Implications of trade policy changes for the competitiveness of Ecuadorian banana exports to the EU market

Anania, Giovanni Research Report Implications of trade policy changes for the competitiveness of Ecuadorian banana exports to the EU market Issue Paper, No. 10 Provided in Cooperation with: International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD), Geneva Suggested Citation: Anania, Giovanni (2011) : Implications of trade policy changes for the competitiveness of Ecuadorian banana exports to the EU market, Issue Paper, No. 10, International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD), Geneva This Version is available at: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/70316 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. 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If the documents have been made available under an Open Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence. http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/us/ Issue Paper No. 10 Implications of Trade Policy Changes for the Competitiveness of Ecuadorian Banana Exports to the EU Market ICTSD EPAs and Regionalism Programme July 2011 | By Giovanni Anania, University of Calabria, Italy l EPAs and Regionalism Programme By Giovanni Anania, University of Calabria, Italy Implications of Trade Policy changes for the competitiveness of Ecuadorian banana Exports to the EU market Issue Paper No. 10 July 2011 ii G. Anania - Implications of Trade Policy Changes for the Competitiveness of Ecuadorian Banana Exports to the EU Market Published by International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) International Environment House 2 7 Chemin de Balexert, 1219 Geneva, Switzerland Tel: +41 22 917 8492 Fax: +41 22 917 8093 E-mail: [email protected] Internet: www.ictsd.org Chief Executive: Ricardo Meléndez-Ortiz Programmes Director: Christophe Bellmann Programme Officer: Maximiliano Chab Acknowledgments This paper was produced under the ICTSD EPAs and Regionalism Programme. ICTSD is grateful for the support of ICTSD’s core and thematic donors including the UK Department for International Development (DFID), the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA); the Netherlands Directorate-General of Development Cooperation (DGIS); the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, Danida; the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway; AusAID; and Oxfam Novib. The author and ICTSD would like to acknowledge the support of the Ministry of Coordination for Political Economy of Ecuador, which permitted the author to consult broadly with stakeholders. Dr Giovanni Anania is Professor in the Department of Economics and Statistics at the University of Calabria, Italy. For more information about ICTSD’s Programme on EPAs and Regionalism visit our web site at www. ictsd.org ICTSD welcomes feedback and comments on this document. These can be forwarded to Maximiliano Chab: [email protected] Citation: ICTSD; (2011); Implications of Trade Policy Changes for the Competitiveness of Ecuadorian Banana Exports to the EU Market; ICTSD Programme on EPAs and Regionalism; Issue Paper No. 10; International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, Geneva, Switzerland. The views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of ICTSD or the funding institutions Copyright ICTSD, 2011. Readers are encouraged to quote and reproduce this material for educational, non-profit purposes, provided the source is acknowledged. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No-Derivative Works 3.0 License. To view a copy of this license, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ us/ or send a letter to Creative Commons, 171 Second Street, Suite 300, San Francisco, California, 94105, USA. ISSN 2071-5952 iii EPAs and Regionalism Programme TABLE OF CONTENTS LIST OF FIGURES AND TAbLES iv FOREWORD vi EXEcUTIVE SUmmARY vii 1. INTRODUcTION 1 2. ThE WORLD mARkET FOR bANANAS 2 3. REcENT DEVELOPmENTS IN ThE EU ImPORT REGImE FOR bANANAS 3 4. EcUADORIAN bANANA EXPORTS AND ThE EU mARkET 6 5. bANANAS IN A POSSIbLE NEGOTIATION FOR A TRADE AGREEmENT bETWEEN EcUADOR AND ThE EU 10 6. Other factOrs affecting the cOmpetitiveness Of ecuadOr’s bANANA EXPORTS TO ThE EU mARkET. 12 ENDNOTES 35 iv G. Anania - Implications of Trade Policy Changes for the Competitiveness of Ecuadorian Banana Exports to the EU Market List of Figures 1 - Bananas. Main Producing Countries (million t; 2009). 2 - Bananas. Main exporting countries (net exports; million t; 2008). 3 - Banana importers’ shares of world market (2008; %). 4 - Bananas. World production, exports and exports as a percentage of production [million t; 1990-2009 (production); 1990-2008 (exports)]. 5 - Bananas. World, EU, USA, Russia and Japan. Per capita consumption (kg per capita per year; 1997-2007). 6 - EU-27. Consumption by member state (2007; %). 7 - European Union. Per capita yearly consumption of bananas in selected member states (2007; kg). 8 - European Union. Banana production (1990-2009; 000 tonnes). 9 - Bananas. EU-27 imports (extra-EU trade only) from MFN and ACP countries (million t; 2000-2010). 10 - Bananas. EU-27 imports (extra-EU trade only) from MFN and ACP countries (market shares; 2000-2010). 11 - EU import tariffs for bananas under the different import regimes (euro/tonne). 12 - Bananas. Ecuador, production (million t; % of world production; 1990-2009). 13 - Bananas. Ecuador, exports (thousand t; % of world exports; 1990-2008). 14 - Exports by the main exporters (2000-2009/2010; million tonnes). 15 - Exports by the main exporters (2000-2009/2010; 2000=100). 16 - Land productivity in banana production (1990-2009; tonnes/ha). 17 - Ecuador. Banana exports by country of destination (t; %; 2009). 18 - Ecuador. Banana exports by country of destination (million t; 2000-2009). 19 - Ecuador. Banana exports by country of destination (%; 2000-2009). 20 - Ecuador. Banana exports by country of destination (2000=100; 2000-2009). 21 - Bananas. EU-27 imports (extra-EU trade only) from MFN countries (million t; 20002010). 22 - Bananas. EU-27 imports (extra-EU trade only) from MFN countries (market shares; 20002010). 23 - Ecuador. Average unit value of banana exports by country of destination, as reported by Ecuador (fob at its border; $/t; 2000-2009). 24 - Ecuador, Colombia and Costa Rica. Average unit value of banana exports to the EU, as reported by the EU (cif at its border; $/t; 2000-2010). 25 - Average unit value of Ecuador banana exports to the EU as reported by Ecuador (fob at its border) and by the EU (cif at its border) ($/t; 2000-2010). 26 - Preferential margins of Colombia, Peru and the Central American countries vis a vis Ecuador (euro/tonne; 2010-2025). LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES v EPAs and Regionalism Programme 27 - Colombia and Peru: banana exports to the EU-27, total banana exports (20002009) and ‘trigger import volumes’ (2010-2019). 28 - Costa Rica and El Salvador: banana exports to the EU-27, total banana exports (20002009) and ‘trigger import volumes’ (2010-2019). 