Public Perceptions in Flux: Identities, War, and Transnational Linkages in Ukraine

ZOiS REPORT No. 4 / 2018 · December 2018 PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS IN FLUX: IDENTITIES, WAR, AND TRANSNATIONAL LINKAGES IN UKRAINE, 2017–18 Gwendolyn Sasse and Alice Lackner ZOiS Report 4/2018 Public Perceptions in Ukraine 2 Content 2 ____ Executive summary 3 ____ Introduction 4 ____ Identities: State, ethnicity and language 4 _______ Civic and ethnic identities 5 _______ Language identities 6 ____ The status of the Donbas and the Minsk Agreement 6 _______ Special status 8 _______ The Minsk Agreement 10 ___ Mobility and personal ties to Russia and the EU 12 ___ Conclusion 14 ___ Appendix 15 ___ Imprint Executive summary This report examines changes in public opinion in Ukraine (excluding the non-government controlled areas in the Donbas and Crimea) based on original survey data from 2017 and 2018. The focus is on three issues: identity (citizenship and language); the status of the Donbas and the Minsk Agreement; and relations with the EU and Russia. The key findings are the following: – The two most dominant identities in Ukraine are ‘Ukrainian citizen’ and ‘ethnic Ukrainian’. In 2018, more people identify as ‘Ukrainian citizen’ than in 2017, and fewer people identify as ‘ethnic Ukrainians’ in 2018 compared to 2017. – Most Ukrainians consider Ukrainian their native language. Yet, in 2018, fewer people name Ukrainian as their native language than in 2017, and the share of those indicating that Russian is their native language has increased. – The majority of Ukrainians reject an autonomy status for the non-government controlled areas in the Donbas. Most people think that these territories should have the same status as before the war, i.e. as parts of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. However, the willingness to consider an autonomy status – with variation regarding its parameters – has increased from 2017 to 2018. ZOiS Report 4/2018 Public Perceptions in Ukraine 3 – Ukrainians vary significantly in their assessments of the Minsk Agreement. This diversity of views has not significantly changed, with the exception of one statement: as of 2018 fewer people think that a new international format that includes the US is needed to end the war. – The majority of Ukrainians have no direct experience of living in the EU or Russia in the last 10 years. However, about a third of the respondents have family or friends based in Russia, and another third have family or friends who currently live in the EU. The share of the latter has increased significantly from 2017 to 2018. Introduction The Ukrainian state and Ukrainian politics have changed significantly since the Euromaidan, the annexation of Crimea and the onset of war in the Donbas. Previous ZOiS Reports analysed the attitudes of those most directly affected by the war – the displaced in Ukraine and in Russia, as well as the resident population of the government-controlled and non-government controlled Donbas. This report widens the focus to the overall population of Ukraine (with the exception of Crimea and the non-government controlled areas in the Donbas) and traces the most recent trends and changes in public opinion with regard to different types of identity (state identity, ethnic identity, native language), the war in Donbas (the status issue, the Minsk Agreement, US involvement in the negotiations), and individual-level links to Russia and the EU (direct migration experience, contact with family members/friends abroad). The survey data on which this report is based is from the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS). KIIS regularly conducts an all-Ukrainian public opinion poll ‘Opinions and Views of Ukrainian People’. For the KIIS surveys in May – June 2017 and May – June 2018, the Centre for Eastern European and International Studies (ZOiS) commissioned a series of specific questions. KIIS applied a stratified random sample design, and interviews were held with respondents from 110 settlements in Ukraine (2017: 2,040 respondents; 2018: 2,025 respondents). It is important to keep in mind that the present analysis deals with crosssectional rather than panel-data. Thus, it captures opinions from different sets of people at two points in time rather than from the same group of people