Final framework

2 This project has received funding from the European Union’s HORIZON-AG - HORIZON Action Grant Budget-Based research and innovation programme under grant agreement GA 101091268 NOVASOIL INNOVATIVE BUSINESS MODELS FOR SOIL HEALTH Grant agreement ID: 101091268 Final framework Project NOVASOIL Project title INNOVATIVE BUSINESS MODELS FOR SOIL HEALTH Work Package WP1 Deliverable D1.4 Period covered M18-M36 Publication date Dissemination level PU Organisation name of lead beneficiary for this report EVENOR Authors Blanco-Velázquez Francisco José, Gonzalez-Peñaloza Félix, Bravo-García Javier, Anaya-Romero María Contributors Ref. Ares(2025)9373159 - 31/10/2025 3 This project has received funding from the European Union’s HORIZON-AG - HORIZON Action Grant Budget-Based research and innovation programme under grant agreement GA 101091268 QUALITY ASSURANCE PROCEDURES This document has been reviewed by the NOVASOIL consortium according to the national reports and comments received TABLE REVISION HISTORY DELIVERABLE Ro w Version Date Reviewers Description 1 V1.0 01/10/2025 EVENOR Draft version online provided 2 V1.1 15/10/2025 All Comments and suggestions were provided 3 V2.0 31/10/2025 EVENOR Comments and improvements accepted 4 This project has received funding from the European Union’s HORIZON-AG - HORIZON Action Grant Budget-Based research and innovation programme under grant agreement GA 101091268 Project Consortium Nº Participant organisation name Countr y 1 EVENOR TECH SLU ES 2 LEIBNIZ-ZENTRUM FUER AGRARLANDSCHAFTSFORSCHUNG GE 3 ZEMNIEKU SAEIMA LV 4 NEW BULGARIAN UNIVERSITY BU 5 CENTRE NATIONAL DE LA RECHERCHE SCIENTIFIQUE CNRS FR 6 KOBENHAVNS UNIVERSITET DK 7 TECHNISCHE UNIVERSITAET MUENCHEN GE 8 ASSEMBLEE DES REGIONS EUROPEENNES FRUITIERES LEGUMIERES ET HORTICOLES FR 9 ISTITUTO DELTA ECOLOGIA APPLICATA SRL IT 10 UNIVERSITA DEGLI STUDI DI FERRARA IT 11 WAGENINGEN UNIVERSITY NL 12 CENTRE OF ESTONIAN RURAL RESEARCH AND KNOWLEDGE EE 13 UNIVERSIDAD POLITECNICA DE MADRID ES 14 UNIVERSITA DI PISA IT 15 ASOCIACION AGRARIA JOVENES AGRICULTORES DE SEVILLA ES 16 UNIVERSITY OF LEEDS GB 5 This project has received funding from the European Union’s HORIZON-AG - HORIZON Action Grant Budget-Based research and innovation programme under grant agreement GA 101091268 Table of contents 1 Summary ............................................................................................................................................. 8 2 Introduction ....................................................................................................................................... 9 2.1 Objectives ...................................................................................................................................... 9 2.2 Potential use of the document ................................................................................. 10 2.3 Outline the document ...................................................................................................... 11 3 Main sources of information ................................................................................................... 12 3.1 Case studies ................................................................................................................................ 12 CS: Integrated production in the vineyards (NBU) ................................................... 12 CS: Integrated production in Estonia (METK) .............................................................. 15 CS: CiRAA LTEs on conventional and organic agriculturePayment for Ecosystem Services (UNIPI) ................................................................................................... 18 CS: District of the Sands - Carbon Credits (DELTA & UNIFE) .............................. 21 CS: Rueda,Organic vineyardsIntegrated production.........................................26 CS: Integrated Production in Andalusian Olive Groves (ASAJA) .....................29 CS: A model for multifunctional and sustainable local development of marginal areas - Value chain (UNIPI) ................................................................................ 31 CS: ZSA DIH System (ZSA) ....................................................................................................... 35 CS: CO2-Land initiative in Germany (TUM) ...................................................................39 CS: Payments for Ecosystem Services in the Tamarguillo Park ..................... 42 CS: Rabo Carbon Bank (WU) ................................................................................................ 46 3.2 Feasibility of new business models for practitioners ................................. 46 4 Business models .......................................................................................................................... 47 4.1 Business models and their features ..................................................................... 48 Value Chain Payments ............................................................................................................. 49 5 Design guide: list of potential parameters and options ........................................ 2 5.1 Actors/Parties involved ......................................................................................................... 2 5.2 Payment characteristics ................................................................................................. 6 5.3 Object of business model ............................................................................................... 2 5.4 Contracts: Findings from DCEs................................................................................... 3 5.5 Monitoring & enforcement ............................................................................................ 7 5.6 Sanctions ................................................................................................................................... 7 6 This project has received funding from the European Union’s HORIZON-AG - HORIZON Action Grant Budget-Based research and innovation programme under grant agreement GA 101091268 5.7 Flexibiity ..................................................................................................................................... 9 5.8 Information as a part of the role ................................................................................ 9 5.9 Eligibility/Conditions for participation .................................................................. 12 5.10. Prioritised Soil Parameters for Monitoring ............................................................ 14 6 Design guide - decision trees for innovative business model types .............. 3 6.1 Payment per ecosystem services .............................................................................. 5 6.2 Carbon credits ....................................................................................................................... 6 6.3 Result-based ........................................................................................................................... 7 6.4 Value-chain ..................................................................................................................................... 8 7. Discussion, Conclusions and the next Steps ..................................................................... 8 7 Acknowledgment ........................................................................................................................ 10 7 This project has received funding from the European Union’s HORIZON-AG - HORIZON Action Grant Budget-Based research and innovation programme under grant agreement GA 101091268 List of acronyms WP Work Package DCE Discrete Choice Experiment CAP Common Agricultural Policy GAEC Good Agricultural and Environmental Condition AECM Agri-EnvironmentClimate Measures AES Agri-Environment Schemes PES Payments for Ecosystem Services MRV Monitoring, Reporting and Verification SOC Soil Organic Carbon SOM Soil Organic Matter CSR Corporate Social Responsibility CRCF Carbon Removal Certification Framework (Regulation (EU) 2024/3012) CO2e Carbon Dioxide Equivalent LTEs Long-Term Experiments IP Integrated Production IPM Integrated Pest Management PDO Protected Designation of Origin DO Denominación de Origen (Protected Designation of Origin, in Spanish context) ETKI/ METK Estonian Crop Research Institute (Eesti Taimekasvatuse Instituut) ARIB Agricultural Registers and Information Board (Estonia) UPM Universidad Politécnica de Madrid UNIPI Università di Pisa UNIFE Università degli Studi di Ferrara TUM Technische Universität München ZSA Zemnieku Saeima (Latvian Farmers’ Parliament) NBU New Bulgarian University ASAJA Asociación Agraria de Jóvenes Agricultores CNRS Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique WU Wageningen University DELTA Istituto Delta Ecologia Applicata EVENOR Evenor Tech SLU SWOT Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats analysis NDVI Normalized Difference Vegetation Index (in MRV context) NDMI Normalized Difference Moisture Index EU European Union RDP Rural Development Programme 8 This project has received funding from the European Union’s HORIZON-AG - HORIZON Action Grant Budget-Based research and innovation programme under grant agreement GA 101091268 1 Summary This deliverable (D1.4 – Final Framework) brings together the lessons learned across NOVASOIL to propose a coherent way of designing and applying business models that can genuinely improve soil health. Rather than treating soils as a purely technical issue, the framework recognises that they are living systems shaped by the choices of farmers, advisers, cooperatives, public authorities and consumers. For this reason, the framework is built to integrate agronomic evidence with economic logic, governance arrangements and the lived realities of those who manage the land. The document outlines the key dimensions that define soil-health business cases: who the actors are, which enabling conditions allow agreements to work, how contracts are structured, and how results can be monitored and verified without placing excessive burdens on farmers. It also introduces a set of indicators that capture not only soil and agronomic improvements, but also adoption drivers, economic viability, and the governance effort required to make initiatives succeed in practice. What makes the framework tangible are the case studies spread across Europe. Vineyards in Bulgaria and Spain show how cover crops and organic amendments can be translated into added value through regional identity and wine tourism. Long-term experiments in Tuscany and Germany illustrate how decades of scientific data can be converted into credible contracts that reward soil carbon gains. In Andalusia, integrated production in olive groves demonstrates how a label can combine market recognition with soil resilience. Latvia’s digital mapping service makes soil-friendly practices visible and easier to adopt. Germany and Italy test carbon credit models adapted to sandy or arable soils, while Switzerland shows how trust-based funds can mobilise farmers’ intrinsic motivation. Even an urban park in Seville demonstrates that the same logic can help reconnect citizens with the benefits that soils provide. Across these diverse experiences, common threads emerge. Simplicity and predictability are crucial: farmers and land managers respond best when incentives are clear, accessible and proportionate. Hybrid schemes that combine public support with value-chain signals or result-based bonuses reduce risks and keep participation attractive. Monitoring and verification should build on what farms and land managers already record, using digital tools and remote sensing to cut costs while maintaining credibility. Finally, trust matters: cooperatives, digital hubs and boundary organisations are often the ones that make complex arrangements workable by lowering transaction costs and aligning interests. 