29 - Honduras and Guatemala: banana exports to the EU-27, total banana exports (20002009) and ‘trigger import volumes’ (2010-2019). 30 - Nicaragua and Panama: banana exports to the EU-27, total banana exports (20002009) and ‘trigger import volumes’ (2010-2019). 31 - Ecuador. Banana exports to the EU-27, total banana exports (2000-2009) and likely range for the ‘trigger import volumes’ (thousand tonnes; 2010-2019). 32 - Euro/US$ exchange rate (January 1999-June 2011). List of Tables European Union. Per capita and total banana consumption by member state (kg per capita per year; 000 tonnes; 1997, 2002, 2007). EU import tariffs for bananas under different regimes; preferential margin vis a vis Ecuador of Andean and Central American signatory countries of the Trade Agreements with the EU. vi G. Anania - Implications of Trade Policy Changes for the Competitiveness of Ecuadorian Banana Exports to the EU Market Ricardo Meléndez-Ortiz Chief Executive, ICTSD Bananas has been a particularly sensitive matter in Ecuador´s negotiations on international trade for decades. In its most recent iteration the issue has been at the forefront of talks concerning the establishment of regional trade agreements between the European Union (EU) and Andean countries, as well as in the context of the EU-Central American negotiations. As the world’s largest exporter of bananas, Ecuador plays a critical role in the definition of the fruit’s world prices. The EU, on the other hand, being the largest importer of bananas is a critical player in the determination of levels and dynamics of demand. An agreement between these two parties is likely to have significant impacts on the world market for bananas and related development challenges. Our research builds on a series of policy dialogues and consultations held by ICTSD over the past fifteen years, and in particular the last two years, with ministers, policy-makers and other stakeholders from banana producing and exporting countries. This work attracted the attention of the “Ministerio de Coordinación de la Política Económica del Ecuador” (Ecuadorian Ministry of Economic Policy Coordination) and forms the basis for the paper that follows. Through the facilitation of the Ministry and ICTSD, Prof. Anania engaged with a diversity of stakeholders at the national level. Discussions with public and private sector actors led to a reformulation of some key questions and the discovery of new avenues of research. In this way, Prof. Anania has now been able to address issues not yet covered by existing literature. Most observers believe that the country’s banana industry would significantly benefit from Ecuador reaching a trade agreement with the EU similar to those already finalized with Peru, Colombia and the Central American countries. However, the political decision of signing a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the EU needs to be based on an assessment of the overall costs and benefits Ecuador will face. Given the relevance of bananas to livelihoods and development for varied Ecuadorian constituencies, any study on the proposed FTA with the EU ought to reflect the rich debate in the country. ICTSD’s unique approach as an impartial and objective facilitator allows us to capture the diversity of opinion on the matter and is reflected in our findings. The paper that follows should not be taken as a deliberation on the impact of the trade agreement as a whole. Rather, it focuses on how a trade deal between Ecuador and the EU could impact trade in bananas as well as the competitiveness of the industry. This study should be of use to policy makers, negotiators and other stakeholders and we hope you find this a useful contribution to a sensitive, yet critical, discussion. FOREWORD vii EPAs and Regionalism Programme The paper discusses implications for Ecuador of a possible bilateral trade agreement with the EU which includes provisions for banana trade similar to those contained in the trade agreements the EU signed in 2010 with Colombia, Peru and Central American countries. Its main conclusions can be synthesized as follows: 1. Trade policy changes do matter. The EU, with 27.1% of the world market in 2008, is the largest importer of bananas. The EU import regime for bananas underwent major changes in recent years which affected – with different, sometimes opposing, effects - the relative competitiveness of banana exports to the EU from different countries. These changes include the 2001 ‘Everything But Arms’ initiative, the introduction in January 2006 of the EU ‘tariff-only’ import regime, the implementation in January 2008 of the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), the December 2009 WTO agreement on bananas, and the 2010 Trade Agreements (TAs) between the EU and Colombia and Peru and the Association Agreement with Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama. The introduction in 2006 of the ‘tariff only’ import regime and in 2008 of the EPAs significantly affected banana trade. The ‘tariff only’ import regime brought a significant increase in EU-27 imports from MFN countries, which rose from volumes very close to 3.1 million tonnes in 2000-2005, to 3.6 million tonnes in 2006, 3.9 in 2007 and over 4 million tonnes in 2008. ACP exports to the EU increased from 843,000 tonnes in 2007 to 920 in 2008, 960 in 2009 and over 1 million tonnes in 2010. 2. Not only is Ecuador, by far, the largest exporter of bananas in the world, but it has proved in recent years to be a strong and competitive exporter. Ecuador is a key competitive player in the banana market. Banana production in Ecuador between 1990 and 2009 increased from 3 to 7.6 million tonnes. Ecuador’s exports show over the same time period a regular upward sloping trend; Ecuador’s share of the growing world market for bananas increased from 23.9% in 1990, to 27.8% in 1995, 27.9% in 2000, 29.4% in 2005 and 29.3% in 2008. Ecuador is the only country which is able to export significant volumes of bananas to both segments of the world market: the East Asia & Oceania market, and the rest of the world. 3. The EU is a strategic market for Ecuador’s banana exports. Almost 85% of Ecuador’s banana exports in 2009 were directed toward three markets only: the European Union (39.2% of total exports by Ecuador), Russia (23%) and the US (22.4%). Ecuador’s exports to the EU increased between 2000 and 2009 from 1.4 million tonnes to 2.2. (+60%, from 33.6% of Ecuador’s exports to 39.2%). 4. The implications for Ecuador of the 2010 Trade Agreements between the EU and Colombia, Peru and the Central American countries will be different in the short run (until 2020), and in the medium run (from 2020). This is because the reduction of the tariff imposed on EU imports of bananas from the countries which signed the TAs will be progressive and because after 2019 the ‘safeguard’ clause based on the ‘Trigger Import Volumes’ (TIVs) will no longer be active. 