Semantic Posteriority: Why Justifications Do Not Generate Conclusions

1 Semantic Posteriority: Why Justifications Do Not Generate Conclusions Evidence from the Paradox of Revision in Academic Writing Mist Independent Researcher [email protected] ORCID: 0009-0004-7129-8833 Abstract Across domains—moral judgment, legal reasoning, academic inquiry—a pervasive assumption governs our understanding of justification: that arguments generate the conclusions they defend. This paper argues for the opposite view: conclusions originate from pre-linguistic insights (𝑅), while arguments are post-hoc protocols for anchoring those insights in public space (𝑆). Traditional criticism commits a category mistake by conflating the failure of justification (accessibility failure) with the falsity of conclusion (absence of truth). To formalize this principle, we propose the R→e→S/U Observation Framework, which treats Generalized Semantics (𝑆) and Interactional Utility (𝑈) as parallel 2 projections of Expression (𝑒) along different dimensions, thereby ontologically decoupling the spurious causal chain between justification and insight. We test this framework in academic writing—rationalism’s stronghold—where peer review provides a natural experiment: external agents (reviewers) exogenously force argumentation revision, allowing us to observe whether 𝑀 → 𝑌. The resulting “Paradox of Revision” (drastic restructuring of argumentation yields negligible drift in conclusions) constitutes strong evidence for Semantic Posteriority. Through inclusive diagnosis of Grice, Stalnaker, Davidson, and Haidt, this paper demonstrates that the function of logic is not as a generator of truth, but as a suppressor of semantic drift. Keywords: Semantic Posteriority, Anchoring, The Paradox of Revision, R→e→S/U Framework, Semantic Drift (𝐷𝑆𝑈) 1. Introduction Human expression operates under a pervasive illusion: that public justifications— arguments, reasons, explanations—generate the conclusions they defend. This illusion pervades courtrooms, political debates, and academic seminars alike. The standard narrative runs: “Based on premises P1 and P2, through inference rule R, we derive conclusion C.” Yet a closer examination reveals a systematic inversion: conclusions emerge from pre-linguistic insights, and justifications are post-hoc anchoring protocols. This view receives strong support from cognitive science. Haidt (2001), in his influential Social Intuitionist Model, demonstrates that moral judgments originate from rapid 3 intuitions, while reasoning is merely a post-hoc “lawyer” hired to justify already-reached judgments. Mercier & Sperber (2011), in their “Argumentative Theory of Reasoning,” further argue that the evolutionary function of human reasoning was never to discover truth in solitude, but to produce reasons for persuading others in social interaction. If this is true for moral reasoning—long considered the domain of rational deliberation—it is likely true for justification in general. This paper formalizes these insights as “The Principle of Semantic Posteriority”: across domains, semantics (including public arguments and conclusions) is not the cause of insight, but its effect. We elaborate academic writing as our primary test case not because the framework is about academia, but because peer review provides the cleanest natural experiment—external agents (reviewers) exogenously force argumentation revision (𝑀), allowing us to observe whether changing argumentation changes conclusions (𝑌). The resulting “Paradox of Revision” (drastic restructuring of arguments yields negligible drift in conclusions) constitutes strong evidence for Semantic Posteriority even in rationalism’s stronghold. If “argument generates conclusion” is an illusion, why has it dominated human discourse for centuries? The answer lies in the fact that the appearance of temporal sequence masks the truth of generative sequence. From the receiver’s perspective (transmission view), one indeed encounters the argument before the conclusion: Argument (t1) → Conclusion (t2). But from the expresser’s perspective (generation view), the process is exactly reversed: Insight (t0) → Argument construction (t1) → Conclusion statement (t2). Training in any justificatory discipline—law, philosophy, science— 4 primarily teaches us how to “read” (as receivers), thereby reinforcing the hegemony of the transmission perspective. The limitations of this perspective remain visible even in contemporary cutting-edge discourse analysis. For instance, Hamed & Alqurashi (2025), in their sophisticated comparison of Trump’s and Harris’s campaign rhetoric, provide meticulous textual-level analysis of logical structure and phrasing differences. Yet their analysis—like most work in this tradition—faces a persistent explanatory gap: how can Trump’s logically chaotic expressions still produce enormous Interactional Utility (𝑈), often exceeding that of his more coherent opponent? This is not a failure of their scholarship, but a structural limitation of any approach that focuses solely on verbal text (𝑆𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑙) while bracketing multimodal generative mechanisms. Such “Modal Truncation” (focusing on linguistic text while masking nonverbal modalities) cannot capture how 𝑅 (pre-linguistic charisma, affective resonance) directly shapes 𝑈 independently of logical argumentation. This explanatory gap motivates our broader ontological framework that incorporates Pre-linguistic Resources (𝑅). To formalize Semantic Posteriority, we establish the R→e→S/U Observation Framework, demonstrating that 𝑆 (normative expectation) and 𝑈 (actual effect) are parallel projections of the same expressive event 𝑒 along different dimensions, thereby thoroughly decoupling the spurious causal chain of “argument-conclusion.” The core thesis can be stated as follows: Semantics (including public arguments and conclusions) is not the cause of insight, but its effect; logical argumentation is an anchoring protocol whose function is to make semantic drift (𝐷𝑆𝑈) measurable, not to generate truth. 