The United States, Iran's Revolution, and the USSR Communist Phantom: The Linchpins that Triggered the Emergence of the Moroccan "Modern" Armed Forces from 1979 to 1982?

28 | The Journal of US-Africa Studies Jorge Teixeira  DOI: 10.21747/21846251/jour3a2 The United States, Iran’s Revolution, and the USSR Communist Phantom: The Linchpins that Triggered the Emergence of the Moroccan “Modern” Armed Forces from 1979 to 1982?  Jorge Teixeira1 Abstract The ghost of the USSR was one of the most important weapons used throughout the Cold War. This phantom made the US act almost immediately, helping his allies or to outmanoeuvring his political opponents. In the case of Iran, it made the US try to solve a deep social/economic problem by showering Iran with military and economic aid, which would prove to be fatal. Moroccan king Hassan II, an expert and savvy political manipulator, would use his position as a US proxy agent to manoeuvre in the shadows within the Arab-speaking world and Africa. This position came to be in full effect when Morocco invaded Western Sahara, with the confidence that it would be a short affair. This proved to be difficult, almost impossible, as a short war became a long one. However, when in 1979, Iran, a stable political ally of the US, plummeted there were a shift in the US politics. The very public rhetoric branding Polisario as a communist agent proved to be a stepping stone into reverting an almost lost war into a stalemate. The US, not wanting a replication of what happened in Iran to happen in Morocco, changed its policies. Polisario was now seen as a threat to the Moroccan Regime. Therefore, trying to prevent possible proxy problems such as 1 African Studies Center of the University of Porto CEAUP. The Journal of US-Africa Studies | 29 internal un-ruling and uprises that could lead to the fall of the kingdom, the US used the Iranian solution: military and economic aid. Keywords: Morocco, USSR, US, Iran Revolution, Cold War, Weapons Trade. 30 | The Journal of US-Africa Studies The United States, Iran’s Revolution, and the USSR Communist Phantom: The Linchpins that Triggered the Emergence of the Moroccan “Modern” Armed Forces from 1979 to 1982? 1. Introduction A worldwide chess game ensued immediately after the end of WWII. Risen from the change in geopolitics, the World saw the creation of two major blocks. The Western Block, led by the United States (US) and the Eastern Block, led by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). This division created an atmosphere of asymmetrical warfare which was exploited by the two superpowers, where the “Third World were likely to become the principal battlegrounds for the Cold War during the decades ahead.” (Little 194). The USSR was viewed as “[…] a mortal threat to the United States and that dictated global vigilance against Russian-backed communist subversion, U.S. policymakers […]” (Little 117). This period, between 1947 and 1991, became known as the Cold War. Communism was seen as a major threat to Western Democracies, capitalism, and Western Values. Hence, the US “[…] waged a Cold War against the Kremlin from the sun-drenched shores of the Eastern Mediterranean to the snow-capped mountains of Afghanistan.” (Little 117). Within this logical framework, the Middle East was seen as the gateway to the control of three continents: Europe, Asia, and Africa. As it also holds another important resource, oil. If it falls into the hands of the USSR, the Kremlin’s sphere of influence would be guaranteed access to those resources, as all the geopolitical and military advantages of the region (Little 216). This would also compromise the defence of one of the US’s most important allies, Israel. The strategies were simple in design but very complex to implement. As the smoulders of WWII were still fading out, the Allies started to drift apart, and the USSR, the great victor in Europe, started to consolidate its power in Eastern Europe. In response, in 1949, a coalition of European nations, the US and Canada, created the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In 1955, the USSR and the seven socialist republics of Central and Eastern Europe signed the Warsaw Pact (WP) as a direct response to The Journal of US-Africa Studies | 31 Jorge Teixeira NATO. This period was characterised by indirect intervention via proxy wars, economic influence, and trade agreements, creating an asymmetric war environment. The focus was to negate advantages, utilise the enemies’ vulnerabilities, avoid attrition, and exploit the initiative (Eaton 52). Why enter a direct confrontation, where