The Donbas – Two parts, or still one?

ZOiS REPORT THE DONBAS – TWO PARTS, OR STILL ONE? THE EXPERIENCE OF WAR THROUGH THE EYES OF THE REGIONAL POPULATION No. 2 / 2017 · May 2017 Gwendolyn Sasse ZOiS Report 2/2017 The Donbas – Two parts, or still one? 2 Content 02 ___ Executive summary 03 ___ Introduction 04 ___ Life and attitudes across the frontline 04 ______ Personal contacts across the frontline 06 ______ Political identities 11 ______ Views on the war and the status of the region 14 ______ Trust in political institutions and the media 18 ______ Foreign policy orientation 19 ___ Conclusion 20 ___ Imprint Executive summary A ZOiS survey conducted in the Donbas in December 2016 provides insights into life and attitudes across the frontline between the Kyiv-controlled Donbas and the occupied territories, the self-declared Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) and the Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR). The two-part survey reveals the differentiated public opinion in the DNR / LNR and similarities in views shared across the frontline. The main results of the two-part survey are: – The regional population maintains close contacts across the frontline. – In both parts of the Donbas mixed Ukrainian-Russian identities are significant and counterbalance ethnification and polarization induced by the war. ZOiS Report 2/2017 The Donbas – Two parts, or still one? 3 – The attitudes of the population of the DNR / LNR are more differentiated than might be expected, thereby defying the notion of a region set in its views and ‘lost’ by Kyiv. – The population of the Kyiv-controlled Donbas and the DNR / LNR are furthest apart in their views about the future status of the occupied territories. The views in the DNR / LNR indicate aspirations for the recognition of the region’s special status, either within Ukraine or within Russia. In the Kyiv-conrolled Donbas opposition to a special status is the majority view. – Trust in Ukrainian political institutions is similarly low in both parts of the Donbas. – Foreign policy orientations are shared across the frontline: while widespread opposition to NATO membership in both parts of the Donbas is not surprising, respondents in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas are nearly as sceptical of EU membership for Ukraine (72 percent) as in the occupied territories (82 percent). Introduction1 The war in eastern Ukraine that started in the aftermath of the Euromaidan and Russia’s annexation of Crimea in the spring of 2014 has claimed about 10,000 lives to date and made about 2.8 million people living in the region leave their homes (according to estimates there are about 1.8 million internally displaced and about one million who left for Russia)2. The frontline has cut the historical region of Donbas, used as a shorthand to describe Donetsk oblast and Luhansk oblast, into two parts. The self-declared Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics (DNR / LNR), supported by Russia, include the regional capital cities Donetsk and Luhansk. The war appears to be now in an unstable stalemate that is pulling the two parts of the Donbas 1 The author gratefully acknowledges the research assistance by Alice Lackner who contributed to the data analysis and prepared the charts. 2 For an analysis of the attitudes of the displaced in Ukraine and Russia, based on ZOiS survey data, see Gwendolyn Sasse, The Displaced Ukrainians: Who are they, and what do they think?, ZOiS Report No. 1, March 2017. ZOiS Report 2/2017 The Donbas – Two parts, or still one? 4 increasingly apart. On the one hand, the integration of the DNR / LNR into Russian structures is progressing, for example through the distribution of Russian passports, the introduction of the ruble as the local currency and the renationalization of enterprises. On the other hand, the Ukraininan government has stopped social security payments to the population in the occupied territories, and representatives of Ukrainian political parties have enforced a blockade of coal transports from the occupied territories, which Ukrainian president Petro Poroshenko was forced to endorse as government policy. The central questions, which this report addresses on the basis of the new ZOIS survey data, are whether the increasing physical and political distance between the two parts of the Donbas is reflected in the local population’s lives, identities and attitudes. Moreover, the survey provides insights into the effects of the war on identitities, as reported by the respondents. By covering the whole Donbas region rather than just the part controlled by Kyiv, the survey