The phenomenon of the regime in the legal system: an interdisciplinary approach

European Science Law THE PHENOMENON OF THE REGIME IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH Inna Shapovalova Assistant Professor, Senior Research Fellow, Candidate of Legal Sciences, of Department of State and Legal Disciplines,Odesa State University of Internal Affairs, Odesa, Ukraine ORCID ID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5607-2837 Abstract. The article examines the legal regime as a complex, multifaceted legal construct that permeates the entire legal system, not only the sphere of public administration. An expanded interpretation of the phenomenon of the legal regime is proposed, taking into account philosophical phenomenology and its integrative role in the structure of law as a holistic social phenomenon. It is proposed to analyze the legal regime in a broader inter-branch dimension, based on the conceptual unity of law as a universal means of social regulation. Keywords: legal regime, phenomenon, phenomenology, philosophy of law, legal doctrine, legal system. Introduction Based on the ontological nature of law, the legal regime can be analyzed as a phenomenon that has a complex structure and performs an integrating function within the entire legal system. For this, the tools of phenomenology (E. Husserl), hermeneutics (H.-G. Gadamer), transcendental philosophy (I. Kant), structuralism (M. Foucault), and philosophical legal consciousness (V. K. Kolpakov) are used. The concept of phenomenon originates in ancient Greek philosophy (from the Greek phainomenon  "that which appears"), where Plato already distinguished between appearances and essences. In modern times, I. Kant introduced the fundamental distinction between phenomena and noumena. For Kant, the phenomenon is the form through which the subject of knowledge comprehends the world, while the noumenon is the thing-initself, inaccessible to direct experience [1]. E. Husserl, the founder of phenomenology as a philosophical method, developed the concept of intentionality  the directedness of consciousness toward an object. From this point of view, law is not only an external system of rules but also an internal structure of consciousness, experienced as an objective normative order [2]. The phenomenological approach allows us to consider the legal regime not as a purely positivist category but as a special form of manifestation of law in social reality. It exists not only as a set of norms but as a structure that organizes legal reality and ensures its predictability, legitimacy, and systematization. In law, the legal regime is traditionally perceived as a European Science Law regulatory order expressed in a specific combination of permissions, prohibitions, and positive obligations. State of research on the issue. Modern legal science increasingly uses the concept of “phenomenon” to analyze legal phenomena. “In the history of philosophy, the notion of ‘phenomenon’ is interpreted depending on the interpretation of human experience: a) as a manifestation and expression of essence or idea; b) as knowable reality  the world of phenomena that is ordered by scientific methods and a priori schemes of the transcendental subject; c) as subjective experiences, combinations of sensations, psychic associations, to which experience and all reality are reduced” [3, p. 228]. Teachings about phenomena can be found in ancient Greek philosophy, as well as in the works of Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, Brentano, Stumpf, Hartmann, Itard, Locke, Berkeley, Hume. However, the most developed concept of phenomenology was presented by the German philosopher Edmund Husserl. Thanks to this philosopher, phenomenology became one of the leading trends in 20th-century philosophy and had a significant impact on its further development. Husserl’s concept of consciousness and the world is built on the basis of the notion of intentionality  the directedness of consciousness toward an object. According to his concept, the phenomenon is identified with the appearance, essence, and very being of the object [2, p. 336]. Presentation of the main material. A phenomenon in law is understood not only as an external form of being that is accessible to experience, but also as a manifestation of deep essence, which is revealed in legal life. Almost everything created by humanity and present in the individual’s consciousness is a phenomenon. All legal phenomena are phenomena because they have an anthropogenic nature. The phenomenological concept becomes especially prominent when describing such a legal phenomenon as the legal regime. A distinctive methodological feature here is that the key element in both the philosophical and legal construction is the object around which the corresponding structure is built. Among legal phenomena, we can distinguish: the legal system, branches of law, legal institutions, legal dogmas, legal principles, legal relations, legal norms, and other categories of legal science. Recently, legal science increasingly uses complex legal constructions, associated with the development of legal thought. One of these constructions is the legal regime, the phenomenon of which we are examining. The legal regime is a multilayered legal phenomenon. It encompasses various layers of legal matter, which significantly complicates its analysis. Most research on special legal regimes is conducted by administrative law scholars. Even etymologically, the term "regime" comes from the French régime  order (to organize), and Latin regimen  governance. In explanatory dictionaries, "regime" has three main meanings: European Science Law 1. A system of rules, measures, methods for achieving a certain goal; 2. An established order of life activity; 3. Conditions of activity [4, p. 586]. All three meanings are reflected in the understanding of the legal regime. The condition, in this case, is the respective object. The system of rules  is the system of relevant legal norms, and the order  is the process of implementing these norms (or the totality of procedural and procedurallegal forms). The legal regime is undoubtedly a legal form. But it is an external legal form. The difference between external and internal legal forms is that the internal one is the connection between the elements of law itself, while the external one is the connection between law and non-legal phenomena requiring legal regulation. The basis of the legal regime is the corresponding social regime that exists in society. Based on the reflections of many scholars, we can conclude that the legal regime and legal status are paired legal categories. In the first case, all legal phenomena are associated with the object of legal relations; in the second — with its subjects. The regime establishes the boundaries