State-Building in Situation of Internal Conflict: A Case Study on Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) from (2003 2023)

State-Building in Situation of Internal Conflict: A Case Study on Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) from (20032023) By Kovan Hasan Gaberki University of Kurdistan Hewlêr Erbil, Kurdistan MA August 2024 State-Building in Situation of Internal Conflict: A Case Study on Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) from (20032023) By Kovan Hasan Gaberki Bachelor of Arts in International Relations Student Number: 022200141 A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Diplomacy and International Law Department of Politics and International Relations School of Social Sciences University of Kurdistan Hewlêr MA August 2024 Erbil, Kurdistan II Declaration I hereby declare that this dissertation/thesis entitled: “State-Building in Situation of Internal Conflict: A Case Study on Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) from (2003-2023)“ is my own original work and hereby certify that unless stated, all work contained within this is my own independent research and has not been submitted for the award of any other degree at any institution, except where due acknowledgement is made in the text. Signature Name: Kovan Hasan Gaberki Date: III Supervisor’s Certificate This dissertation/thesis has been written under my supervision and has been submitted for the award of the degree of ‘Master of Arts’ in ‘Diplomacy and International Law’. _______________________________ __________________________ Signature Name ______________________________ Date I confirm that all the requirements have been fulfilled. __________________________________ ____________________________ Signature Name ___________________________________ _____________________ Head of Department of Date I confirm that all the requirements have been fulfilled. __________________________________ ____________________________ Signature Name ___________________________________ _____________________ Dean of School of Date IV Examining Committee Certification We certify that we have read this dissertation/thesis: ‘State-Building in Situation of Internal Conflict: A Case Study on Kurdistan Region of Iraq(KRI) from (2003-2023)’ and as a committee have examined the student ‘Kovan Hasan Gaberki’ in its content and what is related to it. We approve that it meets the standards of a dissertation/thesis for the degree of ‘Master of Arts’ in ‘Diplomacy and International Law’ _______________________________ __________________________ Signature Signature Name: Name: Member Member Date Date __________________________________ ____________________________ Signature Signature Name: Name: Supervisor Chairman Date Date __________________________________ Signature Name Dean of the School of Social Sciences Date V Dedication To my family, for their unwavering love and support. Kovan Hasan Gaberki 2024 VI Acknowledgements I wish to extend heartfelt appreciation to everyone who go along with me on this exciting and writing this thesis has had a great impact on me. I would like to thank the people who have supported and encouraged me in passing through this educational path. First, I would like to thank my thesis Supervisor. Associate Professor Arzu Yilmaz, whose understanding, help, patience, and guidance shaped my ideas, pushing me to explore horizons I never thought possible. Thank you for believing in me and empowering me to embrace my knowledgeable interest. In addition, I would like to thank my tutors who provided me with enough academic tools and knowledge over the course of several semesters to complete this work, and the whole academic staff of the Department of Diplomacy and International Law. Finally, I want to express my very profound gratitude to my family for providing me with energy, inspiration, and vision, a tower of strength. This accomplishment would not have been possible without them. So once again, thank you all for being part of my journey, making this achievement possible, and encouraging me to keep exploring the unknown. VII Abstract This thesis examines the state-building efforts in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) “Between” 2003-2023. It investigates particularly the impact of internal conflict between the two prominent political parties, namely the Kurdistan Democrat Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union Party (PUK) on the state-building process in the KRI. It argues that, first, the conflict between the KDP and PUK derives primarily from the power struggle between the political elites of both parties rather than their ideological differences and geopolitical considerations. Second, the power struggle between the political elites of KDP and PUK has been the main cause of the failure not only in the efforts to achieve independence from Iraq, but to institutionalize the economic, political and security apparatus of the federal government in the context of Iraqi Constitution 2005. VIII Table of Contents Declaration ............................................................................................................ II Supervisor’s Certificate ........................................................................................ III Examining Committee Certification ...................................................................... IV Dedication ............................................................................................................. V Acknowledgements .............................................................................................. VI Abstract ............................................................................................................... VII Table of Contents ............................................................................................... VIII List of Abbreviations ............................................................................................. XI List of Symbols .................................................................................................... XII Chapter 1 Introduction ........................................................................................... 1 1.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................ 1 1.2 Problem Statement ............................................................................................ 3 1.3 Research Question ............................................................................................ 4 1.4 Theoretical Framework& Methodology .............................................................. 5 1.5 Methodological Framework and Approaches .................................................. 11 1.6 Literature Review ............................................................................................ 13 1.7 Significance ..................................................................................................... 17 1.8 Chapter Breakdown ......................................................................................... 17 Chapter 2 Historical Background ......................................................................... 19 3 2018, p. 189). As an important ally in the international coalition against ISIS, the Kurds once again found themselves in the global spotlight after more than a decade of relative obscurity. This renewed attention is evident from the growing number of academic and media discussions on the Kurds' role in regional politics and international relations. Consequently, KRI’s ambitions for state-building, independence, and political development began receiving increased attention from scholars. The independence referendum in September 2017 marked a significant step toward the KRG's long-term state-building goals (Anaid & Tugdar, 2019, p. 2). However, the referendum also ignited new tensions between the KDP and PUK amid sensitive regional and international opposition, which fundamentally disrupted the KRG's state-building process. The recapture of disputed territories by Iraqi forces further deepened divisions and escalated the power struggle between the two main parties in the KRG (Charountaki, 2018, pp. 37-38). This thesis explores the impact of the power struggle between the KDP and PUK on the state-building process in the KRG from 2003 to 2023. It focuses on key points of influence in the KRG, such as resources, political interests, territory, and positions. The study employs elite conflict theory as a theoretical framework to investigate the dynamics of the power struggle between the two major political parties, their ideological differences, and the consequences of this struggle for the KRG's state-building process. It will also draw on academic literature, articles, and interviews to examine how the competition for power, control of land, resources, and security has destabilized the KRG's state-building efforts. Additionally, the study investigates external factors contributing to these conflicts and considers regional and international interventions as geopolitical alliances shift. The findings will provide valuable insights into the complex challenges faced by developing states navigating nuanced internal divisions. 1.2 Problem Statement This study will focus on deeply examining the impact of the power struggle between the KDP and PUK on the state-building process in the KRG after 2003. This power struggle has undermined local and international efforts to maintain 4 stability and prosperity in the region. The two parties have also been in conflict over oil and gas management, while ongoing disputes between the governments in Erbil and Baghdad precipitate crises in intergovernmental relations. Simultaneously, the local population faces challenges such as inadequate public facilities, deteriorating roads, and underfunded educational institutions that lack basic medical services. The landscape in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region is largely shaped by conflict between the two parties for control over the KRG’s territory, resources, and institutions, as well as influence over the single government in the KRI. Therefore, an examination of the power struggle, with a particular focus on its root causes and dynamics, is necessary to uncover the flaws in the KRG’s state-building process. I will argue that the dynamics of the power struggle between the two major political parties have shifted since the 2000s due to diverging economic interests. In this context, the conflict between the KDP and PUK arises primarily from economic interests rather than ideological or systemic factors. External issues, such as regional and international interventions, further consolidate political polarization and perpetuate the power struggle. Instead of focusing on superficial arguments for unity, it is essential to address the fundamental drivers of division, such as patronage networks, unequal access to resources, corruption, territorial disputes, elite conflict, and the role of international and regional interventions. 1.3 Research Question The power struggle between the two major political parties will examine how it affects the state-building process in the KRG. The research investigates how the competition for control over government institutions, security, resources, and foreign policy has either hindered or aided the KRG’s state-building efforts. The analysis aims to identify the fundamental principles driving the power struggle between the KDP and PUK, a crucial step in developing rules and interventions to mitigate its negative effects and promote stability and development in the KRG region. Historically, the power struggle between these political parties has obstructed state-building in the KRI, and this investigation will focus on answering one core question along with several complementary questions. 