5. The TAs between the EU and Colombia, Peru and the Central American countries in the short run (between now and 2020) will have a small, gradually increasing, impact on Ecuador’s banana exports and export prices. Ceteris paribus, Ecuador will export a little less to the EU and receive a somewhat lower price for its bananas; however, until the end of 2019 the impact of the TAs on Ecuador’s banana exports will be mitigated by (a) the implementation of the preferential tariff reduction being progressive and (b) the TIV provisions, which will act as a ‘safeguard’ for Ecuador as well as for the EU. 6. After 2019 the negative impact of the TAs on the relative competitiveness on the EU market of Ecuador’s banana exports will be significant. This will be the case because of both, the magnitude of the preferential margin enjoyed by that time by the eight countries benefitting from the TAs, and the ‘safeguard’ clause being no longer applied. Ceteris paribus, Ecuador is expected to export less to the EU than it would in the absence of the TAs and receive a lower price for its exports. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 6G. Anania - Implications of Trade Policy Changes for the Competitiveness of Ecuadorian Banana Exports to the EU Market 4. ECUADORIAN BANANA EXpORTS AND ThE EU MARkET Banana production in Ecuador between 1990 and 2009 shows three phases: a strong positive trend between 1990 and 1997, when production rapidly increased from 3 to 7.5 million tonnes; a stable production between 1998 and 2007, with relatively small fluctuations around 6 million tonnes; and, again, a strong expansion in most recent years, when production reached 7.6 million tonnes (figure 12). Ecuador’s share of world production of bananas was 6.5% in 1990, reached its maximum value, 12.1%, in 1997 and was 7.8% in 2009 (figure 12). Ecuador’s exports, on the contrary, show over the same time period a regular upward sloping trend, only steeper in years when production increased, less pronounced between 1998 and 2007, when production remained relatively stable (figure 13). Ecuador exports’ share of the world market increased over the years: from 23.9% in 1990, to 27.8% in 1995, 27.9% in 2000, 29.4% in 2005 and 29.3% in 20087 (figure 13). When exports by the top five exporters – Ecuador, Costa Rica, Philippines, Colombia and Guatemala – over the past decade are compared, Ecuador shows a stronger rate of growth, apart from that of Guatemala in more recent years, and a more stable overall trend (figures 14 and 15). Not only is Ecuador, by far, the largest exporter of bananas in the world, but it has proved in recent years to be a strong and competitive exporter. Several factors determine jointly the cost of Ecuador’s banana exports. Information on developments in one of these factors, land productivity, is provided in figure 16.8 Banana production per hectare of land used to produce bananas in Ecuador shows a clear upward sloping trend between 1990 and 2009 (figure 16). Land productivity in Ecuador has been and remains significantly higher than the world average but lower than that of two important competitors such as Costa Rica and Guatemala, while Colombia - as a result of the clear, significant, decline in land productivity in banana production - shows a production of bananas per hectare which in most recent years remained below that of Ecuador, yet the contrary was true throughout most of the 1990s and early 2000s. Almost 85% of Ecuador’s exports in 2009 were directed toward three markets only: the European Union (2,244 thousand tonnes, including re-exports by EU member states; 39.2% of total exports by Ecuador), Russia (1,319 thousand tonnes; 23%) and the US (1,283 thousand tonnes; 22.4%) (figure 17). Chile and Argentina were the next most important destinations, with exports close to 200 thousand tonnes each, around 3.5% of Ecuador banana exports, while total exports to other destinations were close to 500 thousand tonnes (8.5%). Ecuador’s exports to the EU and Russia have both increased since 2000; those to Russia from 500 thousand tonnes in 2000 and 2001 to 1.3 million tonnes in 2009 (+140%, from 13.4% of Ecuador’s exports to 23%), those directed to the EU from 1.4 million tonnes to 2.2 (+60%, from 33.6% to 39.2%) (figures 18, 19 and 20). Exports to the US fluctuated around one million tonnes, with a peak of 1.3 million tonnes in 2009. Finally, Ecuador’s exports to destinations different from the EU, Russia and the US have been stable between 2001 and 2006 around 750 thousand tonnes, but increased in more recent years, reaching 880 thousand tonnes in 2009 (figure 18). As mentioned above, Ecuador is able to export bananas to East Asia and Oceania, a market where the Philippines are the leading exporter. Ecuador exports bananas to New Zealand (it holds 35% of the market) and Japan (5%); however, over the years Ecuador has been losing large portions of these markets to the Philippines: it share of these markets in 2000 was 89% and 20%, respectively. In 2010, 3.6 million tonnes (77.7%) of bananas imported by the EU originated in countries subject to its MFN import regime, and 1 million tonnes (22.3%) in ACP countries, whose exports enter the EU tariff-free. As discussed above, the competitiveness of MFN bananas on the EU market changed dramatically in 2006 with the 7 EPAs and Regionalism Programme abolition of the quota and the introduction of the ‘tariff only’ import regime; MFN countries’ exports to the EU increased from 3.2 million tonnes in 2005, to 3.6 in 2006, 3.9 in 2007 and 4 million tonnes in 2008. However, MFN exports to the EU declined in 2009 (3.7 million tonnes) and 2010 (3.6), when ACP exports increased as a result of the significant expansion in the preferential market access granted to them by the EPAs (figures 9 and 10). As a result of differences in the access to quota licenses before 2006, Colombia seems to be the MFN country which benefitted the most from the removal of the MFN quota on EU banana imports, while exports to this market from the other two main exporters, Ecuador and Costa Rica, appear to have increased less significantly (figure 21). Colombia’s share of the EU market exceeded 26% in 2008, 2009 and 2010, from levels below 20% between 2000 and 2004. The shares of Ecuador and Costa Rica do not show significant changes over the decade, as Colombia replaced exports from Panama and other residual MFN exporters, whose joint share went from around 15% at the beginning of the decade down to 7% in 2009 and 2010 (figure 22). Useful information regarding the competitiveness of Ecuador’s bananas in the EU market can be obtained by analyzing differences in average unit values of Ecuador banana exports to different destinations (figure 22) and differences in average unit values of EU banana imports from different sources (figure 23). Average unit values of Ecuador banana exports at its border, as reported by the same country, to its three main destination markets – the EU, Russia and the US – from 2000 to 2009 are very close, but for 2006, when exports to the US registered a per unit value unexpectedly higher than those of bananas exported to the EU and Russia. On the contrary, the average unit value of Ecuador exports to markets different from the main three destinations were