China's Growing Engagements with Africa: Challenges and Prospects

Indian Journal of Social Science and Literature (IJSSL) ISSN: 2583-0643 (Online), Volume-5 Issue-2, December 2025 21 Published By: Lattice Science Publication (LSP) © Copyright: All rights reserved. Retrieval Number:100.1/ijssl.A119805010925 DOI: 10.54105/ijssl.A1198.05021225 Journal Website: www.ijssl.latticescipub.com China's Growing Engagements with Africa: Challenges and Prospects Gaurav Pathak, Santosh Kumar Abstract: This article assesses China's evolving role in Africa, examining whether its influence comes from soft Power, complex power strategies, or a combination of both. As China's demand for resources increases due to its fast-growing economy, the Chinese government has strengthened its engagement in Africa through investments in mining, oil, telecommunications, and infrastructure. These strategies have started a global debate, with critics accusing China of exploiting African resources and imposing neo-colonial debt traps. Employing a dual lens of soft Power and complex strategy, this article investigates China's diplomatic, educational, and humanitarian initiatives alongside its increasing military and economic presence in the region. It assesses China's self-presentation as a peaceful and cooperative partner, in contrast to its geopolitical ambitions, which are reflected in military expansion and resource extraction. By underlining China's multifaceted dominance in cultural exchanges, infrastructure projects, and military operations, this paper examines whether China's presence in Africa promotes genuine development or imposes its economic and strategic control. The findings suggest that China uses soft and hard strategies to secure its interests in Africa while promoting cooperation. Nonetheless, African nations must exercise caution, considering the long-term implications of their interactions with China. Keywords: Soft Power, Hard Power, Geopolitical Influence, Economic Control, Belt and Road Initiative Abbreviations: BRI: Belt and Road Initiative FOCAC: Forum on China-Africa Cooperation CASS: Chinese Academy of Social Sciences CICIR: China Institute for Contemporary International Relations CIIS: China Institute of International Studies CAS: Chinese Academy of Sciences I. INTRODUCTION Since the end of the Chinese Civil War in 1949, Africa has played an enormous role in China's foreign policy, particularly during the early Cold War period, when China focused more on its political relationship with Africa than on economic ties, because the PRC was economically constrained and could provide only limited assistance. Manuscript received on 06 June 2025 | First Revised Manuscript received on 14 July 2025 | Second Revised Manuscript received on 18 November 2025 | Manuscript Accepted on 15 December 2025 | Manuscript published on 30 December 2025. *Correspondence Author(s) Gaurav Pathak*, Department of Political Science, South and Central Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Central University of Punjab, Bathinda (Punjab), India. Email ID: [email protected], ORCID ID: 0009-0003-1591-8674 Dr. Santosh Kumar, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, South and Central Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Central University of Punjab, Bathinda (Punjab), India. Email ID: santosh.ku[email protected]u.in, ORCID ID: 0009-0006-2749-1139 © The Authors. Published by Lattice Science Publication (LSP). This is an open access article under the CC-BY-NC-ND license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ This also marks the beginning of China's diplomatic and strategic engagement with the African continent. During the 1950s and 1960s, China actively supported various African liberation movements, including Algeria, Angola, Zambia, and Mozambique, providing financial, military, and diplomatic assistance to nationalist groups fighting against European colonial powers. This support contributed heavily to the independence of several African countries. During the Cold War period, China and Africa supported each other through the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. China provided considerable aid to African countries in their economic development, and in 1971, African countries' votes proved instrumental in securing PRC control of China’s seats on the UN General Assembly and the Security Council. In 1999, China's "Going Out" strategy enabled Chinese companies to invest abroad, marking a breakthrough in the China–Africa relationship. Following the end of the Cold War, peace and development emerged as key global issues as worldwide geopolitics shifted toward the liberal democratic model, marking a significant shift for both regions, which experienced rapid economic growth. As China's economy grew, so did its demand for resources. Africa, with its abundant natural resources, became a key partner. China invested heavily in Africa's mining and oil sectors, securing impressive trade deals. Chinese private players also diversified their portfolios, exploring telecommunications, agriculture, and manufacturing. China's engagement with Africa has expanded significantly under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). However, China's African strategy has sparked debate at the regional and global levels. Some argued that resource extraction, debt traps, and mass violation of human rights drive China's diplomatic motives towards Africa. The others consider China's economic ties with Africa