provides a rare glimpse of the perceptions of people in the occupied territory and thereby allows for a comparison of the attitudes across the frontline. Opinion polls in Ukraine are currently not ‘nationally representative’ in a strict sense, as they exclude the occupied territories. The two-part ZOiSsuvey, conducted in December 2016, aims to rectify this as much as possible in a situation of war. In Kyiv-controlled Donbas face-to-face interviews were conducted based on a multi-stage quota sample (n = 1,200 split evently between Donetsk and Luhansk oblast) based on age, gender and educational attainment quotas of the urban and rural populations according to the official state statistics of 2016. In the occupied territories the same quotas were applied, as there is no official data on the current residents of this region. Due to the difficulties of access and potential security concerns on the part of the respondents, the interviews (n = 1,200) were conducted by telephone rather than in face-to-face interviews. The questionnaire therefore had to be shortened and simplified but the key questions remained the same in both surveys. Life and attitudes across the frontline Personal contacts across the frontline Border crossings between the two parts of the Donbas is part of the daily routine of many people living close to the frontline. The intensity of contact between family members and friends across the frontline is a powerful counterpoint to the actions of the parties to this war. Of the respondents in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas 38 percent said they have family members or friends in the DNR / LNR. On the other side of the separation line, the personal linkages are even greater: 57 percent of the respondents in the occupied territories have family members or friends living in the governmentcontrolled part of the Donbas. Close to 50 percent of the respondents in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas are in touch with family members and friends in DNR / LNR on a daily basis ZOiS Report 2/2017 The Donbas – Two parts, or still one? 5 FIGURE 1 Donbas: How often are you in touch with your relatives / friends in the DNR / LNR? Source: ZOiS 9.9 36.2 38.1 12.8 3.1 0 10 20 30 40 Percent Every day Once or twice a week Once or twice a month Once or twice a year Not at all at the moment n=423 Donbas How often are you in touch with your relatives/friends in the DNR/LNR? FIGURE 2 DNR / LNR: How often are you in touch with your relatives / friends in the Donbas? 18.8 31.9 34.4 10.7 4.3 0 10 20 30 40 Percent Every day Once or twice a week Once or twice a month Once or twice a year Not at all at the moment n=655 DNR − LNR How often are you in touch with your relatives/friends in the Donbas? Source: ZOiS or once / twice per week. Only about 3 percent report not being in touch at the moment. Similarly, just under 50 percent of the respondents in the DNR / LNR are in touch with family members or friends based in the Kyivcontrolled Donbas on a daily basis or once / twice a week. Within this reference group, the share of those in daily contact is twice as high as that of the respondents in the Donbas in contact with people in the DNR / LNR, namely close to 20 percent. Again only about 4 percent has lost touch for the moment. FIGURES 1 + 2 ZOiS Report 2/2017 The Donbas – Two parts, or still one? 6 Political identities The only way in which a one-off survey can speak to the question of personal identity change is to tap into self-reported changes. The ZOiS survey included a deliberately open question which avoided narrowing it to either ethnic or civic identity categories, followed by more detailed questions about a range of different identity options. As for the first more general question about a change in personal identity as a result of the events of 2013-16, a quarter of the respondents in the occupied territories said that they felt ‘more Russian’ 0.1 0.9 0.3 1.8 1.8 0.6 0.3 2.2 0.7 0.1 0.2 11.3 4.3 6.6 4.8 8.9 7.8 0.5 0.7 0.3 0.5 53.8 53.2 3.7 7.4 3.5 5.7 6.7 11.4 0 20 40 60 Percent Other Ukrainian−speaking Russian Russian−speaking Ukrainian Bilingual Ukr.−Russ. speaker Russian−speaker Ukrainian−speaker Person from Luhansk region Person from Donetsk region Person from Donbas Dual Ukr.