the most important resources of a nation would be depleted when it is possible to gain a strategic advantage? After the Suez Canal Crisis and the continuous rise of communist sympathisers in the region. Securing key strategic points such as Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia became even more important (Santos, 184). The US strategy passed through an “improvement of quality of life and modernization” to stop the spreading of communism (Little 195). This would be achieved by inciting social reforms, economic growth, and the spread of western-style democracies. The US would provide the necessary help2. In this paper, we will try to see the ripple effect caused by the fall of the Pahlavi regime in 1979, had on the US foreign policies to fight against communism. For this, we will go through the change in stance towards another US strategic partner in Africa, Morocco. By analysing the US and Morocco’s weapons sales and military agreements between 1960 and 1980. 2. The decline of the Iranian State The US applied an economic approach in trying to maintain the Middle East away from communist hands. However, this strategy will be proven, at the same time, plentifully and fruitless. For example, after years of being pro-west, Iraq would fall into a prolonged dictatorship that would be pro-soviet at the start (Little 202-203). Later, when Saddam Hussein grabbed the reins of power, it became a more traditional-religious-based dictatorship (Little 206). So, when we analyse the US policies in Iran, we 2 Either through military assistance and loans or through Financial Assistance Programs, grants, and direct financial aid, depending on which administration was in power. 32 | The Journal of US-Africa Studies The United States, Iran’s Revolution, and the USSR Communist Phantom: The Linchpins that Triggered the Emergence of the Moroccan “Modern” Armed Forces from 1979 to 1982? see that “Nowhere in the Middle East did the United States push more consistently for reform and modernization after 1945 than in Iran, and nowhere did America fail more spectacularly.” (Little 215). On the 25th of August 1945, an Anglo-Soviet coalition invaded Iran and deposed Reza Shah Pahlavi. The objective was clear, remove a Nazi sympathiser from power3, and protect the USSR’s southern flank. Replacing him with Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, his twenty-one-year-old son (Little 215). The US would counterbalance both by being the one that helped the young Shah to consolidate his power. Immediately focusing on the 20 million Iranians that were impoverished and abused by the Majlis4 (Little 215). Despite all US efforts, the problem subsisted by the Shah only focusing on security, prompting the US to “encouraged the Iranian government to focus on political and economic reform, as opposed to national security, which, to all intent and purposes, was taken care of by America.” (Murray 2). In the 1950s, the Tudeh Party, a left-wing party with ties to the USSR led by Mohammed Mossadegh5, tried to take over Iran despite being in charge by trying to steer the country towards left-wing policies. Like the nationalisation of the AIOC. This prompted the intervention of the Iranian army, with secret/covert support of the US, which restored the power of the Shah and the country to a right-wing political course on 19th August 1953 (Little 217). A US analyst would later confirm that the failed attempt by the Tudeh Party was a direct result of the abject poverty Iranians still lived in (Murray 3). Moreover, the US support to the Shah, via the support for the coup d’état, put them in the middle of the brewing storm. In 1958, despite the US State Department putting together a 125M USD stimulus package, 3 To protect the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) a British oil company. 4 Majlis were the Iranian parliamentary elites that controlled the land. 5 A sixty-nine-year-old Majli. The Journal of US-Africa Studies | 33 Jorge Teixeira the Shah asked instead for military aid. Stating the fear of a new Communist Party due to the new Iraqi government’s influence (Little 217). In the 1960s, Presidents Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy (JFK) ordered a review of Iran’s situation. And both teams bore the same conclusion “Unless the Shah embarked upon widespread and pervasive social, economic and political reform, he would lose control of Iran.” (Murray 4). The JFK Administration, proposed a plan of action based on “[…] appoint Ali Amini, a pro-Western technocrat […] stimulating growth, redistributing land, and cleaning up corruption […]” (Little 219). However, the Shah had become increasingly more worried about his safety, although he believed that Iran was on the verge of becoming a powerhouse in the Persian Gulf. Such reform would only hinder his supporters (Little 219). This attitude led to several meetings and pressure from Washington, resulting in 1963 in the so-called White Revolution (1973-1979), that is “a series of reforms designed to address some of the most egregious social and economic problems but without similar progress on the political front.” (Murray 4). As long this revolution maintained the feeling that it was local and occurred in the local timeframe, not as an American-imposed one, it had a chance to succussed. With the assassination of President JFK on the 22nd of November 1963, Vice-president Lyndon B. Johnson (LBJ) became the 36th President of the United States. This unforeseeable occurrence made the situation in Iran flip out of control. LBJ was less interested in dealing with the Shah, and more preoccupied with the situation in southeast Asia (Murray 4). The result was a Shah that became more defiant with the US6 in public, claiming that he was the true responsible for Iran’s progress. At the same time, in private, “It was by now a relationship bound by so many ties that the US could ask for and be granted an immunity law that effectively gave carte blanche to 6 Albeit Iran needed to import weapons from the US, and need to export oil. 34 | The Journal of US-Africa Studies The United States, Iran’s Revolution, and the USSR Communist Phantom: The Linchpins that Triggered the Emergence of the Moroccan “Modern” Armed Forces from 1979 to 1982? American citizens of all hues in Iran.” (Murray 4). The “security situation” escalated to the point that the White House believed that the Shah “was justified in citing the Soviet threat as a reason for his substantial military purchases.” (Murray 5). The CIA formed and trained the SAVAK7, and increased weapons sales and military exchange programs. During the Nixon Presidency, Iran had become the go-to ally in the Middle East, especially against the USSR’s influence in the region. And between 1962 and 1970 “US–Iranian relations reached an apex. […] this resulted in a 600 per cent increase in Iran’s military expenditure and a 10-fold increase in US military sales to Iran. […] At the same time, increasingly segregated US personnel in Iran (largely tied to the military equipment sales and training) exacerbated the underlying tensions in Iran.” (Murray 5). Iran was now allowed to buy any type of weaponry, except Nuclear, from the US. The regional political influence of Iran became so entrenched with the American anti-communist sentiment that they, with the blessing of the Ford Administration, intervened in Afghanistan in favour of Mohammed Daoud Khan in July 1973. Mohammed Reza Pahlavi offered a “$400 million loan to encourage political reform, strengthen Afghanistan’s economic infrastructure, and accelerate Kabul’s tilt toward the West.” (Little 223). This program was not appreciated and led to violent protests all over Afghanistan in 1975. Not from communists but Islamic landowners and clergy that fled to Pakistan due to the heavy persecution (Little 223). Internally, the continuous overreliance on the US and the almost state of impunity Americans enjoy, enhanced by SAVAK’s continuous violent repression, foster even further the anti-American sentiment within Iran’s population (Murray 7). 7 The Pahlavi dynasty secret police, formed in 1956 to protect the Shah, that turned to be a source of contest, contempt and hate due to its interrogation practices. The Journal of US-Africa Studies | 35 Jorge Teixeira The protests against the “White Revolution” started in 1963. Being Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini8 a leading figure. (Little 220). Protesting against “American-backed initiatives as secular education, women’s rights, and land reform as affronts to Islamic tradition” (Little 220). With this rhetoric, he gathered around him the disenfranchised of the major cities of Iran. The first wave of repercussions happened almost immediately. With the blessing of US diplomats, “the shah ordered a brutal crackdown that left more than 1,000 Iranians dead and then placed Khomeini and dozens of other clerics under house arrest.” (Little 220) led by the SAVAK. Six months later, when Khomeini resumed his rhetoric, the Shah had him exiled9. On January 8th 1978, a group of students and mullahs, supporters of the exiled Ayatollah Khomeini, started a protest against the Shah. Government forces gunned