5 Before proceeding, we clarify the intended scope. The R→e→S/U structure is not domain-specific. It applies equally to: legal argumentation (lawyers’ reasoning anchors pre-existing judgments of guilt or innocence; closing arguments rarely change verdicts already forming in jurors’ minds); political rhetoric (campaign speeches anchor voters’ pre-linguistic affiliations; logical coherence matters far less than affective resonance); moral judgment (Haidt 2001 shows reasoning anchors intuitions, never generates them— the empirical foundation of this paper); and academic writing (The Paradox of Revision (§4) demonstrates Semantic Posteriority even in rationalism’s stronghold). We elaborate academic cases not because the framework is about academia, but because peer review provides the cleanest natural experiment: external agents (𝑍, reviewers) exogenously force argumentation revision (𝑀), allowing us to test whether 𝑀 → 𝑌. If Semantic Posteriority holds even here—where explicit argumentation is maximally valorized—it likely holds a fortiori in domains with weaker rationalist norms. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 constructs the R→e→S/U ontological framework, defining four core levels and semantic drift (𝐷𝑆𝑈), and classifying types of drift. Section 3 applies this framework to conduct inclusive diagnosis of Grice, Stalnaker, Davidson, and Haidt, revealing the explanatory boundaries of classical theories. Section 4 proposes “The Paradox of Revision” as the core testable prediction, providing a causal graph (DAG) and identification strategy. Section 5 explores the implications of this paradigm shift for justificatory practice, review ethics, and tool humility. 6 To substantiate this framework, we synthesize insights from distinct intellectual traditions. We ground the concept of semantic posteriority empirically in cognitive science, drawing on Haidt’s (2001) social intuitionist model and Mercier & Sperber’s (2011) argumentative theory. Ontologically, we build upon Wittgenstein’s (1953) usetheory and Polanyi’s (1966) tacit dimension to locate the pre-linguistic roots of insight. To diagnose the limitations of classical analytic models, we subject Grice (1975), Stalnaker (1978), and Davidson (1973) to structural reconstruction, revealing their implicit reliance on noise-reduction conditions. Contemporary analyses of strategic drift—particularly Saul (2024) on dogwhistles and Dinges & Zakkou (2023) on deniability—anchor our taxonomy in real-world political discourse, while the proposed “Paradox of Revision” is formalized using Pearl’s (2009) causal modeling tools. 2. The R→e→S/U Framework: Ontological Structure of Expression-SemanticsUtility 2.1 From Epistemology to Ontology: Why an Observation-Based Framework? The causal inversion revealed in the introduction (arguments do not generate conclusions, but anchor them) brings a fatal epistemological consequence to traditional criticism across domains: The Justificatory Gap. In the traditional paradigm, the legitimacy of criticism rests on a core presupposition: the truth-value of a conclusion depends on the validity of justification. That is, it assumes 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 𝑓(𝐴𝑟𝑔𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡). Therefore, if a critic demonstrates that argument 𝐴 is invalid, then conclusion 𝐶 loses its epistemic warrant. However, once we accept “Semantic Posteriority,” this presupposition breaks 7 down at the ontological level. As Polanyi (1966, p. 4) put it, “we know more than we can tell.” Conclusions are actually supported by unobservable Pre-linguistic Resources 𝑅 (the tacit dimension), i.e., 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 ⇐ 𝑅; while argumentation 𝑆 is merely a post-hoc protocol constructed to make 𝑅 visible in public space. This means that when an argument is defeated (logical gaps, insufficient evidence), it merely demonstrates transmission failure (the author failed to establish a valid path to the insight), not cognitive error (the insight itself is false). When reviewers reject a “conclusion” because of “insufficient argumentation,” they commit a category mistake: they misjudge Accessibility Failure (the blockage of a path) as Falsity of Target (the non-existence of the destination). This is like asserting that the mountaintop does not exist because the road leading to it is blocked. Such reasoning is logically invalid (Non Sequitur). Traditional academic criticism, when condemning conclusions, often unwittingly exercises an epistemic veto it does not possess. If attacking arguments cannot logically invalidate conclusions, does this mean that existing peer review is all futile? Not at all. But it requires us to thoroughly reconstruct the legitimacy foundation of review. We need to shift from the Verification Paradigm to the Transmission Paradigm: The old paradigm asks “Based on these premises and derivations, must this conclusion be true?” (attempting to verify the generative relation— but this is futile under the R→e structure); The new