Once the great lockdown is lifted: Post COVID-19 options for the economy
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Ritzen, Jozef M. Working Paper Once the great lockdown is lifted: Post COVID-19 options for the economy UNU-MERIT Working Papers, No. 2020-057 Provided in Cooperation with: Maastricht Economic and Social Research Institute on Innovation and Technology (UNU-MERIT), United Nations University (UNU) Suggested Citation: Ritzen, Jozef M. (2020) : Once the great lockdown is lifted: Post COVID-19 options for the economy, UNU-MERIT Working Papers, No. 2020-057, United Nations University (UNU), Maastricht Economic and Social Research Institute on Innovation and Technology (UNU-MERIT), Maastricht This Version is available at: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/326759 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your personal and scholarly purposes. You are not to copy documents for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. If the documents have been made available under an Open Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/
#2020-057 Oncethegreatlockdownislifted: PostCOVID‐19optionsfortheeconomy JozefM.Ritzen Published18December2020 MaastrichtEconomicandsocialResearchinstituteonInnovationandTechnology(UNU‐MERIT) email:[email protected]|website:http://www.merit.unu.edu Boschstraat24,6211AXMaastricht,TheNetherlands Tel:(31)(43)3884400
UNU-MERIT Working Papers ISSN 1871-9872 Maastricht Economic and social Research Institute on Innovation and Technology UNU-MERIT UNU-MERIT Working Papers intend to disseminate preliminary results of research carried out at UNU-MERIT to stimulate discussion on the issues raised.
COVID‐19economicimpactandoptions search OncetheGreatLockdownisLifted;PostCOVID‐19 OptionsfortheEconomy JozefM.Ritzen,MaastrichtUniversity,UNU‐Merit December2020 Abstract In2021lockdownsstillwillbenecessarytokeepCOVID‐19incheckworld‐wide.Vaccinationmight bringsufficientcoveragebytheendof2021forsomecountries.Prioritiesinthere‐emergenceof economiesshouldbeforsustainability,health,education,fullemploymentandsocialcohesionto preservelong‐termwelfare. PressuresonGovernmentbudgetsaregoingtoriseinviewoftheunprecedentedhighpublicdebtto GDPratioworld‐wide.Increasedtaxationofwealthandofthetop10%‐income‐groupisasuperior strategycomparedtoretrenchment(budgetcutsinhealth,educationandsocialexpenditures). Internationalcooperationistoppriority.Thisappliestohealth,butalsotoeconomicandmonetary policy:itcanlifteconomicgrowthintheG20countriesovertheshortandlongrunbyatleastone third. Theresumptionoftradeshouldbeguidedbyrewardingtheachievementofsocialgoalsandrealizing sustainability.Inthiswaythelevelplayingfieldisrestoredforthosecountrieswhichwantto contributetoasustainableworldandtocooperation. Internationaltaxationrulesforprofitsshouldpreventtaxhavenstomakethisanegativesumgame. Thiswouldgivedevelopingcountriessomeofthenecessarybreathingspacetore‐emergefromthe COVID‐19crisis.
COVID‐19economicimpactandoptions Keywords:COVID‐19,employment,economicdevelopment,environmentalsustainability,social cohesioneducation,health,monetarypolicy,sovereignlong‐terminterestrates,conditionalities, taxation,stockmarket JELClassification:I00,J20,H63,H74,O38,O40,O43,O44,E62,E43,Q58,F18,F23,O52R30,I25,F30, G15,H25,H87 GratefulacknowledgementofcommentsonanearlierversionbyLucSoete,TomvanVeenandKozhan Wahid.