as a part of 'neo-colonialism'. China's strategy in Africa can be seen as a mixture of soft and hard Power. On one hand, China has promoted diplomatic aid, cultural influence, and educational initiatives. On the other hand, China's economic and geopolitical ambitions have guided its actions. The growing presence of China across Africa has sparked intense debate over the nature of Chinese diplomacy. Against this backdrop, the paper delves into the complexities of China's role in Africa. The paper scrutinises the diplomatic motives behind Chinese foreign policy towards Africa and its implications for African nations. By analysing China's diplomatic, educational, humanitarian, military, and economic engagements, this paper aims to answer a fundamental question: Is China's growing presence in Africa: a force for mutual development or a master plan for financial and strategic control? China's Growing Engagements with Africa: Challenges and Prospects 22 Published By: Lattice Science Publication (LSP) © Copyright: All rights reserved. Retrieval Number:100.1/ijssl.A119805010925 DOI: 10.54105/ijssl.A1198.05021225 Journal Website: www.ijssl.latticescipub.com A. Historical Origin Historically, China and Africa have supported each other on various fronts, including the global movement against colonialism in the early 20th century, the Non-Aligned Movement during the Cold War, and the Global South agenda in the UN General Assembly. However, China's first significant contact with Africa occurred in the early 15th century when the Zheng He naval fleet of the Ming dynasty reached the Northeastern coast of Africa. In the early 20th century, after taking Power, Sun Yat-sen and the Republic of China established official relations with South Africa, and soon it became the country with the largest number of Chinese-origin people on the African continent. In the China– Africa relationship, there have been various phases, shaped by global issues and political changes in China. These changes saw China's support for African Liberation movements, the Cultural Revolution, the Cold War, and the Sino-Soviet split. However, a fundamental framework was not regulated until the beginning of the 21st century when the triennial Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) was established in Beijing. The FOCAC proved to be very significant in opening a gateway for an inclusive China-Africa relationship. Similarly, in 2013, China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), launched by Xi Jinping, enabled China to make significant investments in Africa's infrastructure, including railways, Roads, and ports, and is now increasingly expanding into telecom, cloud, digital, and renewable energy. B. First Phase – Mao Zedong and Africa (1949-1976) In his early years after seizing power in 1949, Mao Zedong devoted considerable time to consolidating his rule across China. Also, till 1960, only a handful of African countries were independent. This was a time of economic struggle for China. They had practically no foreign direct investment, so they could not focus more on Africa, except to support them in their struggle against colonial rule. The 1955 Asia–Africa conference in Bandung, Indonesia, proved historic, marking the People's Republic of China's first serious engagement with Africa. It opened trade talks with Egypt. During this time, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai validated Egypt's claim to the Suez Canal as the UK and France fought over it. Following Bandung, African-Asian solidarity soon became an integral part of China's foreign policy. China and Mao Zedong used this platform to criticise US imperialist policies against Africa openly. In the 1970s, many African nations started gaining independence, and their membership in the UN increased. The PRC began pursuing its goal of securing a seat on the UN Security Council, which became possible with diplomatic support from African nations. In 1956, Egypt was the first country to recognise the PRC officially. Subsequently, Morocco and Algeria followed suit in 1958. The People's Republic of China became a permanent member of the UNSC through UNGA resolution 2758, replacing the Republic of China (Taiwan). Seventy-six countries voted in favour of the resolution, including 26 African nations. This was primarily possible due to China's anti-colonial stance and history of rejecting Western dominance. Another significant phase in China-Africa relations began with the start of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in 1966. China advocated for world revolution and promoted the liberation of all nations. This period lasted until Mao died in 1976 and culminated in the overthrow of several African governments, including those of Dahomey (now Benin) and the Central African Republic. C. Second Phase – Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin Era (1978-2002) This phase focused mainly on China's domestic reforms, during which it prioritised its internal economic structure and modernisation. China maintained its relationship with African nations, but trade did not grow significantly, as Africa could not open itself to international markets, which kept Chinese goals at a distance. In 1982, China shifted its Global policy from 'War and revolution' to 'Peace and development' and stopped providing aid to various countries until the Tiananmen Square crisis in 1989, when China felt the need to engage with its African partners. Overall, China's trade surplus