of permissible behavior of specific subjects, thereby forming their legal status. A regime arises only in zones of so-called intensive legal regulation when the legislator pays particular attention to a specific object of legal relations. Ideally, one can imagine a legal regime for each object of legal relations. Moreover, if we consider the totality of all legal regimes as well as legal statuses, we can conclude that these two sets, from different perspectives, but each separately, constitute law in its objective understanding. In legal theory, such fundamental categories as law, justice, legal consciousness, and legal principles are considered phenomena. In this context, the legal regime is a special phenomenon that embodies the interaction of normative matter with real social relations. It functions as a mechanism for determining the goals, means, and limits of law’s influence on a specific object of regulation. The legal regime is defined as a regulatory order based on a system of norms aimed at organizing relations in a specific area or concerning a specific object. It is expressed through the interaction of permissions, prohibitions, positive obligations, and other legal means. At the same time, the legal regime is not only a technical combination of norms but a holistic construct that has its own logic, purpose, and axiological basis. The phenomenon of the legal regime is characterized by emergence  the property of a holistic system to have characteristics that cannot be reduced to the sum of its parts. As Aristotle noted, "the whole is more than the sum of its parts". In a legal context, this means that the legal regime, which consists of normative provisions, procedures, institutions, and objects of regulation, forms a new quality of legal order that cannot be reduced to any of its elements separately. It serves as a kind of ontological matrix that structures the legal being of society. The absence of a regime-based approach complicates the European Science Law implementation of norms, their systematization, and adaptation to social challenges. On the contrary, the formation of a legal regime ensures the integrity of legal influence and consideration of the object’s specifics. The legal regime implements not only a formalized regulation function but also performs an axiological function  it is a bearer of values that determine the nature of legal influence. Values of justice, security, equality, and freedom are realized precisely through the mechanisms of regime-based organization of norms. At the same time, it is a teleological construct aimed at achieving a specific goal: maintaining public order, ensuring rights and freedoms, stabilizing legal relations. For example, the legal regime of a state of emergency aims to overcome threats to national security; therefore, its norms have a different degree of rigidity compared to the basic constitutional regime. A regime is not only a legal category but also a form of legal thinking that allows conceptualizing the objects of legal relations depending on their importance, risk, and social value. According to S. Kuznichenko, it is the correlation of permissions and prohibitions in a regime that creates a special vector of legal influence [5, p. 45–60]. This paradigm is relevant in all branches of law. For example, in civil law, there is a general-permissive regime: “everything is permitted unless prohibited.” In criminal law — a general-prohibitive regime: “everything is prohibited unless permitted.” However, modern legal systems require much more complex regime constructions that combine permissive and restrictive elements, introduce special duties, and specific prescriptions (presumptions, fictions, definitions). H.-G. Gadamer’s hermeneutics emphasizes that understanding is not the reproduction of meaning but its co-creation. Thus, the legal regime appears as a text that is constantly interpreted: by the legislator, practitioner, judge, scholar. In each social context, the same regime acquires new shades of meaning. This hermeneutical dimension of the legal regime indicates its adaptability and contextuality [6]. Traditionally, the legal regime has been studied within administrative law. However, as research shows (V. K. Kolpakov, S. V. Kivalov), its application is much broader. In civil law  the regime of personal property, the regime of spousal property; in labor law  the regime of working time; in financial law  the regime of budget financing; in international law  the regime of neutrality [7, 8]. The ideas of the modern legal doctrine about the inter-branch nature of special legal regimes remain relevant. In fact, there is no legal regime that can be attributed with 100% certainty to a single branch of law. This means that the legal regime has an intersectoral character and represents a junction area between branches of law. The modern typology of legal regimes includes the following categories: •Primary regimes (general-permissive, general-prohibitive); •Branch regimes (administrative-legal, criminal-legal, civil-legal); European Science Law •Special regimes (martial law regime, quarantine regime, secrecy regime); • Institutional regimes (regime of public service, regime of business entities); • Object regimes (regime of strategic objects, restricted-access information, etc.). They can be permanent or temporary, normative or contractual, public or private in their dominant function. The key classification criterion is the object of regulation and the dominant function: protective, ensuring, restrictive, or stimulating. Conclusions Thus, the legal regime is a complex phenomenological construct that structurally and semantically organizes legal reality. It performs the functions of systematization, institutionalization, and axiological realization of law. Its analysis requires the integration of philosophical approaches — from phenomenology and hermeneutics to teleological and axiological perspectives. The regime-based approach allows for the renewal of the foundations of legal systematization and ensures its adaptation to a dynamic social reality. Further research should focus on developing tools for regime typologization and synthesizing branch and inter-branch legal regimes. That is, the legal regime appears as an ontological form of the being of law in society — structured, meaningful, legitimized, and open to interpretation. References 1. Kant, I. Krytyka chystoho rozumu / I. Kant; per. z nim. T. Vasylenko. K. : Yunivers, 2001. 592 s. 2. Husserl, E. Kartézianski rozdumy: Vvedennia v fenomenolohiiu / E. Husserl. Odesa : Helvetyka, 2024. 350 s. 3. Filosofskyi entsyklopedychnyi slovnyk / Za red. I. V. Babii a . K. : Akademiia, 2002. 716 s. 4. Slovnyk ukrainskoi movy v 20 tomakh. K. : Nauk. dumka, 2010–2015. 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