over time. The graphs in this report capture the results of each poll, but a mere comparison of these descriptive statistics could lead to false conclusions: differences in the percentages between the 2017 and 2018 samples may stem from the specific socio-demographic composition of the respective sample (e. g. gender, age, education). Thus, this report includes the results of logistic regression models that control for the main socio-demographic effects and investigate the links between the two samples as well as factors accounting for the reported trends. ZOiS Report 4/2018 Public Perceptions in Ukraine 4 Identities: State, ethnicity and language Civic and ethnic identities Respondents were asked to choose the identity most important to them from a list of ten different options, such as ‘Ukrainian citizen’, ‘ethnic Ukrainian’, ‘ethnic Russian’, ‘European’ etc. The descriptive statistics in FIGURE 1 show that two options were by far the most prevalent ones: ‘ethnic Ukrainian’ and ‘Ukrainian citizen’. These two identity categories developed in opposite directions: the ethnic identity appears to become less important, while the civic identity tied to the Ukrainian state seems to become stronger. In 2017, 46 per cent of the respondents chose ‘ethnic Ukrainian’ as their main identity; compared to about 37 per cent of the 2018 sample. Conversely, ‘Ukrainian citizenship’ was chosen by about 38 per cent of respondents in the 2017 sample and by 49 per cent in the 2018 sample. Our regression analysis confirms that the change from 2017 to 2018 in the chances of choosing ‘ethnic Ukrainian’ or ‘Ukrainian citizen’ as a respondent’s main identity is significant irrespective of the somewhat different socio-demographic profile of the two samples. In both samples, socio-demographic factors had an effect on the identity choice. Among the control variables, gender, income and region had significant effects on identity choice across both years. Overall, men were 22 per cent less likely to choose ‘Ukrainian citizen’ as their main identity. Being Identification with the Ukrainian state has increased. Gender, income and region had significant effects on identity choice. FIGURE 1 What personal identity is currently most important to you? Source: ZOiS 2017 (n=1,963) 2018 (n=1,927) 2017 Q3.Whatpersonalidentityiscurrentlymostimportanttoyou? Q3.Whatpersonalidentityiscurrently | 2017(n=1.963) 2018(n=1.927) mostimportanttoyou? |Freq. EthnicUkrainian 46.01% 36.90% EthnicUkrainian |710.987883 EthnicRussian 2.10% 1.60% EthnicRussian |30.7972807 BothethnicUkrainianandethnicRussian 2.79% 2.12% BothethnicUkrainianandethnicRussia |40.82367149 Ukrainiancitizen 37.71% 49.23% Ukrainiancitizen |948.744137 Apersonfrommyregion 1.66% 1.27% Apersonfrommyregion |24.50114304 European 0.67% 0.88% European |16.893614 Ukrainian-speaker 1.56% 1.54% Ukrainian-speaker |29.7143915 Russian-speaker 1.98% 1.18% Russian-speaker |22.6495679 BilingualUkrainian-andRussian-speaker 4.69% 4.06% BilingualUkrainian-andRussian-speake |78.19082 Other 0.83% 1.23% Other |23.6974909 --------------------------------------- ------------ ------------ --------------------------------------- -+----------- Total 100 Total |1,927 significantchange:Ukrainiancitizen,ethnicUkrainian 100 46.0% 2.1% 2.8% 37.7% 1.7% 0.7% 1.6% 2.0% 4.7% 0.8% 36.9% 1.6% 2.1% 49.2% 1.3% 0.9% 1.5% 1.2% 4.1% 1.2% Ethnic Ukrainian Ethnic Russian Both ethnic Ukrainian and ethnic Russian Ukrainian citizen A person from my region European Ukrainian-speaker Russian-speaker Bilingual Ukrainianand Russian-speaker Other What personal identity is currently most important to you? 2017 (n=1.963) 2018 (n=1.927) Quelle: ZOiS  significant change significant change ZOiS Report 4/2018 Public Perceptions in Ukraine 5 part of a higher income group translated into a higher chance (by 11 per cent) to self-identify as a ‘Ukrainian citizen’. Furthermore, people in Central Ukraine were twice as likely to choose citizenship as their main identity, compared to people in Western Ukraine. As for the category ‘ethnic Ukrainian’, the only socio-demographic variable with a significant impact across both samples was gender: men had a 34 per cent higher chance than women to say that they primarily think of themselves as ‘ethnic Ukrainians’. Language identities Language identities can be different from both citizenship