them down, and two dozen were killed. This led to a wave of protests and violent repressions. On September 8th, a group of “20,000 pro-Khomeini protesters gathered in Tehran’s Jaleh square, killing 400 and wounding 4,000. Angry students, shopkeepers, and mullahs responded by organizing even bigger protests against Pahlavi rule.” (Little 224). Despite the visible escalations of the violence, the US still denied the problem and supported the Shah. This was the start of the countdown to the end. Marked by the realisation by the Carter Administration that Shah’s policies, brutal repression of protesters, and dependency on the US, while publicly maintaining the version that he was in control, made Iran a loose cannon. Trying to avert a civil war, “President Carter rejected last-minute calls for an American-backed military takeover in Tehran and quietly encouraged the shah to leave the country instead. […] On 16 January 1979 Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi bid his unruly subjects farewell and departed for exile in Egypt.” (Little 226). 8 A right-wing conservative unknown muslin clergyman in the holy city of Qom. 9 First in Turkey and then in Iraq. 36 | The Journal of US-Africa Studies The United States, Iran’s Revolution, and the USSR Communist Phantom: The Linchpins that Triggered the Emergence of the Moroccan “Modern” Armed Forces from 1979 to 1982? 3. Morocco, Iran’s shadow in Northern Africa for the United States? While believing the danger would come from outside Iran, especially the communist sphere of influence. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s rhetoric and its acceptance by the population proved two points: 1) Iran’s fall came from the inside, not the outside. 2) The US and the Shah were blind to the problem. And while still blaming outside communist forces, Iran’s bubbling situation worsened to the point of a revolution-enforced change. So, we must ask, was there another country within the logical structure of the Cold War where the US applied the same policies? The answer is yes, Morocco. Although the relations between Morocco and the United States date to 1777 (United States Government). The figure Sultan Sidi Muhammad Ben Abdullah10, sought and formerly sign an official treaty in 1786 (Roberts & Tull 249; U.S. Embassy & Consulates in Morocco). The actual modern relation started with WWII when the US used Morocco as a Logistics platform during the war. The relationship flourished after it, and now it is common to see US Navy ships call ports in Morocco’s Atlantic shore (Solarz 293), both countries doing joint military exercises. Morocco was even designated, in 2004, as a Major NonNATO Ally, by the US. As we see in Table 111, between 1950 and 2021, US exports of weaponry to Morocco represented 42.2%, making the US the number 1 provider of military weaponry to Morocco. 10 Modern Morocco didn’t exist at that time, so we cannot say that it was the Moroccan State that sign the treaty, we can only say that it was Sultan Sidi Muhammad Ben Abdullah that sign it. 11 The USSR cease to exist in 1991, so the data shown in Table 1 for the USSR will only go up to 1991. The Journal of US-Africa Studies | 43 Jorge Teixeira From 1974 to 1975 we see an immediate increase of 71%, going from 241,889,161.21 USD to 413,326,127.88 USD. Onwards we see an average increase of 31% in the expenditure, with no negative values of increase, like in 1964-1965-1969, being the biggest value registered at 71% and the lowest at 6% (Table 4). Note that “Morocco’s army was also battle-tested. Moroccan troops had seen action in the Congo (1960-1961); against Algeria in the 1963 “Sand War;” and with Syrian troops against Israel in 1973. Most Moroccan troops, Arabs and Berbers were drawn from populations north of the High Atlas. These soldiers were accustomed to a moderate Mediterranean climate and largely unfamiliar with the terrain and harsh aridity of the Sahara.” (Mundy 215). This is reflected in the military budget’s weight on GDP (Table 5). And there are just the costs of maintaining an at-the-ready military corps. Since Morocco did not have a state-of-the-art weapons manufacturing industry, to these we must add the values/costs of weapons acquisitions, in other words, imports. If we analyse the SIPRI Arms Transfers Database and divide the data by decades, we see that the overall weapons provider to Morocco is the US, with a total of 4794M USD. Followed by France with 4017 M USD. The data also indicates that France was the first country to sell weaponry to Morocco, having started to export weapons in 1956, Graphic 3. These weapons are just the most visible sign and the easiest data to quantify. However, accompanying the augmentation of “Morocco’s arsenal included arms supplied by the United States, Europe, and the Eastern Bloc, backed up by training programs”. (Mundy 215). 