paradigm asks “Does this argumentation structure effectively eliminate ambiguity, so that the reader’s understanding (𝑈) can precisely anchor onto the author’s insight (𝑅)?” (evaluating transmission efficiency and deviation). Since we cannot directly observe the generative 8 path (𝑅 → 𝑒), nor can we logically falsify the truth of 𝑅, we should instead study the Effect-Path—the public process from expression to understanding. We no longer use arguments to “audit” truth, but to “measure” drift. This leads to our observation-based framework: Expression (𝑒) as public perceptible events; Generalized Semantics (𝑆) as normative expectations serving as the ruler; Interactional Utility (𝑈) as actual transmission effects; Semantic Drift (𝐷𝑆𝑈) as the sole metric for transmission quality. Under this new framework, argumentation remains crucial, but its function has changed: it is no longer a Generator of truth, but a Suppressor of drift. A reader might object: “If 𝑅 is unobservable, why assume it exists? Why not simply start from Expression 𝑒?” Our response takes the form of a transcendental argument (Kantian in style). We do not claim to directly observe 𝑅 empirically, but argue that 𝑅 is a necessary condition for Expression 𝑒 to be possible. The argument proceeds as follows: Empirical fact shows that Expression (𝑒) exists as a structured, non-random public event (e.g., this paper, a spoken utterance); According to the Principle of Non-Self-Causation, expression cannot be its own generative cause—ink marks do not arrange themselves into valid arguments, sound waves do not spontaneously organize into syntax without a source; According to causal necessity, every structured event entails a generative source; Therefore, there must exist a generative resource distinct from 𝑒 to explain its production—we designate this functional locus as Pre-linguistic Resources (𝑅). One might object that 𝑒 is directly determined by “neural firings” or “social discourse,” making a mediating 𝑅 redundant. We maintain that no matter how refined these explanatory models become, they cannot dissolve the necessity of 𝑅 as an 9 individualized generative function. Against emergentism: Even if 𝑒 has its neural correlates, these physical states must collapse into some specific communicative intention before being transformed into symbolic expression. 𝑅 is precisely this functional locus of transformation, regardless of its physical substrate. Against social constructionism: Social discourse indeed externally constrains the form of 𝑒, but it cannot explain the immediate generation by a specific individual. If social discourse directly generated 𝑒, then everyone in the same discursive field would reproduce identical content. The differential expressions of individuals prove that there must exist an individualized filtering and generative variable—this is precisely what we refer to as 𝑅. Against linguistic determinism: If one claims “language causes language,” we face an infinite regress. There must be a boundary where non-linguistic impulses (whether experience, intuition, or confused perception) acquire linguistic form. Therefore, the existence of 𝑅 is not metaphysical redundancy, but an independent variable that must be posited to explain “why this expression rather than that one.” We need not prove its existence by defining 𝑅’s internal components; we need only establish its functional position in the causal chain. 2.2 Framework Overview Based on the Effect-Path strategy, we propose the R→e→S/U Observation Framework. This framework decomposes communication into four distinct ontological levels, distinguishing the generative end (Cause-Path) from the observational end (Effect-Path). Core Topological Chain (see Figure 1): 16 is the audience displays “fearful silence” (negative); 𝐷𝑆𝑈 is the significant distance between positive and negative. 2.4 Theoretical Significance of 𝑫𝑺𝑼: From Transmission Failure to Structural Deviation In traditional communication models (such as the code model), any deviation between 𝑆 and 𝑈 is viewed as “failure”—meaning information was lost or corrupted by noise during transmission. The goal was set as 𝐷𝑆𝑈 = 0. Based on the “two-level lacuna” principle, this framework proposes a fundamental paradigm shift: 𝐷𝑆𝑈 is not a failure of transmission, but a structural feature of expression. Irreducibility: Since 𝑈 always contains Token-details that overflow from 𝑅 beyond 𝑆, 𝐷𝑆𝑈 is essentially impossible to be zero. This is analogous to approximating a circle (𝑈) with finite polygons (𝑆)—no matter how many sides (protocol precision) are added, residue always remains. Corollary: The goal of academic writing is not to eliminate drift (which is impossible), but to manage drift. Diagnostic Function: 𝐷𝑆𝑈 provides an objective diagnostic metric that does not rely on “intention guessing.” We need not ask “what did the author really mean?”; we only need to ask “how much does the expected effect under this protocol (𝑆) differ from the actual effect (𝑈)?” This shifts the evaluation of communication quality from psychological guessing to engineering measurement. Taxonomic Function: Not all drift is the same. By observing how 𝐷𝑆𝑈 responds to transparency intervention, we can distinguish two fundamentally different communicative pathologies—Expressive Drift and Strategic Drift (detailed in the next section). 