increased during Deng Xiaoping's era, but it remained static with Africa. China's global trade increased by US$80 billion from 1980 to 1990, and Africa's fell by US$16 billion within the same period. China's trade with Africa also declined by 1%, accounting for only 2.6% of China's global trade in 1988. The immediate response to the Tiananmen Square crisis and the end of the Cold War marked the beginning of Jiang Zemin's period. The US was very critical about the aftermath of Tiananmen Square, but the African nations mostly stayed silent over this or supported it. The end of the Cold War led to a decline in interest from many countries in Africa, prompting China to intensify its engagement on the continent. As a result, the then-Chinese Foreign Minister, Qian Qichen, made numerous visits to various African nations. Jiang Zemin proposed establishing the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2000, marking a significant turning point in Sino-African relations. Zemin has an entirely different outlook on Africa than Xiaoping, as evidenced by increased economic aid and visits to African nations. In the 1970s, China was not in favour of peacekeeping missions due to its policy of sovereignty and non-interference. Nevertheless, the military gradually began deploying only non-combat personnel and medical units. For the first time, China deployed peacekeeping forces to the UN Transition Assistance Group in 1989, which was responsible for observing Namibia's election process. Subsequently, China sent peacekeepers to another UN mission in Western Sahara in 1991, Mozambique from 1993 to 1994, Liberia from 1994 to 1997, the Ethiopian border, and Sierra Leone from 1998 to 1999. China also supported operations in Somalia, and the US-led operations during that time in the UN Security Council. China's trade with Africa grew impressively during the Jiang Zemin era, from US$1 billion in 1989 to US$10 billion in 2002, as China began to import raw materials such as manganese, bauxite, Uranium, cobalt, iron ore, and other essential resources to meet its Energy needs. D. Third Phase – Xi Jinping (2012 - present) This phase in Chinese politics brought extra assertiveness as Xi Jinping visited the Republic of Congo, Tanzania, Indian Journal of Social Science and Literature (IJSSL) ISSN: 2583-0643 (Online), Volume-5 Issue-2, December 2025 23 Published By: Lattice Science Publication (LSP) © Copyright: All rights reserved. Retrieval Number:100.1/ijssl.A119805010925 DOI: 10.54105/ijssl.A1198.05021225 Journal Website: www.ijssl.latticescipub.com and South Africa in 2013, straight after assuming office. In 2015, he visited Zimbabwe, where he announced a US$60 billion financial package and opened the 6th FOCAC conference. Xi Jinping proposed the concept of the 'Chinese Dream', emphasising the development of Africa alongside China as the ultimate goal, aiming to connect the interests of the Chinese people with those of the African people. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) was also a key paradigm during this era, encompassing several significant infrastructural projects on the African continent. It is a global initiative motivated by strategic and economic aspects. It is vastly popular among developing countries that lack the infrastructure and resources to overcome it. BRI enables China to provide substantial loans to countries for infrastructure development in various sectors, ultimately enhancing economic growth. This new shift in China's approach to Africa is known as 'Xi Jinping's thought,' which aims to change the global order [1]. The economic interaction between China and Africa followed an uneven pattern during this era, primarily due to Africa's growing debt burden. The IMF has already identified 5 African countries as in debt distress, and another 11 are on the verge of it [2]. China provided US$900 million in conventional Arms to North Africa and US$1.9 billion to Sub-Saharan Africa from 2012 to 2015 [3]. Military and Security issues were prioritised during this phase, as China opened its first Military base outside China in Djibouti in 2017 and subsequently increased its budget for UN peacekeeping operations by 10%. China maintained a healthy trade surplus, reaching US$170 billion in 2017. E. China's Economic Engagements with Africa Over the past few years, China's economy has slowed and is undergoing significant changes, driven by domestic and global geopolitical factors. These changes can be observed worldwide, including in Africa. China is Africa's largest bilateral trading partner and a significant source of FDI and development aid. F. Trade China, Africa's largest bilateral trading partner, accounted for only 4.7% of China's global trade, with trade volumes of US$282 billion in 2023. There is a significant trade imbalance between the two regions, with China's exports to Africa totalling US$173 billion and imports from Africa at US$109 billion. In recent years, China has sought to diversify its oil imports, sourcing crude oil from Gulf Cooperation Council countries, Asian countries, and Russia, thereby reducing imports from Arab countries. Chad is the only African country whose oil imports have increased drastically, from 78% in 2009 to 2023 [4]. The export front where Africa is moving swiftly is minerals and metals, which have seen a US$35 billion increase from 2010 to 2021. The ore extracted in Africa is also being refined and processed there. The Chinese Private sector has launched various refining