Terra Incognita: The public mood in Crimea

ZOiS REPORT TERRA INCOGNITA – THE PUBLIC MOOD IN CRIMEA No.3 · November 2017 Gwendolyn Sasse ZOiS Report 3/2017 Terra Incognita: The Public Mood in Crimea 2 Executive Summary Since the incorporation of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol as subjects of the Russian Federation in March 2014 Crimea has, by and large, become terra incognita. The ZOiS survey conducted in Crimea (March-May 2017) provides a rare glimpse into the public mood in the region after its annexation by Russia. The main findings are: – The Crimean population has been effectively cut off from Ukraine in terms of personal travel (only 12 percent travelled to other parts of Ukraine since 2014) and accessing the mass media. Contact with relatives in other parts of Ukraine has decreased significantly. – The Crimean population is inwardly-oriented: over the last three years only 22 percent have travelled to Russia and three percent to other countries. – There is a significant population exodus from the region. Twenty-one percent of the respondents have family members / friends who left Crimea since 2014, and 10 percent are contemplating leaving Crimea. Moscow and other parts of Russia are by far the most preferred migration destinations. – Living in an EU country or the prospect of Ukraine joining the EU one day holds little attraction for Crimeans. – The developments since 2014 have further strengthened regional identity, captured by the term krymchanin (Crimean), compared to other categories, such as ‘Russian’. – About half of the respondents admit to having been taken by surprise by the Russian actions in 2014. – The Crimean population, including the Crimean Tatars, agree that Ukrainian governments neglected the region over many years, with roughly a third of the respondents pointing to this as the main cause of the developments of 2014. Content 02 ___ Executive Summary 03 ___ Introduction 04 ___ Limited external linkages 08 ___ Citizenship and identity 13 ___ Everyday life in Crimea 15 ___ Interethnic relations 16 ___ Assessment of the developments since 2014 20 ___ Conclusion 21 ___ Imprint Terra Incognita: The Public Mood in Crimea ZOiS Report 3/2017 3 Introduction1 Since the Russian intervention in Crimea in March 2014 access to the peninsula has been restricted. Foreign journalists travelling to Crimea via Russia, the only possible entry point, risk not being allowed into Ukraine afterwards. Anecdotal evidence by Ukrainians visiting relatives in Crimea via the highly securitized land route, and reports by Ukrainian sociologists, Crimean Tatar and human rights organizations and individual Crimean Tatars, suggest that the region is de facto cut off from Ukraine, and that there is continued general public support for Russia despite harder living conditions and a repressive regime (for the Crimean Tatars in particular). The annexation of Crimea gave rise to the first Western sanctions on Russia. The issue of Crimea has been sidelined both by the war in the Donbas region and an ambivalent mindset in the West that condemns the annexation as a breach of international law but simultaneously upholds the narrative that Crimea historically belongs to Russia. The latter represents a simplified reading of the region’s history that glosses over the fact that the peninsula was under Crimean Tatar rule for centuries before Catherine the Great annexed it in 1783, that the Crimean Tatars were deported under Stalin at the end of World War II, and that in the period from 1954 – 1991 Crimea was part of the Ukrainian SSR. There is an undercurrent in the public discourse in Germany and the West more generally that interprets the annexation in 2014 as a question of self-determination. There is a notion that the Russian intervention was a response to a popular mobilization in Crimea in favour of joining Russia. However, in 2014 there was no popular mobilization in Crimea, the region was integrated into the Ukrainian state and formed part of the support base for the political regime of then Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych whose electoral support base was the south-east of the country. 