5 The main research question of this thesis is: How has the conflict between the KDP and PUK impacted the state-building process in the KRG? 1.4 Theoretical Framework& Methodology 1.4.a) Perspectives on State-Building Theory This research aims to explore the impact of the power struggle between the KDP and PUK on the state-building process in the KRI after 2003. By applying elite conflict theory and state-building theory, this study seeks to gain a deeper understanding of how the actions and decisions of the ruling elite have shaped the state-building process in the KRI from 2003 to 2023. The elite conflict theory provides a framework for understanding how the KDP and PUK have leveraged state-building efforts to advance their personal agendas (Natali, 2010, p. 78-79). Also, the applying state-building theory may shed light on the challenges of building an in effect state amid internal conflict, as well as the effects of the power struggle between the KDP and PUK on the state-building process in KRG after 2003 (Fearon, 2005, p. 102-104). By combining these two theories, this study will offer a clearer understanding of the complex situations in the KRI and demonstrate how the power struggle between the KDP-PUK has influenced the state-building process. “Max Weber describes the state in political science as a human society that establishes its monopoly of lawful force within a specified region.” However, since the world has changed significantly since 1918, this definition requires revision. Today, states are responsible for more than just ensuring the safety of their citizens; they also regulate, extract, and employ resources to power their operations. A state's primary responsibilities include ensuring the safety of its inhabitants and promoting their economic and social development. This perspective views the state as a protective institution, committed to enhancing the welfare and progress of its people (Tulun, 2009, p. 4). 6 “State-building means the establishment, re-establishment, and strengthening of a public structure in a given territory capable of delivering public goods. Essential to state-building is the creation of sovereign capacities, of which the fundamental one is the successful and generally undisputed claim to a 'monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force.' Only when authority and its norms receive general recognition as legitimate, often through national identity, can this occur. State-building creates institutions, laws, and policies that protect people. We need a functioning government, fair justice, and a strong economy. State-building also encompasses the development of military, police, and legal skills and accountability. Post-conflict peacebuilding frequently involves state-building. It may challenge conflict's core causes, foster reconciliation, and establish lasting peace. State-building requires careful planning, organization, and implementation. It is essential to understand the country's social, economic, and cultural aspects to develop a strong state. Inclusivity, transparency, accountability, and engagement with civil society, the commercial sector, and foreign partners are also necessary (Bogdandy et al., 2005, pp. 583-584). Statebuilding is a complicated topic that draws interest from various fields, such as economics, foreign relations, and the social sciences. It involves the creation of a government, organizations, and rules designed to function effectively and safeguard citizens. It is a complex process that requires deep knowledge of the cultures, events, and situations in each area. As part of efforts to build peace, it is important to address the causes of conflict, encourage healing, and lay the groundwork for lasting peace (Scott, 2010, p. ?) 1.4.b) The Relation between State Building and Nation-Building “Nation-building” and “state-building” are linked. Nation-building legitimizes public authority in a region over collective identity. An effective nation-building process creates a cultural image that legitimizes a state. Nation-building establishes a common identity and purpose among people, laying the groundwork for statebuilding. Creating a common national identity, values, and purpose is a complicated and continuous process. A common language, culture, history, and sense of citizenship and belonging are needed. If handled poorly, nation-building may foster social cohesiveness, stability, and security but can also cause war. 7 Sometimes state-building and nation-building occur simultaneously and require careful coordination and control. Without nation-building, locals may not view state-building initiatives as genuine or meaningful. Unsupported nation-building may be empty and unsustainable. Recognizing the close link between statebuilding and nation-building helps policymakers and practitioners develop more successful and durable peace, stability, and development policies (Bogdandy et al., 2005, pp. 586–588). The majority of theorists believe that state-building is an essential part of nationbuilding, despite the occasional interchange of the terms. State-building establishes the state's machinery and institutions, while nation-building develops a cultural identity in relation to the state's land. While external actors may have an impact on state-building, others contend that nation-building is fundamentally internal. Regrettably, people often use the terms state-building and nationbuilding interchangeably to refer to the same set of activities. The research tends to focus on strengthening states rather than on the cultural identity component of nation-building (Scott, 2010, pp. 3-4). A number of Kurdish political groups and the contemporary Kurdish state have revived Kurdish nationalism; however, “Hussein Tahiri claims that tribalism was the main problem. But according to Hamit Bozarslan,” certain Kurdish tribesmen were instrumental in the nationalist movement's victory in Iraqi Kurdistan. Iraqi Kurdistan residents ranked their devotion to their fellow Kurds, their tribe, and other identification markers in that order, according to a recent public opinion survey. This led to the decline of tribalism and the rise of strong Kurdish nationalism among the Kurdish people (Bengio, 2012, pp. 278–279). 1.4.c) Elite Conflict Theory On the other hand, the political science comprises the theory of state-building. Also, it describes the process of establishing and enhancing the capabilities and institutions of a state (Fukuyama, 2004, pp. 23-24). This process may involve a variety of activities, including the development of a stable economy, the establishment of a functioning government, and the creation of a secure and stable environment (Rotberg, 2004, p. 35-37). However, the elite conflict theory 8 and state-building theory have a strong connection because the actions and choices made by the governing elite can significantly influence the process of state-building (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, pp. 123-124). The power struggle between various elite groups may either impede or support the process of state development in cases where there is internal conflict, such as in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) (Collier, 2009, pp. 55-56). The elite conflict theory helps us understand who will win and what they want in conflicts between powerful groups. A group becomes powerful only when they control all the important connections between the economy and the group. The main goal of a powerful group is to stop other groups from taking back control and becoming powerful again. They aim to maintain their power and independence by exerting control over crucial connections (Lachmann, 1990, p. 412). The elite conflict theory essentially clarifies how a handful of influential individuals govern a nation. These leaders use force and talent to stay in power and keep others from taking their place. They are often former military generals or high-ranking government officials. By holding against power, they make it difficult for political parties to grow and for democracy to work properly, this has also hindered the development of the state’s democratic process (Musa, lbietan & Deinde-Adedeji, 2020, p. 64). A group of leaders called elites can take resources from people who are not in the elite within institutions. Few elites can maintain and grow their autonomy and power by reshaping how competing elites and social classes collaborate. Some powerful leaders can transform society by acting independently, which affects the entire system (Lachmann, 1990, p. 401). Elite conflict theory is a framework that examines power dynamics among elite groups and political parties, focusing on how these groups use their wealth and influence to shape laws, government institutions, and public standards (Lachmann, 1990, p. 402). The history of elite conflict theory, developed by European liberals like Robert Michels, Max Weber, Vilfredo Pareto, Gaetano Mosca, Joseph Schumpeter, and José Ortega y Gasset, suggests that political elites prioritize self-interest over societal improvement. This theory highlights the imbalanced influence of 9 decision-makers and unequal access to resources, leading to power struggles, civil wars, and instability. It also acknowledges the growing role leaders play in directing political change during crises. The theory is supported by factors such as partisan bias, the decline of the state system, mass patronage parties, media focus on key figures, and plebiscitary politics (Pakulski, 2018, pp. 9–13). According to elite conflict theory, the fundamental reason for war is often the struggle for power and authority over crucial institutions like the military, borders, and the abundance of natural resources, particularly oil. Similarly, political parties often engage in frequent conflicts and shift their alliances as they strive to consolidate power, broaden their influence, and secure dominance over others (Kiranda & Kamp et al., 2016, pp. 30–40). The state-building theories and elite conflict theory provide a comprehensive understanding of the challenges states face in establishing effective governmental institutions. These theories emphasize the need for cooperation and approval from influential elites but also highlight the potential for conflict among privileged parties to escalate into physical hostility, leading to instability and breakdown within the governing body. Understanding the elite struggle is crucial for identifying the achievements and weaknesses of state-building actions (Tuong Vu, 2010). The thesis explores elite conflict theory in state-building, arguing that the politics of negotiation and disagreement among political parties and groups complicate the situation. The power struggle between different elite groups, political parties, and local protestors leads to recurrent failures in the state-building process. Through an investigative analysis of changing alliances and rivalries, the thesis sheds light on the challenges faced by political parties and emphasizes the importance of carefully considering elite struggle in explaining political change (Kiranda & Kamp et al., 2016, pp. 30–40). Charles Tilly's theory suggests that force and war drive state-building processes, with rulers' primary imperative being to expand armies, bureaucracies, and tax bases. Brian Downing explores conflict types such as trade disputes, peasant uprisings, and religious conflicts, highlighting the importance of institutional and intellectual movements in influencing state development. Thomas Ertman highlights the distinction between state-building before and after 1450, 10 emphasizing the significance of institutional and intellectual movements. Miguel Centeno and Victoria Tin-bor Hui argue that European states adopted a suitable state-building strategy in the seventeenth century, including taxation, projects, economic production assistants, and merit-based replacement. The battles in Latin America were too short and distant to have a significant impact on bureaucracy, and the continent's geography, economy, and flawed ideology did not support the state system. According to non-European accounts, certain circumstances, particularly those encountered in eighteenth-century European wars, could lead to the establishment of centralized systems. Elite politics contribute to the development of bureaucracy, with Julia Adams focusing on the collective ruler and rulers maintaining close relationships with their families and staff (Tuong Vu, 2010, pp. 152–156). Many studies that look at state failure assume that local power struggles are not very