and ethnic identities. The ZOiS survey question asked about the more symbolic category ‘native language’ rather than language practice. It allowed for the choice between ‘Ukrainian’, ‘Russian’, ‘both Ukrainian and Russian’ and ‘other’. FIGURE 2 displays the descriptive statistics for 2017 and 2018. The majority of the respondents (about 68 per cent in 2017 and 59 per cent in 2018) said that they considered Ukrainian to be their native language. The choices ‘Russian’ and ‘both Ukrainian and Russian’ were less prevalent but increased from 13 to 20 per cent and from 19 to 21 per cent respectively between samples. The main descriptive difference between the 2017 and the 2018 samples partly holds when controlling for socio-demographic differences between the two samples. The direction of change within the space of only one year is noteworthy and somewhat surprising. It seems that there is a perceived need among respondents to highlight the importance of the Russian language, possibly in response to an official discourse and recent legislation centred on the Ukrainian language and defining language as a security issue. The native language category ‘both Ukrainian and Russian’, which was clearly an important choice for a sizeable number of respondents in 2017 and 2018, did not exhibit a significant difference between the two years. Russian remains an important native language – on its own and as part of a bilingual definition of native language. FIGURE 2 What language do you consider to be your native language? Source: ZOiS 2017 (n=2,033) 2018 (n=2,013) 2017 Q8.Whatlanguagedoyouconsidertobethenativeoneforyoucurrently? Q8.Whatlanguagedoyou| considertobethenative| 2018(n=2.013) 2017(n=2.033) Cum. oneforyoucurrently?| Ukrainian 58.66% 67.54% 67.54 Ukrainian| Russian 19.53% 13.26% 80.8 Russian| BothUkrainianandRussian 21.05% 18.69% 99.49 BothUkrainianandRussian| Other 0.76% 0.51% 100 Other| ---------------------------+ -------------- -------------- ------- ---------------------------+ Total| 2,033 100 Total| significantchange:Ukrainian,Russian 67.5% 13.3% 18.7% 0.5% 58.7% 19.5% 21.1% 0.8% Ukrainian Russian Both Ukrainian and Russian Other What language do you consider to be the native one for you currently? 2017 (n=2.033) 2018 (n=2.013) Quelle: ZOiS significant change significant change ZOiS Report 4/2018 Public Perceptions in Ukraine 6 Several socio-demographic factors shaped the native language choices in both years. Men were 25 per cent more likely to say that Ukrainian is their native language than women; the chances for the urban population were 58 per cent lower, and for people with higher education the odds were 33 per cent lower. Living in Western Ukraine significantly increased the likelihood of identifying with the Ukrainian language compared to people living in Central, Southern or Eastern Ukraine. For people describing themselves as Ukrainian Greek Catholics (concentrated in Western Ukraine), the odds were more than fifteen times as high as for people of other confessions. Among followers of the Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate the odds to consider Ukrainian one’s native language were 52 per cent lower compared to people following the Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate. A higher income level increased the chances of naming ‘Russian’ as one’s native language, (by about 17 per cent across both samples). People living in Central, Southern or Eastern Ukraine were significantly more likely to identify with Russian as their native language than respondents in western regions (for example, residents in Eastern Ukraine had a fifteen times higher chance compared to those in Western Ukraine). In comparison to followers of the Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate, followers of the Moscow Patriarchate were more than three times as likely to indicate that Russian was their native language. While no significant difference could be found for the bilingual category across the two years, several socio-demographic factors had an effect in both samples. A higher age slightly reduced the chances (by 1 per cent) to say that both languages are one’s native language. Conversely, living in an urban area more than doubled the chances, and being a follower of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church increased the chances