1 The research support by Alice Lackner is gratefully acknowledged, in particular with regard to the visualization of the data. – The vast majority of the Crimean population would vote for the status quo in a future repeat referendum on Crimea’s status and express trust in Russian state institutions. – The Crimean Tatars remain much more sceptical of the current regime. – The majority of the respondents record an increase in price levels in Crimea as one of the everyday life consequences of the incorporation of Crimea into the Russian Federation. – The Crimean population exhibits high levels of distrust in the regional and local political institutions. ZOiS Report 3/2017 Terra Incognita: The Public Mood in Crimea 4 Crimea had seen a serious period of separatist mobilization in the mid1990s after the collapse of the USSR. This movement, however, was not actively endorsed by the Russian regime under President Boris Yeltsin, as he prioritized good relations with Ukraine and the West. Yeltsin was averse to unpicking the territorial settlement that he himself had helped to engineer following the collapse of the USSR. This period of separatist tension resulted in a constitutionally guaranteed autonomy status for Crimea, though its competences were weak and vaguely defined. From 1998 onwards there was no further significant separatist mobilization in Crimea. ZOiS conducted a survey in Crimea and Sevastopol between 26 March and 3 May 2017.2 The survey was conducted through individual face-to-face interviews. It is based on a representative sample of 1,800 urban and rural Crimean residents aged 18 and older. A booster sample of 200 Crimean Tatars was added to ensure that a sufficient number of Crimean Tatars were included in the sample. Limited external linkages The survey reveals that there has been a comprehensive re-orientation of the social and political linkages of the Crimean population since 2014. The annexation by Russia effectively cut the link to the rest of Ukraine. Ninetythree percent of the survey respondents acknowledged that travelling to other parts of Ukraine has become more difficult. FIGURE 1 This has a direct bearing on family networks: 44 percent of the respondents stated that they have less contact now with family members based in other parts of Ukraine. The question asked for general contact rather than actual visits, so it captures a bigger impact on the personal connections than mere physical travel restrictions. By comparison, 41 percent said that they maintain the same frequency of contact than before 2014. Only 7 percent of the respondents indicated that they have no relatives in other parts of Ukraine. FIGURE 2 This figure underlines how big the impact has been on the many family connections between Crimea and the rest of Ukraine. A vast majority of 88 percent said that they had not visited other regions or cities in Ukraine during the last three years.3 FIGURE 3 The respondents describe a new post2014 reality of broken ties, but they do not feel comfortable with the current situation. A clear majority of 70 percent ‘fully agrees’ and a further 19 percent ‘rather agree’ with the statement that the current border between Crimea and Kherson, the region bordering the peninsula to the north, should be open and easy to cross in both directions. FIGURE 4 The questions about travelling to Russia show an only somewhat more mobile Crimean population. While 58 percent said that travelling to other parts 2 The minimal response rate (AAPOR standards) for the whole of Crimea was 48 percent. The lowest response rate was encountered among the Crimean Tatars. 3 This question was answered by almost all the respondents in the survey, thereby indicating that the question about contacts to family members elsewhere in Ukraine was deemed more sensitive. This does not invalidate the results above but rather gives the answers more emphasis, as opting out of the question seems to have been an easier option in the interview situation. Terra Incognita: The Public Mood in Crimea ZOiS Report 3/2017 5 Grafik3:HaveyouvisitedanyregionsorcitiesinUkraineoverthepastthreeyears? Yes 12,1% n=1915 No 87,9% 12,1% 87,9% Yes No FIGURE 1 Trips to other parts of Ukraine have become... FIGURE 3 Have you visited any regions or cities in Ukraine over the past three years? FIGURE 4 ‘Crimeans and residents of Ukraine should be able to cross the border Crimea-Kherson region easily in both directions.’ Grafik1:TripstootherpartsofUkrainehavebecome moredifficult 93,2% n=222 nothinghaschanged 6,8% 93,2% 6,8% more difficult nothing has changed Grafik4:"CrimeansandresidentsofUkraineshouldbeabletocrosseasilytheborderCrimea-Khersonregioninbothdirections." Fullyagree 70,2% Ratheragree 19,4% Ratherdisagree 6,1% n=1890 Fullydisagree 4,3% 70,2% 19,4% 6,1% 4,3% Fully agree Rather agree Rather disagree Fully disagree Quelle: Zentrum für Osteuropaund internationale StudienQuelle: Zentrum für Osteuropaund internationale Studien Quelle: Zentrum für Osteuropaund internationale Studien Yes No Fully agree Rather agree Rather disagree Fully disagree n=222 FIGURE 2 How often are you in touch with your relatives in Ukraine? Grafik2:HowoftenareyouintouchwithyourrelativesinUkraine? Asoftenasbefore2014 40,8% n=667 Lessoften thanbefore 2014 44,2% Moreoften thanbefore 2014 7,6% Idon'thave relativesin Ukraine including DNR/LNR 7,3% 40,8% 44,2% 7,6% 7,3% As often as before 2014 Less often than before 2014 More often than before 2014 I don't have relatives in Ukraine including DNR/LNR Quelle: Zentrum für Osteuropaund internationale Studien n=667 n=1915 n=1890 ZOiS Report 3/2017 Terra Incognita: The Public Mood in Crimea 6 Figure11:IfyouarethinkingaboutleavingCrimea,wherewouldyouprefertogo? Moscow 23,9% ElswhereinRussia 38,9% n=180 Kiev 5,6% ElswhereinUkraine 12,2% EUcountry 7,8% USA 6,1% Elswhere 5,6% 23,9% 38,9% 5,6% 12,2% 7,8% 6,1% 5,6% Moscow Elswhere in Russia Kiev Elswhere in Ukraine EU country USA Elswhere Grafik5:"TripstootherpartsofRussiahavebecome…" Easier 58,1% n=377 Nothinghaschanged 26,0% Moredifficult 15,9% 58,1% 26,0% 15,9% Easier Nothing has changed More difficult Grafik6:HaveyouvisitedanyregionsorcitiesinRussiaoverthepastthreeyears? Yes 22,1% n=1962 No 77,9% 22,1% 77,9% Yes No Figure7:Inthepast1-3years,haveyoulivedorworked6monthsorlongerin... Yes No …theUS/Canada (n=1888) 0,3% 99,7% …anEUcountry (n=1889) 0,5% 99,5% …otherFSUcountries (n=1894) 1,0% 99,0% …Ukraineincluding DNR/LNR(n=1896) 3,3% 96,7% …elswhereinRussia (n=1912) 5,9% 94,1% 0,3% 0,5% 1,0% 3,3% 5,9% 99,7% 99,5% 99,0% 96,7% 94,1% … the US/Canada (n=1888) … an EU country (n=1889) … other FSU countries (n=1894) … Ukraine including DNR/LNR (n=1896) … elswhere in Russia (n=1912) No Yes Figure8:Haveanyofyourfamilymembers/friendshaveleftCrimeainthelastthreeyears? Yes 21,2% No 78,8% n=2018 21,2% 78,8% Yes No Figure9:Howoftendoyoureceivemoneyfromfamilymembers,relativesorfriendswholive... Often/Regularly Fromtimetotime Never …elswhereinRussia? 5,6% 10,9% 83,5% …inUkraineincl.DNR/LNR? 2,4% 6,4% 91,2% …inotherpartsofFSU? 0,3% 2,4% 97,3% …inanEUcountry? 0,5% 2,5% 97,0% …intheUS/Canada? 0,3% 1,9% 97,8% 5,6% 2,4% 0,3% 0,5% 0,3% 10,9% 6,4% 2,4% 2,5% 1,9% 83,5% 91,2% 97,3% 97,0% 97,8% …elswhere in Russia? … in Ukraine incl. DNR/LNR? …in other parts of FSU? … in an EU country? … in the US/Canada? Often/Regularly From time to time Never FIGURE 5 ‘Trips to other parts of Russia have become…’ FIGURE 7 In the past 1–3 years, have you lived or worked 6 months or longer in... FIGURE 9 How often do you receive money from family members, relatives or friends who live... FIGURE 6 Have you visited any regions or cities in Russia over the past three years? FIGURE 8 Have any of your family members / friends left Crimea in the last three years? FIGURE 10 If you are thinking about leaving Crimea, where would you prefer to go? Quelle: Zentrum für Osteuropaund internationale Studien Quelle: Zentrum für Osteuropaund internationale Studien Quelle: Zentrum für Osteuropaund internationale Studien Quelle: Zentrum für Osteuropaund internationale Studien Quelle: Zentrum für Osteuropaund internationale Studien Quelle: Zentrum für Osteuropaund internationale Studien Yes No No Yes Often / Regularly From time to time Never n=180 n=2018 n=1962 n=1109 n=1058 n=985 n=964 n=946 n=377 n=1962 Terra Incognita: The Public Mood in Crimea ZOiS Report 3/2017 7 of Russia has become easier,4 only 22 percent of the respondents said that they have actually travelled to other parts of Russia since 2014. FIGURE 5+6 Only three percent have travelled to places beyond Ukraine and Russia. This inward-looking orientation of the population effectively insulates the region from external influences that could destabilize the current political situation. However, the question is whether over a longer period of time parts of the population, in particular the younger generation, will feel too restricted and demand change, or exit the region in greater numbers. Migration is also only a weak external linkage. Three percent of the