COVID‐19economicimpactandoptions 1.Intro:devastationandre‐emergence...................................................................................................4 2.COVID‐19impact:health,education,employment,incomeanddebt................................................6 2.1.TheCOVID‐19supplyshock:realandfinancial..............................................................................6 2.2Income......................................................................................................................................8 2.3.Employment...................................................................................................................................9 2.3Healthandeducation....................................................................................................................10 2.4Incomedistributionandpoverty..................................................................................................11 2.5Privateandpublicdebt.................................................................................................................13 2.6Monetarypolicy............................................................................................................................14 3.COVID‐19impact:international:tradeandcapitalflows,andinequalitybetweennations..................16 3.1Inequalitybetweennations..........................................................................................................16 3.2Debtinternational.........................................................................................................................16 3.3Trade.............................................................................................................................................16 3.4Naturalresources..........................................................................................................................17 3.5.Thestockmarket..........................................................................................................................17 4.Options2021andbeyond:realigningresilienceinnationaleconomieswithsustainability.............19 5.Options:internationalcooperation....................................................................................................23 6Conclusions.........................................................................................................................................25 References:.........................................................................................................................................28
COVID‐19economicimpactandoptions 1. Intro:devastationandre‐emergence Wemayrisefromthebunkersofthepartial,intelligentorfulllockdownafterthewavesofCOVID‐19 bombardmentsandseeaworldwithwoundsandscars.Physicallythetreesarethere,thebuildingsare standing,theroadsstillpaved,butthesoulofoursocialandeconomiccontactshasbeenseverely affected.PrettymuchthewholeworldwasstuckwithCOVID‐19.Hencethispaperextendstoricherand poorercountriesalike. Childrenhavelearnedless,anxietyandstresshaveincreasedwithfewerchancesforcoping.Many youngstershavehadadreadfultimeandquiteafewarelikelytobescarredperhapsevenforlifedueto theCOVID‐19bombardment.Theextra‐mortalityinparticularamongtheelderlyandthesickhasfar exceededthatofpreviousflu‐epidemics.Hospitalsarerelievedtoseethatthetimeofanoverflowof their(IC)facilitiesisover,butasawholetheyareexhaustedfromtheonslaughtoftheepidemic. TheCOVID‐19epidemicisahealthcrisis.Governmentssoughttocontainthebeastbylimitingsocial contact,to“lock‐downs”.Intheprocesstheeconomysuffered:customerscouldnolongerbuyasthey wishedandproductscouldnotbetransportedasneeded.Thishasmadethe“GreatLockdown”the biggesteconomicshocksincetheGreatDepression.TheIMFestimateisthatsomewhatlessthana whopping20%(12TrillionUSDollars)willbelostintheglobaleconomyover2020‐21. Economicallythe“GreatLockdown”causedinthefirstinstancea“supplyshock”,ascostumerssimply couldnotaccessthesupplyofservices(transport/mobility,entertainment,restaurantsandbars, culture,tourism)orwhenthefinalsupplyofgoodswasdelayedbecauseofrestrictionsontransportof constituentpartsoffinalproducts.Governmentsintervenedandarestillinterveningmassivelyto precludethebacklashofthesupplyshockonconsumerandfirmdemand. Whenfirmsgobrokeasaresultofasupplyshockandtheirworkends,workerswillhavelessincometo spendintheeconomyandthesupplyshockmayresultinadecreaseindemand,sendingtheeconomy intoadownwardspiral. Asineverycrisistheburdenofthelosswasbornebythenarrowestshoulders:thelowestpercentilesof income.Thisisthefirstpartofpaper(insection2).Mostofthisisbasedonmacro‐figuresandmicro‐ simulationsoftheimpactofthecrisisonindividuals.Thispartdrawsmostlyonpaperswhichusedata fortheperiodofthefirstwave,February‐May2020)withoccasionalupdatesinthesecondhalfof2020. Theshockwasworldwideyetwithsubstantialdifferencesbetweencountries:theOECDcountriesand Chinasufferedlessthandevelopingcountries.Internationaltradewasaffectedwithadecreaseinthe exportofnaturalresourcesanddecreasingcommodityprices:theoilpricefelltoUS$41abarrel.Capital flowsdecreased.Remittances,thetransfersofmigrantsworkinginrichercountriestotheircountryof originandamajorsourceofrevenueformanydevelopingcountries,decreased.Theconvergence betweenricherandpoorercountriesoftheperiod2000‐2010hadalreadycometoastandstillinthe period2010‐2020butnowchangestoasharpdivergence(section3).Theflowofwell‐educatedpeople frommiddleincomecountriestoOECDcountriesisincreasing,aspeopleseebetteropportunitiesthere.