always significantly lower, with the gap increasing over time and reaching around 70 US$/tonne at the end of the 2000s, from 15 US$/tonne at the beginning of the decade. When average unit values of EU banana imports at its border and based on its own custom reporting are considered, those of Ecuador, Colombia and Costa Rica clearly appear to be moving together. However, those of Ecuador tend to be systematically the lowest of the three and those of imports from Costa Rica the highest (figure 24); however, the wedge between the average unit value of Costa Rican and Ecuadorian bananas at the EU border seems to have become ever smaller over the years. Finally, when average unit values of Ecuador’s banana exports to the EU as reported by Ecuador and the EU at the respective borders are compared, the wedge between the two expands over the years (figure 25). This may be due to a range of factors, including increased international transaction costs and changes in non competitive behaviours by banana traders, including strategic pricing. Between today and 2019 there will be two changes progressively taking place in the EU import regimes for bananas: those due to the 2009 WTO agreement and those due to the TAs between the EU and Colombia, Peru and the Central American countries. The EU MFN import tariff will be progressively reduced from its current level of 143 €/tonne to 114 €/tonne, assuming that DDA modalities in agriculture will not be agreed by 31 December 2013, otherwise this will occur by 2017 (table 2; figure 11). This reduction in the MFN tariff, ceteris paribus, is expected to bring (a) an increase in EU total imports and (b) an increase in the share of EU imports of bananas from MFN countries (while imports from ACP countries are expected to contract). Ecuador’s banana exports to the EU are expected to increase as a result of the 2009 agreement on bananas; however, the increase in Ecuador’s overall exports is expected to be somewhat smaller; in fact, because of the changes in relative prices, Ecuador will find it profitable to redirect to the EU market some of its exports previously directed to other destinations. Two distinct phases are to be considered when assessing the implications for Ecuador of the implementation of the changes in the EU import regime for bananas as a result of the 2010 TAs 8G. Anania - Implications of Trade Policy Changes for the Competitiveness of Ecuadorian Banana Exports to the EU Market with Colombia, Peru and Central American countries: the implementation period until 2020, and the subsequent period, when the agreements will be in force and the ‘safeguard’ clause based on the TIVs regime will no longer be active. The implementation of the TAs with Colombia, Peru and the Central American countries will progressively reduce the import tariff their banana exports will face in the EU market, to reach by the year 2020 75 €/tonne (table 1; figure 3). This implies a preferential margin vis a vis Ecuador banana exports which will increase over time to reach 39 €/tonnes in 2020, a margin of an order of magnitude which makes a difference in relative competitiveness (figure 26). However, it is important to recognise that until 2020 banana exports at increasing preferential conditions originating from the countries which signed the TAs will be subject to the ‘safeguard’ clause and less favourable preferential tariff conditions with respect to those when the TAs will be fully implemented. Until 2020, a given country’s benefits from the agreement with the EU will depend on the volume of its exports which would have occurred had the agreement not been signed. Four cases are possible: 1. In the absence of any agreement exports to the EU subject to the MFN tariff would be equal to, or larger than, the TIV. In this case exports and equilibrium prices would remain unchanged under the agreements. However, this does not mean that the TAs have no effect; in fact, they determine an income transfer from the EU budget to (most likely) banana traders, in the form of ‘rents’ deriving from the lower tariff applied on the country’s exports up to the TIV. 2. In the absence of any agreement exports to the EU subject to the MFN tariff would be above zero but below the TIV. In this case the agreements will lead to an increase in the country production, exports and price received, while the opposite will occur for the EU domestic price and for the import price paid for bananas originating in countries, like Ecuador, whose exports remain subject to the MFN tariff. In this case too, depending on the equilibrium reached, part of the reduction in EU tariff revenue on its imports originating in the countries which signed the TAs may well become ‘rents’ to be captured (again, most likely) by banana traders. 3. In the absence of any agreement no exports to the EU would occur at the MFN tariff, but they become profitable under the preferential tariff. 4. In the absence of any agreement no exports to the EU would occur at the MFN tariff, and the preferential margin granted by the agreements is not sufficient to make them profitable. The TAs will generate benefits for the Andean and Central American countries in the first three cases (assuming, rather optimistically, that in case 1 ‘rents’, no matter who captures them, will induce indirect benefits in the exporting country), but production and trade will increase only in cases 2 and 3. This means that during the implementation phase Ecuador banana exports and price received will be affected only if some of the beneficiary countries fall under cases 2 and 3. To help assess which case may apply to which country, figures 27-30 give for each of the eight countries who signed the TAs with the EU: total banana exports and exports to the EU between 2000 and 2009, and expected exports under the pre-TAs regime (this is the linear trend based on the country’s exports to the EU between 2000 and 2009) and TIVs from 2010 to 2019. Colombia (figure 27) is a possible ‘case 1’ candidate. In fact, based on recent trends, expected banana exports to the EU appear very close to the TIVs it will face;9 in addition, its overall exports have been increasing and under the new import regime it will become profitable for Colombia to divert some of its exports from other destinations to the EU market. The reduction in EU tariff revenue which will become ‘rents’, likely to be transferred to 9 EPAs and Regionalism Programme banana traders, will equal 4 million euro in 2010, to reach 76 million euro by 2019. Peru (figure 27), Costa Rica (figure 28) and Panama (figure 30) seem likely ‘case 2’ examples. Costa Rica and Peru, on different scales, show upward trends both for their exports to the EU market and overall, but expected exports to the EU under the MFN import regime were likely to remain below the TIVs. Panama, on the contrary, shows a negative trend for its banana exports, both to the EU and overall. All things being equal, the agreement with the EU should help contain this trend. Because of their current ability to export bananas, though not to the EU, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua (figures 29 and 30) seem to fall under ‘case 3’, while El Salvador (figure 28) can either be a ‘case 3’ or a ‘case 4’. In the short term, i.e. between now and 2020, Ecuador is expected to see its relative competitiveness on the EU market progressively fall with respect to the signatories of the TAs (this will be the case as well for other MFN countries, ACP countries and LDC); caeteris paribus, Ecuador will export a little less to the EU and receive a somewhat lower price for its bananas. In fact, until the end of 2019 the impact of the TAs on Ecuador banana exports will be mitigated by the TIV provisions, which will act as a ‘safeguard’ for it as well as for the EU. The 39 €/tonne preferential margin eventually granted by the TAs from 2020 onwards will significantly improve the competitiveness of the eight Andean and Central American countries on the EU market vis a vis Ecuador and other exporters. Gains for countries benefitting from the TAs which are already exporting bananas to the EU are expected to be conspicuous, as both their exports and the price they will receive for their bananas will increase. This will likely be the case for countries such as Colombia, Costa Rica and Peru. Countries that currently do not export bananas to the EU, or that are only marginal exporters, will benefit from the agreements only if the increase in their competitiveness on this market as a result of the preferential margin granted is sufficient to overcome the negative factors that make their exports currently unprofitable. After 2019 Ecuador (as well as other MFN exporters to the EU, ACP countries and LDC) will see its relative competitiveness on the EU market significantly fall with respect to the eight signatories of the TAs. Caeteris paribus, Ecuador is expected to export less to the EU than it would in the absence of the TAs and receive a lower price for its exports. In markets different from the EU, imports will decline and prices increase, as a result of the trade diversion to the EU market of some of the exports of the Andean and Central American countries; this means that, on the contrary, Ecuador and other countries are expected to expand their exports to these markets, but this will only partially compensate for the decline of their exports to the EU. 10 G. Anania - Implications of Trade Policy Changes for the Competitiveness of Ecuadorian Banana Exports to the EU Market 5. BANANAS IN A pOSSIBLE NEGOTIATION FOR A TRADE AGREEMENT BETWEEN ECUADOR AND ThE EU Originally the negotiations for a possible Association Agreement involved all four member countries of the CAN (Comunidad Andina de Naciones); however, Bolivia pulled out from the negotiations in 2007 and Ecuador ‘suspended’ its participation in 2009. From what has been said so far, there is little doubt that the country’s banana industry would significantly benefit from Ecuador reaching a trade agreement with the EU similar to those agreed by Peru, Colombia and the Central American countries. Obviously, the decision needs to be based on an assessment of the overall net effect of the agreement, i.e. on a comparison of the overall benefits, of different nature, Ecuador will obtain from the TA and of the costs, again, of different nature, Ecuador will have to face as a result of the agreement. Not only that, but, in addition to the extent of the overall costs and benefits deriving from the agreement, their distribution among different social groups needs to be carefully assessed as well (because of the different ‘weights’ the policy maker may attach to each of them). Should Ecuador decide to reopen its negotiations with the EU for a trade agreement containing a chapter on bananas similar to that signed by Colombia, Peru and the Central American countries, a first element to keep in mind is that this would hardly be in the interest of the other exporters to the EU, which would prefer an agreement between the latter and Ecuador not to materialize; in fact, this would either reduce the preferential margin they have secured (the eight Andean and Central American countries), or further reduce the competitiveness of their banana exports in the EU market (ACP countries, LDC and the other MFN exporters, such as Brazil and the Philippines). As regards bananas, in the negotiations with Ecuador it seems unlikely that the EU would be willing to accept provisions different from those included in the TAs with Colombia, Peru and the Central American Countries. This means that negotiations will likely focus, at the most, on two elements only: (a) the timing of the reduction of the tariff faced by Ecuador’s exports and (b) the volume of the TIVs in the implementation period. The preferential import tariff to be eventually reached - 75 €/ tonne - seems to be out of discussion. With respect to the timing of the progressive reduction of the tariff faced by Ecuadorian banana exports, the negotiation appears to be constrained, at one end, by an implementation period as long as that included in the TAs which have already been signed (ten years), and, at the other end, by an implementation period lasting from the start of the implementation of the agreement, whenever this may be, and 2020, the date when the implementation period for Colombia, Peru and the Central American countries, will end. Ecuador’s interest is for the implementation period to be as short as possible. The most advantageous scenario is probably tenable - on the basis that Ecuador, being a member of CAN, could have completed the negotiations along with the other members in 2010 – but difficult to obtain, because of possible opposition by the other countries indirectly involved as well as domestic producers in the EU, and because negotiation rigidities by the EU itself; in fact, the EU might be unwilling to concede to Ecuador provisions different from those granted to the other eight countries, as this could affect its ‘reputation’ in trade negotiations, which is an important asset. The volumes of the TIVs agreed by the eight countries involved in the TAs are linked to recent exports to the EU by each of them; however, their values suggest that they are not the result of a common ‘rule’ having been uniformly applied to all countries. In particular, when the TIVs for the major exporters (Colombia, Costa Rica, Panama and 11 EPAs and Regionalism Programme Peru) are compared with their recent export volumes to the EU, it becomes clear that those for Colombia, the largest exporter to the EU among the four, are much less generous than those for the other three countries. In fact the TIV in 2010 equals 109% of average exports to the EU in 2007-2008-2009 for Colombia, 117% for Costa Rica, 135% for Panama and 173% for Peru. In addition, not only has Peru (the smallest, by far, of the four players) the most generous TIV in 2010 with respect to its historical exports to the EU, but its TIVs expand between 2010 and 2020 by 50%, while those of all other seven countries increase by 45% only. The possible limits of the negotiation space for Ecuador’s TIVs could possibly be the outcomes obtained by