respondents reported that they have lived for six months or longer in other parts of Ukraine, and six percent in Russia. Migration to both other parts of the Former Soviet Union and Western countries has been very limited. FIGURE 7 This is in part also explained by the fact that it is difficult for Crimeans to obtain visas to go to European countries. Twenty-one percent of the survey respondents indicated that relatives or friends of theirs have left Crimea since 2014. FIGURE 8 Estimates put the total number at 40,000 to 60,000 (https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedomworld/2016/crimea), of which at least half are Crimean Tatars. Exit reduces the potential for political opposition but it also creates a set of new transnational or -regional linkages. Their mediumto long-term impact might be more varied. Economic remittances sent through these networks can sustain the status quo by providing households with a financial buffer, but as they are accompanied by an exchange of experiences they can also prolong resistance and reshape expectations vis-à-vis the political regime in the region. The current flow of economic remittances to Crimean households is limited and mostly centred on Russia: 17 percent said they regularly or occasionally receive remittances from Russia, eleven percent receive remittances regularly or occasionally from other parts of Ukraine, and the flow from other post-Soviet states and Western countries is negligible. FIGURE 9 This also underpins that Russia is the key migration destination for Crimeans (with the exception of the Crimean Tatars). According to the survey data, about ten percent of the respondents said that they are currently contemplating leaving Crimea. FIGURE 11 They are concentrated in the younger age categories: 37 percent of those thinking about emigrating are between 18 and 29 years old, and 22 percent are between 30 and 42 years old. For those considering migration, Russia is by far the most desirable destination (about 63 percent of those thinking about leaving would go to Russia, about 18 percent to Ukraine and only just below 8 percent to an EU country and 6 percent to the US). FIGURE 10 If the question is asked more generally – ‘Would you like to live in a country belonging to the EU?’ – only 12 percent of the survey respondents answer positively. Limited actual contact with life in the EU, the EU’s sanction regime against Russia, and EU support for Ukraine are the obvious explanations for this low level of attractiveness. If the data is broken down by ethnicity, Crimean Tatars are significantly more interested in living in an EU member state 4 This wording of the survey questions relating to the relationship between Crimea and the RussianFederationdoesnotreflectanendorsementoftheannexationofCrimeabutis borne out of ethical considerations. The interviewers and respondents cannot be put in a potentially adversarial relationship through the formulation of the survey questions. Figure10:AreyoucurrentlythinkingaboutleavingCrimea? Yes 10,2% n=1932 No 89,8% 10,2% 89,8% Yes No FIGURE 11 Are you currently thinking about leaving Crimea? Quelle: Zentrum für Osteuropaund internationale Studien Yes No n=1932 ZOiS Report 3/2017 Terra Incognita: The Public Mood in Crimea 8 – 32 percent answered ‘yes’. FIGURE 12 This result reflects the more precarious position of the Crimean Tatars in Crimea. Citizenship and identity Already prior to the annexation of Crimea by Russia there had been ample speculation about Russia issuing passports to citizens of neighbouring states. Crimea was considered one of the prime target areas for this policy. According to the ZOiS survey, only 12 percent of Crimeans held a Russian passport six years ago. Asked about their citizenship today, the vast majority of 80 percent confirmed that they are Russian citizens. FIGURE 13 Russian citizenship was conferred automatically on all Crimean residents in 2014. Residents had to actively opt out of Russian citizenship within one month of 18 March. When asked about identity, seemingly those most dissatisfied with the status as Russian citizens ‘escape’ it by declaring themselves to be ‘Crimean’ (krymchanin). Separating the sample by Crimean Tatars and ‘others’ confirms this expectation – 39 percent of the sampled Crimean Tatars chose ‘Crimean’. Compared to other ethnicities, i.e. mostly Russians, a higher share of Crimean