9 This project has received funding from the European Union’s HORIZON-AG - HORIZON Action Grant Budget-Based research and innovation programme under grant agreement GA 101091268 2 Introduction 2.1 Objectives This document presents the final version of the conceptual and operational framework for soil health business cases, developed within the scope of Task 1.3. The aim is to lay the foundations for building practical, scalable, and actororiented soil health solutions that integrate ecological, legal, economic and social dimensions. The present framework serves as the synthesis of all knowledge and feedback generated in all WPs. The Task 1.3. Draft Framework and Initial Operationalisation (M6–M16) (Leader: EVENOR, Contributors: ZSA, NBU, TUM, UNIFE, UNIPI, UPM, ULEEDS, DELTA, ASAJA-SEVILLA) focuses on the development of a comprehensive framework to support soil health business cases across diverse contexts. Initially grounded in desk research, the framework builds upon the conceptual foundations established in Task 1.1 and incorporates preliminary findings from Task 1.2. It brings together the key components required to define and evaluate soil health-oriented business models: actors, drivers, contextual variables, enabling conditions, and contract parameters. The framework aims to: ● Identify relevant dimensions in the design of soil-related agreements and incentives. ● Map interlinkages between actors, enabling conditions and implementation settings. ● Propose tentative evaluation indicators for assessing outcomes such as effectiveness, scalability, longevity, social acceptability, and legal-technical feasibility. ● Provide an initial vision for user typologies and the practical use of the framework across multiple governance levels. Case studies serve a dual function in the project: they act as testbeds for applying the framework in real-world contexts, and as sources of data to improve its robustness and relevance. In this way, Task 1.4. Coordination of Case Studies (led by EVENOR) ensures alignment among partners and key stakeholders throughout the project. A detailed descriptive analysis of each case (considering climate zones, land use, farming systems, and legal constraints) will facilitate the collection of harmonised data across WPs. This close coordination enables iterative learning—findings from early pilots inform updates to typologies, indicators, and contract archetypes—thus improving the framework’s fit to diverse socio-ecological contexts. To connect objectives with measurable progress, the framework will include a core indicator set (comparable across cases) and optional, context-specific 10 This project has received funding from the European Union’s HORIZON-AG - HORIZON Action Grant Budget-Based research and innovation programme under grant agreement GA 101091268 indicators. Alongside environmental and agronomic metrics, the indicator set will track adoption and uptake drivers (e.g., perceived risk, administrative effort, advisory access), economic viability (e.g., net margin impact, costcoverage ratio), and governance performance (e.g., transaction-cost footprint, verification effort per hectare). This dual perspective ensures that effectiveness is assessed not only by results in the field but also by the practicality of getting there. Finally, the framework is conceived as a living tool or guideline. It will be refined through feedback loops with WP2 and WP3, integration of case-study evidence, and targeted exchanges with legal and policy experts where relevant. The end goal is a framework that is credible (methodologically sound), usable (lightweight and well-templated), and transferable across governance levels, supporting public authorities, private initiatives, and farmer organisations to design soil-health business cases that are both ambitious and implementable. 2.2 Potential use of the document This document has been developed based on the results obtained in Work Packages 2, 3, and 4, where key components of soil health business models have been progressively identified and designed, such as actors, payment schemes, enabling conditions, and contractual elements. The final variables and design parameters resulting from these WPs are reflected in the core structure of this framework and will be detailed in Section 6. The document is intended to serve multiple purposes. It can be used to support decision-making when choosing between different types of business models, to guide the design of new models adapted to specific contexts, or to customise existing models according to particular stakeholder needs and local conditions. This report helps to raise the profile of soil health business models with key stakeholders, such as farmers, advisers, policymakers, and consumers, by making visible the range of functions and benefits of soil health business models. It provides an accessible and simple way of understanding how soil management decisions can generate public and private value, and hence support behavioural change and collective action. The framework supports scientific advancement by providing a structured way to characterise and compare soil health business models. It develops interdisciplinary collaboration between agronomy, environmental economics, policy, and social sciences. In addition, it enables integration of scientific teams and infrastructures by bringing together research outcomes from WP2, WP3, and WP4, in soil health indicators, contract design, and modelling techniques. 17 This project has received funding from the European Union’s HORIZON-AG - HORIZON Action Grant Budget-Based research and innovation programme under grant agreement GA 101091268 centres, Seed Centre, professional societies), underscoring the depth of the formal ecosystem that SoilHub can help orchestrate. A proportionate MRV approach is feasible by leveraging existing eco-plan requirements and the digital soil maps. Core elements include: (i) rotation and winter-cover compliance evidenced through area-based declarations and remote-sensing checks; (ii) soil analyses at defined intervals to inform fertilisation (already embedded in the eco-plan); (iii) simple habitat indicators from pollinator strips or water-protection features; and (iv) map-based risk layers (texture, moisture, erosion) to target interventions and track improvement. The rule is simple: use data streams that farms and agencies already maintain, and add only what genuinely informs decisions or claims. Economic perspective On the income side, farms combine basic income support with the environment-friendly production package. These pillars de-risk rotations, cover and careful fertilisation, which in turn safeguard the quality and consistency required for certified seed markets. Where field infrastructure limits performance, melioration support finances essential works. Over time, marketing labels and digital transparency (map-based profiles of soil-friendly management) can yield a modest but real premium, particularly in B2B seed channels sensitive to provenance and stewardship. NOVASOIL’s case configuration also lists voluntary set-asides—useful at the margin to retire under-performing parcels or create ecological buffers that reduce landscapescale risk (erosion/sediment pulses). Risks and outcomes Three risks dominate. First, administrative load: small farms may find compliance and claims management onerous. SoilHub and advisory services can mitigate this by offering templates, digital workflows and help-desk functions that reduce the time cost of doing the right thing. Second, climate variability: rotations and cover crops must remain viable in dry or cold springs; agronomic menus should therefore include hardier mixes and flexible establishment windows. Third, data fragmentation: if soil-map layers, farm records and agency systems don’t talk to each other, transaction costs rise and trust erodes. The remedy is interoperability and light data standards so that evidence for MRV is portable across tools and programmes. Scaled across METK’s network and adopters, the package should improve aggregate stability, reduce erosion risk on vulnerable textures, and maintain or build soil organic carbon through more frequent living cover and prudent nutrient management. Economically, it supports yield stability and the reputation premium associated with certified seed produced under verifiable 18 This project has received funding from the European Union’s HORIZON-AG - HORIZON Action Grant Budget-Based research and innovation programme under grant agreement GA 101091268 soil-friendly systems. Strategically, Estonia demonstrates how a robust formal architecture can be turned into farmer-centred practice when (i) supports are predictable, (ii) MRV piggybacks on existing data, and (iii) a boundary organisation keeps institutions and farms aligned. For the Final Framework, the lessons mirror NOVASOIL’s cross-case evidence: stack a guaranteed public base with value-chain signals, keep the bureaucracy light, and let digital soil intelligence guide both farm decisions and programme oversight. CS: CiRAA LTEs on conventional and organic agriculturePayment for Ecosystem Services (UNIPI) The CiRAA long-term experiments (LTEs) at the University of Pisa constitute one of Italy’s most valuable living laboratories for understanding soil-health management in Mediterranean agricultural systems. Running continuously since the mid-1980s across substantial field scales, the LTEs compare conservation agriculture (reduced or no tillage, cover crops) with conventional mouldboard ploughing, and juxtapose organic and conventional whole-farm systems under realistic rotations. The case study’s ambition is to translate this scientific evidence base into a practical Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES) architecture that rewards farmers for verified improvements in soil condition while maintaining commercially viable farming operations. Rather than asking farmers to adopt soil-friendly practices based on goodwill alone, the model creates clear financial incentives tied to measurable environmental outcomes, backed by credible long-term data that reduce risk for both farmers and paying agencies. Soil health and business model perspective Across three complementary trials, CiRAA has generated a uniquely coherent picture of how tillage intensity, living cover and system-level management shape soils and farm performance under typical North Mediterranean conditions (coastal plains in Tuscany). The first trial (“SODO_ARATO”) compares continuous no-till against annual mouldboard ploughing at 30 cm depth since 1986. This long-running trial follows a biennial rotation of durum wheat and grain legumes (initially soybean, later replaced by faba bean). The trial tracks soil fertility through multiple depth layers—from the surface down to 60 centimeters—while simultaneously monitoring crop yields and nutrient uptake. After nearly 40 years, the data clearly reveals the long-term consequences of soil disturbance versus soil protection, showing that topsoil carbon accumulation under no-till continues beyond three decades, particularly in the 0-10 cm layer, and is still in progress as a steady state was not reached yet. 19 This project has received funding from the European Union’s HORIZON-AG - HORIZON Action Grant Budget-Based research and innovation programme under grant agreement GA 101091268 The second experiment (“COVER CROPS”) ~4 ha factorial experiment begun in 1993 and combines reduced tillage versus 30 cm ploughing with four nitrogen levels and four cover-crop options (no cover crop/weedy control, a non-legume cover crop, a legume cover crop with low nitrogen-fixation potential, and a legume cover crop with high nitrogen-fixation potential) within a four-year rotation of durum wheat, sunflower, durum wheat and grain sorghum. This design isolates marginal effects and interactions among disturbance, N supply and living cover on fertility, weeds and crop performance. The results demonstrate that reduced tillage is most effective when combined with strategic cover crop use and adequate nitrogen inputs. These two latter can help anyway also improving the beneficial side effects on soil C and N stocks also under annual ploughing regimes, spotlighting on the crucial importance of a consistent design of all the elements of the cropping system to reach the goal of soil fertility conservation or improvement. The third trial (“MASCOT”) scales up to whole-farm reality. Since 2001, CiRAA has been comparing on 23 ha of arable land organic and integrated management systems using a local farmer standard 5-year rotation of maize-durum wheatsunflower-faba bean-common wheat. This comparison ran with its original layout through 2016 and continues today with modifications. At plot sizes that mirror actual farm practice, researchers assess soil indicators, crop yields and quality, weed communities, energy consumption, and complete farm economics under realistic conditions. The organic system, supplemented by organic fertilizers and two green manure crops per rotation, shows measurable increases in soil organic matter and total nitrogen over 15 years, alongside greater soil arthropod biodiversity. The business model builds on these proven levers rather than on untested innovations. Reduced or no tillage, purposeful cover-crop use and organic rotations that raise the share of multi-service crops (pulses, forages, cover crops) are monetised through a hybrid PES scheme. The economic architecture combines action-based payments (guaranteed base level) with result-based payments (performance bonuses). An action-based public floor (eco-schemes/AES) supports adoption and predictable extra costs, while a result-based top-up rewards documented improvements—or the maintenance of high status—in key soil indicators and erosion-risk proxies. Because the LTEs provide robust baselines, depth-resolved trend lines and realistic yield/quality trajectories, both sides of the contract face less uncertainty and lower transaction costs Governance, policy and MRV The governance design mirrors how work is already organised around the LTEs, but streamlines roles to cut friction. The regional paying agency/CAP authority issues action-based contracts (organic management, reduced 20 This project has received funding from the European Union’s HORIZON-AG - HORIZON Action Grant Budget-Based research and innovation programme under grant agreement GA 101091268 tillage, cover crops), defines eligibility and processes claims, both from a technical and a formal perspective. A PES programme operator—a regional agency, water authority or consortium—administers the result-based top-ups, sets indicator thresholds and oversees verification. CiRAA/UNIPI and partners act as independent knowledge brokers: they supply sampling designs and technical protocols, provide QA/QC, and ensure targets remain agronomically meaningful and proportionate. Farmers and cooperatives implement practices, keep concise field records (rotations, cover establishment/termination, tillage operations), host sampling and co-design workable calendars for sowing, termination and harvest. Certifiers/third-party auditors perform light-touch checks and produce brief verification reports that integrate cleanly with paying-agency workflows. This division of labour reduces duplication, clarifies accountability and builds trust—especially in the first two years while baselines are set. Monitoring, reporting and verification are depth-aware, practice-anchored and