Lessons to be learned: Germany's crisis management in Mali (2013-2023)

Tull, Denis Research Report Lessons to be learned: Germany's crisis management in Mali (2013-2023) SWP Research Paper, No. 18/2024 Provided in Cooperation with: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Berlin Suggested Citation: Tull, Denis (2024) : Lessons to be learned: Germany's crisis management in Mali (2013-2023), SWP Research Paper, No. 18/2024, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), Berlin, https://doi.org/10.18449/2024RP18 This Version is available at: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/308031 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. 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Tull Lessons to Be Learned: Germany’s Crisis Management in Mali (2013–2023) SWP Research Paper 18 December 2024, Berlin Abstract ∎ Germany was heavily involved in international crisis management in Mali for ten years, from 2013 to 2023. Important lessons can be drawn for effective and adaptive foreign and security policy, in particular concerning Germany’s internal structures and processes. ∎ Germany’s engagement in Mali was shaped by its commitments to allies and the United Nations. This was a legitimate interest, but left Berlin without strategic goals of its own in Mali. ∎ The lack of strategic and political orientation has resulted in less than optimal use of the very substantial resources invested. Interministerial cooperation failed to meet expectations, despite a number of new instruments (including in security force assistance) and institutional innovations (the Sahel Task Force, CIVAD). ∎ Although Germany’s participation in MINUSMA was operationally successful, it was inadequately anchored politically and strategically. MINUSMA as a whole failed to achieve its political goals. ∎ In the field of crisis management, Germany’s organisational learning processes occur mainly from one deployment to the next, less so during a given operation. Despite the duration of the Mali engagement, learning and adjustment processes occurred only at the operational-tactical level. Fundamental course corrections were not made, despite the obvious need to do so. Interministerial cooperation was insufficient to facilitate effective strategy-building. The learning culture within and between government departments proved inadequate. SWP Research Paper Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs Denis M. Tull Lessons to Be Learned: Germany’s Crisis Management in Mali (2013–2023) SWP Research Paper 18 December 2024, Berlin This work is licensed under CC BY 4.0 SWP Research Papers are peer reviewed by senior researchers and the executive board of the Institute. They are also subject to copy-editing. For further information on our quality control procedures, please visit the SWP website: https://www.swp-berlin.org/ en/about-swp/qualitymanagement-for-swppublications/. SWP Research Papers reflect the views of the author(s). SWP Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs Ludwigkirchplatz 3–4 10719 Berlin Germany Phone +49 30 880 07-0 Fax +49 30 880 07-200 www.swp-berlin.org [email protected] ISSN (Print) 2747-5123 ISSN (Online) 1863-1053 DOI: 10.18449/2024RP18 (Slightly revised English version of SWP-Studie 21/2024) Table of Contents 5 Issues and Recommendations 7 Goals and Strategic Capability 7 The real motives: Supporting allies and the UN 8 A German strategy for Mali? 11 A lack of strategy capability 13 The Integrated Approach: Chasing Utopia? 16 Security Force Assistance: Room for Improvement 20 The MINUSMA Experience: Partial Success amidst Overall Failure 25 Learning from Mali? 29 Debating Foreign and Security Policy: More Honesty! 32 Conclusions 33 Abbreviations Dr Denis M. Tull is a Senior Associate in the Africa and Middle East Research Division at SWP and Head of Project Megatrends Afrika. SWP Berlin Lessons to Be Learned: Germany’s Crisis Management in Mali (2013–2023) December 2024 5 Issues and Recommendations Lessons to Be Learned: Germany’s Crisis Management in Mali (2013–2023) Mali was a key focus of German foreign and security policy over the past decade. The engagement began in 2013 and was initially limited in size. But between 2017 and 2023 it became the largest foreign deployment of the German armed forces, with over 1,100 soldiers serving in UN and EU missions. Like Afghanistan, Mali represents a test case for Germany’s capacity to engage in crisis management with an integrated approach involving multiple government departments. This review of the ten-year engagement finds that the German and international responses to the crisis were unsatisfactory overall. It identifies strengths, weaknesses and potential improvements, and outlines the central parameters – strategic capability, integrated approaches and interministerial coordination in the multinational context – that are relevant for future crisis management and for the effective organisation of national and collective defence. Rather than seeking to analyse the impact of German policy in Mali, the study focuses on the functioning of the German crisis management apparatus, examining selected areas and topics. The conclusions have broader implications for German foreign and security policy. The analysis traces connections from overarching strategic issues to concepts, instruments, and learning processes, thereby generating political and operational lessons. First of all, it is encouraging that the progress made in German crisis management over recent years was also reflected in Mali. This involved novel concepts such as the integrated approach and a diverse range of instruments, including security force assistance and stabilisation. Furthermore, the three relevant ministries – the Federal Foreign Office (AA), the Federal Ministry of Defence (BMVg) and the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) – demonstrated remarkable perseverance and committed considerable funding. Total expenditure exceeded €5 billion. However, more does not always mean better. The ministries struggled to develop operationalisable targets and to provide an appropriate strategic framework to match Germany’s substantial financial com- Issues and Recommendations SWP Berlin Lessons to Be Learned: Germany’s Crisis Management in Mali (2013–2023) December 2024 6 mitment. Strategic shortcomings limited effectiveness and impact. The extensive measures adopted were often only vaguely related to the proclaimed objective of stability and peace. Apart from the Bundeswehr’s mandate in MINUSMA, the German engagement was not clearly defined. Only after 2020, towards the end of the intervention, did Berlin attempt to formulate a strategic framework. But by that point – seven years after the initial deployment – the intervention had become mired in path dependencies. Despite the introduction of certain helpful institutional innovations, such as the Sahel interministerial task force and the SFA initiative, which has become a flagship of interministerial crisis response, operationalisation of the integrated approach did not progress as hoped. This is rather surprising given that the integrated approach is firmly established in the German discourse and within the ministries. Participation in MINUSMA was a sound decision from a foreign policy perspective, and Germany’s engagement was undoubtedly successful from an operational standpoint, even if the UN intervention as a whole failed to achieve its political objectives. What was missing was a strategic foundation in the form of a clear, compelling narrative on the objectives and limitations of Germany’s involvement in MINUSMA. Germany was a prominent international actor in both bilateral and multilateral contexts, but its influence on the strategic direction of the intervention was limited. In the initial stages, this was largely due to Berlin’s alliance rationale of the intervention, which appeared to render the development of a national strategic framework unnecessary. Although a decade of involvement in Mali should have provided sufficient time for learning and adaptation processes, these largely failed to materialise even as the situation deteriorated from 2017 onwards. Apart from making a few operational adjustments, Germany’s response was largely to stay the course and double down on its commitment and contribution. But frequent assertions that Germany was “doing a lot” evaded the hard question of why outcomes were inadequate and learning and adaptation insufficient. Government officials themselves point to the discrepancy between the magnitude of the German crisis response and its results. From an institutional perspective, the German apparatus is not yet adequately structured to facilitate effective intraand interministerial learning and adaptation processes. There are almost no established procedures or structures