Tatars affirmed Ukrainian citizenship or dual Russian-Ukrainian citizenship as their identity – all are indications of their dissatisfaction with the automatic allocation of Russian citizenship after March 2014. FIGURE 14 In general, the notion of being Crimean had been prominent in Crimean politics since the 1990s (being the preferred identity category of about a third of the regional population in 2013). The continued relevance of this regional identity per se does not equate with separatist mobilization. As a result of Figure12:WouldyoupersonallylikelivinginamembercountryoftheEU? Yes No EthnicCrimeanTatars 32,2% 67,8% n=174 OtherEthnicity 9,9% 90,1% n=1432 32,2% 67,8% 9,9% 90,1% Yes No Other Ethnicity Ethnic Crimean Tatars Figure13:Citizenship Citizenshipbackin2011(n=1991) Howwouldyoudescribeyourselftoday?(n=1956) Russiancitizen 12,3% 79,9% Ukrainiancitizen 81,2% 3,0% DualUkrainian-Russiancitizen 1,3% 3,60% PersonfromCrimea(Krymchanin) 4,8% 13,30% Other 0,5% 0,30% 12,3% 81,2% 1,3% 4,8% 0,5% 79,9% 3,0% 3,60% 13,30% 0,30% Russian citizen Ukrainian citizen Dual Ukrainian-Russian citizen Person from Crimea (Krymchanin) Other Citizenship back in 2011 (n=1991) How would you describe yourself today? (n=1956) FIGURE 12 Would you personally like to live in an EU country? FIGURE 13 Citizenship Quelle: Zentrum für Osteuropaund internationale Studien Quelle: Zentrum für Osteuropaund internationale Studien Citizenship back in 2011 (n=1991) Which answer would you choose today? (n=1956) Other Ethnicity (n=1432) Ethnic Crimean Tatars (n=174) Terra Incognita: The Public Mood in Crimea ZOiS Report 3/2017 9 the political developments since 2014, 40 percent of the survey respondents saw this identity further strengthened (while 58 percent saw it unchanged and only two percent saw it weakened). FIGURE 15 Thus, the strong sense of a distinctive regional identity not only persists in Crimea, but has been strengthened by the incorporation into the Russian Federation. Probably, this is a combination of a new regionalist sentiment and dissatisfaction with both Russia and Ukraine. This is confirmed by a differently worded question asking about the place the respondents consider their ‘home’: the generic answer ‘the place where I live’ as a specific locality within Crimea and Crimea as a whole are by far the two most popular choices (jointly accounting for 90 percent of the answers). Only six and one percent respectively call Russia and Ukraine their home. FIGURE 16 Surveys have often included the category ‘former USSR’ as an identity category. In Crimea it had remained relevant. By now, the political reality has clearly turned this identifier into a negligible category when placed next to regional and country references. In line with the insularity of the population documented above, the idea of identifying beyond the local is irrelevant. Figure14:CrimeaIfyouwereaskedaboutyourcitizenship,whatwouldyouchoose? EthnicCrimeanTatar OtherEthnicity Russiancitizen 50,7% 84,0% Ukrainiancitizen 4,6% 2,7% DualUkrainian-Russiancitizen 6,0% 3,2% PersonfromCrimea(Krymchanin) 38,7% 9,8% Other 0,3% n=217 n=1679 50,7% 4,6% 6,0% 38,7% 84,0% 2,7% 3,2% 9,8% 0,3% Russian citizen Ukrainian citizen Dual Ukrainian-Russian citizen Person from Crimea (Krymchanin) Other Ethnic Crimean Tatar Other Ethnicity Figure15:CrimeaWhataboutyoursenseofbelongingtoyourregion?Aftertheeventsof2013-16doyoufeel… MorelikeaKrimchaninthanbefore 39,6% LesslikeaKrimchaninthanbefore 2,4% n=1904 Mysenseofbelonginghasn'tchanged 58,0% 39,6% 2,4% 58,0% More like a Krimchanin than before Less like a Krimchanin than before My sense of belonging hasn't changed Figure16:What,aboveall,constitutes'home'foryou? TheplacewhereIlive 62,7% Crimea 27,3% Russia 5,8% TheformerUSSR 2,4% Ukraine 0,9% n=1998 Theworld 1,1% 62,7% 27,3% 5,8% 2,4% 0,9% 1,1% The place where I live Crimea Russia The former USSR Ukraine The world FIGURE 14 Crimea: If asked about your citizenship, which answer would you choose? FIGURE 16 Which of the following constitutes ‘home’ for you? FIGURE 15 Crimea: What about your sense of belonging to your region? After the events of 2013–16 do you feel… Quelle: Zentrum für Osteuropaund internationale Studien Quelle: Zentrum für Osteuropaund internationale Studien Quelle: Zentrum für Osteuropaund internationale Studien Ethnic Crimean Tatar (n=217) Other Ethnicity (n=1679) n=1904 n=1998 ZOiS Report 3/2017 