proportionate. Practice evidence is geo-tagged and standardised (rotations, cover-crop timings, residue handling, tillage logs), forming the compliance backbone for action-based elements and informing agronomic interpretation. The indicator set focuses on what affects decisions and payments: SOC stocks by depth (0–10 and 10–30 cm) on a multi-year cadence using consistent soil sampling methods including also bulk-density measurements; simple proxies of aggregate stability or infiltration on sentinel plots to capture erosion-risk trends; soil nutrient status (total N, available P and occasionally also exchangeable K) and pH at rotation turn-points; and yield/quality traits (including wheat rheology) to ensure agronomic viability. Remote sensing is used opportunistically to validate ground cover and residue presence and to flag anomalous fields for targeted checks. The principle is pragmatic: measure what matters, at a frequency the system can sustain, with methods that standard labs and farm records can deliver. Economic perspective The economic architecture stacks a guaranteed floor with a meaningful top-up. Public action-based payments cover additional inputs and a portion of income risk during transition—particularly where reduced tillage or cover crops imply new equipment, altered operations or learning costs. The resultbased top-up then pays for maintained or improved performance relative to the baseline, with payment curves that recognise plateaus (rewarding the preservation of good status) and share uncertainty through modest buffers for inter-annual variability. Transitional grants can target first-time investments (e.g., seeders/rollers, cover-crop seed), while cooperatives lower unit costs via pooled procurement and shared machinery. Because the LTE evidence narrows uncertainty about agronomic responses, disputes shrink 21 This project has received funding from the European Union’s HORIZON-AG - HORIZON Action Grant Budget-Based research and innovation programme under grant agreement GA 101091268 and verification effort remains proportionate, which further improves costeffectiveness. Risks and outcomes Key risks are treated explicitly. Signal-to-noise in SOC is addressed through multi-year sampling windows, consistent laboratories/methods (e.g., ex-ante and ex-post soil C and nutrient budgets) and composite sampling over adequate area. Yield or weed surprises during transition are mitigated with locally adapted cover-crop mixes and carefully timed termination that protects the following cash crop, backed by accessible advisory support. Administrative load is kept lean by aligning MRV calendars with farm operations, using standard templates and accepting digital submissions. Permanence and liability are managed through rolling contracts with renewal options, programme-level buffer accounts and clauses that fairly account for uncontrollable weather shocks. If implemented broadly across Tuscan arable systems, the CiRAA scheme is expected to improve topsoil structure, enhance infiltration and water storage and deliver stable or rising SOC in the upper profile—while preserving commercially viable rotations and quality. The same evidence base enables cleaner contracts: realistic targets, clear baselines and proportionate checks so farmers know what is expected and agencies or buyers can defend payments. For the Final Framework, the lesson is clear: long-term scientific evidence can be converted into bankable contracts. This requires combining guaranteed payments for practice adoption (action-based floor) with resultbased top-ups, keeping MRV depth-aware and proportionate, and providing accessible advisory support. Furthermore, science-based evidences may help avoiding strict rules in public policies (e.g., RDP actions supporting cover crop cultivation and imposing a strict temporal deadline for cover crop termination) that may hamper farmers adoption. This would enable focusing on result-effective management options while leaving, at the same time, some degree of flexibility in management choices of farmers, striving to adapt to local conditions. This approach transforms soil stewardship from a regulatory compliance burden into a financially viable farming strategy that continues beyond the payment period. CS: District of the Sands - Carbon Credits (DELTA & UNIFE) Along the Emilia–Romagna coast, farming takes place on highly sandy soils that are productive yet fragile. The area faces chronic pressures: salinisation driven by sea-water intrusion and drought, subsidence linked to hydrology and land use, gradual loss of soil organic matter (SOM) and, in places, legacy contamination. The case study sets an explicit dual ambition. Agronomically, it aims to rebuild organic matter and water-holding capacity so that fields 22 This project has received funding from the European Union’s HORIZON-AG - HORIZON Action Grant Budget-Based research and innovation programme under grant agreement GA 101091268 weather heat and irregular rainfall without sacrificing yield stability. Strategically, it seeks to turn that stewardship into cashflow through a Sustainability District, an integrated model that blends carbon farming with certification/production standards and value-chain signalling for coastal horticulture. The District is conceived not as a single project, but as a portfolio: multiple farms, coordinated practices, shared monitoring and an institutional backbone that lowers costs and raises credibility. Soil health and business model perspective On sandy soils the physics are unforgiving: low native fertility, weak aggregation, rapid mineralisation and poor water retention mean that gains are easily lost if management slips. For that reason the technical programme is deliberately conservative and cumulative. The first plank is living cover for as many months as the calendar allows. Winter covers stabilise the surface against wind and runoff; in fallow windows, short “opportunistic” covers keep roots in the ground, slow mineralisation and feed below-ground carbon. Establishment and termination are timed to fit local rotations and moisture, so cover crops add biomass without compromising the cash crop. Next comes residue retention and organic amendments. Where composted manures or green waste are locally available, they are applied to lift carbon inputs and nudge cation-exchange capacity upwards over time. Retained straw and mulches protect the surface, moderate soil temperature and provide a steady trickle of organic matter that microbes can process into more stable fractions. Rotations are widened to include deep-rooting species that explore more of the profile, leave sturdier residues and help interrupt pest and disease cycles. Tillage is reduced and made more targeted. Instead of routine deep inversion, operations are shallower and placed only where needed, preserving nascent aggregates and pore structure. This lowers oxidation losses, keeps the seedbed functional and reduces the risk of blowing sand. Because coastal and irrigated sands often face salt pressure, the programme also includes salinity management: careful water scheduling, basic drainage upkeep and, where risk is high, the use of salt-tolerant cover options to avoid bare, vulnerable periods. Electrical conductivity checks at sentinel spots can flag problems early enough to adjust rotations or amendment timing. Economic perspective The Sustainability District treats carbon credits as a component, not the whole story. SOM increases and reduced erosion are translated into carbon removal/emission reduction claims that can be certified and marketed; meanwhile, the same practice set underpins a product-quality and 23 This project has received funding from the European Union’s HORIZON-AG - HORIZON Action Grant Budget-Based research and innovation programme under grant agreement GA 101091268 stewardship narrative that coastal buyers can recognise (labels, standards, supplier programmes). This creates two revenue streams: 1. Result-based income from verified carbon outcomes; and 2. Value-chain premia (or preferential procurement) for produce carrying the District’s stewardship claim. Importantly, the case embraces hybrid incentives. A public, action-based floor (eco-schemes/AES for cover crops, reduced tillage, landscape features) provides predictability and helps cover extra costs. On top, the result-based carbon component rewards measured performance. This blend reflects farmer preferences observed across Italian work: long, rigid, result-only contracts are unpopular on risky agronomy; add a guaranteed floor and flexibility, and participation rises. Policy, governance and MRV The policy analysis and the choice-modelling arrive at the same conclusion: Italian farmers are wary of long, price-volatile carbon contracts and discount offer that demand extra labour or complicated monitoring. They respond more favourably when per-hectare payments reflect real costs and when commitments are short to medium term with the option to renew. For the District, that translates into credits framed within manageable horizons, while the early seasons are underpinned by public or top-up support and seed funding to cover fixed items such as protocol design, baseline sampling and basic MRV tools. In practice, the District should behave like a true aggregator: one rulebook, shared services, and a single counterparty for buyers and certifiers that simplifies decisions at the farm gate. The governance follows this logic. A District Operator (whether a co-operative, consortium or producer organisation) brings farms into the scheme, standardises the practice menu, manages data flows and sampling, operates the reversal risk buffer, negotiates with buyers and certifiers, and distributes payments. Regional authorities and the paying agency provide the actionbased floor through eco-schemes or AES, oversee compliance, and, where possible, co-finance the initial MRV set-up to de-risk entry. The certification body or standard owner validates quantification, additionality and permanence, reviews the buffer and issues credits. Water authorities and land-reclamation bodies coordinate drainage and salinity mitigation— preconditions for stable soil gains on sandy or coastal ground. Advisory and research partners supply the nuts and bolts: protocols for sandy soils, seasonal decision support on cover species and termination windows, and quality assurance for data. 24 This project has received funding from the European Union’s HORIZON-AG - HORIZON Action Grant Budget-Based research and innovation programme under grant agreement GA 101091268 Taken together, this division of labour lowers transaction costs where they would otherwise fall on individual farms and concentrates specialist tasks where scale and expertise exist. The result is a governance arrangement that is coherent for buyers, workable for administrators and, crucially, usable for farmers. Building on that foundation, the monitoring, reporting and verification must be proportionate to sandy systems yet rigorous enough to stand up to scrutiny. The core is a clear baseline followed by periodic soil-carbon stock assessments at 0–10 cm and 10–30 cm, using consistent bulk-density methods and composite sampling within each management unit. Around this backbone sits a light but informative layer of observation: remote sensing provides ground-cover and erosion proxies, which are then spot-checked in the field during bare-soil risk periods and in the inter-row where disturbance is most likely. Because salinity shocks can erase gains and undermine yields, electrical conductivity (EC) and groundwater depth are monitored at sentinel sites wherever salt risk is material, allowing the District to adjust rotations, cover choices or amendment timing before problems cascade. Equally important is the treatment of activity data. Rotations, cover-crop establishment and termination, residue handling and tillage operations are digitised once in a common format and reused for both public and private claims, reducing paperwork while preserving traceability. The District Operator owns the protocol, enforces method consistency and champions data interoperability so farmers are not asked to re-enter the same information into multiple systems. In practice, this keeps MRV credible for buyers, manageable for administrators and, above all, usable for farms working on unforgiving sands. Early years are about derisking and set-up: public action-based payments cover extra seed, operations and modest yield drag while soils transition; seed funding (public or blended) pays for baselines and shared MRV tools. As SOM begins to rise and erosion risk falls, credit issuance and value-chain premia contribute increasing shares of revenue. Because carbon-price cycles are out of farmers’ control, the District maintains a cost-coverage floor and a buffer to handle inter-annual variability and potential reversals (e.g., a saline flood). Over time, unit MRV costs decline as sampling designs stabilise and remotesensing workflows mature. Risks and outcomes Working on light, wind-prone sands means treating permanence as a real, ongoing challenge rather than a tick-box. The programme therefore starts from conservative baselines and only claims what can be held with confidence. A portfolio buffer absorbs unexpected losses, and practice rules 25 This project has received funding from the European Union’s HORIZON-AG - HORIZON Action Grant Budget-Based research and innovation programme under grant agreement GA 101091268 deliberately avoid over-claiming in sub-zones where wind events, flash floods or salinity spikes make reversals more likely. Where these hazards are present, management is tightened—longer cover windows, gentler tillage, closer salinity checks—so