by 46 per cent. Respondents from Central, Southern and Eastern Ukraine were five, ten and thirteen times more likely than respondents in Western Ukraine to say that both Ukrainian and Russian were their native languages. The status of the Donbas and the Minsk Agreement Special status Almost five years after the onset of war in the Donbas and at a point where the Minsk negotiation process has come unstuck, it is important to understand the Ukrainian public’s perception of the negotiation process and the elements of a potential settlement. One of the ZOiS questions tried to gauge the respondents’ views about the status for the non-government controlled areas or the Donbas as a whole. The Ukrainian government is opposed to the concept of autonomy, though the Minsk Agreement contains a provision for a temporary special status for specified territories in the non-government controlled areas. The issue of autonomy or, in the language of the Minsk Agreement, ‘special status’ is a highly sensitive one in Ukraine. It is closely connected to the ZOiS Report 4/2018 Public Perceptions in Ukraine 7 idea of a threat to state sovereignty. Russia’s support for the self-declared people’s republics of Donetsk and Luhansk and its repeated calls for the federalization of Ukraine have narrowed the space for the discussion about autonomy. Nevertheless, variations of this concept are typical elements of peace agreements and conflict-management more generally. The ZOiS question in the KIIS survey asked the respondents to choose one of nine institutional templates. The categories included options ranging from ‘give the occupied territories the same status as before the war’ to ‘give up on the occupied territories and let them be officially or unofficially administered by Russia’. FIGURE 3 shows that the majority of respondents in 2017 and 2018 said that they would like the non-government controlled areas to have the same status as before the war, i.e. as parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts (2017: 60 per cent; 2018: 53 per cent). All the other answer categories were met with similar approval rates in both years, with less than 10 per cent of respondents choosing any one category. The descriptive statistics suggest that in 2018 fewer people thought that the non-government controlled areas should have the same status as before the war. Indeed, regression analysis confirms a statistically significant decrease from 2017 to 2018 in the support for a return to the status quo ante. Across both samples, the chances to opt for the ‘same status as before’ was 93 per cent higher among Ukrainian Greek Catholics than for respondents of other religious denominations, and followers of the Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate were 40 per cent less likely to opt for this option compared to followers of the Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate. The issue of autonomy is a highly sensitive one in Ukraine. FIGURE 3 In your view, what should the government do in response to the situation in the Donbas? Source: ZOiS 2017 (n=1,524) 2018 (n=1,487) 2017 Inyourview,whatshouldthegovernmentdoinresponsetothesituationintheDonbas? 2017(n=1,524) 2018(n=1,487) Givetheoccupiedterritoriesthestatustheyhadbeforethewar,i.e.aspartofDonetskandLuhanskoblasti 59.65% 53.18% GivetheoccupiedterritoriesextendedrightsincomparisonwithotherregionsofUkraine 5.10% 4.72% GivethewholeofDonbas,includingtheoccupiedterritories,extendedrightsincomparisonwithotherregionsofUkraine 4.89% 2.82% GivetheoccupiedterritoriesatemporaryautonomystatuswithinUkraine 6.73% 8.75% GivetheoccupiedterritoriesapermanentautonomystatuswithinUkraine 3.99% 6.59% GivethewholeofDonbas,includingtheoccupiedterritories,anautonomystatus 3.35% 5.10% GivealloblastiofUkraineanautonomystatus 2.25% 4.09% GiveupontheoccupiedterritoriesandletthemofficiallyorunofficiallybeadministeredbyRussia 8.99% 10.74% Otheranswer 5.06% 3.99% Total 100 significantchange:samestatus,permanentstatus 59.65% 5.10% 4.89% 6.73% 3.99% 3.35% 2.25% 8.99% 5.06% 53.2% 4.7% 2.8% 8.8% 6.6% 5.1% 4.1% 10.7% 4.0% Give the occupied territories the status they had before the war, i.e. as part of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasti Give the occupied territories extended rights in comparison with other regions of Ukraine Give the whole of Donbas, including the occupied territories, extended rights in comparison with other regions of Ukraine Give the occupied territories a temporary autonomy status within Ukraine Give the occupied territories a permanent autonomy status within Ukraine Give the whole of Donbas, including the occupied territories, an autonomy status Give all oblasti of Ukraine an autonomy status Give up on the occupied territories and let them officially or unofficially be administered by Russia Other answer In your view, what should the government do in response to the situation in the Donbas? 