for collective learning. Staff exchanges between ministries are rare, while frequent rotations within ministries erode institutional memory. Evaluations are still uncommon, particularly in the Foreign Office and the Defence Ministry. Furthermore, as civil servants confirm, an organisational culture that encourages learning from mistakes has yet to be established. Recommendations: ∎ The Bundestag should task the relevant ministries to conduct a joint evaluation of their engagement in Mali, in order to identify shortcomings and lessons for future decision-making. Comparing these with the extensive findings of the Enquête Commission on Afghanistan would enhance their robustness. ∎ The Bundestag should demand greater accountability from the ministries. To encourage strategic orientation and a fully integrated approach, it would be appropriate to revisit the concept of interministerial mandates. This should address the current imbalanced focus on the Bundeswehr and strengthen the accountability of the Foreign Office and the Development Ministry, as well as supporting parliamentary engagement with the integrated approach. ∎ Interministerial crisis management should be revamped using positive and negative incentives. The establishment of country-specific interministerial task forces is useful, provided that they are endowed with the political leverage to oversee strategic processes. It would be worthwhile to consider joint and more flexible budgeting for priority countries. This approach needs to build on realistic, comprehensible and operationalisable country strategies. At the very latest when a crisis becomes a political priority in Berlin, a country strategy should be developed, subject to regular review and adjustments. At the same time, the ministries concerned should collectively implement specific measures to reinforce their learning culture and infrastructure. The Integrated Approach: Chasing Utopia? SWP Berlin Lessons to Be Learned: Germany’s Crisis Management in Mali (2013–2023) December 2024 13 Officials regularly mentioned the need for an approach that effectively integrates civilian and military instruments. 32 But many also conceded significant limitations in practice. At the bureaucratic working level, strong interministerial information exchange, consultation and coordination still runs up against the logics and priorities of the individual ministries. Add to this a relative lack of political guidance in defining strategic priorities for the government as a whole and it becomes clear why German policy in Mali remained largely reactive. As one interviewee put it, “we never managed to ride the wave, let alone get ahead of it”. 33 The persistent discrepancy between ambition and practice seems difficult to resolve. And there were frequent calls to “force” interministerial collaboration by using positive or negative incentives to promote joint institutions (formats, procedures, instruments). Country strategies represent one obvious instrument to achieve this. 34 But that would necessitate a strategy process that is more than a mere bureaucratic routine ending with the lowest common denominator. Real strategies could provide a useful framework for promoting a shared interministerial understanding concerning assumptions, objectives and planned action for regions that are expected to become foreign and security policy priorities. In this respect Mali represents a step backwards compared to Afghanistan. A concept for Afghanistan – albeit not a country strategy – was developed relatively early in 2003, two 32 See also Simone Schnabel and Antonia Witt, Friedenspolitische Kohärenz im deutschen Regierungshandeln: Lehren aus Mali und Niger, Studie 5 (Beirat der Bundesregierung Zivile Krisenprävention und Friedensförderung, 2022), 11. 33 Interview with a development actor, 2 February 2024. 34 Schnabel and Witt, Friedenspolitische Kohärenz (see note 32), 12; Julian Bergmann, “Kohärenz stärken: wie ein integrierter Ansatz in der deutschen Afrikapolitik gelingen kann”, Joint Futures Blog, 13 December 2023, https:// www.megatrends-afrika.de/publikation/mta-joint-futures-34ein-integrierter-ansatz-fuer-die-deutsche-afrikapolitik. years after the start of the intervention. 35 The Bundestag should request country strategies and detailed situation and progress reports, similar to those for Afghanistan between 2010 and 2014. Yet some diplomats think that written country strategies have “only limited impact on political practice anyway” or even dismiss them as an academic exercise. 36 One thing is clear: strategies will not be an effective guide in the absence of institutions and procedures to operationalise their implementation. One ambitious step could be joint, multi-year country budgets, which would have to finance large parts of Germany’s involvement in a specific crisis. As well as a financing mechanism, a country budget would create an institutional framework to force the ministries into joint strategic planning. The cooperation between the Foreign Office and the Defence Ministry on security force assistance (“Ertüchtigung”) could serve as a model. At the same time, Mali has shown that jointly managed instruments do not automatically lead to joint action. Likewise, the impact of the Joint Analysis and Coordinated Planning instrument (Gemeinsame Analyse und abgestimmte Planung, GAAP) introduced in 2020 remains limited, especially as it has to date only been applied in two ministries, namely the Foreign Office and Development Ministry. 37 At least in the 2021–2023 period no GAAP was carried out for Mali. In Mali, diverging assessments from different ministries exposed the need for more ambitious integra35 Winfried Nachtwei, “Lehren aus deutschen Krisenengagements gibt es reichlich – aber auch Lernfortschritte?” Sirius 3, no. 4 (2019): 362–77 (369). 36 Interviews with government officials, 11 January 2024, 22 August 2023. 37 Bundesrechnungshof, Bericht an den Haushaltsausschuss des Deutschen Bundestages nach § 88 Abs. 2 BHO über die Humanitäre Hilfe und Übergangshilfe einschließlich der Schnittstellen Krisenprävention, Krisenreaktion, Stabilisierung und Entwicklungszusammenarbeit (Potsdam, 2020), 14. The Integrated Approach: Chasing Utopia? The Integrated Approach: Chasing Utopia? SWP Berlin Lessons to Be Learned: Germany’s Crisis Management in Mali (2013–2023) December 2024 14 tion efforts. The Defence Ministry complained repeatedly that the diplomats were being overoptimistic, euphemistic or unrealistic. 38 The disparities reflected the different timeframes and aims of the ministries. 39 On account of its security focus and detailed mission mandates, the Defence Ministry works to shorter timeframes than the Foreign Office and the Development Ministry, whose horizons are medium-term and long-term respectively. The GAAP therefore needs to be extended to the Defence Ministry and possibly other ministries. At the same time, an expanded GAAP will not solve the problem of a lack of political objectives. Only when these have been defined at the top can the working levels begin to work on the concept of a common operationalisation for all ministries. It is undeniable that the ministries put a great deal of effort into coordination and co-signing processes in Mali. In-country coordination and planning in Bamako were practised within the framework of an institutionalised format (“Nord-Runde”). And a Foreign Office-funded civilian advisor in Gao (CIVAD), who advised the Bundeswehr contingent and the German embassy, served as an interface. Most officials praised this as an innovative and useful instrument for operationalising the integrated approach. On the ground, the CIVAD was able to contribute to a joint assessment of the situation and assist with management of civilian instruments. At the same time, however, this innovation also revealed the limits of integration. Some German development cooperation actors feared a loss of autonomy and excessive proximity to the military contingent. 40 Additionally, there is an obvious discrepancy between the usefulness of the CIVAD as a nodal point of the integrated approach, as acknowledged by all sides, and the fact that the German government only deployed a single CIVAD to Gao. The United Kingdom, the Netherlands and even France had more personnel with similar profiles. At times, London had three CIVADs on the ground. In crisis countries where Germany is heavily involved, there is a strong case to be made for sending more staff from the respective ministerial headquarters and giving them more 38 Interviews with government officials, 26 September 2023, 12 October 2023. 39 Gerrit Kurtz, “Mehr als eine bürokratische Pflichtübung: Ressortgemeinsamkeit in der zivilen Konfliktbearbeitung”, PeaceLab, 28 April 2021, https://peacelab.blog/2021/04/mehrals-eine-buerokratische-pflichtuebung-ressortgemeinsamkeitin-der-zivilen-konfliktbearbeitung. 