gains are built cautiously and protected season by season. Financial exposure is handled with the same pragmatism. Because carbon prices fluctuate and buyer demand can stall, the District does not lean on a single income line. It stacks revenue from credits with value-chain premia for recognised stewardship and seeks multi-year offtake wherever possible, giving farms visibility beyond the next harvest. On the administrative side, the scheme keeps friction low through a single-window. District administration, standardised templates and digital submission; audits are batched to avoid disruption at peak times. To prevent farmer fatigue and deal with inevitable agronomic setbacks, the programme offers advisory backstopping, droughttolerant cover mixes and a clear Plan B for dry or saline years. The intent is simple: keep people engaged and practice on track even when conditions are difficult. At landscape scale, the pay-offs are expected to be incremental but persistent: higher soil organic carbon, better aggregation and infiltration, and reduced erosion, together underpinning more resilient yields on soils where margins are easily eroded by weather. Economically, farms gain a predictable public floor topped up by a new income stream from credits, while confidence to invest grows as unit MRV costs fall with stable sampling designs and maturing remote-sensing workflows. Institutionally, the model shows how to blend public, action-based support with private, results-based incentives while keeping MRV both practical and interoperable. The implication for the Final Framework is clear: start with a guaranteed action-based base, add a measured, results-based layer (credits) inside a portfolio-managed district, and invest early in shared MRV and advisory so that improvements on sandy soils can be certified credibly and at reasonable cost. 26 This project has received funding from the European Union’s HORIZON-AG - HORIZON Action Grant Budget-Based research and innovation programme under grant agreement GA 101091268 CS: Rueda,Organic vineyardsIntegrated production. Set on the high Duero plateau (c. 700–800 m a.s.l.), the Rueda viticultural area is defined by gravelly–sandy topsoils over calcareous subsoils, low inherent organic matter, marked continental seasonality (hot, dry summers; cold winters), recurrent spring frosts and water scarcity. The case is framed as integrated production in vineyards: it aims to keep yields and grape quality stable while rebuilding soil function and lowering dependence on external inputs. Strategically, the ambition is to turn stewardship into cash flow by stacking the regional Integrated Production (IP) certification with CAP ecoschemes and a light, result-based layer that recognises measured improvements in soil condition and erosion risk. Soil health and business model perspective Agronomy. Management focuses on permanent or seasonal inter-row cover, targeted under-vine control (mechanical where feasible), and reduced or noninversion tillage to protect aggregates on the stony, sandy surface. Cover mixes (self-reseeding grasses/legumes adapted to summer drought) are timed to maximise winter and shoulder-season ground cover, with mowing/rolling used to conserve moisture before heat peaks. Organic matter is fed through composted winery pomace and chipped pruning (a local circular stream), occasionally complemented by purchased compost or manure where logistics allow. Fertigation and precision N are tuned to petiole/soil tests to avoid surplus mineral N in a nitrate-sensitive basin. IPM 33 This project has received funding from the European Union’s HORIZON-AG - HORIZON Action Grant Budget-Based research and innovation programme under grant agreement GA 101091268 sustainable, locally-produced ingredients. Distinctive lavender landscapes strengthen regional identity, attract tourists, and support complementary economic activities including farm visits, product sales, and cultural events. Governance, policy and MRV The governance structure originates from the Integrated Supply Chain Project (PIF) funded under Measure 16.2 of Tuscany Region's Rural Development Programme 2014-2020. This framework coordinates multiple actors with clearly defined roles to support system transformation in the hilly areas of Pisa province. The governance structure coordinates multiple actors with complementary roles. Research centres (UNIPI) provide technical guidance on crop establishment, organic management, and soil health monitoring while evaluating agronomic performance and economic viability. Private processing companies within the supply chain provide market connections for essential oils, cosmetic ingredients, food supplements, and soaps, offering quality specifications and purchase commitments that reduce farmer market risk during transition. The Tuscany Region and local municipal administrations coordinate rural development funding, facilitate cooperation among the participating farms covering about 12 hectares, and integrate aromatic crop development with broader territorial enhancement strategies including landscape valorisation and tourism promotion. Inter-farm cooperation through a supply chain agreement enables production aggregation to achieve scale economies in processing, marketing, and procurement. This collaboration overcomes individual barriers to capitalintensive equipment investment and volume-based contract negotiations. Specifically, participating farms share access to a single harvesting machine and a single distillation unit, dramatically reducing per-farm capital requirements while ensuring processing capacity meets collective production needs. Monitoring tracks indicators at field, farm, and territorial scales. At the field level, soil health data over nine years (2015-2024) show 15.3% organic matter increase and 29.7% C/N ratio improvement under biodynamic lavender versus conventional cereals. Soil enzymatic activities—dehydrogenase, βglucosidase, phosphatase, urease, FDA, and microbial biomass—demonstrate significantly enhanced biological activity under organic aromatic management. The initial three-year organic matter balance documented 6.24 t/ha accumulation, equivalent to 13.3 t/ha CO₂ sequestration, through cover crops, manure application, and perennial residues. Productivity assessment examines crop yields and quality parameters including essential oil content, composition, and organoleptic properties determining market value. Landscape and biodiversity indicators document 34 This project has received funding from the European Union’s HORIZON-AG - HORIZON Action Grant Budget-Based research and innovation programme under grant agreement GA 101091268 ecological corridors establishment, increased pollinator populations, and scenic quality enhancement supporting territorial tourism through the annual Lavender Days festival, strengthening regional identity. Economic perspective The economic model addresses substantial transition costs inherent in perennial aromatic systems. Field establishment requires deep plowing (30 cm), subsoiling, and soil refinement, followed by November 2016 transplanting with species-specific densities: lavender varieties at 1.5 plants/m² (0.40 x 1.70 m spacing) and thyme/oregano at 3 plants/m² (0.20 x 1.70 m spacing). Postestablishment management combines mechanical weed control (cultivators, rototillers, finger weeders) with manual hoeing where necessary. Fertility management integrates year-round cover crops—autumn cerealslegumes (barley, oats, spelt, fava bean, sulla, clover) terminated in May, and spring mixes (Ecover and Ecoriz blends with cowpea, buckwheat, mustard, vetch) terminated in July—plus September manure application, creating continuous soil cover and organic matter inputs. Rural development funding through PSR Measure 16.2 covers establishment costs, specialized equipment, and technical assistance during the vulnerable pre-productivity period. At maturity, stacked revenue sources deliver viability: certified organic essential oils, dried herbs, and fresh material sold to processing partners; value-added products (cosmetics, soaps, supplements) capturing processing margins; and agritourism generating supplementary income through farm visits, the annual Lavender Days festival attracting thousands, educational workshops, and direct sales. The value proposition emphasizes certified organic production, transparent traceability, documented sustainable soil management, and consistent quality coordinated through the supply chain partnership. The territorial "Valli dei Profumi" (Valleys of Perfumes) branding creates unique market differentiation positioning products as expressions of place that premium buyers—cosmetic companies and food markets— increasingly seek, accepting higher prices for credibly demonstrated environmental stewardship. Risks and outcomes Key risks required adaptive management. The agronomic learning curve transitioning from cereals to unfamiliar aromatics was overcome through intensive UNIPI technical assistance, training workshops, and the Santa Luce demonstration field. Drought risk on Mediterranean slopes (12-15%) was addressed through drought-tolerant species selection and fertility management improving soil water-holding capacity. Market development proceeded cautiously with processing companies as anchor buyers providing contractual commitments, while diversified marketing (essential oils, FLORA brand products, agritourism) reduced single-market vulnerability. 35 This project has received funding from the European Union’s HORIZON-AG - HORIZON Action Grant Budget-Based research and innovation programme under grant agreement GA 101091268 After nine years (2015-2024), measurable outcomes validate the transformation model. Soil health improved dramatically: 15.3% organic matter increase (1.85% to 2.60%) under biodynamic lavender versus 22.7% decline under conventional cereals; C/N ratio increased 29.7% in aromatic systems while declining 35.6% in cereals and microbial biomass doubled (189.48 vs. 89.42 µg C). Economic viability was achieved through FLORA brand sales, the fifth-edition Lavender Days festival, strengthened regional identity, transformed landscape from tilled cereals to flowering perennial mosaics, increased biodiversity, and revitalized communities making farming economically viable in previously marginal areas. For Final Framework, this demonstrates that strategic transformation toward perennial high-value aromatics with organic management simultaneously restores soil health, enhances profitability, strengthens landscapes, and supports rural vitality—requiring patient multi-year investment, robust technical support, business model innovation through certification and territorial branding, coordinated supply chain governance, and territorial development integration. The model offers replicability potential for European marginal areas facing soil degradation, economic decline, and landscape deterioration under conventional systems. CS: ZSA DIH System (ZSA) Soil health and business model perspective 36 This project has received funding from the European Union’s HORIZON-AG - HORIZON Action Grant Budget-Based research and innovation programme under grant agreement GA 101091268 The Latvian case study builds on the integration of soil data and soil management practices into a digital mapping service hosted within the ZSA Digital Innovation Hub (DIH). It intends to both cover the gaps of information exchange between state authorities, local authorities, land owners and general society about soil health and management practices with a sole aim to increase the adoption of soil-friendly practices that would lead to positive impact on soil health, especially organic matter. The solution highlights the fields in all country where farmers have implemented eco-schemes and soilfriendly agricultural practices, particularlyreduced soil tillage practices, thereby turning soil health improvements into visible, spatialised information. The service is practice-neutral, but it is grounded in the principles of sustainable management—reduced tillage, crop diversification, cover crops, and organic matter management—by making these actions transparent and comparable across regions. The business model dimension relies on digitalisation: by lowering the transaction costs of eco-scheme participation and providing easy access to up-to-date data, the service creates value for farmers, policymakers, and the public. For farmers, it translates soil knowledge into actionable advice, helping them select agrotechnical methods best suited to local soil types and conditions even in cases where farmers themselves have not done the soil agro-chemical property analysis for a particular field. For local authorities and society at large, it creates visibility and accountability of eco-scheme implementation, thus reinforcing the legitimacy of CAP eco-scheme payments, as well as providing clear and functional data about soil properties and management strategies. Governance, policy and MRV The ZSA DIH system operates within the policy context of the Latvian CAP Strategic Plan and the EU Soil Strategy 2030. Eco-schemes define the baseline of eligible practices, while the mapping tool provides an additional layer of transparency and communication. ZSA ensures that data integration and interface design meet both farmer needs and public expectations. Universities and research institutions contribute to methodological robustness, for example by validating soil typology and mechanical composition data. Governance is thus shared: ZSA manages the platform and ensures data flow, policymakers set the eco-scheme requirements, and farmers together with state actors (managing authorities) provide practice information. MRV is designed to be