important in the formation of states because they focus on the state and its inability to perform. This way of thinking suggests that for a state to avoid failure, it needs the right mix of ability, credibility, and functioning institutions. Political processes that balance the needs and demands of both the state and society must support all of these (Karlsson, Malin, 2015, pp. 3–4). Elite politics significantly influence the internal structures of developing Asian states, often resulting in highly centralized bureaucracies. Korea and Indonesia's elite divisions from 1945 to 1950 and 1960 to 1975 were key in shaping centralized governments. State elites collaborated with the public and local elites, often taking control during imperial failures. Local elites and the people formed decentralized states like Indonesia in the late 1940s. However, colonial powers primarily influenced contemporary state-building in their former colonies, suggesting that indigenous players may not have been the primary source of such systems (Tuong Vu, 2010, pp. 156–158). The critical approach to state failure addresses the institutional approach's problems through two criticisms. One critique supports Foucault's 1980 assertion that the state still receives significant attention in political theory and governance, identifying the liberal international order and colonialism as the main causes of state failure. The primary flaw is the failure to consider local actors' agency, focusing instead on Western 11 policymakers' goals for preserving a liberal global order, like how discrimination depoliticizes domestic players (Karlsson, Malin, 2015, p. 5). The theory of elite conflict, primarily related to the power struggle between the KDP and PUK, explores the relevance of state-building theories in the KRI. It also examines the impact of this power struggle on the state-building process in the KRG from 2003 to 2023. The KRG is primarily known for its abundance of natural resources, particularly oil. Similarly, the abundance of rich resources can present challenges to the process of state-building; however, their proliferation can also give rise to issues such as civil war, corruption, regional hegemony, dual administrations, unequal benefit distribution, and intensifying power struggles. This study primarily scrutinizes how resources, oil, division, territory, borders, and the military—both internal and external—manifest themselves in each case. It's possible that power struggles influence the state-building process in KRG struggles and elite conflicts. 1.5 Methodological Framework and Approaches This thesis employs a research method, a qualitative approach, to examine how the power struggle between two major political parties, KDP and PUK, impacts the state-building process in KRI. To gather as much data as possible, this thesis will rely on various information sources, including interviews with members of the KDP, PUK, and other political parties in KRI, as well as academics with a thorough understanding of this case and the social sciences in general. Additionally, the methodology will employ a quantitative approach, drawing heavily from desk research, books, academic papers, and political agreements pertaining to the flow and management of conflict between the KDP and PUK. The research goals align with this method, which aims to clarify the complex power struggle between both political parties during the state-building process in KRI. In this thesis, I have conducted in-depth interviews to enrich my data and gain a deeper understanding of the impact of the power struggle between the KDP and PUK on the state-building process in the KRG from 2003 to 2023. I aim to improve 12 my data by conducting 11 semi-structured qualitative interviews with experts, members of parliament, and senior members of political parties who had firsthand knowledge of or were firsthand witnesses to the conflict between the KDP and PUK, as well as academics with knowledge of this case and the social sciences in general, which constitute an important and key component of this thesis. The interviewees who participated include Arsalan Baiz, the former deputy speaker of the Kurdistan Parliament and a member of the political bureau of the PUK; Rewaz Faiq, a former speaker of the Kurdistan Parliament and a member of the political bureau of the PUK; Ghazi Saaid, the head of the four branches of the Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU) and currently a member of its political bureau; Abubakr Karwani, a former member of the political bureau of the KIU and now a political observer; Falah Mustafa, senior foreign policy advisor to the president of the KRI and the first head of the KRG Department of Foreign Relations (DFR); Chnar S. Abdulla, a former member of the Kurdistan Parliament and currently a member of the political bureau of the KDP; Ibrahim Aziz, a member of the Komall political party; Haji Rekani, a leader and former member of the National Council of the Gorran Movement and one of the founders of the movement in the Bahdinan region; Mohammed Shareef, a lecturer at the University of Kurdistan Hewlêr (UKH) in the Department of International Relations and Diplomacy; Thomas Schmidinger, a lecturer at UKH and an associate professor in political science and international relations; and David Romano, a professor of political science at UKH. The interview process with each participant lasted between 30 and 50 minutes and was conducted in the KRG at the participants' offices between April and June 2024. You can view an overview of the interview questions and participant profiles: 1.5.a) Data Collection In the literature review, I employed a comprehensive and systematic approach to identify and analyze relevant sources on the topic of state-building in situations of internal conflict in KRI from 2003-2023. I conducted a thorough search across various databases, such as Google Scholar and JSTOR, using keywords like "the 19 Chapter 2 Historical Background 2.1 Introduction Since the 1970s, ideological divisions and internal political conflicts have primarily separated the KDP and the PUK. The relationship between these two major political parties is considered complex, with the Kurdish movement facing obstacles in the Algiers Agreement. The two parties declared a formal ceasefire in 1983 and formed a national front for the freedom of Iraqi Kurdistan. In 1986, they established a coalition, the PUK-KDP, and announced their intention to create a Kurdistan national front. The Gulf War of the 1990s significantly impacted the political dynamic between the KDP and PUK from 1991 onward. The civil war, which began in 1994, served as the primary catalyst for conflicts between the two parties. Although many Kurds attempted to mediate a ceasefire through the KNA's peace proposal, the party's fifty-fifty makeup limited its ability to influence the two sides. In 1998, a U.S. political initiative in the Kurdistan region of Iraq facilitated a meeting between Barzani and Talabani, leading to further negotiations through the Washington Agreement (Waisy, 2015, pp. 220-229). 2.2 Roots of the conflict between the KDP-PUK Kurdish leader Malla Mustafa Barzani returned to Baghdad after Abdal-Karim Qasim removed the monarchy system in 1958 and introduced a new constitution for the Republic of Iraq. However, Barzani and the Kurdish movement soon parted ways. During the Baath government, military conflict intensified, marked by airstrikes and attacks on Kurdish populations, including the forced relocation of Kurdish inhabitants. Following negotiations with Barzani's KDP in 1968, the Baath Party agreed to a memorandum in 1970 to establish autonomous Kurdishinhabited territories with a Kurdish majority. However, the implementation of the 1970 memorandum failed, and the 1974 autonomy statute fell short of Kurdish aspirations, leading to a full-scale conflict. The 1975 Algiers Agreement resolved the conflict and dealt a significant blow to the Kurdish movement. The Baghdadbased Revolutionary Command Council imposed its own version of autonomy, granting Erbil limited authority and enforcing Arabization in contested regions like 20 Kirkuk and Khanaqin. The government also destroyed villages along the borders with Iran and Turkey, forcing residents to relocate to government-controlled communities in the Autonomous Region or southern Iraq (Anderson and Stansfield, 2003, pp. 67-68; Patton, 2019, pp. 139-144). Some KDP members believed that Barzani's decision to align with the new administration, avoid challenging government forces, and abolish political parties was a left-wing and right-wing attempt to expel the parties, thereby contributing to the escalation of conflicts in Kurdistan. Omar Mustafa, Jalal Talabani, and Ibrahim Ahmed, members of the KDP's political bureau, spoke out against Barzani's policies. In Rania, they met with Barzani to review the Iraqi government agreement, which they argued did not meet Kurdish expectations. Barzani responded that the Kurdish population was exhausted and might demand independence at a later time. Due to Barzani's demand for Ibrahim Ahmed's resignation as Secretary General, the Political Bureau was unable to establish a negotiating body between the Kurdistan Democratic Party and Barzani to present Kurdish demands to Iraq's government. In 1964, the Politburo held a meeting in Mewat, withdrawing Barzani's authority to negotiate with the Iraqi government. Barzani subsequently removed key Peshmerga leaders, leading to the dissolution of the KDP. However, Barzani retained considerable influence, and the KDP remained committed to his promises. Barzani held his sixth congress in Baghdad, expelling several old leaders and appointing new ones. Aggressive fighting later erupted between Barzani and Ahmed Talabani's group due to their disagreements. In 1966, Talabani's group broke away from Barzani and began fighting against him, aided by Iraq's government and Kurdish tribes, who were labeled Jash (McDowall, 2004, p. 325; Anderson and Stansfield, 2003, pp. 7174; Patton, 2019, pp. 147-148). Jalal Talabani, a long-standing adversary of Mulla Mustafa, was the first to step into the power vacuum after the 1970 Algiers Accord. Upon his return to Beirut, the party assigned Talabani as its representative in Damascus to safeguard Mulla Mustafa Barzani. He later traveled to Damascus, where the Syrian government supported him in the battle against the Iraqi Baath regime. The Socialist Movement of Kurdistan (KSM) and the covert Marxist-Leninist group Komala 21 united to form the PUK in Damascus in 1975, with the PUK bringing the two groups under its leadership. The failure of the uprising was allegedly attributed to the incapacity of feudalist, tribalist, and bourgeois rightist elements. Considering the PUK's declaration of support for Iraqi democracy and Kurdish autonomy, they, along with all left-wing and progressive forces, demanded the overthrow of the regime, despite their forced relocation to Ramadi. In August 1976, Idris and Masoud Barzani, along with Sami Abd al-Rahman, started the KDP-Provisional Leadership (KDP-PL). The program, which had shifted to a formal communist position, faced opposition in both the United States and Iran. Masoud Barzani did not return to Iraqi Kurdistan until Malla Mustafa Barzani died in 1979. Dr. Mahmud Uthman, previously chairman of the KDP's former Executive Bureau, led a third group to enter the political race. The KDP expressed disapproval of its previous reliance on outside forces and did not absolve itself of responsibility. The 1959 secret Pasok group reorganized as the Kurdish Socialist Party in September 1976, with the ultimate goal of uniting Kurdistan as a whole (McDowall, 2004, pp. 343-344). 