40 Interview with government official, 3 April 2024. decision-making authority. The issue of inadequate staffing at key hubs also emerged in connection with Germany’s security force assistance tool (“Ertüchtigung”). There was also constant interministerial coordination in Berlin. At the decision-making level, Mali was temporarily addressed by the State Secretaries’ Round Table, which was originally dedicated only to Afghanistan. After the withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021, this group was soon dissolved. That reflects Mali’s lower priority compared to Afghanistan, despite its major Bundeswehr deployment. The most prominent format for interministerial cooperation and institutional innovation was the Sahel Task Force (AS Sahel), composed of representatives from the Foreign Office, the Defence Ministry and the Development Ministry. 41 But it was only established in 2019, relatively late in the process. This mirrors the delay in producing interministerial strategy papers (from 2020). The AS Sahel only partly fulfilled expectations. While it did manage coordination processes at the working level, almost all interviewees noted that the AS Sahel was unable to serve a strategic political function – which would have meant operationalising Mali policy across ministries, implementing it and providing strategic direction where necessary. 42 The reason for this was that the AS lacked the necessary authority and responsibility. From the point of view of Development Ministry and Defence Ministry representatives, it was not an interministerial institution, but a “unit” of the Foreign Office. Within the Foreign Office, in turn, the task force was only one voice among many, not “primus inter pares”. The AS Sahel lacked the political weight to formulate strategic guidance vis-à-vis other desks and divisions that also had a stake in Mali policy (UN, EU & CSDP, Stabilisation). Even after its establishment, Mali policy lacked political direction, according to many officials in Berlin and Bamako. 43 This clearly suggests that the challenges regarding strategy and coherence should not be reduced to the cross-ministerial dimension. Coherence within the individual ministries cannot be taken for granted either. 41 The “Afghanistan/Pakistan” and “Ebola” (West Africa) working groups were precedents. 42 As noted by Schnabel and Witt, Friedenspolitische Kohärenz (see note 32). 43 Interview with government official, 12 December 2023; interview with government official, 23 August 2023. The Integrated Approach: Chasing Utopia? SWP Berlin Lessons to Be Learned: Germany’s Crisis Management in Mali (2013–2023) December 2024 15 Bureaucratic specialisation and differentiation means that multiple units of one and the same ministry have a seat at the table. For example, within the Foreign Office the Sahel task force had to coordinate internally with the Africa Division, the UN and CSDP desks, and several units of the Stabilisation Division, which have more political weight in the internal hierarchy (UN, EU) or more resources (Stabilisation Division). The degree of complexity within the Defence Ministry is comparable (country division, stabilisation, strategy and deployment, mandating, CSDP). 44 The different responsibilities, logics and resources of the various units within the institutions make it difficult to develop and operationalise strategy. The AS Sahel, for example, was supposed to steer Sahel policy, but like other country units it had no resources of its own with which to back up the policy. This illustrates the price of increasing differentiation of institutions and instruments, namely the increasing complexity of ensuring the harmonisation, coordination and steering that are necessary to bring the vision of integration to life. The more entities, departments and ministries are involved, the more coordination effort is required, without necessarily producing strategic guidelines. In many cases the lowest common denominator is likely to be the result. A task force such as the AS Sahel is a meaningful innovation if it represents more than just another player in the concert of coordination. In other words, if it is granted clear responsibility to guide interministerial policy. Since the creation of such a unit identifies a region or country as a priority, at least temporarily, this should also be accompanied by sufficient staffing and the appointment of a high-ranking official at the top. This is indispensable to provide the AS with the necessary weight to enforce guidance within the Foreign Office and between the ministries. Such a working group should integrate country expertise from different ministries, but also knowledge from the specialised sections responsible for the use of instruments and funds. Another problem that became apparent in Mali is the danger of overblown expectations. In the German discourse, the effectiveness attributed to the integrated approach is exaggerated in almost every respect. It is an ideal. Even if it were possible to implement it comprehensively, it could never be applied effectively everywhere, at least not in a large country like Mali. 44 This refers to the situation until 2023. An organisational reform was carried out in the Defence Ministry in spring 2024. While the German activities concentrated around the Bundeswehr base in Gao were at least partially interlinked, this does not appear to have been the result of a strategic discussion about whether and for what purpose the German government should prioritise Gao and the surrounding area. In terms of the effectiveness of the integrated approach, it makes sense to define spatial priorities – and thus also boundaries. These need to be communicated to national and international partners to create realistic expectations. Overall, Germany still has a long way to go on the road to an integrated, internally coherent approach. Security Force Assistance: Room for Improvement SWP Berlin Lessons to Be Learned: Germany’s Crisis Management in Mali (2013–2023) December 2024 16 The field of security force assistance (“Ertüchtigung”, EIBReg) reveals the strengths and weaknesses of Germany’s crisis management. Significant funding, diverse instruments and a strong focus on the needs of partner countries contrast with inadequate strategic orientation. What Germany wanted to achieve with its assistance in Mali, how this was linked to the overarching German involvement and how individual EIBReg projects fitted into the overall picture all remained fairly vague. EIBReg projects were also insufficiently linked with broader bilateral security measures and CSDP missions. On a positive note, this link was partially implemented – albeit only from 2021 and therefore at a late stage. Measures to strengthen military and security forces are a growing field nationally and internationally. Assistance to foster capacity-building and local ownership are the buzzwords. Almost all of the EU’s CSDP missions since 2006 have focused on training, including two in Mali (EUTM Mali, EUCAP Sahel Mali). 45 In 2016 Germany created its own instrument, the EIBReg, to “sustainably support the security sector of partner countries and thus make Germany and Europe more secure”. 46 As well as the traditional security assistance measures – advice, training, non-lethal equipment and infrastructure – EIBReg also allows arms to be supplied. Focussing on both security and defence, Germany’s EIBReg explicitly follows the guiding principle of integrated security, under which actors, means and instruments should synergise. This is reflected institutionally, with the Foreign Office 45 For detailed information on the problems of EUTM Mali: Denis M. Tull, The European Union Training Mission and the Struggle for a New Model Army in Mali, Research Paper no. 89 (Paris: Institut de Recherche Stratégique de l’École Militaire [IRSEM], February 2020), https://www.irsem.fr/data/files/ irsem/documents/document/file/3233/RP_IRSEM_89.pdf. 46 BMVg, Fragen und Antworten zur Ertüchtigung, https:// www.bmvg.de/de/themen/dossiers/engagement-in-afrika/dasengagement/ertuechtigung-in-afrika/faq-ertuechtigung. and the Defence Ministry sharing responsibility for identifying and funding EIBReg projects. In Mali, Germany carried out far more than just EIBReg projects in the narrow sense of the term. Apart from its participation in EUTM and – to a much lesser extent – EUCAP Sahel Mali, Berlin implemented further security and defence measures in addition to the actual EIBReg projects. The Bundeswehr Advisory Group, which has been engaged in efforts to enhance Malian capacities in the domain of logistics since the 1970s through the German Equipment Assistance Programme (AHP), represents the longest-standing initiative. 