−Russ. citizenship Russian citizen Ukrainian citizen Mixed ethnic Ukrainian/Russian Ethnic Russian Ethnic Ukrainian Now: n=1100 ; Five years ago: n=1111 Donbas What identity is most important to you today? What identity was important to you five years ago? Identity now Identity five years ago 3.4 26.1 20.5 8.5 14.3 20.4 61.8 45.0 0 20 40 60 Percent More Russian More Ukrainian More strongly both No change Donbas: n=995 ; DNR/LNR: n=1141 Donbas − DNR LNR As a result of the events 2013−16, do you feel... Donbas DNR/LNR FIGURE 3 As a result of the events 2013 – 16, do you feel… Source: ZOiS Source: ZOiS FIGURE 4 Donbas: What identity is most important to you today? What identity was most important to you five years ago? Identity now (n = 1.100) Identity five years ago (n = 1.111) Donbas (n = 995) DNR/LNR (n = 1.141) ZOiS Report 2/2017 The Donbas – Two parts, or still one? 7 now – and a fifth of the respondents in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas reported that they felt ‘more Ukrainian’ now. Interestingly, however, 14 percent and 20 percent in the Kyiv-controlled and occupied Donbas respectively said that they felt more strongly now that they are ‘both Ukrainian and Russian’. The majority in both parts of the Donbas reported no change in identity: 62 percent in the government-controlled Donbas and 45 percent in the self-declared republics. Thus, while there has been a greater shift in identities in the occupied territories, a significant number of respondents reported not only a stable identity but also an increase in a mixed identification. FIGURE3 In the Ukrainian controlled Donbas, face-to-face interviews allowed for a more detailed question about identity. 53 and 54 percent of the respondents picked Ukrainian citizenship as their primary self-reported identity now and five years ago, demonstrating that a civic identity already prevailed over ethnic or regional identities before the war and has remained intact throughout the war experience. Only 7 percent and 4 percent chose ‘ethnic Ukrainian’ and ‘ethnic Russian’ as their main identity five years ago. These figures have risen now to 11 percent and 6 percent respectively. Similarly, self-identification as ‘mixed ethnic Russian and Ukrainian’ has risen from 4 to 7 percent over the last five years. Regional identity has grown somewhat in significance, as reflected in the salience of a Donbas identity (up from 8 to 9 percent) and a small drop in identification with the regional sub-units Donetsk and Luhansk oblast (from 7 to 5 percent and from 11 to 4 percent respectively). FIGURE4 Self-identification as a Ukrainian citizen marks an important difference between the Kyiv-controlled and the occupied territories. In the DNR / LNR, 54 percent reported that they felt less like Ukrainian citizens now compared to before 2013, while only 8 percent stated that they felt more like Ukrainian citizens now. 38 percent reported no change. The previously strong sense of being a Ukrainian citizen in this region has tended to be seriously underestimated in the West. This identity is part of the price paid for the war in the occupied territories. This previously strong identity, however, has not been replaced by a clear-cut ethnification or polarization. FIGURE5 8.0 54.0 38.1 0 20 40 60 Percent More Ukr. citizen than before Less Ukr. citizen than before No change n=1156 DNR − LNR As a result of the events of 2013−16, do you feel... Source: ZOiS FIGURE 5 DNR / LNR (Citizenship): As a result of the events 2013 – 16, do you feel… ZOiS Report 2/2017 The Donbas – Two parts, or still one? 8 When we trace in more detail the shifts between self-reported identity categories in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas area, we find that while self-identification as a Ukrainian citizen remains as the most important identity category from five years ago, it is now an identity in flux, with respondents also shifting from Ukrainian citizenship to Ukrainian ethnicity or a regional Donbas identity. FIGURES 6 – 8 Survey questions about ‚native language’ tend to tap into sentiments about language as an identity marker rather than actual day to day language practice. The majority of respondents in both the Kyiv-controlled Donbas (about 50 percent) and the DNR / LNR (about 60 percent) identify Russian as their native language. The range of answers to this question did not only list mutually exclusive options, as is commonly the case in the national census FIGURE 6 Donbas (Identity now: ethnic Ukrainian): Which identity would you have chosen five years ago? FIGURE 7 Donbas (Identity now: mixed ethnic Ukrainian and Russian): Which identity would you have chosen five years ago? 5.6 5.6 0.8 4.0 6.4 4.0 0.8 27.2 0.8 44.8 0 10 20 30 40 50 Percent Russian−speaking Ukrainian Russian−speaker Ukrainian−speaker Person from Luhansk region Person from Donetsk region Person from Donbas Russian citizen Ukrainian citizen Mixed ethnic Ukrainian/Russian Ethnic Ukrainian n=125 Donbas Identity now: Ethnic Ukrainian Which identity would you have chosen five years ago? 7.8 6.5 11.7 1.3 35.1 29.9 2.6 5.2 0 10 20 30 40 Percent Russian−speaker Person from Luhansk region Person from Donbas Dual Ukr.