44 | The Journal of US-Africa Studies The United States, Iran’s Revolution, and the USSR Communist Phantom: The Linchpins that Triggered the Emergence of the Moroccan “Modern” Armed Forces from 1979 to 1982? Graphic 2 – Military ExpenditureMorocco between 1960-1980, in current USD and % of GDP. Source: World Bank: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS?end=1980&loca tions=MA&start=1960 and https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.CD?end=1980&lo cations=MA&start=1960 Retrieved in 10 July 2022, at 17:41 Putting this data into context, by comparing the data between the three major military powers of the region, we can see that between the 1950’s25 and the 1980’s26, Morocco imported 5,554M USD, Algeria 11,795M USD and Libya 30,729M USD (Table 7). Even though Morocco had the early lead, by the time of the Western Sahara invasion, in 1975, it was the region’s 3rd most powerful military powerhouse. Prior to the invasion, the ‘Alawi dynasty was in danger of being overthrown. Earlier in the 1970’s Hassan had survived two coup d’état perpetrated by the armed forces (Garí 9), so he was in a desperate situation even before the invasion of Western Sahara. And this act was 25 The 1970’s, makes references to the data in the SIPRI database collected from 1950 to 1959 26 The 1980’s, makes references to the data in the SIPRI database collected from 1980 to 1989 The Journal of US-Africa Studies | 45 Jorge Teixeira seen as a way for him to maintain his crown by redirecting the blame of his subjects to an exterior enemy. By sending them into the Sahara desert part of his military, he would keep away the bulk of the armed forces from the towns and cities, where they could congregate and consolidate power to try once again to topple him (Garí 9-10). 46 | The Journal of US-Africa Studies The United States, Iran’s Revolution, and the USSR Communist Phantom: The Linchpins that Triggered the Emergence of the Moroccan “Modern” Armed Forces from 1979 to 1982? Table 04 – Military Expenditure - Morocco (Current USD) between 1960-1980 Year Military Increase Increase Average Mode Median Standard Max Minimum Expenditure (Current (%) Value of of value of of value of Deviation value of value of (Current USD) USD) Increase Increase Increase of the value Increase Increase % % % of Increase % % % 1960 41596762.4 – – 1961 48275957.5 6679195.098 16% 1962 53848540.4 5572582.892 12% 1963 74893933.2 21045392.84 39% 1964 69993222 -4900711.2 -7% 1965 63175700.4 -6817521.62 -10% 1966 67938085 4762384.67 8% 1967 70348918.8 2410833.733 4% 1968 90900288.3 20551369.53 29% 1969 84972008.6 -5928279.67 -7% 1970 88924195.1 3952186.448 5% 1971 111288010 22363815.11 25% 1972 140446992 29158981.4 26% 1973 185783994 45337002.24 32% 1974 241889161 56105167.37 30% 1975 413326128 171436966.7 71% 1976 577239433 163913305.4 40% 1977 731455472 154216038.7 27% 1978 772559382 41103909.92 6% 1979 896353802 123794420 16% 1980 1117955622 221601820.2 25% Source: The World BankRetrieved in 10 July 2022, at 17:41 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS?end=1980&locations=MA&start=1960&view=chart 14% #N/A 14% 16% 39% -10% 31% #N/A 26% 21% 71% 6% The Journal of US-Africa Studies | 47 Jorge Teixeira Table 05 – Military Expenditure – Morocco (% GDP) between 1960-1980 Year Military Increase Increase Average Mode Median Standard Max Minimum Expenditure of Military (%) of of of Deviation of of (% GDP) Expenditure Increase Increase Increase of Increase Increase Increase (%GDP) % % % % % % 1960 2.32% – – 1961 2.70% 0.39% 17% 1962 2.57% -0.14% -5% 1963 3.20% 0.63% 25% 1964 2.84% -0.36% -11% 1965 2.43% -0.41% -14% 1966 2.68% 0.25% 10% 1967 2.62% -0.06% -2% 1968 3.00% 0.39% 15% 1969 2.39% -0.61% -20% 1970 2.32% -0.07% -3% 1971 2.63% 0.31% 13 1972 2.84% 0.22% 8% 1973 3.06% 0.22% 8% 1974 3.15% 0.08% 3% 1975 4.60% 1.46% 46% 1976 6.22% 1.62% 35% 1977 6.62% 0.40% 6% 1978 5.84% -0.78% -12% 1979 5.63% -20% -3% 1980 5.94% 0.31% 5% Source: The World BankRetrieved in 10 July 2022, at 17:41 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS?end=1980&locations=MA&start=1960&view=chart 2.99% #N/A 5.20% 12.49% 24.54% -20.45% 13.00% #N/A 5.93% 20.77% 46.32% -11.83% 48 | The Journal of US-Africa Studies The United States, Iran’s Revolution, and the USSR Communist Phantom: The Linchpins that Triggered the Emergence of the Moroccan “Modern” Armed Forces from 1979 to 1982? Table 06 – Top 10 Countries, divided by decade, that have sold weapons to Morocco between 1950-2021 Total of Position Country Decades Weapon Sales ($ Million US) 1960-2021 1950’s 1960’s 1970’s 1980’s 1990’s 2000’s 2010’s 2020’s 1 United States 0 314 814 868 454 27 2107 210 4794 2 France 63 177 1121 833 212 160 1438 13 4017 3 Netherlands 0 0 0 48 0 0 524 0 572 4 Spain 0 0 0 436 62 0 0 0 498 5 China 0 0 0 0 0 0 478 0 478 6 Italy 0 26 216 100 0 0 106 0 448 7 Belarus 0 0 0 0 51 120 0 0 171 8 Russia 0 0 0 0 0 156 0 0 156 9 Soviet Union 0 141 0 1 0 0 0 0 142 10 Austria 0 0 47 38 0 0 0 0 85 Source: The World BankRetrieved in 10 July 2022, at 17:41 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS?end=1980&locations=MA&start=1960&view=chart Graphic 3 – TIV of arms exports to Morocco, 1950-2021 Seller: United States and France. Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, Consulted in: 02 July 2022 at 16:14, https://armstrade.sipri. org/armstrade/page/values.php The Journal of US-Africa Studies | 49 Jorge Teixeira Graphic 4 – Morocco’s, Algeria’s, and Libya’s total of weapons imports between the 1950’s and the 1980’s ($ Million US). Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, Consulted in: 02 July 2022 at 16:14, Link: https://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/html/export_values.php Table 07 – Morocco’s, Algeria’s, and Libya’s total of weapons imports between the 1950’s and the 1980’s ($ Million US). Country 1950’s 1960’s 1970’s 1980’s Total of Weapons Imports (Million USD) Morocco 63 679 2277 2535 5554 Algeria 0 36 4654 7105 11795 Libya 4 310 17886 12529 30729 Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, Consulted in: 02 July 2022 at 16:14, Link: https://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/html/export_values.php However, this war would have a high cost and it would come in the form of an economic crisis. In 1975 Morocco was hit by the phosphate crisis27, alongside the oil crises, and a series of bad agricultural years would make 27 Morocco main export. Not being an oil-based exporter nation, its main source of income is the export of phosphates and its derivates. When the war started, this raw material was in high demand, but soon after the war started, there was a crisis. 50 | The Journal of US-Africa Studies The United States, Iran’s Revolution, and the USSR Communist Phantom: The Linchpins that Triggered the Emergence of the Moroccan “Modern” Armed Forces from 1979 to 1982? the country’s finances spiral out of spiral out of countrol (Santos 186-187). Prompting the IMF “By 1980, facing an untenable economic situation, the Moroccan government accepted an International Monetary Fund (IMF) economic rescue package. At that time, the plan amounted to the second largest of its kind for a developing country and included $1 billion in standby credit. Under the IMF’s program, Morocco was forced to cut state subsidies, which resulted in “bread riots” of May 1981 and 1984.” (Mundy 223) If considering the economic situation, how did Morocco pay for the military equipment that it needed to continue the war? 5. The Anti-communist Rhetoric Turns into an Opportunity? The explanation for this misconception could lie in the fact that the biggest supporter of Polisario, as we have stated already, was Argelia and at a time Kaddafi’s Libya28 (Zunes 431). By virtue of both countries being within the sphere of influence of the USSR and that both supplied weapons (Hodges 354), made that a great part of the weaponry used by the Saharawi’s being of soviet-origin (Solarz 287), the other part made of captured/abandoned (Santos, 186). In fact, the USSR bogyman was one the most common cards that Hassan II played throughout the I Sahara War (Garí 59) the other one would (Santos, 187). Hassan’s intent was to, undoubtedly, put Morocco on the Pro-Western Camp of the Cold War and to put Polisario as a new USSR conduit in Africa29. To be within the eastern side of the conflict could 28 Muammar Kaddafi was an unstable ally, this is supported by the fact that Libya only recognized the Saharawi nation, the SADR, in 1980. But still during the hight of his support, 1980-1983, he vehemently insisted in the idea that Mauritania and SADR should fuse and form a Federal State, because he was a supporter of a Pan-Arab unity. If a new Arab state should appear, it would be one more problem to the creation of his Pan-Arab unity. 