2017 (n=1,524) 2018 (n=1,487) Quelle: ZOiS  significant change significant change ZOiS Report 4/2018 Public Perceptions in Ukraine 8 Even though the overall percentages seem low, the statistical analysis shows that significantly more people thought that the non-government controlled areas should receive a permanent autonomy status. FIGURE 3 shows that in 2017 only 4 per cent of the respondents chose this option, a figure that increased to about 7 per cent by 2018. Region once again had a clear effect: respondents based in Eastern Ukraine were over three times as likely (compared to people in Western Ukraine) to agree with a permanent autonomy option, while respondents in Central Ukraine were 60 per cent less likely to favour this option, making them more critical of autonomy than those based in Western Ukraine. This finding highlights that regional differences in attitudes do not align neatly with an east-west divide, and that the less discussed central region has distinctive views on these issues. No statistically significant difference could be found between 2017 and 2018 with regard to the preferences for a temporary autonomy status or giving up on the territories. FIGURE 4 displays the descriptive statistics for all answer categories expressing approval for some kind of autonomy, versus all answer categories rejecting autonomy outright. In 2017 altogether 16 per cent of the respondents supported some sort of an autonomy status; in 2018 support stood at about 25 per cent. Regression analysis confirms a significant increase by 2018. The chances of respondents from the southern and eastern regions to agree with a form of autonomy were twice and almost three times as high compared to the western macro region. Moreover, across both years, Greek Catholics were particularly sceptical of autonomy, and followers of the Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate were significantly less likely to support the idea than followers of the Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate. The Minsk Agreement The ZOiS survey questions related to the Minsk Agreement tried to establish the public mood regarding the negotiation process as well as potential addons like a more formalized US involvement. The respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed with each of the following four statements on a five-step scale: 1. The Minsk process is slow, but there is no alternative to this attempt at conflict-resolution. FIGURE 5 2. Without the Minsk process there would not have been any ceasefire and the death toll would have been higher. FIGURE 6 3. Ukraine should stop participating in the Minsk negotiations as the framework demands more of Ukraine than of Russia. FIGURE 7 4. A new international format is needed that includes the US. FIGURE 8 The propensity to remain neutral on all questions was lower in 2018, and there was a tendency for the respondents in 2018 to choose the end points of the scale (‘agree’ or ‘disagree’) instead of the softer categories of ‘somewhat agree’ or ‘somewhat disagree’. The descriptive results for all four statements confirm that the Ukrainian population is very diverse in its views on the Minsk Agreement and potential add-ons. This is most apparent in the case of the third question (‘Ukraine should stop participating in the Minsk The Ukrainian population is very diverse in its views on the Minsk Agreement. FIGURE 4 Support for any kind of autonomy Source: ZOiS 2017 (n=1,524) 2018 (n=1,487) 2017 all_autonomyQuestionmissing all_autonom |Freq. 2017(n=1,524) 2018(n=1,487) ------------ +-------------- NoAutonomy 83.68% 75.47% Autonomy |364.827955 Autonomy 16.32% 24.53% ------------ +-------------- Total| 100 significantchangeall_autonom 83.7% 16.3% 75.5% 24.5% No Autonomy Autonomy Support