proportionate and low-burden—visual confirmation of eco-scheme adoption is combined with regular updates of soil data layers. In case if municipal authorities plans to further implement the promotion of sustainable soil management practices in their Sustainable Development plans via tax breaks or other incentives, ZSA using the DIH 37 This project has received funding from the European Union’s HORIZON-AG - HORIZON Action Grant Budget-Based research and innovation programme under grant agreement GA 101091268 systems fills the data transfer gaps between municipal authorities, farmers and state actors. Economic perspective The mapping service itself does not provide direct payments to farmers but strengthens their capacity to comply with eco-scheme requirements and optimise land management. By aligning with statutory eco-scheme funding, it indirectly facilitates access to CAP support. It also opens a potential for future financial incentives from regional authorities (such as tax breaks) by making the field-level data on soil-friendly management practices publicly available for municipalities, especially when creating and amending their sustainable development strategies. Farmers benefit economically through: Reduced information costs (knowing which practices are relevant to their soils) – although soil sampling is mandatory under certain support schemes and in certain regions, due to various reasons there are significant amounts of farmland territories without reliable and up-to date soil analysis. The tool also provides datasets which help to determine the best strategy for soil management strategies even in cases where reliable soil samples are absent. Improved decision-making, leading to better soil fertility, increase in organic matter and higher yields for farmers in long term. By applying basic soil property datasets and datasets of areas with reduced tillage implementation, farmers have decision-support tool which helps to introduce reduced-tillage practices where appropriate, further leading to long-term soil health especially by increase of organic matter in soil. Enhanced visibility, which can support market differentiation and reputational benefits. Although not primarily intended as a part of this case study, during the process of establishing this case study, land owners and farmers in particular highlighted the potential of mapping tool for future implementation of quality schemes such as ‘’conservation agriculture product’’ or ‘’soil-friendly practice product’’, which can provide additional price premium for production goods as well as to benefit the local farmer reputation. Overall, the costs for farmers remain low, since the service is embedded in ZSA’s DIH and presented through a simple, user-friendly interface, and all the datasets used in this tool are being gathered automatically from state and scientific authorities, not leading to any additional burden for land owners. Public authorities and potentially private actors (e.g. food companies seeking to showcase sustainable sourcing) may cover maintenance and extension costs. Risk and outcomes 38 This project has received funding from the European Union’s HORIZON-AG - HORIZON Action Grant Budget-Based research and innovation programme under grant agreement GA 101091268 The main long-term risk is the accuracy and uptake of the digital service. If datasets are outdated or incomplete, farmer trust may be undermined. It is important to emphasize that throughout the CAP planning period of 20232027, there is a reduced tillage eco-scheme implemented in Latvia, which makes it mandatory for farmers to report their fields under this support, and the payment managing authority verifies during on-site controls that all the requirements are met. This means that in short term, till year 2028 the datasets ar complete, up-to date and verified. Looking into long-term there is a significant risk that if subsidy-based support for reduced tillage practices is not prolonged, this would lead to disappearance of significant subsidy motivation for farmers to report their activities, putting the possibility of gathering reliable datasets under serious risk. Similarly, if farmers or the public do not actively use the service, its impact on soil health awareness and practice adoption may be limited. To mitigate this, ZSA provides regular updates, ensures user training, and designs the interface for broad accessibility. There is also a risk for lack of interest especially among regional/local/municipal authorities of implementing regional level incentives (such as reduced property tax), based on the tool. It has to be admitted, that this risk seems to be low, as all the municipalities in Latvia are mandated by law to introduce their Sustainable Development strategies, and have shown genuine interest in the tool which provides reliable data about soil-friendly practice implementation in their territory Environmental outcomes are strongly positive: improved targeting of agrotechnical methods should support soil fertility, organic matter build-up, and reduced erosion. Socially, transparency about eco-scheme uptake raises awareness and motivates further adoption. In the longer term, the service could also be linked to more advanced MRV systems for soil carbon, enhancing its role in both national and EU-wide monitoring frameworks. 39 This project has received funding from the European Union’s HORIZON-AG - HORIZON Action Grant Budget-Based research and innovation programme under grant agreement GA 101091268 CS: CO2-Land initiative in Germany (TUM) CO₂-Land is a carbon-farming initiative in south-western Germany that helps arable farms build additional soil organic carbon (SOC) and monetise certified CO2 removals as tradable climate credits. Within NOVASOIL, it represents the “carbon markets / carbon credit schemes” business model, tested to see whether private markets – when properly governed – can pay farmers for long-term SOC gains. The ambition is twofold: agronomically, to improve soil structure, resilience to drought or heat and nutrient efficiency through enhanced SOC; strategically, to convert those verified gains into a reliable income stream via credits, while fitting within the EU’s new certification regime for carbon removals (CRCF, Regulation (EU) 2024/3012). Soil health and business model perspective Regarding farming practices that enhance SOC, CO₂-Land is practice-neutral but grounded in proven SOC-positive measures. Farms deploy diverse rotations, cover crops, reduced or no tillage, and improved nutrient management, with the emphasis on stacking practices so that small annual gains compound. The agronomic test is practicality: interventions must work at field scale with existing rotations and machinery. To qualify for certification, actions must go beyond the baseline set by statutory standards (e.g., GAEC minimum cover) and are tracked under MRV rules set by CO2-Land. The business model translates the SOC improvements into an economic value. Environmentally, farms create verified CO₂ sinks in arable soils; 40 This project has received funding from the European Union’s HORIZON-AG - HORIZON Action Grant Budget-Based research and innovation programme under grant agreement GA 101091268 economically, they unlock a second revenue stream by selling certified credits on voluntary markets. Governance, policy and MRV The case operates within a dense policy environment. In Germany, GAEC minimum soil cover (enhanced CAP conditionality) and the Fertiliser Ordinance/Law (DÜV/DüngG) define the compliance baseline. Any credited outcome must exceed these standards to satisfy CRCF additionality and durability requirements. In terms of assurance, they align tightly with CRCF quality criteria by— providing credible quantification, verifiable demonstrable additionality and, durable storage and sustainability safeguards—to maintain buyer confidence. In particular, to guarantee a certain level of permanence, CO2-Land targets a minimum contract duration of 10 years with their partner farms. Also, to avoid SOC re-allocation biases within farms, the farms enter with all of their farmland into contract. To monitor the development of SOC levels, soils are tested at the beginning of the contract and in the fourth and tenth year after the contract starts. In their efforts to increase SOC, participating farmers are supported with agronomic advice provided by CO2-Land advisors. With information collected from an initial meeting with a farmer, an individual package of measures is developed for each farm to increase SOC in the coming years. Economic perspective The payment to farmers for soil carbon enhancement amounts to €55 per tonne of CO2e. Payments are based on expected values in years without soil sampling and in sampling years (excluding the first year), according to the results of the soil analyses, usually in the spring of project years 4 and 10. While this amount may not fully cover the additional costs incurred by farmers in many cases, building up soil organic matter provides numerous co-benefits such as improved soil fertility, water retention, and soil biodiversity, which provide likely indirect monetary benefits for farmers. Therefore, the financial reward offered through the programme should not be seen as the main motivation for participation. Another central part of the value creation lies in the exchange of experience with other farmers, gain in information about soils, and personal advice and training provided by CO₂-Land. Costs for farmers to participate in the program might arise by soil testing and additionally implemented farming practices. Farms typically cover the costs of soil sampling and laboratory analyses themselves. However, in some cases partner organisations cover those costs supported by public funding. Participation usually entails no significant additional workload for farmers, as 41 This project has received funding from the European Union’s HORIZON-AG - HORIZON Action Grant Budget-Based research and innovation programme under grant agreement GA 101091268 many are already engaging in practices to build soil organic matter in order to improve soil quality. Administrative processes are kept as simple as possible, allowing farmers to focus their efforts on implementing the measures themselves. The contract features CO2-Land follows can be compared to behavioural evidence from a Discrete Choice Experiment (DCE) with 315 farmers conducted within NOVASOIL in Germany. There, it became evident that farmers avoid long-dated contracts without guaranteed cost recovery. For CO2-Land, a long contract duration is necessary to safeguard permanence, however. On the other hand, additional costs for farmers are kept low by minor bureaucratic burdens and co-benefits generated by the program. The DCE further showed that farmers respond positively to a successor exit clause and ancillary support such as advice around soil health, both are features provided by CO2-Land. Risk and outcomes SOC accumulation depends strongly on environmental factors such as climate, region, and soil type, which means that humus losses due to weather or site conditions may occur. Consequently, the success of humus-building measures cannot be guaranteed. CO2 considers this risk for participating farmers by guaranteeing that participating farmers do not face any penalties if soil organic matter levels stagnate or even decrease over time. In such cases, the only cost is incurred by soil tests. Also, to mitigate this risk, if stagnating SOC levels are detected with soil tests, potential causes are analysed. Based on the findings, measures for the following monitoring period are adjusted to improve results. As this is also a risk for the buyers of certificates and partner institutions, CO₂Land maintains a 20% buffer of the expected carbon storage potential across all project areas. This reserve serves to compensate for lower-than-expected soil carbon gains on certain plots or farms. In this way, it is ensured that the total amount of climate certificates issued remains closely aligned with the actual verified carbon sequestration achieved. 42 This project has received funding from the European Union’s HORIZON-AG - HORIZON Action Grant Budget-Based research and innovation programme under grant agreement GA 101091268 CS: Payments for Ecosystem Services in the Tamarguillo Park The Tamarguillo Park is a large urban green space where soils have been exposed to contamination and constant pressure from housing, traffic and planning decisions. Framed within NOVASOIL as a Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) pilot, the case addresses two connected challenges: the biophysical degradation of urban soils (contamination, low SOM, compaction and sealing) and the institutional gap between the park’s management budgets and the public benefits those soils provide (run-off control, cooling, biodiversity, recreation and property-value uplift). The ambition is to convert verifiable improvements in soil condition into recognised, contractable services, so that day-to-day stewardship can be rewarded and scaled without compromising practical maintenance. Soil health and business model perspective On the ground, the programme prioritises de-sealing and de-compaction, organic matter replenishment and risk-aware remediation. Surfaces are progressively unsealed where feasible; compacted paths and berms are broken up and amended; leaf litter and green waste are recycled as compost; and living cover (diverse ground flora, micro-clover mixes, shaded grass, mulched beds) is extended to reduce dust, suppress resuspension of contaminants and buffer heat. In hotspot areas, the approach is risk-based: contaminated soils are either capped, phytostabilised or selectively removed, with planting palettes that minimise human–soil contact while still building structure and SOM. Tree pits are redesigned as bio-retention cells to increase infiltration and reduce runoff into the storm network. 