COVID‐19economicimpactandoptions RemarkablythestockmarketafteraninitialhesitationinMarch/April2020isflourishingasneverbefore indicatingasurprisingoptimismofinvestors:theyreckononhighprofitsinthefutureorona continuationoflowinterestratesdespiteheavyGovernmentborrowing. ByJanuary2021avaccineisaroundthecorner,butitislikelytotakemorethanayearbeforesufficient coverageisachievedtocompletelyliftallsocialrestrictions(includingthesocialdistancing)inthe advancedeconomiesandsomeyears(somesayuntil2025)inemergingeconomiesanddeveloping countries. Wehopeandliketoseesocietiesre‐emergeformtheCOVID‐19crisis,inasimilarwayasaftertheGreat Depression.AtthattimeUSpresidentFranklinDRooseveltstatedthat“heedlessself‐interestis...bad economicsandfreedomfromwantwasoneoffourgoalsshapingpolicy.Ideasthatwerecontroversiala decadeearlier—thateconomieslefttothemselvescanwreakhavoconpeople’slivesandthat governmentscanadvancethepublicgood—becamecommonplace”Inthemeantimemanysmalland mediumscalebusinessesandservicesinsectorswhichwerealreadyatrisk(likeretail)arebroke,adding tothealreadyhighunemploymentasaresultofthelockdownsthatwreakedhavocintourism,air transportandthefoodanddrinksector. Inthisveincountriescanin2021slowlyrestarttheireconomiestorecouplostincomeonapacewhich dependsontheabilityoftheGovernmenttoraisemoneyforthesupportoftheeconomictransition (eitherthroughborrowingorthroughtaxation).OECDcountriesandChinaareinanexcellentpositionto doso,whiledevelopingcountrieshavetorelyontheIMFandtheWorldBankforsupport. Countriesimmediateconcernistocreateincentivesforeconomic,sustainablegrowthandtorecoupthe lossesinhealthandineducation.Thefirstinclinationcouldbetolookforquickwins,eveniftheygo againstlongrunsustainability.Hopefullytheleadershipwillrecognizethatthisisnottherightroute. Therightrouteistoreenergizethehealthsystemwhichsufferedfromthecrisis,tocreateacatchupfor education,toresorttofullemploymentpolicies(withsomehesitationassuchpolicieshavebeen bannedintheperiodofultra‐capitalism)andtospurinnovation.Economicrestructuringwillbe necessaryinthecountrieswhichrelyforalargepartoftheirincomeonoilexports. Governmentswillhavetoreflectonwaystorepaythedebtsincurredforfightingtheeconomicfall‐out ofthecrisis.Therearebuttwooptions:budgetcuttingwhichwouldputthecarbeforetheeconomic horseorhighertaxation.Wearguethatincreasedtaxationofwealthandofthetop10%‐incomeswill actuallybothhelptoreducethebudgetarysqueezeaswellbenefitsocialcohesioninthecountry leadingtomoretrustinGovernment(section4). TheCOVID‐19epidemichasmadeitcrystalclearthatinternationalcooperationinhealthistoppriority: competitionisanegativesumgame.Thesameappliestoeconomicandmonetarypolicy:calculations showthatincreasedcooperationbetweenG20countriescanlifteconomicgrowthovertheshortand longrunbyatleastonethird.Theresumptionoftradeshouldalsobeundertheclearguidancethat cooperationisrewardedinachievingsocialgoalsandrealizingsustainabilityinthefaceoftheclimate crisis(Attenborough,2020).Inthiswaythelevelplayingfieldisrestoredforthosecountriesthatwantto contributetoasustainableworldandtocooperation.Internationaltaxationrulesforprofitsshould
COVID‐19economicimpactandoptions preventtaxhavenstomakethisanegativesumgame.Theywouldgivedevelopingcountriessomeof thenecessarybreathingspacetore‐emergefromtheCOVID‐19crisis(section5) Weareacutelyawarethatpolicyisnotsomechoicedeterminedbyrationalchoicebasedonevidence andonvaluepropositions,butratherchoicebasedonacomplexsystem,inwhichtheprimaryforcesof “culture”dominateeconomicandsociallong‐termreasoning.Thatiswhywebring“socialcohesion”to thetableofthisoverviewasameanstosupportGovernmentbroadlyinitsre‐emergencepolicies. Inthefollowingwedistinguishfor2020betweenthefirststageofthecrisis(early2020‐mid2020)with ratherstringentlockdownmeasuresinmostcountriesandasecondstage(mid2020‐tillJanuary1, 2021),wheremanycountriestrytoopenupasmuchaspossible,butarestillunderseriouslockdown constraints.Thesections4and5considerthepolicy‐optionsofyears2021andbeyond.Thispaper buildsfurtheronanearlyJune2020assessmentoftheimpactoftheCOVID‐19crisisforEurope(Ritzen, 2020).Thelastsectionpresentsourconclusions. 