for any kind of autonomy 2017 (n=1,524) 2018 (n=1,487) significant change ZOiS Report 4/2018 Public Perceptions in Ukraine 9 2017 Q2.4.AnewinternationalformatfornegotiationisneededthatincludestheUS. Q2.4.Anew| international formatfor negotiationis neededthat 2017(n=1,416) 2018(n=1,465) includestheUS. Agree 37.38% 39.62% Agree Somewhatagree 28.54% 21.55% Somewhatagree Neutral 12.38% 9.04% Neutral Somewhatdisagree 6.29% 4.72% Somewhatdisagree Disagree 15.42% 25.07% Disagree Total 100 Total significantchangeminsk_format 37.4% 28.5% 12.4% 6.3% 15.4% 39.6% 21.6% 9.0% 4.7% 25.1% Agree Somewhat agree Neutral Somewhat disagree Disagree A new international format for negotiation is needed that includes the US. 2017 (n=1,416) 2018 (n=1,465) Quelle: ZOiS 2017 (n=1,472) 2018 (n=1,438) 2017 (n=1,374) 2018 (n=1,311) 2017 (n=1,502) 2018 (n=1,543) 2017 (n=1,416) 2018 (n=1,465) FIGURE 5 The Minsk process is slow but there is no alternative to this attempt at conflict-resolution. FIGURE 7 Ukraine should stop participating in the Minsk negotiations as the framework demands more of Ukraine than of Russia. FIGURE 6 Without the Minsk process there would not have been any ceasefire and the death toll would have been higher. FIGURE 8 A new international format for negotiation is needed that includes the US. 2017 Q2.3.TheMinskprocessisslowbutthereisnoalternativetothisattemptatconflict-resolution. 2017(n=1,472) 2018(n=1,438) Agree 30.63% 38.27% Somewhatagree 34.69% 26.56% Neutral 13.94% 10.31% Somewhatdisagree 9.49% 8.30% Disagree 11.24% 16.56% ------------------ ----------- --------- Total 100 30.6% 34.7% 13.9% 9.5% 11.2% 38.3% 26.6% 10.3% 8.3% 16.6% Agree Somewhat agree Neutral Somewhat disagree Disagree The Minsk process is slow but there is no alternative to this attempt at conflictresolution. 2017 (n=1,472) 2018 (n=1,438) Quelle: ZOiS  2017 Q2.2.UUkraineshouldstopparticipatingintheMinsknegotiationsastheframeworkdemandsmoreofUkrainethanofRussia. Q2.2.Ukraine| shouldstop| participatingin| theMinsk| negotiationsas| 2017(n=1,374) 2018(n=1,311) theframewo| Agree 20% 28.31% Agree| Somewhatagree 23.34% 23.77% Somewhatagree| Neutral 16.63% 12.14% Neutral| Somewhatdisagree 17.38% 12.67% Somewhatdisagree| Disagree 22.64% 23.12% Disagree| ------------------ ----------- --------- ------------------+ Total 100 Total| 20.0% 23.3% 16.6% 17.4% 22.6% 28.3% 23.8% 12.1% 12.7% 23.1% Agree Somewhat agree Neutral Somewhat disagree Disagree Ukraine should stop participating in the Minsk negotiations as the framework demands more of Ukraine than of Russia. 2017 (n=1,374) 2018 (n=1,311) Quelle: ZOiS  2017 Q2.1.WithouttheMinskProcesstherewouldnothavebeenanyceasefireandthedeathtollwouldhavebeenhigher. Q2.1.Withoutthe MinskProcess therewouldnot havebeenany 2017(n=1,502) 2018(n=1,543) ceasefireandthe Agree 29.49% 27.13% Agree Somewhatagree 30.91% 31.10% Somewhatagree Neutral 12.72% 8.63% Neutral Somewhatdisagree 11.33% 9.36% Somewhatdisagree Disagree 15.54% 23.78% Disagree Total| 100 Total 29.5% 30.9% 12.7% 11.3% 15.5% 27.1% 31.1% 8.6% 9.4% 23.8% Agree Somewhat agree Neutral Somewhat disagree Disagree Without the Minsk Process there would not have been any ceasefire and the death toll would have been higher. 2017 (n=1,502) 2018 (n=1,543) Source: ZOiS Source: ZOiS Source: ZOiS Source: ZOiS negotiations as the framework demands more of Ukraine than of Russia’), where answers are almost equally spread across the five different answer categories. About 60 per cent in both years agree or somewhat agree with the statement ‘Without the Minsk Process there would not have been any ceasefire and the death toll would have been higher’. The clearest position is revealed with regard to the fourth question on the need for an international format that includes the US: in 2017 and 2018, altogether around 65 per cent and 61 per cent respectively agree or somewhat agree with this statement. Regression analysis1 reveals that only in this case there was a significant change 1 For the regression analysis the categories ‘agree’ and ‘somewhat agree’ were collapsed, as well as the categories ‘disagree’ and ‘somewhat disagree’. The neutral middle category was coded as missing. Thus, a comparison takes place here between ‘agree / somewhat agree’ and ‘disagree / somewhat disagree’. significant change ZOiS Report 4/2018 Public Perceptions in Ukraine 16