−Russ. citizenship Ukrainian citizen Mixed ethnic Ukrainian/Russian Ethnic Russian Ethnic Ukrainian n=77 Donbas Identity now: Mixed ethnic Ukr. & Russ. Which identity would you have chosen five years ago? Source: ZOiS Source: ZOiS ZOiS Report 2/2017 The Donbas – Two parts, or still one? 9 and many standard opinion polls, but included the option ‘both Russian and Ukrainian’ which, in turn, was chosen by 34 percent and 36 percent in the government-controlled Donbas and in the DNR / LNR respectively. The selfreported relevance of a bilingual identity is compatible with the expressions of a mixed Russian-Ukrainian identity, whether defined in ethnic or more civic terms, in both the Kyiv-controlled Donbas and the DNR / LNR, and the salience of Ukrainian citizenship as the primary identity in the government-controlled Donbas. There is anecdotal evidence of people adjusting their language identity and / or practice in light of their war experience. However, no significant change was reported by the respondents themselves about a readjustment of their native language. FIGURE9 50.1 59.8 16.0 4.3 33.7 35.8 0.2 0.1 0 20 40 60 Percent Russian Ukrainian Both Russian and Ukrainian Crimean Tatar Donbas: n=1150 ; DNR/LNR: n=1198 What language do you consider your native language? Donbas DNR/LNR 2.4 8.3 7.1 53.6 26.2 1.2 1.2 0 20 40 60 Percent Russian−speaking Ukrainian Person from Luhansk region Person from Donetsk region Person from Donbas Ukrainian citizen Mixed ethnic Ukrainian/Russian Ethnic Ukrainian n=84 Donbas Identity now: Person from Donbas Which identity would you have chosen five years ago? FIGURE 8 Donbas (Identity now: person from Donbas): Which identity would you have chosen five years ago? Source: ZOiS Source: ZOiS FIGURE 9 What language do you consider your native language? Donbas (n = 1.150) DNR/LNR (n = 1.198) ZOiS Report 2/2017 The Donbas – Two parts, or still one? 16 General attitudes about democracy and the economy are shared across both parts of the Donbas. Support for democracy is best described as lukewarm: 42 percent of the respondents in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas and 39 percent in the occupied territories ‘strongly’ or ‘somewhat’ agree with the statement that democracy is still the best possible form of government, while 38 and 37 percent respectively are non-committal and neither agree nor disagree. FIGURE 20 12.3 17.0 29.7 21.8 38.0 36.8 10.8 11.3 9.2 13.1 0 10 20 30 40 Percent Strongly agree Somewhat agree Neither agree nor disagree Somewhat disagree Strongly disagree Donbas: n=972 ; DNR/LNR: n=1136 Democracy is still the best form of government Donbas DNR/LNR 24.0 27.6 15.3 11.3 60.7 61.1 0 20 40 60 Percent Return to socialist economy Leave everything as it is Deepen market reforms Donbas: n=738 ; DNR/LNR: n=917 What type of economy should exist in Ukraine? Donbas DNR/LNR Source: ZOiS Source: ZOiS FIGURE 20 Democracy is still the best form of government. FIGURE 21 What type of economy should exist in Ukraine? Donbas (n = 972) DNR/LNR (n = 1.136) Donbas (n = 738) DNR/LNR (n = 917) ZOiS Report 2/2017 The Donbas – Two parts, or still one? 17 As for their economic views, 61 percent of the respondents in both the Kyivcontrolled and the occupied Donbas voiced their preference for deepening economic reforms, thereby expressing a general pro-reform attitude. Maintaining the status quo was only the declared preference of 15 percent of respondents in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas and 11 percent in the DNR / LNR. The ‘return to a socialist economy’ was the preferred choice of 24 percent in the government-controlled Donbas and 28 percent in the occupied territories. This response is likely to capture not just a specific ideological view about the socialist economic system but rather a general dissatisfaction with Ukraine’s transition path. FIGURE 21 The combination of a lukewarm position on democracy and a general endorsement of further economic reforms in both parts of the Donbas should be seen in connection with a further result, namely the self-reported change in the level of political interest as a result of the events over the last three years. The trends point in opposite directions across the frontline: while respondents in the DNR / LNR expressed a noteworthy increase in interest in politics (53 percent compared to only 14 percent in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas), 49 percent of the