2.3 Iran-Iraq War The changing dynamics of the conflict between the KDP and PUK involved the PKK, Iran, and Turkey in the power struggle within the IKR. The internal conflict, compounded by the involvement of external actors during the eight-year war between Iraq and Iran from 1980 to 1988, saw the PUK frequently switch allies, alternating between Syria, Iraq, and Iran. In 1986, the PUK signed an agreement with Iran to challenge the Iraqi government until Saddam's removal, with Iran providing money, weapons, and medical supplies. This strategy exposed the limitations of the Kurdish movement. Syria’s support for the PUK, a rival of the KDP, and Turkey’s opposition to Kurdish national ambitions within Turkey and neighboring regions influenced the KDP’s stance toward Iran, as the KDP also sought an ally to retaliate for the Algiers Agreement. From 1985 to 1988, the Kurdish minority placed considerable pressure on the Iraqi administration. During this period, the KDP and PUK briefly developed a strategy that enabled guerrilla warfare against government forces. In 1987, they formed the Iraqi Kurdish Front 22 in pursuit of self-determination (McDowall, 2004, pp. 351-352; Bengio, 2012, pp. 171-173; Mazen, 2019, p. 69). However, in November 1986, Iran, having lost its strong position in the war, intervened to help form a Kurdish coalition against the Iraqi regime. After a few days of negotiations, Iran mediated between the Talabani and Barzani parties, and, after a long time, the division between both political parties led to an agreement signed by Jalal Talabani and Idris Barzani. Shortly after the agreement, Idris Barzani passed away at the end of January 1987, dealing a setback to the peace settlement movement. However, the extension of the accord marked the first substantial progress in forming the Kurdistan Front. Several Kurdish political parties-initiated discussions about an operational framework in 1987. In May 1988, the Kurdistan Front was formed by the Iraqi Kurdistan branch’s communist party, mainly the Kurdistan People’s Party, along with the Kurdish Socialist Party, the PUK, and the KDP. However, the front's inability to pool troops and resources caused each side to focus on its own problems. Nonetheless, this strategy brought the parties together and prevented further fighting (Waisy, 2015, pp. 221-222). Declining relations created political issues for the KDP and the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). In 1983, they united to wage war against Turkey and Iraq. However, by the 1990s, their objectives had shifted, with the PKK establishing strongholds in remote highland regions. Due to the Iraqi Kurds' reliance on Turkey, the PKK became the target of a massive offensive in 1992 aimed at driving it out of the border regions and into the KRI. This political constraint undermined the Kurdish cause, and cross-border collaboration damaged Kurdish movements and governments in both Turkey and Iraq. The Kurds declared a federation in Iraq, as their ambitions hinged on preventing the PKK from achieving its goals. They regained control over remote border areas and sought Turkey’s support for their autonomy. However, Turkish forces managed to access northern Kurdistan, underscoring the complex regional dynamics (Bengio, 2012, pp. 205206). Talabani established Ankara liaison offices by developing a channel with the city. 23 During a 1992 meeting with Prime Minister Demirel, Talabani brought up Turkey's vilayet in Mosul. Demirel chuckled at Iraq's breach of duty and Turkey's democratic process but agreed to discuss the matter. They encouraged Turkey to consider annexing Kurdistan, a region of Iraq. Exploiting the PKK's dependence, Ankara launched a large-scale offensive in the border region during October and November 1992 against the PKK. The KDP and PUK did not cooperate with the PKK. Although the Front managed to apprehend the majority of the captives, the operation sparked controversy. Relying on Iraqi Kurds, Ankara signaled acceptance of the situation, even though it refused to officially recognize the Kurdish administration. In August 1993, Turkey provided the Erbilbased Kurdish administration with US$13-5 million in aid (McDowall, 2004, p. 384). 2.4 Gulf War The changing dynamics of the conflict between the KDP and the PUK were influenced by the involvement of the USA in regional politics. A few days after the ceasefire on February 28, 1991, which marked the end of the US-led coalition's war for Kuwait's liberation, an uprising occurred in northern Iraq. During the Gulf War, Iraqi forces took no action to suppress the uprising. However, special elements within the Iraqi government and allied troops violently crushed the revolt. In the north and east, hundreds of thousands of Iraqi Kurds fled to the borders with Turkey and Iran. Many lost their lives in the mountains and from the obstacles they encountered. While the Kurds were likely fleeing, their allies in the Gulf War established a safe haven, and the UN Security Council approved relief assistance through Resolution 688. The Kurdish political parties gradually took control of Duhok, Erbil, and Sulaimania. Not only did they have to manage the immediate crisis, but they also faced the lingering effects of the 1980s, which had left cities devastated and forced many people to relocate (Ozdemir, 2012, pp. 2833; Ahmad, 2012, p. 57). Since 1991, the Gulf War in Iraqi Kurdistan has significantly influenced the political dynamic between the KDP and PUK. Iraqi President Saddam Hussein launched an attack to control Kuwait in 1990, igniting the Gulf War (Ahmad, 2012, 24 p. 58). The attack on Kuwait presented a significant opportunity for the Iraqi Kurds and the two major political parties, the KDP and PUK, under the leadership of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. It also established a no-fly zone over northern Iraq, enforced by the USA and a coalition of other nations, leading to the withdrawal of the Iraqi regime's army from Kuwait. The purpose of this intervention was to protect Iraq's Kurdistan region from the Iraqi government. The power struggle between the KDP and PUK, which had been ongoing since the late 1980s, intensified, with both parties focusing on their rivalry rather than external security threats. The conflict escalated, resulting in increased armed hostility and the division of Kurdish lands into separate jurisdictional areas. The United States and other international actors actively sought to resolve the conflict between the KDP and PUK. In 1998, the US brokered the Washington Agreement, establishing a power-sharing plan between the two parties and a unified Kurdish government in the Kurdistan region of Iraq. However, the calm was short-lived, as conflict resumed in 1994. The US, once again attempting to stabilize the region, deployed troops to safeguard the fragile ceasefire between the KDP and PUK and to shield Iraqi Kurds from the Iraqi government’s military threat. The presence of US military personnel contributed to a reduction in killings between the two parties, though tensions remained high. The situation worsened in 1996 when the KDP invited the Iraqi regime's army to Erbil, aiming to seize control of the city. The international community strongly condemned the conflict and advocated for a peaceful resolution. Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, the US continued mediating between the two parties. In 2005, the KDP and PUK reached an agreement to establish the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), which has remained relatively unified despite occasional conflicts (McDowall, 2004, pp. 369-371; Anderson and Stansfield, 2003, pp. 95-99). 2.5 Washington Agreement What sort of power-sharing did the Washington Agreement (WA) establish between the KDP and PUK? A new political setting emerged in the KRG when the KDP and the Kurdistan National Liberation Army (PKLA) initiated a peace process in 1997. The two major political parties met for the first time in February 1998 in Shaqlawa. Sami Abdul Rahman and Jawher Namiq Salim led the KDP 25 mission, while Dr. Kamal Fouad, Omar Said Ali, and Arsalan Bayaez represented the PUK team. The meetings focused on building trust, discussing the implementation of the ceasefire, cessation of media attacks, release of prisoners, halt to expulsions, formation of a joint committee to monitor compliance with SCR 986, and encouraging public service offices to collaborate more effectively. After the United States revived its political initiative in Iraqi Kurdistan in 1998, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs David Welsh visited the region to meet with Masoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani, offering the Washington Agreement as a platform for further negotiations. The visit led to the signing of the Washington Agreement on September 17, 1998, building on earlier discussions in Shaqlawa and Koysanjaq. The agreement aimed to foster cooperation between the two political parties, potentially leading to the formation of a provisional government in Erbil. Multi-party elections were planned to unify the KNA and the KRG. However, in practice, the implementation of the issues agreed upon during the Shaqlawa talks showed limited success (Anderson and Stansfield, 2003, p. 100; Rogg and Rimscha, 2007, p. 829). People have actively attempted to resolve various issues, with differing degrees of success. These efforts include regularizing travel between Suleimania and Erbil, creating additional civil service jobs funded by the KDP, and maintaining the ban on using media to spread false information about the opposing side. The primary challenge in implementing the Washington Agreement was clearly understanding its key components. This was particularly important for restoring orders in Erbil, Suleimania, and Duhok; sharing revenue; forming a temporary united government; reuniting the Kurdish National Assembly (KNA); addressing security issues, especially with the PKK; allowing IDPs to return; and deciding when to hold multi-party elections. The PUK emphasized that the next step under the Washington Agreement was to promote peace in the Kurdistan region of Iraq. Erbil, the capital, needed to normalize conditions, followed by the equitable distribution of funds in Suleimania and Duhok. A provisional administration had to be established, given governmental authority, and the borders with Turkey and Iran secured once governance was in place. By 2003, both major political parties had largely stopped concerning themselves with the PKK, as they were frustrated 26 by its activities in Iraqi Kurdistan. Despite the challenges, the Washington Agreement offered a range of solutions, reflecting the US's recognition of the complexities involved in quickly uniting the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) (Anderson and Stansfield, 2003, pp. 101-102). 27 Chapter 3 Reconciliation & Reconstruction 3.1 Introduction Chapter 3 explores the Kurdish political initiatives aimed at mending fences and rebuilding trust, specifically focusing on the dynamic between the KDP and PUK. It will examine how their relationship changed during the 2003 Iraq War and how the 2005 Iraqi Constitution impacted them. Political perspectives, economic factors, geographical obstacles, and security concerns are the four pillars upon which the KDP and PUK may either reconcile or remain at odds. The PKK, Turkey, and Iran are external factors that complicate the situation, shaping alliances and antagonisms among stakeholders; they also play important roles in influencing the course of KDP-PUK relations. This chapter aims to shed light on the delicate balance between the ongoing calls for unity and progress in the Kurdistan Region and the pursuit of long-term reconciliation. 