Adapting Military Decision-Making Logic to the GSF Decision-Making Process (GSF-DMP)

1 | P a g e A purpose-built GSF decisionmaking process is not an organizational preference, but a foundational condition for interoperability, operational coherence, and legitimacy from the outset of deployment. Concept Paper: Adapting Military Decision-Making Logic to the GSF Decision-Making Process (GSF-DMP) By Rafael Barbieri 1 Contextual Overview For the Gang Suppression Force (GSF), interoperability will not be achieved organically in theatre; it must be demonstrated and validated before deployment. It should be treated as a pre-deployment condition. If sectors and units are not able to plan, communicate, decide, and operate coherently from the outset, the force risks losing operational tempo, fragmenting under pressure, and undermining both effectiveness and legitimacy. This concept paper outlines why the GSF requires a purpose-built decision-making process (DMP) and how military decisionmaking logic—adapted to the political, legal, and human-rights constraints of the GSF—can provide a coherent, agile, and accountable framework for operations in complex urban environments. Why the GSF Requires a Purpose-Built Decision Model The GSF will operate in an environment characterized by: (i) persistent violence and fragmented territorial control; (ii) high civilian density with elevated risks of civilian harm; (iii) acute political sensitivity and sustained international scrutiny; and (iv) a structural separation between operational command exercised by the GSF and enabling support provided by UNSOH and partners. In this context, the principal risk to effectiveness is not the absence of force, intelligence, or logistics. Rather, it is the risk that decision-making logic fails to keep pace with operational reality. Decision-making processes designed for stable environments, exhaustive analysis, or layered coordination are ill-suited to the tempo and ambiguity in which the GSF must operate. Delay, ambiguity in authority, or over-centralization of decisions can quickly 1 ORCID: 0009-0008-6490-5139 2 | P a g e translate into loss of initiative, increased civilian exposure, and erosion of political confidence. Accordingly, the GSF requires a decision-making process that is (i) fast enough to retain initiative in a fluid threat environment; (ii) clear enough to assign responsibility and preserve accountability; and (iii) disciplined enough to ensure compliance with international law and the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP). The adapted GSF-DMP should therefore be grounded in a small number of robust, military-derived principles, carefully tailored to the GSF’s mandate and governance architecture. Principle 1: Situational Clarity over Complete Information GSF commanders must be enabled to decide and act on partial but sufficient situational clarity, rather than waiting for exhaustive or fully corroborated intelligence. In the operating environment the GSF will face, intelligence on gangs will remain inherently incomplete, contested, and time-sensitive. Attempting to achieve comprehensive understanding before acting risks ceding initiative and allowing threats to consolidate. For the GSF, situational clarity therefore entails prioritizing what is operationally decisive. This includes: (i) understanding who controls which areas and with what degree of influence; (ii) identifying the immediate threats posed to civilians or state authority; and (iii) recognizing time-bound windows of opportunity in which gang activity can be disrupted or deterred. Information gaps should be treated as managed risk variables, not decision blockers. In practice, the GSF decision-making process should privilege operational relevance over analytical completeness. Mission analysis should concentrate on identifying priority threats and assessing civilian-harm risks, rather than attempting exhaustive mapping of the operational environment, which is neither achievable nor necessary in a fluid urban context. Decisions should be framed as deliberately timebound and explicitly revisable, with defined review points that allow commanders to reassess assumptions, adapt to new information, and adjust course as required. Within this framework, delay must become a conscious and justified choice—taken in full awareness of its operational and civilian-protection implications—rather than the default response to uncertainty. 3 | P a g e Principle 2: Command Logic Creates Accountability and Control Given the GSF’s hybrid architecture, clarity of command logic is not a procedural preference—it is an operational necessity. The GSF decision-making process must clearly distinguish between: (i) strategic direction and political oversight exercised by the Standing Group of Partners; (ii) operational command and decision-making vested in the GSF Force Commander; and (iii) enabling, advisory, and support functions provided by UNSOH, relevant UN entities, and partners. The decision-making process must reinforce, consistently and unambiguously, that (i) operational decisions rest within the GSF chain of command; (ii) support entities enable operations but do not direct them; and (iii) responsibility for outcomes—including civilian-harm mitigation—cannot be diffused across institutional structures. To preserve coherence and control, each phase of the GSF decision-making process should explicitly distinguish between decision authority and support roles, ensuring that responsibility is clear before operations commence. Rules, constraints, and caveats must be defined and understood during planning, rather than negotiated under operational pressure, where ambiguity can lead to delay, over-caution, or uncontrolled escalation. Accountability mechanisms should therefore be embedded within planning and decision-making from the outset, enabling responsibility for outcomes—including civilian-harm mitigation—to be clearly assigned and reviewed, rather than retrofitted after operations have concluded. Ambiguity in authority is one of the fastest routes to paralysis, over-caution, or uncontrolled escalation. Principle 3: Continuous Decision Cycles Sustain Operational Pressure The GSF cannot rely on static plans in an environment where gangs adapt rapidly, displace geographically, and reconstitute under pressure. What is required is a decisionmaking rhythm built around short, repeatable cycles that preserve momentum while managing risk. The adapted GSF-DMP should function as a continuous loop: Assess → Decide → Act → Review → Adjust This approach replaces extended planning horizons that are increasingly detached from operational reality, as well as one-off operations that deliver short-term effects but fail to generate sustained institutional learning. Operations should be deliberately designed in phases, each incorporating explicit decision points and reassessment triggers to support timely adjustment as conditions 4 | P a g e evolve. After-action reviews should be treated as operational tools rather than compliance-driven reporting requirements, with a clear mandate to inform subsequent decisions. Civilian impact, conduct and discipline considerations, and intelligence lessons must feed directly into the next decision cycle, ensuring that operational adaptation, accountability, and learning are continuous rather than episodic. This approach enables rapid adaptation to evolving gang behavior, continuous refinement of tactics, and demonstrable HRDDP compliance through documented decision logic. A Fit-for-Purpose Framework When adapted correctly, the GSF decision-making process becomes more than a planning methodology. It functions as a control mechanism within a politically sensitive operational environment, a structured risk-management framework for civilian protection and conduct oversight, and a confidence-building instrument for partners, donors, and the broader international community. Crucially, it also reinforces the requirement that interoperability—at sector and unit level—must be achieved and validated before deployment, not improvised in theatre. In Essence The GSF does not require perfect information; it requires decisions made early enough to influence outcomes. It does not require additional coordination layers, but rather clear command logic that assigns responsibility and preserves accountability. Nor does it require longer plans, but short, disciplined decision cycles that sustain pressure on gangs while protecting civilians. Institutionalizing this logic within the GSF decision-making process is likely to be an important contributing factor in sustaining speed, coherence, and control from the outset of operations. Author Rafael (“Rafa”) Barbieri is a peace operations professional with experience in designing decision-making, readiness, and interoperability frameworks for complex multinational operations. He serves within the United Nations Department of Peace Operations, supporting Member States on pre-deployment training, operational readiness, and the adaptation of military and police decision-making to high-risk, politically sensitive environments, with a strong focus on compliance with international law and civilian protection. Disclaimer: This paper is provided for analytical and discussion purposes only. The views expressed are those of the author and do not constitute official policy or guidance of the United Nations or its Member States.