MENTAL SPACES AND THEIR INTEGRATION: A COGNITIVE-LINGUISTIC PERSPECTIVE OF GILLES FAUCONNIER

ISSN: 2582-4686 SJIF 2021-3.261,SJIF 20222.889, 2024-6.875 ResearchBib IF: 9.948 / 2024 VOLUME-5, ISSUE-12 816 MENTAL SPACES AND THEIR INTEGRATION: A COGNITIVELINGUISTIC PERSPECTIVE OF GILLES FAUCONNIER Sobirova Firuza Urunbayevna Samarkand state institute of foreign languages, teacher of department of English Philology fiza_s[email protected] Young Soon Cho Chonnam National University, Professor, academic advisor [email protected] Abstract. This article examines Gilles Fauconnier’s theory of mental spaces, which represents a key cognitive-linguistic approach to understanding meaning in language. The focus is on the cognitive function of language as a tool for constructing meaning, the mechanisms of building and integrating mental spaces, and their distinction from formal semantics. The interpretation of utterances through cognitive spaces and the modeled world is analyzed, emphasizing the dynamic and flexible nature of language comprehension. Keywords: mental spaces, cognitive linguistics, meaning, integration, formal semantics, cognitive model. The theory of mental spaces, developed by Gilles Fauconnier in his book Mental Spaces [Fauconnier 1994; first edition 1985], is considered a fundamental concept in cognitive linguistics. Alongside the works of George Lakoff, Ronald Langacker, and others, it differs radically from objectivist approaches to meaning and semantics. Fauconnier asserts: “Language has its own structure, but its functioning is inseparable from other cognitive systems” [Fauconnier 1990: 151]. In this perspective, language is not a passive carrier of meaning but an active tool for constructing it, embedded within the broader cognitive architecture of the human mind. From the perspective of a naive worldview, meaning appears to be “contained” in words: a person formulates a thought, selects words, and conveys content. Fauconnier emphasizes, however, that the verbal form is only the “tip of the iceberg,” beneath which complex implicit cognitive processes are automatically activated during utterance interpretation [Fauconnier 1994: xviii]. Language does not transmit meaning in a ready-made form but provides instructions for its construction, ISSN: 2582-4686 SJIF 2021-3.261,SJIF 20222.889, 2024-6.875 ResearchBib IF: 9.948 / 2024 VOLUME-5, ISSUE-12 817 functioning as a mechanism for managing meaning. The basis of this process is mental spaces— cognitive models of situations that may be real, hypothetical, imaginary, or domain-specific. Formally, mental spaces are described as ordered sets of elements (a, b, c…) and the relations between them (R₁ab, R₂ad…), open to continuous expansion with new data. Examples of mental spaces include representations of the current state of affairs, hypothetical scenarios, models of the past or future, fictional worlds, and domain-specific areas such as economics, politics, or mathematics [Lakoff 1987: 281]. Despite their complexity, the mechanisms for constructing mental spaces are universal and manifest across all cultures [Fauconnier 1994: xvii–xviii]. In Fauconnier’s framework, language performs a dual function. On one hand, it is interpreted in relation to context and situation; on the other, it creates and organizes mental spaces, populating them with elements and establishing relations among them. The success of communication depends on the degree of alignment or compatibility between the spatial configurations of interlocutors, influenced by both linguistic and extralinguistic factors, including background knowledge, pragmatics, and cultural expectations [Fauconnier 1994: 2]. Reference is always mediated by the cognitive system, since “reality” exists only as a form of mental representation. Utterance comprehension can be represented as a sequential movement through multiple cognitive levels, formalized by Fauconnier in the scheme E → C → R, where E represents the linguistic expression, C the cognitive space as an intermediate model of the situation, and R the conceptualized world in which the expression acquires meaning. At this level, a flexible, dynamic cognitive structure is formed that can change during discourse, and internal consistency is not obligatory, reflecting the natural ambiguity of human communication [Fauconnier 1990: 152–153]. Unlike formal semantics, where direct correspondence between expression and world is treated as a truth condition (E → R), the cognitive model demonstrates that the path to meaning always passes through an intermediate layer of mental modeling. This approach accounts for the dynamic and variable nature of meaning, which formal approaches often overlook. Thus, Fauconnier’s theory of mental spaces demonstrates that