2. COVID‐19impact:health,education,employment,incomeanddebt 2.1.TheCOVID‐19supplyshock:realandfinancial Inthefirststage(early2020)oftheCOVID‐19epidemicthelockdownscausedseriousdisruptionsinthe supplyofgoodsandservices.Consumerscouldn’taccessforexample,airtravel,tourism,barsand restaurants,entertainmentandconsumergoodsinretailshops.Firmscouldnotaccesstotheirsuppliers ofintermediategoods,requiredfortheirownproductioninthe“justintime”modewherestocksof intermediateproductsarekeptassmallaspossible.Thedangerwasthatinasecondstagethissupply disruptionwouldturnintoadecreaseindemand:firmslosebusinessandhavetoshedworkers. Workershavetoacceptlowerwagesoralowerincomewhentheybecomeunemployed.Theyhaveless tospend.Nowthesuppliersarenothurtbythelockdownmeasuresbutbylowerdemand.Beforeyou knowitweareina“supply‐demanddoomloop”,adownwardspiral(Fornaro,2020). Thisisthebasiceconomicthinkingbehindtheimpactofthe“GreatLockdown”ontheeconomy,asfor examplecapturedintheanalysesofthetwomajorinternationalorganizations(WorldBankandIMF) (Utz,2020)(ErikssonvonAllmen,2020).Themacro‐financialchannelsandspilloversthatcouldamplify thenegativeeconomicandfinancialimpactoftheCOVID‐19‐19outbreakaredepictedinFigure1.In yellowisthethreatofthe“doomloop”orinthejargon:“theamplificationthroughstructuralmacro‐ financiallinkages”. Buttherearetwoothermajorlinkswiththerealeconomyofdemandandsupplyofgoodsandservices. Theseareofthemonetarytype,namelytheimpactoncreditandthroughfinancialmarkets.Itislikely
COVID‐19economicimpactandoptions 2.5Privateandpublicdebt TheinterventionsofGovernmentswithincomesupportandfinancialsupportforfirmshassoftenedthe economicblowofCOVID‐19lockdownsonemploymentandincome.YettheyhavebroughtGovernment financeinadifficultposition.BeforetheCOVID‐19crisisthelevelsofpublicandprivatedebtwere alreadyhistoricallyveryhigh.Butthecrisiswillcertainlybringthemtothehighestlevelseverasshown inFigure3. Figure3DebttoGDPratio’s1880‐2020 TheIMFcalculatesthatprivatedebt(nonfinancial)amountedbeforetheCOVID‐19crisistoUS$152 trillion,or225percentofworldGDP,whilepublicdebthadincreasedby15percentagepointsofGDP between2000and2015(Okamoto,2020).Mediandebtin2021isnowprojectedtobeupbyabout17
COVID‐19economicimpactandoptions percentofGDPinadvancedeconomies;12percentinemergingeconomies;and8percentinlow‐ incomecountries.USdebthasreachedaheightofUS$27trillion(withaGDPof25trillion).Thatisan alarmingrise.Withfewerresourcesandlesscapacity,low‐Incomecountriesareparticularlyvulnerable: abouthalfofthemwerealreadyin,orathighriskof,debtdistresspriortothecrisisonslaught. Thereissubstantialdiscussiononthelevelofdebtthatcountriescanincuriftheirlevelofeconomic growthishigherthatthelevelofinterestforthatcountry(deVette,2020).Ifexpectedeconomicgrowth ishigherthantheinterestrate,thenborrowingmoneyislike"afreelunch":itcaneasilyberepaid.Itis onthisnotionthatquiteaviewOECDcountrieshaddecidedbeforetheonslaughtoftheCOVID‐19crisis toborrowsubstantialfundsfornationalinvestmentfunds.Thenotionisthattherateofreturntothese investmentsislikelytobehigherthantheinterestrateforborrowings. Nowthepressingquestionishowinternationalinterestratesaregoingtodevelopinviewofthe tremendousincreasesinborrowing.Thebasicnotionisthatifthedemandformoneyincreases,then thepriceformoney(theinterestrate)wouldgoup.Thiswouldinvitethepartieswhoprovidemoneyto savemoreandofferitforpublicandprivatedebt.Inotherwords:theinterestrateislikelytogoup throughincreasedGovernmentborrowing.Yet,oneshouldrealizethattheOECDeconomiesare characterizedby"secularstagnation"(Summers,2019)whichhaveledtodecreasinginterestrates. However,theCOVID‐19crisishasintensifiedthisstagnation(drivingdowninterestrates)(Goy,2020). ThejuryisstilloutontheneteffectsofincreasedGovernmentdebtontheinterestrate.Theprevious peak(seeFigure3indebttoGDP‐ratio’swasjustaftertheSecondWorldWar.Interestrateswerethen ataverylowrate.However,interestrateswereatanall‐timehighatthetimeofthehighdebttoGDP ratio’saftertheGreatDepression. 2.6Monetarypolicy TheUSandtheEUtheCentralBankshave–sincetheLehmanBrotherscrisisof2008‐engagedinbuying upsubstantialamountsofprivateandpublicdebtasameanstokeeptheeconomiesfromfallinginto thedeflationtrapwithdemandsupplyloopdepictedearlier.Theearlierfearsforinflationandariseof interestrateswerebeliedaspredictedbySchooloftheModernTheorist(Kelton,2020).Debtmaynot bemuchofaproblemifitisincurredfor“investmentsintheeconomy”astheoldKeynesianthinking wouldhaveit.Evendebt,financedthroughmoneycreationdoesnothavetobeaproblemasthehuge amountsofmoneycreatedto“buyupprivateandpublicdebt”afterthefinancialcrisisshowed.The earlyexperiencewithdebtbuy‐upprogramsinJapaninthe1990’sshowedthatbuy‐upprograms indeedcanthwartdeflationarypressures. AlsowiththeadventoftheCOVID‐19crisistheCentralBanksoftheUSandEuropehavesteppedin.This wasinEuropedebatedasapossible“HamiltonianMoment”.ThereferenceofcourseistoAmerica’s firstTreasurySecretary,AlexanderHamilton,whoconsolidatedthewardebtofthethirteencolonies withtheissuanceofcommondebt.GermanFinanceMinisterOlafScholzdescribedthe€750billion reconstructionpackage(of2020)withahistoricalreferencetotheformerAmericanTreasurysecretary.