49 This project has received funding from the European Union’s HORIZON-AG - HORIZON Action Grant Budget-Based research and innovation programme under grant agreement GA 101091268 specific practices rather than rewarding outcomes. Uptake can also vary considerably due to administrative burdens, budgetary constraints, and uneven implementation across Member States. Carbon Credit Markets Voluntary carbon markets provide payments for certified carbon removal activities, such as agroforestry, afforestation, peatland rewetting, and certain soil health practices. The forthcoming EU Carbon Removal Certification Framework will define eligibility through QU.A.L.ITY criteria: ● Quantification: Robust measurement against standardised baselines. ● Additionality: Beyond legal obligations. ● Long-term storage: Ensuring permanence and liability mechanisms for reversals. ● Sustainability: Neutral or positive impact on other environmental objectives. Payments are typically result-based, with revenues linked to the volume of certified carbon credits sold. Challenges include market price volatility, high monitoring costs, and limited farmer acceptance of long-term commitments, especially for measures with high permanence requirements. Carbon credit markets have the potential to attract substantial private investment, offering a mechanism that aligns agricultural practices with climate neutrality objectives while delivering co-benefits for biodiversity conservation and water regulation. However, their effectiveness is constrained by significant challenges, including the risks associated with permanence and carbon reversibility, the complexity of certification procedures, and, in some markets, the low prices currently obtained for carbon credits, which may limit farmer engagement. Value Chain Payments In this model, downstream value chain actors (e.g., processors, retailers, food brands) compensate farmers for producing under soil-friendly standards. Payments are often embedded in product pricing rather than delivered as separate ecosystem service remuneration. Contracts may offer price premiums, purchase guarantees, and technical support. Examples include the Barilla Sustainable Farming Project, which integrates soil health measures such as crop rotation and reduced tillage into supply 50 This project has received funding from the European Union’s HORIZON-AG - HORIZON Action Grant Budget-Based research and innovation programme under grant agreement GA 101091268 contracts, supported by decision-support tools and training. These schemes can be purely private or co-financed through public–private partnerships. Value chain payments provide market-driven incentives that can integrate soil health requirements into product value, offering opportunities for branding and consumer engagement while allowing considerable flexibility in contract design. Nevertheless, their broader application is limited by the scarcity of research on farmer preferences for such arrangements, a strong dependency on the strategic priorities of participating companies, and the risk of short-termism if contractual frameworks do not secure long-term environmental commitments. 2 This project has received funding from the European Union’s HORIZON-AG - HORIZON Action Grant Budget-Based research and innovation programme under grant agreement GA 101091268 Table 1. Summary of main business models and their features Model What is paid for? Contract type Funding source MRV / Baseline Main advantages Key limitations Best fit / when to use Examples / Instruments Acceptance Public Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) Practices (action) and, in hybrid designs, environmental results Eco-schemes: annual; AECM/AES: multi-annual (less 5 years) CAP funds (Pillar I & II) + national/regio nal cofinancing Regulatory baseline (GAEC, Nitrates); proportionate MRV (practice checks and/or simple indicators) Broad coverage; predictable funding; aligned with CAP objectives Lower flexibility if action-only; admin burden; uneven budgets/design across MS Territory-scale roll-out; standard, lowrisk practice adoption Eco-schemes (Pillar I); AECM/AES (Pillar II); organic conversion, cover crops, reduced tillage Higher with cost coverage, simple paperwork, advisory support, farm-friendly calendars Carbon Credit Markets (voluntary / CRCFaligned) Certified tCO₂e (removals/avoi dance) Variable; often medium–long due to permanence Private buyers; sometimes seed/impact funds CRCF QU.A.L.ITY: robust quantification, additionality beyond law, longterm storage, sustainability; stringent MRV Attracts private capital; aligns farming with climate goals; cobenefits Price volatility; MRV costs; permanence/reve rsal risk; lower acceptance for long rigid terms Projects with clear SOC/biomass potential and strong aggregators; where corporate demand exists Agroforestry, peatland rewetting, certified soilcarbon practices Improves with successor exit, guaranteed cost coverage, technical/inv estment support, flexible contracts ValueChain Payments (brands, retailers, processors) Soil-friendly production standards; price premia/guaran tees; technical support Commercial contracts (1–3+ years), renewable Private (companies); sometimes PPP/cofunding Contract-fit MRV (audits, traceability data, light RS); baseline = buyer spec + regulation Marketdriven incentives; brand/consu mer linkage; flexible design; can spur innovation Dependent on corporate priorities; limited evidence on farmer preferences; risk of short-termism Chains with purchasing power and ESG strategies; DOs/IGPs with a sustainability story “Sustainable sourcing” programmes (e.g., rotation, reduced tillage with digital DSS & training) Rises with clear premia, purchase guarantees, simplified requirement s, continuous technical assistance 2 This project has received funding from the European Union’s HORIZON-AG - HORIZON Action Grant Budget-Based research and innovation programme under grant agreement GA 101091268 5 Design guide: list of potential parameters and options This section translates the conceptual and empirical insights of the Final Framework into a practical design guide. Its purpose is to help stakeholder as farmers, cooperatives, advisers, policymakers, and private actors and navigate the process of shaping soil-health business models that are both effective in the field and feasible in practice. The guide is structured around the key building blocks identified throughout NOVASOIL: defining objectives, mapping actors, aligning incentives, tailoring contractual parameters, and selecting proportionate monitoring and verification tools. Each step is illustrated with lessons drawn from the project’s diverse case studies, showing how abstract principles can be applied in real socio-ecological contexts. Rather than prescribing a single blueprint, the guide offers a flexible set of design choices and decision points. It highlights trade-offs—between simplicity and precision, public support and market incentives, short-term adoption and long-term resilience—so that users can adapt models to local conditions while maintaining overall coherence. In this way, the Design Guide serves as a bridge between the analytical framework and the practical implementation of soil-health business models across Europe. 5.1 Actors/Parties involved A coherent incentive architecture for soil-health business models requires a clear division of roles among farmers, intermediaries/marketplaces, buyers, public authorities, certifiers/verifiers, finance providers, and knowledge/tech actors. NOVASOIL’s case studies show that participation rises when responsibilities are transparent, monitoring and transaction costs are reduced, and risks (price volatility, permanence, sunk certification costs) are equitably shared. 3 This project has received funding from the European Union’s HORIZON-AG - HORIZON Action Grant Budget-Based research and innovation programme under grant agreement GA 101091268 Table 2. Summary of type of actors involved in NOVASOIL case studies 4 This project has received funding from the European Union’s HORIZON-AG - HORIZON Action Grant Budget-Based research and innovation programme under grant agreement GA 101091268 Actor: Farmers / Farm organisations Role & responsibilities: Implement soil-health measures; accept contract terms (duration, payments, monitoring); report management records. What incentivises them: Guaranteed cost coverage, hybrid payments, flexibility (e.g., successor termination), low admin burden. Data / MRV contributions: Farm records, access for audits/sampling; adoption evidence Case-Study illustration: Dutch Rabo Carbon Bank require extra incentives and termination options; German farmers reject long, inflexible contracts without cost guarantees. Actor: Intermediaries / Markletplaces Role & responsibilities: Aggregate projects, package and sell credits or certificates; interface with buyers; manage buffers What incentivises them: Deal flow, reputational gains, efficient certification Data / MRV contributions: Project documentation, issuance logs, refistry entries Case-Study illustration: Rabo Carbon Bank (aggregation and advice); AgoraNatura (online marketplace for Biodiversity/ES credits). Actor: Private buyers/Value-chain firms Role & responsibilities: Purchase credits or pay sustainability premia; use labels/claims What incentivises them: Verified impacts, stable supply, credible labels Data / MRV contributions: Contractual specs, claims subsanation Case-Study illustration: Wine value-chain in BG (quality/tourism positioning); prospective food-sector sustainability labelling. Actor: Public authorities (CAP, Paying Agencies, Ministries) Role & responsibilities: Provide ASED/eco-schemes; enable blended finance; set elegibility & enforcement What incentivises them: Policy targets (soil/biodiversity/climate), uptake Data / MRV contributions: Programme rules, payment ledgers, audit trials Case-Study illustration: Italian case explores combining CAP (actionbaesd) with market (results-based). 5 This project has received funding from the European Union’s HORIZON-AG - HORIZON Action Grant Budget-Based research and innovation programme under grant agreement GA 101091268 Actor: Certifiers / Verifiers / standards Role & responsibilities: Ensure quality criteria (quantification, additionality, permanence, no-harm); issue certificates What incentivises them: Certification fees, market growth Data / MRV contributions: Verification reports, sampling protocols Case-Study illustration: EU CRCF quality criteria frame carbon removals on arable land Actor: Finance providers (bank/funds) Role & responsibilities: Provide loans/seed funding; de-risk upfront costs What incentivises them: Risk-adjusted return, pipeline Data / MRV contributions: Due-diligence data, disbursement records Case-Study illustration: Public seed-funding to cover-fixed costs valued by farmers in AgoraNatura; loan discounts tested in NL/DE. Actor: Advisory / Research / Extension Role & responsibilities: Co-design contracts; training; decision support What incentivises them: Impact, adoption Data / MRV contributions: Training curricula, guidance, monitoring methods. Case-Study illustration: Free advice increases willingness to participate in De; training valued in NL/DE Actor: Tech providers (MRV/ AI/ EO) Role & responsibilities: Monitoring solutions, automation, cost reduction What incentivises them: Market access, innovation Data / MRV contributions: RS/AI outputs, dashboards, audit data Case-Study illustration: AI-based monitoring is positively valued by farmers in the German marketplace case. 6 This project has received funding from the European Union’s HORIZON-AG - HORIZON Action Grant Budget-Based research and innovation programme under grant agreement GA 101091268 5.2 Payment characteristics The design of payment mechanisms is a critical determinant of the effectiveness, efficiency, and fairness of business models for soil health. Evidence from NOVASOIL case studies and stakeholder consultations indicates that payment characteristics influence both farmer participation and the environmental performance of the schemes. Across the business models analysed—public payments for ecosystem services, carbon credit markets, and value chain arrangements—payments can be differentiated along several key dimensions: 1. Payment Type Payments can take the form of direct financial transfers (e.g., subsidies, compensation, price premiums) or in-kind support, such as provision of equipment, inputs, or technical assistance. While direct monetary payments are more common in public PES and carbon markets, value chain models often combine financial incentives with technical advisory services or market access advantages. 2. Basis of Payment Two main approaches prevail: action-based payments, where remuneration is linked to the implementation of prescribed practices, and result-based payments, where funding is conditional on measured environmental outcomes (e.g., verified soil organic carbon increase, biodiversity indices). Hybrid models combining both elements are emerging, particularly in innovative PES schemes and some value chain contracts. 3. Payment Level Determination The level of payment can be calculated using various benchmarks: ● Cost-based approaches, covering the additional costs and income foregone relative to baseline practices (commonly applied in CAP agrienvironment-climate measures). ● Market-based approaches, linking remuneration to the value of ecosystem services in voluntary carbon markets or consumer price premiums in value chain arrangements. ● Performance-based approaches, where payment levels increase proportionally with the degree of improvement achieved (e.g., tonnes of CO₂-equivalent sequestered). 