17 2.5 Reachability Anchoring and Drift Classification Since drift is ineliminable, what is the function of logical argumentation, definitions, and citations—the apparatus of academic writing? The answer is: Reachability Anchoring. If 𝑅 → 𝑒 is an unobservable generative process, then the reader’s actual understanding (𝑈) based on 𝑒 is like a random landing point without a coordinate system. The function of logical argumentation is not to generate 𝑅, but to establish a probability distribution constraint system for where 𝑈 lands. The distinctiveness of academic writing lies in its being a form of High-S-Encoding expression. Unlike everyday conversation where 𝑆 is often implicit in context, academic authors strive to explicitly encode 𝑆 (derivation rules, definitions, constraints) into 𝑒 (the text). We propose three engineering functions of logical argumentation. Semantic Anchoring: Through definitions and axioms, fix the 𝑆-boundaries of key terms. This does not guarantee that readers fully understand the author’s 𝑅, but it excludes those 𝑈 that are too distant (e.g., defining “freedom” excludes the interpretation of “license”). Function: Narrow the dispersion range of 𝑈. Path Constraint: Through inference rules (such as syllogism), enforce legitimate paths from premises to conclusions. Function: Force different readers’ cognitive processing to converge. Although each person’s experience (Qualia) differs, they are forced to traverse the same inferential steps, thereby increasing the probability of 𝑈 overlapping at the endpoint. Drift Detection: Logic provides a public error-flagging mechanism. When 𝑈 severely deviates from 𝑆 (e.g., deriving contradictory conclusions), the protocol itself raises an alarm. Function: Make implicit misunderstandings explicit, thereby triggering correction. 18 Conclusion: Logical argumentation is not a production line for truth, but a convergence device for understanding. This aligns with Mercier & Sperber (2011)’s assertion: the primary function of reasoning is social. Logic sacrifices part of 𝑅’s richness (modal truncation) in exchange for high fidelity and low variance of 𝑈 in public space. This is why, despite 𝐷𝑆𝑈 always existing, we must still insist on rigorous argumentation—not for perfection, but for controllability. The reason the traditional path has long maintained the illusion that “arguments generate conclusions” is that successful academic writing constructs a simulated closedloop system within the text (even though the entire text exists as Expression 𝑒). The author provides not only Expression (𝑒) and Protocol (𝑆), but even rehearses the ideal understanding (𝑈𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑) for the reader in the “Conclusion” section. In this selfreferential system, the author forces 𝑆 and 𝑈𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 to coincide (𝐷𝑆𝑈 ≈ 0). This artificially manufactured semantic closure conceals the drift that necessarily exists in real interaction, allowing the illusion that “arguments generate truth” to persist. Not all semantic drift is alike. Based on how 𝐷𝑆𝑈 responds to Transparency Intervention, we can distinguish two fundamentally different types of drift. Type A is Expressive Drift: Unintentional deviation due to expressive limitations, protocol mismatch, or context misalignment. Characteristic: When external transparency intervention is applied (e.g., “please define this term,” “please give an example,” “please restate your logic”), 𝐷𝑆𝑈 shows a significant downward trend. Mechanism: The author intends to transmit 𝑅, but is limited by the bandwidth of 𝑒 or the ambiguity of 𝑆. Once the ruler is calibrated, understanding rapidly converges. Case: Obscure Kantian 19 philosophy—Initially very difficult to understand (high 𝐷𝑆𝑈), but through more annotations, lecture notes, and repeated study by the academic community (adding auxiliary 𝑆), understanding gradually converges. Type B is Strategic Drift: The expresser manipulates the relationship between 𝑆 and 𝑈 through Protocol Separation. As Dinges & Zakkou (2023) point out in discussing “Deniability,” the author constructs an 𝑒 that can simultaneously project an explicit protocol 𝑆𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡 (to provide cognitive deniability) and an implicit protocol 𝑆𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡 (to generate actual utility). Characteristic: 𝑈 severely diverges from 𝑆𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡 but highly aligns with 𝑆𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡. The author then hides behind 𝑆𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡 claiming “I was misunderstood,” even though the production of 𝑈 perfectly matches their design. Mechanism: Exploiting the multimodal bandwidth of 𝑒 to maintain compliant 𝑆𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡 at the textual level while transmitting 𝑆𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡 at the nonverbal (or coded) level. Case Analysis—The Applause Ritual of the Stalin Era: Solzhenitsyn recorded a famous case in The Gulag Archipelago: at a regional Party conference, the entire audience stood to applaud Stalin. 𝑒: Frenzied applause lasting over 10 minutes. 𝑆𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡 (Official Protocol): Expressing adoration for the leader. 𝑆𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡 (Survival Protocol): Whoever stops clapping first is the enemy. 