3.2 KDP-PUK Relations during the Iraqi War of 2003 The changing dynamics in KDP-PUK relations after 2003 provided a good opportunity for the KRG's state-building process to shift dynamics and improve relations between both sides. Romano pointed out that, around 2003, the KDP and PUK recognized that the overthrow of Saddam’s regime would bring both opportunities and risks. They realized the need to move beyond their conflict and present a united front to Baghdad and the international community. As a result, they worked to unify their administrations and redistribute power among themselves. This was a favorable opportunity for the state-building process in the KRI, aligning with Romano's argument that the KRI's autonomy and security infrastructure make it a more suitable partner for state-building than Iraq (Romano, 8 June 2024). After 2003, the dynamics between the KDP and PUK changed significantly due to new opportunities for the state-building process in the KRG. Ibrahim Aziz pointed out that the US-led coalition's intervention in Iraq forced both parties to reconsider their previously strained relations and work towards unifying the 28 region by ending the two separate governments in the Yellow and Green Zones. The fall of Saddam Hussein's regime required both parties to collaborate more closely, leading to extensive negotiations that resulted in the strategic agreement between Barzani and Talabani. This agreement marked a significant step toward cooperation, driven by the new political landscape post-2003. It was indeed an opportunity for the KRI’s state-building process, as its experience and infrastructure offered a solid foundation for future collaboration and development. In contrast, Iraq faced significant challenges in achieving stability and effective governance (Aziz, June 8, 2024). Likewise, the period between 2003 and 2005 saw both the merging of the two administrations and the establishment of mutual trust within the KRI. Furthermore, Rewaz Faiq emphasizes that Masoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani both played important roles in creating a unified KRG, recognizing that if two governments persisted, the Kurds would not have a strong role in the new Iraq (Faiq, 23 April 2024). Several factors led both political parties to re-establish contact during the 2003 Iraqi War. Most interviewees mentioned that the first reason was the significant role played by the Americans in reconciling the KDP and PUK, having already contributed to the ceasefire during the 1990s civil war and partially to the Washington Agreement of 1998. The United States led their military campaign against Saddam Hussein with their allies and sought to unite the PUK and KDP, as they needed an ally in the region. The second reason is that both major political parties in the KRG, the KDP and PUK, seemingly recognized that continuing their conflict would neither benefit them nor advance the Kurdish cause. As a result, both sides began making conciliatory gestures, while also striving to gain the Kurds' support by promoting the Kurdish national agenda and improving the region's socioeconomic conditions (interview, 2024). However, the third reason, from this perspective, is more rational, as noted by Thomas Schmidinger, who emphasizes that the Americans sought to unite the PUK and KDP to eradicate pockets of Islamist armed groups in the border region with Iran, as well as various other Islamist groups in the Halabja district. Likewise, he points out that Saudi Arabia and Iran were supporting these Islamist groups in the KRG (Schmidinger, 23 May 2024). In addition, Bengio argues that these 35 countries hindered the plan’s success. Due to their connections with Turkey and Iran, the KDP and PUK pressured the KRG to lift restrictions on Iraqi imports of goods from these countries. Currently, agriculture accounts for only 4% of the KRI's GDP, down from over 20% in the 1970s. Recent droughts and agricultural water loss prompted the government to allocate funds in 2021 to build several dams, intended to retain water and reduce consumption (Abdullah & Gray, 2022, p. 4). During their term, both the KDP and PUK focused on expanding their support base by hiring large numbers of Peshmerga members and staff after 2003, prioritizing excessive spending on salaries instead of investing in necessary infrastructure. Despite receiving a generous 17% share of the national budget from Baghdad, the KRG failed to use the funds efficiently, falling short of building the proper infrastructure required for successful state-building. Effective statebuilding heavily depends on a healthy economy, yet the KRG suffered from mismanaged resources, with most funds allocated to expanding voter pools through increases in Peshmerga forces and public sector employment under the KDP and PUK. Despite the KRG's strong economy and income, poor fund allocation and the ongoing power struggle between the two political parties resulted in a severe economic and political crisis (Saad, May 8, 2024). After 2003, the KRG received a national budget share from the Iraqi government, which was divided into two parts. Arsalan Baiz pointed out that the KRG’s budget was twice the size of Jordan’s budget. However, at that time, the PUK and KDP failed to develop suitable infrastructure for the KRG's state-building process. Instead, both political parties focused on expanding their Peshmerga forces and hiring an excessive number of employees, which contributed to a severe crisis in the region after 2014 (Baiz, April 22, 2024). CGeographic Following the establishment of the KRG in the 1990s after the Gulf War, the KRI became informally divided into two main zones controlled separately by the KDP and PUK. This division arose primarily from ideological differences and 36 leadership power struggles rather than ethnic or sectarian affiliations. As a result, each zone developed distinct characteristics reflecting the differing policies and priorities of their respective ruling parties. Historically, the KDP and PUK have maintained separate domains of control within the KRG. Since the 1990s, these divisions have been marked by two major zones, with Erbil serving as the KDP's yellow zone and Sulaymania representing the PUK's green zone (Khdhir, 2015, pp. 103-115). There were agreements on most issues during the tenure of Nechirvan Barzani as prime minister and Qubad Talabani as deputy prime minister. Mohammed Shareef pointed out that Qubad specifically held the position of prime minister for the Green Zone, while Nechirvan served as prime minister for the Yellow Zone. Matters related to areas where the PUK held dominance were managed by Qubad, with any Green Zone issues promptly forwarded to his office. Similarly, issues concerning the Yellow Zone were sent directly to Nechirvan’s office, reflecting a continuation of the power-sharing agreement. The division of power extended even to positions abroad. For example, KRG representation in Washington remained vacant until the early 2000s, when it was filled by Bayan Sami Abdul Rahman. Bayan had previously served as the KRG's representative in London, but when the KDP moved her to Washington, Karwan Jamal took over the London position. This transition highlighted a lack of agreement and understanding between both parties (Shareef, May 23, 2024). Both the KDP and PUK continue to control geographic territory in the KRG, specifically in the Yellow and Green Zones. Arsalan Baiz noted that since KRG unification, both the KDP and PUK have refrained from taking official positions within each other’s traditional zones of influence. Specifically, the KDP has not held prominent positions in the PUK-governed Green Zone, nor has the PUK assumed key positions in the Yellow Zone, which remains under KDP control, effectively maintaining two administrations (Baiz, April 22, 2024). Three distinct ethnic groups inhabit Kirkuk city: Kurds, Arabs, and Turkmen. Based on UN estimates, the entire population of Kirkuk is roughly 900,000, with more than 50% being Kurdish. Redistricting, the deportation of Turkmen and Kurds, and the immigration of Arabs, mostly Shiites from southern Iraq, were all 37 part of Saddam Hussein's Arabization efforts, which significantly altered the city's demographics. Although laws acknowledge these historical injustices, even after Saddam’s downfall, Article 58 of the 2004 Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) mandated a referendum on Kirkuk's final status. The 2005 constitution reiterated these guidelines and required the process to be completed by December 31, 2007 (Ahmad, 2012, pp. 184-186; Wolff, 2010). The power dynamic between the PUK and KDP, the two major Kurdish parties, will likely shift with the incorporation of Kirkuk into the KRI. For the Kurds, concerns remain about the future stability and security of an expanded KRG, as well as the strategic alliance between Erbil and Ankara, Turkey's largest foreign investor in the region. As Baghdad and Erbil continue to discuss the political status and administration of the disputed territory of Kirkuk, the city has come to symbolize Iraq's tumultuous political process. This situation complicates local negotiations over power-sharing agreements, giving spoilers more opportunities to obstruct or delay genuine settlements at the local level. Additionally, Kurdish power struggles between the KDP, PUK, and the rising Gorran movement further complicate matters. Growing resistance to a referendum on Kirkuk's integration into the KRI, along with the strong backing of Iraq’s mostly secular Shiite coalition, suggests that Arab and Turkmen interests may diverge. The power dynamic surrounding Kirkuk now heavily opposes Kurdish ambitions, as both Ankara and Baghdad are equally against this outcome (Wolff, 2010, pp. 1370-1372). DSecurity The KRG and the United States have collaborated for years, with Iraqi Kurdish forces playing a crucial role in the war against ISIS. The Nineveh Operations Command in Makhmour, Iraq, was a rare joint effort between the Kurdish Peshmerga and the Iraqi Security Forces. However, the North KDP in Erbil and Duhok and the South PUK in Sulaymania divided the KRG's territory and Peshmerga between themselves. The Kurdistan National Assembly attempted to unify its security apparatus under the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs, but the KDP and PUK went to war in 1994, resulting in the partition of the KRG. The civil war between 1994 and 1998 reversed much of the progress achieved after 1990, with the conflict driven largely by the Peshmerga. This division remains present in the 38 KRG today (Hama, 2018, pp. 42-43). Since the U.S. invasion in 2003, the KRG has not been able to depoliticize its forces. From 2005 until ISIS emerged in 2011, the KRG attempted to unify the security apparatus under the “Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs” with a legislative resolution aimed at abolishing partisan militaries. However, the Peshmerga forces remain divided into two divisions: divisions 70 and 80. Each division is controlled by a separate party, with both maintaining complete monopoly over their forces in their respective zones, taking orders only from their political parties rather than from the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs (Helfont, 2017, p. 3). The Asayish, or Security, is the chief organization responsible for handling major crimes such as smuggling, espionage, and terrorism. The Kurds' civil war in 1994 led to the creation of the Asayish and separate Ministries of Interior, both of which emerged from the ranks of the Peshmerga after the 1991 revolt. The parallel development of these organizations remains unresolved, and the fear that politically segregated organizations might investigate crimes such as rackets exposes them to serious abuse. More covert organizations, like the Azhanci Parastini Asayeshi Harema Kurdistan and the Dazgahe Zaniyare, handle intelligence operations. These groups address both internal and external threats, becoming politicized centers of significant power. The Zaniyare and its associated Counter-Terrorism Group (CTG) have reported better working relationships with Baghdad than with their counterparts in Erbil. The gendarmerie of the KRG, known as the Zerevani, includes a faction of the PUK called the Emergency Force, while the KDP retains the name Zerevani. These units, referred to as Peshmerga forces, operate in both KDPand PUK-controlled territories (Andrés, 2020, pp. 111-114; Borsari, 2022, p. 4). For years, the armed forces have discussed the possibility of a unified Peshmerga. Thomas Schmidinger pointed out, however, that this has never materialized, and it is widely known that these Peshmerga forces are responsible for maintaining the union between the KDP and PUK. Splits within the PUK have already occurred twice to some extent; one was the split led by Nawshirwan Mustafa, and more significantly, the split between Bafel and Lahur Talabani. The 39 KDP has not experienced such divisions, possibly because Masoud Barzani is still alive. It is well known that internal conflicts within the PUK escalated after the death of Mam Jalal, and Harahan could no longer intervene due to health issues. The next generation inherited this power structure, with cousins fighting each other, raising the possibility that a similar scenario could occur between Nechirvan and Masrour Barzani, given the factions within the KDP. This factionalism poses a potential danger, as it could lead to the formation of more splinter groups in the future. While this would not be as concerning if the KDP and PUK were merely regular political parties, the involvement of armed forces for territorial control complicates the situation. It raises not just the issue of who controls the territory but also who controls the resources (Schmidinger, May 23, 2024). That is, not only can the KDP and PUK not bring together their forces to create national forces under KRG control. Arsalan Baiz pointed out that the PUK cannot even unify its own army forces under centralized PUK control, as many members have their own forces named after them. The KDP faces a similar issue, with its members leading separate groups of military forces. If the KDP and PUK are unable to unite their military forces under the KRG's authority, it raises serious doubts about their ability to establish a state. This failure significantly affects the state-building process in the KRG, as both political parties have been unable to unify the Peshmerga (Baiz, April 22, 2024). 