47 Five members of the Bundeswehr were in Mali from 2013 to 2023 under this programme. There was also a comprehensive training and education programme for the Malian army. In 2021 it included more than thirty slots for Malian officers to participate in officer training courses, specialist training and study programmes in Germany (short and multi-month to multi-year). In addition, a German officer was sent as an advisor to the regional École de Maintien de la Paix (EMP) in Bamako in 2016, and later assigned to the Malian Ministry of Defence. 48 There is no publicly available overview of the volume and scope of EIBReg projects. Since 2016, the commitment has created a broad spectrum of predominantly military projects (approximately 80 per cent of expenditure), including biological security (as part of the G5 Sahel regional organisation), border management and security, personal equipment for soldiers (boots, helmets, body armour), support for military justice, construction of ammunition bunkers, and stockpile security and management in the area of 47 This includes the supply of equipment and specialised training on the equipment, primarily in the areas of pioneer service, medical services, logistics and maintenance. 48 The post of defence attaché was established at the German embassy in Bamako in 2016/17. Security Force Assistance: Room for Improvement Security Force Assistance: Room for Improvement SWP Berlin Lessons to Be Learned: Germany’s Crisis Management in Mali (2013–2023) December 2024 17 small arms and ammunition control. 49 The largest financial contribution was the provision of at least forty armoured Casspir and Puma troop carriers manufactured in South Africa, which were handed over to the Malian army. 50 The unit price for these vehicles was roughly €500,000 apiece. The lack of transparency on the part of the German government makes it difficult to discern the effectiveness and success of individual projects. So far, Germany’s involvement has only been evaluated selectively and results are not publicly accessible. 51 Discussions with officials suggest a mixed picture regarding project outcomes. What is clear is that Germany made a significant investment. There was certainly no shortage of German assistance. The EIBReg volume for Mali reached around €30 million per year in 2021 and 2022. 52 This represented 13 per cent of the German security force assistance budget (which was €225 million, excluding Ukraine). 53 Germany has probably been by far Mali’s most important partner in the field of security force assistance in recent years. Security force assistance bears similarities to other fields of German involvement such as stabilisation. A comprehensive and diverse commitment can be a strength; coherence and strategic orientation remain challenges. Individual projects can be very successful, but do not necessarily contribute to overarching strategic goals (and may not even be coherent with the overall approach). For example, it cannot be ruled out that training in ammunition management has helped 49 BMVg, “Ausbildung zur Munitionskontrolle in Mali”, 8 January 2019, https://www.bmvg.de/de/aktuelles/ausbildungzur-munitionskontrolle-in-mali-29990. 50 Gerhard Heiming, “Deutschland unterstützt Mali mit geschützten Fahrzeugen”, Europäische Sicherheit und Technik, 24 July 2019, https://esut.de/2019/07/meldungen/internatio nal/14096/deutschland-unterstuetzt-mali-mit-geschuetztenfahrzeugen; “Germany Gives Malian Army New OTT Technologies Armoured Vehicles”, Africa Intelligence, 10 May 2021. 51 See also Philipp Rotmann, “Von Deutschland lernen?”, Welt-Sichten, 9 August 2020, https://gppi.net/2020/08/09/vondeutschland-lernen. 52 Interviews with BMVg representatives, 25 November 2021, 17 November 2022, 11 October 2023. 53 Bundesrechnungshof, Bericht nach § 88 Absatz 2 BHO an den Haushaltsausschuss des Deutschen Bundestages – Information ber die Entwicklung des Einzelplans 60 (Allgemeine Finanzverwaltung) fr die Beratungen zum Bundeshaushalt 2022 (Bonn, 12 May 2022), 10, https://www.bundesrechnungshof.de/Shared Docs/Downloads/DE/Berichte/2022/entwicklung-einzelplan60-bundeshaushalt-2022-ergaenzung-volltext.pdf?__blob= publicationFile&v=1. the Malian armed forces. But it is certainly not obvious whether and how it made a “significant contribution to the peace process and the stabilisation of the country”. 54 In order to assess this, the objectives, assumptions and results of the project would have to be accessible. This highlights a problem that has characterised Germany’s overall approach in Mali, namely the gap between exceedingly broad objectives (stability, peace) on the one hand and specific measures on the other. For example, it can be argued that German security force assistance has certainly contributed to strengthening the Malian security forces. However, the range of individual measures does not necessarily add up to an impact-orientated and above all strategic approach. What is missing is a theory of change that establishes a plausible causality of assumptions, measures and resources and aligns them with the objectives to be achieved. Some ministerial officials concede that there is room for improvement as regards strategic orientation. They also recognise that all too often bureaucratic processes mean that project cycles (start, implementation, completion) and related considerations (project feasibility, funding) take centre stage to the detriment of strategic objectives and effectiveness. Making the Federal Foreign Office and the Federal Ministry of Defence jointly responsible for EIBReg was actually meant to avoid these problems. However, its impact fell short of expectations. In Mali at least the EIBReg was less an interministerial instrument than a funding mechanism that, in the words of one official, “can be tapped from two directions”. 55 Administrative coordination can certainly prevent project duplication, but ultimately both the Foreign Office and the Defence Ministry seem to view “their” projects primarily as independent endeavours running in parallel. This is evident in the annual planning process. Instead of a structured review that examines the contribution of specific projects to strategic goals, there is reportedly only a loosely defined list of projects. In Mali, the lack of coordination and joint strategic planning meant that potentially similar or complementary projects “had nothing to do with each other” and – worse still – in at least one case knew nothing of each other. 56 The idea of an inte54 BMVg, “Ausbildung zur Munitionskontrolle in Mali” (see note 47). 55 Interview with government official, 2 October 2023. 56 Interview with government official, 11 October 2023. Security Force Assistance: Room for Improvement SWP Berlin Lessons to Be Learned: Germany’s Crisis Management in Mali (2013–2023) December 2024 18 grated, cross-ministerial approach thus fell short of the political aspirations. This did not go unnoticed by Malian partners, who noted a lack of transparency and contradictory objectives and agreements on the German side, damaging its political credibility. 57 The need to strategically link different EIBReg projects should be given further consideration, because security force assistance is not limited to EIBReg. Multiple instruments (EIBReg, equipment assistance, participation in CSDP missions) and considerable German funding are only an asset if measures are planned more strategically. If this is not done “from below”, top-down political guidance is needed to break through project logics and path dependencies. Criteria for selecting projects could for example consider interlinkages and complementarities with CSDP missions. Tentative steps in this direction were taken in Mali, albeit at a late stage For example the training for driving the EIBReg-financed troop carriers was partly carried out by EUTM. Greater integration and coherency are important for the effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of German programmes, and also necessary in order to promote local ownership. Considering the multitude of instruments deployed in the realm of security force assistance (including by Germany itself), it is not surprising that the Malian government was quickly overwhelmed by the task of coordinating and managing its numerous international supporters. For instance, in 2017 external partners implemented no fewer than seventy projects to support the security sector (justice, defence and internal security). It is not without irony that a study had to be commissioned specifically to establish an overview of which donors were active in which areas. 58 The EU alone deployed two separate missions (EUCAP Sahel Mali, EUTM Mali) and ran several large projects (including PARSEC, GAR-SI Sahel) and numerous smaller ones, suggesting that strategic coherence was uncertain at best. 59 Instead, the inte57 Ibid. 58 International Security Sector Advisory Team (ISSAT) and Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), Cartographie du soutien de la communauté internationale en matière de sécurité et de justice au Mali: Rapport final (Geneva, February 2017). 