projects, including a US$250 million lithium processing plant in Nigeria and Zimbabwe. Angola leads as the primary supplier of crude oil, followed by Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the Republic of the Congo, which also export a large quantity of copper. Semi-processed agricultural exports to China also need to be examined more seriously by Africa, as they have the potential to reduce its trade deficit. In this regard, Namibia started exporting beef to China in 2019. Similarly, Kenya exports 30% of its Avocados to China. Due to its imports of Chinese electronics and machinery, Tanzania is China's largest trading partner in Africa. It exports minerals and Cashew nuts to China. The E-Commerce platform is another tool to streamline trade between China and Africa. China is one of the largest ecommerce markets in the world, and platforms such as Kikuu, Jd.com, Alibaba, and Kilimall have played a significant role in recent years. These platforms sell African products during Chinese festivals and livestream events, allowing the Chinese public to engage with them. China's exports of photovoltaic products, lithium batteries and energy vehicles to Africa in 2023 increased by 57 per cent, 109 per cent and 291 per cent, respectively. Similarly, China's imports of fruit, flowers, vegetables, and African nuts increased by 7 per cent, 14 per cent, 32 per cent, and 130 per cent, respectively, over the same period. II. INVESTMENTS At the 2023 BRICS Summit in South Africa, Chinese officials expressed interest in collaborating with African countries on industrialisation, as some African countries are lagging in infrastructure development. However, we have also seen a decrease in investments from public sector financiers. Hence, private companies will likely make significant contributions at this time. Smalland mediumsized manufacturing companies in China are a fast-growing, competitive force seeking new markets, particularly amid rising labour costs in China and other Asian countries. The rising demand of the African middle class has prompted various Chinese investors to set up factories in sectors such as Electric cars, cell phones, cosmetics, cement, and plastics. Additionally, Chinese investors are also looking to streamline supply chains by incorporating processing capacity in African agricultural sectors, including the processing of natural resources, which will benefit both the African and Chinese economies. Kenya has become one of the regional hubs for Chinese investments; the SGR (Standard Gauge railway) project is a testament to this. Chinese banks have also partnered with local institutions to revamp Ethiopia's financial sector. Similarly, the Bagamoyo Port project, which aims to enhance Tanzania's trade capacity, is also a significant Chinese investment. Similarly, small 'Chinatowns' have been established by investing in real estate to cater to these African Chinese business communities. A. China's Soft Power China is rapidly expanding its engagements in Africa through trade and development. In this phase of new engagements, China has placed special emphasis on soft power, aiming to cater to the international community and the people of Africa. China portrays itself as a harmless, responsible Power. The famous Chinese proverb "Crossing the river by feeling the stones" refers to making decisions China's Growing Engagements with Africa: Challenges and Prospects 24 Published By: Lattice Science Publication (LSP) © Copyright: All rights reserved. Retrieval Number:100.1/ijssl.A119805010925 DOI: 10.54105/ijssl.A1198.05021225 Journal Website: www.ijssl.latticescipub.com based on immediate information and adapting as you proceed. This approach has allowed the Chinese to adapt to the reactions of the African government and people. China is a rapidly growing economy with new, rising demands for energy resources, minerals, and other commodities. These needs cannot be fulfilled without a friendly diplomatic push with African governments, which in turn creates an image of China as a responsible power in international forums. This further sets the stage for Chinese ambitions in the global sphere, with a large and strong market for Chinese goods and services. B. Cultural and Academic Exchange Academic and cultural exchange is critical as the two cooperating countries need to know each other's history, cultures, tastes, food, music, and everything about their lives. Researchers have emphasised this aspect as it will only enhance cooperation between the two nations. 21st century has seen an increase in the Chinese government agencies and institutions who are conducting research on Africa which includes Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS), Policy Planning Department and Africa Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the West Asian and African Affairs Department of the Ministry of Commerce, the China Institute for Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), the China Institute of International Studies (CIIS), the African Studies Center of Zhejiang Normal University, and many more centers from other Chinese universities. On the other hand, African Universities and institutions face numerous challenges when conducting research on China, including an insufficient number of researchers in Chinese studies, a shortage of funds, and a lack of such institutions. To bridge this gap, China has offered training opportunities to several African scholars through the Inter-University Cooperation