7 This project has received funding from the European Union’s HORIZON-AG - HORIZON Action Grant Budget-Based research and innovation programme under grant agreement GA 101091268 4. Timing and Duration of Payments Public schemes generally provide annual or multi-annual payments aligned with policy cycles (e.g., five-year contracts under AES), whereas carbon market and value chain payments may be more variable, depending on contract design and verification cycles. Duration influences farmer willingness to commit—short-term payments can encourage initial participation but may fail to ensure long-term soil health improvements, while long-term commitments require higher certainty and risk-sharing mechanisms. 5.Risk-sharing and Conditionality Payment structures often include clauses to address risks such as crop failure, climatic events, or reversal of carbon storage. Public schemes may offer flexibility in force majeure cases, while private contracts may embed penalty clauses or insurance mechanisms. Conditionality is central to ensuring environmental integrity, with clear criteria for compliance and verification. 6.Co-financing and Blended Mechanisms: Emerging approaches integrate public–private co-financing, where public funds leverage private contributions, for example, CAP funding combined with company-led premiums for sustainable produce. Such blended finance models can increase the total incentive while diversifying funding sources and reducing dependency on a single payer. Overall, the design of payment characteristics must balance attractiveness to farmers, environmental ambition, and administrative feasibility. Lessons from the NOVASOIL cases show that schemes with transparent payment rules, adequate remuneration levels, and a balance between flexibility and accountability are more likely to achieve both high participation rates and measurable improvements in soil health. 2 This project has received funding from the European Union’s HORIZON-AG - HORIZON Action Grant Budget-Based research and innovation programme under grant agreement GA 101091268 Table 3. Summary of payments Dimension Options / Variants Typical in… Strengths Limits / Risks NOVASOIL design notes Illustrative examples 1) Payment type Cash (subsidy, compensation, premium); In-kind (equipment, inputs, advisory, market access); Mixed Cash: PES & carbon markets; Inkind+cash: value-chain Cash is simple, liquid; In-kind solves capability gaps and lowers upfront costs In-kind can be less flexible; cash alone may not fix knowhow barriers Pair cash with advisory/investment support where adoption risk is high Eco-schemes (cash); valuechain programmes with agronomy support; investment grants for seeders/rollers 2) Basis of payment Action-based (pay for practices); Result-based (pay for outcomes); Hybrid Ecoschemes/AES; Carbon credits; Innovative PES/valuechain Action reduces uncertainty and admin for farmers; Result rewards real impact Action may under-deliver outcomes; pure result adds risk/volatility Favour hybrids: action floor + result top-up; keep MRV proportionate Cover crops (action) + SOC/erosion KPIs (result) 7 This project has received funding from the European Union’s HORIZON-AG - HORIZON Action Grant Budget-Based research and innovation programme under grant agreement GA 101091268 risk and reward, enhance farmer participation, and contribute to the broader policy objectives of the European Green Deal and the Soil Monitoring Law. 5.5 Monitoring & enforcement In NOVASOIL, monitoring and enforcement ensure that beneficiaries carry out the soil measures they are paid for and that any claimed results are verifiable. Monitoring means checking—using methods proportionate to the contract—both that agreed actions (e.g., cover crops, reduced tillage, organic amendments) were implemented and, where relevant, that results linked to payment (e.g., ground cover during risk periods, increases in SOM/SOC, fewer bare-soil days or reduced runoff) are measured against clear protocols. The toolkit combines single-entry digital activity records, targeted field checks, and earth observation (fractional cover/NDVI, sealed-area mapping, landsurface temperature) to keep MRV costs low while maintaining traceability. Enforcement refers to the procedures and measures applied in cases of noncompliance: corrective action plans with deadlines, payment adjustments/withholds, and—under results-based designs—use of buffers to manage reversals. Contracts include force-majeure clauses (e.g., severe drought, late frost or other extreme events) and apply a graduated, proportionate response that prioritises remedy over sanction where environmental risk is low. Audits are batched and scheduled outside peak farm work, and a single-window aggregator prevents duplicate paperwork. Crucially, compliance monitoring for payment is not the same as impact monitoring or scientific evaluation. The former verifies actions and outcomes for contractual purposes; the latter assesses environmental performance at project or landscape scale and may require additional methods. Keeping this distinction clear allows payments to be made quickly and securely, while still generating the learning needed to improve soil-health business models over time. 5.6 Sanctions Sanctions constitute an integral part of contractual arrangements in soil health business models, ensuring compliance with agreed management practices or performance targets. In the NOVASOIL framework, sanctions are designed not merely as punitive measures but as safeguards for environmental integrity and as incentives for adherence to commitments. While the application of sanctions varies according to the business model, they are most commonly linked to payment suspension, contract termination, or non-renewal. 8 This project has received funding from the European Union’s HORIZON-AG - HORIZON Action Grant Budget-Based research and innovation programme under grant agreement GA 101091268 In action-based schemes—such as many public PES contracts—noncompliance with prescribed practices typically leads to proportional reductions or complete suspension of payments. In result-based schemes, particularly within carbon markets, penalties are less common if targets are not met, but payments are withheld until verification confirms that agreed outcomes have been achieved. In value chain arrangements, sanctions may include loss of price premiums, withdrawal of technical support, or exclusion from preferred supplier lists. The types of sanctions identified within NOVASOIL case studies can be summarised as follows: Sanction Type Points of Attention Examples from NOVASOIL Context Reduction or suspension of payments Applied when management requirements are not met; proportional to the severity of noncompliance In public PES, failure to maintain cover crops or adhere to reduced tillage commitments can trigger partial payment reductions; in carbon schemes, lack of monitoring data can delay credit issuance Termination of contract Due to repeated or serious breaches of contract terms In long-term carbon credit contracts, deliberate reversal of stored carbon (e.g., land-use change) may trigger contract termination Non-renewal of contract Based on performance review at the end of contract period In hybrid PES–value chain schemes, failure to achieve agreed soil organic carbon increases can lead to exclusion from subsequent funding cycles Sanctioning of control criteria and indicators Non-compliance with monitoring and reporting obligations In value chain agreements, failure to submit required soil health indicators (e.g., organic matter tests) can result in loss of preferential buyer agreements 9 This project has received funding from the European Union’s HORIZON-AG - HORIZON Action Grant Budget-Based research and innovation programme under grant agreement GA 101091268 5.7 Flexibiity In NOVASOIL’s approach to business models, flexibility is about shaping contracts so they work in real-life farming situations, rather than expecting every farmer to fit into a single, rigid mould. When agreements can be adapted to local conditions or individual circumstances, they tend to be easier to accept and more likely to attract participants. For example, giving farmers the chance to choose which soil health practices suit their land, or allowing them to adjust the timing of activities to fit weather patterns, can make a big difference in uptake. This kind of adaptability is especially important in result-based contracts, where the goal is the outcome, not the exact method used to achieve it. Farmers are free to decide how best to meet agreed targets, which can encourage innovation, reduce unnecessary costs, and fit better with local knowledge and environmental conditions. That said, flexibility is not without its challenges. The more room there is to customise, the more time and effort may be needed for negotiations and monitoring, and the greater the risk that the agreed results will not be met. In the NOVASOIL context, flexibility can touch many parts of an agreement: how long the contract runs, which measures are eligible, whether actions can be modified mid-way, or how much land is covered. For instance, a farmer might start with cover crops and later switch to reduced tillage if weather or market conditions change, as long as the soil health indicators continue to improve. In value chain agreements, flexibility might mean adjusting crop rotations or inputs to meet seasonal demands while keeping long-term commitments intact. The key is to find the right balance. Flexibility should make participation easier and allow for creative, locally adapted solutions, but it also needs to be framed by clear rules and effective monitoring. In this way, adaptable contracts can encourage engagement and innovation while still ensuring that the environmental goals—healthier soils, better biodiversity, and climate resilience—are achieved. 5.8 Information as a part of the role In many NOVASOIL-inspired schemes, the provision of information and advice is more than an add-on, it is a key part of making the whole system work. Guidance, technical support, and knowledge-sharing can help farmers understand not only what is being asked of them, but also why certain practices matter and how they can adapt them to their own land. In this way, information is not separate from the contract; it interacts with and strengthens other features, from payment design to monitoring. 10 This project has received funding from the European Union’s HORIZON-AG - HORIZON Action Grant Budget-Based research and innovation programme under grant agreement GA 101091268 One of the recurring challenges in agri-environmental initiatives is the imbalance of information between those paying for environmental services and those delivering them. Farmers often have a better grasp of the actual costs and local conditions than policymakers or buyers, while those designing the schemes may hold more knowledge on policy frameworks, market demands, or long-term sustainability goals. There is also the issue of spatial targeting—the fact that local soil conditions, climate, and landscape features can affect how effective a given practice will be. Different contract models approach the information challenge in their own way. In result-based schemes, for example, regular measurement of outcomes over time can naturally reduce uncertainty, as both farmers and regulators build up a clearer picture of what works under different conditions. This learning process benefits everyone involved and can lead to more efficient, fairer schemes in the long run. In auction-based models, the process itself can generate valuable information about the true costs farmers face, narrowing the gap between what is offered and what is needed. By integrating information provision and advice into contracts from the outset, NOVASOIL’s approach aims to create a two-way flow of knowledge. Farmers gain access to tailored guidance that helps them succeed, while those funding or regulating the scheme gain clearer, more accurate insights into the realities of soil management on the ground. This shared understanding not only improves trust but also increases the chances of meeting both economic and environmental objectives. Information as part of the scheme/role Benefits Disadvan tages Points of attention Case study examples Information provided directly by public authorities Ensures official, standardised information; enhances trust and compliance Can be rigid and not tailored to local contexts Needs to be regularly updated and accessible to all stakeholders E.g., In ES1, the regional authority provides farmers with official guidelines on soil management practices 11 This project has received funding from the European Union’s HORIZON-AG - HORIZON Action Grant Budget-Based research and innovation programme under grant agreement GA 101091268 linked to ecoschemes Information integrated by private actors (e.g., cooperatives, advisory services) Practical and closer to daily farm management; often faster in dissemination May prioritise commerci al interests over neutrality Transparency about funding sources and objectives is essential E.g., In IT2, cooperative extension services provide information on fertilisation and soil cover management Information through NGOs / civil society organisations Builds awareness and ownership among stakeholders; often includes education and outreach Reliance on external funding; continuity may be uncertain Should be linked to capacitybuilding to ensure longterm sustainability E.g., In LV1, the NGO-led scheme provides biodiversityrelated information and