receiving, at one end, a treatment similar to that granted to Peru (TIV in year one of the implementation period equal to 173% of Ecuador’s average exports to the EU in the most recent three year period, and a TIV at the end of the implementation period equal to 150% of that in the first year), and, at the other end, a treatment similar to that granted to Colombia (TIV in year one of the implementation period equal to 109% of average exports to the EU in the most recent three year period, and a TIV at the end of the period equal to 145% of that in the first year). These two extreme scenarios are represented in figure 31. However, Ecuador being a very large and competitive exporter, it is unlikely that the EU would be ready to consider granting it provisions similar to those granted to Peru. 12 G. Anania - Implications of Trade Policy Changes for the Competitiveness of Ecuadorian Banana Exports to the EU Market 6. OThER FACTORS AFFECTING ThE COMpETITIVENESS OF ECUADOR’S BANANA EXpORTS TO ThE EU MARkET The conclusion which has emerged is that trade policy changes in the banana market certainly do matter. The TAs concluded by the EU with Colombia, Peru and the Central American countries in the short run (between now and 2020) will have a small, gradually increasing, impact on Ecuador’s banana exports and export prices. From 2020 the negative impact of the TAs on the competitiveness of Ecuador’s banana exports on the EU market will be significant, because of both, the magnitude of the preferential margin enjoyed by that time by the eight countries benefitting from the TAs and the ‘safeguard’ clause being no longer applied. This, conversely, implies that the benefits for Ecuador’s banana industry of reaching a trade agreement with the EU similar to those signed in 2010 by Colombia, Peru and the Central America countries will be small during the implementation period, but will become sizeable after then. In addition, it is important to recognise that the preferential gap in the tariff faced on the EU market would increase the competitiveness of Ecuador’s banana exports vis a vis exports from the Philippines, which are subject to the MFN import regime. Having said that, the final section of the paper is devoted to a brief discussion of factors different from the EU import regime which are relevant in determining the competitiveness of Ecuador banana exports to the EU market. The euro/$ exchange rate. Since the introduction of the euro, its exchange rate with the US$ has been subject to wide fluctuations and changes in medium term trend (figure 32). Structural changes in this exchange rate will obviously affect Ecuador’s volumes exported and prices received (on the EU market as well as on other markets, being, as discussed above, Ecuador’s export banana markets well integrated). Product differentiation, including organic and fair trade bananas. Based on past developments, there is no reason to expect the expansion of banana consumption, both in the EU and worldwide, not to continue in the years to come. Hence, the issue of competitiveness of Ecuadorian bananas relative to that of other exporters relates to its implications in terms of market share of a growing market. The vast majority of EU consumers are unable today to identify the country of origin of the bananas they consume. The multinationals which control the market of bananas are very careful to protect the value of their own branding from the emergence of preferences by consumers based on the country of origin of bananas. In other words, for EU consumers today “a banana is a banana”, while a banana from Chiquita, for some consumers at least, is different from a banana by Del Monte or Dole.10 If Ecuador were able to convince a significant share of consumers that its bananas were different and better than those of other origins, this would give them a competitive margin on the market, leading to a larger market share and/or a price premium (the actual result would depend on the strategic behaviour adopted to exploit the benefits deriving from product differentiation). Product differentiation is a necessary condition for the effectiveness of public and private market promotion and market development actions. Developing a product differentiation strategy based on the country of origin in the banana market is not easy, for several reasons, not least of which being in evident conflict with the strategic behaviours of the multinationals controlling a very large share of the banana market. However, there are examples of countries that have been able to implement product differentiation strategies based on other quality characteristics, namely certified organic and ‘fair trade’ bananas. The most evident example of the successful implementation of such a strategy is probably the Dominican Republic. Dominican Republic exports to the EU increased from 60,000 tonnes in 2000 to over 300,000 in 2010, becoming the largest ACP exporter to the EU market, surpassing the two traditional main ACP exporters, Cameroon (243,000 tonnes) and 13 EPAs and Regionalism Programme Cote d’Ivoire (244,000 tonnes). This tremendous expansion in exports is largely due to the fact that two thirds of Dominican Republic banana ex p or t s to day are ce r ti fie d as b ein g bot h org anic and ‘fair trade’. Although differences in agroclimatic conditions in Ecuador and Dominican Republic make producing a large share of organic bananas in Ecuador more problematic, Ecuador produces and exports today a volume of organic bananas much smaller than it could. Should Ecuador expand ‘fair trade’ banana production, this would bring benefits which go well beyond increasing the competitiveness of its banana exports in the EU market; it would provide an important additional push to improve compliance to existing laws in the area of farm employee working conditions, wages received and social security coverage. While a significant expansion of organic and ‘fair trade’ bananas is likely to generate private benefits mostly in terms of volumes exported (the price premium received is likely to be not much higher than what is needed to cover additional costs and higher production risks involved in ‘organic’ practices), benefits will extend beyond those of the private entities involved. First of all, ‘fair trade’ bananas are, because of the specific nature of this ‘quality characteristic’, associated to their country of origin, and this will help build a positive image with EU consumers of the entire Ecuadorian banana industry, which today suffers from the concerns systematically raised regarding farm working conditions and possible use of child labour. Second, benefits may flow even outside the boundaries of the banana industry, because consumer perception of the Ecuadorian banana industry being linked to organic and ‘fair trade’ production will have positive spill-over effects on the image of Ecuador as a country strongly committed to the environment, with direct benefits also for the demand for tourist services. Productivity in banana production and quality of domestic logistic infrastructures. Productivity