COVID‐19economicimpactandoptions IntheUSthe“monetizationofUSdebt”orthe“quantitativeeasingofdebt”(meaningtheissuanceof newmoneyfordebt1)hashadalongerhistory.Duringthefinancialcrisisthe“Fed”(USCentralBank) startedtobuyupprivateandpublicdebt(Amadeo,2020).Bythestartof2015theFedendedupwith roughlyUS$4.5trilliononitsbalancesheet.InMarch2020theFedannouncedthatitwillbuyupsome US$1.25trillionofdebt.TheEuropeanCentralBankhasrampedupitspandemictrillionEurosinJune 2020.bond‐buyingtoEuro1.35trillionalsoinadditiontoearlierbuy‐upprogramsfromtheeraofthe financialcrisis. Thebuyupprogramsprovideconfidencetofinancialmarketsthattheirmoneyusedtofunddebtare safe,sothatinterestratescanbelow.ThiswasinparticularimportantinEuropeforItalyandSpain.In debeginningoftheCOVID‐19theirGovernmentinterestratewentup.WhentheECBmadeitclearwith thebuy‐upprogramthattheseborrowingsaresecure,theinterestratescamedownagain. Foreconomiststhiswasuncharteredterritory.Indeed,interestwentdownatfirstinstance,butatthe sametimethemoneysupplywentup,potentiallygivingrisetoinflationandinturnhigherinterest rates,withthepossibilityofaninterest‐pricespiral.Fortunatelythisdidnotoccurduringthebuyup programsduringthefinancialcrisisas–istheexplanation‐“secularstagnation”:theriseofsavings resultingfromtheageingofthepopulation(Summers,2019). OnceagaintheuncharteredterritoryisthatthecombinationoftheriseinGovernment(andprivate debt)togetherwiththehugesizeof“monetizing”debtisnotacertainrecipeforanincreaseininterest ratesworld‐wide.Tobesure:financialmarkets(andtheanalystswhichadviseinvestors)donotbelieve thatthisisthecaseandstillcountthatstocksgiveabetterreturnthaninvestmentsincountrydebt (section2.6). Monetizingdebtisreservedforcountrieswithastrongfinancialstandingandasufficientlylargesize. Thislimitsmonetizationasapolicyoptionformostcountriesintheworld.Notethatmonetarypolicyin mostcountriesisnotpartofGovernmentpolicy,butisindependent. CentralBankshavebecomeawarethatmonetarypolicydoesnotonlyaffectpricestabilityand economicgrowth,butalsothedistributionofincome(Jakob,2020).Sinceincomedistributionstandsso centrallyinrelationtosocialcohesion,whichinturnhasapositiveeffectongrowth,wemayexpect fromCentralBankstotakeincomedistributionmoreintoaccount. 2.7 Innovation TheCOVID‐19globallockdowntriggeredanunprecedentedexperiment.Millionsofprofessionalshadto dofromhomewhattheyusedtodoinofficesusingZOOM,Teamsoranyofthemanyothermeansfor teleconferencing.Teacherstaughtonline.Inoneschool‐districtintheNetherland80%oftheteachers becameabletoworkwithICTforteaching(upfromsome10‐15%).Teleworkingwaspromotedtoviable long‐termsolutionfromtemporaryfixorprecariousfreelancerarrangement(Adriano,2020). 1TheCentralBanksbuyGovernmentor–inEurope‐privatedebt.Theydonothavetoprintmoney,butgivecredit totheCommercialBanksortheGovernments,reducingthedebtpositionoftheseparties,andallowingthemin thisway
COVID‐19economicimpactandoptions Teleworkingwillstaywithuslongafterthecrisis,reducingthecostsofmobilitytofirmsandtothe public(forGovernmentservices).Herethesubstantialdifferencesbetweenricherandpoorercountries playalsoout.Inpoorercountriesthemeansforusingtelecommunicationforschoolsorforworkwere onlyavailableonalimitedscale.InternationalLabourOrganizationresearchersestimatethatlessthan oneinfiveworkersworldwideareinoccupationsandliveincountrieswiththeinfrastructureneededfor effectiveworkingfromhome.Thataveragedisguiseswidedisparities.InNorthAmericaandWestern Europe,theproportionis1in3;insub‐SaharanAfricaitis1in17. 3.COVID‐19impact:international:tradeandcapitalflows,and inequalitybetweennations 3.1Inequalitybetweennations Thepoorestcountries–withlimitedresourcesandconstrainedcapacity–arehithardest:growthin low‐incomenationswillbeatastandstillthisyear,comparedwith5%lastyear. Withoutnecessaryaction,thisgroupofabout70countries,representingmorethan1billionpeople, facesunprecedentedhumanandeconomicdevastation.Thedecades‐longdecliningtrendinglobal povertyisbeingpushedintoreverse,withasmanyas90millionadditionalpeoplefallingintoextreme poverty,mostlyinsub‐SaharanAfricaandsouthAsia. Justthismonth,theUNwarnedoffamine.Thereisalsothefearthatthepandemicwillsetbackhealth progressfordecadesaswellasreverseprogressonothercrucialfrontssuchasgenderequality. 