awareness programmes Information via digital tools and platforms Easy access, wide reach, enables monitoring and updates in real time Digital divide may exclude less techsavvy farmers; risk of data overload Requires training and simple interfaces for users E.g., In ZSA DIH case, digital maps provide information on ecoschemes and soil-friendly practices 12 This project has received funding from the European Union’s HORIZON-AG - HORIZON Action Grant Budget-Based research and innovation programme under grant agreement GA 101091268 Peer-to-peer information sharing (farmer networks) Builds trust, locally relevant, encourages adoption through demonstratio n Quality and accuracy of informati on may vary; depende nt on farmer leaders Needs facilitation to avoid misinformati on and ensure broad participation E.g., In ASAJASE case, farmers exchange practical information on cover crops and pruning residue management Incentivised information provision (linked to payments) Ensures that information is delivered alongside contractual obligations; increases uptake Can create depende ncy if tied only to financial incentives Information should remain relevant beyond the contract period E.g., In UNIPI case, information on soil health indicators is linked to PES schemes 5.9 Eligibility/Conditions for participation In NOVASOIL, contractual arrangements for soil health business models also include specific conditions for participation, which vary depending on the type of scheme and governance level. For instance, agri-environment-climate measures (AECM) are usually targeted directly at farmers, while value chain contracts may introduce eligibility rules linked to geographical or quality labels (e.g., Designations of Origin such as Rueda vineyards in Spain). Collective arrangements, such as those implemented through farmer organisations or cooperatives, can additionally require agreements on common practices and contiguity between participating farms to ensure consistency in implementation. These conditions play a key role in balancing inclusiveness, accountability, and environmental ambition across the NOVASOIL case studies. 13 This project has received funding from the European Union’s HORIZON-AG - HORIZON Action Grant Budget-Based research and innovation programme under grant agreement GA 101091268 Eligibility/ conditions for participati on Benefits Disadvant ages Points of attention Case study examples No special conditions Open participation maximises inclusiveness and uptake. May dilute environme ntal effectivene ss if too broad. Even when “no conditions” are declared, basic compliance with CAP or local rules applies. E.g., Tamarguillo PES (ES) open to land managers without strict entry barriers in a future CAP or other policy’ reform. Limitations linked to brand use or labelling Adds market value by protecting product reputation. Noncomplianc e leads to loss of brand use. Product category must meet agreed standards. E.g., Rueda vineyards (ES): collective brand requires compliance with IP certification. Consensus among farmers/sta keholders Builds legitimacy and collective ownership. Timeconsuming ; requires facilitation. Needs transparent decisionmaking to avoid conflicts. E.g., ASAJA olive groves (ES): measures agreed within cooperatives. Agreemen t on environme ntal targets and action plans Clarifies expectations; aligns incentives with measurable goals. Payments tied to targets increase risk for farmers. Targets should be realistic and co-designed with farmers. E.g., CiRAA LTEs (IT): farmers submit farm-level action plans before contracting. Geographi c/ecologica l eligibility Focuses resources on priority areas; Excludes farmers outside zones. Needs clear justification to ensure fairness. E.g., Delta sandy soils (IT): limited to sandy and coastal 14 This project has received funding from the European Union’s HORIZON-AG - HORIZON Action Grant Budget-Based research and innovation programme under grant agreement GA 101091268 maximises impact. areas; Rueda DO vineyards (ES). Minimum farm or parcel requireme nts Ensures scale and relevance. May exclude smallholde rs. Consider flexibility for diverse farm sizes. E.g., CO₂-Land (DE): contracts cover whole farm area. A fixed duration of participati on Provides stability and predictability for outcomes. Long commitme nts may deter participatio n. Balance between long-term ambition and flexibility. E.g., CO₂-Land (DE): 10-year contracts to ensure permanence of SOC gains. Minimum number of farmers required Encourages collective action and scale. Interdepen dence may create risks if one farmer fails. Define clear entry/exit rules for members. E.g., Olive cooperatives (ES): schemes require collective engagement to qualify. Organic certificatio n of enrolled farms Guarantees high-quality practices and market recognition. Farmers must cover costs of certificatio n. Works mainly for value-chain models where premiums exist. E.g., Organic vineyards in Rueda (ES) and CiRAA organic systems (IT). 5.10. Prioritised Soil Parameters for Monitoring The effectiveness and credibility of soil-health business models depend on a robust yet proportionate monitoring framework. While the choice of parameters should reflect local context and case-specific objectives, a core set of soil indicators has emerged from NOVASOIL’s evidence base as both feasible to measure and meaningful for decision-making. In this section, the final set of soil indicators adopted within the NOVASOIL framework will be detailed. It is not necessary for every case study to monitor the full range of 15 This project has received funding from the European Union’s HORIZON-AG - HORIZON Action Grant Budget-Based research and innovation programme under grant agreement GA 101091268 parameters; rather, the selection should focus on those most relevant to the type of business model being implemented, the specific characteristics of the case study, and its environmental and agronomic background. This flexible approach ensures that monitoring remains proportionate, context-sensitive, and aligned with both the scientific objectives of the project and the practical needs of stakeholders. In the project, soil indicators are primarily organised into three groups: physical, chemical, and biological parameters. This classification helps to capture the different dimensions of soil health in a structured and comparable way, while allowing flexibility for case-specific adaptation. • Physical parameters describe the soil’s structure and capacity to perform essential functions such as water infiltration, retention, aeration, and resistance to erosion. Typical indicators include bulk density, aggregate stability, infiltration rate, texture and the proportion of ground cover. These metrics are especially relevant in contexts where erosion risk, compaction or trafficability directly affect both soil resilience and farm operations. • Chemical parameters provide information on soil fertility, nutrient cycling and the presence of potential constraints or risks. Core indicators include soil organic carbon (SOC) as a central measure of fertility and climate relevance, pH as a determinant of nutrient availability, and macronutrients such as nitrogen, phosphorus and potassium. In some cases, salinity (electrical conductivity) or contaminants (heavy metals, hydrocarbons) are also prioritised, particularly in coastal, irrigated or urban soils. • Biological parameters reflect the living dimension of soil, capturing the activity and diversity of organisms that drive decomposition, nutrient cycling and resilience to stress. These can include microbial biomass, enzymatic activity, soil respiration, and biodiversity proxies (such as earthworm counts or arthropod diversity). While often more complex to measure, these indicators provide unique insights into the long-term regenerative capacity of soils and are increasingly relevant where ecosystem services are part of the business model. By combining these three groups, NOVASOIL ensures that soil health is understood holistically. Cases can select the subset of indicators most aligned with their objectives. 2 This project has received funding from the European Union’s HORIZON-AG - HORIZON Action Grant Budget-Based research and innovation programme under grant agreement GA 101091268 Table 3.. Main soil parameters to measure soil health Indicator Explanation Methodology for measurement pH Measure of soil acidity or alkalinity, affecting nutrient availability and microbial activity. Measured in a soil–water suspension (1:2.5) or in KCl solution using a calibrated pH meter. Electrical Conductivity (EC, µS/cm) Indicates soluble salt content; high values signal salinity stress. Soil–water extract (1:5) measured with an EC meter. Cation Exchange Capacity (CEC, meq/100 g) Ability of soil to retain and exchange cations, reflecting fertility potential. Ammonium acetate extraction (pH 7) Organic matter (%) Overall organic fraction in soil, key for fertility, structure, and water retention. Loss-on-ignition method (combustion at 360–550 °C) or Walkley–Black wet oxidation. Soil Organic Carbon (SOC, %) Carbon content of organic matter; central indicator for fertility and climate mitigation. Dry combustion (Elemental analyser) or Walkley– Black oxidation. Clay (%) Fine soil fraction (<0.002 mm) influencing water retention, nutrient binding, and aggregation. Particle-size analysis (Boyeucos method) Silt (%) Intermediate soil fraction (0.002–0.05 mm) affecting structure and erodibility. Same as above (texture analysis). Sand (%) Coarse soil fraction (0.05–2 mm) influencing drainage, aeration, and stability. Same as above (texture analysis). 7 This project has received funding from the European Union’s HORIZON-AG - HORIZON Action Grant Budget-Based research and innovation programme under grant agreement GA 101091268 6.3 Result-based 8 This project has received funding from the European Union’s HORIZON-AG - HORIZON Action Grant Budget-Based research and innovation programme under grant agreement GA 101091268 6.4 Value-chain 7. Discussion, Conclusions and the next Steps The NOVASOIL project has demonstrated that soil health business models can provide a credible and operational pathway to integrate ecological objectives with economic incentives and governance innovations. Across the case studies, the evidence shows that different contractual solutions—ranging from agri-environment-climate measures (AECMs) to value-chain arrangements and Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES), each offer distinct advantages but also face structural limitations. Key lessons emerge from the analysis of conditions for participation: while open eligibility maximises inclusiveness, more restrictive entry rules (e.g., geographical zones, organic certification, collective action requirements) can secure higher environmental integrity but at the cost of participation rates. Striking the balance between flexibility advice provision has proven essential: schemes with embedded technical assistance and training tend to show higher uptake, stronger farmer engagement, and better long-term sustainability. Regarding payment design, NOVASOIL’s review confirms that action-based contracts provide predictability, but risk delivering lower ecological outcomes. 9 This project has received funding from the European Union’s HORIZON-AG - HORIZON Action Grant Budget-Based research and innovation programme under grant agreement GA 101091268 Result-based schemes increase credibility and measurable impact but face challenges of monitoring costs, farmer risk exposure, and variability in outcomes. Hybrid approaches appear particularly promising, especially when supported by transparent MRV frameworks and co-financing arrangements that spread risk across public and private actors. Importantly, the timing, duration, and risk-sharing clauses embedded in payment mechanisms strongly influence both farmer willingness to participate and the long-term impact on soil health. The design guides and decision trees developed within NOVASOIL provide a practical toolkit for policymakers, advisors, and stakeholders. By systematising the choice of contract solutions and payment mechanisms, they enable more consistent and transparent decision-making, bridging scientific evidence with operational needs. These tools also underline the importance of aligning schemes with local governance structures, available technical capacity, and market opportunities, thus ensuring context-specific but scalable solutions. Overall, NOVASOIL highlights that: ● Business models for soil health are feasible and effective when they integrate ecological, economic, social, and legal dimensions. ● Participation conditions matter: inclusiveness must be balanced with environmental ambition, ensuring that entry rules do not exclude smallholders while maintaining robust standards. ● Payment mechanisms shape outcomes: transparent, fair, and wellstructured incentives are key determinants of farmer adoption and ecological success. ● Knowledge and advisory support are critical enablers: without accessible information and training, even well-designed schemes risk underperformance. ● Collective and blended approaches hold strong potential: pooling resources and responsibilities across farmers, public authorities, and private actors increases resilience, credibility, and impact. 10 This project has received funding from the European Union’s HORIZON-AG - HORIZON Action Grant Budget-Based research and innovation programme under grant agreement GA 101091268 7 Acknowledgment The authors would like to thank the EU for funding, in the frame of the European Union’s Horizon Europe research and innovation programme under Grant Agreement GA 101091268. 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