and the efficiency of logistic infrastructures of the banana industry in Ecuador obviously directly affect costs of production and handling, and, in turn, competitiveness of Ecuadorian banana exports. Based on available information as well as on the opinions expressed by actors I had the opportunity to speak with, s i g n i fi c a n t m a r g i n s o f i m p r o v e m e n t e x i s t f o r b o t h factors. Surprisingly, despite the economic and social importance of the banana industry for Ecuador, very little has been invested, both by private and public actors, in the development of improved environmentally and socially sustainable production technologies, and in facilitating the adoption of more productive environmentally and socially sustainable production technologies which are already available. The public sector should consider developing a ‘research & development plan’ for the banana sector, to support research activities as well as actions meant to facilitate the adoption by farms of new and existing improved sustainable production technologies. Analogously, the need emerges for an assessment of existing infrastructures specifically relevant for the banana industry, in order to identify interventions to fill gaps, if any, and improve the stock of existing infrastructure, in order to reduce domestic handling costs of bananas. Distribution of power along the banana market chain. The quantification of both (a) potential total benefits for the Ecuadorian banana industry deriving from a TA with the EU similar to those reached by Colombia, Peru and the Central American countries in 2010, and (b) the distribution of these benefits among the main domestic social groups involved (i.e. workers, farm owners, exporters) cannot be performed without an assessment of (formal and informal) contractual terms regulating exchanges of goods and services among them (and, in the case of the exporters, of those between them and downstream agents, such as traders, providers of transportation services and importers). In the absence of information on the distribution of market power along the chain of Ecuadorian banana production and trade any policy decision, regardless of it being related to trade or domestic interventions, will be ill-informed, because the implications of the alternatives being considered and of the decision eventually made will be imprecisely assessed. This means that an effort should be 14 G. Anania - Implications of Trade Policy Changes for the Competitiveness of Ecuadorian Banana Exports to the EU Market made to identify, at least in general terms, formal and informal ‘rules’ governing prices paid and received in the exchanges of goods and services along the market chain of Ecuadorian bananas. Other factors outside the area of possible public intervention by the Ecuadorian Government. Other important factors which will affect the competitiveness of Ecuadorian banana exports on the EU market include developments in international transportation technologies and costs, developments in the degree of concentration and in buying and pricing strategies by the retail sector, and structural changes in international banana trading. All these factors fall largely outside the area of possible direct intervention by Ecuador’s policy makers. A final consideration refers to the more general issue related to the design of public policy interventions for the banana industry. Current and potential public policy interventions in this sector in Ecuador include very different policy instruments and touches very different aspects of banana production and trade: from fiscal policies (at the farm and border level), to regulating contractual terms of domestic banana trade by fixing the minimum price per box of bananas to be paid by exporters to producers; from regulating farm obligations to its employees in terms of working conditions, minimum wages and social security coverage, to investments in research and development activities; from increasing efforts for an effective implementation of existing regulations (a relevant policy decision per se), to investing in domestic physical infrastructures or in market specific promotion or development plans. Because of the economic and social relevance of the banana industry in Ecuador, there is a need to develop an ‘integrated policy action plan’, defined under the sole responsibility of the Government but developed with the involvement of all relevant social actors. This plan should first identify the public goals to be achieved; then draw up all public policy interventions relevant for the banana industry to be implemented (current interventions; modified ones, if required; innovative ones) in a single integrated and coherent plan of policy action; finally, identify the contribution expected by the public sector as well as each of the social groups involved. Only if defined and implemented w ithin a concerte d, cohere nt single plan of action, can public policy interventions be effective and efficiently implemented to reach the stated public goals. 15 EPAs and Regionalism Programme India Philippines China Equador Brazil Indonesia United Republic of Tanzania Guatemala Costa Rica Mexico Colombia Viet Nam Thailand Papua New Guinea Egypt Cameroon Rest of the world 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 Figure 1. Bananas. Main Producing Countries (million t; 2009) Figure 2. Bananas. Main exporting countries (net exports; million t; 2008) Source: Faostat. Source: Faostat. Ecuador Costa Rica Philippines Colombia Guatemala Honduras Panama Cameroon Cote d’Ivoire Dominican Republic Brazil 012 3 4 5 6 (million t) (million t) 22 G. Anania - Implications of Trade Policy Changes for the Competitiveness of Ecuadorian Banana Exports to the EU Market Figure 15. Exports by the main exporters (2000-2009/2010; 2000=100) Figure 16. Land productivity in banana production (1990-2009; tonnes/ha) Source: Comtrade Source: Faostat Ecuador Costa Rica Philippines Colombia Guatemala 250 225 200 175 150 125 100 75 50 25 0 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 (tonnes/ha) 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 Colombia Costa Rica Ecuador Guatemala Philippines World 23 EPAs and Regionalism Programme Figure 17. Ecuador. Banana exports by country of destination (t; %; 2009) Figure 18. Ecuador. Banana exports by country of destination (million t; 2000-2009) Source: Comtrade Source: Comtrade USA 1282599 22,4% Chile 199939 3,5% Argentina 195531 3,4% Others 486000 8,5% Russia 1318910 23,0% EU 2244263 39,2% (million t) 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 EU Russia USA Others 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Others USA Russia EU 1,284 0,887 0,548 1,379 0,734 1,011 1,033 1,921 0,641 1,129 0,875 1,706 0,746 1,151 1,118 1,943 0,842 0,99 1,397 2,128 0,776 1,024 0,492 1,357 0,736 1,051 1,145 1,915 0,776 1,001 0,974 2,008 0,965 1,035 1,27 2,017 0,881 1,283 1,319 2,244 24 G. Anania - Implications of Trade Policy Changes for the Competitiveness of Ecuadorian Banana Exports to the EU Market Figure 19. Ecuador. Banana exports by