respondents in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas reported that they were now less interested in politics (compared to 24 percent in the DNR / LNR). Thus, the experience of war has politicized the population of the DNR / LNR much more than their counterpart in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas. While Kyiv is confronted with a population that seems to be turning away from national politics, the population of the occupied territories has become highly politicized, though not in one particular direction. FIGURE 22 13.6 52.6 37.3 23.9 49.1 23.5 0 10 20 30 40 50 Percent More The same Less Donbas: n=1111 ; DNR/LNR: n=1167 Are you now more or less interested in politics than three years ago? Donbas DNR/LNR Source: ZOiS FIGURE 22 Are you now more or less interested in politics than three years ago? Donbas (n = 1.111) DNR/LNR (n = 1.167) ZOiS Report 2/2017 The Donbas – Two parts, or still one? 18 Foreign policy orientation In terms of foreign policy orientation, the two parts of the divided Donbas are more similar than one might think: while NATO membership was rejected outright, as could be expected, by the vast majority in both parts, the widespread negative views of the EU in the Donbas might come as a surprise: 72 percent of respondents in the government-controlled Donbas and 82 percent in the self-declared republics are against Ukraine joining the EU. FIGURES 23 + 24 While support for the EU in view of a slow reform process and the inability of Western actors to end the war, has cooled off again across Ukraine according to recent polls, there has generally been support above 50 percent for EU membership in recent years. Thus, with regard to the Ukrainian government’s declared objective of aligning its reform process with the EU, the Donbas is being left behind. 27.9 18.2 72.1 81.8 0 20 40 60 80 Percent Yes No Donbas: n=867 ; DNR/LNR: n=1063 Should Ukraine join the EU? Donbas DNR/LNR 17.5 6.9 82.5 93.1 0 20 40 60 80 100 Percent Yes No Donbas: n=928 ; DNR/LNR: n=1092 Should Ukraine join the NATO? Donbas DNR/LNR Source: ZOiS Source: ZOiS FIGURE 23 Should Ukraine join the EU? FIGURE 24 Should Ukraine join the NATO? Donbas (n = 867) DNR/LNR (n = 1.063) Donbas (n = 928) DNR/LNR (n = 1.092) ZOiS Report 2/2017 The Donbas – Two parts, or still one? 19 Conclusion The ZOiS survey illustrates that the gap in attitudes between the two parts of the Donbas is not as clear-cut as one might have expected as a result of the increasing de facto separation of the DNR / LNR and the Kyiv-controlled Donbas. Mixed Russian-Ukrainian identities, whether rooted in ethnicity, native language, language use, or a combination of ethnic and civic criteria, remain prevalent across the whole Donbas region and, in some cases, this identity has emerged strengthened from the war experience. On foreign policy issues, both parts of the Donbas are also more similar than might be expected: the EU is seen almost equally sceptically on both sides of the frontline. On the issue of EU membership, the Kyiv-controlled Donbas seems to have drifted away from the centre’s main foreign policy goal faster than other Ukrainian regions. Similarly, support for democracy is only lukewarm and political apathy is greater than in the DNR / LNR. Not only are the views on critical issues aligned in both parts of the Donbas, the attitudes in the occupied territories are also much more differentiated than the war-related political divisions suggest. The mixed identities across the Donbas and the wide range of preferences regarding the status of the occupied territories are something Ukrainian, Western and Russian policymakers should take note of. For Kyiv it would be premature to effectively give up on the occupied territories; while Moscow could not count on the unwavering loyalty of the population of the DNR / LNR. In line with the local sentiments, international attempts at conflict-management should refocus on facilitating some form of special status for the DNR / LNR. ZOiS Report 2/2017 The Donbas – Two parts, or still one? 20 Imprint Author Gwendolyn Sasse Published by © Centre for East European and International Studies (ZOiS) gGmbH Address Centre for East European and International Studies (ZOiS) gGmbH Mohrenstraße 60 10117 Berlin [email protected] www.zois-berlin.de Citation Sasse, Gwendolyn: The Donbas – Two parts, or still one?, ZOiS Report 2 / 2017, (https://www.zoisberlin.de/fileadmin/media/Dateien/ZOiS_Reports/ZOiS_Report_2_2017. pdf) ISSN 2512-7233 Layout Yuko Stier ZOiS Report 2/2017 The Donbas – Two parts, or still one? 21 ZOiS Report 2/2017 The Donbas – Two parts, or still one? 22