Terra Incognita: The Public Mood in Crimea 16 Assessment of the developments since 2014 Forty-four percent of the survey respondents said they were surprised by the Russian military action in Crimea in February 2014, compared to 56 percent saying that they were not surprised. FIGURE34 The latter cannot be read as proof of Crimean mobilization at the time, but rather as a general sense that Russia had retained a stake in the region and, possibly, as a retrospective logic imposed on the developments. The survey reveals variation in the assessments of the political developments among respondents. This variation is even higher when one compares the Crimean Tatars to the rest of the sample. Only eight percent of the Crimean Tatars saw the reason for Crimea becoming part of the Russian Federation in the mobilization of the Crimean population – compared to 25 percent of the rest of the sample. Conversely, 24 percent of the Crimean Tatars see it as a result of Russian actions, compared to 17 percent of the rest of the sample. Interestingly, there is agreement across the different ethnic groups about Kyiv’s neglect of the region over many years being a reason behind the events of 2014 in Crimea (both about 33 percent). A greater share of the Crimean Tatars (35 percent) linked the events to the Euromaidan, compared to 25 percent of the rest of the respondents. FIGURE35 This suggests that for the majority of the Crimean population the Euromaidan FIGURE 34 Were you suprised by the Russians actions? FIGURE 35 Crimea has become part of the Russian Federation… Figure34:WereyousuprisedbytheRussiansactions? Yes 43,90% No 56,10% n=1794 43,9% 56,1% Yes No Figure35:Crimeahas becomepartoftheRussia Federation… EthicCrimeanTatar OtherEthnicity Asaresultofthe mobilizationofthe Crimeanpopulation 7,8% 25,0% AsaresultofRussia's action 24,0% 17,4% AsaresultofKiev'sneglect oftheregionovermany years 32,9% 32,9% Asaresultofthe Euromaidan 35,3% 24,7% n=167 n=1571 7,8% 24,0% 32,9% 35,3% 25,0% 17,4% 32,9% 24,7% As a result of the mobilization of the Crimean population As a result of Russia's action As a result of Kiev's neglect of the region over many years As a result of the Euromaidan Ethic Crimean Tatar Other Ethnicity Figure36:IfareferendumaboutCrimeajoiningtheRussianFederationwasheldtodayhow-inyouropinion-wouldCrimeansvote? EthnicCrimeanTatar OtherEthnicity Amajoritywould vote thesame,aminority would changetheirvote. 27,2% 43,7% Amajoritywould change theirvote,aminority would votethesame. 16,2% 3,8% Morepeoplewould abstain,therest wouldvotethe same. 7,3% 5,4% Theywouldvotethe same asinMarch2014. 34,6% 41,6% Don'twantto answer 14,7% 5,4% 27,2% 16,2% 7,3% 34,6% 14,7% 43,7% 3,8% 5,4% 41,6% 5,4% A majority would vote the same, a minority would change their vote. A majority would change their vote, a minority would vote the same. More people would abstain, the rest would vote the same. They would vote the same as in March 2014. Don't want to answer Ethnic Crimean Tatar Other Ethnicity Quelle: Zentrum für Osteuropaund internationale StudienQuelle: Zentrum für Osteuropaund internationale Studien Yes No Quelle: Zentrum für Osteuropaund internationale Studien Ethnic Crimean Tatar (n=167) Other Ethnicity (n=1571) Ethnic Crimean Tatar (n=191) Other Ethnicity (n=1583) FIGURE 36 If a referendum about Crimea joining the Russian Federation was held today how – in your opinion – would Crimeans vote? n=1794 Terra Incognita: The Public Mood in Crimea ZOiS Report 3/2017 17 FIGURE 38 Compared to 2014, how would you vote if a referendum about Crimea joining the Russian Federation was held today? Figure37:HowwouldyouvoteifareferendumaboutCrimeajoiningtheRussianFederationwasheldtoday? Thesameas in March2014 78,8% Differently 2,4% Wouldabstain 4,1% Ididnotvote in the referendum 7,9% n=1913 Don'twanttoanswer 6,8% 78,8% 2,4% 4,1% 7,9% 6,8% The same as in March 2014 Differently Would abstain I did not vote in the referendum Don't want to answer Figure38:HowwouldyouvoteifareferendumaboutCrimeajoiningtheRussianFederationwasheldtoday? EthnicCrimeanTatar OtherEthnicity Thesameas in March2014 49,2% 83,4% Differently 4,7% 1,9% Wouldabstain 8,3% 3,2% Ididnotvote in the referendum 19,7% 5,9% Don'twant toanswer 18,1% 5,5% n=193 n=1642 49,2% 4,7% 8,3% 19,7% 18,1% 83,4% 1,9% 3,2% 5,9% 5,5% The same as in March 2014 Differently Would abstain I did not vote in the referendum Don't want to answer Ethnic