59 Katherine Pye, A Means to an End or an End in Itself? The EU Integrated Approach to Conflict in Mali, EU Diplomacy Paper 05/2019 (Bruges: College of Europe, 2019), https://www. coleurope.eu/sites/default/files/research-paper/edp-5-2019_ pye_0.pdf; Andrew Lebovich, Halting Ambition: EU Migration and Security Policy in the Sahel, ECFR Policy Brief (London: Eurograted approach became to some extent an end in itself – and Mali became its “laboratory”. 60 The jungle of German and other international partners and their activities – by no means only in the security sector – was detrimental to effectiveness and efficiency, and also politically problematic. In the eyes of Malian officials they created the impression of paternalism and concerns over “loss of control.” 61 Another insight is the necessity to clarify the relationship between the theoretical and conceptual frameworks of security force assistance (capacitybuilding) and security sector reform (SSR). The prevailing understanding is that security sector support should do more than simply strengthen the partner’s capacities. 62 Yet in practice all international partners – including Germany – seem to focus on operational capacity-building while the dimension of security sector governance plays only a subordinate role. Thus, even if it had been possible to establish a perfect military apparatus in Mali, this would not have solved the fundamental medium-term difficulties of the security sector, which cannot be isolated from the rest of the political system. One problem was that the governance dimension met with little or no interest among key Malian actors – not among government elites, because the goal of maintaining power stood in the way of actual SSR, and not among military officers, because they prioritised operational capabilities and capacities. International actors’ advocacy for security sector reform thus fell on deaf ears. With very few exceptions (one being military justice), the conclusion of German actors seemed to be that their reform ambitions were largely futile, leading them to focus instead on capacity-building that either covered a concrete need (such as Casspir vehicles) or was at least politically uncontroversial (such as small arms control and ammunition management). Findings from Mali and other countries show, however, that capacity-building without governance repean Council on Foreign Relations [ECFR], 25 September 2018). 60 Interview with EU official, Bamako, 10 June 2017. 61 Interview with government official, 22 August 2023 (quote); see also Denis M. Tull, “Rebuilding Mali’s Army: The Dissonant Relationship between Mali and Its International Partners”, International Affairs 95, no. 2 (2019): 405–22. 62 Auswärtiges Amt, Ressortgemeinsame Strategie zur Unterstützung der Sicherheitssektorreform (SSR) (Berlin, July 2019), https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/blob/2247420/222c695ee 476e6ec1eaa350989c08f41/190917-sicherheitssektorreformdata.pdf. Security Force Assistance: Room for Improvement SWP Berlin Lessons to Be Learned: Germany’s Crisis Management in Mali (2013–2023) December 2024 19 forms is neither effective nor sustainable. 63 Simply declaring that civil society should be more involved in future security sector assistance is not a solution. 64 If it is to achieve a sustainable impact the EIBReg will have to address the uncomfortable and undoubtedly difficult questions concerning the relationship between military capacity-building and political reform. At the same time, reform initiatives will suffer if German government officials increasingly conceive security force assistance as a political door-opener and call for “pragmatism” in a wider international context that is characterised by increasing strategic competition. Four lessons can be learnt from Mali. Firstly, there is room for improvement in the interministerial management of EIBReg, where there is a need to move from mere coordination to ambitious joint strategic planning. The EIBReg is no longer a niche instrument (see Ukraine) and also deserves more attention from the Bundestag in order to realise the ambition of effective interministerial action. Strategic goals, a plausible theory of change and more transparency are needed. This does not guarantee success, but would at least create the conditions for “projects to become solutions”. 65 A second challenge is to overcome path dependencies and project logics. These are salient where ample budgets are available and allocated annually, but personnel capacities (especially on site) are scarce. The pressure to spend existing funds may set in motion a spiral of activities that are ill adapted to the sensitivity of security sector assistance, the complexity of the context and the limited capacities of both the partners and the German actors on the ground. The problematic result is often that short-term project logics are prioritised over impact. Thirdly, strong financial engagement in a politically sensitive and complex realm such as security sector assistance requires commensurate capacities in terms of personnel on the ground. In Mali, a large proportion of the military EIBReg projects rested on the shoulders of a single military advisor, even when funding was in the tens of millions. The disjoint was unacceptable, especially in light of the demanding tasks that had to be accomplished. These included the identification of local needs, negotiation processes with partners and Berlin headquarters, and manage63 Rotmann, “Learning from Germany?” (see note 51). 64 Auswärtiges Amt, Ressortgemeinsame Strategie (see note 62), 24. 65 Interview with government official, 1 November 2023. ment of project processes. In addition, essential tasks – namely close monitoring of project outcomes, consequences and impacts – fell by the wayside. The political risks of security force assistance and impact monitoring demand adequate personnel on site to perform management and analysis and fulfil reporting and due diligence obligations. Fourthly, the sensitivity of this field of intervention demands much closer observation of local dynamics and – building on this – political planning to anticipate conceivable disruptions (such as coups) and prepare adequate responses. Berlin (like Paris) was caught off guard by the coup in August 2020 and the implications for Germany’s military cooperation with Mali remained unclear for too long. Of course, political planning anticipating possible adverse developments should be required for Germany’s crisis response as a whole. 66 66 Markus Kaim, “Afghanistan, Mali, Niger: Warum deutsche Außenpolitik so oft an der Wirklichkeit scheitert”, Der Spiegel, 8 August 2023. The MINUSMA Experience: Partial Success amidst Overall Failure SWP Berlin Lessons to Be Learned: Germany’s Crisis Management in Mali (2013–2023) December 2024 20 MINUSMA was Germany’s first significant participation in a UN peacekeeping mission since Somalia (1993/94) and Bosnia (1995). 67 It was also – for better or worse – the most visible aspect of the German involvement in Mali. The Bundeswehr deployment completely overshadowed the rest of Germany’s involvement in the Mali crisis. 68 It is futile to draw lessons from Germany’s MINUSMA participation without examining the mission itself. Like comparable UN stabilisation missions, MINUSMA faced major challenges. These included: ongoing armed conflict and the absence of a viable peace agreement; the changing nature of conflict, which mitigates against traditional forms of resolution; an environment in which peacekeepers themselves were targeted; and finally, disputes between the members of the UN Security Council, which fatally weakened the authority and legitimacy of the mission in the host country and among the conflict parties. There are good reasons to doubt whether traditional UN missions can achieve much in a context like Mali. The problems were exacerbated by the Security Council’s unwillingness or inability to adapt MINUSMA to the difficult conditions. Measured against the main objectives laid out in its mandate, MINUSMA failed politically. It proved unable to make a decisive contribution to conflict resolution by helping to implement the Malian peace agreement of 2015. However – and this is often overlooked – it did at least keep the agreement alive. The peace accord only collapsed after the mission had left the country. 67 This excludes the participation of the German Navy in the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). 