3.2Debtinternational Justaspeoplewithweakimmunesystemsaremorevulnerabletothevirus,solow‐incomecountries withweakfundamentalsaremorepronetoitseconomiceffects.Morethanhalfofthesecountrieswere alreadyathighriskof–oractuallyin–debtdistressbeforethecrisisbegan. Thepandemichasexacerbatedthiswithapoisonouscocktailofexternalshocks:sharplyfallingexports andcommodityprices(see:section3.4),collapsingtrade,evaporatingtourismandlesscapitalinflows. Remittances,whicharethemainsourceofincomeformanypoorfamilies,havebeenhithard–by almost20%incountriessuchasBangladesh(IMF,2020). Therehavebeensignificantdevelopmentsinsovereigndebtrestructuringinvolvingprivate‐sector creditorssincetheIMF’slaststocktakingin2014.Whilethecurrentcontractualapproachhasbeen largelyeffectiveinresolvingsovereigndebtcasessince2014,ithasgapsthatcouldposechallengesin futurerestructurings.AstheCOVID‐19‐19pandemichaltedbusinessactivityaroundtheworld,theIMF fieldedemergencyloanrequestsfrommorethanhalfofits189members,themostinitshistory. 3.3Trade Tradehasbeenaffectedinthefirstperiod(March‐June,2020)asairtransporthalted.Moreover countriesclosedtheirbordersfortheexportofmedicalessentials.Globalvaluechains(GVC)were disrupted,leadingtotheconclusionthatfirmscouldnolongerrelyon“justintime”deliveryof
COVID‐19economicimpactandoptions intermediateproducts,butneededtocreatemorebuffers.Agarwaletal.haveanalyzedtheimpactof previoushealthshocks(SARSandMERS)on“globalvaluechain”basedproducts.Theyfindnoevidence for“reshoring”inresponsetoeachofthesevirusoutbreaks.Theiranalysisalsosuggeststhatimport sharesfromChinaandUAEdeclinedduringeachoutbreak,concludingthatCOVID‐19mightleadto diversificationawayfromChina”(Agarwal). 3.4Naturalresources Commoditypriceshavereactedstronglytothecrisis,reflectingchangesinsupplyanddemanddueto policymeasurestolimitcontagion.Commodity‐dependentdevelopingcountriesaretherefore confrontedwithanunprecedentedcombinationofshocks.Thecrisishasbroughttotheforetheneed forlessdependencyoncommodityexportsandmechanismstostabilizecommoditypricesaswellas strategiesforeconomicdiversification(Tröster,2020).Whilemetalandagriculturalcommoditieshave recoupedtheirlossesfromtheCOVID‐19pandemicandareexpectedtomakemodestgainsin2021, energyprices,despitesomerecovery,areexpectedtostabilizebelowpre‐pandemiclevelsin2021 (WorldBank,2020). OilpricesareexpectedtoaverageUS$44perbarrelin2021(upfromUS$41perbarrelin2020.Demand isexpectedtoriseonlyslowlyastourismandtravelcontinuetobeheldbackbyhealthconcernsandas globaleconomicactivityisanticipatedtoreturntopre‐pandemiclevelsonlyin2022or2023.Thehigh pricelevelsof2011‐2014ofaroundUS$120abarrelarenotgoingtoreturninthisdecade.Thisputsa tremendousstrainoncountriesthatdependonoilformorethan50%oftheirGDPtoquicklyrestructure theireconomiesawayfromoildependency. Agriculturepricesareexpectedtoriseslightlyin2021,followinganestimated3%increasein2020 followingsomeshortfallinedibleoilproduction.Concernsaboutfoodinsecurityremainrelevantin severalemergingmarketanddevelopingeconomies.Theseconcernsarepromptedbyhitstoincomes fromtheglobalrecession,bottlenecksinfoodavailabilityatthelocallevel,andborderrestrictionsthat haveconstrainedlaborsupply.Foodpriceinflationhasspikedinseveralcountries(WorldBank,2020). 3.5.Thestockmarket TheCOVID‐19crisishasoftenbeencomparedtotheGreatDepression.Inatleastoneelementthereisa remarkabledifference:thestockmarket.Figure4showsthedifferencebetweenthedevelopment betweenDecember1927andAugust1929withtheCOVID‐19periodDecember2019throughAugust
COVID‐19economicimpactandoptions 2020,whileFigure5givesamoredetailedpictureforthreedifferentstock‐markets. Figure4Stockmarketprices1929and2020