𝑈 (Actual Utility): Extreme fear, muscle cramps, no one dares to stop. Diagnosis: If we only look at 𝑆𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡, we cannot explain 𝑈 (adoration need not cause hand injuries and extreme fear). Only 𝑆𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡 can perfectly explain the current 𝑈. Conclusion: This is an advanced form of strategic drift. The author (here, the institutional designer) uses 𝑆𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡 as a cover (Figleaf), while actually executing 𝑆𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡. When diagnosing drift, we should not force 𝑈 to align with 𝑆𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡, 20 but identify which 𝑆 truly explains 𝑈. Modern Form: This mechanism remains prevalent in contemporary politics. The “Dogwhistles” phenomenon analyzed by Saul (2024) is a modern variant of strategic drift: seemingly neutral vocabulary (like “Inner City”) is harmless under 𝑆𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡, but under the 𝑆𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡 of specific groups, it precisely triggers racist 𝑈. This classification provides new weapons for academic and political criticism: we need not be deceived by the 𝑆 the author claims (“I was merely discussing scholarship”), but should infer the truly operative protocol by observing 𝑈 (the actual fear, compliance, or exclusion that occurred). 2.6 Scope and Commitments The R→e→S/U framework constructed in this paper is a functional observation model. We commit: The existence of 𝑅 is a logical necessity, but we do not discuss its psychological mechanisms. 𝑆 and 𝑈 are independent measurement dimensions, and 𝐷𝑆𝑈 is computable. The core task of academic writing is to control the variance of 𝐷𝑆𝑈 from an engineering standpoint. Based on this, we shall proceed in the next section to theoretical dialogue, demonstrating how this framework can encompass and transcend existing analytic philosophy models. 21 3. Theory Unification and Deductive Verification 3.1 Methodology: The Engineering Stance and Structural Mapping Before entering into specific theoretical dialogue, we must clarify this paper’s distinctive methodological stance toward classical theories. This is not a rejection of prior work, but an Orthogonal Shift in perspective. In treating classical theories such as Grice, Stalnaker, and Davidson, this paper explicitly abandons the traditional path of Exegesis. We do not attempt to reconstruct these philosophers’ “real intentions” or intervene in their internal textual disputes. Instead, we adopt the “Engineering Black-box” method. We treat each theory as a functional module for processing the task of “semantic transmission” and examine its I/O Characteristics. Our core question is: When we place these idealized models into the high-noise, high-adversarial, multimodal environment of real expression (i.e., the full panorama of R→e→S/U), where are their boundary conditions? What are their Failure Modes? This analysis will reveal: classical theories often appear elegant because they presuppose certain implicit Noise-Reduction Conditions (e.g., presupposing 𝐷𝑆𝑈 ≈ 0 or truncating nonverbal modalities). Our task is to remove this artificial noise reduction and expose their performance in a “bare-metal state.” To precisely diagnose the limitations of these theories, it is crucial to use the ontological-epistemological dual-track structure established in §2 as a coordinate system. Ontological Track (𝑅 → 𝑒): Focuses on generative causes. Diagnostic Function: We examine whether classical theories acknowledge the existence of 𝑅, or whether they commit the error of “subjectless generation” (e.g., mistakenly assuming that context or 22 propositions can automatically generate expression). Epistemological Track (𝑒 → 𝑆 → 𝑈): Focuses on observation and measurement. Diagnostic Function: We examine whether classical theories distinguish 𝑆 from 𝑈, or whether they commit the error of “normative confusion” (e.g., mistakenly assuming that if 𝑆 is perfect, 𝑈 will necessarily align). This coordinate system enables us to pinpoint precisely: Grice is trapped in the CP Zone of 𝑆, Stalnaker is lost in the propositional subset of 𝑆, and Davidson sacrifices modal richness to maintain the coherence of 𝑆. The engineering stance of this framework is deeply inspired by the later Wittgenstein (1953), though we attempt to cross the boundary of his “anti-theoretical” position. Inheritance: We fully accept the core insight that “meaning is use.” In our terminology, this means 𝑈 (actual utility) is the ultimate reality of semantics, while 𝑆 (normative protocol) is merely an artificial convention reached to coordinate 𝑈 (“there is no private language”). Extension: Wittgenstein stopped at Description of language games, admonishing us to “look” rather than “think.” We attempt to provide a set of Measurement tools. 𝐷𝑆𝑈 is precisely the arithmetizable version of “language game deviation.” If Wittgenstein taught us to acknowledge the chaos and diversity of language, R→e→S/U attempts to establish Tolerance Standards for that chaos. In summary, we shall employ inclusive diagnosis rather than simple refutation. This means we shall demonstrate that the R→e→S/U framework is not a competitor to these classical theories, but their Superset. We can precisely reproduce Grice’s or Stalnaker’s models by applying specific Masks to the full panorama (e.g., “ignore 𝑅” or “force 𝑆 = 𝑈”). This proves that classical theories are special cases of R→e→S/U under specific 23 constraints. In this way, we not only identify their blind spots but also explain the scope of their validity, thereby achieving genuine theory unification. 