Program. Additionally, more than 100 Chinese teachers have been sent to Africa along with thousands of books to teach the Chinese language and traditions. As Michel Foucault said, Power is everywhere, and so is culture. It is in mineral resources, industries and trade exchanges. A 20-member cultural delegation from China visited Africa; similarly, a 45member African delegation visited China in 1958. China has also established cultural centres in various African countries, including Ghana and Morocco. These delegations included individuals from diverse cultural backgrounds, such as sports teams, music groups, and drama clubs. African delegations celebrated events such as "Algeria Day" and "Congo Week" in the presence of large numbers of Chinese people in the 1950s and 1960s. The African Chinese government has established numerous Confucian institutes to promote its language and culture to the general public. The first such institute was established in Nairobi in 2005. 19 Confucian institutions offer academic scholarships, cultural exchange programs, and language training. Additionally, thousands of African students have been awarded scholarships to study in Chinese institutions, and several African entrepreneurs are relocating to Chinese cities in pursuit of better opportunities. C. Humanitarian and Development Assistance China has been working on the Healthcare sector in Africa, particularly through Medical Aid and the provision of medical supplies, which is difficult to quantify, especially during the COVID-19 pandemic. As China does not participate in the Western global rating system that other countries follow, it is challenging to determine the exact amount of China's humanitarian assistance contribution. The Aid Data Global Chinese Development Finance Dataset is the only currently available source that covers these reports from 2000 to 2017 and incorporates data from various sources. China's approach to family planning in Uganda is also awe-inspiring, demonstrating how policies with lower costs and less technology can be effective. This contrasts with Western Partners, who often prioritise a heavy flow of funds and advanced technology. China's efforts are commendable in helping various African nations address food security issues, promote sustainable development, and bridge the digital divide. Apart from that, China has been heavily investing in development projects in Africa, including infrastructure, road construction, energy projects, ports, and railways. These are all part of the BRI, through which China aims to establish itself as a partner for mutual growth and development. This Chinese model is highly modern and technically superior, attracting many African governments and serving as an acceptable alternative to Western industrialisation models, which often come with strict social and political conditions. Additionally, China has been offering financial assistance to African countries, characterised by a non-interference policy, unlike its Western counterparts, which set conditions, such as human rights improvements and democratic reforms, for the aid they provide. D. People to People Exchange The historical connection between Africa and China dates back to the Silk Road era, when both regions were connected not just through the exchange of goods and services, but also through ideas and the flow of knowledge. One such University was Timbuktu in western Africa, where the Chinese scholars frequently visited. China-Africa people-topeople exchanges are evident, dating back to the giraffe diplomacy. The Luban workshop in Africa is one such initiative by China, which was announced in 2018. This workshop is named after the Chinese inventor Lu Ban, renowned for his exceptional craftsmanship. After so many years, LuBan workshops have become the premier Chinese vocational education program in Africa. The LuBan workshop has helped many African youths achieve their dream of a better future. Africans choose China as their preferred destination for education, with roughly 81,600 students. China's immigration policy is much more complex than those of other American or European countries. That is why Africans tend to return home after their studies, which also reduces the risk of brain drain from the African continent Furthermore, during the recent China-Africa Cooperation plan in 2023, a talent development the plan was announced, in which it was decided to train 500 school principals and vocational teachers every year. However, the vital thing to remember is that the quality of education needs to improve, as there have been occasional reports about the proficiency of Chinese teachers in English and the efficiency of Indian Journal of Social Science and Literature (IJSSL) ISSN: 2583-0643 (Online), Volume-5 Issue-2, December 2025 25 Published By: Lattice Science Publication (LSP) © Copyright: All rights reserved. Retrieval Number:100.1/ijssl.A119805010925 DOI: 10.54105/ijssl.A1198.05021225 Journal Website: www.ijssl.latticescipub.com administrative services. If the quality of education does not improve, the quantitative growth in cooperating universities may not be sustained in the long term. E. China's Hard Strategy Significant soft power tools have brought China closer to Africa, but its growing economic and geopolitical track suggests a more aggressive stance. It refers to the use of coercive action and force to meet strategic needs. When discussing China's presence in Africa, it involves military expansion, political