language does not contain meaning in a ready-made form but provides instructions for its construction. Meaning emerges through the building and integration of mental spaces, relying on knowledge, context, and cognitive schemas. Communication is effective only when the interlocutors’ mental spaces coincide or are compatible. Fauconnier’s approach highlights the limitations of formal-semantic models and offers a cognitively adequate perspective on language comprehension that accommodates the ISSN: 2582-4686 SJIF 2021-3.261,SJIF 20222.889, 2024-6.875 ResearchBib IF: 9.948 / 2024 VOLUME-5, ISSUE-12 818 variability, flexibility, and dynamic nature of human thought. Mental spaces function as a universal cognitive tool, enabling the construction and integration of meanings in communication and revealing the complex nature of language as a system for meaning-making. Connections Between Mental Spaces: A Cognitive Analysis Fauconnier’s theory of mental spaces provides a robust framework for understanding meaning construction, especially in cases that defy traditional formalsemantic analysis. Consider the sentence: In the painting, the girl with blue eyes has green eyes. Formally, this appears contradictory, as a single individual cannot simultaneously have blue and green eyes. Fauconnier resolves this by positing two interconnected mental spaces: one representing the real world (the girl has blue eyes) and another representing the artist’s perspective (the girl has green eyes). These spaces are linked through an identity relationship, which operates at the level of reference rather than literal equivalence [Fauconnier 1994: 12–14]. Fauconnier further identifies common types of connections between mental spaces [Ibid.: xxxviii], including analogical and metaphorical projections, functionto-meaning links, and pragmatic metonymic relations. The establishment of such connections relies on a connector, an intuitively recognized relation that links objects across spaces. The connector allows one object to inform the identification of another, following the identification principle: "If two objects a and b are connected by a pragmatic function F (b = F(a)), then the description of object a, D, can be used to identify object b" [Fauconnier 1994: 3]. Examples include the link between a real individual and their depiction in art, or the metonymic connection between an author and their works, as in Plato is on the top shelf, where “Plato” refers to his writings. These connectors are shaped by social, cultural, and psychological factors, leading to variability across contexts and individuals [Ibid.: 10]. Fauconnier’s concepts build on Nunberg’s (1979) work on reference and polysemy, extending them within the framework of idealized cognitive modelsproposed by Lakoff (1987). These models reveal that meaning is not inherent to words but emerges through dynamic interactions between mental spaces, mediated by connectors. The theory highlights that human cognition interprets language through flexible, context-sensitive representations. Connectors demonstrate how reference and meaning depend on cultural knowledge, pragmatic functions, and the relational ISSN: 2582-4686 SJIF 2021-3.261,SJIF 20222.889, 2024-6.875 ResearchBib IF: 9.948 / 2024 VOLUME-5, ISSUE-12 819 structure of mental spaces. This approach provides a more nuanced understanding of metaphor, ambiguity, and cross-space references than formal semantics can offer. To conclude, Fauconnier’s mental spaces framework emphasizes the dynamic construction of meaning and the cognitive mechanisms underpinning interpretation. By incorporating connectors and identification principles, it accounts for both the variability of human understanding and the influence of socio-cultural context, offering a comprehensive cognitive model for analyzing language and thought [Fauconnier 1994; Nunberg 1979; Lakoff 1987]. References: 1. Fauconnier, G. Mental Spaces: Aspects of Meaning Construction in Natural Language. Cambridge: MIT Press. 1990 2. Fauconnier, G. Mental Spaces. Cambridge University Press. 1994 3. Lakoff, G., Johnson, M. Metaphors We Live By. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1980 4. Lakoff, G. Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1987 5. Langacker, R. Foundations of Cognitive Grammar. Vol. 1. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1987a 6. Langacker, R. Foundations of Cognitive Grammar. Vol. 2. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1991b 7. Nunberg, G. The Non-uniqueness of Semantic Solutions: Polysemy. Linguistics and Philosophy, 3(2), 143–184. 1979. 8. Sobirova, F., Young Soon Cho. “Cognitive Linguistics as an Interdisciplinary Field of Knowledge.” International Journal of Formal Education, vol. 4, no. 3, 2025.