3.4 External Actors APKK The Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and Turkey have turned the KRG into a battleground for their regional conflict. Abobakr Karwani pointed out that the PKK, as an external actor, significantly impacts the KRG’s stability, security, and growth in numerous ways. If the PKK continues its political efforts in Turkey and engages in non-violent civil resistance on the streets of Diyarbakir, the international community may recognize their martyrs. However, the PKK faces significant challenges in achieving its political objectives if it continues fighting the Turkish 40 army along the KRG’s borders, including in areas like Amide, Kanimaze, and Qandil, which have been severely affected by the conflict (Karwani, May 14, 2024). The PKK's apparent disregard for lessons learned in the KRI is a notable weakness. Arsalan Baiz discussed how the PKK assumes a superior stance, labeling itself as the sole legitimate representative and commander of the Kurdish people. In contrast, we recognize that every group has distinctive qualities, strengths, and weaknesses. Our region boasts a thriving economy, wellestablished governments, and valuable experience in managing our affairs. Unfortunately, the PKK lacks tangible achievements in the northern Kurdistan territory. Unlike us, they cannot claim governance or the implementation of their ideas in even a single village. Given this stark contrast, it would greatly benefit the PKK to acknowledge and learn from our accomplishments rather than creating problems for us. In this way, the PKK poses a significant threat to the KRG's state-building process (Baiz, April 22, 2024). The PKK's presence and activities have significantly impacted the KRG's statebuilding process and opened the door for Turkish intervention along the KRG’s border. The PKK's continuous armed conflict causes destabilization, creating instability and uncertainty across the KRG landscape. Regular outbreaks of violence threaten safety and discourage investors, hindering the region's economic growth and development (Phillips, 2008, p. 7). The PKK established contacts with the KDP and PUK in the early 1980s, shaped by both historical and current factors. The historical context and the KRG’s statebuilding process have influenced the relationship between the PUK, KDP, and PKK, significantly impacting Rabia, Sinjar, Kirkuk, and Makhmur during the Iraqi civil war. From 2014 to 2017, PKK operations primarily focused on the Qandil Mountains. These dynamics will shape the KRG authorities' response to the PKK issue (Amalyan, 2018, pp. 50-52). Shingal, a strategically significant town near the Syrian border, is contested by the KDP and PUK, both seeking to expand their influence. Yazidi defense forces also contest the region, while Turkey aims to separate the PKK’s Syrian holdings through its KDP partners. The Shingal 41 Resistance Units (YBS) have clashed with KRG fighters, highlighting the ongoing Kurdish civil war (Holland-McCowan, 2017, p. 15). BTurkey The power struggles between the KDP and PUK in the KRG, along with pressure from external actors, impact the relationship between the two political parties in the region. The following briefly discusses the relationship between the KRG and regional powers like Turkey and Iran, which have the greatest impact on the statebuilding process and in shaping the KRI’s political conflicts and economic dynamics. Politically and economically, Turkey has had a significant impact on the KRI and Iraq since the fall of Saddam. As a major investor and economic partner, Turkey has contributed to the growth of the KRG's economy, which heavily depends on services and oil exports. Turkey is the KRG’s largest oil buyer. As a U.S.-favored partner, Turkey's Sunni influence on the KRG and its NATO membership have strengthened the KRG’s relationship with Iraq, especially after the withdrawal of U.S. troops (Hussein, 2022, p. 25). The increasing problems between the PUK and KDP are also a result of Turkey's growing pressure on the PUK and the serious threats it poses. Thomas Schmidinger pointed out that Turkey has attacked several targets in Sulaymaniyah, but it has not yet directly targeted the PUK. Ultimately, if Turkey puts pressure on the KDP, it limits the party's ability to comply with its demands. Turkey also maintains its own military forces, as evidenced by the heavily fortified Turkish military positions along the KRI’s border, and it is undeniably playing a significant political role in the region now (Schmidinger, May 23, 2024). There are two factors that affect the state-building process in the KRG: internal and external. However, the internal factor significantly influences the KRI's development more than the external one, as internal unity has limited the external factor's influence. Arsalan Baiz notes that the power struggle between the PUK and KDP, along with the division of authority “between” the KDP-controlled Yellow Zone, has allowed Turkey and the PKK to operate freely. There are more than thirty Turkish military positions in the Duhok area, and the KDP’s alignment with Ankara has a significant impact on the Yellow Zone. Similarly, the area controlled 42 by the PUK, Iran, and the PKK gives these actors freedom to act as they wish. Tehran's influence has a considerable impact on Sulaymaniyah, recognized as the Green Zone (Baiz, April 22, 2024). Regional issues in these situations are currently influenced only by Iran and Turkey, as neither Syria nor the Gulf countries can effectively project power in Iraq. In a speech at the Independence of Kurdistan Conference at the American University of Kurdistan-Duhok (AUK) in 2016, David Romano stated that Turkey has strong strategic and economic reasons to align itself with the KRG. Turkey also seeks assistance in containing the PKK, given the overlap between various Kurdish movements. This alignment could reflect a convergence of interests, making Ankara more strategic than just an ephemeral partner for the KRG. However, Romano noted that Ankara may not be a reliable partner for the KRG. "It may sound like a contradiction, but remember August 2014, when ISIS was threatening the KRI? It was not Turkey that came in time to help, but rather Iran and various Kurdish parties from across Kurdistan" (Romano, 2016). CIran For political, economic, and security reasons, Iran has a major impact on the power dynamic between the KRG and Iraq at large. During Kurdistan’s civil war, Iran sided with the PUK against the KDP, despite Turkey’s support for the KDP. This highlights how closely Iran has aligned with the PUK (Hussein, 2022, p. 27). There is persistent pressure from Iran on the KRG, and whenever discussions arise about the conflict between the PUK and KDP and its impact on the region, as well as the hindrance to KRG’s development, external actors like Iran and Turkey are always mentioned. Thomas Schmidinger notes that Iran is increasing its pressure on the KDP. However, it is not just the PKK that operates in Qandil— both the Turks and Iranians are also present there. The borders play a significant economic and political role for the KRG (Schmidinger, May 23, 2024). Iran is always a significant threat to Iraq, especially to the KRG’s state-building process, and it possesses a wealth of levers and tools, particularly within the Iraqi federal government. In a speech at the Independence of Kurdistan Conference 43 at the American University of Kurdistan-Duhok (AUK) in 2016, David Romano noted that Iran holds power over several political parties in the KRI, as well as the PKK. It also maintains influence with Baghdad and has the potential to obstruct any negotiations for KRI independence. Iran could leverage its influence in Baghdad to block the success of a negotiated Kurdish independence process. It can also pressure Kurdish parties, particularly those in Sulaymaniyah, on a variety of issues. Iran has the capacity to create instability in the region, raising serious concerns. Additionally, it could impose a blockade on the Kurdistan region; if done in coordination with Turkey, it could effectively cut off the region’s energy supply. However, if Kurdistan is exporting, there are still various options available (Romano, 2016). Regional powers like Iran and Turkey influenced the 2017 referendum in Kirkuk, which was held without Iraqi authorization, with the blessing of non-Kurdish minority groups, and without consultation with neighboring countries—deeply angering and upsetting the Kurds. However, with the backing of regional powers and the U.S., Iran and Turkey allowed Iraqi Prime Minister Abadi to act. Iraq’s neighbors, Turkey and Iran, support Iraq’s territorial unity and oppose the KRG (Abdullah, 2018, p. 4). The KDP and PUK should adopt a similar approach by maintaining a balanced relationship with both Turkey and Iran rather than favoring one over the other. Falah Mustafa and Arsalan Baiz observe that the geography of the KRI dictates its approach to dealing with both sides, as it shares a long border with Turkey and Iran, and both political parties have historically maintained ties with these countries. The KRG and these countries depend on each other. In today’s world, it is impossible to avoid engaging with neighbors, which is why countries strive to maintain a zero-problems policy. They aim to resolve issues to foster peace and promote joint programs, cooperation, and coordination. To maintain a balanced relationship, the KDP and PUK have attempted to encourage the KRG to adopt a similar approach toward both Iran and Turkey (Mustafa & Baiz, 2024). The PUK and Iran have formed a partnership due to their proximity, historical events, and a shared desire to counterbalance the KDP's relations with Turkey. 44 They collaborated during the Iran-Iraq conflict and the Kurdish civil war in the 1990s, providing mutual support for military operations in Iraq. The PUK also aligns Shia forces loyal to Iran with Kurdish Peshmerga in Diyala province, aiming to enhance Tehran's influence in the KRI and Iraq. This partnership is crucial to their mutual goals (Sommer, 2021, p. 51). Iran is exerting pressure on the KRG, particularly on the KDP, which has struggled to meet Iran's demands. Chnar Saad asserts that this is due to the KDP's commitment to protecting its own interests as well as Iran's. "Our neighbors should not treat the KRG in this way, as we are not their actors, and this is where the conflict arises" (Saad, May 15, 2024). 