COVID‐19economicimpactandoptions Figure5Stock‐marketpricesFebruary‐July2020 Ofcoursenotallstockshavefollowedthesameupwardtrend.WeiandZhangdistinguishbetweenstay‐ at‐homestocks(SAHstocks)andthego‐outsidesstocks(GOstocks).Inparticular,theSAHstocksmainly containthestocksinthecategoriesofColdChainLogistics,Beer,Dairy,Webcast,CloudOffice,Cloud Games,andOnlineEducationandtheGOstocksconsistofthestocksinthecategoriesofSports,Ride‐ hailing,andTravel(Wei,2020).TheSAHpriceshaverisenmorethantheGOpricesdeclined,withan overallupwardeffect. Bakeretal.explaintheunprecedentedstockmarketreactiontotheCOVID‐19pandemicbythe alertnessandinterferenceofGovernment(Baker,2020).Thebottomlineisthatthestockmarket– whichexpressesthebeliefsofinvestors‐,reflectsahighlypositivedevelopmentoffutureprofits. 4. Options2021andbeyond:realigningresilienceinnational economieswithsustainability World‐wideCOVID‐19haschangedourviewsoftheroleofpublicpolicyinoursocieties.Inthisrespect itiscomparabletoearliercrisesliketheDepressionandtheSecondWorldWar(Carlin,2020).Thepublic hasrealizedthatitispublicpolicywhichisneededtofirsttominimizetheimpactofthecrisisonthe shortrunaswelltoprevent“scarring”–long‐termlossofhumanandeconomiccapacityasaresultof
COVID‐19economicimpactandoptions thelockdowns.Itisalsopublicpolicywhichwillcontributetothere‐emergenceofvibranteconomies. “Marketswilldothejob”,usedtobetheimperativeinmostoftheworldbeforethecrisis.Howevernow werealizethatmarketscanonlyfunctionwhenGovernmentprovidestherightsideconditions,in fundingandininstitutions. Now,attheendof2020,wespeakaftermostGovernmentshavedonetheirutmosttosupportthe medicalsectordealingwithCOVID19‐patients,topreventcontagionthroughlockdownsandtesting,but alsotobreaktheeconomicdoomloop.MostGovernments,butnotall,havedone"whateverittakes" (Krugman,2020). Butthecrisisisnotover.Intheadvancedeconomiestheyears2021‐2022willstillbeneededtoachieve asufficientcoverageofvaccinationtoliftlockdownscompletely,whileduringthoseyearspartial lockdownswillbeessentialtocopewiththepressureonthemedicalsystem.Indevelopingcountries thereisarealfearthattheanti‐COVID‐19vaccinewillnotbeavailableinsufficientcoverageforthenext threetofouryears.Partiallockdownswiththeirnegativeimpactontheeconomymightstillbe necessary. Sowhatarethepolicyoptionsfortheyearstocome? Vaccinationisnotanoptionbutanimperative.Countrieswhichcanaffordtobuythevaccinewillsoon findthattheywillopenupforallthosewhoarevaccinated.Itwouldnotbesurprisingifbytheendof 2021forexampleairtravelortheuseofpublictransportoraccesstolargecrowdsisreservedforthose whoarevaccinated,evenifatpresentanysuchdiscussionmightleadtoadifferentconclusion. TheoptionsarearoundprioritiestobesetbyGovernmentstoensurethatthelongruneffectsofthe crisisaremitigatedandeconomiesre‐emergefromthedarkCOVID‐19days.Figure3presentsalistof theoptionsusedinthefirstyearoftheCOVID‐19crisis.Theseoptionsarestillrelevantfortheperiod whenvaccinationhasnotyetreceivedfullcoverage:Governmentsneedtosecureaccessto opportunities–education,jobs,financingtostartbusinesses–forthegenerationofyoungpeopleupon whomthefutureofthesecountriesdepends,atatimewhenunemploymenthasrisenandmanyfirms arebroke.Thisallmeans:additionalresourcesfortheStatewhilefiscalrevenueisdeclining. Sustainability WhiletheCOVID‐19crisisraged,worldtemperaturesstillwentup.Thiswasasignalthattheclimate crisiswhichmakestheworldunfitforhabitationandnutritionforits11billionpeopleby2100 (Attenborough,2020)iscreepingfasteraheadthanimagined,evenwhileCO2emissionswerereduced asaresultoftheCOVID‐19crisis.AnyGovernmentpolicyshouldbeimbeddedintheParisAgreements. Health Thejuryisstilloutonthebeststrategyforvaccinations.Whichgroupsshouldbeprioritized?Froma publichealthperspectivethephysicallyweakerandtheolderarethefirsttargetedgroup.Thisislikely tobemosteffectiveinreducingthe“over‐morbidity”(additionalnumberofdeathsduetoCOVID‐19, comparedthepreviousyears).Healthworkersneedtohaveahighpriorityastheycarrygreatrisksin dealingwithCOVID‐19infectedpatients.