68 Torsten Konopka, “Mali: Rückzug oder mehr Risiko?” Vereinte Nationen, no. 1 (2022): 9–14. There were other partial successes, too. 69 MINUSMA indirectly contributed to preventing the violence in rural areas from reaching the larger urban centres. It facilitated the delivery of humanitarian aid and helped to protect civilians (albeit only in a small part of the country). It was hampered by governmental obstruction in Bamako, a lack of capacity and mobility, and a hostile environment. The mission had to invest 60 to 70 per cent of its resources in self-protection – securing camps and convoys – in order to minimise its own casualty figures and preserve the support of troop-contributing countries. Conversely, Malian support for the mission was weak from the outset. Both the government and the population expected a military partner prepared to fight the armed groups, and this “misunderstanding” was never resolved. The government even fuelled rumours that the mission was supporting the “terrorists”. 70 MINUSMA could only rely on local support in the small part of Mali where its presence – as in Gao – improved local security and provided economic opportunities. What lessons can Germany learn from its participation in the mission? Berlin arguably achieved its foreign policy goals, earning credit with France and at the United Nations. The duration of Germany’s involvement, with its high-end capacities, was a selling point that generated foreign policy prestige. Contributing to MINUSMA was also relevant with respect to Africa policy, as it meant sharing the burden with the African states that bore the main burden of the 69 Henrik Maihack, “Eine neue Mission für Mali”, Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft, 22 September 2022. 70 Fabien Offner, “A Dozen Shades of Khaki: CounterInsurgency Operations in the Sahel”, The New Humanitarian, 11 January 2018. The MINUSMA Experience: Partial Success amidst Overall Failure The MINUSMA Experience: Partial Success amidst Overall Failure SWP Berlin Lessons to Be Learned: Germany’s Crisis Management in Mali (2013–2023) December 2024 21 Mali crisis and the risks involved in the mission, both as affected neighbours and the largest MINUSMA troop contributors (with a share of around two thirds). 71 Politically and strategically, Germany’s participation in MINUSMA – unsurprisingly – reflected the strengths and weaknesses of its overall approach. Germany’s actual motivation was not clearly related to objectives in the country itself. Although a Malicentred crisis narrative was increasingly underpinned by action, this shift was inadequately justified and operationalised. Abstract platitudes aside, there was no overarching strategic narrative to coherently justify German participation. This can be conceived as a lack of political embedding, in the sense of explaining how MINUSMA contributed to stability and what part the Bundeswehr played in the overall constellation. For example, many members of the German MINUSMA contingent were uncertain about the aim and purpose of their deployment, even though their tasks were precisely outlined. The fact that German government politicians consistently attributed the mission’s political significance to objectives outside its mandate contributed significantly to the uncertainty. Preventing irregular migration and countering terrorism were explicitly not covered by the MINUSMA mandate. 72 Anyway, at the tactical level the Bundeswehr was strictly limited by its rules of engagement. Robust action was permitted in self-defence, but not to actively pursue or capture suspected members of jihadist groups. Such inconsistencies between proclaimed goals and actual tasks should be avoided in future missions. A credible narrative is necessary to ensure that all involved – including the armed forces and members of parliament – know exactly why Germany is participating in a mission and what its objectives are – and that they can be achieved. 73 Another lesson concerns the exit strategy. When Germany joined MINUSMA in 2013 it was not foresee71 Maihack, “Eine neue Mission für Mali” (see note 69). 72 For example the then Defence Minister Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer: “Everything we do in that region, every terrorist attack we prevent … justifies our involvement, because it improves the lives of those who live there, weakens terrorism and thus also makes our own region more secure.” Deutscher Bundestag, Stenografischer Bericht, 159. Sitzung, Berlin, 13 May 2020, 19754, https://dserver.bundestag.de/ btp/19/19159.pdf#page=70. 73 Similarly, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, A Mission within a Mission (see note 8), 5. able that Mali would become the Bundeswehr’s largest current foreign deployment, as it was from 2017. 74 Nor was its duration foreseeable, as Berlin shied away from setting a timeframe. While the need for credible exit strategies is widely acknowledged, practically speaking they are unlikely to be implemented in multinational missions. For one thing, Berlin has little influence on factors such as conflict trajectories or the decisions of international partners. For another, multinational deployments also generate dependencies. It was politically crucial for Germany that other European states also became involved in MINUSMA. Conversely, it was Germany’s participation that motivated smaller European states to provide troops. For the latter, Germany served as a “linchpin” (“Anlehnnation”). Forces from countries including Belgium, Estonia, Ireland and the Netherlands were integrated into the German contingent and benefited from camp security, logistics and medical services. This created German responsibilities vis-à-vis partners. Interdependencies also arose from the nature of Germany’s high-value capabilities, for which the UN could not easily find adequate substitutes in other member states. In view of its international responsibility and dependability, the German government had to factor its partners into any (even partial) withdrawal plans. Join missions with a finite multi-year commitment. Domestic politics also stood in the way of a well thought-out exit strategy. This applied especially to the negotiating processes between the parties of the governing coalition and between the foreign and defence ministries. This became particularly apparent after the second coup d’état in Mali in May 2021, when the merits and downsides of opting out of MINUSMA were debated extensively within and between the foreign and defence ministries. In the end, the Federal Chancellery’s compromise in 2023 was to extend the mission one last time while announcing its withdrawal for the following year. 75 This was a sensible response that enabled a planned and predictable 74 Konopka, “Mali: Rückzug oder mehr Risiko?” (see note 68), 10. 75 Deutscher Bundestag, “Mali-Einsatz der Bundeswehr letztmalig verlängert”, May 2023, https://www.bundestag.de/ dokumente/textarchiv/2023/kw21-de-bundeswehr-minusma947962. The MINUSMA Experience: Partial Success amidst Overall Failure SWP Berlin Lessons to Be Learned: Germany’s Crisis Management in Mali (2013–2023) December 2024 22 withdrawal under difficult conditions. Compared to Afghanistan, this orderly exit was undoubtedly a step forward. Ideally, Germany’s withdrawal from a mission should be part of an overarching exit strategy. From this perspective, the trajectory of Germany’s MINUSMA participation cannot be described as coherent or forward-looking. At best, this was the case during the second half of the intervention, and even then only partially. However, there were also signs of “mission creep”, of incremental expansion of the Bundeswehr’s role. This was perceptible from the growing financial cost, the increasing use of capabilities and the expansion of infrastructure at the Gao and Niamey sites. For the most part, Germany’s MINUSMA participation was largely reactive and tentative. 76 It made a 76 See Konopka, “Mali: Rückzug oder mehr Risiko?” (see note 68), 12. brief quantum leap in the period from 2016 to 2018, when a Heron 1 reconnaissance drone, a mixed reconnaissance company, four NH90 transport helicopters and four Tiger combat helicopters were deployed to Mali, and an airbase was established in Niamey. The deployment of the NH90 helicopters from 2017 was certainly not planned in advance. 