3.2 Deduction of Grice: Rationality Interval and Ontological Burden Grice’s theory is one of analytic philosophy’s most sophisticated constructions of communication mechanisms. In our panoramic view, we can see the ontological arrangements he made to maintain the “rational agent assumption”: placing a specific form of inference at the center and assigning “intention” a heavy explanatory burden. We directly overlay Grice’s core concepts onto the R→e→S/U model (see Figure 2): Figure 2: Grice’s Theory Mapped onto R→e→S/U Framework 24 Detailed Diagnosis. On the Extra Burden on 𝑅 and the Jurisprudential Turn: Grice correctly intuited the existence of 𝑅, but he tightly bundled 𝑅 with extremely complex Reflexive Intention (i.e., “A intends for B to form belief p, and A intends for B to recognize A’s intention…”). This means he loaded 𝑅 with hard-to-verify psychological presuppositions. Our Correction adopts Jurisprudential Determination: Rather than obsessing over the unknowable recursive intention in the author’s mind (private 𝑅), we advocate adopting a court trial perspective. In jurisprudence, a judge does not care about the suspect’s “true” inner psychological activity (that belongs to God’s perspective). The court only cares about: based on the suspect’s behavior (𝑒), under current law and common-sense protocols (𝑃, 𝑐), what intention (𝑆) should be inferred. This “publicly reasonable intention” is our 𝑆. It solves the long-entangled “intention identification” problem in philosophy of language: we need no mind-reading, only public adjudication. On the Limitation of 𝑆—Rationality Locked in the CP Zone: Grice demarcated a subset of 𝑆—the region conforming to the Cooperative Principle (CP)—and implied that only derivations within this region count as “rational.” This is essentially an experimental zone established to ensure 𝐷𝑆𝑈 remains controllable. In the real world (courtroom debates, political speeches), people often operate under non-cooperative or even deceptive protocols. Our framework can accommodate these high-𝐷𝑆𝑈 scenarios, whereas Grice’s model fails here. On the Ontological Conflation of Implicature: Grice’s core contribution, “conversational implicature,” reveals an ontological Hybridity under our framework. On one hand, implicature has normativity (based on CP, what the hearer should infer)—this 25 belongs to 𝑆. On the other hand, implicature is often used to explain what the hearer actually understood—this belongs to 𝑈. Grice conflates these two because he presupposes the hearer is always ideal. But in our framework, we must separate “SImplicature” (the logically warranted implication) from “U-Implicature” (the actually triggered association). It is precisely this conflation that makes traditional pragmatics unable to precisely measure drift. Conclusion: Grice’s scheme is an institutionalized circumvention of Semantic Drift (𝐷𝑆𝑈): by presupposing “everyone is a rational cooperator” and focusing on the CP Zone, he artificially eliminates drift. The R→e→S/U framework, introducing the jurisprudential perspective, allows us to publicly anchor intentions even in the non-cooperative, nonideal wilderness of reality. 3.3 Deduction of Stalnaker: The Perceptual Boundary of the Notebook Perspective Stalnaker’s contribution lies in introducing Common Ground (CG) to describe the “context” and “update” of dialogue (Stalnaker, 1978, 1999). His core metaphor is: communication is like continuously updating a notebook shared by both parties. Under our framework, CG is not the full panorama, but merely a propositional subset of the 𝑆 layer (see Figure 3): 32 attempting to minimize 𝐷𝑆𝑈 through normalized expression, though this attempt often meets resistance. Haidt discovered a key phenomenon called “Moral Dumbfounding,” which constitutes the psychological prototype of the “Paradox of Revision” we propose. In experiments, when the reasons (𝑆) that subjects provide for their moral judgments (e.g., “incest is wrong”) are refuted one by one by experimenters, subjects often fall into a “dumbfounded” state: they acknowledge that their arguments are invalid (𝑆 collapses), but still maintain their original moral judgment (U-Conclusion remains stable), typically saying: “I don’t know why, but I just know it’s wrong.” This phenomenon reveals the epistemological truth: Decoupling—It proves that conclusions (𝑈) and arguments (𝑆) are causally decoupled. The foundation of conclusions lies in 𝑅 (intuition), not in 𝑆. The Academic Mirror—This explains why in peer review, even when reviewers point out logical gaps in argumentation (creating an academic version of “dumbfounding”), the author’s core conclusions often remain standing. Authors repair arguments (𝑀) only to restore the integrity of social display (𝑆), not to revise conclusions (𝑌). Conclusion: By introducing Haidt, we ground the R→e→S/U framework from a purely philosophical speculative model to one that accords with cognitive science facts. It shows that “Semantic Posteriority” is not merely a strategic choice in academic writing, but a Factory Setting of human cognitive architecture. Academic training attempts to suppress this instinct by emphasizing logic, but the Paradox of Revision proves that such suppression often only creates the illusion of rationality at the 𝑆 layer, while the intuitive drive at the 𝑅 layer never stops. 