Crimean Tatar Other Ethnicity was not a major point of reference, although arguably Russia’s actions in Crimea were directly related to the change in the political regime in Kyiv, in particular the emergence of the interim government following President Yanukovych’s ouster. A survey question about a new referendum on joining Russia is clearly a sensitive issue. A more impersonal question about the overall outcome of a new referendum as well as the more personal question about one’s own potential repeat vote reveal a few small nuances: an overwhelming majority (86 percent) of the non-Crimean Tatar respondents would expect the same or a only marginally different referendum result. The Crimean Tatars are more cautious in their prediction, with 52 percent saying that the result would be the same or change only slightly. Sixteen percent of the Crimean Tatar respondents said that a majority would change their vote (compared to only three percent of the rest of the respondents). Overall, the Crimean Tatars felt more uncomfortable answering this question, with 15 percent choosing not to answer (compared to only five percent of the non-Crimean Tatar respondents). FIGURE36 The more direct question about personal vote choice in a repeat referendum yielded a clear overall confirmation of the ‘yes’-vote – 79 percent of the respondents chose this option. FIGURE37 + 38 Quelle: Zentrum für Osteuropaund internationale StudienQuelle: Zentrum für Osteuropaund internationale Studien Other Ethnicity (n=1642) Ethnic Crimean Tatar (n=193) FIGURE 37 How would you vote if a referendum about Crimea joining the Russian Federation was held today? n=1913 ZOiS Report 3/2017 Terra Incognita: The Public Mood in Crimea 18 When asked about their level of trust in various political institutions (for each institution respondents could choose between ‘I don’t trust’, ‘I rather not trust’, ‘I rather trust’, ‘I trust’), trust in the Russian president is the highest, followed by the Russian army and national-level state institutions. FIGURE39 What is more interesting, however, are the very low levels of trust associated with region-wide Crimean and local institutions. This suggests a more long-term disillusionment with regional and local government and politics predating 2014. Combined with the dissatisfaction expressed about Kyiv’s long-term neglect of the region, mentioned above, this dissatisfaction with local politics suggests two key elements in the explanation of why the incorporation of Crimea into the Russian Federation was met with approval and expectations on the part of a substantial part of its population. That the referendum did not meet democratic standards and the turnout and exact results are imprecise is indisputable, but it is also certain that the majority was supportive. The ZOiS survey confirms that the Crimean population is fully integrated into the Russian media sphere. Seventy-six percent of the respondents said that they obtain their information about politics through the Russian media; nine percent use local media as their main source of information, and the influence of Ukrainian and international media is negligible. FIGURE40 Approval for democracy in general is lukewarm among the Crimean population, with 48 percent agreeing with the statement that democracy remains the best possible form of government despite its flaws and 41 percent being non-committal. FIGURE41 The reported preferences for Crimea’s economic system are as follows: 39 percent prefer the status quo, 35 percent favour deepening market reforms, and 27 percent would opt for the return to a socialist economy. FIGURE42 FIGURE 39 I trust… Grafik39:Itrust… LocalMajorandlokalcouncillorsinyourarea 348 CouncilofMinistersofCrimea 481 PoliceandotherlawentforcementagenciesinCrimea 494 StateCouncilofCrimea 545 CourtsinRussia 568 PoliceandotherlawentforcementagenciesinRussia 585 TheCounciloftheFederationRussia 634 RussianParliament/StateDuma 748 RussianOrthodoxChurch 784 RussianGovernment 970 RussianArmy 1254 RussianPresident 1454 348 481 494 545 568 585 634 748 784 970 1254 1454 Local Major and lokal councillors in your area Council of Ministers of Crimea Police and other law entforcement agencies in Crimea State Council of Crimea Courts in Russia Police and other law entforcement agencies in Russia The Council of the Federation Russia Russian Parliament / State Duma Russian Orthodox