29 In spite the multitude of evidence that Polisario and the SADR never actually received, at the time, help from the USSR, Eastern States, China, or Cuba. And they would shoot at USSR fishing vessels when they were fishing in Western Sahara coast. The Journal of US-Africa Studies | 51 Jorge Teixeira allow the claim that the Western Sahara War was part of the Cold War. (Mundy 211). With this, Morocco could gain international support and, more importantly, access to military support, either by monetary aid, military equipment, or both. So how was the FAR adapting to the conflict? Not great, they would be outwitted by Polisario several times, and the economic strain the war aggravated the domestic recession. (Santos, 186-187). In 1979, Morocco was already four years deep into the I Western Sahara War, a war that was seen as unjust, unnecessary, and unwinnable. Plus, the King was seen as unstable and on the verge of losing the throne (Zunes 429). So, when Iran’s Shah departed to exile and the Iranian regime fell, and the USSR invaded Afghanistan, the opportunity arose for the claims that Morocco had been making since 1975. Although, the US were in possession of intelligence reports that clearly stated that Polisario had never received aid from the USSR (Zunes 430), and a few groups of people believed that the war in Western Sahara was a Cold War proxy fight (Mundy 224). However, years of playing the role of proxy for the US interest in Africa and the Arab-speaking world (Zunes, 433; Santos, 188), had solidified Morocco’s position as stable and important ally, bringing with it advantages as well. From 1979 to 1981, Morocco received financial help from Saudi Arabia, summing a total of 1 billion USD per year, halve that value on the years afterwards, and by pardoning Morocco debt in 1991 (Mundy 223). The Saudis have also acted as a surrogate of the US military industrial complex, by buying weapons from the US and suppling them to Morocco (Solarz 294). Reports from the World Bank, also suggest that, near 60% of the war cost were covered by Saudi grants. When it comes to the US, and the rest of the West, they weren’t in a position, that would allow the loss of another allied nation, like Iran (Zunes, 425; Santos, 188). However, it was only obtained when the public opinion in the US changed. The Carter Administration was reluctant to increase the 52 | The Journal of US-Africa Studies The United States, Iran’s Revolution, and the USSR Communist Phantom: The Linchpins that Triggered the Emergence of the Moroccan “Modern” Armed Forces from 1979 to 1982? number of weapons, believing that “to view African problems in an African context, would also see such a change in policy as an implicit repudiation of the new direction in which the President has steered our African policy.” (Solarz 290). Arguing that the policy could not be changed because the US was prohibited by law, the 1968 Foreign Military Sales, in specific the Chapter 1 – Foreign and National Security Policy Objectives and Restraints, Sec.4 “PURPOSES FOR WHICH MILITARY SALES BY THE UNITED STATES ARE AUTHORIZED. – Defense articles and defense services shall be sold by the United States Government under this Act to friendly countries solely for internal security, for legitimate self-defense […]”, the Arms Control and Disarmament Act of 1961, and the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, plus a clause in the 1960 US-Moroccan Agreement, prohibit the US to sell offensive weaponry and weapons sold cold only be used for self-defense, within the international recognized borders at the time of signing (Solarz, 297; Zunes, 425). The war in Western Sahara, was not part of Morocco, so, in the eyes of US Law, this was an offensive war. “It is hard to see how giving Morocco permission to utilize American military equipment throughout the Western Sahara could be in any way squared with the relevant legislation’s reference to “legitimate self-defense.” It would in fact be seen by the world as a reward for aggression.” (Solarz 292). But this would turn with the events of 1979, by altering the perception of the war, by making appear that Morocco was the victim, not the perpetrator (Garí 65), and this was helped by the Polisario operations in Western Sahara “[…] attacking commercial and fishing ships of various national origins […] Algerian-backed escalations of Polisario’s capabilities only engendered more sympathy for Morocco, one of the West’s most steadfast client regimes. The October 31, 1981, battle of Galtah Zammur (Guelta Zemmour) is a case in point. The multi-pronged attack saw Polisario’s use of tanks for the first time. More devastating, though, were Polisario’s Sovietmade SA-6 surface-to-air missiles. With these, the Sahrawi fighters downed