33 4. Logical Implication and Empirical Corroboration: The Paradox of Revision 4.1 Epistemic Priority of Logical Structure The validity of “Semantic Posteriority” does not hinge on empirical verification. The philosophical case rests on the transcendental argument for 𝑅’s necessity (§2.1) and the inclusive diagnosis of classical theories (§3). What follows is a logical implication: if the R→e→S/U ontology is sound, then we should observe specific patterns in environments where argumentation (𝑀) is exogenously varied while 𝑅 remains constant. The “Paradox of Revision” formalizes this implication using causal modeling tools (Pearl, 2009). The DAG presented below serves not primarily as a blueprint for statistical regression, but as a conceptual clarification of the causal topology—making explicit what must be the case if justifications are indeed posterior to insights. That said, corroboration matters. This section deliberately adopts a “Reader’s Blueprint” approach: we decompose the falsifiable component into clear variables and identification strategy, inviting subsequent researchers to test whether the predicted pattern (𝑀 →  𝑌) holds in peer review data. If systematic investigation were to demonstrate strong 𝑀 → 𝑌 effects, that would not merely be surprising—it would force revision of our ontological commitments. 4.2 The Phenomenon: The Paradox of Revision in Academia We observe an anomalous phenomenon in academic publishing practice—The Paradox of Revision. Observation: The review process often drives drastic restructuring of argumentation (𝑀). If the traditional view (argument generates conclusion) is correct, 34 then drastic changes in argumentative logic should lead to significant drift in conclusions (𝑌). Fact: Empirical experience tells us that the vast majority of papers, after undergoing “Major Revision,” despite their argumentative paths, cited literature, and even core definitions becoming unrecognizable, their core conclusions remain remarkably stable. This reveals a neglected truth: in mature academic production, the function of logical argumentation is not to “discover” conclusions, but to “serve” conclusions—it is the Accessibility Path constructed for existing insights to reach public space. This phenomenon is structurally isomorphic to the “Moral Dumbfounding” observed by Haidt: the collapse of arguments does not lead to the abandonment of beliefs. 4.3 Causal Hypothesis Based on the R→e→S/U framework, we propose the following competing hypotheses: 35 Dimension Traditional Hypothesis (Verification Paradigm) Present Hypothesis (Transmission Paradigm) Causal Chain 𝑀 → 𝑌 (Argument generates Conclusion) 𝑀 → 𝑌 ≈ 0 (Argument anchors Conclusion) Consequence of Repair Repairing logical gaps should lead to revision or abandonment of conclusion Repairing logical gaps only changes argumentative path; conclusion remains robust Generative Source Logical derivation Pre-linguistic insight (𝑅) Core Test: If we can demonstrate that, controlling for other variables, substantial argumentative modification (Δ𝑀) does not lead to corresponding change in conclusions (Δ𝑌), then the traditional myth that “arguments generate conclusions” collapses. 4.4 Causal Graph (DAG) To clearly identify causal effects, we construct the following causal graph according to Pearl (2009)’s graphical model theory (see Figure 5): 36 Figure 5: Causal Graph (DAG) for the Paradox of Revision 𝑅 (Confounder): The author’s original insight. It simultaneously determines both initial argumentation 𝑀 and conclusion 𝑌. Since 𝑅 is unobservable, direct regression of 𝑀 → 𝑌 will suffer from confounding bias. 𝑍 (Instrument): Reviewers’ non-fatal revision requests. Exogeneity: Reviewers cannot peer into the author’s inner 𝑅, so 𝑍 is independent of 𝑅. Relevance: Review comments strongly drive authors to revise argumentation (𝑍 → 𝑀). Exclusion Restriction: Review comments (𝑍) can only affect conclusions (𝑌) by changing argumentation (𝑀), not by directly modifying conclusions (Note: we must exclude review comments that directly demand “change your conclusion,” as these would violate the exclusion restriction). 4.5 Variable Definition and Operationalization To make this prediction testable, we provide specific operational definitions: 37 Variable Operationalization 𝑍 (IV) Code review reports targeting “argumentative logic,” “definitional clarity,” “literature support.” Exclude conclusion-rejecting comments. 𝑀 Levenshtein Distance or Semantic Vector Cosine Distance between initial/final drafts (Introduction + Discussion). 𝑌 Semantic vector distance of core claims in Abstract/Conclusion sections. 𝐶 Author prestige, topic difficulty, journal discipline. 4.6 Identification Strategy Given that 𝑀 is endogenous (influenced by 𝑅), simple OLS regression is biased. We recommend using Instrumental Variable (IV-2SLS): First Stage: Estimate the driving force of review comments on argumentation revision. 𝑀 = 𝛼0+ 𝛼1𝑍 + 𝛾𝐶 + 𝜖𝑀 (We expect 𝛼1 to be significantly positive, i.e., review comments indeed cause major argumentation revision) Second Stage: Estimate the causal effect of argumentation revision on conclusion change. 𝑌 = 𝛽0+ 𝛽1𝑀 +𝛾𝐶 + 𝜖𝑌 38 Discrimination Criteria: Traditional view predicts 𝛽1 is significantly positive, meaning if argumentation changes, conclusions must follow. This paper predicts 𝛽1 is statistically indistinguishable from zero, meaning no matter how much reviewers shake up the argumentation (𝑀), as long as 𝑅 remains unchanged, conclusions (𝑌) remain unmoved. 4.7 Data Source Suggestions Future researchers can obtain data from the following channels: Open Peer Review Journals such as BMJ Open, eLife, F1000Research—these journals publicly release review comments (𝑍) and multiple manuscript versions (𝑀, 𝑌), making them natural data goldmines; Preprint Tracking—track differences between preprints (initial drafts) on arXiv/SSRN and their final published versions (final drafts), although lacking explicit 𝑍, one can observe the correlation between Δ𝑀 and Δ𝑌; Academic Revision Corpora— utilize existing academic writing revision datasets (such as ACL-provided corpora) for secondary annotation analysis. 