Church Russian Government Russian Army Russian President Full count of answers Quelle: Zentrum für Osteuropaund internationale Studien Terra Incognita: The Public Mood in Crimea ZOiS Report 3/2017 19 FIGURE 40 Where do you get most of your information about politics? FIGURE 42 Crimea: What type of economy should exist in Crimea? FIGURE 41 Crimea: Democracy might have its problems, but it is still best form of government. Figure40:Wheredoyougetmostofyourinformationaboutpolitics? Russianmedia 75,7% Crimeanmedia 8,8% International/foreignmedia 2,0% Ukrainianmedia 0,7% Relativesandfriends 5,9% n=2000 Other 2,3% Iamnotinterestedinpolitics 4,5% 75,7% 8,8% 2,0% 0,7% 5,9% 2,3% 4,5% Russian media Crimean media International/foreign media Ukrainian media Relatives and friends Other I am not interested in politics Figure41:CrimeaDemocracymighthaveitsproblems,butitisstillbestformofgovernment. Stronglyagree 19% Somewhatagree 28,90% Neitheragree nordisagree 40,90% Somewhatdisagree 6,30% n=1782 Stronglydisagree 5% 19,0% 28,9% 40,9% 6,3% 5,0% Strongly agree Somewhat agree Neither agree nor disagree Somewhat disagree Strongly disagree Grafik42:CrimeaWhattypeofeconomyshouldexistinCrimea? Returntosocialisteconomy 26,5% Leaveeverthingasitis 38,7% Deepenmarketreforms 34,8% n=1631 26,5% 38,7% 34,8% Return to socialist economy Leave everthing as it is Deepen market reforms Quelle: Zentrum für Osteuropaund internationale Studien Quelle: Zentrum für Osteuropaund internationale Studien Quelle: Zentrum für Osteuropaund internationale Studien n=2000 n=1782 n=1631 ZOiS Report 3/2017 Terra Incognita: The Public Mood in Crimea 20 Conclusion The ZOiS survey provides a snapshot of the current public mood in Crimea at a sensitive political moment. It is clear that the survey conditions are not ideal, but this is not a reason for not listening to the Crimeans’ own voice. The extent to which answers to some of the politically charged questions, regarding the status of Crimea or the impact of the Western sanctions, reflect actually held beliefs is impossible to determine. However, this is an inherent problem in survey research. The survey results are best understood as indicating trends rather than exact measures. The questions tapping into everyday life in the region are particularly revealing. The survey respondents confirm the increase in prices, a severe disruption of links to the rest of Ukraine, including contacts to Ukrainian relatives and friends, limited travel to other parts of Russia, the absence of personal international reference points, a near-complete integration into the Russian media sphere. The regional identity category krymchanin (Crimean) has gained further in significance, where one might have expected a strengthening of the identification as ethnic Russians or Russian citizens. This strong sense of regional distinctiveness will have to be carefully managed by Moscow if it wants to maintain a stable status quo. The Crimean Tatars remain more sceptical of the current regime. The societal and political integration of the Crimean Tatars could not be taken for granted within the Ukrainian state and continues to be a potential destabilizing factor in a Crimea controlled by Russia. For the moment, Russia has opted for repression rather than active accommodation of the Crimean Tatars – a strategy that is bound to build up opposition. Two further interesting findings of the ZOiS survey are the widespread lack of trust in regional and local political institutions and the view, shared by the Crimean Tatars, that Kyiv had neglected the region in the years leading up to 2014. The combination of this perception of neglect, the experience of the Ukrainian blockade and Western sanctions, and the pervasiveness of Russian information flows, linkages and socialization suggests that a change in the opinions of the majority of the Crimean population on the annexation is unlikely in the foreseeable future. Imprint Author Prof. Dr. Gwendolyn Sasse Published by © Centre for East European and International Studies (ZOiS) gGmbH Address Centre for East European and International Studies (ZOiS) gGmbH Mohrenstraße 60 10117 Berlin [email protected] www.zois-berlin.de Citation Sasse, Gwendolyn: Terra incognita – The public mood in Crimea, ZOiS Report 3/2017, (https:// www.zoisberlin.de/fileadmin/media/Dateien/ZOiS_Reports/ZOiS_Report_3_2017.pdf) ISSN 2512-7233 Layout Yuko Stier