51 It is crucial to emphasize that Masoud Barzani personally initiated the referendum, and this was not a decision made by the Kurdistan regional parliament. Furthermore, the political power struggle significantly influenced the timing of the referendum (Mustafa, 2022, p. 66). Nearly all political parties withdrew from the referendum, leaving Masoud Barzani, the leader of the KDP, as the only one who remained committed, considering it his lifetime project. Abobakr Karwani stated, "I don't know. Maybe someone told Barzani to do the referendum, and we will support you." The referendum's poor outcomes were not due to alliances but rather to the power struggle between the KDP and PUK (Karwani, May 14, 2024). According to former KRI President Masoud Barzani, after receiving approval from the Kurdish parties, he asked Qubad Talabani, the youngest son of the late Mam Jalal, along with Darbaz Kosrat and Mustafa Sayd Qadir, to accompany him to the U.S. He wanted them to hear his discussion about Kurdistan's rights and freedom, as well as how the U.S. viewed these issues. Barzani notes in his book that he wanted to reach out to party members to emphasize that the referendum was not just about Masoud Barzani but about the lives and futures of all Kurdistanis, regardless of their political, religious, or ethnic backgrounds (Barzani, 2020, p. 57). During the 2017 referendum, the shifting balance of power between the PUK and KDP had an impact, especially when people urged Barzani to move forward and disregard American advice. Thomas Schmidinger pointed out that Barzani received poor advice and faced significant issues with his legitimacy. Masoud Barzani, having already extended his presidency, received approval from the PUK for the first extension but not for the second. At this point, Barzani's authority as president was limited to the yellow zone and no longer recognized in the green zone. Another factor influencing the referendum and the shifting power dynamics between the two parties was the reinstallation of the parliament, which occurred before the referendum’s endorsement. However, the parliament’s speaker was living in exile in Sulaymaniyah. Institutional problems persisted, and if the referendum had succeeded, it could have resolved the legitimacy issues (Schmidinger, May 23, 2024). 52 According to Masoud Barzani (2020), when the meeting started, the PUK group appeared nervous. Nechirvan Barzani, the prime minister of the KRG, asked if there were any deals with Baghdad. The PUK members, both those aware of the deals and those who did not deny their existence, were in agreement. A later investigation revealed that Qassem Suleimani had broken a secret deal with some PUK members without the permission of the Kurdistan High Political Council or the Kurdish Presidency. Even top PUK members were unaware of this agreement between their party and the Hashd forces, which ultimately led to the capture of Kirkuk by the Iranian-backed Hashd al-Shaabi and Iraqi forces (Barzani, 2020, pp. 94-95). Barzani mentioned in his book Staking Our Claim that, during disagreements between Baghdad and Erbil, King Abdullah II of Jordan asked Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi and Masoud Barzani to reconcile in Jordan. Barzani agreed, but at the time, Kurdistan's airports were closed due to sanctions imposed by Baghdad. Abadi also agreed but with one condition: he would attend the meeting in Jordan only if Masoud Barzani announced on television that the referendum results were cancelled. Barzani wrote, "This was, of course, an enormously inappropriate precondition, as Abadi knew that no one had the authority to cancel the vote of millions of people” (Barzani, 2020, p. 96). According to Baiz, the European Union and the United States sent messages to Masoud Barzani, advising him not to proceed with the referendum due to its potential negative consequences. He also noted that Turkey and Iran opposed the referendum, and he confirmed that he was present when these messages were delivered. Baiz stated that half of the PUK supported the referendum, while others did not agree with it. He explained that, in 2005, NGOs conducted an unofficial referendum on independence in the KRI, with 95% of the people voting in favor. However, this referendum was not officially sanctioned, as only NGOs participated. In 2017, Kurdish leaders held a similar referendum, with 97% of the population voting for independence. However, both referendums failed due to conflicts between the KDP and PUK, which hindered the state-building process in the KRG (Baiz, April 22, 2024). The day of the referendum is our dream, but if we are waiting for a third opportunity, then we should hold it. However, Ghazi Saaid notes that if we 53 examine the first opportunity, provided by the Gulf War as de facto in the 1990s, and the second opportunity, which resulted in the establishment of federal systems following the removal of the Baath regime in 2003, the ISIS attack on the KRG also presented an opportunity. Yet, the subsequent economic, security, and political crises in the KRG, driven by conflicts between the two major parties, prevented us from seizing a third chance (Saaid, May 8, 2024). The Kurds voted in favor of the Iraqi constitution, believing it upholds their right to self-determination. However, Rewaz Faiq states that the Iraqi government argues holding a referendum violates the constitution, causing tension between Erbil and Baghdad. This is because Iraq exerts influence over the KRI and opposes Kurdish independence. In early October 2017, the balance between the PUK and KDP began to shift, but two key issues needed to be addressed. The first was that, according to an agreement Barzani made with the alliance after the ISIS war, the Peshmerga were expected to return to their previous positions, which Barzani did not implement. The second issue was a lack of unity, resulting in the KRG losing 51% of its territory (Faiq, April 23, 2024). 54 Chapter 5 The Current State of Conflict between the PDK-KDP 5.1 Introduction Chapter 5 delves into the ongoing conflict between the KDP and PUK, focusing on political disagreements, governance issues, economic power imbalances, financial allocations, and oil resource management. It critically evaluates the KDP and PUK's approaches to unifying Peshmerga forces and proposes strategies to foster cooperation while acknowledging the underlying distrust and deep-rooted factionalism. The chapter also examines the role of external actors, such as the US, Turkey, Iran, and Gulf States, in shaping localized developments. Understanding how international engagements influence local dynamics is critical for predicting future outcomes and determining whether the KDP-PUK feud will be resolved or escalate further. 5.2 Political Disagreements The geographical and clan differences, as well as the competing personal and political goals of their leaders, are at the heart of the KDP and PUK's power struggle. Recently, the parties' disagreements have intensified because Barzani, an authoritarian leader, refused to step down until October 2017 and prevented the region's Parliament from meeting for nearly two years. This led to tensions between the Change Movement (GM), the PUK, and Barzani. On May 17, 2016, Gorran and the PUK agreed to cooperate, marking a significant event in the region's politics and ending seven years of conflict between the two groups. However, the conflict also extended to Syria, where the KDP imposed a lockdown on YPG-held territory near Kurdistan's borders (Abdullah, 2018, pp. 3-4). The KRG's political disagreements are leading to two key outcomes: externally, countries like Iran and Turkey oppose the unification of Kurdish political parties. However, the internal conflicts have a stronger impact on the state-building process in the KRG. Arsalan Baiz stated, "I do apologize to Masoud Barzani, but this duty is on his shoulders, and the key is in his hands, given the absence of 55 Mam Jalal and Nawshirwan. Masoud Barzani needs to step away from the party’s rules and steer clear partisanship. It’s not appropriate for him to extend a warm welcome to someone who has left the PUK or other parties to join the KDP, as it suggests he is aligning himself with partisanship" (Baiz, April 22, 2024). The KDP and PUK are two distinct political parties, each with their own agenda. While the ideological differences between them are unclear, their disputes typically revolve around issues such as dominance, wealth, positions, and vision. Falah Mustafa notes that, in addition, their disagreements stem from the legacy of the late Mam Jalal Talabani. Talabani had an agreement with Masoud Barzani, and they agreed on how to collaborate, including a strategy for dealing with the United States. In 2002, they undertook an undeclared visit to the US, indicating that even before the regime's fall, they had agreed to cooperate. The historical background of mistrust and power struggles may have contributed to their differences, but now is the time for both parties to address these issues in a way that prioritizes the interests of the KRG, which remains the ultimate goal (Mustafa, May 15, 2024). The disagreements between the PUK and KDP over the governance of the KRG stem from the different perspectives each party holds. Rewaz Faiq states that their views on the economy, relations with Baghdad, and relations with regional actors differ, as shown by an in-depth analysis of the PUK-KDP relationship. The failure to implement agreements between the two parties followed the cancellation of earlier strategic agreements. When the PUK makes an agreement with the KDP, the KDP does not implement it; when the KDP makes an agreement, the PUK fails to implement it. As a result, there is now a lack of trust between them (Faiq, April 23, 2024). There are disagreements between the two major political parties due to fundamental differences between the PUK and KDP and other parties, with the PUK and KDP controlling territory and resources. Thomas Schmidinger pointed out that they are, in fact, two parasites or two de facto regimes, and it is unclear whether they would agree on a deal—or, at best, on a deal that somehow includes the PKK. The PKK also maintains control over small territories in the 56 mountains, which is crucial for its relations with Turkey and Iran. However, if the major Kurdish parties reach a consensus, the issue of smaller arms will not arise (Schmidinger, May 23, 2024). Sometimes, disagreements between political parties are beyond their control, and external factors can trigger a political crisis. Chnar Saad pointed out that the primary cause of the disagreement between the KDP and PUK is the lack of elections for a long time, which could help resolve numerous issues, including those involving Baghdad and neighboring states. The political focus in Iraq is primarily on governance, as addressing economic problems would ease tensions between the PUK and KDP, thereby significantly contributing to the KRG's development (Saad, May 15, 2024). Recognizing the KRG as a separate autonomous region granted it greater economic and security freedom, but the dream of full independence has remained elusive. A free Kurdistan, according to Talabani, was merely a "dream of poets." Barzani sought to enhance the KRG’s global standing, particularly with Turkey. However, the relationship between the KRG and Baghdad deteriorated, especially after 2010. Disputes over revenue sharing, Peshmerga forces, disputed territories, and oil exports between the KRG and Turkey undermined the KRG’s de facto independence and threatened Iraq's unity. These issues weakened the KRG’s autonomy while putting Iraq’s territorial integrity at risk. In response to the KRG withholding agreed oil revenues, Maliki cut its share of the national budget. Due to the ongoing tensions with Baghdad, Barzani refused to engage in negotiations and visited Baghdad only once (Hussein, 2022, p. 22). 