4.8 Epistemic Status and Falsifiability We emphasize: the philosophical validity of “Semantic Posteriority” stands independently on the ontological arguments of §2 and the structural diagnosis of §3. The Paradox of Revision is a logical consequence of those commitments, not their foundation. The DAG formalizes the causal structure to clarify what the theory predicts: if 𝑅 generates both argumentation and conclusion, and if peer review exogenously varies only argumentation, then we should observe 𝑀 →  𝑌. This is a conceptual claim about the topology of justification, not merely an empirical bet. 39 Nevertheless, falsifiability is crucial. If systematic empirical investigation were to demonstrate robust 𝑀 → 𝑌 effects across multiple studies and domains, that would constitute a serious challenge to the R→e→S/U ontology itself. We therefore leave this formalization as an open invitation: the logical structure is clear; the empirical shadow awaits inspection. Any such investigation that contradicts our prediction would be welcomed as a genuine contribution to understanding human justification—even if it required us to revise our framework. 5. Conclusion and Implications 5.1 From Generation to Anchoring: A Paradigm Shift The core argument of this paper can be reduced to one sentence: Stop pretending that arguments generate conclusions. The R→e→S/U framework we propose, by separating the generative end (𝑅) from the observational end (𝑒, 𝑆, 𝑈), reveals the true mechanism of human justification— tested here through academic writing, but applicable wherever reasons are offered for conclusions. 𝑆 is a ruler, not a cause: Without 𝑆, 𝑈 has only “change,” not “drift.” Argumentation is an anchoring protocol: It designates “where to land” for pre-linguistic insight (𝑅), rather than generating the insight itself. Drift is ineliminable: Since 𝑈 always contains token residue, pursuing 𝐷𝑆𝑈 = 0 is futile; our goal is to manage drift. This paradigm shift requires us to abandon the vain ambition of “verifying truth” and instead assume the engineering responsibility of “building accessibility.” 40 5.2 Implications of the Paradox of Revision: Integrity in Resistance The “Paradox of Revision” proposed in Section 4 is not a scandal of academia, but evidence of academic integrity. It is precisely because conclusions (𝑌) are so stubborn (faithful to 𝑅) that we need such laborious argument revision (𝑀) to ensure their accessibility in public space (𝑆). If conclusions changed every time logic changed, that would be a “Fence-sitter”—indicating the author has no genuine insight, merely swaying in the wind of argumentation. True scholars hold onto their 𝑅 (core insight) while continuously repairing 𝑆 (argumentative path), only so that others can touch that stubborn truth. This phenomenon of “arguments may change, but the original insight remains” precisely proves that the academic community strives to maintain a form of communication that is difficult but honest. 5.3 Practical Implications: Living with Semantic Posteriority For Authors (and Advocates): Hold onto 𝑅, repair 𝑆—When reviewers attack your argumentation, do not panic into thinking your discovery (𝑅) is wrong. Usually, only your road (𝑆) needs repair. You can dramatically rewrite the Introduction, reorganize the logical chain, but defend your core findings to the death. Be honest with your intuition— If you find that maintaining logical consistency requires abandoning your original intuition, stop. That may be 𝑆 cannibalizing 𝑅. For Critics (Reviewers, Judges, Interlocutors): Distinguish two types of drift—Be tolerant of Expressive Drift—that is a road-building problem, help the expresser build the road; be vigilant against Strategic Drift—that is a direction problem, and when transparency intervention fails, have the courage to reject. Do not overstep—You may 41 say “this argument does not lead to the conclusion,” but do not lightly say “the conclusion is wrong.” You are only responsible for checking the path (𝑆); God is responsible for checking truth (𝑅). For Audiences (Readers, Jurors, Voters): Look for the anchor—Do not only examine whether the argument is rigorous; ask yourself: through this elaborate 𝑆, where exactly does the author want to take my 𝑈? Charitable interpretation—If the argument has gaps but you still feel resonance (𝑈 is successfully anchored), then this argument has already fulfilled its historical mission. 5.4 Final Reflection: The Humility of Tools Logic (𝑆) is our only lifeline in the world after the fall of Babel. Although it cannot generate truth—truth always exists in our intuition and experience prior to logic—it allows the truth in our hands to be touched by another person. It is not the light source; it is the lens. If you have read this far and feel “this theory makes sense,” ask yourself: did this paper’s logical argumentation generate your assent, or did the argumentation anchor an intuition you already had (but vaguely)? If the latter, then you have already experienced the core insight of this paper. If the former, then our theory may be wrong—or perhaps you still need to await your own Eureka moment. There is a deeper irony in writing a paper on Semantic Posteriority—one that reveals the framework’s reflexive universality. The moment an insight (𝑅) collapses into text (𝑒), it becomes an external object, even to its author. I am no exception to the structure I