COVID‐19economicimpactandoptions YetAngusDeatonandAnneCase(2020)pointtothe“deathbydespair”:peoplewhocomedesperate, becausetheyhavenomeanstosustainthemselves:thetremendousmentalhealthimpactofpoverty andunemployment.Doesn’tthisimplyapriorityforvaccinationsforgroupsatriskinthepopulation? Andwhataboutthoseineducation,inparticularinhighschoolanduniversity,bothstudentsandstaff? Weowetheyoungsterstoreturnasquicklyaspossibletoanormallife,whichimpliesthatalsothe (older)staffshouldhaveahighpriorityinthevaccinationcampaign Education Educationisaspecialpoint.Thecrisishasdelayedtheadvancementinintellectualandpersonal developmentofyoungsters(section2.3).Asubstantial“catch‐up”exercisewillbeneededto compensateforthat.Therateofreturnofthecostsofsuchanexerciseislikelytobesubstantial,as higherperformancemeansingeneralhighereconomicgrowth(Hanushek,2016). Investmentininnovation BeforetheCOVID‐19crisissomeGovernmentsintheadvancedeconomieshadalreadysetoutplansfor substantialnewinvestmentpropositions,basedonnewlyemergingtechnologies(likeICT).Morein generalcountriesmustlooktotransformtheireconomiesforaverydifferenttomorrow–includingby incentivizingthetransitiontoaclimateresilientandlow‐carboneconomy,andbybuildingdigitalskills andinfrastructure.Forexample,expandinginternetaccessinsub‐SaharanAfricaby10%couldincrease realpercapitaGDPgrowthbyuptoanestimatedfourpercentagepoints. Inothercountries,likethecountriesintheGulfregionmajorstructuraltransformationsofthe economiesawayfromoildependencywerealreadyontheway,likeVision2030inSaudiArabia. Oilexportingcountrieswillhavetorealizethattheoilpriceislikelytoremaindepressedforanextended periodoftime.TheWorldBank(AyhanKose)states:“Inthepost‐COVIDworld,thesecountriesneedto bemoreaggressiveinimplementingpoliciestoreducetheirrelianceonoilrevenues.”(WorldBank, 2020).Thegeneraltendencyawayfromfossilfuel–asameanstosavetheplanet‐willalsocontributeto depressedoilprices. Itappearsurgenttoensurethatearlierstructuraltransformationplansneedtoberampedupasa meanstore‐emergeoutoftheCOVID‐19crisis.Structuraltransformationisamatterofinvestment,but alsoofthe“right”institutionalarrangementstomaketheseinvestmentsprofitable.Timeandagainitis shownthatthatinstitutionsmatter(Kozhan,2020).
COVID‐19economicimpactandoptions Figure6Policyoptionstoaddresseconomicimplications Taxes Governmentwillhavetoexertthemselvestomanagethedebtincurredduringthecrisiswithnewfiscal measures.Taxesonwealthandonthetopincomesofcountrieshavetobemobilizedinordertoensure sufficientresourcesontheonehandwiththeleasteffectontheeconomy.Intheprocessincome inequalitymightbereducedwhichhelpsthenecessarysocialcohesionintheprocessofrestructuring andcontributestofutureeconomicgrowth(Easterly,2006)Anaggressivemovetowardshighertaxesis urgentlyneededtoavoidanausteritydriveinmuchoftheworldinordertorepaythedebt(andthe interestincurredonit).Anausteritydrivewouldharmthesocialinfrastructure,government effectivenessandinparticularhealthandeducation. Socialcohesionandpolarization The“license”ofGovernmenttoactissurelyrelatedto“socialcohesion”.Thisisanebulousnotion indicatingthetrustinGovernmentasactingtosupportthefutureofindividualsinsocietywhatever theiridentityis.LimitedsocialcohesiontranslatesinlimitedtrustinGovernmentandpolitical polarization.InturnitlimitsGovernmenttoactdecisivelyinthecrisis.AnexampleistheUSwheredue topolarizationnoagreementcouldbereachedin2020onapackageoffinancialsupportmeasures breakingthedoom‐loop.InturnthisislikelytolowerUSgrowthintheyearstocome.
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