temporary and external phenomenon (García Sanjuán, 2020). Nineteenth-century romantic historiography constructed Al-Andalus as a ‘lost exoticism’ and the Reconquista as a ‘national liberation epic.’ Despite the secularisation process in modern Spanish historiography, this narrative continued to carry a religious subtext, national identity = Catholic civilisation. As a result of this ideological construction, Andalusian Islam was presented as the ‘foreign past’ of Spanish history. Islam was represented not as a factor in Spain’s cultural advancement, but as a disruption to its ‘natural course of development.’ This discourse, combined with the clichés of ‘Arab barbarism’ in 19th century European Orientalism, constructed Islam as an irrational, despotic and aesthetically sterile culture. Thus, al-Andalus was stripped of its status as a historical subject and transformed into a mirror of the ‘other’ in which Western modernity defined itself (Ramón Solans, 2021, pp. 293–300). Spain’s modernisation process suppressed the legacy of al-Andalus through a deliberate ‘policy of forgetting.’ At the beginning of the 20th century, Franco-era historiography made this mythology the official ideology, the Reconquista was interpreted as ‘the historical mission bestowed upon Spain by God (García Sanjuán, 2020, pp. 133–140).’ This ideological framework excluded not only Islam but also Jews and ‘Arabised’ cultural elements from the national memory. In this sense, al-Andalus remained in modern Spanish historiography as both an erased and a symbolised past which is a negative founding element of national identity. Parallel to this exclusionary historiography in Spain, 19th century European Orientalism also imposed its own aesthetic and ideological projections onto ql-Andalus. As Edward Said pointed out, Orientalism is not merely a way of depicting the East, but also a way of constructing it (Said, 2014). In this construction process, alAndalus was represented as a ‘Westernised East’, both exotic and accessible, ŞAHIN BAYKAL 141 both Islamic and European. European travellers and historians described alAndalus with romantic melancholy. Portrayed as history’s lost paradise, alAndalus was conceived as an ‘intermediate civilisation’ embodying both the elegance of the East and the rationality of the West. This romantic discourse maintained an aesthetic admiration while preserving a political distance (Pearce, pp. 29–36). Muslim Spain was glorified but positioned as a ‘past pushed outside Europe.’ In these Orientalist depictions, the Alhambra Palace became a symbol of exoticism. Andalusia became a fossilised aesthetic memory. However, this admiration was based on an approach that historicised Islam. Muslim Andalusia was admired, but at the same time removed from history. In the second half of the 19th century, philological Orientalism began to examine al-Andalus in a ‘scientific’ manner through Arabic sources. However, these studies (e.g., Dozy, Lévi-Provençal, Simonet) were epistemologically grounded in a Eurocentric perspective. Islamic history was treated not as a precursor to European civilisation, but as a background element. The study of Arabic texts was conducted on the assumption that ‘the East had no historical consciousness of its own.’ In this understanding, Al-Andalus was regarded as an intermediate station in the maturation process of Western civilisation. Thus, Islam’s contribution was limited to a ‘carrier’ or “transmitter” role. Particularly in the history of science studies (e.g., George Sarton, H. P. J. Renaud), Al-Andalus was depicted as a bridge transmitting the Greek heritage to Europe, however, this transmission was interpreted as a ‘conduit’ devoid of creativity (Şeyban, 2010). From the mid-20th century onwards, the writing of Andalusian history underwent a significant paradigm shift. In the intellectual atmosphere following the Second World War, themes of cultural pluralism, coexistence and intercultural interaction began to come to the fore. In this context, Al-Andalus was rediscovered as a model and source of hope for Europe’s multicultural past. American and Spanish researchers, particularly Américo Castro and María Rosa Menocal, interpreted al-Andalus as a ‘laboratory of cultural coexistence(Menocal, 2003).’ Castro’s 1948 work, España en su historia, argued that Spanish identity was shaped by the interaction of Arab, Jewish and Christian elements (Castro, 1996, pp. 20–35). This thesis caused a major upheaval in Spanish historiography, as it reversed the myth of the Reconquista, presenting the Islamic past not as a ‘foreign’ element but as a ‘founding’ one. Menocal, in her 2002 work The Ornament of the World, depicted Al-Andalus as a ‘pre-Enlightenment Renaissance’ where the intellectual roots of modern Europe originated. This discourse of ‘Convivencia’ transformed al-Andalus into a symbol of tolerance, AL-ANDALUS: HISTORIOGRAPHY, IDENTITY, AND THE POLITICS OF MEMORY 142 reconnecting it with modern liberal values. However, this approach has been criticised since the 1980s. Historians such as David Nirenberg, Brian Catlos and Richard Hitchcock argued that the concept of Convivencia idealised historical reality (Yildiz, 2023). According to them, coexistence in al-Andalus was not peaceful equality, but a complex process of negotiation, domination and compromise (Catlos, 2018, pp. 71–80). The concept of Convivencia was a way for modern Western society to rewrite history in order to glorify its own liberal identity. This debate deepened the epistemological transformation of Andalusian historiography, the question was no longer ‘was there tolerance?’, but rather ‘how is history represented?’ At the beginning of the 21st century, postcolonial readings of Andalusian history began to question how historical writing was intertwined with postcolonial discourses. Figures such, for instance, Maribel Fierro and Jessica Coope, argued that Andalusian history represented an experience that transcended the epistemic boundaries of European modernity. This new historiography positions al-Andalus not merely within Islamic or European history, but as a Mediterranean intellectual circulation space (Coope, 2017, p. 35). History is now read not through national or religious categories, but through the concept of ‘geographies of knowledge.’ Thus, alAndalus becomes both a pre-colonial contact zone for Europe and a historical image that provides a basis for the critique of modernity. Over the past twenty years, Andalusia has been not only an academic but also a political arena for debate. The resurgence of the Morisco heritage in Spain, the UNESCO status of the Alhambra, and phenomena such as ‘Islamic heritage tourism’ have intertwined the writing of history with memory politics. These new memory policies often market the past as a ‘showcase of tolerance,’ yet they do not involve a profound reckoning. Al-Andalus remains a representation in modern Europe that hesitates between a ‘lost paradise’ and a ‘threatening other.’ Therefore, the historiography of al-Andalus is not only a mirror of the past but also of the present, Europe’s way of defining itself in relation to Islam, either against it or alongside it, continues to unfold through this history. Therefore, modern Andalusian historiography is not merely the history of a historical event, but the history of the production of knowledge. This history, rewritten within the triangle of Orientalism, nationalism and modernity, still raises the fundamental question today: “Is the history of Andalusia being written, or is modernity constructing its own history through Andalusia?” ŞAHIN BAYKAL 143 6. A Historical Reading Through the Concept of the “Reconquista” The concept of the “Reconquista” (the reconquest) represents in contemporary historiography not only a military process but also the manner in which European identity and modern historical consciousness were constructed (Esteve-Del-Valle & Costa López, 2023, pp. 494–500). This concept reduces an eight-century historical process to a single teleological framework, framing the Islamic presence as a ‘temporary occupation’ and the return of Christianity as a ‘natural restoration (Wolf, 2019, pp. 37–40).’ Thus, the Reconquista is not a definition of a historical event but an ideological template for a historical narrative (García Sanjuán, 2020, pp. 146–150). The process known today as the ‘Reconquista’ covers the period from the Muslim conquests that began in 711 to the fall of Granada in 1492. However, it is noteworthy that this term was not used systematically in medieval Christian sources. The verb ‘reconquistare’ rarely appears in chronicles written between the 8th and 13th centuries, and when it does, it is used in a technical sense to mean the recapture of a specific region. The fact that Christian kingdoms viewed their actions during their own era not as the ‘reconquest of Spain’ but as ‘jihad in accordance with God’s will’ or ‘the establishment of justice’ points to the modernity of the concept. In early sources, Christian resistance is generally narrated in the context of local dynasties’ struggles for legitimacy (O’Callaghan, 2011, pp. 20–25). The language of ‘conquest’ or “reconquest” emphasises divine providence rather than a ‘national consciousness’. The kingdoms of León and Navarre in northern Spain described their struggle against Muslim rule from the 9th century, as ‘the expansion of the kingdom’ or ‘God’s will.’ Therefore, the term “Reconquista” did not carry the meaning of a ‘national liberation epic’ for the Christian world of that period (Şeyban, 2010). In this context, the concept itself is a retrospective invention of 19th century nationalism. By applying the ‘Reconquista’ to the entire history of medieval Spain with a retrospective teleology, historians have transformed the dynamics of different periods and localities into a single linear ‘movement of recovery’ (García-Sanjuán, 2018, pp. 127–135). Thus, a complex historical reality, such as war, alliance, trade, cultural exchange, and the permeability of religious boundaries, has been reduced to a narrative of ‘the awakening of a nation.’ From the perspective of Islamic historians, the loss of al-Andalus has been interpreted through the lens of the 8th century ‘conquest’ paradigm (García-Sanjuán, 2024, pp. 85–92). In Islamic sources, there is no concept equivalent to ‘reconquista’ for the fall of al-Andalus. Terms such as zavâl AL-ANDALUS: HISTORIOGRAPHY, IDENTITY, AND THE POLITICS OF MEMORY 144 (disintegration), fitna (internal strife) or inqirâz (destruction) are used. Each of these concepts links political collapse to moral decay. Thus, in Islamic historiography, the ‘lost land’ is conceptualised not as a trauma but as the result of ‘submission to divine will (Jakubowski, 2017, pp. 9–22).’ In contrast, modern Western historiography has interpreted this loss as proof of its own historical superiority. Thus, ‘conquest’ and ‘reconquista’ become two opposing yet complementary ideological mirrors. One based on the rhetoric of spreading God’s word, the other on restoring God’s order. The term ‘Reconquista’ first appeared in its modern sense in the late 18th century, during the Spanish Enlightenment. During this period, history had become a tool for constructing national identity rather than a religious memory (Gümüş, 2023). With 19th century romantic historiography, the Reconquista became an allegory of Spain’s historical spirit. Islam ceased to be ‘the other’ and became ‘the symbol of the dark ages (Şeyban, 2010).’ This rewriting parallels the rise of nationalism and colonial expansion across Europe. The ‘reconquest’ is not only a medieval concept but also a modern one, Spain lost al-Andalus but compensated by ‘reconquering’ America. Thus, the rhetoric of the Reconquista produced the historical legitimacy of Spanish colonialism. The ‘conquest of the New World’ was seen as ‘continuing the spirit of the conquests in the Old World.’ Thus, the Reconquista became a link in an ideological chain stretching from the Middle Ages to the modern colonial era, the struggle against Islam was transformed into a rhetoric of civilising ‘barbarian’ peoples (García Sanjuán, 2020, pp. 147–150). The concept of the ‘Reconquista’ is not merely a historical narrative, but a temporal construct. This concept renders Spanish history as an unbroken eight-century line, a ‘line of destiny’ whose meaning is national rather than divine. This teleological understanding of history is a typical product of modern historical consciousness, the past is read as a preface to the future. This approach places the idea of ‘historical continuity’ at the foundation of the nation-state. Periods of Muslim rule are excluded from this continuity. Historical time is considered to have been ‘interrupted’ by the presence of Islam. Therefore, the Reconquista is not merely a narrative of military success, but a myth of historical continuity. Here, history is bound not to God’s will, but to the will of the nation. In this sense, the Reconquista is a form of post-Enlightenment secular historiography reshaping the religious heritage: “sacred history becomes national history” (García-Sanjuán, 2018, p. ibid). In the second half of the 20th century, particularly with the development of historical philosophy and historiographical criticism, the concept of ŞAHIN BAYKAL 145 the ‘Reconquista’ began to be increasingly questioned. Researchers, for example, Joseph F. O’Callaghan, and more recently Brian Catlos drew attention to the anachronistic nature of this term (Catlos, 2014, pp. 313–320). What these historians have in common is that they view the ‘Reconquista’ as an ideological scheme rather than a historical fact. The narrative of the Reconquista has suppressed the pluralistic structure of the Middle Ages by defining Spanish history along the axis of ‘Christian progress.’ The real historical process, however, is characterised by constant alliances, cultural exchanges, and permeable borders. Christian and Muslim powers frequently formed alliances with each other and even cooperated against common enemies in certain periods. Therefore, the idea of an ‘endless war between two civilisations’ does not correspond to historical reality. Catlos’ work Kingdoms of Faith evaluates the Reconquista as a ‘chain of myths.’ According to Catlos, the concept’s power stems not from historical accuracy but from the symbolic order of the modern mind, Western identity still constructs its origins through a ‘history cleansed of Islam.’ Therefore, the Reconquista is not merely a historical myth but an epistemological mechanism, the West’s way of defining itself by excluding the ‘other’ (Catlos, 2018). Among modern Islamic historians, the concept of the Reconquista is seen as an instrument of the epistemic alienation of Islamic history (Şeyban, 2010). The loss of al-Andalus created a ‘void’ in Muslim historiography because, in the modern era, the science of history has been redefined within the boundaries of Western epistemology. Consequently, Muslim historiography is often constrained by the conceptual language of the West when narrating Al-Andalus. Consequently, the critique of the Reconquista also signifies the reconstruction of Islamic historical consciousness, redefining the subject of history means transforming not only the past but also the mode of knowledge production. Today, Reconquista is a concept that has been revived not only among historians but also in political discourse (García-Sanjuán, 2018, pp. 10–18). Rising far-right movements in Europe use this term to refer to “the West’s revival against Islam”, in Spain, some populist rhetoric associates the “spirit of Reconquista” with contemporary anti-immigrant sentiment (EsteveDel-Valle & Costa López, 2023, pp. 10–22). This situation shows that the concept carries symbolic rather than historical power. The Reconquista still lives on as an ideological code defining Europe’s “relationship with the other.” Although academic historiography distances itself from this political discourse, the concept’s influence continues in popular culture, media, and tourism discourse. Cities such as Alhambra, Toledo, and Córdoba are commercialised as the “legacy of tolerance and loss,” while simultaneously