77 At the same time, there was apparently already a plan to withdraw at the end of 2018, although this was never implemented. Only the helicopters were withdrawn that year – but only temporarily and without adequate replacement from other UN member states. The drones remained and more were added (there were two from 77 Thomas Wiegold, “Hubschraubermangel in Mali: Deutsche Helikopter ‘nicht auszuschließen’”, Augen geradeaus! (blog), 11 July 2016, https://augengeradeaus.net/2016/07/ hubschraubermangel-in-mali-deutsche-helikopter-nichtauszuschliessen/. Figure 2 The MINUSMA Experience: Partial Success amidst Overall Failure Debating Foreign and Security Policy: More Honesty! SWP Berlin Lessons to Be Learned: Germany’s Crisis Management in Mali (2013–2023) December 2024 29 Decision-making processes in foreign and security policy are structured by highly ritualised discussions and procedures. Its protagonists are ministers and senior officials, the working levels of the ministerial bureaucracy and the members of parliament. Particularly in the context of a foreign deployment of the Bundeswehr, interactions between these groups are characterised by routinised roles and patterns, while strategic and substantive issues are often avoided. In the case of Mali, such patterns were evident in the successive governments’ justifications of Germany’s engagement. For a long time, there was a discrepancy between the dominant motives of UN and alliance politics and the declared official goal of stabilising Mali and the Sahel. The objectives were not incompatible and the true motives (solidarity with France, UN politics) were not concealed – though they were rarely voiced by the German government. What explains these largely parallel discourses? What political effects did they have on Germany’s involvement in Mali? While Germany’s foreign policy vocabulary places great emphasis on solidarity with allies, multilateralism and international responsibility, these aspects are apparently insufficient to legitimise participation in international crisis management, at least in the domestic political context. This is certainly the case when the German armed forces are to be deployed (always a controversial issue), and all the more so when the deployment is to a country that is not traditionally one of Germany’s priorities (Mali). Afghanistan was no exception. The 9/11 attacks on the United States should have been sufficient to trigger political and military solidarity. Apparently that was not the case, otherwise there would have been no need for the controversial dictum of “protecting Germany’s security in the Hindu Kush”. In the German discourse, justifications for a Bundeswehr deployment may appear normatively incomplete if as the purpose is “merely” alliance solidarity. 110 The issue with the parallel discourse is not the existence of multiple objectives; rather, it is the lack of transparency regarding these objectives. This may explain why cabinet members put forward straightforward motives (viz. the stabilisation of Mali) to preclude criticism from the Bundestag, the media and the public that deploying German forces to show solidarity with France or the UN is insufficient, arbitrary and altogether unconvincing. However, one can question whether it is really inadmissible to disclose the full story. The foreign and defence specialists in parliament are well aware of the complexity of foreign policy decision-making processes. Indeed, with respect to Mali, their arguments were more nuanced than those put to parliament by ministers. In any case, ministers expose themselves to accusations of insincerity and opacity. This, in turn, gives rise to another issue: emphasising stabilisation over other motives ultimately forced the government to assess its performance against criteria that do not entirely match its actual motives. Communication at cabinet level had consequences at the working level of the ministerial bureaucracies. The latter had to achieve the best possible results in line with official stated goals – despite the vast majority of mid-level officials and desk officers clearly believing that the proclaimed goal of stabilising Mali was not Germany’s actual, overriding priority. These unspoken discrepancies are likely to have discouraged strategic thinking and action in the ministerial bureaucracies. This also eroded the willingness to take risks, which is so important for crisis response. 111 These contradictions, which were ultimately driven by domestic politics, shaped the government’s communication about its Mali policy. German objectives 110 Nachtwei lays out a similar argument in “Lehren aus deutschen Krisenengagements” (see note 35), 369. 111 Rotmann, “Schluss mit dem Autopiloten!” (see note 26). Debating Foreign and Security Policy: More Honesty! Debating Foreign and Security Policy: More Honesty! SWP Berlin Lessons to Be Learned: Germany’s Crisis Management in Mali (2013–2023) December 2024 30 remained vague, while problems and challenges were underplayed, especially in reports to parliament – which were kept at least moderately optimistic to avoid jeopardising parliamentary support for the intervention. The strong emphasis on Germany’s output (“We are doing a lot!”) also served this function. Questions regarding effects and impact were given short shrift, if they were addressed at all. Some ministry officials are quite self-critical of the routines and mechanisms of foreign policy processes and their own role in them. But they also point out that members of parliament often fail to demand more critical reporting or strategic thinking. 112 In Mali it took a dramatic deterioration of the situation on the ground, coupled with the implications of France’s announced withdrawal for the Bundeswehr, to prompt members of parliament to insist on more credible assessments from the ministries. 113 112 See Werner Distler and Miriam Tekath, Robust Mandates, Robust Knowledge? Mali-Mandate im Bundestag (2013–2021), CCS Policy Paper no. 6 (Marburg: Center for Conflict Studies [CCS], Philipps-Universität Marburg, 2021), https://www.unimarburg.de/de/konfliktforschung/dateien/publikationen/ policy-paper_finale-version_test.pdf. 113 Most German media reporting was produced outside Mali and did not provide critical perspectives. See Lutz Lack of transparency in German crisis response Publicly accessible information on the concrete actions of German crisis policy in Mali is scarce. Even basic fact sheets about the relevant ministries’ activities are not freely accessible. And information flows within the government apparatus are also limited, as there is no digital information system to collate data about German programmes and projects in third countries. While public pressure ensures that development cooperation is relatively transparent, this is much less true of other ministries and policy fields. It is particularly striking that stabilisation and security force assistance – the supposed flagships of German crisis response – are largely opaque. The Stabilisation Division of the Federal Foreign Office has published numerous concept papers since it was founded in 2015, but information on how these concepts are to be translated into action, plans and projects and what effects they will have is rare. At best output data is published that says little about outcomes.a Databases can be used to identify Foreign Office–funded projects, but are lacking essential data points.b There is no publicly accessible information on security force assistance, not even a list of implemented projects. At best, PR-type information can be found, which is published by implementing organisations and the Bundeswehr.c Against this backdrop, it is not surprising that information on the impact and consequences of programmes and projects – for example in the form of progress reports or evaluations – is extremely rare. There are only three publicly accessible evaluation reports on Mali for the 2013–2023 period, two of which are from the field of development cooperation.d There is no doubt that more evaluations are carried out than are published, especially in the field of development cooperation. For key areas of crisis management (stabilisation, security force assistance), however, there is every indication that very few impact analyses have been carried out to date. This is regrettable because transparent governance is a prominent German policy goal, which should also be honoured in the case of its own actions – especially as the government’s “Guidelines for Civilian Crisis Prevention” commit it to improving communication in the area of crisis management.e The lack of transparency is particularly striking in light of the considerable resources invested in the military and civilian areas of German crisis management. a See, for example, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), The UNDP Regional Stabilization Facility for the Lake Chad Basin and Liptako-Gourma Regions, https://www. undp.org/africa/waca/undp-regional-stabilization-facilitylake-chad-basin-and-liptako-gourma-regions. b See, for example, d-portal.org, https://d-portal.org/ctrack. html#view=search. c Bundeswehr, “Ertüchtigung zum Umgang mit Munition bei EUTM Mali”, 6 December 2019, https://www.bundeswehr. de/de/einsaetze-bundeswehr/abgeschlossene-einsaetze-derbundeswehr/mali-europaeische-trainingsmission-/eutmbundeswehr-eu-einsatz-mali/ertuechtigung-zum-umgangmit-munition-bei-eutm-mali-161938. d United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), Independent Evaluation of the Sustaining Peace in Mali and the Sahel Region through Strengthening Peacekeeping Training Capacities Project (Phase II) (Geneva, 2019); KfW Entwicklungsbank, Ex Post Evaluation Small-Scale Irrigation – Mali (Frankfurt, 2020); Ben Yishay et al., Does Irrigation Strengthen Climate Resilience? (see note 103). e Bundesregierung, Krisen verhindern, Konflikte bewältigen, Frieden fördern: Leitlinien der Bundesregierung (Berlin, 2017), https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/blob/1213498/ d98437ca3ba49c0ec6a461570f56211f/krisen-verhinderndata.pdf. Debating Foreign and Security Policy: More Honesty! Debating Foreign and Security Policy: More Honesty! SWP Berlin Lessons to Be Learned: Germany’s Crisis Management in Mali (2013–2023) December 2024 31 At the same time, members of parliament need to see a prospect of success in order to justify continued support for German engagement to their voters. 