5.3 Economic power-sharing imbalance The imbalance of economic power sharing between the KDP and PUK, driven by their joint pursuit of indigenous oil extraction, eventually led to a power struggle. After 2006, Nechirvan Barzani and Ashti Hawrami of the KDP formed and controlled a unified ministry. As a result, the KRG was able to export oil independently, and economic and military cooperation between Turkey and the KRG strengthened. This allowed the Barzanis to make decisions independently, 57 without consulting the PUK (Saleem & Skelton, 2020, p. 17). Rewaz Faiq highlighted the PUK's claim that they were unaware of the oil contract with Turkey. Although the PUK was part of the government at the time, they had no involvement in the deal, as only the KDP managed the agreement with Turkey (Faiq, April 23, 2024). However, disagreements over revenue sharing and export contracts have led to disputes between Erbil and Baghdad. For example, in 2011, the KRG signed a controversial deal with ExxonMobil to develop six exploration blocks in the region without obtaining approval from Baghdad. Baghdad criticized the move, arguing that it violated the constitution and undermined efforts to negotiate a fair revenuesharing agreement with the federal government (Gray, 2012, p. 35). At the time, both the KDP and PUK were benefiting from oil revenues, enjoying greater autonomy and self-determination. Between 2005 and 2017, there was relative silence on the question of independence, partly due to these favorable conditions. Consider how oil has influenced the relationship between Baghdad and Erbil, the dynamics between the KDP and PUK, and the role of power imbalances over oil resources in shaping the 2017 referendum (Mustafa, 2022, p. 96). The imbalances have produced mixed results. In 2014, the KRG formed a new cabinet that included representatives from both the KDP and PUK, signaling a renewed commitment to power-sharing and cooperation. However, underlying power struggles persist, particularly regarding the distribution of oil revenues. Without meaningful progress toward resolving these issues, the risk of further instability and division remains high (Saleem & Skelton, 2020, pp. 17-20). In 2014, the KRG faced financial difficulties due to declining oil prices, the rise of ISIS, and the loss of territory and resources. To address these challenges, the KRG increased oil production and exports directly, bypassing the authority of the Iraqi Federal Government. In response, Iraq halted the KRG's share of the national budget, further deepening the fiscal crisis. The KRG's heavy dependence on oil revenues exacerbated the hardship. Internal power imbalances between the KDP and PUK within the KRG weakened the governing structure, resulting in poor coordination, corruption, and policy paralysis, which 58 hindered resource efficiency and the provision of essential public services (Deqli Esposti, 2021, pp. 2325-2326). To gain more power in the struggle with the PUK, KDP’s control over the oil trade has been crucial. The KDP has become the key actor in negotiations with Turkey, enabling it to secure economic benefits and political favors from those relationships. Additionally, the KDP has hindered the development of petroleum resources in southern KRI, favoring its core northern areas. The recent acquisition of Kirkuk—previously controlled by the PUK and home to significant oilfields—may shift the balance of power among the three main groups: the PUK, KDP, and GM (Mills, 2016, p. 31). Through the KRG, the PUK and KDP have shared power and resources, maintaining stability in Kurdish territory. However, recent leadership changes have intensified the power struggle over the imbalance in their informal elite alliance. During the PUK's party congress in January 2020, Bafel Talabani and Lahur Sheikh Jangi were elected as co-leaders, consolidating control over the party's finances, security forces, and major institutions. This shift has raised concern within the KDP, which is why they have refused to meet with the PUK co-leaders. The KDP has strengthened its grip over the KRG and the region’s oil and gas infrastructure, leaving the PUK without the resources to counter these moves (Saleem & Skelton, 2020, pp. 21-22). The ongoing conflict between the KDP and PUK, along with imbalances in economic power sharing and the influence of smaller groups like the Gorran Movement and Kurdistan Islamic Parties, has significantly shaped the region’s political landscape. The persistent power struggles over resources, land, and oil have had a profound impact on the state-building process. These struggles are further complicated by the KDP's challenges in achieving independence, securing external favors, and resolving contested areas—largely due to the PUK’s preference for a united Iraq and ongoing competition between the two parties (Mustafa, 2022, p. 106). 5.4 Unification of Peshmerge Forces 59 How do the KDP and PUK approach the unification of Peshmerga forces? Since the KRI gained de facto sovereignty from Saddam Hussein in 1991, the public has called for the unification of the Peshmerga. The KDP and PUK initially agreed to unite their Peshmerga forces under the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs in 1992. However, the 1994 Kurdish civil war disrupted this effort. Although the KDP and PUK continue to operate independently, the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs underwent reorganization in 2010. Partisan factionalism has made it difficult for the KRI to establish democratic and stable civil-military relations. The need to unite and depoliticize the Peshmerga became urgent after the Islamic State launched a large-scale attack on Iraq in 2014 (Van Wilgenburg & Fumerton, 2015, pp. 1-2). The US, UK, and Germany have supported the Peshmerga reform effort in Iraq since the war against ISIS. The "Peshmerga of the Future" plan includes 35 proposals, such as an official security strategy, a new General Command, and a military doctrine. The plan also introduces a new recruitment approach based on competence, an overhaul of the salary system, and a unified strategy for weapons systems. However, the fall of Kirkuk in October 2017 exposed the severe challenges of reform, as tensions between the KDP and PUK persisted. The Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs has outlined five projects, but their scope and implementation status remain unclear. External support has primarily focused on the Peshmerga and senior KDP and PUK leaders, leaving out other key institutional actors. Additionally, the "Peshmerga of the Future" reform plan does not address the existing Peshmerga's practices and culture (Aziz & Cottey, 2021, pp. 235-237). What sort of unification could ease the conflict between the KDP and PUK? The institutional reform of the Peshmerga forces is crucial for ensuring stability and advancing the state-building process in the KRG and disputed areas. While the integration of PMFs into the ISF has not yet begun, the KRG has initiated essential efforts to modernize and institutionalize its fragmented forces (Borsari, 2022, p. 3). The inability to unify the Kurdish Peshmerga has had a significant impact on the 60 state-building process in the KRG, as the region still does not have national army forces. Arsalan Baiz pointed out that the PUK and KDP cannot bring their Peshmerga together. If the Peshmerga forces had been unified under the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs, the events of October 16 would not have occurred. However, the major issue facing both political parties is their inability to unite their respective armies. Many members from both sides maintain private forces, posing a serious threat to the KRG's future. Many members from both the PUK and KDP control private Peshmerga groups or personal security teams. For example, PUK commander Kosrat Rasul Ali commands a protection brigade named Hezekani Kosrat Rasul, consisting of 2,000 to 3,000 Peshmerga troops. Similarly, Bafel Talabani, son of Jalal Talabani, heads an anti-terror squad that operates independently of any government agency. In July 2014, KDP Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani used his personal security detail to protect Kirkuk’s oil fields (Van Wilgenburg & Fumerton, 2015, p. 5). If the KDP and PUK want to play a role as Kurds in the future of Iraq, pursue independence, or secure as much autonomy as possible, Thomas Schmidinger pointed out that both political parties must unify their Peshmerga forces. However, this unification has only progressed to the extent that the two parties could arrange some form of power sharing between them. The neighboring countries of the KRG also play a significant role, with the KDP closely aligned with Turkey and the PUK with Iran, making it very difficult to find a common position. 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A1 Appendix 1 Interview Questions 1. What were the changing dynamics in KDP-PUK relations after 2003? It was a good opportunity for the state-building process in the KRG. 2. What was the rationale behind the power-sharing agreement between the KDP and PUK after 2003? The power-sharing agreement between the two political parties helped the state-building process in the KRG after 2003. 3. What were the points fully agreed upon, and what points remained unresolved after 2003? 4. What were the turning points in KDP-PUK relations after 2003? 5. How did such developments affect the relations and mutual understanding between the KDP and PUK? What impact did they have on the state-building process in the KRG? 6. How has the establishment of the Gorran Party impacted domestic politics in the KRG, particularly regarding the relationship between the KDP and PUK since 2009? What impact did it have on the statebuilding process in the KRG? 7. How has the referendum impacted the relationship between Erbil and Baghdad, particularly between the KDP and PUK, since 2017? What impact did it have on the state-building process in the KRG? 8. What are the current disagreements between the KDP and PUK? What are the possible reasons and solutions from your perspective? All the above questions represent just a starting point for examining the impacts of the power struggle between the KDP and PUK on the statebuilding process in the KRG from 2003 to 2023. B1 Interviews Bibliography  Baiz, A. (2024). Interview with Arsalan Baiz, Kurdistan, Erbil, 22 April.  Faiq, R. (2024). Interview with Rewaz Faiq, Kurdistan, Erbil, 23 April.  Saaid, G. (2024). Interview with Ghazi Saaid, Kurdistan, Duhok, 3 May.  Karwani, A. (2024). Interview with Abubakr Karwani, Kurdistan, Sulaimani.  Mustafa, F. (2024). Interview with Falah Mustafa, Kurdistan, Erbil, 15 May.  S. Abdulla, C. (2024). Interview with Chnar S. Abdulla, Kurdistan, Erbil, 15 May.  Shareef, M. (2024). Interview with Mohammed Shareef, Kurdistan, Erbil, 23 May.  Schmidinger, T. (2024). Interview with Thomas Schmidinger, Kurdistan, Erbil, 23 May.  Romano, D. (2024). Interview with David Romano, United States, 8 June.  Muhammad, I. (2024). Interview with Ibrahim Muhammad, United Kingdom, 8 June.  Rekani, H. (2024). Interview with Haji Rekani, Kurdistan, Duhok, 10 June. Abstract - Arabic ةصلاخ قارعلا ناتسدرك ميلقإ يف ةلودلا ءانب دوهج ةحورطلأا هذه سردت "نيب"2003-2023 ريثأت يف صاخ لكشب ثحبتو . ينطولا داحتلاا بزحو يناتسدركلا يطارقميدلا بزحلا امهو ،نيزرابلا نييسايسلا نيبزحلا نيب يلخادلا عارصلا يناتسدركلا يطارقميدلا بزحلا نيب عارصلا نأ معزتو .قارعلا ناتسدرك ميلقإ يف ةلودلا ءانب ةيلمع ىلع ،يناتسدركلا داحتلااو امهتافلاتخا نم سيلو نيبزحلا لاك يف ةيسايسلا بخنلا نيب ةطلسلا عارص نم ًلاوأ عبني يناتسدركلا ينطولا يطارقميدلا بزحلا يف ةيسايسلا بخنلا نيب ةطلسلا عارص ناك ،اًيناثو .ةيسايسويجلا امهتارابتعاو ةيجولويديلإا لل يسيئرلا ببسلا يناتسدركلا ينطولا داحتلااو يناتسدركلا نع للاقتسلاا قيقحت ىلإ ةيمارلا دوهجلا يف طقف سيل لشف يف ةيلارديفلا ةموكحلل ةينملأاو ةيسايسلاو ةيداصتقلاا ةزهجلأا ىلع يسسؤملا عباطلا ءافضإ يف اًضيأ نكلو ،قارعلا ماعل يقارعلا روتسدلا قايس2005. Abstract - Kurdish ەتخوپ ۆب ێنووچڤيد و ندناۆخ ەزێت ڤەئ( نێلاس ارەبڤاند ێقارێع اناتسدروک امێرەه ل تەکد ێتەلوەد انرکاڤائ نێلوەه٢٠٠٣-٢٠٢٣ .) یتارکۆميد یتراپ رايد و یکەرەس نێي یسايس نێتراپ وودرەه ارەبڤاند اي یيۆخڤان انلاملم انرکێتراک ۆب ێنووچڤيد تەبيات ب ۆرپ رەسل )ک.ن.ی( ناتسدروک یناميتشن یتەکێئ و )ك.د.پ( ناتسدروک .ێقارێع اناتسدروک امێرەه ل ێتەلوەد انرکاڤائ اس انلاملم ێکێپتسەد ل ،اد ناتسدروک یناميتشن یتەکێئ و ناتسدروک یتارکۆميد یتراپ ارەبڤاند انلاملم ،وک تەکد رايد اسەورەه ب ناي یجۆلوديائ اي ناوەئ ايهادۆج رەسل کەن ،اد ناتراپ وودرەه د یسايس ابخۆن ارەبڤاند ەيێتلاەهتسەد .ەيکيتيلوپۆيج نێتەبا نێلوەه د ێنتب ەن ەي ێنتسەکش ێي یکەرەس ێرەگەئ ،اد ناتراپ وودرەه اي یسايس ابخۆن ارەبڤاند ێتلاەهتسەد انلاملم ،اسەورەه یسايس و یروبائ نێريمائ انرکيوارزەمادب ۆب اسەورەه وکلەب ،ێقاريع ل اد ێيۆخەبرەس انانيئەڤتسەدب ۆب اد ێناتسدروک امێرەه مەئ و لااس ێي ێقارێع ێرووتسەد ێڤوچراچ د ڵارديف اتەمووکح نێي ین٢٠٠٥.