country of destination (%; 2000-2009) Figure 20. Ecuador. Banana exports by country of destination (2000=100; 2000-2009) Source: Comtrade Source: Comtrade 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 (%) Others USA Russia EU 31,4 21,7 13,4 33,6 15,6 21,5 22 40,9 14,7 25,9 20,1 39,2 15 23,2 22,5 39,2 15,7 18,5 26,1 39,7 21,3 28,1 13,6 37,2 15,2 21,7 23,6 39,5 16,3 21 20,5 42,2 18,3 19,6 24 38,2 15,4 22,4 23 39,2 EU Russia USA Others 300 250 200 150 100 50 0 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Others USA Russia EU 100 100 100 100 50 127 160 124 57 114 189 140 58 130 204 141 66 112 255 155 60 115 90 99 60 113 178 146 57 118 209 139 75 117 232 147 69 145 241 163 EU Russia USA Others 25 EPAs and Regionalism Programme Figure 21. Bananas. EU-27 imports (extra-EU trade only) from MFN countries (million t; 2000-2010) Figures 22. Bananas. EU-27 imports (extra-EU trade only) from MFN countries (market shares; 2000-2010) Source: Eurostat Source: Eurostat 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total ACP OTHER MFN PANAMA COSTA RICA COLOMBIA ECUADOR 0,772 0,216 0,436 0,718 0,754 1,097 0,74 0,092 0,396 0,75 0,784 1,182 0,783 0,116 0,371 0,862 0,785 1,149 0,89 0,188 0,314 0,843 0,977 1,237 0,919 0,138 0,295 0,907 1,31 1,39 0,749 0,152 0,418 0,69 0,752 1,116 0,803 0,103 0,382 0,81 0,813 1,211 0,764 0,124 0,282 0,638 0,9 1,276 0,843 0,181 0,355 0,979 1,184 1,222 0,959 0,136 0,185 0,757 1,241 1,344 1,024 0,146 0,184 0,78 1,201 1,262 5 4 3 2 1 0 (million t) 100 80 60 40 20 0 OTHER MFN PANAMA COSTA RICA COLOMBIA ECUADOR 5,4 10,9 18 18,8 27,4 2,3 10 19 19,9 30 2,8 9,1 21,2 19,3 28,2 4,2 7,1 18,9 22 27,8 2,8 5,9 18,3 26,4 28 3,9 10,8 17,8 19,4 28,8 2,5 9,2 19,6 19,7 29,3 3,1 7,1 16 22,6 32 3,8 7,4 20,5 24,8 25,6 2,9 4 16,4 26,8 29,1 3,2 4 17 26,1 27,4 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 26 G. Anania - Implications of Trade Policy Changes for the Competitiveness of Ecuadorian Banana Exports to the EU Market Figure 23. Ecuador. Average unit value of banana exports by country of destination, as reported by Ecuador (fob at its border; $/t; 2000-2009) Figure 24. Ecuador, Colombia and Costa Rica. Average unit value of banana exports to the EU, as reported by the EU (cif at its border; $/t; 2000-2010) Source: Comtrade Source: Comtrade ($/t) EU USA Russia Other destinations 400 360 320 280 240 200 160 EU USA Russia Other destinations 207,3 202,7 204,8 189,4 225,4 227,2 226,3 203,6 224,6 225,8 222,8 181,2 246,6 278,7 238,9 196,3 310,7 322 325,2 243,8 239,4 232 245,7 210,6 237,5 240,8 237,7 193,3 229,2 236,1 227,7 184,7 253,4 264,7 249,7 207,8 358,5 362,4 358,2 287,5 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 ($/t) 1000 900 800 700 600 500 400 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Ecuador Colombia Costa Rica Ecuador Colombia Costa Rica 449,2 482,4 514,1 706,1 804,7 795,8 538 566,2 618,6 709,1 769,1 732,2 839,8 908,8 898,8 483,8 498,9 572,3 755,9 810,2 874,9 872,1 925,3 936,2 601,3 657,6 731,1 810,9 766,4 841,7 799,3 894 809,5 27 EPAs and Regionalism Programme Figure 25. Average unit value of Ecuador banana exports to the EU as reported by Ecuador (fob at its border) and by the EU (cif at its border) ($/t; 2000-2010) Figure 26. Preferential margins of Colombia, Peru and the Central American countries vis a vis Ecuador (euro/tonne; 2010-2025) Source: Comtrade 1000 900 800 700 600 500 400 300 200 100 0 ($/t) Ecuador border EU border 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Ecuador border EU border 207,3 449,2 225,4 538 224,6 706,1 246,6 709,1 310,7 872,1 239,4 483,8 237,5 601,3 229,2 755,9 253,4 810,9 358,5 839,8 799,3 50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 Preferential margin, no DDA Preferential margin, DDA 28 G. Anania - Implications of Trade Policy Changes for the Competitiveness of Ecuadorian Banana Exports to the EU Market Figure 27. Colombia and Peru: banana exports to the EU-27, total banana exports (20002009) and ‘trigger import volumes’ (2010-2019) Source for trade data: Comext, Comtrade. 2500 2250 2000 1750 1500 1250 1000 750 500 250 0 200 175 150 125 100 75 50 25 0 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 Colombia Peru TIV Total Exports TIV Total Exports EU imports EU imports (trend) EU imports EU imports (trend) (000 t) (000 t) 2500 2250 2000 1750 1500 1250 1000 750 500 250 0 200 175 150 125 100 75 50 25 0 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 Colombia Peru TIV Total Exports TIV Total Exports EU imports EU imports (trend) EU imports EU imports (trend) (000 t) (000 t) 29 EPAs and Regionalism Programme Figure 28. Costa Rica and El Salvador: banana exports to the EU-27, total banana exports (2000-2009) and ‘trigger import volumes’ (2010-2019) Source for trade data: Comext, Comtrade. 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 El Salvador TIV Total Exports EU imports (000 t) 2500 2250 2000 1750 1500 1250 1000 750 500 250 0 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 Costa Rica TIV Total Exports EU imports EU imports (trend) (000 t) 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 El Salvador TIV Total Exports EU imports (000 t) 2500 2250 2000 1750 1500 1250 1000 750 500 250 0 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 Costa Rica TIV Total Exports EU imports EU imports (trend) (000 t) 30 G. Anania - Implications of Trade Policy Changes for the Competitiveness of Ecuadorian Banana Exports to the EU Market Figure 29. Honduras and Guatemala: banana exports to the EU-27, total banana exports (2000-2009) and ‘trigger import volumes’ (2010-2019) Source for trade data: Comext, Comtrade. 2000 1800 1600 1400 1200 1000 800 600 400 200 0 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 Guatemala TIV Total Exports EU imports (000 t) 1000 900 800 700 600 500 400 300 200 100 0 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 Honduras TIV Total Exports EU imports (000 t) 2000 1800 1600 1400 1200 1000 800 600 400 200 0 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 Guatemala TIV Total Exports EU imports (000 t) 1000 900 800 700 600 500 400 300 200 100 0 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 Honduras TIV Total Exports EU imports (000 t) 31 EPAs and Regionalism Programme Figure 30. Nicaragua and Panama: banana exports to the EU-27, total banana exports (20002009) and ‘trigger import volumes’ (2010-2019) Source for trade data: Comext, Comtrade (Faostat for Panama total banana exports in 2004). 1000 900 800 700 600 500 400 300 200 100 0 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 Panama (000 t) 200 180 160 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 0 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 Nicaragua TIV Total Exports EU imports (000 t) TIV Total Exports EU imports EU imports (trend) 1000 900 800 700 600 500 400 300 200 100 0 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 Panama (000 t) 200 180 160 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 0 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 Nicaragua TIV Total Exports EU imports (000 t) TIV Total Exports EU imports EU imports (trend)