114 If the government presented modest goals with uncertain prospects, this would raise understandable doubts among parliamentarians as to the point of the mission and its mandate. Parliament should be told what it needs to know and not just what it wants to hear. The vaguer the goals and strategies, the less government departments are exposed to critique by the Bundestag, the media and the public. At the same time, the parliamentary groups that make up the current coalition have little interest in scrutinising their own government’s course too critically. These political logics cannot be avoided, but they do tend to stunt strategic debate. It would undoubtedly be beneficial if all parties and actors involved in decision-making processes were more honest and transparent about the objectives of foreign engagements and the probability of success or failure. Even in cases where the prospects of success are moderate or uncertain, there may be compelling reasons for Germany to engage in a crisis country and accept the risk of failure. Examples include solidarity with allies or the consequences of inaction. However, in the case of Mali, these reasons – and this is the heart of the matter – were often not presented convincingly (or at all). The ministries did not communicate what they considered achievable, but instead proclaimed vague overall objectives and ideal end states in order to persuade parliament to vote in favour. The level of strategic debate can only be raised if the Bundestag is told what it needs to know – and not what it wants to hear. 115 Greater transparency about problems, dilemmas and conflicts of goals could lead the Bundestag to formulate more realistic expectations in a field where success is not the norm. Mükke, Mediale Routinen und Ignoranz? Die Sahel-Einsätze der Bundeswehr im öffentlichen Diskurs (Frankfurt: Otto-BrennerStiftung, 2023). 114 Interview with government official, 6 February 2024. 115 Paraphrasing Lakhdar Brahimi. See United Nations, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (Brahimi Report), A/55/305 – S/2000/809 (New York, 21 August 2000), X. There is no silver bullet to address this problem. Joint meetings of the relevant Bundestag committees 116 or the creation of a dedicated committee (for integrated crisis management) would be conceivable, instead of the foreign affairs, defence and development cooperation committees deliberating separately, as is presently the case. Concentrating expertise in such a joint committee could raise the level of strategic discussion. Given that government departments are required to cooperate and coordinate, it is incomprehensible that that perspective is not reflected in the Bundestag and its committees. That would also relativise the Bundeswehr-centred nature of the crisis management discussion. Above all, however, the greater and broader expertise of an integrated joint committee would put parliament in a better position to demand strategic action from the government. 116 This primarily concerns the Committees on Foreign Affairs, Defence, Human Rights and Humanitarian Aid, and Economic Cooperation and Development. Others could be added as required and relevant (for example Home Affairs). Conclusions SWP Berlin Lessons to Be Learned: Germany’s Crisis Management in Mali (2013–2023) December 2024 32 There is considerable scope for improving Germany’s capability to act strategically in crisis management. What is needed is a more precise conceptualisation of what Germany’s own interests and objectives are in any given case, and decisions on the means to be used to achieve them. If, as in the early years of the Mali engagement, the primary objectives are not directly related to the crisis but nevertheless justifiable (such as UN policy or solidarity with allies), the government should have the courage to say so clearly and define the mission and its objectives accordingly. This is important for the mission’s domestic legitimacy and for the criteria used to assess expected and achieved results. It is also necessary to establish the appropriate level of political guidance for a strategy once it has been defined by the government. Without continuous review of interministerial goal-orientation, effectiveness and coherence, even the best concept is at risk of failing. The lack of appropriate strategic objectives and operationalisation also makes it highly likely that the considerable resources that Germany mobilised in Mali were employed less effectively and efficiently than would have been possible. These insights into strategic and management deficits are not particularly controversial, and are shared by many civil servants within the apparatus. Where disagreement remains, however, is over the necessary consequences and improvements. The experience in Mali suggests that making many small adjustments did not have sufficient qualitative effects, especially concerning cooperation across ministries and agencies. Existing committees, formats and interfaces (such as regular meetings of state secretaries, the AS Sahel, weekly jours fixes, etc.) are clearly not enough to ensure progress in shaping, adjusting and implementing a coherent and realistic strategy. This is largely attributable to the institutional autonomy of the ministries, but there are other factors at play. Internally, multi-tiered structure and differentiation can serve specialisation and professionalisation. But the proliferation of specialised sections and desks also poses a challenge when formulating binding overarching goals within a ministry, to which all sections then contribute, for example through country strategies that define the strategic framework. If the status quo does not allow a sufficient degree of strategic debate and decisions, then the obvious question is whether a National Security Council – the creation of which has been much discussed – would be suitable for solving the problem. There are numerous good proposals on the table, but there are also understandable concerns that point to powerful government principles and coalition logics. 117 Whether a new institution would solve old problems or merely shift them is open to debate. However, if unclear competences and responsibilities in strategy development and political guidance are one of the main problems of German crisis management, such a body would certainly not represent a quantum leap, but it would possibly represent progress. 117 See the numerous articles on this topic in Internationale Politik, https://internationalepolitik.de, as well as on the following blog 49security, https://fourninesecurity.de. Conclusions Abbreviations SWP Berlin Lessons to Be Learned: Germany’s Crisis Management in Mali (2013–2023) December 2024 33 Abbreviations AA Federal Foreign Office (Auswärtiges Amt) AFISMA African-led International Support Mission in Mali AS Sahel Sahel Task Force (Arbeitsstab Sahel) BMVg Federal Ministry of Defence (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung) BMZ Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung) CIVAD Civil advisor CSDP Common Security and Defence Policy EIBReg Security force assistance initiative (Ertüchtigungsinitiative der Bundesregierung) EUCAP Sahel Mali EU Capacity Building Mission in Mali EUTM Mali European Union Training Mission Mali GAAP (Joint Analysis and Coordinated Planning) Gemeinsame Analyse und abgestimmte Planung GAR-SI Groupes d’Action Rapide – Surveillance et Intervention au Sahel MANTIS Modular, Automatic and Network capable Targeting and Interception System MINUSMA United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali PARSEC Programme d’Appui au Renforcement de la Sécurité dans la Région de Mopti et à la Gestion des Zones Frontalières SFA Security force assistance SSR Security sector reform UNDP United Nations Development Programme UNITAR United Nations Institute for Training and Research UNSC United Nations Security Council