influence, and resource extraction. China's growing military presence in Africa is part of a policy aimed at igniting the rise of the Chinese nation and its restoration as a "Great Power". Beijing has pursued a very aggressive and bold foreign policy over the past decade towards African nations. PRC's military presence in Africa is significant. China passed a law in 2015 that allowed the overseas deployment of the People's Liberation Army and China's other security forces. The most significant deployed PLA force outside China's periphery is on the African continent. Their presence is evident in Djibouti and in UN peacekeeping missions and counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. Various reports suggest that the PRC will likely build more military bases and infrastructure around the continent, including in the Gulf of Guinea. In 2017, China inaugurated its first foreign naval base in Djibouti, located in the Horn of Africa. This base is strategically important, as it sits near the Bab El–Mandeb Strait, which connects the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden —a strategic chokepoint. A significant training exercise was conducted by the PLA helicopters in August 2018 to evacuate war casualties from a guided missile near the Djibouti coast, which shows the capability of China in ground as well as aerial competency. In 2018, Burkina Faso established diplomatic relations with China and ceased to recognise Taiwan as a separate nation. In May 2018, Burkina Faso established diplomatic relations with China and rescinded its recognition of Taiwan. The Chinese PLA and Burkina Faso are making new inroads in their relationship, which will soon feature counterterrorism exercises and infrastructure development. The PLA deployed the Sixth Battle Group to Mali, including regular and special forces, as part of the United Nations-led peacekeeping operation MINUSMA. This deployment provided China with a security presence in a country that remains central in its ongoing effort to extend the BRI into the Sahel and the larger West African region [5]. The PRC also leads multilateral forums in Africa, such as FOCAC and the China-Africa Peace and Security Forum, and organises professional military education programs for African military leaders to gain influence. Apart from that, arms sales have increased significantly as the PRC seeks to counter Russia. In August 2024, China's PLA conducted a 2-week military exercise with Tanzania and Mozambique. A Chinese deployment of 1,000 troops conducted maritime patrols, search-and-rescue missions, and live-fire drills, labelled "Peace-Unity 2024". For the past few years, we have seen a modernisation approach and changes in their strategies from the PLA, driven by their "Go Out" strategy and "New Historic Mission" guidance. Started in 2000 as part of their national strategy, "Go Out," also known as "Go Global," is an initiative that enables state-owned companies to relocate abroad and secure new markets. It has also led to the establishment of the Forum for China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2000 and the "One Belt One Road" initiative (later renamed the Belt and Road Initiative for the international audience) in 2013. The New Historic Missions contain two goals that China prioritises through 2030. The first is to enhance China's delivery of global public goods, such as peacekeeping, antipiracy, and disaster response, referred to by the PLA as "diversified tasks." China has already shunned them as a symbol of Western dominance. It now accepts them as a means to project itself as a "responsible great power". The second is to protect operational capabilities and overseas interests, including infrastructure, oil, sea transport, and the interests of Chinese nationals abroad. The use of Chinese military and civilian assets to evacuate Chinese citizens from places like Ethiopia, Libya, South Sudan, and Sudan is part of this goal [6]. F. Criticism Despite the numerous positive aspects of development assistance and infrastructure projects, the PRC has faced international criticism, particularly regarding debt. Financing all these large infrastructure projects requires substantial borrowing from the Chinese government, and African governments struggle to repay those loans when their financial needs remain unmet. Critics of international society argue that China is intentionally creating a debt trap for African nations, leading them to surrender key strategic assets — such as airports, mines, and ports — thereby compromising their sovereignty and autonomy. The worstcase scenario could be that these African countries transfer some assets, which could jeopardise their sovereignty. Criticism has also been raised about whether Chinese investments benefit African people. While the large-scale investments have created jobs, these jobs are often short-term and low-skilled. Additionally, the continuous influx of the Chinese workforce on the African continent has created anxiety among the African youth, who usually feel left out in their own countries. Another factor that leads to the criticism of Chinese occupation in Africa is how Chinese companies do not comply with the environmental rules and indulge in violating various African worker rights as well. These companies have a one-track mind, making a profit by siding with autocratic regimes on the continent while setting aside human rights and democratic principles [7]. Local small businesses in Africa are struggling and facing intense competition due to the influx of cheap Chinese imports. As a result, Africa has lost approximately 70,000 jobs in recent years [8]. African people have complained that China takes their raw materials, produces goods sold elsewhere, and fails to share the most critical technologies and know-how. African labour is seen as a cheaper alternative, costing less than half as much as Chinese labour, which is why Chinese companies are employing Ethiopian workers at a significantly lower cost. This China's Growing Engagements with Africa: Challenges and Prospects 26 Published By: Lattice Science Publication (LSP) © Copyright: All rights reserved. Retrieval Number:100.1/ijssl.A119805010925 DOI: 10.54105/ijssl.A1198.05021225 Journal Website: www.ijssl.latticescipub.com also applies to child labour, which has created tension between the two regions. III. CONCLUSION AND WAY FORWARD China employs a combination of soft and hard power strategies in Africa, and its relationship with the continent is mutually beneficial. China has effectively utilised cultural diplomacy, trade, humanitarian assistance, and people-to-people exchanges to project an image of a responsible power in Africa. At the same time, it employs aggressive policies, such as political leverage, military expansion, and resource extraction, to advance its geopolitical agenda and secure economic benefits. This relationship is expected to grow in the coming years as both powers mutually benefit each other. However, Africa should be cautious in its commitments to China, as the future is uncertain and the risks must be carefully weighed against the potential benefits. China needs to protect its reputation on the international stage, and the best way forward is to assist debt-distressed countries in Africa, alongside the West, through institutions such as the G20. It would not be easy for China, considering its competition with the US. Therefore, it would be only fair if African nations themselves demand that China and the West work together to alleviate debt distress. Subsequently, the West should encourage the African Union to join the G20, fostering equitable cooperation between the West and China. DECLARATION STATEMENT After aggregating input from all authors, I must verify the accuracy of the following information as the article's author. ▪ Conflicts of Interest/ Competing Interests: Based on my understanding, this article has no conflicts of interest. ▪ Funding Support: This article has not been funded by any organizations or agencies. This independence ensures that the research is conducted with objectivity and without any external influence. ▪ Ethical Approval and Consent to Participate: The content of this article does not necessitate ethical approval or consent to participate with supporting documentation. ▪ Data Access Statement and Material Availability: The adequate resources of this article are publicly accessible. ▪ Author's Contributions: The authorship of this article is contributed equally to all participating individuals. REFERENCES 1. Asia Society Policy Institute. (2018). Xi Jinping: China and the global order. Asia Society. [June, 2018] from https://asiasociety.org/sites/default/files/201901/Xi%20Jinping_China%20and%20the%20Global%20Order.pdf 2. Chen, W., Fornino, M., & Rawlings, H. (2024). Navigating the Evolving Landscape between China and Africa's Economic Engagements. IMF eLibrary. DOI: http://doi.org/10.5089/9798400267840.001 3. Shinn, D. H. (2019). China–Africa Relations in Historical Context. 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DOI: https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315571683 AUTHOR’S PROFILE Gaurav Pathak holds a Master's degree in Political Science from the Central University of Punjab, India. His primary research interests include Indian politics, global climate change diplomacy, and Geopolitical issues. He has qualified for the UGC-NET in Political Science and actively engages in academic discourse on contemporary political and international issues. Dr. Santosh Kumar is an Assistant Professor in the Department of South and Central Asian Studies at the School of International Studies, Central University of Punjab, Bathinda, India. He holds a PhD and M.Phil. in East Asian Studies (Japanese Division) from Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, as well as an M.A. in International Relations from the same institution. His academic foundation also includes a B.A. (Hons.) in Political Science from Zakir Husain College, University of Delhi. Dr Kumar's research interests encompass Japanese studies, international relations theory, and Indian foreign policy. He has qualified for both the UGC-NET and UGC-JRF, and was selected under the prestigious Japan-East Asia Network of Exchange for Students and Youths (JENESYS) Programme in 2009. He is currently leading a research project titled “The Growing Interlinkages between India and Japan under the Modi Government: Contextualising the Conundrum Caused by the Rise of China.” Disclaimer/Publisher’s Note: The statements, opinions and data contained in all publications are solely those of the individual author(s) and contributor(s) and not of the Lattice Science Publication (LSP)/ journal and/ or the editor(s). The Lattice Science Publication (LSP)/ journal and/or the editor(s) disclaim responsibility for any injury to people or property resulting from any ideas, methods, instructions, or products referred to in the content.